"Averse … to Remaining Idle Spectators:" the Emergence of Loyalist Privateering During the American Revolution, 1775-1778 Volume I. Introduction to Chapter 8

Richard D. Pougher

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"AVERSE...TO REMAINING IDLE SPECTATORS:" THE EMERGENCE OF LOYALIST PRIVATEERING DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1775-1778

VOLUME I. INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER 8

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A THESIS
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (in History)

The Graduate School
The University of Maine
May, 2002

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"AVERSE...TO REMAINING IDLE SPECTATORS:" THE EMERGENCE OF
LOYALIST PRIVATEERING DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION,
1775-1778

By Richard D. Pougher

Thesis Advisor: Dr. Jerome Nadelhaft

An Abstract of the Thesis Presented
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The important topic of loyalist privateering during the American Revolution has remained unaddressed. The intention of this study is to examine the activity's developmental period between 1775-1778. Relying predominantly on primary source materials such as newspapers, admiralty court records, ships' papers, correspondence, memorials, diaries, journals, and minute, account, and log books, this work analyzes the participants and assesses their role in the war.

There are three key focuses. The first is on the activities of loyalist mariners during the war's first half, prior to official recognition of privateering by the British. Loyalist service on various types of vessels is examined to view the growth of maritime involvement, analyze crews and vessels, and ascertain levels of success. Also discussed are the obstacles imposed by the British which loyalist privateers were forced to overcome to gain acceptance. To explain the developing situation within the scope of the North Atlantic world, related events in East Florida, Nova Scotia, Bermuda, and the West Indies are also examined. Ultimately, the study shows that privateering
was strongly supported loyalists, and their activities at sea during the early part of the conflict resulted in significant contributions to the British war effort.

The second focus is on the development of the participants, themselves, as loyalists and privateers. Individuals from different maritime regions are identified and profiled according to social, economic, occupational, ethnic, and racial backgrounds, experiences, and motivating factors. The regional groups are then compared to discern similarities and differences. The third key theme is closely associated. Considerable attention is paid to the situation and activities of one family, the Goodriches, who became leaders in the privateering enterprise. Interrelated is the issue of how British trade restrictions negatively affected loyalists, prompting them to become privateers. The work shows that loyalist Americans involved in privateering, though dominated by the merchant/mariner classes, reflected a cross-section of the populace, were generally motivated by legitimate, honorable factors, and constituted a previously unrecognized, significant, highly unified sub-community within the loyalist community.
DEDICATION

For Gayle and India who were marooned on Dissertation Island for too long.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.............................................................................................................. iv
LIST OF FIGURES......................................................................................................................... x
LIST OF SOURCE ABBREVIATIONS USED IN NOTES.............................................................. xii

Volume I
INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................... 1
Chapter
1. PRIVATEERING: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT................................................................. 39
2. "INFLUENCED BY MOTIVES OF LOYALTY, ZEALOUS FOR THE GOOD OF
   HIS MAJESTY'S SERVICE, AND ACTUATED BY THE ELDEST LAW OF
   NATURE, WE APPREHEND OURSELVES FULLY JUSTIFIED BY THE LAWS
   OF GOD AND MAN:" AN OVERVIEW OF LOYALIST BACKGROUNDS AND
   MOTIVATIONS......................................................................................................................... 51
3. "GENTLEMEN WELL DISPOSED TO HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT:" THE
   LOYALIST PRIVATEERS OF THE CHESAPEAKE BAY REGION......................... 97
4. "A SPIRITED, ACTIVE, INDUSTRIOUS FAMILY:" THE
   GOODRICHES OF VIRGINIA............................................................................................ 121
5. "THE LITTLE TENDERS HAVE HAD GREAT SUCCESS:" LOYALIST
   OPERATIONS IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY REGION, 1776.............................. 216
6. "ZEALOUS TO BECOME USEFUL:" THE LOYALIST PRIVATEERS OF THE
   NEW ENGLAND MARITIME REGIONS................................................................. 255
7. "IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE UNHAPPY DISSENSIONS:" THE LOYALIST PRIVATEERS OF THE DELAWARE BAY AND NEW JERSEY MARITIME REGION..........................................................289


Volume II

9. "COOL, PRUDENT MEN" POSSESSING "THE LIBERTY OF THINKING AND ACTING FOR THEMSELVES:" THE LOYALIST PRIVATEERS OF NEW YORK..........................................................344

10. "FOR THE SAFETY AND DEFENCE AND SECURITY OF THE COAST:" OPERATIONS IN EAST FLORIDA AND NOVA SCOTIA, 1775-1777........376

11. "OBLIGED TO EXERT THEIR UTMOST ENDEAVOURS TO SUPPRESS SUCH REBELLION:" THE ISLANDS, 1776-1777.........................411

12. "I APPREHEND...THE OPPORTUNITY WILL BE LOST:" NEW YORK, JANUARY, 1777, TO AUGUST, 1778.........................462

13. "I MEAN TO GO TO BERMUDA, BUILD ME A VESSEL, AND COME AND SEE YOU:" OPERATIONS, JANUARY TO OCTOBER, 1778............498

14. "THE HEROICK SPIRIT OF THE...BRITISH TAR:" NEW YORK AND OPERATIONS, SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1778................591

CONCLUSION. "THE SUCCESS THAT HAS ACCOMPANIED THEIR ZEAL BEARS TESTIMONY THAT I WAS NOT ERRONEOUS IN MY SUGGESTIONS OF THE IMPORTANT UTILITY OF THAT DEPREDATORY COMMERCE"..................632

BIBLIOGRAPHY.....................................................644

APPENDICES

Appendix A. Vessel Types As Defined by Rig and Hull............663

Appendix B. Ordnance and Small Arms Carried Aboard Privateers..............................................674

BIOGRAPHY OF THE AUTHOR........................................682
# LIST OF FIGURES

**Volume I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>North America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Chesapeake Bay Maritime Region</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The Upper New England Maritime Region</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The Lower New England Maritime Region</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The Delaware Bay and New Jersey Maritime Region</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The Southern Maritime Region. The North Carolina Coastline</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The Southern Maritime Region. The Carolinas and Georgia</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Volume II**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>The East Florida Theater of Operations</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The Nova Scotia Theater of Operations</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>The West Indies</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>The New York Privateering District</td>
<td>609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Sloop, Circa 1741, Defined By Rig.</td>
<td>664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Schooner, Circa 1780s, Defined By Rig.</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Brig, Circa 1777, Defined By Rig.</td>
<td>666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Snow, Circa 1768, Defined By Rig.</td>
<td>667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Ship, Circa 1773, Defined By Rig.</td>
<td>668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Pink, Circa 1768, and Bermuda Sloop, Circa 1768, Defined By Hull</td>
<td>669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>&quot;Marble Head&quot; Schooner, Circa 1767, and Privateer Schooner Circa 1768, Defined By Hull</td>
<td>670</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 19. Bark, Circa 1768, Defined By Hull and Rigged as a Brig, and Sloop, Circa 1768, Defined By Hull.............671

Figure 20. Bark, Circa 1768, Defined by Hull and Rigged as a Snow, and Privateer, Circa 1768, to be Rigged as a Snow........................................672

Figure 21. West Indiaman, Circa 1768, Defined by Hull and Rigged as a Ship, and Frigate-Built Privateer, Circa 1768, Defined by Hull...............................673

Figure 22. Ship's Carriage Gun..................................................675

Figure 23. Swivel Gun.............................................................676

Figure 24. Swivel Howitzers.....................................................677

Figure 25. Cohorn Mortar.........................................................678

Figure 26. Sea Service Muskets and Sea Service Pistols..................679

Figure 27. Ship's Musketoons....................................................680

Figure 28. Boarding Cutlasses and Boarding Axe............................681
LIST OF SOURCE ABBREVIATIONS USED IN NOTES

NDAR....................Naval Documents of the American Revolution
CW..................John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Library, Colonial Williamsburg
NC...............................State Archives of North Carolina
PRO...............................Public Record Office (Great Britain)
Adm........................................Admiralty
AO........................................Audit Office
CO........................................Colonial Office
HCA.................................High Court of Admiralty
T........................................Treasury Office
VMHB.........................Virginia Magazine of History and Biography
INTRODUCTION

Historians have generated a fair amount of literature concerning the loyalists of the American Revolution. Much has also been written about the numerous naval and maritime aspects of the war. Yet, a key element of both the loyalist community and the conflict at sea has been ignored: the loyalist privateersmen. If one finds a reference to these individuals in the secondary literature, it is usually only a passing acknowledgment of their existence. Rare indeed are accounts offering much substance, and when encountered, they are usually brief, relative asides in a broader study where the real emphasis lies elsewhere. As long ago as 1942, no less a historian than Robert Greenhalgh Albion remarked on the lack of a study on these people. In 1948, Thomas Jefferson Wertenbaker called loyalist privateering "the most important activity of New York," but he devoted less than three pages to the topic. In the lengthy interim since then, no one has seen fit to pursue the matter. Several factors may account for this lack of attention. As an unaddressed topic, historians may simply have failed to recognize the significance of loyalist privateering. Various biases may have played a part. Traditionally, land campaigns have been viewed as more important than those conducted at sea. Also, a bias against loyalists in general, often perceived as the enemy, may account, in part for the neglect. Bias against naval and military studies, which has prevailed in the historical community until recently, may also have precluded tackling such a study. Simple research logistical problems were undoubtedly a factor for anyone who may have attempted work on this topic. Pertinent material is widely scattered in numerous ar-
chives around the North Atlantic rim. Finally, the state of loyalist literature has only just progressed enough to establish a data base of information and ideas to allow researchers to advance and investigate more specific topics in depth. The Provincial Corps and the loyalist militia system also await detailed examinations. Given this lack of historical treatment, it is of primary importance to ascertain not only just what these individuals accomplished, but simply who they were.

The loyalist privateering enterprise was ultimately popular, widespread, and conducted on a large scale. The story of this activity can be divided neatly into two consecutive periods. The first, the developmental stage, lasted until October, 1778, when the British government finally granted authorization to loyalists for general privateering operations. With acceptance, the second period began, entailing extensive unrestricted activity and continuing until the end of the war. A key historical objective found in secondary loyalist literature involves ascertaining the various roles of loyalists in the British war effort and assessing their significance. Although the first era did not witness privateering on the same level as the second, loyalist activity at sea during the earlier phase was still significant, and examining the evolutionary phase is key to our understanding the whole story. Only by doing this can we become aware of why the participants opted for this means of involving themselves in the conflict, and why the British, who were initially opposed to the activity, ultimately decided to recognize it and rely on it as a major part of their war effort. More importantly, during this time, loyalist mariners, though acting in a limited capacity under major restraints, nevertheless, continued to push for and develop privateering, significantly aiding the British war effort as they did so. These mariners not only caused considerable disruption and losses to rebel trade,
they provided other important services, acting as naval auxiliaries, performing convoy duty, gathering intelligence, and supplying beleaguered areas with much needed provisions and materials. At the same time, these loyalists negatively affected the focus of rebel war aims by forcing the revolutionaries to acknowledge their threat and take considerable steps to counter it. Consequently, examining the role played by loyalists at sea and assessing the results they achieved during this first period constitute the primary goal of this study, and consequently, this is largely a study of a series of maritime campaigns.

Three additional objectives have been germane to loyalist studies. Two simply entail identifying who the loyalists were and defining their unique experience. In turn, collective analysis of established identities and experiences has resulted in achieving the remaining goal, creating group profiles based on background, degree of involvement, and motivation. In terms of background, the overall loyalist composition (used here synonymously with profile) reflected a cross-section of colonial social class, occupation, economic status, ethnicity, race, gender, and region. At the same time, however, regional variations in the general profile existed. Levels of involvement for loyalists as a whole ranged from neutral to equivocal to extremely active. A variety of motivational factors prompted their decision to side with the crown. In general, loyalists were a varied and complex group.¹

Coinciding with and integral to the development of loyalist privateering as an activity was the evolution of the participants, themselves, first as loyalists, then as privateersmen. A second, parallel objective for this study, is to profile loyalist privateers with the intention of determining who they were and why they became what they did. As a ground-breaking work, simply identifying individuals is of
primary importance. This will not only tell us who was involved, it will also help convey the widespread level of participation. Of course, not everyone can be identified and included, but the sample presented in the course of this paper, consisting of 265 men and women, is representative of the much larger group. While fitting the broader, inter-colonial profile, loyalist mariners also alter it by adding a previously unacknowledged, but numerically, and thus socially, significant element to the intricate composition of the loyalist community. In fact, they formed a large, distinct maritime sub-community. Using the broader, established historical view as a point of reference, profiling will also allow regional differences in composition to be discerned among privateers. More importantly, the examination of the background and experience of this whole group of loyalists allows their general collective character to be assessed; we then can arrive at an understanding of why these individuals chose the course they did. This is essential, because rebel contemporaries often viewed loyalist privateersmen as little better than ruthless, plundering pirates, and this view has sometimes carried over into the secondary literature on those rare instances when historians have acknowledged the existence of these people. In reality, for the most part, loyalist privateers, with merchants and mariners serving as a large core element, were simply everyday, moderate, responsible, respectable people, motivated by generally acceptable, honorable reasons, who acted, or more appropriately, reacted, as consciences and circumstances dictated. Forced on the defensive, these Americans were transformed into extremely aggressive participants in the war against their once fellow countrymen.

Of course certain loyalists stand out as exemplary or significant for various reasons. As such, they warrant greater attention. In the annals of loyalist privateering, one name, Goodrich, stands out
above all others. The activities of this Virginia family, consisting of a father, five sons, and a son-in-law, were integral to the developmental period of loyalist privateering, during which they established themselves as without peers in the activity. Furthermore, the experiences which caused them to become loyalists in the first place, though clearly extreme, never-the-less involved many elements reflective of other loyalists' situations. Much of the story of the early period focuses on the Goodriches.

It is necessary at this point to elaborate on an aspect of motivation which is pertinent to establishing the collective character of loyalist privateersmen and will be a major sub-theme in this work. As noted, motivation is a key profile element that historians have worked hard to isolate and define because it is essential to our understanding the loyalist stance. As varied as loyalist backgrounds were their reasons for casting their lot with the British. Often cited and emphasized by historians, in what is tantamount to a stock in trade discussion in loyalist studies, is one specific motivating factor. Loyalists, in particular the merchant class, are perceived as having been opportunistic and self-interested, and so, chose the side they did for reasons of personal gain. At the same time, almost all privateering studies address the issue of personal profit as a motivational factor. Commonly encountered in the secondary literature on privateersmen, regardless of time period, is the belief that they operated with the primary intention of enhancing their wealth. To illustrate how deeply this view has permeated the popular perception, on numerous occasions during the course of preparing this study people would ask what my research involved. When they were told it concerned privateers, the response of those who knew what a privateer was inevitably replied, "Oh! Legalized piracy." This clearly indicates that a cloud of profit oriented unrespectability has come to shroud the activity in the minds of
many. Because these negative views are so prevalent with historians working in both fields, and because loyalist privateering revolved around the merchant/mariner class, it is doubly important to explore this issue in the course of this study. If left unaddressed, the reader might conclude that merchant/mariners, if motivated by reasons of personal enhancement to become loyalists in the first place, would logically pursue privateering as a matter of course to attain their goals. This would have the affect of casting an even greater pall over the participants, making them appear truly disreputable.

On the other hand, in addressing the issue of self-interest in a couple of recent studies on privateering, writers have displayed a more enlightened understanding of the activity with regards to profitability. They have effectively shown that not only were privateersmen generally patriotic, but also, while acknowledging that money was a consideration, within the context of eighteenth century mercantile beliefs, that waging war while attempting to fill one’s coffers was completely acceptable behavior. To paraphrase Carl E. Swanson, what today would be considered “private vice” was then equated with “public virtue.” Consequently, the negative view that privateersmen, at least, were prompted by the lure of filthy lucre becomes moot. Other studies have taken a different tack by showing that the merchant/mariner class often entered into the activity because they had little alternative. With their normal trade regimen disrupted by war, privateering offered the only logical and viable alternative venture allowing the continuation of some form of business.

A key purpose of this study, which is part and parcel to explaining the development of the enterprise and incorporates the two views just outlined is to show that in the first place, that these loyalists were motivated by a high level of their own brand of public virtue. In turn, their degree of commitment carried over prompting
them to become privateersmen. While the motivation of many can, in a limited, qualified degree, be defined as self-interested, it was justifiably so and free of negative implications. Specifically, the decisions of these individuals to become either loyalists or privateersmen, were not governed by speculative dreams of personal financial enhancement. The situation was simply not conducive to this.

Belying self-interest and prompting involvement in privateering was the extremely disrupted trade situation that loyalist merchant/mariners found themselves in. This was brought on not only by the war itself, but by the trade restrictions imposed by the British that negatively affected loyalists as well as rebels. Discussion of this topic, constituting another major sub-theme, will crop up throughout the study. Disruption of trade was a key factor in turning many to privateering.

Another topic supports the generally honorable character of these men. For many, privateering was not the only means of showing their commitment. A significant number served in other military or naval capacities, often as unpaid volunteers. Others acted as public officials and performed civic and humanitarian roles. For many privateering was only one way of showing their commitment.

Examination of loyalist experience has led some historians to assert that in most cases the effects of the war on loyalists was generally mild and that even accounts of their persecution have been over-stated. While they acknowledge that selected individuals and even certain populations in specific locales did suffer serious abuse, the treatment of most loyalists is said to have been quite lenient. As a group, a comparatively high proportion of loyalist privateers suffered severely in one way or another for their stance. Persecution was both a motivating and reinforcing agent for involvement.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the developmental phase concerns the place of loyalist privateers in early British policy and strategy. Simply put, officially, it had none. Loyalist privateersmen were *persona non grata*. Despite the fact that they were increasingly eager, as the war progressed, to act in the capacity of privateersmen, there was considerable opposition to the idea of their doing so. Their efforts to attain the official sanction necessary to conduct legitimate operations at sea met with a very negative response from factions holding sway in the British Government and the Royal Navy. In an effort to maintain control of a deteriorating situation, these two groups, for diplomatic, legal, professional, and personal reasons, in conjunction with their implementation and enforcement of restrictive legislative acts and general policy, refused to acknowledge the activity and seriously retarded its development. In general, members of government and the navy held loyalist privateers to be a potentially serious liability for a number of reasons. In addition, in Bermuda, loyalist privateersmen met with severe resistance from a civil populace. Despite the lack of official recognition and support, the activity continued to evolve. Proponents of privateering persevered in their efforts for acceptance, often conducting operations without the necessary proper authority. As the situation required, loyalist privateersmen learned to circumvent and even openly defy the restraints in the shadow of which they functioned. Still, gaining acceptance was a long and sometimes difficult process with expanding levels of qualified recognition achieved in sporadic stages. By 1778, however, coinciding with France entering the fray and the resulting necessity on the part of the British to reassess their war aims and the roles loyalists would play in them, loyalists had proven themselves effective privateersmen and thus, important assets to the British war effort. In the face of opposition, loyalist mariners had achieved a significant
record of success. They could no longer be ignored, and they got what they desired, official widespread sanction to independently wage war at sea with the freedom normally accorded privateers. Loyalist response to the news that the British would finally officially allow them to go privateering was incredibly enthusiastic, constituting an uncommon feverish rage.

During the course of previous imperialistic struggles in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, warfare at sea had come to be equated with mercantile trade war, and consequently, privateering fit in well with the scheme of things. The nature of the conflict during the early stages of the American Revolution, however, was new and different. Despite the efforts of the British to bring the rebels into line by imposing severe trade restrictions, as witnessed with the Restraining and Prohibitory Acts of 1775 and 1776, this was not a trade war like previous colonial conflicts. In trying to put down the rebellion, the British were not attempting to acquire and control new territories, markets, and resources, but rather to maintain a grip on existing ones by hitting the rebels where it would hurt most. The target was the same, but the object and the means of achieving it were different. In light of this situation, British resistance to legitimizing privatizing reflected valid concerns. Employing commissioned vessels was not really appropriate at this early stage, and if allowed, the activity could backfire and prove an embarrassing liability.

Despite privateering's popularity, some individuals feared that men, waging war independently, free from the controls and discipline of established military and naval forces, would act without regard to the rules of civilized warfare, commit heinous atrocities, and so, become little better than, if not actually, pirates. When these beliefs were applied to the specific situation in North America, there was fear that rather than aid the war effort, privateers would only serve
to make a bad situation worse. Prior to 1779, while the British were actively fighting the rebels, they also strove for reconciliation with them. Unleashing privateers of any sort, be it loyalist or British, would have had the effect of creating a civil war with all the real and potential horrors inherent to such a conflict. Privateers would only serve to anger and alienate the rebels further, and so, negatively affect the negotiations for a peaceful settlement.

There was a second major reason for Britain's reluctance in authorizing privateering. The activity was governed by international laws and conducted between established, legitimate nations. To sanction privateering against the rebels would have been tantamount to acknowledging them as independent.¹²

Britons who opposed privateering harbored yet another legitimate fear. In accordance with the Prohibitory Act leveled against the rebels on December 2, 1775, foreign vessels found carrying supplies to them were subject to seizure by the Royal Navy. Were the British to sanction privateers, the same foreign bottoms would become fair game for them as well. Again, in light of the opinion that held privateers to be an uncontrollable entity, there was serious concern they would be less scrupulous than the navy in their selection of prizes, and so, they might provoke an international incident drawing another opponent into the war. Needless to say, this was something the British hoped to avoid at all costs. With France's entry into the war and the collapse of the peace negotiations, the nature of the conflict and views on employing loyalist privateers changed radically.

The Royal Navy maintained other self-serving and less justifiable reasons for opposing privateers. The primary concern of that august body was that privateering would prove such an attractive alternative to naval service, it would not only make it even more difficult to acquire crews, it would also cause desertions and deplete ex-
isting ones. Even less legitimate was the fear on the part of some naval officers that privateering would negatively affect the opportunity for prize money. Prize money was the traditional means by which impoverished officers achieved wealth, and they guarded the perquisite against interlopers who might diminish opportunities for reward.

Lest the reader think that loyalist privateersmen were singled out for repressive treatment by the British, it need be noted the British response to them was in keeping with a broader policy towards loyalists in general. The British simply did not want to rely on them. Paralleling the development of loyalist privateering was the evolution of the loyalist Provincial Corps within the Army. Early in the war as stopgap measures to meet immediate crises, the Crown had resorted to using loyalist soldiers as well as mariners, and just as there would be an outcry for the recognition of privateering, there was one for allowing the formation of provincial military units. In fact, initially, the clamor for such commands seems to have greatly surpassed that for letters of marque, and the British responded to a degree. Provincial battalions were formed. As troops, however, they came under direct British military command, and so, a great deal of control could be exerted over them. This led to problems. Use of provincial troops was limited and the nature of the service was not what the loyalists had in mind. Often, these units, comprised of men who volunteered to ardently do their part, were deemed as second rate and not trusted by British superiors. As a result, they were generally relegated to performing menial, inferior, less than glamorous duties. In part, this less than enthusiastic response to the employment of loyalist troops was a result of the peace effort. The British feared that their use would also create the ugly situation of civil war and so, jeopardize hopes for reconciliation. In any case, the loyalists became disheartened with their lot, and enthusiasm for raising and joining provincial
commands waned to the point that by the time the policy was reversed in 1778 and a major effort was made to enlist loyalist support, the British were sadly disappointed in the response. Loyalists were tired and fed up with what they felt was unappreciative neglect and ill-usage and they were disillusioned by what they deemed the half-hearted, irresolute manner in which the British had prosecuted the war to date. Potential troops had grown somewhat wary of the British and appeasement was too late.\textsuperscript{13}

The course of loyalist privateering was just the opposite of that of the Provincial Corps. While the initial demands for letters of marque seem to have been much less than for military commands, as will be seen, the outcry for them grew and continued to grow steadily, despite opposition, until the restrictions on their issue were removed. At that point, in September and October, 1778, there was a considerable outpouring of support for the activity.

Not all British officials and naval officers held the idea of loyalist privateering in such low regard. At the senior government level, no less a figure than Lord George Germain, Viscount Sackville, Secretary of State for the Colonies, and his Under-Secretary, William Knox, strongly advocated the activity. In the navy, Vice Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot was certainly not averse to the idea, and lesser officers of distinction, such as Captain Andrew Snape Hammond, actually declared their support of it. A number of colonial officials were quick to assess the situation and realize the value of relying on loyalist mariners, sometimes taking matters into their own hands and transcending the limits of their authority. Such included Governors John Murray, Earl Dunmore, of Virginia, Josiah Martin of North Carolina, William Campbell of South Carolina, Patrick Tonyn of East Florida, William Tryon of New York, and Lieutenant Governor Thomas Oliver of Massachusetts.
A final technical problem confronting evolving loyalist privateers was that in order for the undertaking to be conducted efficiently, effectively, successfully, and most importantly, legally, certain administrative and legal machinery, in the form of the powers granted colonial governors and vice admiralty courts, needed to be in place. They were not. Earlier, colonial governors had been granted the courtesy title of vice-admiral and empowered with the considerable rights accorded such. A significant aspect of their role was the right, when sanctioned (as it always had been in the past) to authorize letters of marque for individuals desirous of becoming privateers-men. The governors also supervised the vice admiralty courts which had been authorized in 1696 and had existed in most colonies. These courts served three main functions. They mediated in such matters as disputes between captains and crews, they enforced the navigation acts, and most significantly with regard to this study, in time of war, they heard prize cases. Also, while it was the governors who authorized letters of marque, it was the court that actually issued them. Although the court’s judges were subject to Royal approval, they were selected by the governors, thus giving them effective control over the system. Of course, for reasons too obvious and numerous to mention, the presence of an admiralty court in a colony was lucrative for all associated. More importantly, however, a governor’s ability to issue letters of marque and the immediate presence of a vice-admiralty court were essential for effective, efficient, and successful privateering. Without them, there was no place conveniently close to acquire authorization to cruise or to send prizes to be libeled and condemned.  

At the end of the Seven Years War there were eleven vice admiralty courts in North America. In 1764, however, the system was radically altered. The governors lost their right to grant commissions,
and the courts were restructured to include only four, strategically located at Halifax, Boston, Philadelphia, and Charlestown. A fifth court was established at St. Augustine, East Florida, in 1771. Of course, for most if not all of the period in question, Boston, Philadelphia, and Charlestown were under rebel control, leaving only remote, inconveniently located Halifax and St. Augustine as the only legitimate, officially recognized vice-admiralty courts on the continent. This proved problematic not only for privateers, but for the Royal Navy as well. The problem lay primarily in the fact that for every vessel seized, a detachment of experienced sailors from the captor had to be detached to sail the prize to the nearest port with a vice-admiralty court. The negative results were two-fold with one compounding the other. First, the potential efficiency and effectiveness of the captor was steadily reduced through the loss of manpower every time a capture was made. In fact, this was simply the nature of the business and acceptable. It became increasingly problematic, however, the further away the court. The farther the distance, the longer the men would be away and the greater the inconvenience in retrieving them. Other factors, to be discussed later, appear to have negatively affected the viability of using the St. Augustine court even more. Yet, despite these issues, the British resisted efforts to reinstate the prerogatives of the governors and establish new courts. In fact, the Prohibitory Act directly addressed the prize court situation, declaring that captured rebel vessels could not be brought into any of the thirteen rebellious colonies for court proceedings. As such, the act had a negative effect on loyalists. A decree of this nature was hardly conducive to pursuing privateering. The issue of the court system plays an important part in this story.\textsuperscript{15}

Another sub-theme reoccurring throughout the work concerns the examination of the types of vessels employed, their ordnance, and
crews. The intent is to show the continued increase in the size of privateers, their armaments, and compliments. This, in turn, will reflect the escalating degree of commitment and participation.

A final, highly significant theme concerns the geographic scope of this study. The intention is to view the early period of loyalist privateering comprehensively within the context of the North Atlantic world. Consequently, in addition to viewing the activities of the mainland loyalists from the thirteen rebellious colonies, the situation and operations in East Florida, Nova Scotia, Bermuda, the Bahamas, the West Indies, and Britain will also be examined. Of course, the Bahamas are part of the West Indies, but they were somewhat of a fringe element, and in terms of privateering and their place in the colonial/revolutionary world, they constitute a separate entity to be discussed apart from the rest.

This "big picture" view was necessitated by the nature of the historical situation dictating an all or nothing approach. The issues, events, and personalities of one region were often closely tied with those elsewhere, with affairs in one locale often affecting those in another. Therefore, to fully explain matters in one area, it is often necessary to discuss related events in other regions. Also, privateering was an extremely dynamic activity unrestricted by artificial territorial boundaries. Vessels based in one port often conducted operations in other remote areas inter-mingling with craft from other ports. The majority of loyalists, themselves, were dispossessed refugees who relocated to far-flung locales coming into contact with others in the same situation and establishing new affiliations as they did so. This makes it impossible to effectively isolate the participants from a given colony or even region and focus specifically on them and their activities. Adopting this broader scope serves to enhance the over-all meaningfulness to the topic. It will place person-
alities, issues, and events separated by time and space in context with each other, while at the same time showing the homogeneity of the enterprise. It will also allow a better assessment of operations and their significance. This, in turn, will further enhance our understanding of the significance of the war at sea during the revolution and its affects on other aspects of the conflict.

During the pre-war era, the same merchant/mariners who would instigate privateering conducted business amid an intricate intercolonial trade network encompassing the North Atlantic world. Effective business required an intimate knowledge of commodities, tides, winds, weather conditions, navigational hazards, and the economics of remote areas, and was reliant on a complex infra-structure of established routes, ports, supply and repair facilities, and personal connections. This knowledge and infra-structure was easily adapted and essential to privateering and served as the foundation for operations in that enterprise. In essence, as merchant/mariners and consequently, privateers, these individuals functioned in a much larger and more complex world than other loyalists. This sets them apart as distinctive. The means they chose to wage war was a logical extension of their peacetime occupation, based on a specific knowledge of that larger world which they used to their advantage.

In establishing this North Atlantic scope a somewhat contradictory fact becomes apparent. Despite the regional expanse, the world of the loyalist privateersman was really a small one. A number of these men were already known to each other through pre-war business ventures. More would come into contact with each other as a result of the conflict and be further linked by privateering. As such, the loyalist maritime community was reinforced and unified to an even greater degree. They possessed a level of inter-colonial cohesiveness setting them apart from other segments of the loyalist population.
To summarize, there are three main objectives to this study, the third of which is closely related to the second. First, the work will strive to explain the development of loyalist privateering, examine loyalist maritime operations during the early period, show the affect of activities, and establish their significance. In assessing effectiveness much will be achieved by employing the time-honored naval history method of simply relying on numbers. The number of prizes and cargoes seized in conjunction with estimates of tonnage will be established and presented in relation to the number of loyalist vessels and their losses. Additional assessments of effectiveness will be based on the significance of captured cargoes, their value, and the measures the rebels were forced to take in response to the situation.

The second objective is to identify the participants and analyze their backgrounds, experiences, and motivations collectively to explain who was involved, their character, and why they were involved as both loyalists and as privateersmen. Going hand-in-hand with this will be a detailed discourse on the rise of the Goodrich family as the leading element in the loyalist privateering world. It needs to be noted that not all of the individuals discussed were actually involved in the early phase. They are introduced here, because they reflect, and so help establish, the overall composition of the loyalist privateering community.

There is a reason for adopting this three-focus coverage. While each topic could be dealt with individually and stand on its own merit, it is better to discuss them in association, because the examination of any one would still require delving into the other two to a considerable degree. In essence, they are closely related, so a complete exploration of all three in combination is warranted. This will result in a more complete coverage of the story, making it more meaningful.
Interrelated with the above topics are several important sub-themes. Discussion of the trade situation, British opposition to privateering, and the vice-admiralty court situation are essential to our understanding the development of the activity. Another theme involves analyzing vessel, armament, and crew size with an eye to explaining the related technology and showing scale in development. Finally, all of these topics will be explored within the context of the North Atlantic world.

There are certain topics that the reader might expect to be addressed in a study of this nature which are not. For instance, apart from the occasional passing reference, no effort will be made to compare these loyalists with others such back-country groups or the Provincial Corps. As to privateers, there is not detailed coverage of topics like life at sea, crew organization, investment structure, vice admiralty court procedures, or whether or not the activity was profitable. All these topics await further work.

As to general organization, the method effectively employed by N. A. M. Rogers in his The Safeguard of the Sea was adopted. This involves an over-all chronological approach with lateral excursions to explore key issues as they arise. Generally, chapters dealing with personalities and specific topics are interspersed among those discussing operations. Due to necessity, however, there is an occasional intermingling of the two in a given chapter. Within this framework, the materials are organized by maritime region.

In those chapters in which participants are identified and examined in terms of composition and experience, the traditional approach used in loyalist studies involving discussion by individual colony has been modified. This structure was considered too unwieldy and for reasons about to be discussed, inappropriate. Instead, loyalist mariners are examined in accordance with six maritime regions, the upper and
lower New England regions, the Delaware Bay and New Jersey coast region, the Chesapeake Bay region, the southern coastal region, and New York. The traditional regional divisions of New England, the Middle Colonies, and the South, while still valid, will only serve to define the broad parameters of the more defined regions within them. Of course, it could easily be argued that New York should be included with New Jersey, but for several reasons, it stands apart and needs to be viewed separately. It was actually located directly between two of the other regions, and as a port, it serviced its own large, specific hinterland. Furthermore, because it became the primary refuge for loyalists, the center for their privateering operations, and the bastion of British presence in North America, it needs to be viewed as a distinct entity.

This format has been adopted for the following reasons. Because maritime trade was dynamic, it was not confined by provincial borders. Each region was defined by a key port serving the entire area's commerce. The merchants and mariners of a given region operated in accordance with a number of shared affinities linking them together, creating a common identity, and establishing a sense of unity. Of course, they shared the same occupation, life-style, and socio-economic background. More specifically, the men of a particular region functioned under the same meteorological and navigational conditions, dealt in regionally specific trade commodities, conducted transactions with specific markets, and were associated with each other through their business dealings. This required a degree of specialization in vessels, sailing skills, and business knowledge. Also, this format, is more in keeping with the broader, inter-colonial North Atlantic scope of the study.

Chapter 1 offers background information on privateering in general plus material on rebel privateering activities so that informa-
tion supplied later on loyalists can be viewed in context. Chapter 2 consists first of a general historiographical overview of loyalist background, experience, stance, and motivation, and then of an in-depth discussion of opportunism and self-interest as a motivating factor. Chapters 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9 serve to identify various loyalists by region, establish their composite, relate their early experiences, define their character, and examine their early war maritime activities. Chapter 4 deals almost exclusively with the Goodrich family's situation early in the conflict, although there are references to related activities by other loyalist mariners. In Chapters 5, 10, 11, and 13, operations in different regions are discussed. Chapters 12 and 14 explore the privateering and trade situation in New York during 1778. Chapter 14 also presents information on specific operations during September and October, 1778.

Before continuing, it is necessary to define privateer and other synonymous or related terms. Basically, a privateer was a privately owned warship granted a written commission, or Letter of Marque and Reprisal, by a government authorizing it to attack and capture, or destroy, the shipping of a specific enemy country in time of war. Possession of such a document gave the aggressive action legal sanction and distinguished it from piracy. Depending on circumstances and the abilities and tenacity of the opponent's officers and crew, seizing a prize could involve a lengthy chase in which the sailing skills of both parties were tested, and occasionally an engagement of varying degrees of intensity once the pursuer closed with the quarry. Upon seizure, a prize crew under the command of a prize master was delegated to sail the captured vessel to a port with an admiralty or vice admiralty court. There, after a review of the prize's paperwork, the taking of depositions, and allowing time for anyone to come forward to contest the matter, the court ruled on the legitimacy of the capture.
If the prize was judged righteous, then the vessel and cargo would be sold at public vendue. After deducting various expenses, such as court costs, auction fees, and the overhead for the voyage, the proceeds from the sale were divided among the owners, officers, and crew of the captor according to a preestablished schedule of percentage based shares. The immediate purpose was two-fold and mutually gratifying for the parties involved. The privateersman aided his country's war effort by at least disrupting, if not destroying, enemy trade, and if fortune smiled, he made a profit, occasionally a handsome one.

In fact, there were two distinct types of commissioned vessel, and the terms distinguishing them have often been used without discretion, causing some confusion. The main difference was in purpose. First, there were vessels specifically called letters of marque. These were commissioned, armed merchantmen whose primary function was to carry cargo between predetermined ports of call. Technically, such a vessel was not allowed to deviate from her designated route to search for enemy vessels. If, however, one should appear during the course of her planned voyage, she possessed the authority to attack and attempt to seize it. The second type was the privateer. Although she carried a virtually identical commission (differing only in statement of intent), unlike the letter of marque, she did not carry cargo, nor were her activities confined to a specific route. A privateer's primary purpose was to attack and capture or destroy enemy shipping, and she was free to go wherever it was thought the hunting would be best. Reflecting the basic difference between the two types is the fact that crews on letters of marque received regular pay while those on privateers served without. (For illustrations of specific vessel types, ordnance, and weapons, please see Appendices A and B.)

Throughout this study, the term letter of marque will be used specifically to refer to the first type of vessel or the commissions
carried by both types. The term privateer will specifically denote a vessel of the second category. In fact, until the very end of the period covered in this study, letters of marque were the only officially sanctioned commissioned vessels. There were, however, some letters of marque that circumvented or ignored the restrictions governing their activity and operated more in the manner of true privateers. Other vessels acted in the same capacity under the authority of commissions granted without official approval or simply without commissions at all. Because of the nature of their conduct, these will be called privateers as well. The same word will be employed as a general term when referring to both types of vessel collectively. The term privateering, denoting the activity, will also be used to describe the actions of both types of vessel. Finally, in an effort to avoid the awkward term privateersmen in reference to owners and crews, when suitable for conveying the correct meaning without confusion, the term privateer will also denote individuals involved in the activity as well as their vessels.

There was another type of privateer employed by loyalists that departed somewhat from the norm. These were the vessels operated by a group known as the Associated Loyalists. Although the establishment of this organization post-dates the period covered here, it will be referenced occasionally because a number of the individuals to be discussed joined it. Consequently, some explanation is in order. Raised in New York, the Associators were a combined force employing both troops and ships to launch attacks on the Connecticut and New Jersey coasts, distress rebel trade, and help defend the city. Governed by a Board of Directors, the organization of this independent force was said to be "a kind of corporation or body politic." Although independent, they were to receive their ordnance, small arms, ammunition, equipage, provisions when conducting operations, and even their vessels
from the British. There were, however, problems procuring vessels in the prescribed manner, and so, they resorted to other means as yet not fully researched. Regardless, the structural organization of the Associators combined with British assistance means that technically, their vessels were not the result of private investment like other privateers. Still, they were commissioned and the Associators were entitled to the proceeds from prizes they took. Furthermore, contemporaries considered them to be privateers.\textsuperscript{16}

Other terms can also cause confusion. Frequently, \textit{cruiser} and \textit{armed vessel}, or variations of the latter, such as \textit{armed sloop} and \textit{armed schooner}, were applied to private, commissioned warships. In the case of \textit{cruiser}, while it was frequently used to mean a privateer, it could also indicate a small, patrolling Royal Navy vessel. For the purpose of this study, the term \textit{cruiser} will specifically indicate a privateer unless otherwise stated.

The term \textit{armed vessel} is even more confusing. It was often used to refer to privateers, letters of marque, small Royal Navy warships, transports in government service carrying cannon, and simply any armed merchantman, which, of course, a great many merchantmen were in time of war. For the purpose of this study, unless otherwise noted, the term \textit{armed vessel} will only be used to refer to letters of marque and privateers. Even then, it will only be employed when a synonym is required for the more usual terms, \textit{privateer} or \textit{letter of marque}.

\textit{Tenders} constitute another type of vessel to discuss. These were small, armed auxiliary craft that generally acted in consort with specified naval men-of-war. As such, they were not privateers. They were, however, often privately owned and frequently manned with loyalist personnel. Furthermore, as vessels of war sanctioned by the Navy or a colonial governor, they were justified in attacking and seizing
rebel shipping. This they did, sometimes while acting quite independently of their parent naval vessel. Tender crews were also entitled to shares of the prize money. Consequently, in a qualified sense, their conduct could be considered similar to that of a true privateer. Loyalist tender activity in conjunction with the Royal Navy was important to the development of loyalist privateering. A number of key participants began their careers serving aboard this type of vessel. Then again, later in the period, there were actually privateer tenders, some of which were independently commissioned, that sailed in consort with larger privateers to assist them.

Finally, there were provincial vessels. These were warships fitted out in the colonies, manned with local personnel, and taken into government service, usually on the authority of a colonial governor. Their primary purpose was local defense, and as did tenders, they often acted as naval auxiliaries.

The terms loyalist and loyalist privateer also require definition. As to what constituted a loyalist, historians have offered various polarized opinions ranging from the very broad and all-encompassing to the narrower and more restrictive. Of course there is a myriad of qualified levels in between. For the purpose of this study, a rather basic definition will suffice. A loyalist was any individual who was, by birth or residency, affiliated with the thirteen rebellious colonies, and who, for whatever reason, supported the king during the revolution.

It is possible to argue, however, on a certain qualified level, that the pro-British residents of East Florida, Nova Scotia, Bermuda, and the Bahamas, can also be considered loyalists. These were people who produced their own share of privateers, as well. In the case of East Florida and Nova Scotia, both were contiguous to colonies in a state of rebellion. Their close proximity at either end of the line of
troublesome colonies, their shared social, cultural, and economic affinities with those areas, and the fact that a considerable number of residents in both were directly involved in the war and active against their neighbors to the north and south, respectively, justifies viewing the populaces as loyalist even though neither colony was in revolt. Strengthening this view is the fact that in Nova Scotia there was a faction, although relatively subdued in nature, sympathetic to the rebels. Furthermore, there are those who consider Nova Scotian privateers to be loyalist. At the same time, historically, because of the influx of refugees, East Florida is often considered a loyalist domain, regardless.\(^{18}\)

With Bermuda and the Bahamas, again, there existed strong social and economic ties to the North American continent. In their case, however, the association was not just with the mainland in general but specifically with the rebels themselves. Furthermore, though not in open rebellion, both colonies, especially Bermuda, suffered their own political and social unrest, relative to the situation on the mainland, with opposing factions identifying with and supporting the rebels or the Crown.\(^{19}\)

Due to the unique situation in these four colonies, their pro-British residents might be defined as peripheral loyalists. Regardless of classification, because the activities of these people were integral to the development of loyalist privateering, they will be examined in some depth. At the same time, however, these people were removed from mainstream loyalism, and so, the nature of their experience and reasons for their involvement were different. Consequently, this study will not profile them.

Next, there is the question of what constituted a loyalist privateer. A definition involving certain specific criteria is necessary so loyalist privateers can be distinguished as such from British and
other colonial privateers and categorized accordingly. Logically, the nature of such a vessel is defined by affiliations. So, in a perfect world, the ideal definition for such would be any vessel which received its letter of marque, was registered, and was based in a British-held port in one of the thirteen colonies, and whose owners, officers, and crew emanated from the same. Unfortunately, this characterization is unrealistic and limiting. The nature of the historical situation and the activity does not allow such a tight and tidy definition.

As noted, a large number of the loyalists in question were dispossessed. Most of these refugees ultimately came to be associated with the port of New York, but a fair number based themselves in Bermuda, and others worked out of East Florida, Nova Scotia, the Bahamas, the West Indies, and even Britain itself. Reflecting the dynamics of the activity, a fair number of vessels, owned and manned by true mainland loyalists, were fitted out, commissioned, and based in various far flung ports to cruise in yet other far removed areas. Also, loyalist activities constituted only a part of the whole of British privateering operations. In addition to loyalist craft, other British colonial privateers and purely British ones, as well, operated from the same bases and worked the same sea lanes. As a result, the activities of one group of privateers was sometimes closely intertwined with those of another. More significantly, the regional backgrounds of the personnel associated with any given privateer could be mixed.

All this could result in a variety of interesting scenarios. For instance, some vessels owned in New York were sent to Antigua to be fitted out. Other New York craft went to St. Augustine for their commissions. Privateers fitted out, manned and commissioned in Britain were owned by loyalists residing there who sent them to the Western Hemisphere to cruise. An Irishman was captain and part owner of a
privateer fitted out, manned, commissioned and otherwise owned in New York. Yet another privateer, in all other ways associated with New York and loyalists, picked up a large part of her crew at a West Indian island which served as her base of operations. Other vessels, commissioned in New York, were owned in London or the islands. Theoretically, it was possible for a privateer to be owned by loyalist refugees in London, be commissioned in New York, have a Scottish captain, and receive a large part of her crew while conducting extended operations in the West Indies. In essence, the affiliations of any given privateer could be varied and complex comprising elements of the entire North Atlantic world. As such, many vessels with solid loyalist ties, that would escape notice if the more stringent defining criteria were applied.

For the reasons just outlined, a more realistic, less restrictive definition is necessary. Vessels will be defined as loyalist if they meet any one of four criteria. In fact, these are the same criteria already discussed. They are simply applied separately rather than collectively. As to the first three, any vessel owned, commanded, OR in large part manned by individuals from the thirteen colonies in rebellion, regardless of her port of registry, base of operations, and place commissioned will merit classification as loyalist. As controlling factors, owners and captains, in particular, define the nature of vessels. A few vessels, though owned and commanded by British individuals and fitted out and commissioned there as well, will nevertheless be considered loyalist on the premise that significant portions of their crews were undoubtedly colonials. The vessels in question, despite their pedigree, spent lengthy periods associated with North American bases of operation. Consequently, it stands to reason that locals signed on as replacement and additional crew members in those ports, and as will be seen, there is evidence of this occurring. The
fourth criteria is that any privateer for which the background of the owners, commander, or crew can not be established, but which is known to have received its commission and have been registered or based in a British held port in the thirteen colonies, East Florida, Nova Scotia, Bermuda, or the Bahamas, will be considered a loyalist vessel as well. Granted, this last criteria is not absolutely fool-proof. Still, with regard to New York, Newport, and later, Charlestown, Savannah, and the Penobscot, because the vast majority of privateers associated with these ports can be identified as loyalist, it stands to reason that in all probability, the occasional vessel failing to meet the other criteria was loyalist as well. In the case of East Florida, Nova Scotia, Bermuda, and the Bahamas, given the number of true loyalist privateersmen operating from those colonies, and the fact that confirmed vessels are known to have had personnel of mixed backgrounds, there is a very good chance the odd, unidentified vessel from those colonies had at least some loyalist association. Even if not, because the local privateersmen, themselves, can be viewed as loyalist in a sense, their vessels warrant the same classification.

A final word is in order with regard to terminology. Throughout this study, the terms loyalist and rebel have been used to distinguish the opposing factions. These might be interpreted by the reader as positive and negative terms conveying a degree of bias. Loyalist is, in fact, a positive term used instead of Tory, which during the period was considered extremely derogative. While some might view rebel as a negative term, this is what they were in the eyes of at least many of their contemporaries. Furthermore, the argument can be made that Americans past and present revel in the term rebel and flaunt it like a badge of honor rather than a scarlet letter. Thus, in our usage, it is positive. At the same time, this study is intended to present the loyalist perspective, therefore, terminology they would have under-
stood is used, and it is hoped that understanding is not confused with bias. To put this another way, had this work dealt with the revolutionaries' privateers, the same terminology would have been used.

A few words are also in order on research methodology. The lack of historical attention this topic has received negated following a deductive approach. There was simply nothing on which to base any pre-conceived ideas to test and so focus investigation on a specific topic. At the same time, there was little indication of what information potential sources might offer. The problem was further compounded by the widely varied and scattered nature of the materials being sought. Consequently, research involved a purely inductive approach, as it logically must be when delving into the complete unknown, and a very large net was cast to ensnare all potentially relevant sources. With the aid of hindsight, the end justified the means. Because of the problems just outlined, a more focused research effort would have been extremely unrewarding in that relevant materials would have been missed.

