New England Journal of Political Science
Abstract
This article examines how early decisions regarding the financial model supporting Social Security—a dedicated payroll tax and a fully-funded reserve account—shaped the understanding of revenue flows and, ultimately, the debt. Although the original model was discarded, the residual features of the model had unintended consequences. The segregation of payroll taxes from the general fund and the distinction between the debt held by the public and the intragovernmental debt accentuated concerns over an imminent fiscal crisis and created pressure for austerity in discretionary spending. The projections of trust fund insolvency, in turn, framed a larger narrative about the entitlement crisis. To what extent is the concern over crisis an artifact of a policy architecture that was abandoned long ago?
Recommended Citation
Eisner, Marc A.
(2023)
"Fiscal Crisis as Political Artifact: The Problem of Misplaced Trust,"
New England Journal of Political Science: Vol. 13:
No.
1, Article 4.
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/nejps/vol13/iss1/4