Initial research progressed along five parallel lines. One of these involved going through the biographical encyclopedias of loyalists compiled by Lorenzo Sabine and Gregory Palmer looking for information on individuals involved in privateering. References found there would then serve as a springboard for examining the Loyalist Claims Commission records of the British Public Records Office. While offering some data, this effort was initially disappointing, because direct references were relatively few. At the same time, believing newspapers potentially offered a wealth of information, a survey was undertaken of the many extant loyalists editions, and some key rebel ones as well, with the intention of identifying participants and vessels. The newspapers provided a wealth of information allowing the creation of a data bank of individuals' and privateers' names to be investigated.
Also, all the pertinent secondary literature on both loyalists and privateering was read for insights, background, and specific references. Simultaneously, work commenced with the collection of naval and maritime documents compiled by the Naval History Center, Naval Documents of the Revolution. This proved an invaluable source in many ways. Finally, numerous archival guides were canvassed for all the major and many minor repositories throughout the United States, Canada, Great Britain and the West Indies with the intent of locating admiralty court records as well as other relevant collections of personal, official, and maritime papers. Combined, these five approaches ultimately supplied a considerable amount of information and clues on which to base further research.

From this point, research consisted of cross-referencing between the sources already consulted and running down the leads they offered. For instance, the names acquired from the newspapers allowed a return to Sabine and Palmer enabling additional information to be obtained on many individuals, now identified as privateers, who would have otherwise gone unnoticed. In turn, armed with a lengthy list of confirmed privateersmen, an examination of the voluminous Loyalist Claims Commissions records could be undertaken with the intent of locating even more information. In many cases, continued research was a matter of one source shedding light on the possible existence of another to be sought, resulting in a series of inter-twined chain reactions. Work followed numerous exploratory paths until they either started to turn inward on themselves and each other or came to a dead end.

This comprehensive research approach was necessary to acquire the materials to complete the story as fully as possible. As is apparent from the compound nature of many of the notes, frequently, data needed to establish even the smallest of facts came from a variety of documents from widely scattered archival collections. For instance,
the data required to confirm a specific vessel as a privateer, identify her captain, and supply her technical specifics often required piecing together information from multiple sources such as several articles and advertisements in different newspapers, vice admiralty court records, and correspondence. The same was also true when confirming that a Virginia captain, John Doe, was the same John Doe who later commanded a privateer out of New York when more direct links were not forthcoming.

Perseverance in turning over every research stone led to some wonderful discoveries that might otherwise have been missed. For instance, brief references in a couple of secondary sources indicated a significant link between privateering and the New York Chamber of Commerce. This led to a search for existing records from that organization, and two quite obscure, but extremely important volumes of printed primary material were ultimately uncovered. Another example concerns the Frederick Rhinelander Letter Book. Rhinelander had already been confirmed as a major investor in privateers, so despite the fact the catalogue description of the volume said it contained correspondence relating to his import business, it was though best to examine it anyway. While the letter book did contain materials pertaining to Rhinelander's trade activities, there was also a large number of letters pertaining to his privateers.

The result of these efforts is that this study is based on a wide variety of source materials with those of a primary nature dominating. Included and encompassing loyalist, British, and rebel sources were newspapers, personal and official correspondence and journals, log, account, receipt, and minute books, diaries, proclamations, official acts of Parliament and Congress, petitions, records of sales, ships' papers consisting of commissions, bonds, articles of agreement, crew rosters, bills of lading, invoices, registers, and clearances,
and vice admiralty court records involving libels, affidavits, depositions, monitions, answers and claims, replications, appeals, answers and decrees, and registers. All of these sources supplied data on both participants and activities. Still, despite the amount of material collected, gaps remain, resulting in sketchy treatment of some individuals, issues, and events. Ultimately, the search for these documents led to inquiries at over seventy archives, libraries, museums, and other repositories, and work was conducted at or material was acquired from thirty-three.

While all of these materials supplied significant information, those supplying the most were the newspapers, the vice admiralty court records, correspondence, and the loyalist memorials. The Rosetta stone for this study was the series of lists prepared by Governor William Tryon of New York in 1778 and 1779, notating the principle information on many privateers such as technical data, name, captain, owners, and dates. These lists served as lynch pins establishing the connections between references in numerous other sources. It is impossible to determine how much correspondence was read in preparing this study. As to newspapers, every extant copy from the ten loyalist presses was read from cover to cover. In addition, every extant copy of nine major rebel papers from key ports were read as well. In total, over 2,500 newspapers were examined. Over three-hundred loyalist memorials and their supporting paperwork were relied on. Finally, all the available materials relating to over 1,500 loyalist, Royal Navy, and rebel vice admiralty court cases were read in depth.

The necessity of relying on multiple sources to establish even the simplest of facts combined with efforts to keep this lengthy study as short as possible, seriously affected much of the writing style. Simply put, the reader might find it wordy. This is the result of frequent efforts to compress data from several sources while conveying
their specific meanings in an effort to save space. Doing this sev-
ereally limited options for basic phrasing, sentence structure, and
even word choice.

Readers may balk at the number of names of individuals and ves-
sels and other specific details presented throughout. They are cer-
tainly not expected to remember them all. There are, however, several
reasons for their inclusion. As stated, as an introductory study it is
simply essential to establish who the participants and their vessels
were, thus confirming their existence either as privateers or prizes.
In turn, these identifications should help any future researchers who
might choose to pursue the topic further. When the identifications are
viewed in combination, their numbers will reflect levels of involve-
ment and the significance of activities. Most significantly, however,
because the primary intent of this work is to relate and analyze a se-
ries of loyalist campaigns within the framework of a large regional
scope, it is essential to establish who was where at what time and do-
ing what to whom. The reader might feel that this type of data would
have been better placed in a table, but to do so would negate being
able show the movement and interaction through time and space of mul-
tiple individuals and vessels which is essential to establishing the
North Atlantic scope of the loyalist privateering. Tables would also
have the effect of dehumanizing the events discussed. In addition, the
data they would convey is too sketchy in many cases to correlate in a
table format. Finally, the presentation of such details is in keeping
with the current trends in naval and maritime history. For instance,
in recent battle studies in which four, five and even six-hundred
pages are devoted to events sometimes encompassing only a single day,
the reader becomes acquainted with not only the senior commanders, but
a host of company grade officers and numerous enlisted men as well.
Their movements over the hours are traced with such precision that the
reader becomes familiar with every field, wood lot, fence-line, farm lane, ditch, rivulet, and structure encountered during the action. Naval and Military studies generally involve a large cast of players representing many levels of involvement. To ignore the lesser people and their experience would be to deny them their moment in history. This type of detail is what the readership has come to expect and demand.

As indicated, prior to October, 1778, the scale of loyalist privateering operations did not approach the level it did later. Yet, loyalist mariners, serving on tenders, letters of marque, and privateers, proved their value by aiding the war effort in a number of capacities. Of course the most obvious way in which they helped was as commerce raiders. In that role, they caused considerable damage to the enemy merchant fleet, disrupting their commerce, and thus their economy. In fact, in certain areas they were integral in bringing rebel trade to occasional standstills. Such activity deprived the rebels of much needed supplies, provisions, and materials, which, in turn, were often redistributed to beleaguered, needy regions of the empire. Loyalist presence at sea also served to tie up rebel troops, ships and materials that could have been better used elsewhere, and forced the enemy to spend considerable time, effort, and money in efforts to suppress them. Also, they assisted the Royal Navy, not only by taking some of the pressure off them and freeing them for other duties, but also by acting as auxiliaries and guides. Another important function loyalists performed involved acting as intelligence gatherers and carrying dispatches. By combating rebel and French warships and privateers, loyalists did their part in the defense of British trade. They also showed they could and would fight.
NOTES FOR INTRODUCTION


9Swanson, Predators, p. 27.


12Starkey, British Privateering, p. 194.


20*Gazette of the State of South-Carolina*, October 14, 1777, p. 3.
21 Tryon to Germain, July 8, 1778, PRO, C05/1108/258.

22 Memorial of William Dunlop, n.d., PRO, AO12/36/319; Memorial of Samuel Martin, December 31, 1782, PRO, AO13/31/M3; William Shaw and George Hall to Customs House, Whitehaven, September 17, 1777, PRO, C05/149/495; and Samuel Martin to Germain, December 25, 1777, and Extract, Maclean and Kilsick to Samuel Martin, August 19, 1777, PRO, C05/155/189, 192.

23 Review of Mathew Mangen's Claim, October 13, 1786, PRO, AO12/102/12; and Commission, privateer schooner Jack o' the Lanthorn, Captain Mathew Mangan [sic], March 10, 21st year of the reign, Maryland Admiralty, 7871-1-38, Maryland State Archives, Annapolis, Maryland.


25 Account of Warrants Issued by Governor Tryon, enclosure with Tryon to Germain, February 5, 1778, PRO, C05/1109/80, 82.
CHAPTER 1

PRIVATEERING: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Although privateering dates from at least the thirteenth century, and was practiced in variant forms with regularity over the ensuing years, it was not until the late seventeenth century with the accumulation of colonial empires and the emergence of mercantile theory that the activity really began to develop as a major means of waging war. From that time to the eve of the Revolution, privateering grew in popularity in the colonies to such a degree that it was frequently said there was a rage or fever for it. The increase in the number of privateers at New York during the eighteenth century illustrates this. There, between 1703 and 1712, during The War of the Spanish Succession, or Queen Anne's War, eighteen privateers were fitted out.¹ During the War of the Austrian Succession, or King George's War, thirty-three called New York their home port.² During the Seven Years, or French and Indian War, at least eighty-three cruisers operated from New York, making it the privateering capitol of the North American colonies.³ Newport, Rhode Island, also emerged as a major privateering center and for the period of 1739-1744, more cruisers sailed out of that port than any other in the colonies.⁴ The activity was also undertaken with regularity in Boston, Philadelphia, and Charleston, and during the last two Anglo-French conflicts the Chesapeake Bay area witnessed its own development of privateering.⁵

Privateering was popular because it was advantageous to all involved. For the government, privateers constituted an additional mari-
time force acting as auxiliaries to over-extended naval resources in
defense of trade. At the same time, the activity was without risk or
cost to the Crown. Of course, merchants were equally happy to have ad-
ditional security for their commerce.

For owners and crews, there was the chance of making a profit. Still, while the prospect of making money was undoubtedly a key at-
traction motivating individuals to engage in privateering, there were
other reasons for becoming involved. Most importantly, given that a
large part of eighteenth-century warfare focused on matters of trade,
merchants and mariners frequently found themselves in the forefront of
the conflict facing the threat of serious physical and financial loss.
Thus, involved as they already were, in light of their background as
merchants and mariners, they found privateering to be the perfect and
logical venue by which to participate and express their patriotism. In
so doing they acted in support of their country as well as in defense
of their own trade.

As to making a profit, for many merchants in time of war, priva-
teering was not simply an opportunity to make additional money. It
might be the only means. With trading vessels often confined to port
because of blockade or fear of their loss to the enemy while negotiat-
ing the sea lanes, commerce was often greatly reduced if not brought
to a standstill. Privateering offered an alternative form of business
opportunity that allowed one to keep some form of operation going. The
activity also provided a means of keeping ships employed which other-
wise would have sat idle, rotting at their moorings. Of course, ships
require crews which meant employment opportunities for excess officers
and men whose only other options, service in the navy or inactivity,
were far less attractive. 6

Furthermore, the nature of the employment held its appeals. On a
personal level, it allowed a greater sense of freedom and independence
of action, a wider latitude of discretion, and perhaps, a somewhat
less rigid and harsh lifestyle than would be found in service with the
army or navy. A privateer's captain and crew were generally not under
government orders, and even in those instances in which they were, it
was usually voluntary. For the most part, a captain and crew were only
responsible to the owners' directives, and could do pretty much as
they pleased within the limits of the prescribed rules and regula-
tions.

The activity also served the good of the community by stimulat-
ing a port's economy in two ways. Support businesses certainly re-
ceived a boost, with victualers, ship chandlers, smiths, auctioneers,
lawyers, and shipbuilders all acquiring income for their services. At
the same time, the influx of prize goods and occasional specie cer-
tainly brought economic benefits to the community in general. Prize
foodstuffs could also help sustain a community whose normal trade was
negatively affected by the war. Historian James Lydon has done an ad-
mirable job of showing how privateering in the eighteenth century was
a significant factor in the development of New York as a major port.
Liverpool, England, was another port for which privateering generated
great rewards prompting growth.7

With regard to economic growth in the broader terms of the em-
pire, as historian Carl E. Swanson has effectively argued, priva-
teering, as a method of waging war, dovetailed perfectly with the pre-
dominant economic theory of the age, mercantilism. This further ac-
counts for the activity's popularity with both populace and govern-
ment. There were four basic tenets to mercantile theory, the first
three of which were as follows. The controllable wealth in the world
was finite, therefore it was necessary for a country to maintain a fa-
vorable balance of trade, and the accumulation of precious metals was
imperative. The idea was that a country should export more than it im-
ported (so more money came in than went out), control as much of the world's finite wealth as possible, and amass all the gold, silver and specie it could. The belief was that a country which adhered to these principles could not help but enhance its economic status, and thus, its power, prestige, and position among European nations.⁸

Keeping in mind that the main purpose of privateering was to seize or destroy enemy shipping and so disrupt an opponent's commerce, the potential existed for the activity to be extremely beneficial in achieving mercantile goals. Privateering could assist in establishing or enhancing a favorable balance of trade, and greater control over more of the world's finite wealth could be achieved through the capture or destruction of enemy vessels and cargoes. The possibility also existed that the contents of both private and national coffers would be increased with precious metals in one form or another. While privateering produced such positive results for a country, its effect on an opponent would be exactly the opposite. The bottom line is that privateering offered a means of enlarging a country's wealth while decreasing, and thus hurting, that of an opponent.⁹

The intents and goals of privateering place it in a rather unique light in the annals of warfare. The basic idea was to seize an opponent's property intact. On the theoretical level, at least, it was not meant to evoke bloodshed or destruction in the manner of armies and navies. As such, privateering might be viewed, oxymoronic as it may sound, as the most civilized form of warfare devised by western man. In reality, matters could get quite nasty.

The fourth basic tenet of mercantile theory was that a government should do all it could to help advance its trade. Because privateering helped trade, governments, in terms of keeping with the tenet, promoted privateering. Although there was little incentive to go privateering at the end of the seventeenth century, throughout the eight-
teenth, the British government instigated a number of changes in the system. For instance, from 1708, court costs were cut and regulated, bonuses were instigated, customs duties on prize goods were reduced, the Crown waved its right to the Royal Droit, and to a degree, crews were exempt from impressment. At the same time, the rules of privateering were continually being refined. These changes served to increase government control over the activity while making it more lucrative for the participants. As privateering became potentially more profitable, so it became more popular. James Lydon has done an admirable job of showing this progression in his study of the activity.10

In accordance with the original plan for this study, a detailed comparison was to be made between the numbers of rebel privateers, crewmen, losses, and prizes and those of their loyalist counterparts in an effort to better ascertain the relative strength and effectiveness of the latter. Unfortunately, after considerable effort, given the state of the secondary historical material on rebel privateering, attempting such correlations proved to be a true study in futility. Simply put, as will be demonstrated in the following paragraphs, there is little reliable information on these aspects of rebel privateering on which to base comparisons. There is considerable debate on the topic, and historical assertions as to rebel numbers are incredibly varied to the point of being irreconcilable. Furthermore, the figures given often reflect poor or insufficient research and faulty interpretation. Of course, this renders the proffered estimates suspect and so, valueless. Still some comments are warranted with the hope that at least a generalized comparison, in terms of basic scale, can be made later and loyalist activities can be seen in some degree of perspective with regards to the levels of activity.

With the commencement of hostilities in 1775, the rebels, lacking a naval force, made early preparations for a war at sea. In addi-
tion to promoting state navies which were beginning to be organized by the end of the year, in keeping with the times, the rebels were also quick to realize the importance of employing privateers. On November 1, 1775, Massachusetts authorized the issue of letters of marque on the state level, and New Hampshire followed suit in January, 1776. On March 23, 1776, the Continental Congress enacted legislation authorizing the issue of commissions. With this system, Congress sent out signed, blank commissions to the various states which were authorized to issue them at that level. By May, Connecticut rebels began to privateer. Marylanders started soon after in June, and the remaining colonies followed.11

As to the number of rebel privateers in operation during the war, a commonly quoted figure is about 2,000 plus.12 This estimate, however is bracketed by a wide spread of other calculations. One belief is that there were as few as 792 rebel privateers.13 Another calculates there were between 1,500 and 2,000.14 A third speculates there may have been as many as 3,000.15 Yet another offers the phenomenal figure of over 3,500.16 Finally, evidence has been presented that Massachusetts alone issued 1,554 letters of marque.17 All of these figures, however, reflect problems in calculation.

Most are based on lists of commissions issued and bonds posted during the war. As such they reflect the number of commissions granted and the number of bonds given rather than the actual number of ships involved. With every change of ownership or command, and with the completion of every cruise for a true letter of marque, a new commission was required. The result is that over the course of an eight year war, numerous vessels received two if not more commissions and are therefore at least duplicated in the lists. At the same time, however, the lists are known to be incomplete. A list compiled by Charles Henry Lincoln in 1906 records 1,697 commissions issued, but there are no
vessels included from North Carolina, and only one from South Carolina is mentioned. In the same compilation, only 626 are recorded for Massachusetts, most of which date from August, 1780. The bottom line is that the various estimates are too low, too vague, or especially, too high. Even accepting an incredible output from rebel shipyards and the possibility that the vast majority of rebel vessels carried letters of marque, figures of 3,000 or more simply seem too great.  

As to the number of men who served on Continental privateers, again, the figures are irreconcilable with each other and the facts, and they are clearly way too high. The most commonly quoted estimate is that there were about 70,000 rebel privateersmen. Another calculation is that there were over 58,400. Like the number of privateers, the number of associated personnel is tallied from the number of bonds and commissions. Consequently, just as the vessels themselves are counted more than once, so are the crews. Furthermore, there is the implication in these calculations that every rebel privateer that put to sea had its own specific crew completely different from any other vessel at any point in the war. In fact, vessels were not all in commission and at sea at the same time. They came and went, and at any given point in the war only a fraction of the total were active. So, many crew members on a vessel completing a cruise undoubtedly selected berths on another about to put out, making it likely that many privateersmen served on at least two different vessels in the course of any year. When this calculation is extrapolated for the period of the entire war, a professional rebel privateersmen undoubtedly served on a number of different craft during the conflict. Of course, the result is that not only do historical estimates reflect duplications, they show multiple representations for the same individual.

Most writers agree that the Continental privateers aided the rebel war effort. The degree of aid, however, is seriously debated. Some
would have us believe that rebel privateers saved the cause and won the war single-handedly. Others argue they certainly did serious damage to the British merchant fleet and trade. Offering a worst case scenario are those who view the Continental privateers as only a major nuisance to the British, but still nuisance enough to force them to allocate considerable time, money, effort, manpower, and materials in efforts to suppress them.

Of course the logical way to assess the effectiveness of rebel privateers would be to examine the number of prizes they took, but the existing estimates are again problematic. Some writers maintain as few as 600 prizes were taken by rebel cruisers, while others offer the polarized figure of about 3,000. A more focused regional study estimates they sent 2,106 prizes into the New England and middle colonies during the war, and another claims 1,200 seizures were made by Massachusetts privateers alone. Two separate groups of figures that are somewhat solid as far they go have been compiled from Lloyd's data. Again, however, there are discrepancies between them. According to one set compiled by the secretary of Lloyd's for historian William Laird Clowes, a total of 3,087 British merchantmen and eighty-nine privateers were captured during the war. Of those, 879 merchantmen and fourteen privateers were recaptured, resulting in an actual loss of 2,283 vessels. The second set of figures, based on the New Lloyd's List shows 3,386 vessels seized, with 495 recaptured and 507 ransomed for a total actual loss of 2,384. Unfortunately, the figures do not represent a true picture of rebel privateer activity. On the one hand, it seems likely that both tallies are incomplete. At the same time, however, although one writer asserts the tally of 3,087 represents prizes taken by rebel privateers alone, it actually includes prizes taken by the Continental and various state navies as well as the
French, Spanish, and Dutch. For instance, in 1780, the Spanish Navy captured fifty-five British merchantmen out of a single convoy.\textsuperscript{27}

Despite the fact that reliable figures are unavailable, several things are clear. A large number of rebel privateers and privateersmen were at sea during the war. Furthermore, they were fairly effective. As will be seen, they were certainly viewed as a serious threat by various elements within the empire, and though delayed, Britain's ultimate response was to fight fire with fire with privateers of her own. Loyalist privateering was, to a degree, a product of the British reply, and the loyalist desire to become involved in the activity was, in part, to counter those rebels engaged in the same pursuit. The British authorities, however, were not as enthusiastic about the idea and far less quick than the rebels to recognize any advantages to employing privateers of any kind, loyalist, British, or British colonial. When loyalist privateers were finally unleashed, the British reversed their views and fostered the very situation they had initially tried to avoid, civil war at sea. Members of the same society would confront each other in the same sanctioned, organized form of conflict governed by the same basic rules, established and controlled by a central authority.\textsuperscript{28}

With the commencement of hostilities in North America, the Royal Navy found itself facing a serious problem, a severe shortage of vessels. As late as September 29, 1775, after five months of conflict, there were only thirty vessels on the North American coast, inclusive of those in Canadian waters. Only ten of these were rated vessels, and most of these were of the sixth or smallest rate. The remaining majority were primarily sloops and schooners with sixteen guns or less. At that time, only fourteen additional warships were en route from England.\textsuperscript{29}
As if the immediate naval demand for these vessels was not enough, Vice-Admiral Samuel Graves had begun receiving requests from the loyalists of various regions for naval vessels to protect them, their possessions, and their interests from rebel threats even before hostilities erupted. To meet demands, Graves started hiring additional local craft from colonists. The owners were most certainly loyal to the Crown, and with their efforts, the first step towards loyalist involvement in the war at sea was witnessed. Along the coast, a need for ships forced other colonial officials to follow precedent and not only employ loyalist vessels, but crews as well, creating ad hoc, stop-gap forces to supplement the weak naval presence. With such actions, a number of future loyalist privateersmen smelled their first powder of the conflict. It is to the participants that we must now turn.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 1

1Lydon, Pirates, Privateers, p.73. 
2Ibid., p. 271. 
3Ibid., pp. 262, 272-274. 
4Swanson, Predators, p. 122. 
7Lydon, Pirates, Privateers, passim; and Williams, Liverpool Privateers, passim. The positive effect of privateering on the growth of New York and Liverpool is a dominant theme throughout both of the referenced studies.
8 Swanson, *Predators*, pp. 16-21, 27.


14 Winslow, "Wealth and Honour", pp. 16-17.


28 Calhoon, "Civil, Revolutionary," pp. 147, 154-155.


31 Narrative of Vice Admiral Samuel Graves, [March] 30, [1775], and Graves to Philip Stephens, Secretary of the Admiralty, April 11, 1775; in Clark, *NDAR*, 1:163, 178.
CHAPTER 2

"INFLUENCED BY MOTIVES OF LOYALTY, ZEALOUS FOR THE GOOD OF HIS
MAJESTY'S SERVICE, AND ACTUATED BY THE ELDEST LAW OF NATURE,
WE APPREHEND OURSELVES FULLY JUSTIFIED BY THE LAWS OF
GOD AND MAN:" AN OVERVIEW OF LOYALIST
BACKGROUNDS AND MOTIVATIONS

As stated, in accordance with trends in loyalist studies, a goal of this work is to establish identities, examine experiences, and then create profiles for loyalist privateers. In other words, an attempt will be made to determine who these people were and how and why they became what they did. Loyalist privateers generally comply with the historical image created for loyalists as a whole, but they also ad to it and occasionally challenge it. In addition, regional differences in their composition existed. Of course, demonstrating this requires reviewing the established loyalist composite image to create a point of departure for making comparisons. In association, a general overview, outlining loyalist privateers' backgrounds, positions, and experiences, will be presented. These topics will be developed more fully in later chapters. At the same time, however, motivational elements will be discussed in depth at this point. Their all-encompassing applicability to all loyalists, regardless of region, makes it more appropriate and convenient to deal with this issue separately. In particular, the argument will be made that among loyalists in general and loyalist privateers, specifically, negative forms of opportunism and self-
interest, especially with the intent to profit, were not factors prompting them to follow the courses they did, but public virtue was.

Identity in loyalist studies is synonymous with background and is created by distinguishing a combination of characteristics. These include such things as social class, economic status, occupation, nationality, race, gender, age, religion, political stance, place of birth, and residence. Some loyalist studies, when read in isolation from others, convey the distinct impression that loyalism was a middle and upper class phenomenon. The society was one of leaders without rank and file. In fairness, this impression generally seems to be unintentional and is primarily due to the nature of the source materials, the vast majority of which were generated by middle and upper class people. When loyalist studies are read in association, however, the various conclusions in combination support William H. Nelson's assertion that loyalists were socially, economically, and culturally diverse with participants reflecting a wide cross-section of identity defining traits. The social fabric of loyalism in general was a complex and varied weave. That of loyalist privateers, specifically, was no different. In terms of socio-economic background, privateers covered the spectrum from well-to-do public officials, through rich merchants and sea captains, lawyers, doctors, teachers, middle class shopkeepers, artisans, common seamen, and farmers, to slaves. Regarding ethnicity and race, they were comprised of men of English, Scots, Irish, German, Dutch, French, Portuguese, and African extraction. Also, in this traditionally male activity, women were occasionally involved. As to place of birth, there were both native and foreign-born participants. As to residence, while some colonies produced more privateersmen than others, all had men sailing for the king. In a broader regional sense, loyalism was more prevalent in urban coastal areas and remote back country locales. Needless to say, back country residents
did not dominate the ranks of privateers, but there was at least some involvement. On the other hand, logically, coastal urban areas were heavily represented. It was from such locales that the two social elements absolutely essential for privateering, merchants and mariners, came. Again, quite logically, the fact that loyalists as a group were adverse to radical change marks them as politically, socially, and economically conservative. In light of the diversity evident in other loyalist traits, it seems safe to say that loyalism in general attracted people of all ages. Unfortunately, data is insufficient to ascertain if the ages of loyalist privateers conformed to the presumed norm. This leaves the issue of religion as an element of loyalism. A number of writers have attempted to establish a link between loyalist political stance and religious affiliation. In the end, they are forced to admit that any such ties that might have existed were tenuous at best. Others state no correlation can be detected at all. In any case, the issue is really moot given that information on the religious affiliations of privateers is virtually non-existent.

Analysis of these various identity factors has resulted in two additional general assertions about the nature of loyalism. First, not only was the character of the movement multi-faceted in any given area, it could vary from one locale to another. This tendency is evident as well between privateersmen from different areas. For example, as will be shown, while New England privateers tended to be native born, in southern locales, first generation immigrants were more in evidence.

The second assertion is that loyalism was a movement of minorities. While privateersmen did not constitute a minority themselves, minority elements were certainly present in their midst. Most noteworthy was the large number of blacks, both slave and free who served on loyalist vessels. In addition, European ethnic backgrounds were repre-
presented by the occasional Portuguese and Frenchman in association with a somewhat greater number of individuals of German and Dutch heritage. Of course, women among privateers constituted a minority presence as well.

Despite a wealth of diversity among loyalist privateers, two groups of men (not mutually exclusive), merchants and mariners, logically dominated the activity, forming an essential core element around which all others gravitated. Between these two groups, all the elements required for successful privateering were brought to the table. The merchants supplied both venture and fixed capital, as well as business savvy. Both groups clearly possessed a knowledge of maritime affairs, and the mariners had the expertise to translate that knowledge into physical action at sea.

As to non-merchants associated with privateering and those lacking seafaring experience, the wealthier were generally involved as investors. Those of more modest means serving aboard vessels signed articles as landsmen or acted in the capacity of marines. Necessary specialists such as medical men and certain artisan types could transplant their practices to aboard ship.

Because of their function, privateers usually put to sea with larger crews than were necessary to sail the vessel under normal circumstances. Extra men were needed to help fight the vessel and provide crews for prizes. Many of the additional berths were filled with inexperienced personnel rated as landsmen, marines, or boys. Five extant crew rosters offer complete breakdowns of the ratings on specific privateers, allowing the ratio of skilled to unskilled men to be established. There were, of course, differences between vessels. One in particular, a barge, offered the seemingly disproportionate ratio of nine landsmen to six seamen. Given her nature, however, this might be expected. As a small craft propelled primarily with oars and intended
for use close inshore, she would not have required a crew with the experience to handle a larger, more complex, blue-water sailing vessel. As to the other four examples, two had crews in which the landsmen, marines, and boys made up about one-third of the compliment. On the remaining two, such crewmen represented only about one-quarter of the total. Regardless of their actual rating, these men and boys still constituted privateersmen, and as such, they warrant classification as mariners. Many who started their privateering careers at these lower levels undoubtedly advanced themselves with time and experience to the rating of seaman. It should be noted that none of the rosters examined designated between ordinary and able seamen.\textsuperscript{10}

With acknowledgment of the merchants and mariners, the traditional composite view of loyalists is altered, not by contradicting the picture already established, but by adding to it. The merchant class has often been a focus of loyalist studies, but such works fail to take note of the very active role these people played in privateering. Consequently, with acknowledgment of their involvement, another facet is added to the view of loyalist participation in the war.

Perhaps more important are the loyalist mariners, both officers and seamen, who have not been previously acknowledged to any significant degree and have remained unincorporated as an element in existing loyalist profiles. In fact, historians generally maintain that the vast majority of colonial mariners supported the rebels and comparatively few sided with the British. This premise is based on several arguments. Because colonial seamen held a strong antipathy for the Royal Navy, and thus the British, due to the employment of press gangs, and then were often involved in prewar mob disturbances arising from the political issues of the day, some historians believe these mariners were politically involved in support of the revolutionaries and remained so when war broke out.\textsuperscript{11}
While a large number of colonial seamen certainly did support the rebel movement, citing their disorderly conduct as evidence of their commitment is tenuous. By nature, Jack Tar was an adventurous rough and tumble sort of fellow. As such, it can be surmised that for many, participation in social disturbances was really only a matter of looking for and finding what they deemed fun while in port. Furthermore, the existing historical view is based on the assumption that all mariners in a port were American. In fact, at any given time, a considerable number of local seamen would be away on a voyage, while a large number of seafarers from other areas of the empire were visiting. Also, participation in prewar incidents does not mean an individual was firmly ensconced with the rebels. As will be seen, a number of loyalist privateersmen actively supported the prewar opposition to Britain before ultimately deciding to remain loyal.

Historian Richard B. Morris acknowledged Jack's tough, undisciplined nature as a factor for his involvement in civil disturbances. He saw it, however, as only one part of the equation leading to participation rather than a reason in and of itself. This aspect of Jack's character surfaced when prompted by deep resentments against royal authority, and in turn, this tendency was recognized and exploited by revolutionary leaders.¹²

Another argument presented to show that American mariners predominantly sided with the rebels is the fact so few claims for losses were filed by loyalist seamen after the war.¹³ In fact, there are very few claims of this nature, but on the other hand, there is no reason to expect an abundance of them. Life as a mariner was transient with minimal personal possessions limited to what would fit in a sea chest. In other words, there was not much to lose, and if a loss was incurred, it was probably viewed as just part of the inherent risks of seafaring. In turn, preparing a claim for so minimal a loss was simply
not worth the time or effort. Given the transient nature of the occupation, many were undoubtedly not in a position to file. Finally, it must be asked just how many common seamen possessed the educational background to prepare the written claim? Of the 145 men listed on seven articles of agreement which the individuals signed themselves, fifty-three, or over one-third, were unable to write so much as their names.\textsuperscript{14}

In any case, as the figures to be presented later will attest, a considerable number of American seamen were loyal to the Crown, and with the acknowledgment of their having been a large and significant part of the loyalist populace, the group's historical composite social image receives a new face, that of loyalist Jack Tar. Compounding this lack of acknowledgement of loyalist mariners, but adding to the interest of their makeup, is the fact that, as noted, a significant number were black.

The loyalist experience is a subject regularly focused upon by historians. Collective analysis of experiences has allowed different types of loyalists to be discerned with regard to the nature and degree of involvement. On the one hand, there were those loyalists who were neutral or passive. These were people who deep in their hearts supported the King, but for whatever reason, made an effort to remain detached from events and factious parties and uphold a middle of the road, low-profile stance.\textsuperscript{15}

On the other hand, there were active loyalists. These were people who openly made their stance known, vigorously supporting the British. Open support could take a variety of forms such as holding public office, performing civic and humanitarian duties, providing physical labor and logistical services, and of course, openly bearing arms in one capacity or another.\textsuperscript{16}
In between these two extremes were equivocal loyalists; those who displayed a marked degree of undecidedness. Equivocal loyalists can, in turn, be divided into three basic groups. First, there were those who really had no political ideology and simply went in whatever direction the wind was blowing at the time. Such individuals could as easily be called equivocal rebels and do not concern us here. Next, and pertinent, were those people who initially may have been truly confused and undecided on a course of action, but ultimately made the decision to side with the British. The third type of equivocal loyalist, also pertinent, was certainly the most interesting. These were individuals who began the conflict in active support of the rebels and then, openly switched their allegiance to the British. This group can, in turn, be subdivided yet again into two groups. There were those who sincerely supported the rebel cause at first. Then, there were those who feigned rebel allegiance to avoid trouble until such a time when it was prudent to make their true beliefs known.  

As with most loyalist categorizations, these groupings were not always mutually exclusive. While a great many loyalist privateersmen were open and active in their support of the King from the beginning, others obviously were not. Instead, they made the progression from passive and equivocal to active, in which capacity, given the nature of their commitment as privateers, they remained. It was not, however, just privateering that ultimately defined these men as highly dedicated loyalists. A significant number performed other services that aided the war effort. As such many of these men were at the pinnacle of loyalist activity.

Another aspect of the loyalist experience focused on by historians is their treatment at the hands of the rebels. In the past, loyalists have been portrayed as victims who were roughly handled by their opponents. More recently, however, there has been a trend towards ar-
guing that loyalists were not as oppressed and abused as was once maintained. Perhaps this was the case with loyalists in general, especially when those of a passive or equivocal nature who avoided confrontation are factored into the whole. Contrary to this, however, within the ranks of loyalist privateers as a group, there was a relatively high concentration of individuals who were severely ill-treated for their beliefs. Suffering took a variety of forms including loss of personal property, land, and business, imprisonment, exile, the disruption of families, and blatant physical abuse. This degree of suffering in relation to the level of dedication and activity of these individuals reflects the fact that loyalist privateers experienced an elevated and intensified level of involvement.

Why did people chose to remain or become loyal subjects? Motivation is a profile element historians have spent considerable time and effort trying to isolate and identify. Just as loyalists reflected a variety of backgrounds, the stance they adopted was undoubtedly prompted by a variety of factors. Motivation, however, with its many facets is an extremely elusive element, because primarily, as historians are forced to admit, loyalist statements accounting for their decisions are truly rare. Problematic though this is, it should really not come as any great surprise. Why should people who sincerely believed they did nothing wrong, and so felt no guilt, be expected as a matter of course to offer explanations for their innocent behavior? There was simply no reason for them to do so. In fact, the dearth of such accounts strongly supports that the vast number of loyalists maintained very clear consciences about their decisions and actions. Still, this is small consolation to anyone interested in establishing just what their motives were, and those who are so inclined must seek alternative means of doing so.
Simple logic relative to basic human nature can be employed to determine a number of motivational factors. Others can be defined through the collective analysis of identities and experiences. With the latter approach, certain shared affinities common to large segments of the loyalist community can be detected creating a degree of pattern upon which to isolate motivational elements. Of course, the results of such a method are nowhere near as conclusive and satisfying as if the participants themselves had succinctly outlined the reasons for their behavior.

A number of valid reasons for being a loyalist have been suggested, and these are evident among loyalist privateers, as well. These can be divided into tangible or physical, ideological, and emotional. In turn, some of these can be subdivided further into positive, or acceptable, and negative. Of course, as usual, these classifications are not mutually exclusive.

As to positive tangible reasons, kinship ties were a deciding factor as were business associations, both within the colonies and with Britain. Also, many public officials naturally supported the Crown which they represented. Such personal bonds were logically persuasive and difficult to break. Nationality and place of origin aided in many decisions. For instance, many of Scottish extraction cast their lot with the King, and many of them, as well as many of English extraction, were fairly recent first generation immigrants. Needless to say, such individuals had yet to acculturate, and were, in fact, still more British than colonial. Also, region was a factor as indicated by the concentration of loyalists along the coast and in the back country. The coastal areas were those with the most direct links to the mother country. The remote interior locales were those with the least ties, but perhaps needed and relied on them the most for their well being. A final physical reason was the immediate presence of
British troops. With the army or navy close at hand, many loyalists felt more secure about openly declaring themselves with the belief they could and would receive support and protection.  

Next, there were the positive ideological reasons. Religion falls into this category, but as noted, no significant information on the religious affiliations of loyalist privateers has been forthcoming. Historians have shown that basic morality, however, was undoubtedly an element in that resistance to established authority, especially violent resistance, was considered unacceptable behavior by many. There is also the fact these people, as viewed by historians, were socially and politically conservative and as such, simply did not favor change.

Most importantly, though some historians seem loath to accept it, or convey an inability to understand it if they do, ideologically, loyalists undoubtedly maintained a level of their own brand of public virtue. They sincerely believed in the King and the existing political system and would act in support of it. While not constituting a direct explanation for their actions, virtually all post-war loyalist claims contain a statement of the petitioner’s fidelity to King and country. While it could be argued that such declarations were simply politic and had to be made because of the position the memorialists found themselves in, their actions corroborated by the testimony of others support their sincerity.

Then there were the emotional factors, both positive and negative. Of course, closely tied to ideological belief in King and country was someone's love of the same. Fear of guilt and shame as a result of not doing one's part may have played a role as well.

Other emotional factors emerged due to direct contact with the rebels. Rebel abuse of loyalists, suspected and real, resulted in feelings that were certainly involved in the decision making process.
A scenario could play out as follows. A passive or equivocal loyalist would be the recipient of a personal affront from the rebels resulting in at least anger and sometimes the less than acceptable desire for revenge. Logically, smoldering loyalist sentiments were enflamed, the injured party disassociated himself from his abusers, and he declared for the king. Sometimes persecution was severe enough that an individual was left with no choice but to throw in with the British. For open, avowed loyalists who had already taken an active stand, such ill-treatment certainly served to strengthen their resolve. Some historians, however, convey a subtle implication that the victims were overreacting and not justified in the degree of their response to the situation.\textsuperscript{23}

That revenge was a motivating factor for some loyalist privateersmen is evident from the names of their vessels. Lists of New York privateers dating between the Fall of 1778 and the Summer of 1779 include the \textit{Tory's Revenge}, the \textit{Norfolk Revenge}, the \textit{Refugee's Revenge}, the \textit{Vengeance}, and the \textit{Retaliation}. In addition, there were three vessels simply called the \textit{Revenge}.\textsuperscript{24}

Ill-treatment produced another emotion, simple fear. For the abused party, there was logically a dread he would eventually be the recipient of additional and even greater physical or material harm unless he sought the protection and safety of the British. Fear was undoubtedly a factor even for those who did not directly suffer abuse. After witnessing the sufferings of others, they must certainly have entertained the notion that the same could happen to them. So, they responded accordingly by also seeking British security. Fear was a factor in a broader sense as well. Accepting the inherent conservative nature of loyalists as a whole, there was undoubtedly a strong fear of general political, economic, and social change if not outright upheaval.\textsuperscript{25}
In the case of those equivocal loyalists who started the conflict in sincere active support of the rebels another factor clearly played a role in their ultimately becoming loyalists. For some reason, they became disillusioned with the rebel cause, or that movement simply evolved to a point or moved in a direction they could no longer accept in good conscience. So, they felt the need to disassociate themselves. Of all the loyalist documents read for this study, in only a very few do the writers offer succinct reasons for their behavior. Interestingly, in two of these instances, the reasons were identical, and there is evidence for a third in the same vein. After each party had supported the rebels, neither could accept the idea of independence from Britain when affairs turned in that direction. Inability to accept a break from Britain is cited by some historians as a fairly common reason behind loyalist decisions.

Regarding negative motivation, revenge has already been mentioned. Historians have also viewed loyalists as opportunistic people prompted by self-interest. A number of studies, even sympathetic ones, convey the distinct impression that while many loyalists acted as they did for understandable, even acceptable reasons, those reasons were less noble than the lofty ideals motivating the rebels and certainly not sufficient to fully justify actions. The rebels were motivated by republican concepts essential to which was the idea of public virtue. A virtuous citizen was selfless, subordinating personal interests to meet civic obligations for the common good. In contrast, individuals acting in a self-interested manner were deemed corrupt and morally inferior. Also, while most studies pay lip service to the idea that some loyalists may actually have been sincerely devoted to the crown, the feeling is still conveyed that in light of their options, such a misguided stance is difficult to imagine. Consequently, there is often the implication, if not outright assertion, with an extremely negative
spin, that loyalists took advantage of the situation, maintained self-serving agendas, and conducted themselves accordingly. Their association with what was considered a self-interested, corrupt government is seen to support this. By implication, loyalists were incapable of self-sacrifice and so, corrupt themselves. They lacked the "For King and Country" British equivalent of public virtue. While there is little doubt revenge was a motivational element for some, it is unlikely a negative form of self-interest prompted many loyalists to take the road they did.27

This historical outlook pertaining to self-interest is certainly problematic from a philosophical point of view. The line between self-interest and patriotism is often very thin, if it exists at all. An individual only supports a government because he or she believes in and identifies with it, and doing so serves a purpose, either spiritually or materially. In other words, a government must first have something worthwhile to offer that will support and enhance the people's well being and chosen lifestyle before those people validate it with their support. When a government ceases to give the people what they want, it is time to reassess, and when it is found that nothing more is forthcoming in support of the people's desired way of life, then, possibly, it is time for something new. Upon reflection, when push came to shove, loyalists decided they were basically content with British rule. Those who became rebels clearly were not. By definition, a revolution involves change. If an individual supports a revolution, it indicates a desire for change. Why? The answer is to create a situation in which one will be allowed to better one's self and lead an improved life. Thus, support of a revolution is certainly self-serving. Furthermore, pursuing such a course of action is usually done at the expense of others through violent imposition, which is certainly indicative of severe unfeeling selfishness. The bottom line is
there would not have been a revolution if people did not hope to gain something from it, and so, in conjunction, statements to the effect that loyalists suffered from self-interest hold little weight if for no other reason than the extreme double standard they reflect.

Three maxims that always need to be kept in mind when dealing with loyalists is that they did not want the war, they did not start the war, and many were given little choice about their participation in the war. Loyalist involvement was merely a defensive response, and as such, in accordance with the prevailing eighteenth century views on civilized conflict, theirs was a truly just war, as much theirs as Britain's. Loyalist privateer George Leonard, quoted in the chapter title, was certainly of this opinion. His statement, "we apprehend ourselves fully justified by the laws of God and man," continued, "in making retaliations and reprisals." As a group, loyalists were a people who saw no need for drastic change. They did not want something more, better, or different. On the contrary they were basically content with what they had and were attempting to maintain it. In other words, loyalist activity stemmed from the basic need of self-preservation created by circumstances brought about by others. A large part of self-preservation on this level involves support of a government that allows one to exist in the manner desired. To preserve yourself, you help preserve the power that protects and so insures the way of life you feel is best. The whole thing is a give and take symbiotic relationship. Consequently, self-preservation and survival should not be confused with opportunistic self-interest. Where is the problem in desiring to maintain the status quo? As matters stand, historically, the rebel's desire for change resulting in self-improvement is positive and not indicative of self-interest, whereas the loyalist desire to maintain the status quo is negative and reflective of self-serving interests. This is really rather illogical.
To examine this issue on another basic level, a maxim for inspiring patriotism is the bottom line need to defend home and family. Defense of these entities is a fundamental element in defense of country. Loyalists were certainly trying to do this. Everything they had worked for and possessed was suddenly threatened. In fact, many found themselves in a situation more dire. Having already lost heavily in terms of property, possessions, and business to the rebels, and with families sometimes split up, they were doing more than defending and maintaining. They were attempting to simply survive and regain what had been lost.

Supporting the argument that a strong element of sincere selflessness motivated loyalists is the simple fact that so many voluntarily put themselves in harm’s way, actively bearing arms for the King. Historians estimate between 10,000 and 50,000 adult males served in the Provincial Corps and militia units at different times during the war. They might have avoided involvement and let the British resolve matters for them. This is especially significant where first generation immigrants of British origin are concerned, especially the more recent arrivals. They would seem the most logical candidates to simply pack up, disassociate themselves, and return home. Yet, a great many did not. Viewing the war as much theirs as Britain’s, numerous loyalists did not shirk their duty, but rather elected to do their part and see matters brought to a favorable conclusion. Of the few men who offered their reasons for being active loyalists, George Leonard, who will be quoted at the end of the chapter, conveyed this sentiment. In addition, as will be seen, a number of loyalists had made their position clear before the commencement of hostilities, so they certainly were not acting on the belief that war would be beneficial to them. Also, there is the fact that a considerable number of the loyalists in question met with substantial abuse from the rebels from
the beginning, indicating they maintained strong, well established views from early on. It is unlikely shifty, self-serving opportunists would leave themselves open to such ill-treatment by publicly expounding in favor of issues that obviously did not matter to them. Furthermore, the experience of rebel abuse must certainly have conveyed to many that open support of the British might not be easy or pleasant, even if they believed the British would quickly resolve matters in their favor. Finally, as will also be shown, a number of these men suffered what can only be defined as serious injustices at the hands of the British, the very people they supported. Yet, their allegiance did not waver despite such incidents.

Opportunistic, self-interested behavior is often ascribed to three key elements of the loyalist community. First, black loyalists, in particular, slaves, are often viewed by historians in this light. Free blacks were, theoretically, in a position to make the same choices for the same reasons as whites. Slaves, however, acted in accordance with a different set of circumstances. In fact, loyalist slaves can be further subdivided into two groups, those still in bondage to loyalist masters and those who had run away from rebel owners. Regarding the former, their motivation, if it can be called that, was obvious. They acted in accordance with the dictates of their owners. Logically, at least some were not at all happy with their situation. Two slaves, each named Ned and owned by North Carolina loyalist John Hamilton, jumped ship from the privateer brig Britania in which Hamilton was part owner.

As for runaways, escaping their situation as slaves with hopes of gaining the freedom held up as a reward by the British is the reason most often cited by historians for these blacks having become loyalists. This was undoubtedly a very real and widespread motivating factor. Slaves prompted by this incentive, however, are generally
viewed historically as being merely opportunistic. The reasons for their actions were distinct from and without regards to the broad, mainstream issues and the various traditional ties to Britain prompting white loyalists. Runaway slaves simply took advantage of the situation. While no historian can be accused of begrudging slaves their attempts at freedom, these views on motivation seem to cast a slight, negative pall, perhaps unintentionally, over the participation of black loyalists. Accordingly, relative to white participants, slave motivation becomes less pure. There is the unstated implication that their involvement lacked some degree of integrity, because for their own benefit, they opportunistically selected the side generally perceived as the enemy with whom they shared no affinity. This outlook has led to the refusal of at least one historian to accept blacks as true loyalists, and it has caused others to qualify and temper their classification.34

In reality, this is rather demeaning with the implication that slaves could not be politically aware and make their decisions accordingly. As Sylvia Frey has argued, the slave community was undoubtedly quite knowledgeable of events, issues, and their significance. The very fact slaves were aware that the British were offering freedom to runaways supports this. By running away and joining the loyalist ranks, tens of thousands of slaves made a conscious personal decision, exhibiting an awareness of the situation, to select a side and become active participants.35 They were electing to undergo sacrifices the same as, if not greater than, white loyalists. Under the circumstances, the numerous slaves who served on privateers should be accorded full status as loyalists.

Public officials constitute the second element of the loyalist community who are often viewed as self-interested. In essence, there are assertions that these men remained loyal to the crown because it
was the crown who supplied them with a livelihood. On a certain level, there is undoubtedly a great deal of truth in this, but again, a very negative spin has been put on what was generally an innocent situation. The negative view of public officials, however, is quite weak in that it fails to acknowledge the fact that many of these men were public officials in the first place because they were civic minded, believing in what they did and the system they did it for. As such they naturally followed the already established line of heart and conscience rather than the lure of pay. Negative self-interest, with regards to officials, is not applicable as a motivation. Also, if for no other reason, this opinion is invalidated by the blanket manner in which it is seemingly applied to all public officials, which simply defies credibility.

Nowhere is the sentiment that loyalists were opportunistic and self-serving more apparent than in the historical treatment of the merchant class. Historians regularly assert that negative self-interest was that group's primary motive for remaining loyal. More specifically, continued allegiance to the British would prove the most financially profitable course to steer. According to the historical interpretation, the merchants believed they would make a fortune in trade.

Of course, this easily translates into their actions having been founded on the less than virtuous reason of simple greed. In turn, by republican standards, this means they were corrupt. There may have been some merchants who for some reason entertained such notions, just as some rebel merchants undoubtedly did the same. But, in general, the prevailing historical view is very difficult to accept if for no other reason than the vista is so all-encompassing. It is again problematic from a philosophical standpoint, as well, when examined in light of the known facts. As to general self-interest, to a degree, a certain
element did exist among loyalist merchants, but it was definitely not negative. Instead, it manifested itself in a basic desire for simple self-preservation and survival rather than increased riches. The possibility of financial gain was certainly not a serious factor, if it was a factor at all, prompting loyalist merchants to remain loyal.

Among loyalists, merchants in particular were conservative individuals, and as such, they were not seeking something new or more. They had been merchants previously, still were, and would be. Making money and being successful were key to their existence and happiness. The existing government and the trade situation it had established were essential in making the attainment of the merchants' goals possible. For merchants, Britain was the fosterer, nurturer, and protector of the trade that constituted the basis of their existence. Rather than attempting financial gain, they were trying to avoid the financial loss that disruption of government, society, and thus, trade would result in. Their inclination to support Britain merely reflected a desire to preserve that good existence they believed they had and maintain a status quo trade situation. Undeniably, this is a rather natural instinct for which it is difficult to condemn someone. Furthermore, from the merchant's point of view of the empire, trade was the major element holding it together. Therefore, support of government for a continuance of the established trade situation was clearly for the common good.38

If a loyalist were profit oriented, he could view the situation from two perspectives. First, he could think in terms of more immediate, short term profits that might be gleaned as a direct result of the war. At the same time, he might view matters in the sense of long term profits. This would entail looking to the post-war future with a speculative eye to what the trade situation would be after the British successfully defeated the rebels. In essence, a merchant might hope
not only for a secure market situation protected by British might, but an improved one as well. Neither of these views for loyalist motivation, however, stand the test. Why? As will be seen shortly, no serious, immediate market opportunities existed for loyalists. As to long term, there is nothing to suggest there was anything to speculate on, or that the postwar era would be any different from that preceding. In all likelihood it would have been business as usual following the war. Consequently, any eye to the long term future was undoubtedly for maintaining or returning to the status quo rather than toward the possibility of even greater financial rewards.

Furthermore, the facts of the matter belie that loyalist merchants, and by association, mariners, acted for opportunistic, profit oriented reasons. On the contrary, their responsive behavior relative to events which negatively affected them indicates a high level of public virtue. Although designed to control and suppress rebel trade, the Restraining and Prohibitory Acts severely restricted loyalist maritime commerce as well, making it difficult even for them to make any money. The first Restraining Act, affecting only the New England colonies, was passed on March 30, 1775. Individuals there could not export any domestically grown or manufactured enumerated commodities to anyplace in the empire. They could not re-export enumerated commodities from other British domains to any place other than Britain and the West Indies. As to non-enumerated goods, domestic or imported from elsewhere with the intent to re-export, such could not be shipped to any point other than Britain, the West Indies, or Ireland. All imports to New England had to first pass through Britain. The only exceptions to these rules concerned the import and export of provisions for the army and navy, and the import of raw materials and manufactures from the West Indies. In addition, all ships' paperwork had to be in complete order, and the region's fishing vessels were generally
banned from operating in the North Atlantic. Failure to comply would result in stiff fines, loss of bond, and seizure of vessel and cargo.\textsuperscript{39}

Almost two weeks later, on April 13, the second Restraining Act passed. Pertaining to the remaining colonies with the exception of New York, North Carolina, and Georgia, its mandates were virtually identical to those of the first. The three exempted colonies were granted consideration on the grounds that they were still believed to be basically loyal, and so, were salvageable. The two acts would go into effect on July 1, and July 20, respectively.\textsuperscript{40}

By May 25, Vice Admiral Samuel Graves, Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Navy in North America, had received copies of both acts.\textsuperscript{41} In the interim, he, too, had issued pertinent orders against colonial trade. He directed his captains to take possession of any unauthorized vessel carrying arms or provisions into the colonies.\textsuperscript{42}

Of note is the fact that no exceptions were made for friends of government in any of these acts or orders. On the contrary, the negative, limited trade situation established by them affected loyalists as well as rebels. As such, affairs were not conducive for loyalists to believe the atmosphere was ripe for turning major profits from trade during the war.

In early July, additional directives were sent from London. All trade between the rebellious middle and southern colonies, including New York and North Carolina, would cease. More significantly, all New England vessels became subject to seizure with the notable exception of those belonging to friends of government. Considerate though this might initially sound, it could only have been a small consolation to New England and other loyalist merchants for whom the trade situation had actually just worsened. In essence, though New England loyalist merchants could keep their vessels, there was even less they and other loyalist merchants could do with them. Furthermore, all indications
are the burden of proof as to one's loyalty would be exacting and fall upon the individual. Consequently, for any loyalist merchant choosing to pursue any remaining commerce options, operations would still be potentially risky when conducted under the watchful eye of a zealous Royal Navy which had authority to stop and search all vessels.43

On September 2, conditions worsened when yet another order was sent from London updating Graves' instructions. At this point, all vessels belonging to the twelve colonies already referred to (Georgia was still exempt) were to be seized unless it was apparent they were en route directly to or from Britain, Ireland, or the West Indies. In addition, the crews of colonial vessels could be impressed.44

While the September 2 directives failed to take note of loyalists, they had, in fact been acknowledged two days earlier in a separate dispatch to Graves. By it, loyalist merchants were granted the opportunity to remove their wares and merchandise to the security of their vessels, and then, seek naval protection. At that point, they would be allowed "every Indulgence which the Law will allow." While this sounds favorable, the law no longer allowed for much. Between late March and early September, 1775, trade opportunities for loyalist merchants had gone from bad to worse, diminishing significantly. Of course, profits undoubtedly diminished accordingly. All this, however, was really only a prelude of what was to come.45

On December 20, 1775, a bill even more restrictive in nature, the Prohibitory Act, passed. Replacing the two Restraining Acts and going into effect in stages between January 1 and August 1, 1776, the Prohibitory Act declared that all vessels belonging to and all others trading with the thirteen colonies (Georgia was now considered in a state of rebellion as well) were to be seized. In effect, all colonial commerce was to come to a halt. No exceptions were made for loyalists. The only vessels exempt were those in government service or those pos-
sessing government licenses to carry stores and provisions to the
army, navy, and the civilian populaces of garrisoned areas.46

With the advent of this bill, any loyalist who, up to this
time, might have entertained unrealistic hopes of taking advantage of
the situation and turning a profit, must certainly have had those
hopes squashed. For loyalist merchants, whether or not they suffered
the usual wartime problems of blockade and enemy predators was of lit-
tle consequence, because they still could not get their vessels to sea
and trade freely in the manner they once had.

In conjunction, it was difficult in any case, if not impossible,
for loyalist merchants to export goods for other reasons. Many were or
would be cut off from their sources of trade goods and materials be-
cause production regions were in rebel hands. This was compounded by
the fact many were dispossessed with the result that their business
connections were severed. In essence, the situation was very disrup-
tive to trade.

Unable to export and with import opportunities severely limited,
business was curtailed. For loyalist merchants, the situation allowed
only two possible but unattractive options to circumvent restrictions.
An individual could remove himself, his family, and his entire opera-
tion to a point outside the thirteen colonies, reregister his ves-
sel(s), and resume business in a new locale. Of course, this is assum-
ing the individual in question still had something to relocate with
and was willing to abandon his home. Furthermore, one historian has
indicated efforts to relocate were problematic, not only because of a
lack of capital, but also because of a lack of business connections in
new locales.47 While, as will be seen, some chose this route, the ma-
jority of future privateers chose the alternative to remain in Amer-
ica. For many, however, this still entailed a disrupting relocation to
a British-held port and adapting to new, but very restricted market
situations and business associations. For those remaining in British-held colonial ports within the thirteen colonies, all that could be done was to petition for a license and contract to carry necessary stores and provisions for the services and civilian population they protected. While this alternative would at least keep some vessels in service, keep some seamen employed, and provide some income (perhaps even a good one), such heavily controlled, limited, and rather menial employment, if it could be had at all, was hardly the sort of business venture many of these men were used to. Yet many opted for this despite the unfavorable situation. The fact that so many did not give up and remained under the circumstances says a great deal about their sincerity of devotion and level of commitment. Of course for loyalist merchants remaining in rebel held areas, there were no options at all.

Given that these trade restrictions began at an early date and rapidly increased, few, if any, loyalist merchants could have made their decision without a knowledge of them. Furthermore, the Prohibitory Act would remain in place, with only a couple of specific concessions being granted, throughout the period covered in this study. Consequently, it is impossible to imagine that any loyalist merchant, aware of the restrictions as anyone must certainly have been, would even consider that the war might prove a profitable opportunity. On the contrary, the situation was such that loyalists could not hope to make money. They could not hope to gain anything from the war. Those attempting to maintain the status quo could not even do that for the time being. In light of this, any loyalist who still might think he could turn a profit on the war and who acted for strictly self-serving opportunistic reasons, had to have been on the one hand, either very naive or stupid, or on the other, an extremely adventurous speculator. Any individual, however, who was solely profit minded and willing to gamble to such a degree, would have found the rebels just as attrac-
tive if not more so. With them, there was the opportunity of new markets and avoidance of the British trade restrictions. In fact, on a certain level it could be argued that the effects of the Acts were harder on loyalists than they were on the rebels. The latter were at least in a position to be free to ignore and defy the acts, whereas the loyalists were not. Yet, in spite of the negative effects of the Restraining and Prohibitory Acts, the men in question remained loyal. Ironically, these trade restrictions did have one positive effect. Ultimately, unable to conduct their normal business regimen, loyalist merchants and mariners were forced to seek alternative business opportunities as a matter of survival, and for many, privateering fit the bill perfectly. As will be seen, however, the Prohibitory Act did little, initially, to promote that course of action either.

The ill-effects of the trade acts did not stop with the merchants. They undoubtedly extended further to disrupt the associated occupations of others, especially mariners. Logically, a reduction in trade would result in a lack of employment opportunities for many masters and seamen. Nevertheless, large numbers of these men remained loyal, supporting the idea that making money was not a serious factor in their decisions either.

The Prohibitory Act impacted some loyalists' trading activities to an even greater degree. A number of loyal merchants and mariners actually lost vessels to the Royal Navy because of it. Despite such injustices, these men remained loyal. This particular incurrence of losses instead of profits says a great amount about the sincerity of their stance.

The reader need keep in mind that loyalist trade was negatively affected by factors other than British legislation. Loyalist merchants were also under the constraints of the Continental Association, the stipulations of which forbade the import and later, export, of goods
in an effort to force Britain to redress grievances. Being caught in violation of the Articles could easily result in the loss of cargo and possibly vessel. As such, loyalist merchants, and mariners as well, were truly caught in the middle of a less than happy situation.

As stated, most of what can be defined as loyalist motivation is founded on basic logic and an understanding of human nature, and as a result, conclusions are primarily speculative. Furthermore, as historians will agree, for any given individual, when the decision was made, it was likely made for a variety of deeply personal and intertwined reasons. Still, in light of loyalist response to influential events such as the trade acts, there is no reason to doubt the majority of merchants and mariners who turned privateer were sincere in their convictions and very active support of the Crown. In actuality, loyalists were really no different from the rebels. In their own way, they were just as virtuous. Of course, among the good, there was undoubtedly, as always, an element of the bad and the ugly.

Having outlined the basic attractions of privateering and, in general, discussed the factors prompting men to be loyalists in the first place, this study will now address the reasons these individuals became privateers. Before continuing, it need be noted that again, a general lack of relative source materials results in some speculative suggestion. For hundreds of owners and officers and thousands of seamen, information pertaining to their background, war-time experience, or both is sadly lacking. Information that does exist is often sketchy and episodic at best. As for personal explanations about why men became privateers, they are almost as rare as those outlining why they were loyalists in the first place. There are, however, some informa-
tive accounts of their actions and pertinent commentary by peers and associates that reflect their mindset.

What motivated a large portion of the loyalist community centering on the merchant and mariner classes to enter into privateering? There were undoubtedly a number of factors in combination prompting any individual's involvement. If it were accepted that the merchants, in general, were driven by greed, then there would be a simple answer. In the same manner that some historians believe opportunistic, profit oriented self-interest motivated loyalist merchants, other historians maintain the same incentives were the factors behind anyone becoming a privateer at any time. If this were the case, quite logically, loyalist merchants could be expected to pursue this course of action. Privateering would offer yet another financial opportunity to cash in on the war and further enrich their coffers. This was not, however, the situation. A number of legitimate reasons motivated men to take up privateering, not the least of which was a high level of public virtue.

While the possibility of making some money was undoubtedly a strong motivating factor for loyalists to privateer, it was generally so only in a qualified sense, free of negative implications. Furthermore, money was certainly not the only reason to become involved. In the annals of privateering, loyalists were rather unique. Privateersmen at other times or places usually had the luxury of operating out of safe, secure, home ports, and were allowed a greater latitude in their decisions about whether or not to become privateersmen. Many loyalist privateers, however, were dispossessed, needy, and desperate. While men at other times and places resorted to privateering out of necessity, because their trade was adversely affected by war, those men still had the option of trying to pursue the normal regimen and attempt to trade. For loyalist merchants and mariners, because of the
trade acts, even this narrow window of opportunity was shut. Hands were seriously tied. Privateering offered the only really viable option for many to be able to maintain themselves and their families. So, financially speaking, the loyalists' desire to become involved with privateering was not a matter of making more money for money's sake. It was a matter of making some money to survive. This seems to have been the case with Roger and Robert Stewart, Virginia merchant/mariners, who had lost heavily in terms of property and trade. With their last remaining vessel they took up privateering, and of her they said, "she cruised with various success" and "afforded to them a tolerable but precarious subsistence."^{52}

For many others of lesser status, the need to acquire a means of support was particularly crucial. Thousands of refugees flocked to New York, creating a serious indigent problem. For many in need of income, serving on a letter of marque or a privateer, if not the only employment opportunity, was certainly an attainable one. So, simply put, and not to detract from other, more noble motivating factors that acted in association, for many, privateering offered the prospect of an occupation so they could subsist. To others, it handed up the opportunity to offer employment to those in need. George Leonard declared this was a major reason for his fitting out seven armed vessels.^{53}

One thing can be said with absolute certainty about loyalist privateersmen. Given the initial opposition to the activity and the late date of its acceptance, few, if any, merchants or ships' masters (those men essential to instigating operations) became loyalists just in order to go privateering. It was simply not a realistic option at the time the vast majority of these individuals made their decision. If nothing else, the trade restrictions imposed by the Prohibitory Act served to deter such ideas. According to the act's mandates, prize goods were considered no different than any other trade commodity. As
such, loyalists of New York or Newport could not bring them into port without a license, and once there, they certainly could not export them. Of course, initially, this would have negatively affected the attraction of privateering for any profit-minded individual by reducing potential yield. What was the point of going to all the time and trouble to privateer when it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to realize a worthwhile return from your investment. Before anyone could privateer freely and effectively in the traditional manner, trade restrictions governing prize goods needed to be lifted, or a means of circumventing them needed to be found. Yet, despite these limiting factors, many still wanted to enter into privateering.54

Because some historians, and even some contemporaries, have viewed privateering as an opportunistic, self-serving, profit-minded activity that amounted to little more than legalized piracy and hurt war efforts by siphoning off men and materials needed for more crucial roles, it is considered tainted and distasteful in some circles.55 These views thus convey the implication that men associated with privateering did not have the same level of public virtue as soldiers in the ranks facing selfless death without the prospect of compensatory reward. Such writers seem to forget that many a Continental soldier was induced into the army with promises of high bounties and rather substantial land grants while naval personnel on both sides were afforded the opportunity of prize money in addition, at least theoretically, to regular pay. While men signing articles on letters of marque received seamen's pay, those joining privateers did not. Their only prospect of financial recompense was if prizes were actually taken, and even then monetary reward was not a certainty.

Most contemporaries did not maintain negative views of privateers. The vast number of accounts appearing in the newspapers indicates the public clamored for news of their activities and viewed the
participants as heroic in stature. Furthermore, if there was a real problem at the time with the virtue of privateersmen, and the idea of their making money was distasteful, it must be asked why governments generally went so far to encourage and support the activity. In the mercantile world, deriving an income at the expense of one's enemies was exactly what governments wanted and privateers could do. Considering that during the conflicts for empire during the eighteenth century increased control of trade and the enhancement of economic status were primary considerations for a country going to war, what greater service could there be than to wage it in a fashion that maintained an eye to this end? There was no stigma. Making money by appropriating an opponent's wealth was respectable and deemed every bit as important as seizing his territories and defeating his army and navy. In short, in accordance with the views of the period, privateering served what was perceived as the common good. Consequently, even if loyalist privateers acted for reasons of financial gain it was legitimate for them to do so in the eyes of the western world. George Leonard, when stating in reference to privateering, "profit and honor are inseparably blended" clearly conveyed this belief.

While some historians view privateering distastefully, there is a popular perception that maintains an overly attractive, romantic image of the activity. The life of a privateersmen was glamorous, swashbuckling, and full of adventure with the added prospect of acquiring wealth. There was freedom from all the harsh and distasteful aspects of military and naval service. Even with this outlook, an air of self-interest is still implicit in that it conveys there was an unwillingness on the part of privateers to face the harsher rigors of war.

In reality, privateering was a very serious undertaking, not to be taken lightly. The investment costs were considerable, the risks
were high, and the chances of turning an exceedingly large profit, if any, were relatively slim. Concerning the profitability of privateering in general, some historians maintain that in actuality only a very few individuals amassed any serious wealth from their involvement, and what returns others realized were not really worthwhile. Other historians, however, assert that while most participants did not become rich, the chance to turn a tidy profit, justifying one's efforts, did exist, and a fair number realized what were at least worthwhile rewards for their time and trouble. Regardless, everything came down to chance. Involvement entailed a major gamble, and so a major decision. For investors, the possibility of losing a vessel at sea or backing an unsuccessful cruise were very real, both resulting in serious financial loss which, for many loyalists, could be ill-afforded. Furthermore, there were the physical risks for crewmen. Daily, at sea, a privateersmen faced a variety of life threatening situations ranging from the constant hazards of seafaring to intermittent, vicious combat. He could end up just as dead or permanently maimed as a soldier shouldering a musket in the ranks. Perhaps even worse, he might languish in a rebel prison such as the infamous Simsbury Mines.

Privateering was well established by the time of the revolution, and the experienced merchants and mariners who chose to become involved knew what the score was. These men were not starry-eyed fortune hunters. Privateering required serious commitment and a willingness to risk the incurrence of serious loss, financial and physical. It was not for the faint hearted. In light of this, with anyone who pursued privateering, a motivation other than making money had to have been present. There had to be a desire to assist in the war effort which, in association with the risk factors, indicates a willingness to sacrifice and thus, a serious level of public virtue. To look at this from a different angle, the fact that so many people on both sides be-
came privateers supports the idea that if the activity was self-serving, then, a very large part of society did not hold with the concept of public virtue. If that was, in fact, the case, then there are certainly no grounds for attaching a stigma to privateering or the people associated with it. The entire argument becomes moot.

As will be shown, that virtue played a large part in what these men did is confirmed by their other wartime activities. The lives of many were far from being solely devoted to privateering. A number served in a military capacity as well. Others acted as indispensable pilots and guides for the Royal navy. A fair number were quite involved in civic affairs both as office holders and humanitarians.

More specifically related to the war at sea and privateering, the conduct of a number of these men and women supports the opinion that virtue was a key element in their behavior. Just as the negative factor of revenge is apparent in the names of vessels, so is patriotism evident. Again, drawing on the lists of privateers commissioned at New York between September, 1778 and July, 1779, one encounters references to the Prince of Wales, the Prince William, the Royal Charlotte, the Queen Charlotte, the Hibernia, the St. Andrew, the St. Patrick, the St. George, the British Tar, the Loyal Subject, and of course, represented by two each, the Britannia and the King George. In addition, no less than twenty-four other vessels were named after lesser political, military, naval, and royal personages such as the Germain, the Dunmore, the Sir Henry Clinton, the Lord Howe, and even the Prince of Hesse. 61

George Leonard spent his fortune fitting out seven armed vessels, three transports, and some armed boats, and then, for the good of the cause, offered their services to the British for less than lucrative convoy, transport, and guide duty. Later, when referring to the Associated Loyalists, while undoubtedly exaggerating somewhat, he
declared none were motivated by profit. John Macklin, in addition to serving with the Royal Navy, spending time as a prisoner-of-war, and being wounded three times, commanded a commissioned vessel for Governor Patrick Tonyn of East Florida, never receiving pay for his services. Another example is found with William Chambers prior to his becoming a privateer captain. A trading venture of his to the Bahamas coincided with the Continental Navy's attack on the islands in 1776. Described as the only man willing to risk his life and ship to keep valuable and much needed gunpowder out of rebel hands, Chambers, at Governor Montfort Browne's request, immediately threw his cargo overboard to make room for the powder, chartered his vessel to Browne, and carried the munitions to St. Augustine.

Virtue was particularly in evidence with female privateers. The New York loyalist press heralded the patriotic efforts of Ann Burgess, Isabella Burton, and Anne McAdam. Following the examples set by the Marchioness of Granby, Queen Charlotte, herself, and other English women, and acting as principal owners, these three ladies initiated a subscription for loyalist women to raise money to fit out the appropriately named privateer sloop Royal Charlotte. Governor Tryon, also impressed with their commitment, commented on their actions in a dispatch to Germain.

Their activity certainly stirred the soul of at least one individual, Exul Virginiensis, prompting him to pen the following wonderful doggerel verse as a New Year's gift for their efforts.

When female hearts beat high for virtuous Fame,  
And patriot passions glow with hallowed flame;  
Their good designs, who can refrain to paint?  
Tho' weak his colours, and his lines tho' faint.  
Hail! Lovely Fair! who grace that safe retreat,  
Where Britain's friends in cordial union meet;  
Whose well-taught minds, in just connection view,  
What's to your God, your King, and Country due:  
Since your sweet bosoms loyal ardours feel,  
And true concern disclose for publick-weal;  
Since you adopt our Royal Charlotte's plans,  
Who, to her sex, a bright example stands;
Assured be, that ev'ry honest Man
Will idolize THE FAIR AMERICAN;
Brave loyal Tars, with Hearts of Oak, will vie,
For you to fight, to conquer, live or die;
By you inspir'd, they'll plead our common cause,
With vengeful Thunder, 'gainst the Congress laws;
Firm to sustain, and resolute to dare,
The Friends of George, no Gaus or Yankies fear:
With equal haste, the French and Rebels beat,
As if they rush'd your lovely lips to meet.

Soon as full arm'd, you bid your Privateer,
Go, share the trophies of the rising year;
Her martial crew, their vent'rous course, they urge;
Thro' Neptune's plains, piratic Gangs to scourge;
Our ancient foes, in naval combats, foil;
Still, in your laps, to pour the golden spoil:
Some Poet too, will tell each British Dame,
That New-York Ladies emulate their Fame;
On their lov'd Queen, still fix their faithful eyes,
To catch her manners living as they rise;
Your loyal compact, with due praise rehearse,
And place your names, in some immortal verse.

Thus, when Rebellion, to her native Hell,
With Diabolods, is confin'd to dwell;
Your gallant Youths, will claim no higher Prize,
Than New-York Nymphs, in chaste endearing ties:
Then, should they deign, to bliss each am'rous boy -
Muse - Haste - A curtain o'er those scenes of Joy.  

Another loyalist whose conduct, though in part activated by revenge, was also motivated by a high degree of selflessness was John Goodrich, Sr. At one point in the war, having already lost heavily to the rebels, he declared, "I am in the old Stile working for nothing and finding myself - but am determined to Persevere for my King & Country should I wreck a Second fortune." As commander of a privateer, rather than pursue rebel shipping, he spent the war offering his services, without pay, as a guide and consultant to the British on their various forays into the Chesapeake Bay. In fact, despite numerous historical assertions to the contrary, there is no evidence that as the captain of a commissioned vessel, he ever actually seized a rebel vessel. As to his conduct, in post-war testimonials, a British admiral, a commodore, a general, and a governor used such descriptive phrases as, "self disinterested conduct," "disinterested Patriotism," "zealous disinterested conduct," and "the most zealous & disinterested Conduct."
Perhaps the most exemplary instances of the patriotic spirit of loyalist mariners occurred during similar incidents in July, 1778, and July, 1780. Each time, the presence of a threatening French fleet coincided with crew shortages in the British fleet at New York. In the first instance, both officers and crews of transports and merchantmen in the harbor volunteered en masse to fill naval vacancies until the crisis had passed. Between 200 and 300 men answered the initial call, and ultimately 1,000 came forward. Others offered the services of their vessels. In the second situation, Vice Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot requested the New York Chamber of Commerce to help raise 400 to 500 sailors for the Royal Navy. By the afternoon, the Chamber had already gathered 350 volunteers. Within twenty-four hours a total of 2,000 had made themselves available. Another example of loyalist aid to the navy was that of Samuel Pearce, owner of twenty privateers, who claimed he always loaned his crews whenever the navy needed them.69

Finally, as will be seen, the actions of some, specifically as privateersmen, support a virtuous motivation rather than a purely financial one. Often, loyalist privateers freely engaged rebel warships or privateers in serious actions. The significance of this is that if profit minded, they could have avoided such actions and chosen to search for safer, more vulnerable and lucrative merchantmen. That they opted instead to incur serious physical risk in a fight offering less reward says a great deal. Joseph Galloway certainly held up such conduct as evidence of loyalist virtue.70

Another major reason for British and British colonial merchant/mariners (other than those in the thirteen colonies) to back privateers was the belief that their employment would assist in the defense of trade. They deemed privateering a counter response to their rebel opponents involved in the same activity. For the true mainland loyalist, however, during the period covered by this study, this could only
have been an indirect and general motivating force. Apart from their vessels in government carrying service, they really had no immediate commerce to protect. Still, the employment of loyalist privateers would be a factor in the defense of the empire's trade in general, and undoubtedly at least some loyalists were public spirited enough to view matters in this broader light. Joseph Galloway certainly perceived prospective loyalist privateers acting for this reason.71

It need be pointed out that some men occasionally entered into privateers for rather unique personal reasons. A sickly Collin Mackenzie signed articles on a St. Augustine privateer "for the Benefit of Sea-Air." His efforts were rather counter-productive, resulting in his being captured and imprisoned in Charlestown.72

Privateering was undoubtedly appealing, because it gave loyalists a unique venue in which to act. By engaging in it, they gained a sense of freedom of action with a high degree of control over their own destiny. Generally, divorced from direct association with and control by the army and navy, they could attain a greater sense of identity, personal involvement and self-worth through awareness of the significant role they knew they were playing in the war effort. Privateering allowed them an opportunity to fight, in their own way, what had become their war as well as Britain's.

Many loyalists simply wanted to do their part to help, and privateering was the chosen means by which to do it. Fed up with the rebels, John Dunlop left North Carolina for England just so he could fit out a privateer, return to America, and harass his enemies. Both George Leonard and Joseph Galloway maintained there were numerous individuals desirous of doing their part to aid the cause as privateers-men.73

Privateering offered the best venue in which merchants and mariners could express their support of the crown for another logical rea-
son. The various owners and captains were established, respectable men with unique, specialized backgrounds and experience. That they should join the army and stand in the line of battle with musket in hand is expecting too much. For them to have found a berth on a naval vessel equal to their abilities and status was impossible. As a result, privateering afforded the only realistic avenue of involvement, and as men readily familiar with ships and the sea, what better way was there? For common seamen, as well, in light of their background, the activity was the logical choice. In fact, for merchants and seafaring men privateering was really just an extension of their peacetime occupation.

George Leonard, privateer captain and owner, undoubtedly summed up many a loyalist privateersman's views when he wrote:

"The people under my direction are loyalists of this country who fled for protection to the British standard, unwilling to be idle spectators of a contest where their happiness depends on the success of British arms; we were also unwilling to enter as common seamen on board his Majesty's ships or as soldiers in the army, as most of us were by birth and education, gentlemen."

As shown, there were a number of motivational elements that came into play when people made the decision to remain loyal and support the king. To summarize on the issue of negative opportunism and self-interest versus public virtue, loyalists simply were not prompted in their actions by the former. For the merchant/mariner class in particular, the state of trade and privateering during the first years of the war certainly negated profit oriented opportunistic self-interest being an element in their decision making process. Furthermore, their later actions attest to their sincere desire to play a part in the war effort and illustrate their high level of virtue.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2

1George Leonard, Declaration, in James Rivington's *The Royal Gazette*, February 13, 1779, p. 2.


4It need be noted that, in fact, no loyalist privateers have been identified from New Hampshire, but in light of the overall numbers from all other locales, there can be no doubt that colony produced such men as well.


10Articles of Agreement, privateer barge, Restoration, Captain John McMullan, n.d., Maryland Admiralty, 7871-1-46, Maryland State Archives; Crew rosters for privateer schooners Trimmer, Captain John Phillips, and Surprise, Captain David Ross, n.d. PRO, HCA32/491/b (CW). Large collections of British Public Record Office High Court of
Admiralty papers exist at both the John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Library, Colonial Williamsburg, and the North Carolina State Archives. Like other PRO collections, HCA has been renumbered over the years with the result that the American repositories use different PRO numbers. Consequently, the abbreviations CW and NC will be employed throughout the study to distinguish them; Articles of Agreement, letter of marque schooner Betsey, Captain John Robinson, October 10-19, 1781, Hartford Maritime Court, 1776-1783, RG3, Box 651, #727, Connecticut State Library and Archives, Hartford, Connecticut; and Account Book, privateer sloop Musquito, Captain Neil McNeill, 1779-1780, Papers of Joseph M. Toner, Box 279, Miscellaneous, pp. 26-26, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. This account book is arranged with opposing left and right-hand pages having the same page number.


15Brown, Good Americans, pp. 51, 80, 226-227; Brown, King's Friends, pp. 73, 137, 159, 251-252; Nelson, American Tory, pp. vi, 144-145; Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, p. 71; Hast, Loyalism, pp. 3, 84; George, "Virginia Loyalists," p. 176; and Norton, British-Americans, p. 39.


17Brown, Good Americans, pp. 38, 65, 227; Brown, King's Friends, pp. 113, 131, 159, 228, 233, 251-252; Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, p. 186; Hast, Loyalism, p. 3; George, "Virginia Loyalists," p.
175; and Norton, The British-Americans, p. 35; and Loyalist Claims Commissioners, cited in Allen, Loyalist Literature, p. 12.


19Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, pp. 24, 307; Brown, King's Friends, p. 187; Brown, Good Americans, p. 44; and Norton, British-Americans, p. 8.


24Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, Account of Warrants Issued by Governor Tryon, February 5 to May 1, 1779, and Account of Warrants Issued by Governor Tryon, May 1 to July 24, 1779, PRO, C05/1109/82, 125, 170.


spondence of the State Council of Maryland, 8 vols. (1930), vol. 7, 1781, ed., J. Hall Pleasants, pp. 7-8; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 2:301; Brown, Good Americans, p. 36; and Norton, British Americans, p. 6.


Leonard, Declaration, in Rivington's Royal Gazette, February 13, 1779, p. 2.


George Leonard to Vice Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot, September 20, 1779, quoted in Callahan, Royal Raiders, p. 198.

Brown, Good Americans, p. 48; Brown, King's Friends, p. 275; James W. St. G. Walker, cited in Allen, Loyalist Literature, p. 54; George, "Virginia Loyalists," p. 188; and Quarles, Negro in the Revolution, p. 115.

Rivington's Royal Gazette, November 18, 1778, p. 3; and Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, PRO, C05/1109/82.

George, "Virginia Loyalists," p. 188; Brown, Good Americans, pp. 48-49; Brown, King's Friends, p. 275; and Allen, Loyalist Literature, p. 54, citing Walker.


Brown, Good Americans, pp. 44-45, 52, 80; Brown, King's Friends, pp. 13, 34, 232-233; Norton, British Americans, p. 8; Labaree, Conservatism, p. 164; and Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:55.

Brown, Good Americans, pp. 50, 50, quoting John Adams, 51-52, 73, 80; Brown, King's Friends, pp. 13, 35, 38, 97, 150, 278; Norton, British Americans, pp. 8, 139; Hast, Loyalism, pp. 46, 48, 75-76, 82; and Labaree, Conservatism, pp. 46-48, 55, 57, 164-165.


43 William Legge, Earl of Dartmouth, Secretary of State for the Colonies, to the Lords Commissioners of the British Admiralty, July 1, 1775, in Clark, *NDAR*, 1:1307-1308.

44 Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to Graves and other Flag Officers, September 2, 1775, and British Admiralty Proceedings Relative to North America, September 2, 1775, in Clark, *NDAR*, 2:701, 702.


49 Brown, *Good Americans*, p. 118

50 Dr. Jerome Nadelhaft, personal communication; Brown, *Good Americans*, p. 72; and Brown, *King's Friends*, 74, 223.


52 Memorial of Roger and Robert Stewart, October, 15, 1783, PRO, A012/54/418.


For substantiation of privateering's popularity, one need only scan through issues of Hugh Gaine's The New-York Gazette and The Weekly Mercury and Rivington's Royal Gazette. Both of these New York papers contain an abundance of references to privateering activities too numerous to cite.

Swanson, Predators, p. 27; Starkey, British Privateering, p. 13; and Gaine's New-York Gazette, July 19, 1779, p. 2.

Coggins, Ships and Seamen, pp. 65-66; and Wilbur, Pirates & Patriots, p. 29.


Swanson, Predators, pp. 3, 207, 218, 221; and Lydon, Pirates, Privateers, p. 25.

Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, May 1, 1779, and Account of Warrants Issued Tryon, July 24, 1779, PRO, CO5/1109/82, 125, 170.

Memorial of Leonard, PRO, A012/10/394; Evidence on the Claim of Leonard, PRO, A012/10/406; Memorial of Leonard, PRO, A013/51/20; Memorial of George Leonard, n.d., PRO, CO5/131/72; and George Leonard to James Murray, June 13, 1780, James M. Robbins Papers, Box 3, Correspondence, 1778-1812, File, Aug.-Dec., 1780, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Massachusetts.


Rivington's Royal Gazette, January 6, 1779, p. 3, and January 16, 1779, p. 3; Tryon to Germain, February 5, 1779, and Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, PRO, CO5/1109/80, 82; and Commission of privateer sloop Royal Charlotte, Ships Collection, New York Historical Society, New York, New York. In the newspaper articles of January, 1776, the vessel in question is called the Fair American, but in later, official documents, she is called the Royal Charlotte, indicating a change in name.
Exul Virginiensis, untitled poem, in Rivington's *Royal Gazette*, January 16, 1779, p. 3.

John Goodrich, Sr. to Margaret and William Goodrich, Portsmouth, Virginia, November 1, 1780, Sir Henry Clinton Papers, Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Ibid.: John Goodrich, Sr. to General Sir Henry Clinton, November 2, 1778, and John Goodrich, Sr. to Clinton, [1781], Sir Henry Clinton Papers, Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan; Testimonial of Dunmore for John Goodrich, Sr., April 12, 1784, Testimonial of Arbuthnot for John Goodrich, Sr., May 3, 1782, Testimonial of Commodore Sir George Collier for John Goodrich, Sr., May 3, 1784, and Testimonial of Clinton for John Goodrich, Sr., May 14, 1784, PRO, A013/30/G-IV; Memorial of John Goodrich, Sr., March 1, 1784, PRO, A012/56/166; Petition of John Goodrich, Sr., May 10, 1784, PRO, A013/29/G; Account of Warrants issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, PRO, C05/1109/82; Minutes of the New York Vice Admiralty Court, September 16, 1777, to July 10, 1783, PRO, HCA49/92, 93, 94. A thorough search of the extensive minutes of the New York Vice Admiralty Court concerning libeling and condemnation proceedings has failed to produce any evidence that John Goodrich, Sr. ever brought a prize into that port; and A List of Vessels Captured and brought into Bermuda, with Mr. Knox's letter, February 14, 1781, PRO, C037/22, typed transcript, Navy History Center, Washington, D.C.. Goodrich was associated with Bermuda as well as New York, yet a list of prizes brought into that island, dating to well into the privateering war, does not mention any taken by him.


71 Ibid., p. 36 / 1:282.


73 Ibid.; Memorial of William Dunlop, n.d. PRO, AO12/36/319; Leonard to Arbuthnot, September 20, 1779, quoted in Callahan, Royal Raiders, p. 198; and Memorial of Leonard, PRO, CO5/131/72.

74 Leonard to Arbuthnot, September 20, 1779, quoted in Callahan, Royal Raiders, p. 198.
CHAPTER 3

"GENTLEMEN WELL DISPOSED TO HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT:"

THE LOYALIST PRIVATEERS OF THE CHESAPEAKE BAY REGION

The Chesapeake Bay region witnessed the most extensive and serious active involvement of loyalist mariners during the first two years of the rebellion. There, a large number of individuals who would later be part of the privateering community as owners, captains, and common seamen rallied around Virginia Governor, John Murry, Lord Dunmore's standard, offering assistance to the royal cause. Primarily, the men whose identities are known were from Virginia, but a number from Maryland became active as well. Largely urban and coastal and dominated by members of the merchant and mariner classes, there was also healthy leavening of individuals from other backgrounds in this group. Men of foreign birth were very much in evidence, as were ethnic and racial elements. Motivated by various factors, most displayed their pro-British stance at a fairly early date. Some, however, were decidedly neutral at first, and there is some evidence of equivocal behavior. Regardless, most suffered significantly in one way or another for maintaining pro-British sentiments and ultimately siding with them.

As elsewhere along the North American coast, a weak Royal Navy presence existed in the Bay, and like other governors, Dunmore believed a stronger naval showing would help maintain control of his colony and protect the persons and property of those who remained loyal. As early as May 1, 1775, Dunmore wrote both Vice Admiral Samuel Graves and General Thomas Gage requesting additional naval support. On
Figure 1: North America and the Caribbean.
Figure 2: The Chesapeake Bay Maritime Region.
June 8, with control rapidly slipping from his grip, Dunmore, fearing for the safety of his family and himself, fled Williamsburg and sought sanctuary on H.M.S. Fowey at Yorktown. There, H.M. Sloop Otter and H.M.S. Mercury joined him and shortly after, British naval operations against the rebels began. A July 7th report indicates the Otter would cruise the coast in search of rebel provision vessels, and although Dunmore could have had no knowledge of it at the time, such activities were about to be authorized in London.\(^3\) As of July 1, the navy was to establish a loose blockade with squadrons focusing on key points along the North American coast.\(^4\) On July 5, William Legge, Earl of Dartmouth and Secretary of State for the Colonies, wrote Dunmore notifying the governor that Admiral Graves's instructions were

> to exert the most vigorous Efforts for suppressing the Rebellion now openly avowed & supported in that Country, & to seize and detain all Ships & Vessels belonging to the Inhabitants thereof, such only excepted as are the Property of persons who are friends of Government, & have shewn an Attachment to the Constitution.\(^5\)

These directives took the mandates of the Restraining Acts a step further in that all rebel vessels, whether trading or not, became subject to seizure. While loyalist vessels were not to be molested, these instructions in no way should be interpreted to mean that they would be allowed to carry on trade. In addition, naval forces were to protect all loyal subjects and their property.\(^6\)

In September, additional instructions were sent from London concerning naval operations and the roles the governors were to play in them. One directive empowered Royal Navy officers to demand provisions from colonists, offering a fair market price in return. If the offer was refused, then, necessary items could be taken by force.\(^7\) Also, because of fears that large rebel merchant bottoms would be converted into men-of-war, the navy was authorized to confiscate their masts and rudders or otherwise disable them.\(^8\) Of more importance, however, was the circular directive sent to the governors reminding them that His
Majesty's vessels were only to be used for purposes assigned by the Admiral, thus undercutting local authority and control. These orders, in combination with the Restraining Acts and those issued in July, were intended not only to create a blockade and bring to a stop all rebel maritime trade, but prevent the insurgents from acting offensively with warships of their own.

Throughout the remainder of his campaign, Dunmore remained uneasy about not having sufficient naval vessels for his goals. Only six spent any amount of time with the governor, and there were never more than four at any one point. Furthermore, these vessels were not only responsible for the Chesapeake region. They were required to cover the Delaware Bay and the North Carolina Outer Banks as well. The navy was stretched thin, and Dunmore had grounds for concern. To counteract this deficiency, he would increasingly rely on loyalist craft and personnel to augment his force. Fortunately, there was considerable local talent to draw upon.

While naval plans were being formulated, on August 23, George III issued His "Proclamation for Suppressing Rebellion and Sedition." This document would be of considerable importance for future privateersmen. Of significance were the following passages.

To the end therefore that none of our subjects may neglect or violate their duty through ignorance thereof, or through any doubt of the protection which the law will afford to their loyalty and zeal, we have thought fit...to issue this our Royal Proclamation, hereby declaring, that not only all our officers, civil and military, are obliged to exert their utmost endeavours to suppress such Rebellion, and bring the traitors to justice; but that all our subjects of this realm, and the dominions thereunto belonging, are bound by law to be aiding and assisting in the suppression of such Rebellion,...and we do accordingly strictly charge and command all our officers, as well civil as military, and all other our obedient and loyal subjects, to use their utmost endeavours to withstand and suppress such Rebellion[.]

On July 15, Dunmore had shifted his base of operations to the Elizabeth River between Norfolk and Portsmouth, both towns being centers of loyalist activity. There, he hired the first of a number of
loyalist vessels, the William and then the Eilbeck (later the Dunmore) to augment his flotilla. By September, loyalists were beginning to join the governor seeking protection and offering support. Over the following months, numerous loyalists gathered under the royal banner that flew over what was fast becoming a floating town due to the accumulation of shipping which at times would total over one hundred vessels. A number of these individuals, representative of all social classes, would later be involved in privateering in one way or another.

A large element of the Norfolk/Portsmouth merchant class supported Dunmore. Included in this respectable and established group were Jonathan Eilbeck, Roger and Robert Stewart, William Calderhead, Hector MacAlister, Robert Gilmour, Hugh Miller, Thomas Farrar, John Begg, Neil Jamieson, and Robert Sheddon. Merchant George Blair from nearby Smithfield offered his assistance as well. This was a tight group unified by common bonds. At least half were Scots. Ten were first generation colonists of whom none had arrived earlier than the last French War. Some still maintained strong family and business ties with Britain. Neil Jamieson, undoubtedly the wealthiest of the group, was factor for the Glasgow firm of Glassford, Gordon, & Montieth & Co., as well as being a junior partner. Robert Sheddon was a partner in his brother's operation, John Sheddon & Co., also in Glasgow.

Within the immediate Norfolk/Portsmouth band there were also strong commercial, social, and family ties. Sheddon did business with Calderhead and MacAlister. Calderhead was part owner with Gilmour and Jamieson in a distillery. Jamieson and MacAlister had business ties. Sheddon, Jamieson, and the Stewarts, at least, lived in close proximity to each other. Of course, Roger and Robert Stewart were broth-
As will be seen, other significant business and family ties existed as well with Robert Sheddon.

Being relatively recent immigrants to the colonies, the majority of these men had not had time to acculturate. Their sentiments towards Britain undoubtedly remained strong. In fact, they were in many ways still more British than American. This, in association with the strong personal and business bonds between themselves and the mother country certainly helps explain, at least in part, their decisions to remain loyal.27

Jamieson was also well connected with important loyalist merchants elsewhere, who would be involved in privateering. Such included James Anderson and Nathaniel Coffin of Massachusetts, and Hugh and Alexander Wallace of New York.28

Another link was that as merchants these men were closely associated with seafaring. Almost all were ship owners.29 A few still commanded vessels. Roger and Robert Stewart described themselves as sailors and shipmasters who had advanced themselves.30 Hugh Miller was a sea captain as well as a merchant.31 Other Virginia skippers joining Dunmore were Willoughby Morgan and, from the Eastern Shore, William Picket who sailed for Sheddon.32 From Maryland came Captains Thomas Slater of Baltimore and Joseph Wayland.33 In addition, though their colony of residence is unknown, there were Captains Charles McDonald, John Buchanan, and James Ridley.34

Joining Dunmore too were elements of Virginia's middle class such as shopowners John Lownds and John Carmont, and Royal Navy veteran turned shoemaker, John Muirhead. Carmont and Muirhead were also first generation colonists from Scotland.35

Of those future privateersmen who joined Dunmore from the lowest of social classes, the slaves, the names of two, those belonging to Mary Rotherway and Roger and Robert Stewart, are not known. Rother-
way's, however, gained his freedom from Dunmore. The Stewarts', along with six of their other slaves, had been raised from a boy specifically to be a mariner. George Mills, only five years a slave in Virginia from the Guinea coast, ran away and gained his freedom as well by joining the governor. Unfortunately, it is not known if he ever served on a privateer. In his brief postwar memorial, however, he stated that he spent the entire war at sea, without reference to naval service, making it quite possible he served aboard such a vessel.

Of interest is the fact that some of these men were initially sympathetic to the rebel cause. Jamieson signed the non-importation agreement in 1770, and during the Tea Crisis, he even cooperated so far as to send back a shipment of that commodity consigned to himself. In 1774, he, Sheddon, and Gilmour were members of the Norfolk Committee of Correspondence. Jamieson was later on the Norfolk Borough Committee to enforce the Articles of the Continental Association. Sheddon signed the non-importation agreement as well in 1774 or 1775.

By late 1775, though unhappy with the situation in general, Jamieson displayed loyalist preferences and an attachment to Dunmore. He thought little of the rebels, and was so uneasy, he was prepared to pull up stakes and leave if need be. With his trade goods aboard ship, Jamieson slept with loaded arms and claimed he could depart within thirty minutes notice. Still, he had enough faith in the British putting down the rebellion that he went so far as to order a shipment of goods contrary to the association in mid-November.

Jamieson's situation was interesting. As a man of great wealth capable of extending considerable credit, he was actively courted by the rebels as well as the British. Ultimately, however, Dunmore received the benefit of Jamieson's wealth. With loans totaling £30,000, Jamieson made it possible for the Governor to supply his fleet. He
also worked surveying and appraising vessels taken into government service and contracting for shipments of supplies. 43

Some, such as MacAlister, Blair, and Carmont joined Dunmore early, seemingly without hesitation, as active supporters. 44 Both Blair and MacAlister were granted captain's commissions - Blair in the Queen's Loyal American Regiment and MacAlister in the Ethiopian Battalion. 45 The latter also served as paymaster for Dunmore. 46 Carmont and Begg fought with the British at Great Bridge in December. 47

For joining the British, all for whom the information is available, lost considerably in the way of real estate, debts owed, personal property, business, and merchandise, and this, in turn, undoubtedly solidified their loyal stance all the more. 48 Although comparatively minimal in amount, even runaway slave George Mills claimed a loss of £10, which for him was considerable. 49 Having joined Dunmore, they continued to suffer at the hands of the rebels, which could only have strengthened their resolve. MacAlister and Sheddon lost vessels and cargoes for violating the association. 50 Jamieson's and Sheddon's houses and other Portsmouth properties were burned. 51 Begg, Carmont, Blair, and Muirhead were all captured by the rebels, and the last three were badly treated. 52 Blair spent over twelve months in close confinement, often in irons, until making his escape. 53 Carmont, after being convicted of bearing arms against the colony and then refusing to help the rebels dig entrenchments, was tied with his arms around a tree in freezing weather. With the circulation cut off and severely frost bitten, he never regained the proper use of his hands. 54

At the same time, the strength of their convictions did not waiver when they suffered reverses at the hands of the British. The Royal Navy seized a vessel in which Jamieson had invested. 55 On Dunmore's orders, Calderhead scuttled three of the five vessels containing his wares and personal effects due to a lack of men to sail
Sheddon lost two vessels and cargo in the same manner. As if Carmont had not suffered enough, while imprisoned, the vessel containing all his merchandise was also lost or destroyed with Dunmore.

Interestingly enough, there were those who joined the British despite what could be defined as ill-treatment at their hands. One of these was Thomas Slater. On a return voyage from Granados to Virginia, his brigantine, the Betsey, was stopped by the Royal Navy and his crew pressed. His voyage effectively over, Slater, although ill-used by the navy, still offered his services to Dunmore. Then, after sitting idle a while, the Betsey herself was pressed into service as a tender under direct naval command. After fitting her out at his own expense for this new role, Slater stayed with his vessel in a subordinate capacity.

As is to be expected with such established and respectable men, a number are known to have had families. Falling in this group were Muirhead, Eilbeck, Morgan, Wayland, Jamieson, Sheddon, and Calderhead. When Jamieson departed the colony, it was necessary to leave his wife, Fernelia, behind. As late as 1780, she was still in Virginia. Although the sources are vague, Eilbeck’s wife may have remained as well.

Upon leaving Virginia, the vast majority of these men made their way to New York. A few, such as Sheddon, Eilbeck, and Morgan, went to Bermuda. Roger Stewart returned to Scotland.

Most of these men, Calderhead, Gilmour, Sheddon, MacAlister, Farrar, Begg, Jamieson, Eilbeck, Miller, Blair, and Lownds would go on to invest in privateers. Picket, Muirhead (who would also serve again in the Royal Navy), Slater, Wayland, McDonald, Buchanan, and Ridley would become captains. The Stewart brothers would also own a privateer with one of them acting as skipper. In addition to being a part owner, Morgan served in the capacity of a lesser officer aboard such
vessels, and for a while, commanded his own vessel, either a privateer itself or a tender to one. Carmont appears to have acted as a common seaman. As far as is known, those who came from the slave community acted as common seamen as well.

Not all Virginia loyalists left with Dunmore. Some departed at an early date without any affiliation with the Governor. John Sheddon, brother of Robert, returned to Glasgow, Scotland, earlier when hostilities commenced. Another Scottish partner in the Sheddon firm was John Sym of Smithfield, Virginia, who, because of the political unrest, returned to North Britain at an early date as well. Sym also acted as factor for his kinsman, Andrew Sym, another merchant who had spent time in Virginia, but had returned to Scotland at an earlier date. Andrew, with whom Sheddon also conducted business, would soon be heard from on the North American coast.

There was also Emanuel Walker, another business associate of Jamieson's. Walker resided in Petersburg where, though principal factor for the British firm of Spiers, Bowman, & Co., he had earned a reputation as a rigid supporter of the Continental Association. By early 1776, however, he had seemingly had enough and asked permission from the Committee of Safety to leave the colony. That body granted Walker's request on March 2, and he left for Philadelphia. Like so many others, after first going to Glasgow, too, he would make his way to New York and be involved in privateering as an owner.

Typical of many Virginia loyalists, these men were Scottish immigrant merchants linked by both family and business ties to each other and Britain. While John Sheddon and John Sym are not known to have been involved in privateering, they were part of the web, and
their return home must have reinforced the ties to Britain of their relatives, Robert and Andrew, who did enter into the activity.

Others who behaved themselves managed to maintain a neutral position and remain until early 1777. At that time, however, being accused of "seducing and corrupting the minds of the people...and giving intelligence to the enemy," first generation British merchants who would not confirm their allegiance to the rebels were required by an Act of Assembly to depart within forty days after January 1, 1777.76 Merchants William Sheddon of Tappahanock (kinsman of Robert), Daniel Fraser, a French and Indian War veteran, of Petersburg, and Henry Mitchell of Fredericksburg, all left and made their way to New York. Sheddon then went to Bermuda. Like so many in the exodus with Dunmore or earlier, not only were these men recent immigrants, they were all Scots as well. Also leaving for New York was immigrant merchant John Begg who had earlier served with Dunmore until captured. After three months imprisonment, the rebels released Begg on parole, but he later refused to take the oath. Like the earlier group, this party lost heavily in terms of money and property.77

Sheddon had run afoul of the rebels once already. Suspected of having supplied Dunmore with provisions, the Essex County Committee investigated his activities in November, 1775. Though acquitted, Sheddon's situation remained unpleasant, and one gets the impression the Act requiring him to leave came at a time when life in Virginia for men of his ilk was becoming unbearable. Prior to departure he was exposed "to the Resentment of the violent" and he often "experienced ill-usage and injurious Treatment."78

Of interest is the story of John Martin of Botetourt County. A prosperous landowner and veteran of Lord Dunmore's War against the Indians in 1774, Martin managed to maintain a peaceful existence for the first year of the war despite his support of the King. In 1776, how-
ever, the rebels "drafted" him for military service. Given his situation in a "Rebellious part of the Country," he felt obliged to accept conscription and play along until an opportunity presented itself to join the British. Unfortunately, the British did not arrive as expected and Martin spent many months serving in Georgia and South Carolina. Unable to return to Virginia and loath to actually fight with the rebels against the British, when the chance to desert arose, he took it. Getting aboard a ship for the West Indies, Martin made St. Lucia. There, after first sailing on a smuggler, he signed articles to serve on a privateer.  

One final Virginia loyalist must be mentioned, merchant and landowner Samuel Martin. Martin is of interest because though born in Virginia, he relocated to Whitehaven, Scotland, years before the war. There, he conducted business operations which included a large trade with his native colony, considerable shipping interests, and the management of at least a large portion of the family's Virginia properties totaling over 9,700 acres. Of course, he suffered heavy losses in these areas. Martin, a relative of Governor Josiah Martin of North Carolina, was important enough to have the ear of men such as John Montagu, Earl of Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty and William Knox, Under Secretary to Lord George Germain. Though absent from Virginia during Dunmore's campaign, Martin was, nevertheless, somewhat involved. While on a trading voyage to that colony, one of his vessels, the *Unicorn*, was taken into ministerial service by the Governor.  

Throughout the war, Virginia slaves continued to make their escape to the British lines. Many, such as James Dalkeith, Isaac Bailey, Benjamin Smith, Tom King, Maxwell Roy, Titus, James Jackson, Jack Robinson, and Southey served aboard loyalist privateers. Slaves in Maryland did the same. Four known to have served as crewmen were
Isaac, owned by Alice Rous, and Daniel, Charles, and Abram, owned by William Bell. 82

Maryland produced other privateers as well, some of whom have already been mentioned. Another whose trials were similar to John Martin's was Robert Begnal of Georgetown. Although it is unclear if Begnal was an immigrant or second generation, he was of Irish extraction. Because he refused to take the rebel oath of allegiance he was assessed triple taxes for a period of three years; the rebels believing this would coerce him into line. When this plan failed, they conscripted Begnal for a nine month term of service with the militia. At this juncture, the loyalist had two choices. He could submit to the rebels or escape. Even though he realized he would lose a great deal of his property by doing so, he opted to leave. He proceeded to load his family and what valuables he could on his "Schooner Flatt" and sail for Portsmouth, Virginia. There, he made contact with the British under Benedict Arnold who promptly commandeered his vessel for government service. Begnal lost all. Following a stint in the Commissary Department at Charleston, South Carolina, Begnal and his family arrived destitute in New York. There, in an effort to provide for them, he signed on a privateer. Shortly after, he was taken prisoner, forcing his wife and child to petition the British for relief to keep from starving. 83

Daniel Chamier, originally from a well-to-do London family, was also a Maryland resident, having arrived in 1753. Described as honorable, friendly, hospitable, and philanthropic, Chamier removed to New York where he became Auditor and Comptroller of Accounts for the army. He also invested in a privateer before dying in December, 1778. 84

James Anderson, a mariner from Fell's Point (Baltimore), was a very equivocal loyalist. Not only did he willingly take the rebel oath, he willingly joined their forces and was made a lieutenant on a
galley. Because his zealous conduct was viewed so favorably, he was ultimately given his own command. What happened next that precipitated a change in allegiance is unknown, but Anderson proceeded to sail his vessel to New York and deliver her to the British. When next heard from, he commanded a loyalist privateer.⁸⁵

There were yet other men from the Bay area who, although they did not join Dunmore, would make their way to New York and pursue privateering. Benedict Byrne was a mariner from either Virginia or Maryland, who, before becoming a privateer captain, served in a provincial unit, was captured, escaped to New York, and there acted as a pilot.⁸⁶ David Carcand of Calvert County, Maryland, was a planter, but he was also "Bred to Sea." His nautical experience allowed him to pursue his later role as sailing master on an armed vessel.⁸⁷

Two other Maryland loyalists were merchants, Anthony Stewart and his father-in-law/partner James Dick. At the time the war started, Dick had already faced problems with the rebels for at least several years. In 1770, one of his vessels, the Good Intent, prevented from unloading in the colony, was forced to return with her cargo. Stewart is particularly noteworthy for having been the owner of the Peggy Stewart carrying tea consigned to Annapolis in October 1774. For this, the mob confronted Stewart and forced him to sign a paper saying he was sorry for the offense and would, along with the Williams brothers who owned the tea, set fire to the vessel and its cargo. This he did, destroying a brigantine valued at £1,500. Apparently this was not penance enough, for he was continually threatened and finally forced to flee in 1775. Both he and Dick would go to New York. Dick would become a privateer owner and Stewart would serve with the Associated Loyalists.⁸⁸

Finally, there was no less a figure than Robert Alexander, lawyer, who was a delegate to the Continental Congress in 1775. Though
against British taxation, he was also against "republican Government" and the use of violence. Opting for "Constitutional Correction" as the solution to the problem with Britain, he withdrew from Congress when independence was declared. Forced to give up his law practice because he would not take the oath, he left Maryland in August, 1777, to join the British at Philadelphia and ultimately go to New York. There, he would serve on the Board of the Associated Loyalists. 89

Like other Virginians and Marylanders, a number of these men are known to have lost considerably in terms of personal property, real estate, etc. 90 Furthermore, families suffered. Begnal's situation has already been recounted. For Carcand, who left his family behind, losses resulted in their being in "Great Distress." 91 Stewart and Alexander were also forced to leave their wives and numerous children. 92

Although the merchant/mariner class was the dominant element, the Virginia and Maryland privateers exhibited a cross-section of regional society by including others of varied occupational, economic, and class background, ethnic elements, and racial minorities. A small degree of equivocalness and neutral behavior (acceptable and understandable under the circumstances) was detectable, and a number of motivational factors came into play when making the decision to become active loyalists. These included the tenuous security offered by a British presence at Norfolk. Also, these men were the recipients of a considerable amount of rebel abuse, which either provoked them to take the course they took or reinforced positions already taken.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3

1Dunmore to Dartmouth, October 5, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2:316.
Dunmore to Admiral Graves and General Thomas Gage, Williamsburg, May 1, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 1:257-259.

Purdie's Virginia Gazette, July 7, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 1:841.

Dartmouth to the Lords Commissioners of the British Admiralty, July 1, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 1:1307

Dartmouth to Dunmore, July 5, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 1:1312.

Abstract of the Most Material Proceedings in this Department..., July 6, [1775], in Clark, NDAR, 1:1314.

Dartmouth to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, September 12, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2:712.

The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to Graves, September 14, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2:715.


Dunmore to Dartmouth, August 2, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 1:1046; Dunmore to Dartmouth, December 6, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2:1311; Virginia Committee of Safety to Maryland delegates in the Continental Congress, December 29, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 3:297; Dunmore to Germain, March 30, 1776, and Dunmore to Payne, April 8, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:586, 731; E. Johnson to Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Somerville, June 22, 1776, and List of Ships in Lord Dunmore's Fleet, July 10, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:685, 1021-1022; Memorial of Bartlet Goodrich, February 21, 1778, PRO, T1/545/307; Return of Ships & Vessels taken into his Majesty's Service by...Dunmore, July 1, 1776, PRO, Adm49/2/1.


Journal, Otter, July 17, 1775, and Dixon & Hunter's Virginia Gazette, September 2, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 1:904, 1297.
15 Continental Congress, Marine Committee to Commodore Esek Hopkins, April [23], 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:1217; Purdie's Virginia Gazette, May 24, 1776, and Johnson to Somerville, June 22, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:242, 685.

16 Memorial of Jonathan Eilbeck, n.d., PRO, A012/56/125; Memorial of the Stewarts, PRO, A012/54/418; Memorial of William Calderhead, n.d., PRO, A012/54/147; Review of Robert Gilmour's Claim, April 2, 1783, PRO, A012/99/146; Review of John Begg's Claim, February 12, 1784, PRO, A012/100/141; Memorial of Neil Jamieson, n.d., PRO, A012/55/46; Evidence on Robert Sheddon's Memorial, November 6, 1786, PRO, A012/56/109; Peter Jenning Wrike, The Governor's Island (Gwynn, Virginia: The Gwynn's Island Museum, 1993), pp. 125, 129; Gregory Palmer, Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of the American Revolution (Westport, Connecticut, and London: Meckler Publishing, 1984), p. 517; and List, Ships in Norfolk and Hampton Roads, December 30, 1775, and Journal of the Virginia Convention, January 5, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 3:309, 644. Note: Over the years, the loyalist claims pages have been renumbered, some as many as three times, without deleting the earlier numbers. Others are not numbered at all, relying instead on a simple alphabetical designation. With the numbered pages, it is often difficult to determine which is the appropriate designation. If questionable, but one of the page numbers was known to be traditionally used, based on such sources as Palmer, that number was selected. In those cases in which this form of selection was not an option, the printed page or folio numbers were relied on.


18 Review of Begg's Claim, PRO, A012/100/141; Memorial of Jamieson, PRO, A012/56/46; Evidence on Sheddon's Memorial, PRO, A012/56/109; and Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 125, 829.

19 Ibid.; Memorial of Eilbeck, PRO, A012/56/125; Memorial of Calderhead, PRO, A012/54/147; Review of Gilmour's Claim, PRO, A012/99/146; and Memorial of Blair, PRO, A012/56/184.

20 Memorial of Jamieson, PRO, A012/56/46.


22 Hector MacAlister to John Matteaux, November 13, 1775, and Robert Sheddon to John Sheddon, November 20, 1775, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 4:393, 440.

23 Memorial of Calderhead, PRO, A012/54/147.

Memorial of the Stewarts, PRO, A012/54/418.

A View of Portsmouth in Virginia, n.d., PRO, A013/27/A.

Hast, Loyalism, pp. 10-11, 74, 82.

Jamieson to Anderson or Coffin, November 28, 1775, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 4:487.


Memorial of the Stewarts, PRO, A012/54/418.

Palmer, Loyalists, p. 606; and Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 2:557.

Estimate of Willoughby Morgan's losses, n.d., PRO, A012/55/26; Robert Sheddon to John Sheddon, November 9, 1775, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 4:353; Purdie's Virginia Gazette, April 12, 1776, p. 3, and Supplement, April 26, 1776, p. 2.

Review of Joseph Wayland's Claim, November 18, 1784, PRO, A012/101/140; Memorial of Captain Joseph Wayland, "True Copy", December 30, 1784, PRO, A013/40/251; Memorial of Thomas Slater, May 27, 1785, PRO, A013/32/S; and Deposition of Thomas Slater, Report and Decree for brigantine Betsey, Pennsylvania Admiralty Court, May 25, to June 11, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:477-478.

Wrike, Governor's Island, pp. 115, 117.


Evidence on Mary Rotherway's Memorial, February 25, 1784, PRO, A012/54/65; and Evidence on Roger and Robert Stewart's Memorial, February 13, 1786, PRO, A012/54/418.

38Scribner, *Revolutionary Virginia*, 7:429 n. 16.


41Memorial of Sheddon, PRO, A012/56/104.


49Claim of Mills, PRO, A012/99/23.

51 Memorial of Jamieson, PRO, A012/56/184; Claim of Jamieson, PRO, A013/31/1-J; Schedule of Sheddon's losses, PRO, A012/56/106; and Hast, Loyalism, p. 64.

52 Review of Begg's Claim, PRO, A012/100/141; Memorial of Carmont, PRO, A013/28/C; Memorial of Blair, PRO, A012/56/184; and Memorial of Muirhead, PRO, A013/31/M, pt. VI;

53 Memorial of Blair, PRO, A012/56/184.

54 Memorial of Carmont, PRO, A013/28/C.

55 Memorial of Jamieson, PRO, A012/55/41.

56 Memorial of Calderhead, PRO, A012/54/147.

57 Schedule of Sheddon's losses, PRO, A012/56/106.

58 Memorial of Carmont, PRO, A013/28/C.

59 Memorial of Slater, PRO, A013/32/S; Account of Thomas Slater, April 5, 1785, PRO, A013/32/S; and Deposition of Slater, in Report and Decree for brigantine Betsey, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:477-478.

60 Review of Muirhead's Claim, PRO, A012/102/42; Memorial of Eilbeck, PRO, A012/56/125; Memorial of Morgan, PRO, A012/55/24; Memorial of Wayland, PRO, A013/40/251; Proceedings, Virginia Convention, January 16, 1776, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 5:416; List of Ships in Lord Dunmore's Fleet, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:1022; Hast, Loyalism, pp. 129-131; and Wrike, Governor's Island, p. 123. Seemingly Calderhead's wife passed on during the war. In his post-war claim, he is referred to as single. Review of William Calderhead's Claim, June 25, 1783, PRO, A012/99/336.

61 Hast, Loyalism, pp. 129-131; and Memorial of Eilbeck, PRO, A012/56/125.

62 Memorial of Blair, PRO, A012/56/184; Memorial of the Stewarts, PRO, A012/54/418; Memorial of Calderhead, PRO, A012/54/147; Review of Begg's Claim, PRO, A012/100/141; Evidence on Jamieson's claim, PRO, A012/55/52; Certificate of Major General Stirling, PRO, A013/32/S; Claim of Wayland, PRO, A012/101/140; Examination on the demand of Robert Gilmour, June 29, 1789, PRO, A013/4/83/455; Review of Muirhead's Claim, PRO, A012/102/42; Memorial of Carmont, PRO, A013/28/C; Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, and Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, May 1, 1779, PRO, CO5/1109/82, 125; and Palmer, Loyalists, p. 606.

63 Memorial of Sheddon, PRO, A012/56/104; Memorial of Eilbeck, PRO, A012/56/125; and Memorial of Morgan, PRO, A012/55/24.

64 Memorial of the Stewarts, PRO, A012/54/418.

65 Memorial, Declaration, and Voucher of William Calderhead, June 29, 1789, PRO, A013/2/356; List of owners of privateer, General Mathews, June 29, 1789, PRO, A013/4/83/482; Memorial of Robert Gilmour, June 25, 1779, PRO, A013/4/83/467; Memorial of Sheddon, PRO, A012/56/104; and Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5,
1779, and Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, May 1, 1779, PRO, CO5/1109/82, 125.

66 Dixon & Nicolson's Virginia Gazette, December 25, 1779, p. 2; Memorial of Muirhead, PRO, A013/31/M/pt. VI; Review of Muirhead's Claim, PRO, A012/102/42; Certificate of Major General Thomas Stirling for Thomas Slater, April 16, 1785, PRO, A013/32/S; Memorial of Wayland, PRO, A013/40/251; and Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, and Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, May 1, 1779, PRO, CO5/1109/82, 125;

67 Memorial of the Stewarts, and Evidence on the Stewart's Memorial, PRO, A012/54/418.

68 Evidence on Willoughby Morgan's Claim, March 1, 1786, PRO, A012/55/27; Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, PRO, CO5/1109/125; and Affidavit of Willoughby Morgan, Prize Master, brigantine Fair American, August 22, 1782, PRO, HCA32/337/23 (CW); Affidavit of Willoughby Morgan, Mate, schooner, Revenge, January 18, 1779, PRO, HCA32/434/e (CW); Affidavit of Willoughby Morgan, Master, sloop, Hammond, January 10, 1778, PRO, HCA32/443/2 (NC); and James Humphrey's The Pennsylvania Ledger: Or The Philadelphia Market-Day Advertiser, December 13, 1777, p. 2.

69 Memorial of Carmont, PRO, A013/28/C.

70 Evidence on Rotherway's Memorial, PRO, A012/54/65; and Evidence on the Stewart's Memorial, PRO, A012/54/418.

71 Memorial of John Sym, PRO, A013/83/682; and Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 4:358-359, n. 6.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.; Claim of Andrew Sym and Memorial of Andrew Sym, [1798?], PRO, T79/12; and Robert Sheddon to Andrew Sym, November 9, 1775, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 4:354-355.

74 Evidence on Sheddon's Memorial, PRO, A012/56/109; Claim of Andrew Sym, PRO, T79/12; and Robert Sheddon to John Sheddon, November 9, 1775, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 4:353.


77. Memorial of William Sheddon, received March 23, 1784, PRO, A013/83/S; Review of Begg's Claim, PRO, A012/100/141; Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 291, 614; Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 4:62-63, n. 1; and Proceedings, Virginia Committee of Safety, March 12, 1776, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 6:201.

78. Proceedings, Essex County Committee, November 10, 1775, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 4:374; Dixon & Hunter's Virginia Gazette, November 18, 1775, p. 3; and Memorial of William Sheddon, PRO, A013/83/S.


80. Memorial of Samuel Martin, December 31, 1782, PRO, A013/31/MIII; Evidence on the Memorial of Samuel and George Martin, n.d., PRO, A012/56/86; Samuel Martin to Germain, December 25, 1777, PRO, C05/155/189; and Return of Ships & Vessels, PRO, Adm49/2/1.

81. Dixon & Nicolson's Virginia Gazette, August 7, 1779, p. 3, and August 21, 1779, p. 3; and Libel, Zakeriah Walley vs. Negro Southey, September 28, 1781, and Deposition of John Marchant, October 30, 1781, Maryland Admiralty, 7871-1-52, Maryland State Archives.

82. Libel, Gear Chadwick vs. Whaleboat, July 24, 1781, Deposition of Richard Wagstaff, August 28, 1881, and Answer and Claim of Williamson Bell, August 24, 1781, Maryland Admiralty, 7871-1-43, Maryland State Archives.


84. Rivington's Royal Gazette, December 2, 1778, p. 2; and Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1778, PRO, C05/1109/82.


86. Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:285-286.


88. Biographical note concerning Anthony Stewart, Memorial of Anthony Stewart and Thomas Charles Williams, March 10, 1777, and Memorial of Anthony Stewart, November 15, 1783, Fisher Transcripts, Anthony Stewart Papers, MS.360.25, 29, 57, Maryland Historical Society; and Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, PRO, C05/1109/82.

Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:285-286; Memorial of Carcand, PRO, AO13/97/201; Biographical note concerning Stewart, Memorial of Anthony Stewart, November 15, 1783, and Memorial of Anthony Stewart, February 8, 1786, Fisher Transcripts, Anthony Stewart Papers, MS.360.25, 57, 74, Maryland Historical Society; Memorial of Alexander, PRO, AO12/8/96; and Losses of Robert Alexander, n.d., PRO, AO12/8/105.

Memorial of Carcand, PRO, AO13/97/201.

Memorial of Alexander, PRO, AO12/8/96; and Biographical note concerning Anthony Stewart, and Memorial of Anthony Stewart, November 15, 1783, Fisher Transcripts, Anthony Stewart Papers, MS.360.25, 57.
"A SPIRITED, ACTIVE, INDUSTRIOUS FAMILY:"

THE GOODRICHES OF VIRGINIA

During the summer and early fall of 1775, while Dunmore was attempting to buttress the royal presence, another important sequence of events was transpiring, the consequences of which rebel merchants and mariners would come to have cause to regret. Though perhaps an extreme example, as this complex yarn shakes out, the reader will get an idea of the trials suffered by at least one family during the revolution. The Goodriches began the war in support of the rebels, acting on their behalf. An error in judgement, however, and the consequent overreaction by the rebels to it (quite probably fueled by negative personal factors) resulted in serious persecution of the family. This had the affect of forcing them from the rebel camp and into the arms of the British where they would become extremely influential in shaping the course of the war at sea. The family’s transformation, however, was gradual due to compounding events and circumstances in which they found themselves caught in the middle.

On June 14, 1775, Thomas Newton, Jr., burgess delegate for Norfolk, Virginia, informed William Goodrich that Treasurer Robert Carter Nicholas wanted to discuss a business deal with him. William, (Billie) Goodrich, "a well made lusty Man, about 34 Years of Age [sic], about 5 Feet 8 or 9 Inches high, stoop shouldered, smooth faced, full eyed, [who] sometimes looks redish about the Eyes, and generally wears short light or yellow coloured curly Hair," was the second son of John Good-
rich, Sr. and brother of John, Jr. (Johnie), Bartlet, and Bridger. By the eve of the revolution, this family, descended from ancestors who arrived in Virginia in the 1630s, was well established and successful as both landowners and merchant mariners. The elder Goodrich's holdings were extensive. In Portsmouth alone, he owned three lots of land and eighteen structures (plus outbuildings) which included (some serving dual functions) seven dwellings, six warehouses, one store, six artisan shops, and a wharf. In the countryside, he possessed six estates with considerable livestock and land totaling 1,915 acres. In Alexandria, he owned two lots with two more houses and another store. In addition, he had well over thirty adult slaves, at least eleven of whom were seamen.

The family also owned twelve merchant vessels said to trade the world over, but especially in the West Indies. Probably inclusive of the twelve, they were concerned in a total of twenty-three merchantmen. As mariners they were acknowledged as perhaps the best the region had to offer. Four of the adult males were described as being fully acquainted with every inch of the Chesapeake Bay and its numerous tributaries. These four were also said to display a "genius" for ship design and construction.

Furthermore, the Goodriches favored the rebel cause. As of May, 1774, John, Sr. was a member of the joint Norfolk-Portsmouth Committee of Correspondence, and on at least one occasion, a Goodrich vessel conveyed messages between committees. Goodrich also supported the Continental Association and actively urged individuals such as Jonathan Ewing to sign the agreement as well.

For the deal about to be proposed to William, the Goodriches seemed the perfect choice. They possessed every quality needed, including one final and very necessary ability. As mariners, they were involved in an activity so many of their calling participated in,
smuggling. John, Sr. was actually known as a "famous Contraband Man," and because of this, as early as May 21, 1775, Richard Henry Lee suggested that he was the one for the job in question.9

Representing the family's company, William traveled to Williamsburg a day or two after receiving word from Newton, and there met with Nicholas. Virginia desperately needed gunpowder, and William, undoubtedly due to his skills as a mariner and smuggler with considerable trade connections, was asked to take bills of exchange valued at £5,000 sterling, proceed to the West Indies, and purchase all he could. A letter outlining Billie's instructions indicated that a great deal of faith was placed in his abilities with "no doubt." Furthermore, the directive said, "we must rely altogether for your endeavours for the best as it is impossible for me to say what is the [best] method to take in the islands[, I] therefore leave it to you to transact this matter as you think [best] for the good of the voyage." In essence, William was given carte blanche to do whatever was necessary to obtain the gunpowder and make the transaction. Also included in the letter was a list of contacts, including a Mr. Isaac Van Dam, and the directive that William should make one of his brothers privy to the situation in case of accident and the need for someone else to take over.10

William did not jump at the opportunity. He had doubts and was apprehensive. When told the powder was to be obtained at any price, he requested confirmation from the Assembly. He also questioned his personal safety, asking whether or not his life would be in jeopardy by undertaking the voyage. Newton and Nicholas assured him it would not, but did admit the possibility of William losing his vessel. In light of the situation and William's experience, both the question and reply seem rather odd.11
So, a smuggler was hired to smuggle, and on July 14, 1775, William Goodrich, in a sloop commanded by James Eastwood, set sail on a voyage that would permanently effect his life, his family's lives, and perhaps the lives of everyone else involved in maritime trade in North America and the islands. 

William's voyage was a relatively lengthy one, lasting until October, because of the difficulty he had obtaining powder. His first stop was Antigua where he sold £500 or £550 worth of bills of exchange for cash. Next, he went to St. Eustatia where he sold another £2,000 and deposited £500 in cash with Isaac Van Dam, one of the contacts designated in the instructions. Van Dam was to use it to pay for powder procured and shipped by a Mr. Bartrand at St. Pierre, Martinico. Van Dam would then hold it in readiness for a vessel to pick it up and carry it to Virginia. William then sailed to Martinico in an effort to locate more powder, but once there, finding none and believing he was watched by suspicious British officers, he left and, via other French islands, returned to St. Eustatia. There, he found that Bartrand had managed to get 1,800 pounds of powder and William also managed to buy 750 pounds more from a French schooner. Finally, in the proverbial eleventh hour, "a small English Guinea Ship" arrived from which another 1,600 pounds was obtained. This brought the total to 4,150 pounds of explosives. The transaction with the Guineaman is of further interest.

Before continuing, however, it is necessary to backtrack a bit and discuss another related event. At some point, and indicative of the faith the Virginia rebels placed in the Goodriches' abilities, the Virginians contracted with John, Jr. for a second shipment of goods. This time, the family was to procure and run in a cargo of coarse linens. For this venture, they were not advanced any funds.
While William was searching for powder, Bartlet was also in the West Indies making transactions of his own. At Antigua, he had encountered the Guineaman first, and aware of the powder she carried and his brother's search for the same, he offered to purchase it. This same vessel, however, also carried a small amount of British textiles, white lead, and linseed oil, and her Captain agreed to sell the powder only on the condition that Bartlet take the entire cargo, the textiles included. Of course, as British goods, these articles were proscribed from importation by the Articles of Association. Despite this, because of the need for powder and the difficulty in getting it, Bartlet agreed to the transaction. The Guineaman then sailed to St. Eustatia where the bargain was completed and for some reason, the cargo was briefly transferred to an intermediary vessel, the schooner Fanny, Robert Connoway, Master. Connoway, in turn, passed the powder to William. It need be noted that Bartlet did not make the transaction without making a profit himself. Having paid between three shillings and three shillings, nine pence per pound for the powder, he charged William four shillings, six pence per pound. Although it must have seemed of little consequence at the time, this deal would cause the family considerable problems.¹⁵

Meanwhile, in Virginia, in October, affairs began to warm with the British becoming increasingly aggressive in response to rebel military buildup. Early in the month, for their exploits, the Governor and his naval associates were being called "pirates and banditti" by the rebels.¹⁶ On October 12, Dunmore's troops began a series of successful forays up rivers into the surrounding countryside to relieve the rebels of stores of arms, ordnance, and munitions.¹⁷ Also, at some point in late September or early October, without any authority for taking such action, the Governor created an ad hoc Vice-Admiralty Court to deal with the prizes being brought in. Lacking a judge, five
commissioners were appointed to oversee matters. As of October 5, at least two prizes had been condemned. 18

While contemporary rebel and later historical accounts give the impression Dunmore's raiders, also styled "harpies" and "sheep-stealers" by the revolutionaries, committed heinous depredations, all indications are that at this time and for months to come, forays ashore were conducted merely to seize war materials and a printing press, procure food and fuel for the growing number of people in Dunmore's floating town, bring off slaves, and rescue stranded loyalists. As late as February 26, 1776, naval officers were still directed to first offer payment for provisions from the populace. Property damage seems to have been minimal and confined to such things as the occasional outbuilding storing grain. There are no references to the theft or destruction of other forms of personal property, nor are there any accounts of physical abuse. 19

The Governor was also aware of rebel smuggling activities and knew an attempt to run in gunpowder was afoot. Furthermore, he knew Billie was somehow involved in the later undertaking. In an effort to intercept the shipment, Dunmore had two prizes (condemned by the Admiralty Court but not sold) fitted out as tenders (small auxiliary craft taken into government service to act in consort with the naval vessels) to cruise for the powder vessel and other smugglers. 20

On October 1, William sailed for the mainland with his cargo of powder, a small assortment of weapons, and a parcel of shot, for which he had spent £1,501.4.0, West Indian Currency (slightly over £850 sterling). The remaining amount of money he entrusted to Van Dam to purchase additional powder, which he would store until William returned to pick it up. On October 9, Billie made Ocracoke on the North Carolina Outer Banks. He then proceeded up the sounds to the Pasquotank River where he safely off-loaded the powder and a large quantity
of legal osnaburgs brought in on his own account. From there, William headed for Norfolk to see Newton, but before arriving, he was warned that Dunmore was looking for him and, in any case, Newton was not there. So, he went to the family home in Portsmouth only to be told the family had moved inland to one of their plantations. At the same time, William received a second tip that Dunmore was searching for him, because of his efforts to obtain powder for the rebels. So, off William went again to the next refuge where he spent a day or two with family before moving on to Williamsburg. According to William's own account, while en route to the capital, he happened to meet Newton to whom he gave a full account of the venture, and who, upon hearing about it, seemed satisfied with matters as he should have been at this point in the affair. William was then directed by Newton to continue on to Williamsburg to meet with Nicholas and present the same account to him. This was done with Nicholas also being satisfied with what he had been told. William then returned home to move his pregnant wife, "looking to layin in the corse of a month or so," to the care of a midwife.21

Despite his knowledge that an effort to smuggle powder was in progress and that William was involved, Dunmore seemingly had little, if any, solid, specific information upon which to act. He later claimed he knew of John, Sr.'s involvement, but James Parker later stated that Dunmore had refused to believe anything ill of the elder Goodrich, and so, he felt very deceived upon learning of his participation in the scheme. This tends to indicate the Governor had been suspicious of Goodrich at some point and had confronted him, but Goodrich must have convinced him of his lack of personal involvement. Had Dunmore believed family members, other than William, were party to the undertaking, it seems likely he would have acted against them. Yet, John, Sr. and John, Jr. appear to have gone about their business with-
out any personal interference. On October 15, however, the situation
changed. On that date, while John, Sr. was on the coast keeping watch
for his returning vessels to help facilitate their entry through the
blockade, Dunmore intercepted the following letter written to Goodrich
by his son-in-law and sometimes business associate, Robert Sheddon.22

Sir Johnie came up yesterday, and Set off about 2
O'Clock this Morning for Nansemond - T.Hs. Boat could not
find the way in, and got safe up here - Johnie hired a
Vessel, which would Sail this day - Morris would be in
time to prevent any other Vessel, Returning except long
Splice with Salt from Turks Island, which is much wanted -
Johnie has placed several boats for to look out - I have
not heard from Nansemond Since Billie went up, but no
doubt the business is done - J. Webb set of to Secure the
papers &c and to push the Sloop out - The F. must now be
at Sea 10 or 11 Days - Bartlates Letters is not yet come
to hand - The Sloop Sailed this day fortnight and has a
considerable Value in Course Linens a Board which Billie
seemed resolute to have Secured, I beg't him to get W. Cr
to undertake it and not be seen himself in S- as it
might be a Means of discovering what Course to Stear -
Receive your shirt &c by Jupiter who goes to Conduct
Greenock and Luckie - I wish you may be so luckie as to
get a Sight of the F- to Secure her and the letters a
Shore to dessapoint the many Malicious Enemys you have,
who have made themselves bussie for your destruction -
Every thing remains quite here at present, take care of
yourself which is the only uneasiness we have now.- I am
Sir

Your Most Obedt. Servt

Robert Sheddon23

Clearly indicating clandestine shipping operations and the Goodriches' involvement, this letter enraged Dunmore, who immediately had Sheddon and John, Jr. apprehended and brought before him where they met the full force of the governor's violent wrath.24 Under interrogation, Sheddon somehow convinced Dunmore he had no involvement with or knowledge of the gunpowder. He declared his sole purpose in writing the letter was to warn family and friends of potential trouble in an ill-advised undertaking with the other cargoes, and so prevent their ruin.25 Releasing Sheddon, Dunmore turned his attention to John, Jr., clearly implicated by the letter, who must have confessed to even more, because he was clapped in irons in close confinement.26 In the
course of the confrontation, either Sheddon or Johnie explained the abbreviated parts of the note. "T.Hs." was Thomas Hardwick, "F" referred to the schooner Fanny, "W.Cr." was Willis Cooper (Wills Cooper), and the "S" pertained to Suffolk.27

Before continuing, several comments need be made about Sheddon's very interesting missive. In the past, there has been, with good reason, some confusion about the number of vessels referred to and their cargoes.28 While a number of craft are discussed, there are three either mentioned directly or alluded to that are of significance. First, there was William's sloop with a cargo of gunpowder and osnaburgs which had already made port on the Pasquotank River.29 Then, there was a second sloop with a valuable lading of coarse linens which had also made port near, if not at, Suffolk, Virginia.30 Her cargo undoubtedly consisted of the textiles the rebels had contracted for. These, valued at £840 and for which the family was owed £1,098, are known to have been landed and sold in October.31 Finally, there was the schooner Fanny carrying the enigmatic letters as well as an additional cargo of osnaburgs.32 Like William's, these textiles seem to have been legal and brought in on Bartlet's personal account. Combined, the brothers' personal cargoes consisted of 50,000 yards of osnaburgs valued at a very tidy sum between £3,125 and £3,750.33

Furthermore, some historians believe that the textiles referred to were the same as those purchased illegally by Bartlet from the Guineaman.34 Of course, this would constitute smuggling against the Articles of Association. In fact, not only is there no reference to the textiles bought by Bartlet, those actually discussed do not match up with the illicit textiles in either value or type. Their worth of only £297.17.10 is certainly not comparable with the considerable value of the osnaburgs and coarse linens known to have arrived.35 Furthermore, the illicit textiles consisted of "Checks Cotton Gingham Striped hol-
land Jeans Scotch thread Printed Linens [and] Irish Linens" certainly not osnaburgs or the coarse linens consisting of dowlas, Russia sheeting, and linen, as well as more osnaburgs of German manufacture. The bottom line is that there is no indication the illegal cargo was smuggled in at this time. As far as the rebels were concerned, all three textile cargoes that did arrive were legitimate. It was Dunmore who would have viewed the shipments as illegal and did.

Another interesting feature of the note is that given the fact both sloops had already returned, and their cargoes were secure, the only concern was for the Fanny and the "letters" she carried from Bartlet. The exact nature of the "letters" will probably never be known, but it is evident the family did not want them falling into the wrong hands. There are, however, three possible interpretations as to the identity of these mysterious items. First, it is possible they were actual letters containing incriminating information the family wished to keep secret, but this does not seem likely. If necessary, such documents could easily be destroyed and the contents conveyed verbally at a later date without loss and with no one the wiser. Secondly, the term "letters" could be a code word for smuggled goods, but this makes little sense in light of the fact that other smuggled goods are referred to directly as what they are in the same note. This leaves the third and most logical explanation. The letters were letters of credit. Such would certainly have been of value and something the family would not wish to destroy or have fall into the hands of their enemies.

This leads to the question of the identity of the "many Malicious Enemys." Quite logically, the reference was to Dunmore, and obviously, he was a concern. He was certainly attempting to intercept the gunpowder and other goods shipped by the Goodriches, and his efforts clearly gave the family cause for worry. Sheddon was undoubtedly
referring to Dunmore's possible interference when he stated he did not want William to go to Suffolk to personally handle the transaction with the coarse linens, because his presence "might be a Means of discovering what Course to Stear-.." In essence, William's presence would tip off Dunmore as to the location of that cargo. Also, John, Sr. was on the coast in an effort to assist his incoming vessels from falling into Dunmore's grasp.

Yet, there are aspects of the letter that strongly suggest Dunmore was not the only enemy. Primarily the letter was an update of information for John, Sr. on the state of affairs, but it also served as a warning. Keeping in mind that Goodrich, Sr. was already acting to keep his vessels from Dunmore, it is evident he was quite aware the Governor was intent on causing trouble and certainly did not have to be reminded of the fact. Furthermore, there is the wording of the letter. Despite the fact Sheddon's prose leaves a great deal to be desired, the phrase, "many Malicious Enemys you have, who have made themselves bussie for your destruction" clearly indicates a fair number of people conspiring against Goodrich. Dunmore would constitute only a single enemy. Also, the use of the word "Malicious" is of note in that it conveys a personal element which would seem unlikely to exist between John, Sr. and the Governor. Finally, the phrase, "your destruction" conveys a sense of someone wanting to totally ruin the elder Goodrich in some manner.

At the time the letter was written, only two vessels remained unaccounted for at sea, and only one of those, the Fanny, was seemingly of serious consequence to the family. Still, while the loss to Dunmore of a single schooner and cargo, if not insured, and even the letters, would have constituted a financial setback, perhaps even a serious one, it would not have resulted in Goodrich's destruction, monetarily or otherwise. The very real possibility of occasionally
losing a vessel under any circumstance was a risk every merchant mariner took and accepted.

Furthermore, all the family members were accounted for, safe, and beyond the Governor's grasp at the time Sheddon wrote. So, Dunmore did not present a personal threat at that time. In fact, it is highly doubtful he had previously presented a personal threat at all to anyone but William, and even if he had apprehended Billie, it would not have resulted in John, Sr.'s destruction. The governor was far more concerned with intercepting the powder than with catching whoever brought it in. Of course, this does not negate the fact that anyone caught doing so was going to be in serious trouble. Still, Dunmore did not consider John, Sr. to be involved, and if it was John, Sr., himself, who convinced him of this, the elder Goodrich knew the Governor was a threat only if he was found out by being caught. That the family members were able to go about their business unmolested shows Dunmore was certainly not acting like someone bent on John, Sr.'s destruction, and John, Sr. was not concerned as much with Dunmore as he was with simply getting his cargo in safely. That Dunmore did not act until after intercepting Sheddon's letter adds considerable credence to this. Also, the fact John, Jr. was, seemingly, so easily apprehended supports the idea that family members were little concerned about the governor targeting them personally. In essence, while John, Sr. was concerned about Dunmore in a general sense as a potential problem, Dunmore was not concerned about John, Sr. in a specific sense. The governor was a problem to the family only if they were caught.

All this tends to suggest that John, Sr. had personal enemies in the rebel camp as well as political ones in the British. Someone in Goodrich's position as a wealthy merchant had undoubtedly had a few conflicts over the years with individuals in the course of simply conducting routine business. One we know of was no less a figure than
Robert Carter III who on two occasions was so displeased with the Goodriches that he ceased conducting business with them altogether.\textsuperscript{37}

One thing is certain. Someone informed on the family to Dunmore about the powder. William was certainly of this belief. The rebel leaders acknowledged the fact as well. An angry Edmund Pendleton implied the act was more than a slip of the tongue stating, "A villain has given Lord Dunmore information of it." Considering the obvious clandestine nature of the operation, whoever the culprit was, he must have been fairly highly placed in the revolutionary government.\textsuperscript{38}

Accepting the Goodriches had personal enemies in the rebel camp, the question remains whether the informer conveyed his intelligence because the Goodriches, specifically, were involved, or simply because the news of the powder itself was significant. Of course, the answer will probably never be known. If the former, however, there is a clue to what the malefactors intended. They wanted John, Sr., personally, to be caught by Dunmore, hoping he would at least be imprisoned, if not executed, for treason. This would certainly entail his destruction. Even if the informer and "Malicious Enemys" were unassociated, Dunmore's being aware of the family's involvement could be used to advantage by the latter. It would be hoped John, Sr. would be caught, and that possibility may have been actively promoted. Unfortunately for any "Malicious Enemys," if this was part of their agenda, Dunmore must have initially let them down by refusing to believe John, Sr. was a party to the gunpowder scheme.

Of primary concern to the family at this point were the letters. Of course, it is doubtful any rebel "Malicious Enemys" were aware of their existence, but someone was clearly looking for some means of destroying John, Sr. Sheddon, aware of the enemies' intentions, knew the letters offered the means of their doing so, and was duly anxious about their safe arrival. Of course, this line of thought would indi-
cate there was something incriminating about the letters which the family wished to keep the rebels from finding out about. What? The most plausible explanation is, if they were letters of credit, which seems likely, they probably indicated Bartlet had conducted other business with the British in the islands. They might also indicate the family would be doing business with political undesirables in Virginia. As such, their interception, in addition to resulting in a financial setback, could also result in John Sr.'s destruction. In essence, whatever incriminating evidence they contained could be used to ruin his reputation and make it impossible for him to conduct business within the existing political climate. At the same time, however, it need be noted that such letters could only point to family members having done business with British merchants or their intent to do so. Because they were not a commodity, bringing them in, in and of themselves, could not be construed as going against the Association or being illegal in any other manner.

If the "Malicious Enemys" existed, which seems probable, they were in a good position to see their goal of John, Sr.'s destruction carried into effect. If matters worked out as they probably hoped, the Governor would handle affairs for them, and they could avoid getting their hands dirty. If this failed, they could continue their own efforts. The family may well have been caught between two groups of enemies.

Because of the family's reputation as smugglers, historians have assumed that all their cargoes were illicit. There is no basis for such assumptions, and to this point, one thing is apparent. There is no evidence the Goodriches had done anything overtly wrong with regards to Virginia and the rebels. On the contrary, they had gone to a great deal of trouble and personal risk to honor their two contracts, and two of their vessels had imported an additional large quantity of
legal osnaburgs which could only have been of use to the Virginians. Certainly, all seemed happy with the powder deal, and no one found fault with the contract for coarse linens. The worst they could have been accused of was conducting business with the enemy based on information gleaned from the letters. Even then, however, there is no indication of their actually smuggling anything and going against the Articles of Association. Furthermore, during William's and Bartlet's absence, John, Jr. went so far as to show his loyalty to the rebels by passing on intelligence and warning them of a possible attack by Dunmore on Williamsburg.\textsuperscript{40}

The Goodriches were, however, in serious trouble, having given "mortal Offensen to Dunmore, who was "very violent", and who, having John, Jr. in his power, possessed considerable leverage.\textsuperscript{41} Hearing of his son's unhappy situation and undoubtedly concerned about his well being, John, Sr. contacted Dunmore professing "his Sincere repentance of what was past, and his earnest desire of returning to his duty."\textsuperscript{42} He also sought an audience which was arranged. At this meeting Dunmore made it clear that procuring the powder was a capital offense. Also, although there is no indication the topic arose at this time, it could hardly have escaped John, Sr.'s notice that a large part of his Portsmouth holdings, including his house, warehouses, stores, shops, wharves, trade goods, and several vessels, were literally under Dunmore's guns. Threatened with an extreme loss of property in addition to the seemingly very real possibility of losing a son, Goodrich, under duress, fell under Dunmore's control. His only choices were to put on as good a face as possible, bow to the inevitable, attempt to soothe Dunmore, try to talk his way out, comply with the Governor's wishes, and hope for the best. In the manner of a true businessman, John, Sr. offered the simple explanation that the powder deal was just an opportunity for "a good freight." The whole affair was a business
matter and nothing more. This obviously was not enough, because Good-
rich then made a serious proposition to Dunmore. He would offer up
William as a hostage while he, himself, sailed to the West Indies to
procure the powder and any remaining money for the Governor. Dunmore
agreed to this, and John, Sr. committed himself and his family to a
very dangerous game of walking a narrow path between the proverbial
rock and hard place.43

William was brought on board Dunmore's ship to join Johnie by
October 31. At that time, the Governor applied pressure for more in-
formation. Intimidated, Billie offered additional details about his
voyage and dealings with Van Dam in a formal deposition.44

Armed with a pass from Dunmore, John, Sr. set off on in early
November to South Quay on the Black Water River to get William's
sloop, which had been moved there from the Pasquotank, and set sail
for St. Eustatia. He made it no further than Ocracoke Inlet where he
was stopped by a tender in Dunmore's service.45 The tender's captain, a
Mr. Jones, refused to acknowledge the pass on the grounds that Good-
rich was known to the British to be an "old Rascal," and therefore,
Dunmore would never have issued such a document.46 It had to be a for-
gery. As a result, the British "Used him very Ill."47 Soaking wet, and
without food, drink, bedding, or a change of clothes, Goodrich was
clapped in the hold of a vessel and kept there for a several days.
Following this, he was sent in his own sloop, possibly in irons, to
Norfolk. There, Dunmore, in exasperation, informed Jones of his error
in performing his job too well, and a new scheme was formulated.48

According to the new plan devised by Dunmore and the Goodriches,
William would be sent (seemingly under guard) on one of the naval ten-
ders to obtain the powder and any remaining money.49 Once he had ob-
tained the funds, he was to use them to purchase arms and additional
powder for the British and then return any left over to Dunmore.50
John, Sr. and John, Jr. were paroled on the condition they report on board Dunmore's ship every ten days. William sailed, probably in the fourth week of November, and John, Sr. retired to his plantation on the Nansemond River.

William's account of his seizure by Dunmore, his father's efforts to go to St. Eustatia, and his own subsequent selection for the task are of interest. While the basics of his story conform to other known facts, the specifics he offered initially appear questionable. In general, William recounted his being captured, John, Sr.'s attempts to get to the islands and his being detained by Jones, and as a result, his (William's) being selected to make another effort. Beyond this, however, Billie recounts these events in a very different and somewhat strange light. He stated he was seized at 2:00 a.m. by a party of eight men and an officer at one of his father's plantations while en route back to St. Eustatia. He further stated that at that time he had yet to see his father since his return from the West Indies and believed him to still be at the Capes. Then, William professed that when John, Sr. heard of his being taken, he picked up the directions concerning the transaction with Van Dam and, taking over the operation, sailed to St. Eustatia to complete the unfinished business. In the process, the elder Goodrich was captured by Jones. The paperwork seized at the same time showed William had left a considerable amount of funds with Van Dam, and as a result, the younger Goodrich was ordered by Dunmore to retrieve the money and powder.

As noted, these specifics do not fit the story as known, with the result it initially appears William's account, written later when a prisoner, was a fabrication perpetrated to get him off the hook. Yet, there are indications, in some cases in the specifics themselves, that William was telling the truth as he knew it. In essence, it seems William did not know about his father's dealings with Dunmore, the
plan he would be held hostage, or his father's reasons for going to St. Eustatia. If this is accepted, then William's account makes perfect sense.

Even William's assertion that Dunmore did not find out about the remaining funds deposited with Van Dam until after John, Sr. was captured at Ocracoke is believable. Of course, Dunmore knew, having heard it from John, Sr. who had probably received the information via Sheddon. William, however did not convey this fact in his deposition for the governor, and consequently, if William was in the dark about the whole affair, to his knowledge, this would have been the first time Dunmore had become aware of the fact. 54

That William was seized at 2:00 a.m. at one of his father's plantations, a fair distance from Norfolk, supports the fact that he had not been made privy to the scheme. First of all, the unnecessary detail indicates the account, in itself, is true. Furthermore, according to Dunmore, John, Sr. was to insure William would be at a certain place at a certain time to be apprehended. This being the case, if William was aware of what was transpiring, it must be asked why a more convenient time and location were not selected? It must also be asked why William would make up such a yarn when undoubtedly, if he were aware of the true nature of the situation, the explanation of acting under duress with the threat of capital punishment, would have sufficed.

This leads to the final argument in support of the fact William had no knowledge of what was going on. Having just spent a considerable amount of effort avoiding capture by Dunmore, why would he suddenly and willingly submit to imprisonment and the seemingly very real possibility of facing execution, even if directed to do so by his father? To reiterate, it really does appear William had no idea of the true nature of what was transpiring between his father and Dunmore.
Furthermore, the situation exemplifies the fact that the family members did not always conspire and act in concert. While John, Sr. attempted to clear the Outer Banks for St. Eustatia, son-in-law Robert caught up on his business correspondence, which reflected exactly what he had come to think of the Articles of Association and where he stood politically. On November, 9, he penned a missive to his brother, John, in Glasgow, Scotland, patting himself on the back for what he felt was the important assistance he had rendered Goodrich in the matter with Dunmore and stating he was in good standing with the rebels. Next, Sheddon clearly indicated his preference for the Crown. Then, citing the profits made on the 50,000 yards of osnaburgs brought in on William's sloop and the schooner Fanny, he openly defied the non-importation agreement by advising his brother to invest as much as possible in a large cargo of "every Necessary Article - None of your Luxury" and send it out to Virginia where there were great demands and profits to be made. The intention was that another business associate in Glasgow, former Virginian Andrew Sym, also be a partner in the venture. In a second letter to John dated the next day, Robert again indicated there was a fortune to be made and suggested John Goodrich, Sr. might be brought in on the deal as an investor. It should be noted that there is no indication the matter had been discussed with Goodrich. On the contrary, all evidence suggests that Sheddon's father-in-law had no knowledge of the scheme. He was only suggested as a possible alternative partner as an afterthought. Goodrich was not referred to in this regard in the first letter, and given the fact that at the time both were penned he was attempting to sail to St. Eustatia, there was no opportunity for Sheddon to have discussed the matter with him between November 9 and 10. The letter does, however, indicate Sheddon's awareness of his father-in-law's past and propensity for smuggling.
For a man so involved in smuggling, Sheddon seems to have had considerable problems when it came to successfully sending incriminating mail. These letters were intercepted as well. This time it was by the rebels.\(^57\)

By late October, the situation in Virginia was intensifying. On the 27th, the British made a brisk but unsuccessful attack on Hampton resulting in the loss of the Hawk, tender.\(^58\) In November, Virginia troops began to move against Dunmore, and in an effort to hinder them, several tenders cruised up the James River with H.M. Sloop King Fisher to destroy the ferries at Jamestown Island and Burwell's Landing.\(^59\) Others sailed to take up station at strategic points to enforce the blockade, "seising all that pass."\(^60\) As of November 5, a tender at Ocracoke had taken two prizes loaded with salt.\(^61\)

On November 15, Dunmore used the occasion of his victory at Kemp's Landing as reason to issue a proclamation written on the 7th and held in readiness for the appropriate moment. This declared martial law and required all loyal subjects capable of bearing arms to rally to him. Furthermore, "all indented Servants, Negroes or others, (appertaining to Rebels,)" that could and would shoulder a musket would be freed if they offered their service to the King. With this proclamation, Dunmore drew his line in the sand forcing the populace to decide their loyalties.\(^62\)

By late November, "Tenders were plying up the Rivers, plundering Plantations and using every Art to seduce the Negroes."\(^63\) All indications are that until the proclamation, and probably for some weeks thereafter, the tenders in Dunmore's service were commanded and probably manned with Royal Navy personnel. The reliance on and increased use of Loyalists to command and man tenders seems to stem from the issuing of the proclamation.
Early December witnessed Dunmore arming additional sloops and schooners taken into government service for use as tenders. By late in the month, at least three with loyalist commanders and crews were at sea. Robert Stewart was captain of one, an eight or ten gun sloop. Affairs did not always go well for these vessels. The rebels captured the other two while they were foraging and attempting to collect stranded loyalists. Although some of the loyalist vessels serving Dunmore were occasionally referred to as privateers, there is no indication the Governor ever exceeded his authority and issued letters of marque. Furthermore, the loyalist tenders generally did not cruise on their own as would a privateer. In most instances, they acted in consort with Royal Navy craft, thus placing them under the control of professional British officers.

During this same time, Dunmore began raising two regiments of troops, the Queen's Loyal Virginia Regiment from white Tories, and Lord Dunmore's Ethiopian Regiment from blacks. On December 9, a nasty and tragic action at Great Bridge resulted in a British defeat, forcing them to fall back on Norfolk. As the rebels advanced on that port, local loyalists flocked to the Governor for refuge. There, with British and rebels confronting each other, matters were tense, and on January 1, they came to a head. Caught between the opposing forces, Norfolk was burned during an engagement in which both sides did their best to intentionally level certain sections of the town for their own reasons.

Meanwhile, with regards to the Goodriches, by early December, individuals in the rebel camp were increasingly aware of the family's ill-treatment at the hands of Dunmore and commented on it sympathetically. Others grew suspicious. Questions were asked about the Goodriches' contact with the Governor and their conduct concerning the powder seemingly on his behalf. In essence, the family's association
and activities with the governor, regardless of the reason, were causing doubts. The reference to John, Sr. in the letter from Sheddon to his brother must have raised a few eyebrows as well. Consequently, on December 11, the Virginia Convention appointed a Committee headed by James Mercer and including Newton, William Aylett, Richard Henry Lee, Richard Bland, and others, "to enquire into the Conduct of John Goodrich William Goodrich and John Goodrich junr. relating to the importation of Gunpowder and other Articles for the use of this Colony." It should be noted there was no reference to Bartlet.

At some point in December, an event transpired that was undoubt-edly the most disreputable act in a long series. The incident also illustrates the public’s awareness of the family’s activities. While William was away, an enraged mob, believing he had sold out the rebel cause and intended to deliver the powder money to Dunmore, showed up at the house where his wife was recuperating from giving birth three days earlier. It was their intent to burn the structure with her in it, and only the exertions of family friends prevented their doing so. Still, fearing for her life, these friends, within two weeks, sent her off by sea to a place of safety.

On January 4, 1776, a separate, local committee met in Isle of Wight County to deliberate on John, Sr.’s activities. Primarily this group was concerned about the fact John, Sr. was able to freely sail a small schooner on the Nansemond and James Rivers without interference from Dunmore. Goodrich offered a logical and legitimate explanation. He used the schooner to report to Dunmore every ten days as per the agreement of his parole and in fact, he had only made the trip four times. Seemingly on his own Goodrich also offered that he intended to ship some corn from his plantation in Isle of Wight to that in Nansemond. Regardless of the legitimacy of this explanation, the committee felt that if others could not travel as freely, then John Goodrich
should certainly not be allowed to do so. Furthermore, they declared he could not ship provisions of any kind without authorization from the Convention or Committee of Safety. The Isle of Wight Committee then turned the proceedings over to the Convention's Committee and ordered Goodrich to deliver himself and his vessel into the custody of the commanding officer at Burwell's Ferry near Williamsburg. Given the degree of public outcry exhibited by the mob in attacking William's wife and the fact he was being investigated by two committees, John, Sr. was certainly aware of the fact he and his family were in serious trouble. Yet, there is no evidence that John, Sr. was anything but complacent and cooperative about going along with the directives, indicating a belief on his part that he was guiltless of any crime.  

Problems were beginning for Robert Sheddon as well. On January 5, the Virginia Convention declared his conduct inimical, and as a result, his sloop, the Agatha, and a part of her cargo of rum which had been seized were decreed to be forfeit to the colony.  

John Goodrich, Sr., on January 10, performed a rather brazen act which, under the circumstances, tends to further reflect just how sure he was of himself and his innocence. He petitioned the Convention to direct the Committee of Safety to pay him the balance of his account. This was undoubtedly the amount due for the coarse linens which had yet to be paid.  

On January 13, the Convention's Committee met and presented its findings on the Goodriches. Accepting that John, Sr.'s actions were the result of his drawing "the resentment of Lord Dunmore," his unhindered excursions by water were merely to honor his parole, and the corn he intended to transport was only a small amount intended for the use of his family, they  

Resolved that the said John Goodrich hath been active in favour of this Colony and hath suffered considerably on that Account that nothing in his Conduct appears to be inimical to the common cause,
but that no Grain or other Article of Provision should be Water-borne in the neighbourhood of the Enemy. 41

As to William's conduct in going back for the powder and remaining funds, the committee accepted that he too had acted under duress. They also seemingly accepted the word of John, Sr. and John, Jr., despite the fact they had had no contact with William since his recent return, that he had brought back neither powder or money. 75

Out of the frying pan and into the fire, family members were suddenly confronted with an altogether new charge, the smuggling of British goods proscribed by the first Article of the Association. Bartlet, in absentia, and John, Jr. were accused of conspiring to break the rules and run in the additional goods purchased from the Guineaman. In St. Eustatia, the textiles had been repacked and concealed in rum puncheons for shipment, and the invoices badly altered to indicate they had been shipped from that place rather than Liverpool and Antigua and were of Dutch rather than Irish manufacture. Bartlet then shipped the cargo in the schooner Fanny to some point on the Potomac River where it was received by John, Jr. Like his father, Goodrich, Jr. seems to have fully cooperated with the committee by freely answering their questions and so honestly admitting that this had been done as to supply his inquisitors with specifics. He even produced the invoices which were being used as evidence against him.

In his defense, John, Jr. recounted how Bartlet, in order to get the gunpowder from the Guineaman which was badly needed by the colony, had been required to purchase the rest of the cargo as well. This fact was confirmed by the testimony of Robert Connoway, Master of the Fanny. 76

In addition to finding fault with the textiles, the Committee made a point of noting that Bartlet had sold the powder to William at a profit. In doing so, they conveyed a strong hint of disapproval of this action as well. Although it is not stated directly, there is the impression Bartlet's actions were considered less than patriotic. 77
Despite John, Jr.'s explanations and the fact William had been directed to do whatever was necessary to get the powder, he and Bartlet were found guilty. The goods in question were to be forfeited for the use of the colony. Furthermore, in accordance with the punishment prescribed by the Articles of Association, a resolution would be published in the Gazette requesting that no one have any further business dealings with either of the two brothers.78

At this point, some comments are in order about the historiographical treatment of the Goodrich family in general. Because of the family's reputation for involvement in smuggling and the fact members did actually smuggle in the small amount of British textiles, historians have conveyed the impression they were all basically bad people who were dishonest about everything else they did.79 It has been difficult for historians to conceive that family members, because of their participation in an activity generally winked at could still be honorable men in other respects. They were businessmen, and in the world of 18th century business, involving a relatively small and closely associated community of men, a merchant's word and honesty were of great importance and a key to the level of success the Goodriches had obviously attained.80 As in any community, there were rules of conduct, and if you did not play by them, you did not play at all. This is not to say John, Sr. was all pure and lily white. As shown in his dealings with Dunmore, he was more than capable of dissembling. Dunmore, however, was the enemy at the time, and so, such conduct can be deemed acceptable under the circumstances. Furthermore, although clearly tightly knit, the family is treated as a single entity in which members constantly acted together conspiratorially and in complete harmony as a group. In essence, historians maintain they conspired and lied about everything, and this view has seriously biased interpretations of their conduct and testimony.81 In reality, the individual ac-
counts of each are quite candid. There is no reason to doubt them. In further defense, given the various voyages undertaken and the number of times and places different family members were in the custody of one faction or the other, contact between them was relatively brief and sporadic. What contact there was took place during a series of events ever increasing in complexity and often rapidly developing. There was little opportunity for family members to meet to fabricate and coordinate their stories. Yet, the detailed testimony of any given family member, recounting their personal involvement in a specific incident and forming only a part of the puzzle, meshes with and corroborates that of another.

Regarding the testimony offered at the inquiry, John, Jr.'s explanation for why the textiles were purchased in the first place is considered merely a fabrication to excuse a blatant smuggling effort and get out of trouble. In fact, the story makes perfect sense and there is no reason to doubt it. Such a transaction does not seem at all atypical for the 18th century. The Guineaman was from Liverpool and as such, was undoubtedly preparing for the last leg of a long triangular voyage. For the sake of cost efficiency, her captain would have wanted to get rid of all of his cargo as fast as possible. He certainly would not have wanted to incur additional expenses while waiting around hoping to find a buyer for the relatively piddling remainder of his cargo valued at only £297.17.10.

Furthermore, when there were obviously very large, valuable cargoes of legitimate textiles to be had, it must be asked why anyone would purposely risk getting into trouble for such a comparatively minor additional quantity? As mentioned earlier, the osnaburgs brought in legally and already sold by William and Bartlet were valued at between £3,125 and £3,750.
Historians have asked if the story about purchasing the textiles were true, then why were family members simply not open and honest about it from the beginning? If they had been candid about the transaction, given the circumstances, it seems doubtful the Virginia government would have found fault with them. The family's failure to do this is held against them as illustrative of their devious motives and lack of honesty. While this idea entails some valid reasoning in the proverbial perfect world, in the real one it reflects a certain level of naiveté. Still, the question needs to be addressed. Why did the family not tell the convention and instead conceal and smuggle the textiles? Clearly aware the textiles were a problem, they could not count on the Virginia rebels being so understanding. The family might still get into trouble and lose the cargo as well through confiscation. The cargo, however small, still represented an investment Bartlet would not wish to risk losing. All indications are that under the circumstances, right or wrong, Bartlet simply either did not think the textiles were of any consequence or did not care. Furthermore, William had been told to do whatever was necessary to get the gunpowder. Though, in retrospect, clearly an error in judgment, it seems plausible that for Bartlett, as a smuggler, the easiest, most trouble free, and safest way to handle the textiles was to bring them in clandestinely with no one the wiser.

More importantly, if both John, Sr. and John, Jr. were lying about these facts, why did they not lie about everything else? On the contrary, both were extremely cooperative, honest and forthright about everything else to the point of offering testimony and evidence that was incriminating. In light of this there is no reason to believe they fabricated a self-serving yarn about the nature of the transaction with the Liverpool vessel. In turn, if father and son actually had cause for concern about their guilt and were intent on worming their
way out of a tight spot, it would have been easy to deny everything, keep their own council, and conveniently lose or misplace the incriminating invoices. This did not happen.

As to the smuggling act itself, as mentioned earlier, some historians believe the illicit textiles came in on the **Fanny** in mid-October. There is no evidence to support this, and in fact, it could not have been the case. John, Jr. received the cargo himself somewhere on the Potomac River. At the time in question, however, he was in Dunmore's custody. In conjunction, it seems highly unlikely that as an experienced smuggler, Bartlet would have shipped such a cargo without first communicating with his brother about its impending arrival, giving him time to make preparations to receive it. Yes, William had already returned prior to the arrival of the **Fanny** and might have given word she was coming in. The **Fanny**, however, had actually sailed days before William got back, and taking into account the uncertainties of wind and weather, Bartlet, an experienced mariner, certainly could not have counted on his brother getting back in time to make necessary arrangements. Such a scenario would have been entirely too haphazard, leaving too much to chance. All indications are the textiles in question came in at a later date.

Of note is the fact that, although both brothers were held equally responsible, given the nature of the deal with the Guineaman, the decisions regarding the transaction and intended smuggling were Bartlet's alone. The act was certainly not premeditated, and he could not have conspired about the purchase either before or during the event with John, Jr., because he was in Virginia. Although undoubtedly later informed about the textiles' purchase and plans to smuggle them, Johnie's involvement was really only as an accessory after the fact. What was he to do but help his brother who had already committed himself to this course of action?
Also of significance is the fact that it is apparent the matter of the textiles had only just come to light. There was no reference to their being a topic of inquiry for the two committees at an earlier date. Yet, suddenly they were an issue with which, to use a modern term, the family was "blind-sided." Adding weight to this argument is the fact Bartlet was suddenly named as a co-conspirator. Roughly only two weeks before, probably on December 27, Bartlet and his sloop, the Dorothy, in ballast, were seized by a rebel vessel actively employed in stopping vessels suspected of breaking the Articles of Association. Although the Dorothy was detained, it seems Bartlet was released. There is no record of his being held, and the fact he was not present for the inquiry supports he was not. If a charge of smuggling had already been leveled at Bartlet at the time he was stopped, something one would think officials, especially the captain of a vessel apprehending potential smugglers, would be aware of, it is difficult to imagine Bartlet not being placed in custody and sent to Williamsburg. He was not. Consequently, the matter of the textiles could only have come to light during the early part of January after the Dorothy was seized.¹⁴

Not only was the charge recent, certain aspects of it were suspicious. It must be asked how individuals with a reputation for being experienced smugglers could get caught with and examined for such an inconsequential cargo? Bartlet had certainly taken pains to run it in clandestinely, and it was run in successfully. They were not caught in the act. Perhaps the reference to John, Sr. in the Sheddon letter had caused suspicions. Even so, clearly someone (a "Malicious Enemy"?) had to have been looking very hard for evidence against the family to have found out about this past clandestine incident. Then, in conjunction, someone (another "Malicious Enemy"?) had to have informed on them. Finally, it needs to be asked why, considering the family's efforts on
the part of the rebels, involving considerable trouble and risk, and their ultimate honest explanation about what had transpired, such a major issue was made out of what was really a relatively inconsequential affair and such a harsh penalty imposed? With the posting of the resolves in the press, John, Jr.'s and Bartlet's business careers were effectively over. They became *persona non grata* in the rebel merchant community. They were ruined. The situation is even more curious in light of William having been directed to do whatever was required for the successful completion of the voyage. In a worst case scenario, someone really was intent on John Goodrich's "destruction." William certainly believed someone had let the cat out of the bag to Dunmore. At best, the Virginia rebels come off looking very naive. They had hired smugglers to smuggle, then became upset when they smuggled.

The very nature of the proceedings is rather suspicious as well. In December, the Virginians had established an Admiralty Court, one of the purposes of which was to deal with smugglers. Yet, the Goodrich brothers were not accorded the benefit of a trial under this institution's authority. They were merely pronounced guilty by the investigating committee.⁸⁵

A final note on this part of the story concerns the Virginians taking a dim view of Bartlet's having made a profit off the powder he sold to William. Perhaps, to again use modern parlance, it was time for a "reality check" with the rebels. Bartlet was not the person designated to fulfill the contract, but he went to considerable time, effort, and personal expense to acquire additional amounts of the needed commodity. Consequently, it is somewhat hard to find fault with him, a merchant, making at least some money out of the deal.

While these events were transpiring for family members in Virginia, William was having an interesting time in St. Eustatia where he had been sent to claim the powder and unspent money and had arrived by
December 6. He later asserted he had no intention of returning with either for Dunmore. In fact, a large part of the funds were not even available to collect. Van Dam had sent bills valued at £2,000 sterling to France to buy additional powder. As for the remainder, £3,762.11.0 in West Indian currency (roughly £2,150 sterling), William, with Van Dam's assistance, came up with a scheme to appease the Governor. He would return just enough of the bills, two with a total value of £400, to keep the Governor happy. Approximately £1,750 sterling would remain with Van Dam. In support, Van Dam offered a ledger and note explaining the balance of William's account and assuring the rest of the money would be handed over when it was known the bills had cleared without protest. Then displaying his business savvy, William made arrangements that only he or his brother, Bridger, could receive the remaining money from Van Dam in the future. This stipulation put William in the position of controlling the situation relative to both the rebels and the British. Of note, William later stated there was, in fact, powder ready to be picked up when he arrived in St. Eustatia. This, he simply left, and Van Dam later sold it to a vessel from New York.

Somewhere between January 4 and 9, 1776, William returned to Virginia where, failing to mention the existence of the powder, he handed the two bills and Van Dam's account over to Dunmore, explaining that the remaining bills had been sold. Upon receipt, the governor seemed satisfied with the state of affairs and released William. There is no evidence William purchased any arms or additional powder as per his instructions.

By offering bills of exchange, William bought time and lulled Dunmore by hoodwinking him, at least to a certain degree. Bills of exchange were the 18th century version of checks, not ready cash. Although Dunmore seemed to think those William brought back could be redeemed for the British, their negotiability remains questionable. If
not negotiable, the bills were worthless. Even if they were, the bills were of no immediate value to Germain. Issued by an illegal and as yet unrecognized government and drawn on the London firm of John Norton & Sons, it seems unlikely Dunmore could find a buyer among his followers (or anyone else in the colonies) willing to take the risk of purchasing such dubious paper with such a suspicious history. As an alternative, all he could do was send them to England, which is what he did. This course of action would take time and undoubtedly still be problematic. Norton and Sons had strong Virginia ties, supported the rebels, and were aware of the circumstances for which the bills had originally been circulated. As such, they certainly would have questioned their appearance in the hands of British officials and, at least, argued against payment. In any case, the rebels had not as yet actually lost any money due to William's actions. At worst, the immediate funds designated for munitions was reduced with the £400 in a state of limbo. In light of William's plan to pull the wool over Dunmore's eyes, it seems probable he originally intended to inform the Convention of his actions. In turn, even if Norton and Sons were obliged to make payment, regardless of the bearer, the Virginians could still contact them with orders to refuse payment to anyone attempting to cash the bills. By one account, upon being set free, William promptly set out for Williamsburg, perhaps partially for this reason, perhaps because he had heard of his family's situation there. Whatever the reason, upon finding out about William's destination, Dunmore had him detained and again confined on ship. William, himself, stated Dunmore released him on parole to visit his family with whom he spent three days before returning to the Governor as a prisoner. It seems highly unlikely that William was lying about his intentions and the nature of what transpired when he met with Van Dam, pri-
arily because of Van Dam's actions in response to the situation. Keep in mind that Van Dam was not a Goodrich associate. He was recommended to William by the Virginia Government. In other words, he was on the side of the Virginians not the Goodriches. Given that Billie arrived under guard on a British warship, if he really intended to reclaim the powder and funds for the British, one would think Van Dam would have detected something was amiss and withheld everything. Furthermore, it would be expected he would be suspicious enough to contact the Virginians to assess what was going on and inform them of the situation. He did none of this. On the contrary, he went along with William, handing over the two bills and penning an explanation for the others. Clearly Van Dam did not feel anything was wrong. His actions indicate he was aware of William's predicament, convinced of his true intentions, and willing to play along. This goes far to support that William was telling the truth about what transpired in St. Eustatia and why. He was only going through the motions of acting on Dunmore's behalf.

At this point, John, Sr.'s statement to the committee that William returned neither powder or money can be addressed. The testimony is also held up as evidence of the family's dishonesty given that William actually came back with two bills of exchange. In fact, John, Sr.'s comment, when juxtaposed with William's account of events, was truthful as far as he knew it to be. Recall that William said he initially did not intend to return with either item, indicating a premeditated plan of action. John, Sr. was very much a part of formulating the plan for William to go to St. Eustatia. As such, it seems likely the two conspired beforehand merely to go through the motions of getting the goods and money without actually doing so. Believing this was what William intended and what would occur, John, Sr. felt confident saying his recently returned son had brought neither item
back. Furthermore, John, Sr.'s testimony was undoubtedly taken down under examination prior to January 13, possibly before William's return, and even as of that date, he seems to have had no contact with his son to learn otherwise. Even if he had heard from William, John, Sr. was not lying. William brought back bills of exchange rather than cash.

As stated earlier, the Goodrich family has been viewed as a single group that constantly acted together in complete agreement. What one did, all supported and did as well. In fact, of the five male family members under consideration, all were adults who led their own lives and were responsible for their own actions. They must be viewed as separate individuals, each making his own decisions for his own personal reasons in his own time. Accepting this, the question must be asked when the various family members jumped off the fence rail into the loyalist camp.

Historians maintain that all family members, if not already committed to the loyalist cause, were well on the road to becoming so by December, 1775.92 Certainly, John, Sr.'s post-war memorial to the Loyalist Claim's Commission states he was in Dunmore's service at that time.93 Technically, in a qualified sense, he was, but for the same reason he failed to mention his involvement with the rebels and the gunpowder, he obviously would not mention the fact he was not a willing associate. In any case, as will be shown, the December date is far too early for most of the family members. Each departed from the revolutionaries at different times in succession, seemingly when each had had enough of accumulating rebel provocation. The Goodriches were caught in the middle of a spiraling sequence of events beyond their control. Because of their activities for the rebels, they were in a position to be intimidated into association with the loyalists. This contact, in turn, led to increasing doubts and persecution on the part
of the revolutionaries progressively forcing them away. In reality, it can be said rather than leave the rebel camp, the Goodriches were alienated and driven from it into the waiting embrace of Dunmore. The governor, becoming aware of their potential usefulness to the royal cause, would court their favor and welcome them when they had no place else to go. As of December, however, the only rebel affronts to the Goodriches were the assault on William’s wife and the establishment of the committee of inquiry. While serious, most family members seem to have accepted these incidents and taken them in stride. In January, the accusation and conviction for smuggling in conjunction with the apparent doubts about the family’s patriotism, because of their contact with Dunmore, constituted additional provocations. Yet, most of the family still professed loyalty to the rebels and acted accordingly. Bartlet was the exception.

Bartlet’s activities between mid-October and late December are somewhat of a mystery and a bit problematic. All indications, however, are that he stayed in St. Eustatia in October, and remained in the West Indies (if not specifically at the Dutch island) throughout the fall and early winter. There is no report of his having returned to Virginia during this time. Sheddon’s cryptic note of October 15, while indicating that Bartlet’s enigmatic letters were expected, offer no hint that Bartlet, himself, would be arriving. Another source states that on October 16, Dunmore intercepted correspondence from Bartlet in St. Eustatia which he had sent on yet another vessel. If it is accepted the illicit textiles were shipped at a later date, given they were sent by Bartlet and allowing the Fanny time to make a return voyage, this activity would indicate he was at St. Eustatia at least until early November, if not later in the month. He was also at that same island during the first week of December at the end of which he returned to Virginia.
As of December 22, it is evident he had not only returned home, but was acting for Dunmore as well. The Governor contracted with Bartlet to hire the Fanny for government service into which she entered on that date. Furthermore, Bartlet went so far as to fit her out at his own expense. His commitment to the royal cause at that time is interesting because it predates not only the inquiries, but also his seizure and release by the rebels. Clearly, the Virginians were not yet aware of his actions, and it is possible family members were not as well.96

The facts recorded by the rebels about Bartlet's detainment, probably on December 27, pose a problem, however, about his location in that at first glance, they would appear to contradict his being in Virginia on the 22nd. One document states he was twenty days out from St. Eustatia when stopped. Another reiterates Bartlet had cleared from the Dutch island and adds his destination as Nansemond. Yet a third, of a later date, is interesting, because it says the voyage was from Antigua to Norfolk. Ignoring the third document for the moment, the first two, when read in association, tend to imply Bartlet was taken immediately upon his return following a twenty day voyage. Of course, this raises the question of how he could be at sea and dealing with Dunmore at the same time. The answer is really quite simple. Bartlet had actually been in Virginia at least a week prior to detainment.97

In support, the weight of evidence is with the documents pertaining to the hiring of the Fanny. These include not only the testimony of Bartlet and Dunmore, but the surveyors' report as well, all agreeing the schooner was taken into service on December 22. As Bartlet's presence was required to make the agreement as well as fit her out, there can be no doubt about his actually being there.98

How then can the rebel documents be accounted for? The facts they offer, while rife for misinterpretation, are essentially true and
even offer a few hints. While there is no doubt Bartlet left St. Busto-
tatia twenty days earlier, that the actual voyage took twenty days,
although possible considering the uncertainties of wind and weather,
is suspect. Other vessels seem to have regularly made the passage in
less than two weeks; some, such as William's sloop, in much less. In
essence, Bartlet could have easily returned earlier, before the 22nd.
In light of other known facts, the twenty days must be interpreted to
indicate only when he left the islands, not where he was or what he
did in the interim. In conjunction, as will be seen, the discrepancies
between destinations can actually be used to explain what occurred.

There is also the intriguing fact that the Dorothy was in ballast. For a merchantman to make a passage without a cargo was cer-
tainly not at all uncommon, but given the situation and the individual
in question, it is curious. Why would an experienced merchant in a po-
sition to procure a cargo for a destination known to be an excellent
market make the run in ballast? In fact, after all the time spent in
the islands, why did Bartlet choose that point to go home? The answer
is that Billie had just arrived with information from home.100

Now, Bartlet's activities in December can be tentatively pieced
together. It seems unlikely he had not heard something about what was
going on with the family. The Fanny's master may have been able to
convey a partial account outlining the basics. Yet, it is doubtful
Connaway was privy to any of the finer points of the behind the scenes
negotiations, and during the time frame in question, there would have
been much that transpired after his departure for the island that he
could not have known. Consequently, while aware the family was having
problems, there was much Bartlet must have been in the dark about.
William would have offered his brother the first detailed, first-hand
account bringing him up to date on just how serious matters at home
had become. Hearing this, Bartlet made a hasty departure for Virginia
which accounts for his sailing in ballast. His destination, quite logically, was Nansemond, not a place of business, but one of the family seats. In light of the fact Norfolk was under the control of Dunmore, then considered an enemy, there is no reason to believe that port was his destination at that time. In any case, it is likely Bartlet made Nansemond by the 19th or 20th, only to find that since William had left, affairs had taken on a whole new and even more serious complexion. The rebels, having called for an inquiry and attempted to assault William's wife, were showing themselves to be as great an enemy as the Governor. Obviously, in Bartlet's mind, they were even more so, because these two rebel actions seem to have been enough provocation to make him decide to throw in with Dunmore, which he did within a day or two. Having made the pact, Bartlett was in the logical process of bringing the Dorothy around to Norfolk to join the Governor when she was detained, thus accounting for the discrepancies in destinations.

The reference to Bartlet's departure from Antigua is really of no consequence. It can easily be explained by the fact it was undoubtedly Bartlet's last port of call prior to St. Eustatia. It was probably noted, because it was a British port and therefore suspicious.

Three days after the inquiry in which John, Sr. and sons were exonerated of any inimical conduct against Virginia with regards to their trading efforts to obtain necessary items for the colony, the committee reported its resolution to the Convention concerning the father's petition for payment. After acknowledging that family members had satisfactorily carried out the contract for the coarse linens and admitting they were due payment of £1,098, the committee offered yet another affront when it announced its intention to retain the money until all the powder funds were accounted for. In essence, after having just declared the family innocent, the committee conveyed it still
had serious doubts and was distrustful of them. Interestingly enough, at the same time, indicating they were still in the dark about Bartlet’s status, they did agree to return the Dorothy.\textsuperscript{101}

Not to be put off easily, John, Sr. immediately entered two more petitions on the same day. The first concerned the status of son-in-law Robert Sheddon, daughter Agatha, and their two children who were aboard a vessel in the harbor at Norfolk. After acknowledging he knew the Convention viewed Sheddon as inimical because of his attempted smuggling, Goodrich pointed out that Robert had been of some service in procuring the powder. He hoped the Convention would thus view him in a more favorable light and allow him and his family to return ashore “and reside under the protection of this Colony.” This was hardly the request of a man who had turned traitor.\textsuperscript{102}

Goodrich then repetitioned for payment. This request is noteworthy for its sense of restraint, humility, and complacency, given that he could not have been at all happy about the rejection of the first. After quite justly pointing out the family “had exposed themselves to great dangers and had suffered many hardships and inconveniences and had incurred considerable expense in their endeavours to serve this Colony”, he prayed the “Convention would take the same into Consideration and make such reasonable Compensation as shall be thought just.”\textsuperscript{103}

In light of the nature of this second request, a refusal to comply in any way on the part of the committee could only be viewed negatively. John, Sr. had just cunningly put them in a position in which they were required to play their hand one way or the other, letting him know exactly where he stood. While the Convention responded favorably to the petition concerning Sheddon’s wife and children, the second request fell on deaf ears.\textsuperscript{104}
By February, compounding events, including the attempted assault on William's wife, conveyed to John, Sr. that the family was in such serious trouble with the rebels, that the safety of his own wife and youngest children was cause for concern. At some point prior to the 15th of that month Margaret Goodrich received a pass from the Committee of Safety for herself and the three youngest offspring to leave the colony. Also allowed to accompany her was Bridger. Described as "about 5 Feet 10 Inches high, stoop shouldered, a genteel well looking young Man, about 24 Years of Age, [sic] of a daring bold Countenance, light coloured Hair, his Face a little freckled," this is the second glance at this youngest of the adult brothers. Although he had been authorized by William to collect the powder money, there is no evidence Bridger was actively involved in any of the family's dealings to this time. That he was allowed to leave supports this. He would, however, become a major player in the family's fortunes. As of the 15th, however, it is evident these individuals had yet to depart, because on that day the Committee added that such slaves as were usually employed as domestics could also leave with Margaret.

Also by February, the Governor's tenders were exceedingly active. By one account, they brought in prizes daily. One was a brig and a number of others were New England vessels sent for grain and flour. On February 3, six tenders went raiding with three pushing up the Nansemond; their boats making it as far upstream as Goodrich's plantation. During this foray a storehouse with corn was burned. A rebel perspective contended the raid was partly undertaken with the concurrence" of Goodrich and sons, to bring off two vessels loaded with provisions by locals. To what degree if any the Goodriches were involved is impossible to say. If, in fact, a family member was party to this at this time, it was undoubtedly Bartlet. The others had yet to cast their lot with Dunmore. This, however, was about to change.
On February 26, Andrew Snape Hamond ordered Captain Matthew Squire, H.M. Sloop Otter to proceed to Baltimore to seize or destroy two rebel armed vessels laden with flour. Failing this, the Otter was to cut out any vessel in the harbor loading provisions or being armed, and if she met with resistance, she was to fire on and destroy the town. General orders were to seize and detain all rebel ships and ships trading with the rebels. Accompanying the Otter were two sloop-tenders, the Edward and the Samuel. The Samuel, was commanded by one of the Goodrich brothers. There is nothing to firmly indicate which, but the weight of circumstantial evidence indicates it was Bridger. Also along as "superintending Pilot" on the Otter was John, Sr. In addition to his navigational responsibilities, his role in the endeavor was to assist Squire in obtaining livestock for the British.\textsuperscript{110}

That Bridger was the brother in question is supported by a number of factors. To begin with, he is known to have been active with Dunmore at this time.\textsuperscript{111} Also, historians traditionally link him with this event.\textsuperscript{112} Finally by process of elimination, after accounting for the whereabouts and activities of the other brothers, only Bridger is left. There is no evidence John, Jr. ever commanded a vessel for the Governor. Bartlet was in the West Indies at this time.\textsuperscript{113} This leaves only William, and as will be seen, all evidence supports he had yet to join Dunmore.

The only evidence suggesting Bridger did not accompany the raid is highly suspect. A document listing prizes condemned and sold under Dunmore's authorization includes a vessel reported to have been taken by Bridger on March 17, which does not match any of those taken by the Otter and her tenders. Of course, this would indicate Bridger was elsewhere at the time. The date, however is extremely unreliable. Certain aspects of this document, which shows signs of having been drawn up long after the events it records, are rather haphazard, especially
the dates of capture. For twenty-two prizes listed, dates of capture are given for only three, including Bridger's. The two remaining are wrong. Consequently, this document can not be relied upon for proof of Bridger's whereabouts, and unless new sources come to light to the contrary, it must be accepted he commanded the Samuel in late February and March.\footnote{14}

At this point in time, there can be no argument that Bridger, despite his complete lack of previous involvement, certainly had even more reason to join Dunmore than Bartlet. Someone in the rebel camp had sold out his father and brothers to the Governor about the gunpowder. His family's patriotism and conduct had been questioned to such a degree that two formal inquiries had been held to investigate them, and two brothers had been publicly censored. Then, adding insult to injury, the Convention withheld payment of a considerable amount of money owed the family. Worst of all, an attempt had been made on the lives of a brother's wife and infant child. All things considered, for Bridger, it seems enough was enough.

What of John, Sr.'s reasons for acting with Dunmore at this time? Historians maintain that as a merchant and smuggler, he was unscrupulous and profit minded to the point that he was motivated in his decision by simple unmitigated greed, and the governor supposedly made him an offer too profitable to refuse.\footnote{15} There is absolutely nothing to support such an opinion. On the contrary, Dunmore, himself, later asserted that the Goodrich "Services were performed free of Fee or reward, and upon every occasion, the Family demonstrated self disinterested Conduct."\footnote{16} The worst that can be said is that in his early dealings with the governor, John, Sr.'s actions were governed to a degree by the threat of considerable property loss to the British if he did not comply with their demands.\footnote{17} In light of the prevailing historical viewpoint, it must be asked just what financial rewards John,
Sr. hoped to glean by changing sides? By joining Dunmore he gave up control of a considerable part of his wealth to the rebels and risked losing that which remained. At a time when the family was realizing significant profits dealing with the revolutionaries, as the value of the osnaburgs attest, all the Governor could offer was the possibility of taking a few prizes and the rather tenuous backing of a government that might look favorably on them for their conduct and see fit to protect their vessels. Given a choice based on potential profits, Dunmore could offer John, Sr. nothing he could take to the bank. There was nothing to gain and even more to lose. In fact, after John, Sr. began acting with the Royal forces, the family still lost at least one vessel and cargo, valued at £697, to the British under the Prohibitory Act. Also, the Fanny was lost to the rebels while in government service. Only with extreme hindsight can it be said the family gained anything by joining the British. In the case of John Sr., as will be seen, he personally gained very little if anything.

In reality, there can be little doubt John, Sr. was motivated by the same provocations as Bridger. He was certainly more directly affected by them. Yet, despite his services to the governor, his actions then and later indicate his participation was less than whole-hearted and he maintained serious reservations. Despite all that had befallen him, he was not, as yet, a devout loyalist.

In addition to John, Sr., two other pilots accompanied the Otter and her consorts up the Bay. When this small squadron arrived off the mouth of the Patapsco River leading to Baltimore, a very interesting situation developed involving two of these men, one of whom was undoubtedly Goodrich. Unfortunately, although John, Sr. served on the Otter, it is impossible to identify which of the two pilots concerned was which. Then again, it does not really matter. As the Otter approached the entrance to the river on March 8, she ran aground. After
considerable effort, she was gotten off five and a half hours later. During this same time, the two tenders, the Samuel and the Edward, went into the mouth of the river to take a rebel merchantman, the ship Molly, Captain Laurence, also aground. The following day, the Samuel and the Edward were still trying to secure the Molly when the Maryland State Navy ship Defence and a small ad hoc flotilla of local vessels approached, driving away the tenders and forcing them to abandon their prize. While this was transpiring, the Otter was making every effort to get under way and come up in support, but was unable to do so when it was "found from the Pilot's ignorance it was impossible." If this pilot was Goodrich his conduct can only be viewed as very suspicious for a man reputed to know every creek and inlet of the Bay. It can only be interpreted that he was being uncooperative and feigning ignorance in an effort to hinder the mission.

With the return of the two tenders, the first pilot was replaced with a second. Given John, Sr.'s reputation and position as chief pilot, if he was not the first pilot then he was certainly the second. There can be no doubt that a frustrated Captain Squire would have selected his best man to take over. Yet, interestingly enough, the second pilot did no better than the first. Conveying an apparent reluctance to proceed, he argued Baltimore could not be approached for a number of reasons. The river was chained, shore batteries with heavy guns existed, and the trees marked for navigational aids had been cut down. Interestingly, although the rebels were frantically in the process of gathering vessels to sink if need be and block the harbor, none had been sunk as yet, and there does not seem to have been any actual chains. As to the shore defenses, Squire's orders stated that if a battery that could not be overpowered was in place at the mouth of the river, he was to abort the mission. All that existed, however, was a hastily erected breastwork mounting "several" guns at
Fells Point, upriver near the town itself.\textsuperscript{130} Allowing the second pilot the benefit of the doubt regarding these two potential deterrents, he may have believed and been acting on false information supplied to him by someone on the Molly. The third argument, however, is more difficult to accept. Again, calling into account John, Sr.'s reputation, is it to be believed that as a highly experienced pilot, undoubtedly selected because of his qualifications for the mission, he would have absolutely needed the navigational markers to negotiate his way up the river? The rebel vessels do not seem to have had too much trouble coming down without them. Regardless of the validity of the arguments, the very fact they were cited as insurmountable obstacles reflects an individual not overly intent on seeing the objective carried out. If the second pilot rather then the first was in fact John, Sr., we are still confronted with a man whose actions could only serve to hinder the operation. Squire certainly did not have a pilot he could rely on when he needed one, and the intelligence given him seems to have been a major factor in his decision to abort the mission.\textsuperscript{131} His superior, Captain Hamond was definitely of the belief the mission failed due to a lack of competent pilots.\textsuperscript{132}

Although the situation at Baltimore proved too much for the Otter and her consorts, forcing them to withdraw back down the bay, they nevertheless managed to take seven prizes and burn another during the cruise.\textsuperscript{133} Four or five more, including the Molly, had been seized at the mouth of the Patapsco, but were recaptured by the Defence.\textsuperscript{134} Of those retained, a schooner and two sloops, were specifically taken by Bridger in the Samuel.\textsuperscript{135}

The Baltimore voyage is noteworthy because two accounts offer insight into Bridger's character, showing him a committed, determined, angry, volatile, and even vengeful young man. He was someone to take notice of and be concerned about. Rebel Captain Thomas Wirt, while a
prisoner of the British, heard him say, "that if they did not get fresh provisions the next time they came up here they would knock down all the Houses along Shore." In actuality in this particular instance, although this sounds like a rather nasty threat, Goodrich was really only reiterating Squire's orders from Hamond. Nevertheless, the statement does reflect a resolute individual.

The second account, from the rebel press, is significant not only for the image offered of Bridger, but for conveying just what the rebels thought of him. In fact, the image presented is absolutely priceless. While the basic facts concerning Goodrich's conduct are probably true, the rebel diatribe is so over-blown and filled with anti-Goodrich sentiment that upon reading it, it is difficult to suppress a good chuckle. Recounting captures by Squire's vessels, the Maryland Gazette stated:

among many others they took two poor industrious French Neutrals, so called, as they were crossing the bay in a small boat, and robbed them of their all, being the hard earnings of ten years honest industry - The infamous Goodrich, the younger, commanded one of the tenders, and his father was in the Otter as Pilot - The violence and barbarity of the former towards the prisoners will hand down his detested name to posterity loaded with the curses of his ravaged and oppressed country - The other officers in general treated these and other prisoners not only with humanity but politeness; but this native barbarian, the reproach of his country, and basest of all Paracides, added brutal insult to his robberies - he tore from these poor people every thing that they had on board, even down to an old razor and a peck of meal, and picked their pockets of 97 l. the fruits of many years sweat and labour[.]

Bridger was a very busy young man during late February and March. He used the brief periods when not acting with the Royal Navy to cruise independently. As of March 26, he had four additional prizes to his credit.

Upon returning from Baltimore, John, Sr. attended prize auctions. Whatever his political stance at this point, he was still a
merchant mariner with an eye for a good ship to be had at a bargain. On March 27, he purchased the schooner Betty, one of Bridger's prizes.\textsuperscript{140}

In February and March, while Bridger was busy taking prizes and upsetting the rebel denizens of the Bay, Bartlet was involved in other activities for the Crown. On February 13, he contracted to hire the sloop Lord Howe to Dunmore for Government service.\textsuperscript{141} At some point, he also received a commission in the Queen's Loyal American Regiment.\textsuperscript{142}

By early March, he was back in St. Eustatia on the Governor's behalf attempting to retrieve the rest of the powder funds. Bartlet, however, was not alone. Rebel agent Abram Van Bibber was also there, in part for the same purpose. Van Bibber met with frustration, because he was not authorized to receive the funds as per William's instructions to Van Dam. Bartlet's intentions were thwarted as well for this same reason and by a new complication. Van Dam was dead. The money was tied up with only Van Dam's widow having any control of it whatsoever, and she was not about to hand it over. According to Van Bibber, Bartlet "came out a great Tory" attempting to claim the money on the grounds he had a right to it, because the Virginians had withheld payment for the coarse linens.\textsuperscript{143}

With the failure of this approach, as per Dunmore's instructions should a problem arise, Bartlet went to Antigua to procure a letter from Vice-Admiral James Young directing the Governor of St. Eustatia to have the money handed over.\textsuperscript{144} "[B]ut having no Credentials whatever and giving rather a lame Account of himself" Bartlet did not impress Young, who believed him an "Imposter" and did not supply the letter.\textsuperscript{145} Because Bartlet failed at this, it was assumed his claim was invalid, and Van Bibber resumed his efforts. Using all of his "Interest and art", "Bowing & scraping" and placing himself "under many obligations
to many" he managed to repossess a large part of the money. For the rest, he received pledges of its payment in time.\textsuperscript{146}

That Bartlet went for the money rather then William or Bridger is clear indication neither had joined Dunmore by the time Bartlet sailed which was probably just after hiring out the \textit{Lord Howe}. If they had, there can be little doubt one of them would have gone instead given they were the only ones authorized to pick it up. This tells us something else. In light of Bartlet's troubles, either William refused to authorize Bartlet as a recipient, or had not even bothered to tell his brother about this stipulation with Van Dam. It would seem he certainly had not told Dunmore. According to Young, Bartlet had no acceptable credentials which one would think William would have given his brother if he were privy to and supportive of the undertaking. Again, it would appear the family did not always act together.

As of March 30, William finally threw his hat into the loyalist ring.\textsuperscript{147} Until this point, the worst that could be said about William's involvement with Dunmore is that he was the actual owner of the sloop \textit{Samuel} commanded by Bridger on the Baltimore expedition. Whether the sloop was used for government purposes with William's blessing, or Bridger acted on his own in using his brother's vessel without asking, is unknown. Even if William willingly allowed the use of his sloop, it was a relatively passive act. The latter alternative is, however, a distinct possibility in that Bridger had, in fact, been master of the \textit{Samuel} since at least 1774. Bridger was Dunmore's man, and he and the Governor had the \textit{Samuel} within their power. In essence, use of the sloop may well have been beyond William's control.\textsuperscript{146}

It is difficult to imagine that anyone in the family had more cause to doubt his ties to the rebels than William. Being sold out to Dunmore, the inquiries, the treatment of his brothers, the withholding of payment due, and of course, the attempted assault on his loved
ones, must have given him cause for serious reflection on matters. In light of the state of affairs, can it be wondered that he not only questioned but disavowed his association with the revolutionaries? Yet, even all these reasons combined were not enough to drive him to such action. There was something else.

William left an interesting and candid account which, though rambling, garbled, generalized, and vague in terms of its chronology of events and time frames, explained his decision to change his allegiance. The gist of the passages of immediate concern is as follows. Upon returning from St. Eustatia in January, William was again confined on ship by the governor who attempted to convert him to the royal cause. William warded off Dunmore's approaches, saying he "could not think of taking up arm against a country that was acting in defense of their liberties." The rebels, however, then began to suspect William's association with the Governor concerning the powder with the result that payment was withheld for the textiles and an angry mob attempted to assault his wife. William then spent the next three months on parole on a vessel after which Dunmore again attempted to sway him and again William refused.149

In William's own words, this Occasion'd his Lordship to grow a little mad. "What," says he, "don't the ill treatment of those fellows on shore to Mrs. Goodrich lead you to resent it?" I replied that I did not think it was right to resent the ill treatment of a few Injurious men on the whole Country, and that I could not take up arms against them with a clear Conscience as long as they were acting in defence of their Liberties. "But," says he, "you may depend upon it that they mean to shake of their dependence on great Britain?" Then I told his Lordship that if he would allow me to remain neutral until they did declare themselves free and independent of great Britain, that I should then look upon myself to be in duty bound to take a part in favour of great Britain, and would do every thing in my power to oppress the Americans in such a declaration. Upon which we parted, and I do declare upon my honour, Gentlemen, that I did not do nothing in favour of government but what I was obliged to do before they declared for Independence. Upon the declaration of Independence in Virginia, I told Lord Dunmore that I was then ready and willing to take a part in favor of great Britain Agree able to my promiss.
At face value, this account does not jibe with other known facts. It conveys the impression that after Dunmore's second effort to sway William at the end of three months, even more time passed before William made his decision based on independence being declared by his fellow Virginians. Logically, this would imply he remained neutral until after at least May 15, when Virginia formally decided to support a vote of independence in the Continental Congress, if not July 2. Yet, as will be seen, William was clearly active on Dunmore's behalf as of March 30. Of course, this would indicate William's statements about his rebel sympathies, motives, and activities were false. There is, however, another way to interpret this testimony which shows William was, in fact, sincere and truthful.

As indicated, the sequence of events and time frames are poorly related and thus, misleading. This is apparent from other corroborating evidence and even from information offered earlier in this same document. For instance, the rebels were clearly suspicious of the family's activities over a month before refusing to pay the money owed. In conjunction, William's testimony makes it seem the assault on his wife three days after giving birth coincided with the decision to withhold payment and occurred after his return from his second voyage to St. Eustatia in early January. Yet by his own earlier statement clearly referring to the latter half of October, she was then, "big with Child and looking to layin in the corse of a month or so." A supporting document, also written by William and referring to the same time, says she was then upwards of eight months pregnant. This certainly indicates a birth date in late November or early December, well before the time implied in the deposition. Furthermore, in what is a relatively lengthy document, the writer only offered two specific time references, and even these are vague. He mentions the deal with Nicholas was made "Sometime in July" and the shipment of coarse linens ar-
rived in October. William is also known to have been simply wrong about his dates. He stated he was captured in August when it was really July. In essence, William merely conveyed his meanings and facts poorly. Although clearly an intelligent young man, the grammar and organization of this and other documents show he was less than a gifted writer.

Part of the key to interpreting William's deposition lies in interpreting the reference to the three months spent aboard ship. Rather than meaning exactly ninety days beginning with the second week of January, Billie was really only saying he was on parole during the three months of January, February, and March. Given this, Dunmore's second visit could have occurred as early as mid-March thus allowing William a couple of weeks of neutrality before making his decision. If this interpretation is accepted, then some sense can be made of this testimony in that at least the time period referred to fits with when William is known to have joined Dunmore.

This, however, still does not explain the clear statement that William did nothing until after independence was declared. If William was not lying, then it is apparent he was not really referring to a time after May 15 or July 2. Something occurred prior to March 30 that unequivocally convinced William independence was at least a foregone conclusion. What?

In fact, there were a number of incidents and factors, singularly or cumulatively, that William could have viewed as evidence the rebels had adopted such a stance. Certainly, the topic was already one of serious discussion amongst the rebel leaders and in fact had actually been debated in the Continental Congress in late February with the radical majority in favor. By March at the latest, six of the seven Virginia delegates supported such an action. Also, the end of January witnessed the publication of Tom Paine's inflammatory Common
Sense, calling for a break from England and convincing many of the need to do so. Perhaps by late March talk of independence had become so commonplace that to some it simply seemed inevitable.

In late January, Dunmore offered a reconciliation proposal to the Virginians. During the third week of February, they rejected it on the grounds they did not have the authority to treat with the governor. The proposal had been forwarded to the Continental Congress as the only governing body that could respond to it. This action clearly indicates Virginia recognized the higher authority of a governing group other than the king and Parliament - a group acting independently.

Even more important, however, and more likely to have affected William's decision, was the fact that toward the end of the third week in March, shortly before William changed sides, Dunmore received word of the Prohibitory Act. With the implementation of this Act, the Crown, for all practical purposes, began treating the colonies in rebellion as enemies outside the empire. Open season was declared on rebel shipping for the Royal Navy. So serious were the Act's mandates, some rebels questioned the need for a formal declaration of independence. They felt, in effect, the British Government had just done it for them.

Then, most significantly, came the rebel response which was perhaps the most influential factor in swaying William. The Continental Congress had actually received notice of the Act as early as February 27. On March 23, Congress, evoking the Laws of Nations and representing the "United Colonies", authorized those colonies to issue Letters of Marque and Reprisal against British shipping. This was the action not only of an independent government, it was the action of an independent government formally at war with England. Whatever William's level of political consciousness, as a merchant mariner of con-
siderable experience and status, in the world as he knew it, the sig-
nificance of this act could not have escaped his particular attention
and understanding. To a man of his specific background this would eas-
ily be construed as a declaration of independence. Did William actu-
ally hear of this prior to switching sides? There is no evidence at
all to support that he did. Yet, news of the magnitude of this act
must have spread quickly through the rebel communications networks,
and the seven days between March 23 and 30 were more than enough for
word to reach Virginia, Dunmore, and thus, William. Certainly some-
thing during the last week of March convinced William Goodrich inde-
pendence had been declared at least as he understood it. In any case,
William's decision was a thoughtful one based on many valid considera-
tions. Any or all of the factors discussed may well have convinced a
disillusioned young man that his associates had gone too far and he
could not go with them. Like many others, while desirous of redressing
grievances with the Crown, William could not bring himself to break
from it, and he joined the Royal forces. He had played the game to the
end.

In further support of William's sincerity and truthfulness, the
contents of his deposition can be viewed from another angle. At the
time he penned his account, he was a prisoner in serious trouble for
what the rebels perceived as his treasonous conduct in changing
sides.\textsuperscript{163} Granted in putting pen to paper, he conveniently failed to
comment on topics that might serve to incriminate him, while emphasiz-
ing those actions which would show him in a better light. Conse-
quently, it would be easy to view his statements simply as an effort
to talk his way out of a bad situation. Still, it simply did not mat-
ter when or why he changed sides. He had done it and no amount of
sugar-coating his explanation could alter this. In fact, the fabrica-
tion of such an elaborate yarn could serve no useful purpose. On the
contrary, if William really intended to mean he had done nothing in Dunmore's service until at least after May 15, then his statement to that effect could only serve to expose him as a blatant liar. The rebels were clearly aware of his activities prior to that date, and consequently, any statement on his part to the contrary could only do more harm than good. In conjunction, the other numerous facts he recounted which can be corroborated are true, so there is no reason to doubt his sentiments or motives.

Still, before William entered Dunmore's service, the rebels offered him and the family one more slap in the face. On March 29, the Committee of Safety seized control of the family's plantations with the intention of managing them and keeping the profits until compensated for the unaccounted powder funds. In his post-war memorial to the loyalist claims commission (a document that dovetails with the account just discussed though suffering the same problems) William clearly stated he joined Dunmore after the confiscation of property, and in part, because of it. If William had yet to make a firm decision, it appears this act of the Virginians was the proverbial straw that broke the one-time rebel's back. On March 30, taking command of the Samuel, Billie departed on his first cruise for the British.

Of particular interest is the fact that on the same date, Dunmore wrote the following to Lord George Germain, the new Secretary of State for the Colonies.

My Lord in my dispatch No 34, I had frequent Occasion to mention a Family of the Name of Goodrich, Natives of this Colony, this is a Spirited, Active, industrious Family, and it has cost me much trouble and pain (knowing the Service they would be of to which ever Party they joined) to secure them in His Majesty's Service. The Male part consist of a Father and Seven Sons, five of which are Arrived to the Age of Manhood, who are now most Zealously engaged in His Majesty's service, four of them are perfectly well acquainted with every River, Creek or Branch within this Bay. I have now five of their vessels employed constantly running up the Rivers, where they have orders to Seize, burn or destroy every thing that is Water Born, that they can get at; they often Land and take off what Provisions they can get, which keeps the Rebels in constant motion, and I generally send a few of the 14th Regi-
ment with them. I mention this Family to your Lordship, for two reasons, the first is, least any of their Vessels of which they have many, in various parts of the World should fall into the hands of any of our Ships of War, that they may have that Attention Shewn to them that I think them so well entitled to. - My second reason is, that should we ever see better times in this Quarter (which I pray God may be soon) that His Majesty may Shew them such marks of His favour as he as he thinks their Services are deserving of. - They have all left their Houses, Negroes, Plantations, Stock, and everything else at the Mercy of the Rebels, and are now with their whole Familys Water Born in this Fleet. 168

This document is noteworthy for several reasons. First of all, it indicates all of the adult male family members had joined Dunmore by March 30. It is probable, however, the Governor was overstating his case in claiming John, Jr. was with him. He certainly erred in saying Johnie's family was with the fleet at the time. 169 John Jr.'s status as a rebel or loyalist during the spring and early summer remains a mystery. All things considered it would seem likely he at least sympathized with the other family members in their decision to join Dunmore, and perhaps he even supported their doing so. Furthermore, it would come as no surprise to find he had formally changed his allegiance as well, but if he did, there is no reference to it other than this statement, and it must have been in a very minor, low-key capacity. There is no known reference to his cruising for Dunmore, and while the Governor's dispatch might be interpreted to imply otherwise, even it offers no direct statement to that effect. On the contrary, Dunmore states only four of the family members were accomplished mariners, clearly referring to John, Sr., William, Bartlet, and Bridger. Supporting this is a later statement by Captain Hamond to the effect that only John, Sr. and three sons were active in the governor's service. 170 In fact, no reference has been found to indicate Johnie ever commanded a vessel under any circumstance or even went to sea in any capacity other than perhaps as supercargo on short voyages in the Bay. In light of this apparent lack of activity, and in conjunction with circumstantial evidence to be discussed later, it is quite probable
John, Jr., in fact, adopted a stance of neutrality and attempted to maintain it. Perhaps this was enough for Dunmore to feel he had him in his control.

As to the fifth "adult" son, this was undoubtedly Edward, the oldest of the "three youngest children" allowed to leave with Margaret.\textsuperscript{171} Very little is known about Edward's activities during the war other than that later he was involved in privateering to some degree.\textsuperscript{172} There is, however, no other reference to his serving Dunmore, and given his age and situation, it seems extremely unlikely he acted in any capacity on the Governor's behalf. As an obviously very young "adult" he was not old enough at this time to act independently, and his presence with the fleet was undoubtedly due to the simple fact his mother was there.

This document is interesting too, because it can hardly be coincidence that Dunmore wrote this at a time corresponding exactly with William's decision to join him. It is tempting to read between the lines and interpret Dunmore as saying that after all his efforts, with William's decision, he had finally won over all four family members who counted most for his purposes; John Sr., William, Bartlet, and Bridger, the four mariners familiar with all parts of the Bay.

Finally, the dispatch is significant for one other reason at least partly accounting for the family's decisions. While the Virginians were busy persecuting the Goodriches for relatively petty reasons which blinded them to the family's potential usefulness to their cause, Dunmore, though he had initially treated them roughly, realized and esteemed their worth to such a degree he was willing to overlook what were, in reality, far worse offenses and actually court their support. This made the Goodriches' decisions all the easier. Few are prone to stay where they are not wanted.
William, commanding the *Samuel* and in company with the sloop *Lilly*, departed from the Elizabeth River and sailed up the James.\(^\text{173}\)

The *Lilly*, a prize, had been recently purchased by Dunmore on March 25.\(^\text{174}\) On this cruise, her first in government service, it is remotely possibly John, Sr. commanded her. One rebel newspaper account written several weeks later associated him with one of the events of the cruise.\(^\text{175}\) On the other hand, both William and Dunmore later made rather detailed statements concerning the same event and neither alluded to the presence of the elder Goodrich.\(^\text{176}\) Also, although Bartlet later stated his father was given command of a tender "about the Month of March," it was "to go on an Expedition to Ocacock," North Carolina.\(^\text{177}\)

More significantly, in a post-war memorial, John, Sr., himself, did not make reference to the incident. On the contrary, he clearly stated that after Baltimore, his next activity for Dunmore was to go to North Carolina, which, as will be seen, he did, in command of the *Lilly*.\(^\text{178}\)

William's objective was twofold. The first involved a nocturnal visit to the family plantation at Nansemond to bring off slaves and livestock. In this, he was only minimally successful, regaining possession of only two slaves.

In response, the Virginians took quick action. The remaining Goodrich slaves were to be "secured" and their livestock sold at public auction. Though still in bondage, the two blacks who were reclaimed could consider themselves lucky. The fate of some remaining slaves was to be transported by the rebels to labor in the mines in the interior. These were probably the lead mines in Fincastle County (present day western West Virginia and Kentucky) to which other loyalist slaves, including one of Sheddon's, were sent.\(^\text{179}\)

The second part of the excursion offered more reward. Per Dunmore's orders, William was to intercept a large merchantman, the
Molly, known to be coming down the Bay with a considerable cargo of flour and wheat. In fact, this was the same ship the Samuel and the Edward had found aground and tried to take at the mouth of the Patapsco. William was more successful, taking his first prize in the conflict. Several weeks later, the rebel press credited John, Sr. with the capture of the Molly, but far more reliable sources, including testimony from Dunmore and William himself, indicate Billie was responsible. John, Sr. if actually present in the Lilly, seems to have been nothing more than a bystander acting in his usual capacity as a pilot.  

Within a few days of the tenders' return, John, Sr. was actually in command of the Lilly. Acting under Dunmore's orders, he sailed for the North Carolina Outer Banks where he was to act as pilot for the naval tender Fincastle, Lieutenant John Wright, then attempting to procure provisions. Upon John, Sr.'s arrival, a very interesting series of events, with regards to his conduct, would be played out.

On April 14, James Buchanan, half owner of the schooner Polly and her cargo of Indian corn, staves, and headings, aground on the swatch at Ocracoke Island, watched what he thought was a pilot boat approaching. Much to his chagrin, the vessel in question turned out to be the armed sloop Lilly fresh from detaining the sloop Two Brothers at Ocracoke Inlet. Without hostility, her master, John Goodrich, Sr., asked to examine the Polly's papers, and upon doing so, informed Buchanan the schooner was a lawful prize. Goodrich did not, however, take possession of her, nor did he disarm her crew. He merely related that his superior, Lieutenant Wright, would arrive that evening and deal with the matter.

As stated, Wright appeared that evening, finally putting a prize crew on the Polly which promptly plundered her. That same night, another vessel, a sloop, passed by. Interestingly, while his crew clam-
ored to give chase, John, Sr. let her go. He sympathetically reasoned that because she was known to be persecuted for not conforming to the Articles of Association, she could not load a cargo and so, was empty. This failure to pursue brought Wright's wrath down on John, Sr. the following morning. There was apparently no love lost between these two men. Years later in his post-war memorial, John, Sr. still saw fit to criticize Wright, referring to his "intemperate and imprudent Conduct". In addition, at some time while the Polly was still aground, the pilot told the lieutenant he thought she should be released. Old and not valuable, she was not worth the trouble of getting off the shoal.183

At some point, probably on the 15th, Goodrich hailed a third vessel, the sloop Friendship. Asking for and examining her papers, he simply told her master, Abraham Adderly, to report to Wright who would decide the matter in the morning. On the 16th, the Pincastle departed with Adderly's craft and the Two Brothers, leaving Goodrich behind with the Polly. A fourth unidentified prize also remained which, given the lack of any reference to her being taken by Goodrich in a wealth of documentation, was probably one of two seized by Wright, referred to in John, Sr.'s confession. Accounts differ, but either adverse winds, tides, or weather, prevented Goodrich from getting over the bar, forcing him to remain another night.184

As noted, John, Sr.'s conduct at Ocracoke was interesting and suspicious. This was because of its general passiveness. He was never hostile with or put a prize crew on either of the two vessels he stopped in Buchanan's presence. In fact, he passed on all responsibility to Wright. Furthermore, he let one vessel escape, and attempted to have another one set free. Quite telling is the fact the cargo of little value on the Polly consisted of Indian corn. In other words, she carried provisions, the very thing Goodrich had been sent to help procure. These are not the actions of a man actively and whole-heartedly
waging war against the King's enemies. Nor does this reflect the conduct of a greedy man. These are the actions of a man who is doing just enough to put on a creditable front to get him through a distasteful situation he wants no part of, but has no choice in.

It must be noted that about two months later, the owners of the Two Brothers entered a claim against the Goodrich estate for compensation for this vessel which was wrecked after leaving Ocracoke. Referring to the actual capture they stated:

John Goodrich of Virginia in an armed Sloop called the Lilly with force and Arms violently seized and took possession of the said Vessel and Cargo with her Crew and having taken out their Captain put on board a prize Master and some Mariners and ordered her to Sea under Convoy of a certain Lieutenant Wright[.]

In fact, some of Goodrich's men did serve as prize crew on the Two Brothers. Obviously, this conveys a somewhat different impression of John, Sr.'s behavior than does Buchanan's account. Buchanan, however, was present, so his testimony concerning John, Sr.'s conduct carries greater weight. As to the violent nature of the capture by force of arms, this simply does not jibe with how Buchanan, a rebel third party, viewed both his and Adderly's seizure. In addition, in both Buchanan's and Adderly's situations, they were not even boarded. Goodrich merely directed the masters to bring their papers to the Lilly for examination. Also, by the owner's own account the Two Brothers was not under way when taken, negating any need for force to bring her too. All in all, the report of the Two Brothers' owners does not ring true. Consequently, one of two assessments can be made of these comments. It is entirely possible the Two Brothers' owners were greatly overstating their case, or, giving them the benefit of the doubt, to them, even without actual physical violence, the simple act of an armed vessel merely taking possession of theirs constituted a violent act undertaken with armed force.
The next day, in the pre-dawn hours, with only a small ad hoc crew on board that included George Blair, the Lilly was approached by four or five boatloads of armed rebels intent on retaking the prizes and capturing the tender. Caught by surprise as the boats pulled alongside, John, Sr., trapped and in self-defense, committed his first real hostile act against the rebels. He gave his crew the order to fire on them. There was not time, however, for his crew to respond as the rebel boatmen climbed aboard to take possession. Because of Goodrich's command, a Captain Harney leveled his gun at John, Sr. and pulled the trigger. The story of John Goodrich, Sr. should end here with all events discussed so far perhaps warranting only a minor footnote in history. But, Harney's piece flashed in the pan. Goodrich and his crew then seem to have submitted with minimal resistance, if any.¹⁹³

A short time later, James Anderson, another boarder, heard Goodrich to say, "he was a prisoner and that he had been so harassed on both sides he did not value his life."¹⁹⁰ These are not the words of a man who has whole-heartedly committed himself to a cause. At the very least, these are the words of a very unhappy man caught in the middle who would prefer to have nothing to do with either side but cannot escape their grasp; a man forced from the rebel cause he once supported, but as yet unwilling to embrace the crown fully.

As a prisoner, John, Sr. was taken first to New Bern and then Halifax, North Carolina, during which time he was confined in shackles and suffered unpleasant jail conditions. At Halifax, depositions were taken from individuals present at Ocracoke, and John, Sr. made a confession. In it, he candidly recounted his activities with Dunmore, including his participation in the Baltimore raid and the cruise to North Carolina. He went on to say Dunmore never ordered him to take up arms nor do anything that he would construe as base. In conjunction,
he declared he served Dunmore, because he was obliged to do so. Dunmore had dismissed a death penalty resulting from the powder incident, and he had a considerable amount of Goodrich's property under his control. Of interest is the fact that Goodrich attributed the prizes taken at Ocracoke to Wright. In light of his conduct, this was technically correct. At the end of the month, John Goodrich, Sr. "a most notorious Tory," was sent to Virginia to face charges.\textsuperscript{191}

During early April, either Bridger or William assisted the Governor in another way. One of them supervised the construction of a galley rowing sixteen oars and intended to carry fifty men, six three-pounders, and twelve swivels.\textsuperscript{192}

Later that month, while his father was beginning his captivity, Bridger was again cruising in a tender. On April 21, he appeared off Hobb's Hole (Tappahanock) on the Rappahanock River. There, he chased a New England schooner loaded with corn upstream and took her. Upon return, however, the prize ran aground. On the 23rd, the local rebels set out in four sailing boats to retake the Yankee. With the enemy craft closing on him, Bridger abandoned the prize, but not before attempting to burn her. Two of the rebel boats maintained the chase, and coming up with the tender, commenced a vicious little action with small arms at close quarters. This lasted fifteen or twenty minutes before the tender broke it off. Reports of loyalist casualties vary between 3 and 8 men out of a crew of twenty-four. This high loss of perhaps one third of the compliment reflects the intensity of the fight.\textsuperscript{193}

Once again, Bridger had displayed his brash personality. At some point during the operation, he boasted he would capture General Lee, all the rebel armed vessels, and be up the river within two weeks.\textsuperscript{194} An irate Landon Carter referred to Bridger as a "Pirate" and a "Villain," "detestable in the Eyes of heaven."\textsuperscript{195}
The Hobb's Hole raid was noteworthy because of another participant, Richard Dale, destined to be John Paul Jones's first officer in the famous fight between the Bon Homme Richard and H.M.S Serapis, a distinguished naval captain in his own right later in the revolution, and one of the first United States naval captains of the New Republic. Even more interesting, however, is the fact that having already been a rebel officer in the Virginia State Navy, at this particular point Dale was sailing and fighting with his old school chum, Bridger Goodrich. Dale's presence with the loyalists reflects the confusion and indecision of at least some about taking a political stance. At the beginning of the war, Dale was the senior officer on a brig owned by Thomas Newton. By early 1776, he was a lieutenant in the Virginia Navy. Captured by a British tender, while held prisoner, his old friend, Bridger, visited him, and "After much solicitation, and many plausible and seductive arguments," Dale was won over. For his efforts, Dale was severely wounded in the head during the fight at Hobb's Hole. While recuperating, he had time to reflect and came to the decision "never again to put himself in the way of the balls of his country." As will be seen, however, Dale's convictions remained shaky for a while longer.196

During this same month, another future loyalist privateersman, William Picket, was active. Earlier, Picket was a merchant captain in Sheddon's employ. As such, he was undoubtedly known to the Goodriches, and at this time, he commanded a sloop-rigged pink owned by them. Cruising off the Virginia Capes, he was involved in bagging a French sloop carrying arms and munitions to the rebels.197

During this time as well, Robert Sheddon experienced additional problems with the rebels. At some point in late March or early April, in a vessel attempting to reach Dunmore, he was pursued by a party of rebels intent on his capture, and submitted only after being fired on
several times. On April 3, at Great Bridge, he was brought before the Commissioners of Norfolk who were investigating suspected loyalists. Sheddon must have been a truly persuasive individual, because once again he talked his way out of a tight situation. The jury found him "not guilty" of "being an enemy to America" and he was "honourably acquitted."\footnote{198}

Despite this verdict, other rebels were not so easily convinced of Sheddon's innocence. On April 11, General Charles Lee ordered Sheddon's apprehension yet again. At some point, probably during the fourth week of the month, he was retaken and sent first to Suffolk and then Williamsburg to be investigated.\footnote{199}

John, Jr. experienced difficulties too. Although the circumstances surrounding his apprehension remain a mystery, by April 30, he was in custody in Williamsburg. On that date, after posting £2,000 bond to the Committee of Safety, he was released under the recognizance of his father-in-law, William Harwood, with instructions to report before the committee on the first Monday of May and not to have any contact with Dunmore or any other loyalists.\footnote{200}

Between April 28 and May 2, the rebels struck again. Under orders from Charles Lee, they burned and destroyed the houses, warehouses, vessels, and other property of Goodrich, Sheddon, and Neil Jamieson, at Portsmouth, and seized their considerable stores of salt, molasses, and other valuable commodities needed by the Virginians.\footnote{201} Even leading Virginia rebels thought this act was too much. Edmund Pendleton rebuked Lee for exceeding his authority.\footnote{202} During the conflagration, John, Jr.'s wife and child were forced to flee for safety and seek sanctuary with Dunmore. On May 3, the Committee of Safety granted leave for Harwood to retrieve his daughter and grandchild under a flag of truce.\footnote{203}
As directed, John, Jr. appeared before the committee on May 6. The only action taken against him at that time, however, was to confine him under guard as a "suspected Person" to his room at a Mrs. Coke's in Williamsburg. On May 26, without any additional proceedings, John, Jr. was again released on bond into the custody of his father-in-law with instructions to appear again on June 3.

While these events were transpiring with other family members, John, Sr. and George Blair were forced to walk from Halifax, North Carolina, to Williamsburg, where they had arrived by May 6. John, Sr., at least, endured the trek handcuffed, and like a trophy, he was displayed "at each public place thro which he pass'd to every Mark of agonizing Ignominy and Insult." At the Virginia capital, both were confined in the jail with other suspected loyalists including Robert Sheddon. On May 7, William managed to pass a message through the lines via a flag of truce notifying his father several changes of clothing and some money were being sent. William also conveyed that Margaret was so upset over his capture that she was quite ill. As soon as she recovered, however, she would come to be with him, foregoing the safety and security of Dunmore's fleet.

News of John, Sr.'s capture spread. Indicative of what an infamous cause célèbre he had become is the fact his being taken prompted reports and comments from North Carolina to Pennsylvania. Upon hearing the news, at least one individual, Josiah Parker, went out of his way to dig up more evidence against Goodrich. Parker can perhaps be best described as a rabid zealot, firebrand, and hatchet man, literally. He was responsible for torching the property of Goodrich and others at Portsmouth. In fact, he had relished his role in this undertaking so much that upon receiving his orders from General Lee, through Colonel Muhlenburg, to destroy Goodrich's and Sheddon's buildings, he promptly wrote back pointing out that Lee had failed to men-
tion Jamieson, and that he, Parker, thought that loyalist's property was worthy of the same attention. 

When planning an attack on Dunmore's fleet the day before, Parker was asked what to do with Tories found on the vessels. Illustrating his complete hatred for loyalists, he responded, "damn them, Tomahawk them all and throw them over Board, and give yourself no further trouble about them." 

Of additional interest is the fact that he, too, was from Isle of Wight County, was a member of the Committee of Safety, and was involved in the inquiry there into John, Sr.'s conduct at least to the extent of carrying the committee's report to the Convention.

Parker sought out James Eastwood, the Goodrich captain who commanded William's sloop when bringing in the powder and skippered the same when John, Sr. was attempting to go to St. Eustatia. Eastwood told Parker about how Dunmore had intimidated John, Sr., the negotiations between the two about retrieving the powder and money, and the circumstances of Goodrich's capture by Jones's tender at Ocracoke in November. It seems unlikely any of this was news to the rebel powers, and if it was, it was in keeping with the facts already established. Parker, however, claimed Eastwood conveyed something else; that Goodrich had acted as a spy for Dunmore, both in late October and when on parole during very late November and December. "[A] better pimp they not have got, for his diligence, at last Convention, made Dunmore esteem him as his first favourite."

In fact, this accusation borders on the absurd. As to Goodrich playing the spy in October, he only had roughly two weeks to do so during which he was involved with far more pressing matters and certainly not in a physical position to obtain intelligence. The only thing he could have divulged to Dunmore, and perhaps it was what Parker was referring to, was the nature of the gunpowder transaction. As to the period of his parole, Parker referred to Goodrich's "dili-
gence, at last Convention." This initially seems to convey the impression John, Sr. regularly attended that group's assemblies and passed on information learned at them. Upon reflection, however, if this is what Parker intended to convey, he was guilty of a serious fabrication. To begin with, it seems most unlikely that a man whose activities were under suspicion and close scrutiny as of December 11, would have dared or even been able to play such a game. Furthermore, all indications are that he remained at the Nansemond plantation.\textsuperscript{217} It was the four voyages from there to Dunmore that in part aroused suspicion. Even if he had been in Williamsburg, it could not have been for any duration. The travel time of four round trips from there to Nansemond to Norfolk and back would account for a considerable amount of his whereabouts.

Parker's account was penned in a letter to his superior, General Lee, who must have passed it on to the committee set to investigate Goodrich.\textsuperscript{218} That body cornered Eastwood and had him give a sworn deposition concerning John, Sr. Confirming that Parker's accusations of spying were false is the fact that Eastwood's deposition, while reiterating everything Parker claimed to have been told in even greater detail, mentions nothing about spying, when it would seem likely this was what the committee would have been most interested in hearing about. Furthermore, when the time came, none of Eastwood's testimony would be cited as evidence against John, Sr., nor was any other evidence brought forth that he had been involved in such activities.\textsuperscript{219}

As of May 13, John, Sr. was preparing his defense. At that time, having heard that Captains Wright Westcoat [Westcott] and Laban Goffagen were in the capital, he requested both be present at his trial. Barring that, he desired they be detained until depositions could be acquired from them. There is no evidence the rebels complied with this request.\textsuperscript{220}
On May 16, yet another blow was struck the family. The Committee of Safety ordered the Isle of Wight plantation sold. Shortly after, although already under lock and key, Goodrich was deemed dangerous enough to warrant being restrained even further with irons. By one account, he was chained immobile on his back.

Margaret arrived on May 29, with the smaller children. Evidently, she thought she would actually be able to stay at the jail with her husband. The rebels quickly made it clear, however, that would not be allowed. She could only visit, and after initial contact, she could not leave Williamsburg.

In early June, probably on the 4th, John, Sr. petitioned the investigating committee. Stating he was heartily tired of the "Confinement & Damn, d Irons" which he had endured for sixteen days, he desired, even welcomed, the commencement of his hearing. He wished to be able to defend himself against "the many false Aspertions, Laid to his Charge, by Envious Informations and Representations." He added that he felt his actions were as "Little Offensive to his Country" as could be for a man in his situation. Then, pointing out he had had a great deal to lose in the beginning, he had, in fact, lost almost everything. Towards the end of the petition, concerning his affiliations, he offered, "I took a warm & Early Part which Involved me in Lord Dunmores Hands I am by his Means now in Your hands or in Other words Discharged from the Obligation I was bound to him In." This petition is particularly intriguing, because of the phrase "many false Aspertions...by Envious information and representations." It recalls to mind the "many Malicious Enemys." Like "Malicious," "Envious" conveys a personal element, and as such, the two words share a certain affinity. This is quite possibly another allusion to there having been personal enemies in the rebel camp who did not wish the
family well. As will be seen, all indications are the committee denied John Sr. a hearing of any kind.

About this time, word circulated that John, Sr. was to be sent upcountry to the interior for imprisonment. Seriously upset over the news, Margaret, on June 5, petitioned the rebels not to do this. Her petition was tabled. Of note is the fact the Convention minute book for that date originally stated, "Two petitions of Goodrichs Read", but the "two" is suspiciously marked out. The more complete "Proceedings" only mention Margaret's. One historian suggests the second was John, Sr.'s request for a hearing. If so, the deletion of the reference would support that his request was ignored.

On the following day, the Convention directed a committee to investigate the conditions of the jail. This facility was undoubtedly not the most enjoyable place to spend time under any circumstance, but overcrowding, bad ventilation, summer heat, poor sanitation, and bad food created an unpleasant and unhealthy environment for its residents. On June 7, the committee reported this and the fact John, Sr. had been suffering a slight fever for three days. They feared it would worsen and become "putrid." Consequently, it was ordered that Goodrich be released from his shackles and sent under a "strong guard" to a more suitable place to recover. On June 10, he was returned to the jail.

Assigned to investigate John, Sr. was the Committee of Privileges and Elections, whose twenty-one members included such notables as Patrick Henry, Robert Carter Nicholas, Richard Bland, Henry and Richard Lee, Archibald Cary, and Dudley Digges. On May 7, this standing body had been vested with judicial powers to examine suspected enemies of the state. "The legislature, not the court, would sentence" John, Sr. On June 11, Henry presented the group's findings to the Convention. After recounting in detail evidence of John, Sr.'s
activities with Dunmore gleaned from Goodrich's own confession and the
depositions of James Buchanan and James Anderson, all taken in North
Carolina, Henry stated the Committee's resolution which was adopted by
the Convention. "Resolved that the said John Goodrich is guilty of
bearing Arms against this Colony and is also guilty of aiding and as-
sisting the Enemy by giving them intelligence contrary to and in con-
tempt of an Ordinance of the last Convention."^235

The nature of the testimony and consequent resolve are curious
for several reasons. To begin with, only three documents, recorded at
the same place and time, were used. More significantly, none of these
statements came from witnesses speaking on Goodrich's behalf, although
he had asked for such support. Most significantly, there is no refer-
ence to any recent testimony from John, Sr. taken since his arrival in
the capitol, despite his request for a hearing. In conjunction, there
is evidence the Committee actually arrived at its conclusion at least
as early as June 5. It was probably a leak of their decision that
prompted Margaret's petition of that date. If this is accepted, and if
John, Sr.'s petition was written on June 4, then a very interesting
picture of the situation develops.^236

The nature of the testimony actually cited in combination with
John, Sr. having yet to be heard at a time coinciding approximately
with when the decision against him was made supports two things. John,
Sr. was not allowed witnesses on his behalf, and he was not even al-
lowed to speak for himself and testify in his own defense. In fact, it
is quite likely John, Sr.'s petition was written, because of this very
thing. If Margaret had received word of the Committee's decision, it
is safe to say she conveyed the news to her husband. Consequently,
John, Sr.'s petition may well represent a last desperate effort to be
heard, written in response to news of the resolution. In turn, this
would explain why the petition was ignored. The decision had already
been made and there was no point in acknowledging Goodrich. In any case, the only recorded instance of members of the investigating Committee ever personally confronting Goodrich was when, in his presence, the confession taken in North Carolina was read.\textsuperscript{237}

Despite the fact there was no accusation or evidence offered of spying, the resolve clearly stated John, Sr. was found "guilty of aiding and assisting the Enemy by giving them intelligence." This must refer to his conduct as a pilot, a role Goodrich freely confessed to and the main activity that was held against him.\textsuperscript{238} In such a capacity, guiding naval vessels and tenders in search of rebel shipping and provisions, he most certainly offered important intelligence. He was not, however, privy to or divulging the colony's state secrets.

As punishment, the rebels confiscated the remainder of Goodrich's estates, making provision from their revenue for the care of the prisoner, Margaret, and the youngest children. John, Sr., himself, was ordered under heavy guard to detention in Charlottesville. Reflecting some sense of decency, the Committee allowed him the use of one of the goaler's personal rooms in order to regain his health before making the journey. As of July 2, there was still enough concern about his physical condition that the Committee of Safety directed a doctor to examine him and report on his condition. It was not until July 22, that the Council of State finally ordered him taken to the interior.\textsuperscript{239}

With matters concerning John, Sr. under control, the Virginians again turned their attention to John, Jr. Though he had been directed to report to the Committee of Safety on June 3, there is no evidence anything transpired at that time. On June 14, however, the Committee told him to appear on June 21. They also, issued summons for two men to appear and give evidence at John, Jr.'s examination.\textsuperscript{240}
On the 21st, the Committee met, considered the accusation that John, Jr. was "inimical to the rights of America", and decided his fate. There being no evidence against him or forthcoming witnesses, they dropped the charges. They maintained, though, that he remained under "general suspicion" and should post £1,000 bond not to give intelligence to the enemy or assist them in any way. On the same day, the Convention concurred with the Committee and ordered the oath administered to Johnie.241

On June 25, with father-in-law Harwood vouching for him, John, Jr. promised future good behavior and was discharged on parole. Still a suspect, though, as directed, the Committee attempted to administer the oath. John, Jr. refused to take it. The only response was to order him disarmed.242

The situation of John, Jr. is of note. It seems he was suspected of guilt merely by association. He was a Goodrich. The circumstances of his confinement and examination, however, tend to support the fact that he never committed himself to Dunmore's service. The rather relaxed nature of his captivity (the fact he had been allowed to go about armed shows just how lax) clearly indicates he was not viewed as a dangerous enemy of the colony as were his father and brother-in-law, and no evidence was ever tendered against him. The only thing that could really be held against him was that in the end, when all else was said and done, he refused to take the oath. His actions following his release further support that he was at least attempting to maintain a neutral stance. Although Bartlet would later refer to John, Jr. as prisoner in Virginia, and he would eventually leave the colony and go to New York, there is no evidence of any overt efforts to escape his lax security during the time he remained, and his departure went unmentioned.243 All indications are that he was content to sit on the sidelines with his family and avoid involvement one way or the other.
Even after he left the colony, he does not seem to have been overly active with the British. To date, only a single reference has been found to John, Jr. having invested in a privateer which, in light of the numerous references pertaining to the involvement of other family members, tends to indicate his participation was comparatively minimal. So, with his acquittal, the story of John, Jr. is really at an end. For this Goodrich family member, profit was certainly not a guiding motive.

While events played out for John, Sr. and John, Jr., affairs were not going well for Robert Sheddon. On June 10, Patrick Henry had presented the Committee's findings on his conduct. They really had nothing substantial in terms of specifics to offer as evidence against him, citing only his general contact with Dunmore, his attempt to escape capture, and that he "was generally thought about Norfolk to be inimical." In fact, it was maintained Sheddon had actually aided rebel Wills Cowper and others by warning them that Dunmore was intent on their capture. Still, the resolve was to confine Sheddon on parole to parts of Surry County at least ten miles from the James River with instructions not to give intelligence to the British or help them in any way. The next day, the place of confinement was changed to an area of Dinwiddie County at least ten miles from the Appomattox River. Sheddon was allowed fifteen days to get his affairs in order and arrive at the designated location.

It is doubtful Sheddon bothered to comply with the Convention's resolves. At a later date, he simply stated that after being held prisoner for several months (April, May, and June), he escaped to rejoin Dunmore with whom he remained. In another account, although he incorrectly stated he was captured in February or March, he mentioned being held captive for fifty days. This span conforms fairly well to the period from when he was taken in April to just after the Commit-
tee's resolution. In essence, it would seem Sheddon took advantage of the fifteen day grace period to rejoin the Governor. His activities for the duration of the campaign remain a mystery. He would, however, go to Bermuda and be heard from again.  

During this same period in June, related events were transpiring in Northampton County on the Eastern Shore. There, at some point during the first week of June, Bartlet, having sailed from the Caribbean with a cargo of produce, small arms, gunpowder, sugar, and sail cloth, was captured in a small armed vessel at Cherrystone Creek. Tried before the Northampton County Court for being "inimical to the Rights & Liberties of America," he was found guilty. An appeal to the Virginia Council of State proved unsuccessful. On July 24, that body upheld the verdict of the county court and sentenced Bartlet to parole in the town of New London, Bedford County. The guards transporting him were directed to hurry in order to catch up with the party escorting John, Sr. and so travel together.  

To believe the Goodriches were badly treated, even innocent, is to accept the unthinkable. Virginia's revolutionary leaders were human and capable of making grievous errors in judgment, if not worse. Edmund Randolph, at least, admitted as much. Following are his comments on the matter replete with masterful double entendre and cryptic reference.

Virginia committed but few errors in the selection of men to whom she committed her interests. But she was not equally fortunate in the repudiation of a father and his three sons, of the name of Goodrich. They were so original and happy in their genius of shipbuilding that from the construction of vessels adapted to all the waters of this colony, many cargoes escaped capture and relieved the most urgent wants of the navy and of the people. But upon a doubt whether upon some occasion they had acted correctly, they were suspected of being unfaithful to the country and forced into the condition of enemies. ...Fertile as revolutions generally are in character equal to every growing necessity, Virginia never repaired the loss which she sustained in these men. ... Whether they were guilty or not of the first imputations was decided by the voice of the public, according to the temperament of him who judged. But a cloud may suddenly envelop well-disposed and capable men, which they may not easily pierce, or which if lessened is
never wholly dissipated. They may be forgiven, and the attainder of their reputation may be proclaimed to be unjust, but the suspicion infects every struggle toward full and delicate confidence. The cause of these men I pretend not to perfectly understand or to advocate. But it is a superfluous function of history to warn a republic to avoid temerity in condemning, without the highest proof, her servants who until the hour of darkness shone with luster in her service.  

Upon reading this, one gets the distinct impression something remained unsaid. In essence, there is the feeling Randolph was privy to additional information, but, for whatever reason, thought it best to keep his own council and say no more.

Many of the particulars necessary to fully explain and understand the Goodrich's situation will probably never come to light. Still, analysis of events and personalities shows that they were treated quite shabbily by their fellow Virginians, and indications are that a darker, personal element lay behind this. The complex sequence of events in which they were caught had the affect of transforming them from rebels to arch loyalists. Family members were given little choice in their decision to side with the British.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 4

1Dunmore to Germain, March 30, 1776, PRO, C05/1353/377.


3Robert Sheddon to John Goodrich, Sr., Sunday 8 O'Clock [October 15, 1775], PRO, C05/1353/350; and Dixon & Hunter's Virginia Gazette, February 7, 1777, p. 2. The age given for William is incorrect as is that for Bridger who is said to be twenty-four later in the same account. John Goodrich, Sr., age fifty-three in 1775, married Margaret Bridger in 1747 when she was fifteen years old. Therefore, their oldest child, John, Jr., could only have been twenty-seven or twenty-eight in 1775. Bartlet is known to have been the third son, and Bridger, only eighteen in 1775, was undoubtedly the youngest of the
four. This indicates William was the second oldest son. There was also a daughter, Agatha, who was about twenty-three at the start of the revolution. In essence, there were five children born over a period of ten years indicating a birth roughly every two years. This tends to indicate William was older than Agatha and was probably about twenty-five in 1775. This would also support that Bartlet was about twenty or twenty-one at the same time. Fairfax Harrison, "The Goodrichs of Isle of Wight County, Virginia," Tyler's Quarterly Historical and Genealogical Magazine 2 (October, 1920; reprint ed., New York: Kraus Reprint Corp., 1967): 130-131; "Notes and Queries," Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, 14 (April, 1907): 443; "Virginia Legislative Papers", Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 15 (July, 1907): 163-164 n; Dunmore to Vice Admiral James Young, April 9, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:742; and William Zuill, "Further Family Connections with Orange Grove," Bermuda Historical Quarterly 30 (Autumn, 1973): 83.


Estimate of John Goodrich Sr.'s losses, March 1, 1784, PRO, A012/56/170. The number of slaves referenced here are those who were lost to the rebels during the time of Dunmore's campaign. Others left with the Governor, but their number is not known.


Norfolk Borough and Portsmouth Town Committee, Election of Joint Committee, May 30, 1774, in Van Schreeven, Revolutionary Virginia, 2:89; and Baltimore Committee of Correspondence to Norfolk-Portsmouth Joint Committee, June 17, 1774, in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:735.

Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 4:442 n. 7: Hast, Loyalism, pp. 48-49; and Major Josiah Parker to Dunmore, May 1, 1776, in The Lee Papers, 4 vols., Collections of the New-York Historical Society, Publication Fund Series, vols. 4-7 (New York: 1871-1874), 1:461.


Deposition of William Goodrich, PRO, CO5/1353/352 (see also in NDAR, 2:664-665); and Robert Carter Nicholas to William Goodrich, June 16, 1775, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 3:206.

Deposition of William Goodrich, PRO, CO5/1353/352.

13 Deposition of William Goodrich, PRO, C05/1353/352; William Goodrich to Council of Safety, September 7, 1776, in Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd series, 1:623; and Colony of Virginia/William Goodrich account with Isaac Van Dam, September 1775, PRO, C05/1353/354.


16 Purdie's Virginia Gazette, Supplement, October 6, 1775, and Dixon & Hunter's Virginia Gazette, October 28, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2:343, 630.

17 Dixon & Hunter's Virginia Gazette, October 21, 1775, Dunmore to Dartmouth, October 22, 1775, and Captain Samuel Leslie to Major General William Howe, November 1, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2:564-565, 574, 844; Dunmore's date of October 15, for the start of the raids is incorrect. The other two sources support each other, indicating the British left on the raid on October 12, and struck on October 13.

18 Dunmore to Dartmouth, October 5, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2:316-317; and Dunmore to Germain, March 30, 1776, PRO, C05/1353/377 (see also in NDAR, 4:585)

Dunmore to Dartmouth, October 5, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2:316-317; Dunmore to Dartmouth, January 4, 1776, PRO, CO5/1353/327 (see also in NDAR, 3:618); and William Goodrich to Council of Safety, Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd series, 1:623.

Deposition of William Goodrich, PRO, CO5/1353/352; William Goodrich to Council of Safety, in Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd series 1:621-622. In this account, the river in question is called the Paspo-tent; Colony of Virginia/William Goodrich account with Isaac Van Dam, n.d.; William Goodrich Account with Isaac Van Dam, December 6, 1775, and Dunmore to Dartmouth, January 4, 1776, PRO, CO5/1353/354, 361, 327; and Proceedings, Virginia Convention, January 13, 1776, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 5:397-399.

William Goodrich to Council of Safety, in Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd series, 1:622; Dunmore to Dartmouth, January 4, 1776, PRO, CO5/1353/327; Parker to Stewart, October 9-21, 1775, National Library of Scotland, Charles Stewart Papers, MS5029/1775-1776/112. The letter in question is not dated. It only indicates it was written on Sunday at 8:00 O'Clock. In Naval Documents of the American Revolution, 1:1006, it is assigned the date July 29, 1775. This is entirely too early. The sequence of events discussed in Parker's letter to Stewart and Dunmore's dispatch to Dartmouth in conjunction with its having been penned on a Sunday, indicate it was written on October 15, 1775. Ivor Noel Hume, 1775: Another Part of the Field (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 371; and Curtis, "Goodrich Family," p. 58.

Robert Sheddon to John Goodrich, Sr., Sunday, 8 O'Clock, [October 15, 1776], PRO, CO5/1353/350.

Parker to Stewart, October 9-21, 1775, National Library of Scotland, Charles Stewart Papers, MS5029/1775-1776/112; and Dunmore to Dartmouth, January 4, 1776, PRO, CO5/1353/327.

Ibid.; Dixon & Hunter's Virginia Gazette, October 21, 1775, p. 2.

Robert Sheddon to Goodrich, Sr., [October 15, 1775], note in margin, PRO, CO5/1353/350.


William Goodrich to Council of Safety, Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd series. 1:623; Parker to Stewart, October 9-21, 1775, National Library of Scotland, Charles Stewart Papers, MS5029/1775-1776/112. Although he doubted the intelligence, Parker reported a Goodrich sloop had come in and sailed up the James River (the course for Suffolk) with a cargo of gunpowder and "duck for tents", i.e., coarse linens. While the vessel did not have any powder, she had actually made it
through the blockade with her shipment of textiles. Parker further distinguishes this sloop from William's and two other "sloops" [sic] expected in, the schooner Fanny and undoubtedly, the Long Splice.

31 William Goodrich to Council of Safety, Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd series, 1:623; Memorial of William Goodrich, PRO, AO13/95/G; Invoice of Sundries Bought of John Goodrich, "Legislative Papers," VMHR 15 (January, 1908): 290-291; and Proceedings, Virginia Convention, January 16, 1776, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 5:415. The difference in figures probably either represents the actual value of the cargo, by itself, and that value plus whatever fees the Goodriches charged for their efforts, or differences in the value of the currency or specie for payment. In his Memorial, William stated the figure of £840 represented the value "in Gold, in Weight, or in Dollars" indicating specie. The £1,098 may well represent the same value in a currency other than pounds sterling.

William Goodrich to Council of Safety, Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd series, 1:622; Robert Sheddon to John Sheddon, November 9, 1775, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 4:353; and Parker to Stewart, October 9-21, 1775, National Library of Scotland, Charles Stewart Papers, MS5029/1775-1776/112.

Robert Sheddon to John Sheddon, November 9, 1775, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 4:353.


42 Dunmore to Dartmouth, January 4, 1776, PRO, C05/1353/327.
Ibid.; Proceedings, Virginia Convention, January 13, 1776, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 5:397-399; Confession of John Goodrich, Sr., April 26, 1776, in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:423; and Hast, Loyalism, pp. 50, 75. Some historians maintain John, Jr. was exchanged for William as part of the deal, and while the former was, in fact, later released on parole, there is nothing to indicate it was contingent on William being in custody. Nöel Hume, 1775, p. 377; Curtis, "Goodrich Family," p. 60; and Hast, Loyalism, p. 50.

Deposition of William Goodrich, PRO, CO5/1353/352; Andrew Sprowle to George Brown, intercepted loyalist letter, November 1, 1775, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 4:314; and Proceedings, Virginia Convention, January 13, 1776, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 5:399. Sprowle states William was brought to the Governor on November 1, but the October 31, date of William's deposition indicates he arrived at least a day earlier. More important is Sprowle's statement to the effect that both William and John, Jr. were both prisoners, supporting the later was not exchanged for the former.


Dunmore to Dartmouth, January 4, 1776, PRO, CO5/1353/327; and Deposition of Eastwood, in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:304.

Edmund Pendleton to Richard Henry Lee, November 27, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2:1167.


Dunmore to Dartmouth, January 4, 1776, PRO, CO5/1353/321.

Proceedings, Virginia Convention, January 13, 1776, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 5:398. Indications are that Dunmore released John, Jr. before John, Sr. Sources dated November 11, and November 25, 1775, comment on William and John, Sr. being in custody, but there is no reference to John, Jr. Virginia Committee of Safety to the Virginia delegates in the Continental Congress, and Robert Carter Nicholas to same, in Clark, NDAR, 2:994, 1138.

Proceedings, Virginia Convention, January 13, 1776, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 5:398. This same document states William did not sail until December, but this is incorrect. As will be seen, he was in St. Eustatia by December 6. Allowing ten to twelve days for the voyage, he could not have weighed later than November 25 or 26. Robert Carter Nicholas reported him in custody as of November 25, but
It is likely his information was actually of an earlier date. Nicholas to the Virginia delegates, November 25, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 2:1138.


54 Ibid.; Dunmore to Dartmouth, January 4, 1776, and Deposition of William Goodrich, PRO, CO5/1353/321, 352.

55 It must be noted that in his post-war memorial, William, like everyone else, implied he was a good loyalist all along, and even declared the scheme concerning his capture had been devised by him and Dunmore as a cover so he could still obtain payment for the cargo of coarse linens. At the same time, there is no reference to his ever having acted for the rebels. Of course, in light of other testimony carrying far more weight, including William's own, William's assertion about his involvement in the scheme are absurd. This is the only blatant falsehood detected in any of the family's accounts. On a certain level, however, this statement is not as serious as it seems considering the time and circumstances under which it was made. It is rather typical of many loyalist memorials in which in an effort to obtain recompense for losses, they consistently failed to mention activities and associations that might reflect them in a questionable light and jeopardize their chances of reimbursement. At the same time, loyalists were often prone to enhancing statements concerning their losses, loyalty, and contributions. It still amazes this writer how relatively few memorials generated by men who were seriously involved in privateering mention that fact. This is probably because they made some money in an activity they chose to become involved in on their own volition which therefore might contradict their claim for losses. In William's case, his memorial was written in part to claim the loss of income for the coarse linens, and this might partially explain his comment. In conjunction, it must be said that as stated, the other numerous facts related in this particular document are true and supported by other testimony. Memorial of William Goodrich, PRO, A013/95/G.

56 Robert Sheddon to John Sheddon, November 9 and 10, 1775, and editorial note in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 4:353, 358 n. 6, 366.

57 Ibid.

58 Purdie's Virginia Gazette, November 3, 1775, John Page to Thomas Jefferson, November 11, [1775], Captain Matthew Squire to Admiral Graves, December 2, 1775, and Dunmore to Dartmouth, December 6, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2:873, 991-992, 1240, 1310.

59 Page to Jefferson, November 11, [1775], Purdie's Virginia Gazette, November 17, 1775, W. Griffin to George Gefferina, November 14, 1775, and Purdie's Virginia Gazette, November 24, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2: 992, 1013-1014, 1024, 1025, 1120; and Selby, Revolution in Virginia, p. 64.

60 Virginia Committee of Safety to the Virginia Delegates in the Continental Congress, November 11, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2:994; Robert Armistead Stewart, The History of Virginia's Navy of the Revolution (Richmond, Virginia: Mitchell & Hotchkiss, Printers, 1933), p. 6; and

61 Samuel Johnston to Joseph Hewes, November 5, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2:899.

62 John Selby, Dunmore (Williamsburg: Virginia Bicentennial Commission, 1977), p. 36; and Dunmore's Proclamation, November 7, 1775, Samuel Leslie to William Howe, November 26, [1775], and Dunmore to Dartmouth, December 6, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2:920, 1148, 1311.

63 Nicholas to Virginia Delegates, November 25, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2:1138.

64 Dunmore to Dartmouth, December 6, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2:1311.

65 Virginia Committee of Safety to Maryland Delegates, December 29, 1775, and List of Ships in Norfolk and Hampton Roads, December 30, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 3:297, 309.


67 Dixon & Hunter's Virginia Gazette, October 21, 1775, p. 2; Virginia Committee of Safety to Virginia Delegates, November 11, 1775, Nicholas to same, November 25, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2:994, 1138; and Pendleton to R. H. Lee, November 27, 1775, in Mays, Letters of Pendleton, 1:133.


70 William Goodrich to Council of Safety, Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd series, 1:622-624; and Memorial of William Goodrich, PRO, A013/95/G.


72 Proceedings, Virginia Convention, January 5, 1776, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 5:342-343.

73 Proceedings, Virginia Convention, January 10, and January 16, 1776, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 5:373, 416; and Memorial of William Goodrich, PRO, A013/95/G.

75 Ibid., pp. 397-399.

76 Ibid., pp. 398-399.

77 Ibid., p. 399.

78 Ibid.

79 Curtis, "Goodrich Family," 53-54, 55 n. 19, 56, 62-63; Nöel Hume, 1775, 371, 373, 376; Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 4:359 n. 8; Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:116 n. 2. and Hast, Loyalism, p. 49.

80 Nöel Hume, 1775, p. 379.

81 Curtis, "Goodrich Family," 53-54, 56, 63; Nöel Hume, 1775, 371, 373, 376-377; Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 4:359, n. 8; and Hast, Loyalism, p. 49.


84 Proceedings, Virginia Convention, December 11, 1775, January 5, January 13, and January 16, 1776, and Extract of letter, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Elliott to the President of the Convention, December 29, [1775], in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 5: 107, 274, 342-343, 397-399, 415. Thomas Ludwell Lee to Richard Henry Lee, December 23, 1775, List of Ships in Norfolk and Hampton Roads, December 30, 1775, and Cary to R. H. Lee, December 24, 1775, in NDAR, 3:219, 227, 309. Pinkney's Virginia Gazette, December 30, 1776, p. 4, states the Dorothy was a tender obviously implying she was in British service. The more official sources, however, do not mention this, which one would think they would have if true. In conjunction, if the Dorothy had been a tender, it seems likely much more to do would have been made about Bartlet's capture.


87 Dunmore to Dartmouth, January 4, and [January 9], 1776, PRO, C05/1353/321; William Goodrich to Council of Safety, in Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd series, 1:623; Colony of Virginia/William Goodrich ac-
count with Van Dam, Van Dam to William Goodrich, William Goodrich account with Van Dam, and Deposition of William Goodrich, PRO, CO5/1353/354, 359, 361, 352; and Proceedings, Virginia Convention, January 13, 1776, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 5:399.

88 Dunmore to Dartmouth, [January 9, 1776], PRO, CO5/1353/321; and Curtis, "Goodrich Family," p. 55, n. 20.


92 Ibid., pp. 60-61; Noel Hume, 1775, pp. 374-377; Hast, Loyalism, p. 50; and Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 5:403 n. 17.

93 Memorial of Goodrich, Sr., March 1, 1784, PRO, AO12/56/166. The Commissioners' review of John Goodrich, Sr.'s claim indicates they believed he never assisted the rebels at all. Review of John Goodrich, Sr.'s claim, October 7, 1775, PRO, AO12/101/108.

94 Parker to Stewart, October 9-21, 1775, National Library of Scotland, Charles Stewart Papers, MS5029/1775-1776/112.

95 Extract of letter, Thomas Elliott to President of Convention, December 29, [1775], in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 5:274.

96 Memorial of Bartlet Goodrich, February 21, 1778, PRO, T1/545/307; Surveyors' report of John Brown, John Cunningham, and J[illeg.] Hunter, December 22, 1775, and Dunmore to Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, July 20, 1776, PRO, T1/545/309, 310. It need be noted the Fanny was contracted from Messrs. John Goodrich & Co., but this should not be taken to mean John, Sr. was privy to the transaction. The organizations name seems to have been merely a cover designation used by all family members (witness the plural Messrs.) whether trading individually or as a group. Some family vessels trading under this distinction were individually owned. Curtis, "Goodrich Family," p. 54; Return of ships and vessels taken into government service by Dunmore, July 4, 1776, PRO, Adm49/2; Memorial of William Goodrich, PRO, AO13/95/G; and Carter to Shaw, July 19, 1774, Robert Carter Letter Book, Vol. 2, pp. 20-25, Duke University Library; Regarding the last two mentioned sources, as will be seen later in this study, the vessel William referred to in his memorial as his own was the Samuel. In 1774, according to Carter, her master was Bridger who was seemingly representing his father's company.

97 Extract of letter, Thomas Elliott to President of Convention, December 29, [1775], and Proceedings, Virginia Convention, January 16, 1776, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 5:274, 415; and List of Ships in Norfolk and Hampton Roads, December 30, 1775, in Clark NDAR, 3:309.

98 Memorial of Bartlet Goodrich, PRO, T1/545/307; Surveyors' report of Brown, John, and Hunter, December 22, 1775, and Dunmore to Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, July 20, 1776, PRO, T1/545/309, 310.
99 Deposition of William Goodrich, PRO, CO5/1353/352; Robert Sheddon to Goodrich, Sr., [October 15, 1776], PRO, CO5/1353/350; and Note from William Lux, April 10, 1776, appended to Van Bibber to Lux, March 28, 1776, in "Legislative Papers," VMHB 15 (January 1908): 288. The date of the note relative to the letter's date indicates a passage of no more than two weeks.

100 Van Dam to William Goodrich, PRO, CO5/1353/359; and Extract of letter, Thomas Elliott to President of the Convention, December 29, [1775], in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 5:274. The date of Van Dam's letter at St. Eustatia and the fact Bartlet had left that island twenty days prior to roughly December 27, indicates there was at least a day or two of overlap with both brothers at the island. They must have made contact.


102 Ibid., p. 416.

103 Ibid.

104 Proceedings, Virginia Convention, January 18, 1776, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 5:427; and Hast, Loyalism, p. 80: No record exists of a response to Goodrich's second petition for payment even though a committee was assigned to consider it. Proceedings, Virginia Convention, January 16, 1776, and editorial note, Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 5:416, 420 n. 17.


106 Dixon & Hunter's Virginia Gazette, February 7, 1777, p. 2.


108 Dunmore to Dartmouth, February 13, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 3:1266.

109 Dixon & Hunter's Virginia Gazette, February 17, 1776, p. 3.


111 List of Vessels taken and Condemned, n.d., PRO, T1/580/118.
112Hamond to Squire, February 26, 1776, Hammond Naval Papers, 4/E/70, University of Virginia Library; Examination of Wirt, and Dunlap's Maryland Gazette, March 19, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:289 n. 3, 413; and Myron J. Smith, Jr., and John G. Earle, "The Maryland State Navy," in The Chesapeake Bay in the American Revolution, ed., Ernest McNeill Eller (Centreville, Maryland: Tidewater Publishers, 1981), pp. 221-223. In this account, Bridger has been confused with John, Sr. and incorrectly placed in command of the Edward.

113Abram Van Bibber to Virginia Convention, March 7, 1776, in "Legislative Papers," VMHB 15 (January, 1908): 291; and Vice Admiral James Young to Dunmore, May 13, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:83.


116Testimonial of Dunmore for John Goodrich, Sr., April 13, 1784, PRO, A013/30/G.


118Dunmore to Germain, March 30, 1776, PRO, C05/1353/377; Dunmore to Admiral Young, April 9, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:742.

119Evidence on the memorial of Sheddon and Goodrich, February 20, 1787, PRO, A012/56/175; and Claim of Robert Sheddon, October 26, 1786, PRO, A013/33/SII.

120Dunmore to Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, July 20, 1776, PRO, T1/532/308.

121Confession of Goodrich, Sr., in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:423.


123Ibid.; Baltimore Committee to Maryland Council of Safety, [March 8,1776], Maryland Council of Safety to Virginia Committee of Safety, March 9, 1776, Minutes of the Baltimore Committee, [March 10, 1776], Maryland Council of Safety to Maryland Delegates in the Continental Congress, March 11, 1776, and Narrative of the Alarm over the Otter, in Clark, NDAR, 4:271, 286, 302, 326 n. 2.

124Ibid.


126Ibid.
127 Ibid.


129 Hammond to Squire, February 26, 1776, Hammond Naval Papers, 4/E/70, University of Virginia Library.


133 Journal of Otter, March 5-13, 1776, and Narrative of the Alarm over the Otter, in Clark, NDAR, 4:271-272, 326 n. 2, 425-426; Howe's list of prizes, March 31, 1776, House of Lords Records Office, Main Papers, American Prizes, 301.4; and List of Vessels taken and Condemned, PRO, T1/580/118.

134 Maryland Council of Safety to Maryland Delegates, March 11, 1776, and Narrative of the Alarm over the Otter, in Clark, NDAR, 4:302, 326, n. 2.

135 Journal of Otter, March 5-13, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:271-272, 425-426; Howe's list of prizes, March 31, 1776, House of Lords Records Office, Main Papers, American Prizes, 301.4; and List of Vessels taken and Condemned, PRO, T1/580/118.

136 Examination of Wirt, in Clark, NDAR, 4:289.

137 Hammond to Squire, February 26, 1776, Hammond Naval Papers, 4/E/70, University of Virginia Library.

138 Dunlap's Maryland Gazette, March 19, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4: 412-413.

139 List of Vessels taken and Condemned, PRO, T1/580/118.

140 Ibid.

141 Memorial of Bartlet Goodrich, February 21, 1778, PRO, T1/545/307; Dunmore to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, July 20, 1776, PRO, T1/545/310; and Survey report of Brown, Cunningham, and Hunter, February 13, 1776, PRO, T1/545/311.


143 Abram Van Bibber to Virginia Committee of Safety, March 11, 1776, in "Virginia Legislative Papers," VMHB 15 (July, 1907): 156-157;

144 Van Bibber to Lux, March 28, 1776, in "Legislative Papers," VMHB 15 (January, 1908): 288-289; and Dunmore to Admiral Young, April 9, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:742.

145 Admiral Young to Dunmore, May 13, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR 5:83.


147 Memorial of William Goodrich, PRO, AO13/95/G; Journal of the Proceedings of his Majesty's Sloop, Otter, Captain Matthew Squire, March 30 and April 5, 1776, PRO, Adm51/663/pt.8; Memorial of Mesures Wooldridge and Kelly, August 14, 1776, and William Chamberlayne to Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, Fisher Transcripts, MS.360.3, Maryland Historical Society; Proceedings, Virginia Committee of Safety, April 3, 1776, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 6:318; Maryland Council of Safety to Maryland Delegates in the Continental Congress, April 5, 1776, and Journal, Otter, April 5, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:671-672, 699, n. 2; and Purdie's Virginia Gazette, Supplement, April 26, 1776, p. 2.


150 Ibid., 1:624.

151 Ibid., 1:622.

152 Memorial of William Goodrich, PRO, AO13/95/G. Apart from William saying he concocted the scheme with Dunmore to have himself taken prisoner in October, 1775, the facts presented in this memorial, though garbled and out of sequence, dovetail well with the account being discussed.


156 Selby, Revolution in Virginia, pp. 90-91.
Dunmore to Richard Corbin, January 27, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 3:1020-1021.

Selby, Revolution in Virginia, pp. 87-88.

Major General Henry Clinton to Dunmore, and to Hamond, March 19, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:415, 416; Dunmore to Germain, March 30, 1776, PRO, CO5/1353/377. Receipt of the Prohibitory Act by Dunmore at this time is only alluded to, but there is no doubt that document is being referred to in his dispatch to Germain. The time frame is also in keeping with the arrival of copies of the Act for other governors. Governor Basil Keith, Jamaica, to Germain, March 27, 1776, and Governor Francis Legge, Nova Scotia, to Germain, April 10, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:546, 745; and Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 6:235-237 ns. 29-33.


Diary of Richard Smith, [February] 27, [1776], in Clark, NDAR, 4:98.


Proceedings, Virginia Committee of Safety, April 3, 1776, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 6:318; and Purdie's Virginia Gazette, Supplement, April 26, 1776, p. 2.


Memorial of William Goodrich, PRO, AO13/95/G.

Memorial of William Goodrich, PRO, AO13/95/G; Journal of the Otter, March 30, and April 5, 1776, PRO, Adm51/663/pt.8; Memorial of Wooldridge and Kelly, August 14, 1776, and Chamberlayne to Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, Fisher Transcripts, MS.360.3, Maryland Historical Society; Proceedings, Virginia Committee of Safety, April 3, 1776, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 6:318; Maryland Council of Safety to Maryland Delegates, April 5, 1776, and Journal, Otter, April 5, 1776, in Clark NDAR, 4:671-672, 699, n. 2,; and Purdie's Virginia Gazette, Supplement, April 26, 1776, p. 2.

Dunmore to Germain, March 30, 1776, PRO, CO5/1353/377.


Testimonial of Captain Andrew Snape Hamond for John Goodrich, Sr., April 12, 1784, PRO, AO13/30/GIV.
171 William E. S. Zuill, "Further Notes on the Bridge House, St. George's," *Bermuda Historical Quarterly* 28 (Spring, 1971): 18. The two youngest sons were James, age twelve and Samuel, age ten; "Notes and Queries," *VMHB* 14 (April, 1907): 443.

172 Commissions for the privateer schooner, Active, Captain Charles Barnet Goff, August 7, and September 19, 1780, Maryland Admiralty, 7871-1-34, Maryland State Archives.


174 List of Vessels taken and Condemned, PRO, T1/580/118.

175 Purdie's *Virginia Gazette*, Supplement, April 26, 1776, p. 2.

176 Memorial of William Goodrich, PRO, A013/95/G; and Chamberlayne to Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, June 11, 1777, Fisher Transcripts, MS.360.1, Maryland Historical Society.

177 Memorial of Bartlet Goodrich, copy sent to Sir William Howe, March 10, 1778, PRO, C05/95/54.


180 Memorial of William Goodrich, PRO, A013/95/G; Journal, Otter, April 5, 1776, PRO, Adm51/663/pt.8; Memorial of Woolridge and Kelly, August 14, 1776, and Chamberlayne to Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, June 11, 1777, Fisher Transcripts, MS.360.3, Maryland Historical Society; and Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer to Charles Carroll, [March 8, 1776], Minutes, Baltimore Committee, [March 10, 1776], Maryland Council of Safety to Maryland Delegates, April 5, 1776, and Journal of Otter, April 5, 1776, in Clark, *NDAR*, 4:242-243, 286, 671-672, 699, n. 2; and Purdie's *Virginia Gazette*, Supplement, April 26, 1776, p. 2.


183 Deposition of Buchanan, in *Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia*, 6:478-479; and Memorial of Goodrich, Sr., PRO, A012/56/166.

184 Ibid.: List of bonds issued at Edenton, North Carolina, in Clark, *NDAR*, 3:985 n. 2; Dunmore to Germain, June 26, 1776, in Morgan,
NDAR, 5:756-757; Memorial of Blair, PRO, A012/56/184; Memorial of Bartlet Goodrich, PRO, C05/95/54; Proceedings, Virginia Convention, June 4, 1776, and Confession of Goodrich, Sr., in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:350, 423; James Iredell to Joseph Hewes, April 29, 1776, in Don Higginbotham, ed., The Papers of James Iredell, 2 vols. (Raleigh, North Carolina: Division of Archives and History, 1976), 1:365.

185 Proceedings, Virginia Convention, June 4, 1776, in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:350.
188 Proceedings, Virginia Convention, June 4, 1776, in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:350.
189 Deposition of James Anderson, April 26, 1776, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 6:479; Memorial of Blair, PRO, A012/56/184; Journal of North Carolina Provincial Congress, April 30, 1776, and Report, Committee to North Carolina Provincial Congress, May 10, 1776, in Saunders, Colonial Records of North Carolina, 10:550, 661; and Iredell to Hewes, April 29, 1776, in Higginbotham, Papers of Iredell, 1:356. One must wonder, given the Goodriches' later exploits against rebel shipping, if Captain Harney was ever chided by comrades about the proper loading and care of his weapons.
190 Deposition of Anderson, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 6:479.
192 Purdie's Virginia Gazette, April 12, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:792. The newspaper account reporting this information conveys the impression John, Sr. was the supervisor, but at that time, he was off the Outer Banks.
193 Rawleigh Colston to Landon Carter, [April 22, 1776] and Diary of Landon Carter (variant version), [April 24, 1776], in Clark, NDAR, 4:1207, 1241; Purdie's Virginia Gazette, May 3, 1776, pp. 2-3; Landon Carter, The Diary of Landon Carter of Sabine Hall, 1752-1778, 2 vols., ed. Jack P. Greene (Charlottesville, Virginia: University Press of Virginia for The Virginia Historical Society, 1965), 2:1021-1025; and "Biographical Memoir of Dale," pp. 500-501. Carter, on hearsay, states this was Bartlet, but Dale, a more reliable source, indicates it was Bridger. Bartlet was probably in the West Indies at the time. Dale did, however, state the action occurred in May, but historians accept that date as incorrect. Diary of Carter, in Clark, NDAR, 4:1207, n. 2.
195 Ibid., 2:1024, 1025.
197 Sheddon to Sheddon, November 9, 1775, in Scribner, *Revolutionary Virginia*, 4:353; and Purdie's *Virginia Gazette*, April 12, 1776, p. 3, and *Supplement*, April 26, 1776, p. 2.
206 Memorial of Bartlet Goodrich, PRO, CO5/95/54; Memorial of Blair, PRO, A012/56/184; and List of Prisoners in Public Jail, in Tartar, *Revolutionary Virginia*, 7:38.
207 Memorial of Bartlet Goodrich, PRO, CO5/95/54.
210 Jones to Iredell, April 28, 1776, and Iredell to Hewes, April 29, 1776, in Higginbotham, *Papers of Iredell*, 1:353, 356; Dixon &
211 Josiah Parker to Charles Lee, n.d. [early May, 1776], in Lee Papers, 2:5-6.

212 Parker to Chas. Lee, April 28, 1776, and same to same, [early May, 1776], in Lee Papers, 1:457-458, 2:4; and editorial text, Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 6:282.

213 Parker to Chas. Lee, April 28, 1776, in Lee Papers, 1:457-458.

214 A spy to Dunmore, May 3, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:1396.


216 Curtis, "Goodrich Family," p. 63, n. 47; and Parker to Chas. Lee, [early May, 1776], in Lee Papers, 2:5-6.


218 Parker to Chas. Lee, [early May, 1776], in Lee Papers, 2:5-6; Pendleton to Chas. Lee, May 5, 1776, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 6:536; Deposition of Eastwood, in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:304.


220 John Goodrich, Sr. to Dudley Digges, May 13, 1776, in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:115.

221 Proceedings, Virginia Committee of Safety, May 16, 1776, in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:169.

222 John Goodrich, Sr. to Committee of Inquiry, n.d., [probably June 4, 1776], and editorial notes, in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:354-355, 355 n. 1, 365 n. 2. Goodrich's letter, though undated, was probably penned on June 4. In it, he says he had been in chains for sixteen days, indicating he was shackled about May 18.

223 Memorial of Bartlet Goodrich, PRO, CO5/95/54.

225 Goodrich, Sr. to Committee of Inquiry, [probably June 4, 1776], and editorial notes, in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:354-355, 355 n. 1, 365 n. 2.

226 Proceedings, Virginia Convention, June 5, 1776, in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:363.

227 Ibid.

228 Tazwell's MS minute, June 5, 1776, quoted in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:365, n. 2.

229 Proceedings, Virginia Convention, June 5, 1776, in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:363.

230 Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:365, n. 2.


233 Proceedings, Virginia Convention, May 7, 1776, in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:46.


236 Ibid.; Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:365, n. 3.

237 Ibid., 7:424, n. 1.

238 Confession of Goodrich, Sr., in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:423.


242 Proceedings, Virginia Committee of Safety, June 25, 1776, in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:618.
243 Memorial of Bartlet Goodrich, PRO, CO5/95/54; and Journal, Council of the State of Virginia, May 16, 1783, in McIlwaine, Journals of the Council, 3:256.

244 Bond for privateer brigantine Lord Hood, Captain James Darrell, December 6, 1782, PRO, HCA49/91/2/44. This document only refers to a John Goodrich without distinguishing Sr. or Jr. In light of the fact that all evidence supports that John, Sr. never invested in a privateer, the individual in question must be John, Jr.

245 Proceedings, Virginia Convention, June 10, 1776, in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:418.

246 Ibid.


248 Memorial of Sheddon, PRO, A012/56/104; and Evidence on Sheddon's Memorial, PRO, A012/56/109.

249 Purdie's Virginia Gazette, June 7, 1776, p. 3; and Dixon & Hunter's Virginia Gazette, June 8, 1776, p. 6.


252 Randolph, History of Virginia, pp. 232-233. Randolph's account suffers from a couple of inaccuracies concerning specifics, but is otherwise true to the story.
CHAPTER 5

"THE LITTLE TENDERS HAVE HAD GREAT SUCCESS:” LOYALIST OPERATIONS IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY REGION, 1776

For Dunmore, as May, 1776, progressed, the Rebels increased their hold on Norfolk and Portsmouth and a major attack on the fleet appeared imminent. Consequently, on the 22nd, after destroying a number of small and worthless vessels and quantities of goods, the governor began the evacuation of the harbor. Sailing up the Bay, the fleet arrived off Gwynn's Island on the 26th. There, amidst the mounting losses and squalor due to smallpox and gaol fever, the group fortified and prepared for the rebels.

During this time and until Dunmore gave up his attempts at maintaining control over Virginia, tender activities continued, involving a fair number of craft manned by a substantial number of loyalist crewmen. Although these mariners suffered losses both in vessels and personnel, they were nevertheless effective, continuing to disrupt rebel trade and provide other services for the governor.

During May and June, tenders accompanied the navy as far as Delaware Bay for blockade duty. There, on May 2, the prize brigan- tine/schooner turned tender, Betsey, was seized after being cut off and trapped in a river by rebel row galleys and the Continental Schooner Wasp. Though under naval command, her former master, future privateersman Thomas Slater, was still on board as part of the crew. During the action, the naval personnel abandoned the Betsey, allowing Slater
to resume command with the assistance of two black loyalist mariners who also remained. All three were captured.3

Following his capture, Slater attempted to defend his actions by claiming he had been coerced into serving the British, and after regaining control of his vessel, was actually trying to flee them when taken.4 His explanation fell on unsympathetic ears, and he was imprisoned at Philadelphia.5 As with other loyalist captives, his accommodations were less than satisfactory, prompting him to formally protest the bad food, absence of bed and bedding, over-crowding, lack of money, and minimal clothing. At the time he penned his complaint, he had been ill for ten days.6 After nine months in the Philadelphia jail, the rebels put Slater in irons and sent him to Baltimore. Upon arrival there, the shackles were removed, and Slater took advantage of the situation to make his escape. Free, he made his way to New York where he would join the future ranks of privateersmen at that port.7

Late in May, Dunmore's raiders were joined by a "tall slim, gallows looking fellow," Maryland pilot and shipowner Joseph Wayland, Jr., destined to become one of the most feared privateersman on the Bay.8 A strong supporter of the King with a serious dislike of the rebels in his region, Wayland first made contact with Dunmore while carrying provisions to the fleet. He then joined the governor on a regular basis in the capacity of pilot and commander of a tender.9

Although there is nothing known about the resulting foray, on June 10, Captain Hamond ordered Lieutenant Wright of the Fincastle to undertake a raid. He was to take [Bridger] Goodrich, then in the sloop Lady Susan, run up the Rappahanock River, destroy rebel galleys and other craft collecting there, and "otherwise to annoy the enemy."10

The tenders performed other services in addition to raiding. Some were sent to the Eastern Shore of Maryland to bring off loyalists and gathered "between fifty and Sixty."11 There having been no room
for more, in late June Dunmore dispatched four more tenders and a naval vessel to collect others left behind. This flotilla, which Wayland accompanied, also took the time to do a little raiding in the area of Hooper's Straits, Maryland. From Hopkin's Island, they took sixty head of cattle, two young men, and "every thing else that was valuable." 

Although in mid-March a tender's crew had plundered a plantation overseer's house, with this foray, the raiding took on a new, more serious complexion. Kidnapping, along with the wanton pilfering and destruction of private property, entered fully as a new element. Worse, matters had become personal. One loyalist took the opportunity to carry out a vendetta, carrying off a William Roberts, a number of his slaves, and a considerable amount of other property. Loyalists also burned the home of another rebel, Samuel McChester. 

In the later half of this same month, one of the Goodrich brothers undertook a successful cruise. As to whether it was Bridger or William, however, remains unrecorded. In any case, at some point prior to the 23rd, one of them seized a French West Indiaman coming in to trade with the rebels. 

Illustrating the degree of notoriety the Goodriches had achieved by this time was an erroneous account concerning one of the family members. The rebels reported one of the brothers was en route to New York when, in a ship to ship duel with the rebel privateer Tyranicide, he was killed and his vessel taken. The news was important enough to be conveyed to the rebel headquarters at New York from which it was relayed to Virginia. Another more detailed account seems to have reached that colony by a different route. There, the news was heralded in both Purdie's and Dixon and Hunter's Virginia Gazettes. Obviously, many rebels wished the intelligence was true, and must have been disappointed upon finding it otherwise.
On July 9, having erected two batteries of artillery on the mainland opposite Gwynn's, the rebels commenced a severe bombardment of the island and anchorage. Having thoroughly disrupted Dunmore's position, the rebels planned an assault for the following day. First, however, three tenders covering the intervening waterway had to be overcome. These vessels consisted of the naval sloop-tender Lady Charlotte under a Midshipman Thomas, the loyalist schooner Lively, John Forsyth, and the loyalist sloop Lady Stanley, William Younghusband.

After playing on these vessels with two six-pound field guns, the rebels, in about thirty canoes, attacked across the haven. This forced the Lively's crew to abandon their position and ground their schooner up a creek on the island. There, they put a torch to her before making their escape. The crew of the Lady Charlotte held out a tad too long before attempting to burn her and taking to their boats. The pursuing rebels were in time to put out the flames and take a few prisoners.

Little is known about the role of the Lady Stanley in this engagement. Rebel sources state she was poorly armed and offered no resistance. British sources state she was burned during the defense of the island.

With their position under fire, the loss of three tenders, numbers greatly reduced by disease, and no suitable supply of water, the British decided the island was no longer tenable. On July 11, they moved to a new base of operations, St. George's Island at the mouth of the Potomac River.17

At St. George's, once again a threatening rebel force began to collect on the mainland opposite, and the supply of water proved insufficient.18 On July 22, to obtain additional water as well as raid, tenders accompanied naval vessels up the Potomac. After filling water casks, skirmishing with the enemy, and burning the house of a rebel colonel, the expedition pushed up-river to the vicinity of Mount Vernon where a shore party brought off three of George Washington's
servants. On the 27th, the squadron returned to St. George's in time to assist in fending off an ill-advised rebel attack.

By this time, though still within close proximity to the main force, some tenders seemingly acted independently. As of July 15, Wayland was cruising off Smiths Island, Potomac River. There, having already taken a sloop belonging to Joseph White and another craft, Wayland took the boat of Moses Yell. According to Yell, Wayland wanted the mast from his boat to replace one on the sloop which he intended to turn into a tender with four four-pounders and twelve swivel guns, "to guard the Islands and keep the Shirt Men from going on to abuse the Inhabitants." Before this could be done, however, Wayland received orders from Dunmore to rejoin the fleet, with the result that after burning the sloop and second prize, he returned the boat to Yell who only suffered the loss of some clothes and about forty shillings.

Despite the ugliness of some loyalists' conduct, both Yell's account and another left by Joseph Mariman, Yells' mate, show Wayland's actions to have been not only gentlemanly, but even kind and considerate. Mariman stated:

they [Wayland] then asked him [Mariman] from whence he came, and what he had in, his answer was they had Plank and Tar, they were from Potomack loaded in Hunger river and bound to Potomack again. Wheeland then asked this Deponent if he did not belong to the fleet; this Deponent ask'd what fleet? they answered the English fleet, this deponent answered he did not, he then asked him, who he was for, either the Country or the King, this deponent told him he did not choose to intermeddle with either side, he then asked him how many men he had on board, this deponent told him there was but one person besides himself, he then asked him, this deponent if he were a Tory or not, he then told him he could not tell, the said Joseph Wheeland then told him he belonged to the English fleet and he must go along with him, he then asked him if he was willing to stay with the fleet, he then told him the said Wheeland no, for he had a wife and children, and wanted to get home as soon as possible, the said Wheeland said he would not detain any person that had a family against their will, but if they had no family they should not goe, he then asked him for some victuals for he was very Hungry. He then ordered him to get in the Canoe with the Mulatto fellow Lazarus and go up to the three Schooners that lay in the Creek, and tell some person to give him some victuals, and while he was giving orders, there came two other persons in a Canoe with a Case of Gin & Rum and gave him a dram.
Although Wayland was fast earning a reputation in the northern part of the Bay, time was already running out. In late July, Wayland, in a small schooner with three other men, was taken in a creek off Hooper's Strait by a party of thirty rebels. Stripped of his clothes, he was sent to Annapolis where the Council of Safety confined him on charges of supplying Dunmore's fleet and burning White's sloop. On September 10, the investigating committee reported its findings, and on the 12th, they sentenced Wayland to imprisonment in a log jail at Frederick, Maryland, until he paid for White's vessel and posted bond for good behavior. As of October 28, he was still naked in the jail at Annapolis where he feared for his life daily, and having no money to purchase new clothes, he requested those taken from him be returned. At some point, Wayland's father secured his release by posting bond and paying damages. Shortly after, however, new charges were leveled, and Wayland was again imprisoned. This time, he would remain so, often chained hand and foot, for four years. While in captivity, the rebels burned his house, forcing his wife and children, who barely escaped the conflagration, to survive on the charity of friends.

Also in July, William Goodrich reemerged. His specific activities between taking the Molly and this time are unknown beyond his having commanded a tender. Billie had made his joining Dunmore somewhat conditional on the Governor's supplying him with a suitable vessel. Although it took a while for Dunmore to address the issue, at some point during the month he sent Goodrich, now in the Lady Susan, to Bermuda to purchase an eighteen-gun brig. Had William been successful, such a vessel would have added some serious weight to the Governor's position. As it was, no such vessel was available, and young Goodrich decided to give up and return home. Three days out at six a.m. on July 27, a strange sail was sighted to windward, and the Lady Susan went to investigate. Too late, William discovered her to be the sixteen-gun
Continental Brig *Lexington*, Captain John Barry, and about nine a.m., the hunter became the hunted. By noon, the two vessels were within range of each other, and a running fight commenced, the *Lexington* with her bow chase guns in play, and Billy replying with a three-pounder firing from a cabin window and occasionally with the after battery guns when he yawed a bit to bring them into action. By 2:30, the *Lexington* managed to come up with the *Lady Susan*, at which time, being horribly outgunned and outmanned, William struck his colors.  

As prisoners, William's crew received the option of remaining so or joining the rebels, and much to Billie's disgust, seven of the ten white crewmen (the eight black seamen were not offered the opportunity) chose to switch sides. One of these men was Richard Dale who entered as a midshipman on the rebel brig. Seemingly, despite his earlier promise to himself after being wounded, it required one more cruise and action on a loyalist vessel to persuade him fully. Despite the fact Dale's conduct could only be described as highly treasonous by the standards under which the Goodriches had been judged, his actions never appear to have been questioned. As for William, despite the general rebel opinion of family members, he was warmly greeted by Barry and well treated while in his custody at sea. He was carried to Philadelphia. There, treated as "a thief or a Robber" rather than a prisoner of war, his deposition was recorded, and he was placed in close confinement in the state prison where he was not allowed to speak to anyone.

For Dunmore, by the end of July, the situation at St. George's, and with the fleet in general, had worsened. Sickness had taken its toll on manpower. There was no reliable source of water and there was a general lack of other necessities for what, by then, amounted to 1,000 loyalist noncombatants representing hundreds of families, in addition to troops and seamen. Furthermore, rebel opposition, in the
form of both warships and militia, increased regularly. The island was simply no longer a suitable base for operations. In addition, the naval personnel, while sticking it out, were heartily tired of raiding, a form of warfare they considered beneath their dignity. Also, shepherding the civilian fleet diverted ships needed elsewhere. Even worse, naval personnel, already limited in number and suffering the same effects from sickness as everyone else, were required to assist in manning the numerous civilian craft due to a general shortage of mariners. In light of all these factors, making the outlook bleak at best, Dunmore decided at last to release his grip on Virginia. On August 5, the fleet cleared the Virginia Capes. Upon doing so, it split into groups bound for Halifax, St. Augustine, England, Bermuda, and the West Indies.

Of the Goodriches, only Bridger remained at large. Nothing specific is known of his activities between early June and the time the loyalists departed, but affairs were about to catch up with him. There are also few details regarding his capture first reported on September 16 and again on September 18. Having assumed command of the prize ship Molly during the evacuation, Bridger was, by one account, under orders from Dunmore to carry 15,000 bushels of wheat to Halifax. Another source indicates his destination was Bermuda. Wherever he was bound, Bridger was taken by Captain Nicholas Biddle in the Continental Brig Andrew Doria and carried to Philadelphia where he joined William in prison. There, the brothers endured hardships similar to other confined loyalists. In November, Billie formally complained to the President of the Continental Congress that some money he had received had been taken from him, leaving nothing to send to his parents or with which purchase necessary articles such as winter clothing for himself and his brother. In December, the two were sent to Baltimore. Upon their arrival on the 21st, Congress ordered the brothers to be
imprisoned in the jail. They were to receive only provisions and arti-
cles of absolute necessity while awaiting the Congress's pleasure. All
the Goodriches were accounted for under lock and key. Rebel mariners
and merchants could rest easy, at least for a while.\textsuperscript{49}

It is impossible to determine exactly how many tenders sailed
for Dunmore during 1775 and 1776, and of these, how many were owned,
commanded, and/or manned by loyalists. Nor is it possible to arrive at
the precise figure of how many loyalists served on such vessels.
Still, all indications are the numbers were fairly considerable, and
some respectable minimum figures can be derived. Whatever the numbers,
these "base" and "deluded wretches," "scoundrel"s, "Marauders,"
"Villain"s, "pirates," and "hell-hounds,"\textsuperscript{50} (so styled by the rebels)
with widely varied backgrounds and motives, caused serious trouble for
the revolutionaries and inflicted considerable damage to their trade.

Seventeen vessels have been identified as tenders commanded and
manned by loyalists. Vessels and/or captains not cited previously were
the sloop \textit{Lord North}, Charles McDonald, the sloop \textit{Lady Gower}, John
Wilkie, the sloop \textit{Lady Augusta}, Lowes, and a schooner, Hugh Miller.\textsuperscript{51}
There was also the Governor's flagship, the \textit{Dunmore}, commanded by
James Lowes.\textsuperscript{52} Then, there was a troopship \textit{Dunmore} (possibly the same
vessel), under John Buchanan and the prize turned storeship, \textit{Molly}, at
one time commanded by James Ridley.\textsuperscript{53} In addition, there were the
schooner \textit{Fanny}, and sloops \textit{Lord Howe} and \textit{Edward}, under contract to the
Governor from Bartlet Goodrich. Finally, though under naval authority,
the \textit{Edward}, the brigantine/schooner \textit{Betsey}, and the sloop \textit{Fincastle}
(after the transfer of command from Robert Stewart to Lieutenant
Wright) had at least some loyalist personnel aboard.\textsuperscript{54}
There were undoubtedly other tenders with loyalist associations. At a time in early May after three of the seventeen had been captured or lost, and at least one other, Bartlet's, was elsewhere, the rebels reported a total of twenty-one in the harbor at Norfolk alone. One of these was the Fincastle, then under naval command, and probably a few others were under naval control as well. Still, after taking these vessels into account, and the fact others, both loyalist and naval, were undoubtedly at sea, the figure indicates an even greater number of loyalist tenders were under Dunmore's authority.  

Of the seventeen vessels, the type, in terms of rig, is known for fifteen. Clearly indicating a preference for small, fast, easily handled vessels, suitable for close inshore employment, there were ten sloops (one a pink) and five schooners. The small size is further indicated by the armament carried by nine of the sloops, two schooners, and one of the untyped vessels. Apart from the Stewarts' atypical sloop, relatively heavily armed with between eight and ten cannon, and the radically polarized untyped vessel and one of the schooners with only small arms, all mounted between two and six carriage guns. The known weight of metal of these weapons was light, all being only two or three-pounders. At least three of the sloops and one schooner carried swivel guns as well, numbering six per vessel where known. The same schooner also mounted a cohorn. In keeping with this basic trend, a reference to an unidentified tender (perhaps one already included in the count) describes her as mounting two carriage guns and twelve swivels. Also, late in the campaign, Wayland planned to fit out a prize sloop with four four-pound carriage guns and twelve swivels.

A word is in order on the relative sizes of the various types of vessels in terms of tonnage. For sloops, twenty to twenty-five tons was considered small, forty to fifty tons was medium, and vessels up
to one-hundred tons were large. Schooner sizes roughly mirrored those of sloops. Comparatively larger were brigs. Sizes for this type ranged from thirty or forty tons to one-hundred and eighty tons, with examples in the sixty to one-hundred ton range being typical. Snows generally averaged slightly larger than brigs with ninety to one-hundred and twenty ton versions being the norm. Ships were larger yet, and with tonnage running from forty to four-hundred tons, they offered the widest differences in size. One-hundred to two-hundred and fifty-ton ships, however, were the more common.  

Compared to regular men-of-war, the crews of these vessels were rather diminutive as well. Still, a respectable number of loyalist mariners served on them. The compliments of eight of the seventeen are known with numbers ranging from a schooner with roughly ten men to a sloop with as many as twenty-four. In addition, at the lower end of the scale, there was a sloop with eleven men. Towards the higher end were an unidentified tender and John Collett's, both with sixteen seamen. In between were two sloops, each with fifteen crewmen and another with fourteen.  

Two additional figures exist for the crew of the sloop Lady Susan. In June, when under Bridger Goodrich's command, her compliment was twenty men. In late July, with William Goodrich as captain, her crew consisted of nineteen men. These numbers are not included in the eight for the following reasons. The sloop with twenty-four men was that commanded by Bridger at Hobb's Hole in April. Though unidentified, this vessel was probably the Lady Susan which Bridger is known to have been in command of shortly after. Consequently, in all subsequent calculations, erring on the side of caution in an effort to avoid duplicating crews, the three figures will be considered to represent the same crew on the same tender. Furthermore, for ease of discussion, this vessel will be referred to as the Lady Susan. Accepting
these three figures represent the crew of the Lady Susan at different periods, then it is interesting to note that the size of her complement actually decreased a bit over time. The first and more serious reduction, from twenty-four to twenty, may well reflect the casualties sustained in the Hobb's Hole fight. The second decrease, however, from twenty to nineteen, is really of little, if any, consequence.⁶⁸

Regarding the other tenders, generally, it is safe to say the crew of one vessel does not overlap with that of another thus duplicating the number. In other words, for the most part, the figures represent distinctly separate bodies of men. The tenders in question appear to have stayed in service for the duration or until captured at which time there was no exchange of prisoners. There is, however, one exception that needs to be taken into account. This involves the men of the Lively. Though lost at Gwynn's, her crew managed to escape. Having done so, it seems likely they entered on other vessels, perhaps other tenders. Consequently, again erring on the side of caution to avoid a duplication of crews, in the following calculations a multiplier of sixteen rather than seventeen tenders will be used.

Accepting these figures offer a representative sample, working with an average number of twenty-one men for the Lady Susan, an average crew size of fifteen men can be derived.⁶⁹ This average coincides neatly with the mid-range figures in the sample, showing they are not skewed. If the average numbers are projected by multiplying by sixteen, then no less than 240 loyalists served on these tenders.

In addition, there are figures for three captured but unidentified tenders, two of which had a combined number of about fifty men, and the other, eighteen.⁷⁰ Though the figure of fifty is not exact, for the sake of this study it will be used to represent the total number of men on the first two vessels. It need be noted that being unidentified, they might be the same as vessels already included in the seven-
teen. They are not, however, the same as the three vessels with the largest crews, the two with the smallest, or the Fincastle (when commanded by Stewart), the Lively, or the Lady Stanley, for which the crew sizes are not recorded. These eight tenders were taken at other times and places or were not taken at all. Furthermore, given there were obviously more than seventeen loyalist tenders total, it seems highly unlikely the three vessels in question were the same as the three of the nine remaining for whom crew size has been reported. Whether they represent duplicates or not, one thing is clear. Considering the additional figures all date to the later half of July, when compared to the proportionately greater number of small crews to large at an earlier date, they reflect a higher ratio of larger compliments. In other words, the crew sizes of loyalist tenders appear to have generally increased late in the period. Of course, this trend supports that an additional number of loyalist mariners joined Dunmore as the campaign progressed. Perhaps the figures reflect an influx of individuals from Maryland as the Governor's fleet moved up the Bay.

If the three unidentified vessels were the same as three others included in the seventeen, but for which the crew sizes have not been counted, the average number of sailors per tender late in the period rose to seventeen. This is actually a conservative figure considering later, larger crew sizes are averaged with smaller ones from earlier. In essence, if the crews of an earlier date conformed to the trend of increased size, the resulting average would be even higher. When extrapolated by multiplying by sixteen, a total figure of 272 men is derived. If the three tenders were additional vessels, then the average of seventeen multiplied by nineteen, the new number of representative vessels, results in a total of 323 loyalist seamen.

Supporting the median figures and an increase in crew size is an alternative approach. Of the eleven tenders with known crew size (in-
cluding the three unidentified vessels), for four, the figures predate the evacuation of Norfolk. The two more are from the time of the occupation of Gwynn's Island. Four represent the weeks in Maryland waters.

For the crew representing the Lady Susan, there are figures for all three periods. The averages for both the first and second periods are sixteen men per vessel. While slightly higher than the earlier fifteen men per tender, the figure is, nevertheless, close. This figure of sixteen is also slightly skewed upwards, because the smallest crew recorded actually falls within the third time frame, where, when averaged in, actually still skews that average down. The average crew size for the last group is nineteen men per vessel. All in all, these figures are both comparable with those established earlier and reflect an increase in crew size.

An additional figure can be added to the totals. The compliment of the Governor's flagship, the Dunmore, consisted of thirty-one individuals. When this is added to the lowest number derived, a total of 271 men is obtained. When added to the highest, a total of 354 is arrived at. Also, three additional figures exist, representing partial crews of four loyalist tenders. These can not be added to the numbers just stated because all four vessels have already been factored in with the seventeen when discerning the averages. They do, however, account for known, documented crewmen. In July, Mariman, as Wayland's prisoner, claimed seeing parts of the crews of three schooners, in all, about twenty men, ten of which, after deleting the ten from Wayland's crew already counted, can be added in. In addition, roughly seven loyalists can be identified on the Lilly, and the seven slave mariners belonging to the Stewarts can be added as well. Finally, Captains Miller, Picket, Forsyth, McDonald, Younghusband, and Robert Stewart can be factored in. The bottom line is that actual known crew members on loyalist warships totaled 250. Exclusive of the crew of the
Dunmore (technically not a tender) and five of the captains who are the sole representatives of five obviously larger crews, 214 loyalists remain associated with only twelve of at least seventeen and quite possibly twenty tenders. This figure conforms well to the averaged and projected figures which, though admittedly rough, safely and conservatively support that no less than about 275 Tory mariners saw active duty on loyalist commanded tenders with Dunmore, and quite possibly as many as 325 served on such craft.

These figures do not include those loyalists who served on the twenty additional identified tenders, active at different times, under direct naval command. There were only six naval vessels that spent any time in the Virginia theater assisting Dunmore. While the crews of these six were relatively large, they were of a finite number required for the effective and efficient handling of the vessels. Only so many could be spared for duty on auxiliary craft. At the same time, naval personnel were increasingly reduced by illness. Sickness aboard the Otter was described as "epidemick," and many died. The logs and journals of these vessels contain a number of references to sailors who had "Departed this life." Hamond was particularly concerned about personnel losses due to the sicknesses that ravaged the fleet. Other mariners certainly became casualties or were taken prisoner. Crewmen were at a premium; so much so that Hammond was quite worried at one point upon hearing Squire intended fitting out an additional tender for the Otter, believing it would weaken her compliment too much. The situation was dire enough to warrant the occasional transfer of crewmen from one naval vessel to another to make up differences. To make up the losses and man their auxiliary craft, the navy supplemented their crews with local talent. Unfortunately, figures indicating to what degree loyalists were relied on are lacking. Still, there are some references supporting that they were employed. The crew of Sla-
ter's *Betsey* were pressed as were two men from another merchantman and three from a third.\(^{85}\) The *Finca...l crew and, there were two blacks who were not naval personnel on the *Betsey* with Slater at the time of her capture.\(^{86}\) The sloop-tender *Edward* also had some black seamen aboard during the Baltimore expedition as did the *Hawk* and another of the *Otter*'s tenders.\(^{87}\) Slave John King spent time on H.M. Sloop *King Fisher* before being returned to his owner, John Goodrich, Sr.\(^{88}\) All indications are that a fair number of additional loyalists served on naval vessels at this time.

This leads to another related topic. A high proportion of some loyalist crews and the total number of loyalist sailors as well, were black. Of the combined crews on the Baltimore foray, twelve to fourteen were Negroes.\(^{89}\) Later, four were on the *Edward* when she was captured, and there were six on the *Samuel* when she took the *Molly*.\(^{90}\) At least five served between the *Hawk* and another of the *Otter*'s tenders.\(^{91}\) In April, the twenty-four man crew of Bridger Goodrich's tender was described as being comprised mostly of slaves, and later, there were eight blacks with the *Lady Susan* when captured.\(^{92}\) The mulatto, Lazarus served with Wayland, and the slave Caesar acted as pilot on a tender.\(^{93}\) Then there were the Stewart's seven slave mariners and the two men who served on the *Betsey*.\(^{94}\) George Mills ran away to serve at sea as well.\(^{95}\) Three or four blacks made up a part of the *Lilly*’s small crew when John Goodrich, Sr. was taken.\(^{96}\) One of the two tenders of unknown type had a crew of sixteen including two Negroes, and in the other, Collett's, fifteen of the sixteen men were of that same race.\(^{97}\) Finally, there were no less than twenty-five serving on the *Dunmore*, men and women.\(^{98}\)

When added up, no less than eighty-two black mariners are accounted for. It is, however, impossible to derive a solid percentage
of black to white seamen on loyalist tenders. The available figures are simply too few, small, varied, and unrelated. Efforts to attain such a figure were made from nine different angles, two of which proved so convoluted they are of dubious value. As to the other seven, first, the total number of actually accounted for loyalist mariners, 266 (including thirteen known to have been on naval tenders plus John King, Caesar, and George Mills), was compared with the total number of known black mariners. Next, the total number of loyalist sailors on loyalist commanded vessels, 250, was compared with the total number of blacks, sixty-eight, serving on like craft. For the Samuel, the figures fifteen and six were used. These represent the total compliment on the Baltimore raid and the six blacks reported on her a little over a week after her return from that operation. Then, the same was done after deleting the six white and twenty-five black crew members on the flagship, Dunmore. She was not technically a tender, and the high ratio of blacks in the crew tends to skew results. Following this, the percentage of Negroes relative to the entire compliment was examined for five vessels for which both figures are established. This entailed seventy-six whites and thirty-two blacks. Finally, the total number of blacks, forty-two, known to have made up parts of the crews of seven tenders, was averaged to achieve a number of six per vessel. This figure was, in turn, compared for three median crew sizes, fifteen, seventeen, and nineteen, derived for loyalist tenders. The results, were 31%, 27%, 20%, 42% 40%, 35%, and 32%, receptively. Clearly, this offers too wide a spread to tell anything definite, but all figures do indicate the ratio of blacks to whites was fairly high. Of course the percentages, as indicated by specific numbers, varied considerably between vessels, but it seems safe to say that overall, perhaps one third of the total number of loyalist mariners serving Dunmore were black.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine how many of these blacks were free men and how many were slaves. Furthermore, of the slaves, it is impossible to discern how many were runaways taking advantage of Dunmore's proclamation, and how many served under the control of their owners simply because they were slaves. The only reference found to a free black was Pompey White, captured on the Edward.99 Three of his crewmates, however, were slaves, and the general evidence supports a high percentage of other blacks were still or had recently been in bondage.100 Certainly John King and Caesar were slaves as were the Stewart's seven men, two on an unidentified loyalist tender, at least some on Collett's, and three on the naval tender, Hawk.101 Perhaps slaves Mike, Harry, and Aberdeen, who shared the Williamsburg jail with their owner, Goodrich, were the same blacks taken on the Lilly.102 "Thomas Saunders, John Lucy, John Pomp, Samuel Sawood, Jack Masson, Charles Mills, Chance, and Jeffery," captured on the Lady Susan, were slaves as well.103 This last vessel and crew are noteworthy, because it appears Dunmore purchased four men specifically for service on her.104 Only George Mills, Aaron, and Johnny, can be confirmed as runaways, although there were undoubtedly others.105 In any case, Dunmore's reliance on black personnel was repugnant in the extreme to the revolutionaries. Concerning the Governor's policy, one rebel called it "Damned, infernal, [and] Diabolical."106 Another stated: "Hell itself could not have vomited anything more black."107 Despite such viewpoints, black mariners with Dunmore seem to have performed the same yeoman service many would on loyalist privateers later in the conflict.

Many loyalists, at least in the maritime community, appear to have been of an opposite mindset regarding blacks. They do not seem to have been bothered in the least by the idea of black sailors, or serving alongside them. Others with Dunmore were apparently little trou-
bled by associating with blacks as well which offended rebel proprieties. Arriving at Gwynn's, the loyalists, "on their evening after landing amused themselves with a promiscuous ball, in which a certain spruce little gentleman opened with one of the black ladies."108

Furthermore, considering the situation, loyalists must have known the possibility of losing their slaves was very real, but retaining possession of them does not seem to have been a high priority. In fact, the Stewart brothers would free their slave mariners.109 This is not to say all these loyalists viewed blacks as equals. In an account of his capture, William Goodrich failed to acknowledge the eight slaves with him as full crew members.110 Still, the practice of relying on black tars would be widely embraced by loyalist privateersmen, especially on vessels with southern and West Indian affiliations.

Actually, even less is known about the backgrounds of the white loyalist crewmen. Though serving before the mast, James Gilchrist of Norfolk, with associates such as St. George Tucker, undoubtedly fell into the category of gentleman adventurer.111 Fifteen white crewmen taken on two tenders in December were referred to as "Americans."112 Another reference concerns the crews of three schooners under Wayland's command in July. A captive reported encountering about twenty of these individuals who he described as all "Country born" but one.113 These two sources tend to support the conclusion that the majority of the mariners with Dunmore were natives, but the reference to one man of foreign birth does indicate the possible presence of an occasional mercenary outsider. As with the blacks, it is also apparent that at this time, not all white seamen acted on their own free will or were firm in their political convictions. As noted, some on naval vessels had been pressed. Most telling is the fact that when given the opportunity, seven of the ten white crewmen on the Lady Susan opted to join the rebels. While perhaps some made this decision to avoid imprison-
ment, it would appear there was a mercenary tendency or considerable indecision among Billie's sailors as well. Dale certainly had some trouble making up his mind.

Other Tory seamen, however, were clearly strong supporters of the King. Of the eleven men comprising Bartlet's crew at the time of seizure, only one protested his captivity, and was allowed to go free. Gilchrist, though unhappy with the state of affairs in general and his own situation in particular, was nevertheless resigned and stalwart in his convictions. After a two month cruise on the Finca-

I assure you I am heartily wearied of this Life of amphibious War

Marmaduke Mister was another loyalist mariner whose political opinions and solid stance are known. Mister was one of Wayland's crewmen at the time Moses Yell was briefly held captive. Yell recounted a conversa-

Mister ask'd this Deponant who he was for, whether King or Country this Deponant answer'd he was Friend to every person who behav'd well the afsd Mr then commanded in the King's Name to tell him the Truth this Deponant then told him he was born in this Country and had a Right to defend his Liberty, Mister then said what these damn'd Rebels call Liberty I call Slavery, & so the people will find it.

While many of these loyalist tars seem to have acted in a volun-
teer capacity, thus reflecting their sincere political stance, those mariners signing articles on vessels which Dunmore had officially taken into government service received pay. While the amount for the ratings is unknown, Captain John Forsyth received £0.4.6 per day. It seems unlikely, however, that the prospect of wages was a serious incentive overriding personal ideologies. On the contrary, the opposite must have been true. In essence, it is doubtful the pay for common
seamen amounted to much, and if money was a consideration, a mariner could make an equivalent sum elsewhere with less hardship and risk.

The tenders known to have been commanded and manned by loyalists suffered relatively heavy losses. Ten were captured or destroyed in action with the rebels. The circumstances, however, of the loss of seven are known and of interest. Only one was taken in a ship-to-ship action. The other six were all seized because they had become trapped (two were aground) in waterways or harbors, in which they were taken by parties from shore. An eleventh was wrecked and her crew captured after making it to land. In other words, the known situations of losses do not reflect an inability or unwillingness to fight. Rather, it seems these men had the common sense to realize that discretion was the better part of valor.¹¹⁹

These losses were, however, more than balanced by the effect the tenders had on the rebels. One effect was to force Virginia and Maryland to spend considerable time, effort, and money to create their own navies to meet the threat and protect commerce and coastlines.¹²⁰ In turn, these efforts diverted manpower and materials that might have been better used elsewhere. In November, 1775, with matters heating up in Virginia, Richard Henry Lee emphasized the need for a rebel naval force in the Bay.¹²¹ By December, although not constituting a formal navy, militia under Richard and James Baron were sailing armed vessels out of Hampton, Virginia.¹²² At the same time, the Convention considered a proposal to establish a regular naval force to protect shipping and repulse enemy raids. On January 11, 1776, the resolution passed.¹²³

While Virginia considered its proposal in December, Maryland purchased a merchantman to convert into a man-of-war. Named the Defence, she would be ready for sea by March, in time to help ward off Squire's attempted attack on Baltimore.¹²⁴ In the interim, while the two colonies prepared their nascent seagoing forces, the rebels in-
tended that vessels of the Continental Navy, authorized by Congress in October, would fill in. A Continental squadron was, in fact, ordered to the Bay to confront Dunmore, but, having sailed in February, it never reached there, opting instead to raid New Providence in the Bahamas. Virginia and Maryland were on their own. Of course, building a navy takes time, and neither state was in full swing by the time Dunmore gave up his hold on the region, and Dunmore's fleet certainly maintained naval superiority throughout the period of its presence. Yet, the gradual build-up and very presence of the rebel warships was a deterrent to Dunmore's movements and activities. Late in the campaign, Dunmore, himself, said the rebels "have actually drove all our Tenders up to the Fleet", and Captain Hammond did "not think it safe to trust one of His Majesty's Sloops alone in the Bay." Given their propensity for raiding ashore, the tenders occupied the attention of Virginia and Maryland rebels in another way. Untold numbers of men in militia and colonial military units were required to focus their energies on attempts to foil loyalist aggression. Of course, this expended even more manpower, funds, and materials.

Most importantly though, for roughly a year, British and loyalist craft thoroughly disrupted the trade of the two colonies and at times, brought it to a complete standstill. In general, the loyalist and naval tenders' effectiveness was confirmed by Dunmore's reports. As early as January 9, 1776, he reported that the blockade was working well enough to drive up prices in Virginia. On February 15, he commented that the tenders brought in prizes from New England daily. These vessels had come for cargoes of flour and grain for the rebel army. Their loss prevented them from supplying that force with needed provisions. As of early March, the Governor reported tenders had taken or destroyed nearly thirty prizes. The tenders' success impressed Hammond as well. Even the rebels admitted, "there were so
many tenders crusing upon the coast...that it is almost impossible for any vessel to escape them.  

As with the numbers of tenders and crewmen, it is impossible to assess the total number of prizes taken by loyalist associated vessels, but again some respectable minimum figures can be determined. A total of twenty-five prizes can be credited to specific loyalist commanded and manned tenders acting either independently or in consort with naval vessels. In conjunction, the Samuel and Edward (the latter being Goodrich owned with loyalist crewmen) seized four or five additional prizes at the mouth of the Patapsco on the Baltimore expedition, but they were quickly retaken. One of these was the ship Molly, later captured again by William Goodrich and included in the count of twenty-five. The Edward also seized at least one prize on her own. Also, the Fincastle with loyalist crewmen took three more. A rebel newspaper account lists eight additional prizes which do not match any of those already mentioned or any known to have been taken by the navy. Then, the Goodrich owned Lord Howe while under naval command captured six more either by herself or while in consort with other naval vessels. Also, a list of prizes condemned and sold under the authority of Dunmore's admiralty court includes five vessels whose captors are not listed or known. As mentioned earlier, this is a problematic document requiring some care when using. Still, it is fairly good (though not infallible) in denoting those prizes taken by naval vessels or their tenders. Consequently, it is possible these five were taken by loyalists craft as well. A problem, however, remains with including these in the count. Some might represent duplicates of others already factored in. Finally, unidentified tenders seized at least four more rebel vessels. In any case, tenders with loyalist affiliations took at least forty-six enemy bottoms and possibly as many as fifty-five. To put this in perspective, by comparison,
the navy can be firmly credited with another fifty-two.\textsuperscript{143} In addition, there is a reference to another prize sloop taken by the navy, but it is possible she is a duplicate of one included in the fifty-two.\textsuperscript{144} A final prize was run aground by the navy during the course of the chase, could not be got off, and so, only her cargo was seized.\textsuperscript{145} When totaled, at least 102 prizes are known to have been taken by Dunmore's forces. If the six treated as possible duplicates were not, and the vessel that ran aground is included, then the total rises to 109. Of the loyalist associated prizes, only six or seven, inclusive of the three or four on the Patapsco, are known to have been recaptured by the rebels.\textsuperscript{146} Of the loyalist tenders' forty-six prizes, the type is known for thirty-four. These included one brigantine, two brigs, two ships, twelve schooners, and seventeen sloops.\textsuperscript{147} Two of these were French.\textsuperscript{148} The possible additional five on Dunmore's list consisted of one brig and four sloops.\textsuperscript{149} The only prize for which a value is known is the sloop \textit{Liberty} taken by Forsyth. Dunmore, himself, purchased her at auction for £295. In terms of the number of vessels taken, loyalist mariners under Dunmore took their toll of enemy shipping.\textsuperscript{150}

These men also made their mark seizing important cargoes of provisions, textiles, medicines, munitions, and arms, necessary for the rebel war effort. In turn, there can be little doubt these commodities were put to good use by their captors. Of the forty-six prizes, the cargoes are reported for twenty-two (exclusive of the recaptures). Two were in ballast.\textsuperscript{151} Four more carried shipments which, although probably valuable as prize goods (one was loaded with tobacco, another, logwood and mahogany, and a third, molasses and coffee), do not fall within the category discussed, and at this point their loss could not have had much effect on the rebel economy.\textsuperscript{152} As to the remaining sixteen, five carried provisions consisting of Indian corn, corn, flour, wheat, bread, cider, cheese, potatoes, and pork.\textsuperscript{153} By one account, the
cargo of one of these, the ship Molly, consisted of 1,900 barrels of flour and bread and 5,000 bushels of wheat.\textsuperscript{154} By another, her lading was 838 barrels of flour and 15,000 bushels of wheat.\textsuperscript{155} Either figure represents a considerable loss. One of these same vessels also transported barrel staves, necessary for the proper storage of food and supplies.\textsuperscript{156} Another prize was in the process of running in a large shipment of medicines when taken, and yet another had a small quantity of the same.\textsuperscript{157} The latter of these and two more carried textiles.\textsuperscript{158} These same three also transported gunpowder as did four others.\textsuperscript{159} Two of these last four carried arms as well, and one shipped saltpeter and sulfur.\textsuperscript{160} All told, loyalists were involved in seizing at least 535 barrels and seventy-four half barrels of gunpowder on these prizes as well as 315 stands of arms.\textsuperscript{161} The rebel press reported the loss of three additional vessels bringing in munitions and weapons whose seizure is attributed to loyalists.\textsuperscript{162} While failing to state the amount of gunpowder, the account does offer the remarkable figure of 5,000 stands of arms being taken.\textsuperscript{163} Losses of this nature indicate loyalist mariners put a serious crimp in the rebel war effort. These, however, could not compare with the damage loyalist privateers would do later.

Perhaps of more significance is the fact that loyalist mariners had begun to prove their value in a conflict involving a guerre de course. While the Royal Navy, then and later, would often hold a dim and skeptical view of loyalist potential at sea, at least some naval officers who served with provincial mariners at this time came to esteem their worth. Some strong loyalist/navy bonds were established, especially with Squire and Hamond, that would last in the years to come.

During 1775 and 1776, a significant number of loyalist mariners showed their support of government by coming forth to serve on a relatively large number of tenders. For their efforts, they lost a large
proportion of vessels and crews. At the same, however, they seriously
disrupted rebel trade by seizing a larger number of their merchantmen.
Furthermore, some of the prizes shipped materials specifically needed
by rebel military forces. Through this and forcing the Virginians and
Marylanders to take measures to counter their operations, the loyal-
ists negatively affected rebel war aims.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 5

1Captain Andrew Snape Hamond to Clinton, May 4, 1776, in Clark,
NDAR, 4:1408.

2Journal, H.M.S. Roebuck, Captain Andrew Snape Hamond, May 26,
1776, Richard Henry Lee to Landon Carter, May 24, 1776, Purdie's Vir-
ginia Gazette, May 24, and June 14, 1776, Journal, Otter, May 22-25,
1776, Dunmore to Germain, June 26, 1776, Examination of [James] Cun-
ningham, July 18, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:223, 240, 242, 258-259,
535, 756, 1135; and Andrew Snape Hamond's Account of His Part in the
American Revolution, May 19-27, 1776, Hamond Naval Papers, vol. 2/
book 2/[pp. 5-8 of unnumbered MS.], University of Virginia Library.

3Memorial of Slater, PRO, A013/32/S; and Report and Decree for
Brigantine Betsey (including Slater's Deposition), May 25, to June 11,
1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:476-478.

4Report and Decree for Betsey (including Slater's Deposition),
May 25, to June 11, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:476-478, 479-480.

5Ibid., 5:480; and Memorial of Slater, PRO, A013/32/S.

6Thomas Slater to Pennsylvania Committee of Safety, July 2, 1776,
in Morgan, NDAR, 5:878-879.

7Memorial of Slater, PRO, A013/32/S.

8Unidentified source quoted in Shomette, Pirates on the Chesa-
apeake, p. 256; Review of Wayland's claim, PRO, A012/101/141; Memorial
of Wayland, PRO, A013/40/251; and An Estimate of the Lands & other Ef-
fects of Joseph Wayland, True Copy, December 30, 1784, PRO,
A013/40/253.

9Memorial of Wayland, PRO, A013/40/251; Certificate of Jacob Eck-
steine for Joseph Wayland, December 30, 1784, PRO, A013/40/258; Depo-
sition of Moses Yell, July 27, 1776, in Archives of Maryland, 65 vols.
(Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1883-1952), vol. XII, Journal
and Correspondence of the Maryland Council of Safety, July 7, - Decem-
ber 31, 1776, ed., William Hand Browne, (1893), p. 155 (see also in
NDAR, 5:1247-1248); and Jameson, "Tory Operations," p. 381.
Hamond to Lieutenant John Wright, June 10, 1776, Hamond Naval Papers, 4/E/83, University of Virginia Library; and E. Johnson to Alexander Somerville, June 22, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:685.

Dunmore to Germain, June 26, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:757.

Memorial of Wayland, PRO, A013/40/251; Shomette, Pirates, pp. 256-257; Thomas Hayward to Maryland Council of Safety, June 25, 1776, William Adams to Matthew Tilghman, June 30, 1776, and Thomas Ennals to Maryland Council of Safety, July 2, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:742, 839, 885; and Edward Noel to Maryland Council of Safety, July 31, 1776, in Archives of Maryland, 12:151-152.

Hayward to Maryland Council of Safety, June 25, 1776, Adams to Tilghman, June 30, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:742, 839.


Purdie's Virginia Gazette, August 9, 1776, p. 3; and Dixon & Hunter's Virginia Gazette, August 17, 1776, p. 2. This was actually Lieutenant John Goodridge, Royal Navy, mistaken at the time for one of the Virginia family members. Disposition of His Majesty's Ships and Vessels in North America, Molyneux Shuldhman, July 6, 1776, Journal, Massachusetts Sloop Tyrannicide, Captain John Fisk, July 12, 1776, Boston Gazette, July 22, 1776, and editorial note, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:949, 1032, 1177, 1177 n. 3.

Hamond's Account, June 10, and July 9-11, 1776, Hamond Naval Papers, 2/2/[12, 16-20], University of Virginia Library; Purdie's Virginia Gazette, July 19, 1776, pp. 2-3; Petition of James Robinson, July 9, 1776, Journal, Roebuck, July 9 and 11, 1776, List of Ships, Dunmore's fleet, Extract of a letter from Williamsburg, Virginia, July 13, [1776], John Page to Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, July 13, 1776, Brigadier General Andrew Lewis to Richard Henry Lee, July 15, 1776, and Dunmore to Germain, July 31, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:993-994, 996, 1022, 1030, 1050, 1068, 1094, 1312; Affidavit of James Parker, Robert Gilmour, et. al., March 7, 1783, List of Vessels taken and Condemned, and Payments credited in Lord Dunmore's Accot., n.d., PRO, T1/580/115, 118, 129.


Hamond's Account, July 14-25, 1776, Hamond Naval Papers, 2/2/[23-26], University of Virginia Library; Master's Log, H.M.S. Roebuck, July 22-24, 1776, and Dunmore to Germain July 31, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:1194, 1250, 1313.

Deposition of Yell, in Archives of Maryland, 12:155-156.


Deposition of Mariman, in Archives of Maryland, 12:153.

Noel to Maryland Council of Safety, July 31, 1776, in Archives of Maryland, 12:151-152; and Brigadier General Henry Hooper to Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, July 30, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR 5:1296.


Abstract and extract, Proceedings, Convention of Maryland, September 10 and 12, 1776, in Calendar of Maryland State Papers, Executive Miscellanea, pp. 57, 58.

Petition of Wayland, in Archives of Maryland, 12:407-408; and Memorial of Wayland, PRO, AO13/40/251.

Memorial of Wayland, PRO, AO13/40/251.

Ibid.; Certificate of Ecksteine for Wayland, PRO, AO13/40/258.

Memorial of William Goodrich, PRO, AO13/95/G.


Ibid.

Ibid.


37 William Goodrich to John Goodrich, Jr., September 5, 1776, and same to Bridger and Bartlet Goodrich, [September 7, 1776], in Morgan, NDAR, 5:716, 741.


39 Hamond's Account, July 9, 1776, Hamond Naval Papers, 2/2/[16-21], University of Virginia Library; Examination of Cunningham, Dunmore to Germain, July 31, 1776, Hamond to Squire, July 31, 1776, and Diary of Miguel Antonio Eduardo, June 23, and July 28, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:1135, 1313-1314, 1315, 1344, 1347; and Hast Loyalism, p. 61.

40 Hamond to Hans Stanley, August 5, 1776, Hamond Naval Papers, Andrew Snape Hamond/Hans Stanley Correspondence, University of Virginia Library.

41 Hamond's Account, July 9, 1776, Hamond Naval Papers, 2/2/[19-21] University of Virginia Library; and Hamond to Dunmore, July 18, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:1139.

42 Hamond's Account, July 9, 1776, Hamond Naval Papers, 2/2/[19], University of Virginia Library.

43 Hamond's Account, July 29, and August 6, 1776, Hamond Naval Papers, 2/2/[26-28], University of Virginia Library; and Dunmore to Germain, July 31, 1776, Letter from a gentleman on the ship Logan, July 31, 1776, Diary of Eduardo, July 30, and August 4, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:1312-1313, 1316, 1348, 1349.

44 Newport Mercury, September 16, 1776 and Pennsylvania Journal, September 18, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 6:855, 895.

45 Newport Mercury, September 16, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:855.

46 Memorial of William Goodrich, PRO, AO13/95/G; and Chamberlayne to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, June 11, 1777, Fisher Transcripts, MS.360.3, Maryland Historical Society.

47 Newport Mercury, September 16, 1776 and Pennsylvania Journal, September 18, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 6:855, 895; and William Goodrich to the President of Congress, November 23, 1776, Papers of the Continental Congress, R95/i78/10/49, Library of Congress.


Cary to R. H. Lee, December 24, 1775, and Purdie's Virginia Gazette, December 30, 1775, and January 5, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 3:227, 307, 645; Dunlap's Maryland Gazette, March 19, 1776, and Extract of letter from North Carolina, April 22, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:413, 1209; Purdie's Virginia Gazette, May 31, 1776, Andrew Lewis to Richard Henry Lee, July 15, 1776, John West to the President of the Maryland Council of Safety, July 18, 1776, and Dixon & Hunter's Virginia Gazette, July 27, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:323, 1094, 1137-1138, 1249; Purdie's Virginia Gazette, July 19, 1776, p. 3; and Carter, Diary, April 24, 1776, 2:1025.

E. Johnson to Alexander Somerville, June 22, 1776, and List of Ships, Dunmore's fleet, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:685, 1022; Palmer, Loyalists, p. 606; and Wrike, Governor's Island, p. 117.

Wrike, Governor's Island, p. 116. This is quite possibly the same Lowes who commanded the Lady Augusta.

Return of Ships & Vessels taken into his Majesty's Service, July 1, 1776, PRO, ADM49/2/1; James Gilchrist to St. George Tucker, April 24, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:1242; and Deposition of Slater, in Report and Decree, John Barry vs. Sloop-Tender Edward, April 30, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:477-478, 1338.

Parker to Chas. Lee, [early May, 1776] Lee Papers, 2:5. The captured tenders previously cited were Collett's, an unidentified vessel lost in December, and the Lilly. Bartlet Goodrich was in the West Indies and would not return until early June.

The rigs of all the vessels in question have been previously referred to when the craft itself was cited. Therefore, this information will not be redocumented here. The sloops were the Lady Stanley, Lady Susan, Lilly, Samuel, Lord North, Lady Gower, Lady Augusta, Finchcastle, and those commanded by Picket and Bartlet Goodrich. The schooners included the three under Wayland's command, Miller's, and the Lively.

Virginia Committee of Safety to Maryland Delegates, December 29, 1775, Pinkney's Virginia Gazette, December 30, 1775, and Ships in Norfolk and Hampton Roads, in Clark, NDAR, 3:297, 307, 309; Examination of Wirt, and Extract of a letter from North Carolina, April 22, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:289, 1209; Johnson to Somerville, June 22, 1776, and Hooper to St. Thomas Jenifer, July 30, 1776, Morgan, NDAR, 5:685, 1296; Wrike, Governor's Island, p. 117; Return of Ships & Vessels, PRO, Adm49/2/1; and Purdie's Virginia Gazette, June 7, 1776, p. 3, and July 19, 1776, p. 3.

Examination of Wirt, in NDAR, 4:289; and Johnson to Somerville, June 22, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:685.

Ibid.; and Purdie's Virginia Gazette, June 7, 1776, p. 3, and July 19, 1776, p. 3.

Purdie's Virginia Gazette, July 19, 1776, p. 3.

Ibid.
Deposition of Yell, in *Archives of Maryland*, 12:155.


*Dixon & Hunter's Virginia Gazette*, June 8, 1776, p. 6.

_Purdie's Virginia Gazette_, December 22 and 29, 1775, Thomas Ludwell Lee to Richard Henry Lee, December 23, 1775, and Pinkney's _Virginia Gazette_, December 30, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 3:210, 219, 297, 307. Two additional accounts state there were seventeen men on Collett's tender. Erring on the side of caution, for this study, the lower figure is used. Pinkney's _Virginia Gazette_, December 23, 1775, and Cary to R. H. Lee, December 24, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 3:220, 227.

Examination of Wirt, in Clark, NDAR, 4:289; and Johnson to Somerville, June 22, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:685.

Carter, *Diary*, April 23, 1776, 2:1024; Johnson to Somerville, June 22, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:685; Extract of letter from Philadelphia, August 3, 1776, William Goodrich to Bridger and Bartlet Goodrich, [September 7, 1776], and Libel, Captain John Barry vs. Eight Negro Slaves, September 9, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 6:42, 741, 766. In the anonymous letter from Philadelphia, the figure of twenty-five white crewmen on the Lady Susan is greatly exaggerated. William Goodrich, a more reliable source, reported only eleven, including himself.

All figures are rounded off to the nearest full number.

_Purdie's Virginia Gazette_, July 27, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:1250; and _Purdie's Virginia Gazette_, July 19, 1776, p. 2. Despite the fact these three vessels are unidentified, they do not coincide with any known losses of tenders under naval command. Therefore, they must have been loyalist. One certainly had loyalist personnel aboard.

The seizure of the Lady Susan, Collett's vessel, the unidentified tender, Bartlet's sloop, the Lively, the Lady Stanley, and Wayland's schooner, have been previously related. The Stewart's Fincastle was not taken.

_Purdie's Virginia Gazette_, December 22 and 29, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 3:210, 297; Examination of Wirt, in Morgan, NDAR, 4:289; and Dixon & Hunter's *Virginia Gazette*, June 8, 1776, p. 6.

Johnson to Somerville, June 22, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:685.

Deposition of Mariman, in *Archives of Maryland*, 12:152, 154; Dixon & Hunter's *Virginia Gazette*, July 27, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:1250; and _Purdie's Virginia Gazette_, July 19, 1776, p. 2.
75 Carter, Diary, April 23, 1776, 2:1024; Johnson to Somerville, June 22, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:685; and William Goodrich to Bridger and Bartlet Goodrich September 7, 1776, and Libel, Barry vs. Eight Negro Slaves, September 9, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 6:741, 766.

76 Johnson to Somerville, June 22, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:685.

77 Deposition of Mariman, in Archives of Maryland, 12:154.


79 The known naval tenders were the sloops Betsey, Carolina (pink), Edward (pink), Fincastle (the same vessel as the Stewart's), Lady Charlotte, Lady Gage, Lord Howe, Maria, Pembroke, Ranger, and one, name unknown, the schooners Fanny, Gaze, Sandwich, and an unnamed schooner pilot boat, the brigantine/schooner Betsey, the pilot boat Hawk, the Dolphin and Spitfire of unknown type, and an unidentified vessel. Dunmore to Dartmouth, October 5, 1775, Journal, Otter, October 12, and November 9, 1775, John Page to Thomas Jefferson, November 11, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2: 316-317, 429, 975, 992; Journal, Otter, December 18 and 20, 1775, and January 6 and 12, 1776, Journal, H.M.S. Liverpool, Captain Henry Bellow, January 22, 1776, editorial note, Hamond to naval captains in Virginia, February 9, 1776, Journal, Roebuck, February 16, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 3:199, 663, 757, 927, 927 n. 2, 1188, 1324; PRO, Adm51/600, quoted in editorial note, Journal, Roebuck, March 4, 22, 26, and 29, 1776, Hamond's Account, March 26 and 28, and April 30, 1776, Hamond to Bellow, April 8, 1776, Extract of letter from Philadelphia, April 11, 1776, editorial note, Journal, Otter, April 21, 1776, Gilchrist to Tucker, April 24, 1776, Journal, Roebuck, April 30, and May 1, 1776, and editorial note, in Clark, NDAR, 4:38 n. 2, 165, 510, 529, 551, 596, 729, 772, 773 ns. 2 & 3, 1209, 1242, 1344, 1383, 1383 n. 2; Journal, Roebuck, May 16, 1776, Deposition of Slater, in Report and Decree for Betsey, and List of Ships, Dunmore's fleet, in Morgan, NDAR, 5: 129, 477-478, 1022; Hamond to Mr. Richard Whitworth, August 6, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 6:89; Purdie's Virginia Gazette, July 19, 1776, p. 3; and Hamond to Captain George Montagu, June 1, 1776, Hamond Naval Papers, 4/E/104, University of Virginia Library.

There also exists a reference to a tender, the John, commanded by Whitworth. In actuality, this was almost certainly the Pembroke commanded by Richard Whitworth. Previously, the Pembroke was the prize Little John whose name was changed when taken into naval service. It seems likely the compiler of the source in question was unaware of the change. Hamond's Account, April 30, 1776, Howe's prize list, March 31, 1777, cited in editorial note, and Journal, Roebuck, April 30, and May 1, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:1344, 1344 n. 2, 1383; Johnson to Somerville, June 22, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:685; and Hamond to Whitworth, August 6, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 6:89.

80 Hamond to Vice Admiral Molyneux Shuldham, March 5, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:182.

81 Journal, Otter, February 26, March 6 and 15, 1776, and Journal, Roebuck, April 5, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:111, 272, 426, 555; and Master's Log, Roebuck, July 25 and 30, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:1250, 1316.
82 Hamond to Shuldham, March 5, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:182; and Hamond's Account, February 27, 1776, Hamond Naval Papers, 2/1/19-20, University of Virginia Library.

83 Hamond to Bellow, April 8, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:729.

84 Hamond's Account, February 26, 1776, Hamond Naval Papers, 2/1/18-19, University of Virginia Library.

85 Journal, Otter, January 24, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 3:963; and Deposition of Slater, in Report and Decree for Betsey, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:477; and Hamond's Account, March 2, 1776, Hamond Naval Papers, 2/1/22-23, University of Virginia Library.

86 Gilchrist to Tucker, April 24, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:1242; Return of Ships & Vessels, PRO, A0119/21; and Deposition of Slater, in Report and Decree for Betsey, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:477-478.


89 Examination of Wirt, in NDAR, 4:289.

90 Report and Decree, Barry vs. Sloop Edward, April 30, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:1338; and Memorial of William Goodrich, PRO, A013/95/G.


92 Carter, Diary, April 23, 1776, 2:1024; and Libel, Barry vs. Eight Negro Slaves, September 9, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 6:766.


94 Memorial of the Stewarts, PRO, A012/54/418; and Deposition of Slater, in Report and Decree for Betsey, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:477-478.

95 Review of Mill's Claim, PRO, A012/99/23.

96 Iredell to Hewes, April 29, 1776, in Higgenbotham, Papers of Iredell, 1:356.

97 Purdie's Virginia Gazette, December 22 and 29, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 3:210, 297.

98 Johnson to Somerville, June 22, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:685.
Report and Decree, Barry vs. Sloop Edward, in Clark, NDAR, 4:1338.

Ibid.


List of Prisoners in Public Jail, in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:38.

Libel, Barry vs. Eight Negro Slaves, in Morgan, NDAR, 6:766.

Payment credited in Lord Dunmore's Accot., PRO, T1/580/129.


Extract of a letter from Philadelphia, December 6, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2:1307.


Memorial of the Stewarts, PRO, AO12/54/418.

William Goodrich to Bridger and Bartlet Goodrich, September 7, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 6:741. The ten men referred to were the white crewmen. There were eight black crewmen as well. Libel, Barry vs. Eight Negro Slaves, in Morgan, NDAR, 6:766.

Gilchrist to Tucker, April 24, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:1242.

Virginia Committee of Safety to Maryland Delegates, December 29, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 3:297.

Deposition of Mariman, in Archives of Maryland, 12:153.


Gilchrist to Tucker, April 24, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:1242.

Deposition of Yell, in Archives of Maryland, 12:156.

Dunmore's Account with Government, November 1, 1775 - May 2, 1777, PRO, T1/580/128; and Payments credited in Dunmore's Accot., PRO, T1/580/129.
Payments credited in Dunmore's account, PRO, T1/580/129.

Hamond's Account, July 9-11, 1776, Hamond Naval Papers, 2/2/[16-20], University of Virginia Library; Purdie's Virginia Gazette, June 7, 1776, p. 3, and July 19, 1776, p. 2; Journal of the Council of Virginia, July 24, 1776, in McIlwaine, Journals of the Council, 1:89; Memorial of Bartlet Goodrich, PRO, C05/95/54; Dixon & Hunter's Virginia Gazette, December 23, 1775, Purdie's Virginia Gazette, December 29, 1775, and Pinkney's Virginia Gazette, December 30, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 3:219, 297, 306-307; Dunmore to Germain, June 26, and July 31, 1776, Andrew Lewis to Richard Henry Lee, July 15, 1776, and Hooper to St. Thomas Jenifer, July 30, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:756-757, 1094, 1296, 1312; William Goodrich to Bridger and Bartlet Goodrich, September 7, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 6:741; and Iredell to Hewes, April 29, 1776, in Higgenbotham, Papers of Iredell, 1:356.


Stewart, Virginia's Navy, pp. 7-8; and Eller, "Chesapeake Bay," pp. 20-21.

Ibid.

Dunmore to Germain, July 31, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:1314; and Goldenberg, "Virginia State Navy," p. 175.


Dunmore to Dartmouth, [January 9, 1776], PRO, C05/1353/321.

Dunmore to Dartmouth, February 13, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 3:1266.

Ibid.

Dunmore to Dartmouth, March 4, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:165.
133 Hamond to Peter Parker, May 4, 1776, in Hamond Naval Papers, 5/A, University of Virginia Library.

134 Dixon & Hunter's Virginia Gazette, April 13, 1776, in NDAR 4:803.

135 These prizes were the sloops Philadelphia Packet, Vulcan, Nancy, Peggy, Polly, Liberty, Two Brothers, and Friendship, schooners Jenny, Nancy, Charlotte, and Betty, brigantine Polly, and ship Molly. In addition there were four sloops and four schooners whose names, if any, are unknown, and three vessels for whom the type is not recorded. List of bonds issued at Edenton, North Carolina, Clark, NDAR, 3:985, n. 2; Journal of Otter, March 5-13, 1776, Narrative of the Alarm over the Sloop Otter, and Dixon & Hunter's Virginia Gazette, April 13, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:271-272, 326, n. 2, 425-426, 803; Petition of James Robinson to the Pennsylvania Committee of Safety, July 9, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:993-994; Carter, Diary, April 22-24, 1776, 2:1021-1025; Mason to Cockburn, June 23, 1776, in Rutland, Papers of Mason, 1:311; Deposition of Buchanan, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 6:478-479; Proceedings, Virginia Convention, June 4, 1776, in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:350; Purdie's Virginia Gazette, April 12, 1776, p. 3; Deposition of Yell, in Archives of Maryland, 12:155-156; List of Vessels taken and Condemned, PRO, T1/580/118; Memorial of William Goodrich, PRO, A013/95/G; and Howe's prize list, March 31, 1777, House of Lords Records Office, Main Papers, American Prizes, .310.4

136 Narrative of the Alarm over the Sloop Otter, in Clark, NDAR, 4:326 n. 2.

137 Journal, Otter, February 28, 1776, in Clark, NDAR 4:112. The Edward was undoubtedly responsible for taking several other prizes as well. Unfortunately, documents supporting this only refer to the Liverpool's tender, and there are indications she had more than one. It is therefore impossible to determine which tender took which prizes. As a result, to be conservative, all prizes falling into this category are credited to the navy.

138 The prizes were the sloop Batchelor, an unidentified vessel from Philadelphia, and the fourth unidentified prize retaken with John Goodrich, Sr. at Ocracoke. Intelligence concerning American vessels loading gunpowder at Martinique, March 5, 1776, and Journal, Otter, April 6, 1776, Clark, NDAR, 4:188, 691; Dummore to Germain, June 26, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:756-757; Confession of Goodrich Sr., in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:423; Iredell to Hewes, April 29, 1776, in Higgenbotham, Papers of Iredell, 1:365.

139 Purdie's Virginia Gazette, Supplement, April 26, 1776, p. 2.

140 The prizes were the sloops Dove and Maria, schooner Cazia, Brig Juno, ship Grace, and a schooner of unknown name. Journal, H.M. Sloop Kingfisher, Captain Alexander Graeme, February 28, 1776, Journal of Roebuck, March 4, 11, and 20, 1776, Master's Log, Roebuck, March 5, 11, and 20, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:111, 165, 183, 314-315, 427, 439; and List of Vessels taken and Condemned, PRO, T1/580/118.

141 The five prizes in question were the sloops Lilly, Betsey, Polly, and Polly, and the brig Ann. List of Vessels taken and Condemned, PRO, T1/580/118.
The prizes were the sloops Sally, Red Row, Maria, Polly, Dove, Dolphin, Betsey, Little John, Susannah, Sally, Polly, Sally, and Temperence, the schooners Molly, Sandwich, Polly, Peace and Plenty, Sally, Dolphin (pilot boat), Ranger, Joseph, Dolphin, and Dolphin, the brigantine/schooner Betsey, the brigs, Susanna and Betsey and Molly, the snow St. Barbara, and the ship Chance. There were also those prizes for which the type is known but not the name. This group included ten sloops, six schooners, four brigs, and two pilot boats. Finally, both the type and name for two of the prizes is unknown. Howe's prize list, March 31, 1777, and Account of Vessels seized, Vice Admiral [Molyneux] Shuldham, April 24, 1776, House of Lords Records Office, Main Papers, American Prizes, T1/580/118; List of Vessels taken and Condemned, PRO, T1/580/118; Journal, H.M. Sloop Kingfisher, Captain James Montagu, October 5, 1776, November 19, and 23, and November 6, 1775, Journal, Otter, October 11 and 12, and November 9, 1775, Samuel Johnston to Joseph Hewes, November 5, 1775, Deposition of Captain Oliver Porter, November 9, 1775, and Page to Jefferson, November 11, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2:316-317, 408, 409, 429, 529, 584, 899, 909, 960-961, 975, 992; Letter from Norfolk [extract], December 19, 1775, Letter from a Midshipman on H.M.S. Liverpool, January 4, 1776, Journal, Otter, January 12, 1776, Journal, Kingfisher, January 16, and February 8, 1776, Journal, Liverpool, January 12, and February 10 and 17, 1776, Dixon & Hunter's Virginia Gazette, February 3, 1776, and editorial notes, in Clark, NDAR, 3:176, 621, 757, 826, 927, 1119, n. 2-4, 1187, 1209, 1341, n. 3; Purdie's Virginia Gazette, March 22, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:457; Journal, Liverpool, May 22 and 23, and June 3, 1776, and Deposition of Slater, in Report and Decree for Betsey, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:234, 363-364, 476-478; Report and Decree for Schooner Sandwich, September 17, 1776, and editorial note, in Morgan, NDAR, 6:867-868, 868 n. 2; and Hamond's Account, March 5, 15, 18, and 19, 1776, Hamond Naval Papers, 2/1[24, 26-27, 291, University of Virginia Library.

Two of the unidentified prize sloops are said to be the same as the Susanna and Peace and Plenty on Shuldham's prize list cited above. The dates of capture, however, do not coincide. Also, neither were sloops. The Peace and Plenty was a schooner, and the Susanna was a brig. Consequently, both sloops must be accepted as separate, additional prizes. Journal, Kingfisher, January 16, 1776, editorial note, Journal, Liverpool, January 22, 1776, editorial note, and Dixon & Hunter's Virginia Gazette, February 3, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 3:826, 826 n. 2, 927, 927 n. 2, 1119.

Finally, it has been suggested that one of the unknown brigs taken by one of the Liverpool's tenders was released, because there is no record of her on any official prize list. It is possible this was the case, but given the large number of other prizes that do not appear on any official list, this argument cannot be used for grounds for such an assumption. Journal, Liverpool, February 10, 1776, and editorial note, in Clark, NDAR, 3:1209, 1209 n. 2.

This was a sloop brought in by one of the Liverpool's tenders which may be the same as one of the Sallys of the same type credited to Bellow on Dunmore's prize list. Journal, Liverpool, March 3, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:152; and List of Vessels taken and Condemned, PRO, T1/580/118.
The other three recaptured prizes, previously documented, were the Polly and the unidentified vessel retaken when John Goodrich, Sr. was captured at Ocracoke, and Bridger Goodrich's prize abandoned at Hobb's Hole. The prize lost at sea was the sloop Two Brothers. Proceedings, Virginia Convention, June 4, 1776, in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:350.

See Chapter 4, Notes 82, 84, 85, 86, and 87.

Purdie's Virginia Gazette, April 12, 1776, p. 3; and Mason to Cockburn, June 23, 1776, in Rutland, Papers of Mason, 1:311.

See Chapter 4, Note 88.

List of Vessels taken and Condemned, PRO, T1/580/118; and Payments credited in Dunmore's Accot., PRO, T1/580/129.

These were the ship Grace and an unidentified schooner. Master's Log, Roebuck, March 5 and 20, 1776, and Journal, Roebuck, March 20, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:183, 427, 439; and Howe's prize list, March 31, 1777, House of Lords Records Office, Main Papers, American Prizes, .301.4.

These were the sloops Vulcan and Nancy, schooner Cazia, and Brigantine Polly. Howe's prize list, March 31, 1777, House of Lords Records Office, Main Papers, American Prizes, .301.4; and Petition of James Robinson, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:993-994.

These were the ship Molly, schooner Nancy, sloop Friendship, an unidentified brig, and an unidentified New England vessel. Ibid.; Confession of Goodrich, Sr., in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:423; and Purdie's Virginia Gazette, Supplement, April 26, 1776, p. 2.

Purdie's Virginia Gazette, Supplement, April 26, 1776, p. 2.

Memorial of William Goodrich, PRO, A013/95/G.

This was the sloop, Friendship. Confession of Goodrich, Sr. in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:423.

These were an unidentified schooner and the sloop Liberty. Purdie's Virginia Gazette, Supplement, April 26, 1776, p. 2; and Dixon & Hunter's Virginia Gazette, April 13, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:803.

These were the sloops Congress, Liberty, and Maria. Ibid.; and Howe's prize list, March 31, 1777, House of Lords Records Office, Main Papers, American Prizes, .301.4.

The four other prizes were the sloop Batchelor, brig Juno, an unidentified French sloop, and an unidentified vessel from Philadelphia. Ibid.; Confession of Goodrich, Sr., in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:423; Journal, Roebuck, March 4, 1776, and Journal, Otter, April 6, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:165, 691; Shuldham's prize list, House of Lords Records Office, Main Papers, American Prizes, .301.2; and Purdie's Virginia Gazette, April 12, 1776, p. 3.
These were the sloop Batchelor, brig Juno, and an unidentified French sloop. Confession of Goodrich, Sr., in Tartar, Revolutionary Virginia, 7:423; Journal, Roebuck, March 4, 1776, and Journal, Otter, April 6, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:165, 691; Shuldham's prize list, House of Lords Records Office, Main Papers, American Prizes, .301.2; and Purdie's Virginia Gazette, April 12, 1776, p. 3.

These were the sloops Batchelor, Congress, and Maria, the brig Juno, and an unidentified French sloop. Ibid.; Journal, Roebuck, March 11 and 12, 1776, and Dixon & Hunter's Virginia Gazette, April 13, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:315, 803; and Purdie's Virginia Gazette, Supplement, April 26, 1776, p. 2.

Purdie's Virginia Gazette, Supplement, April 26, 1776, p. 2.

Ibid.
It is not surprising that New England, given its strong maritime culture, produced a number of loyalists who would become privateers. The area can be neatly subdivided into two distinct maritime regions. Massachusetts Bay and the Gulf of Maine, with Boston as the key port, constituted the upper New England region. Long Island Sound and Narragansett Bay (inclusive of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard) with Newport, Rhode Island as the main port, comprised the lower portion.

The men of both New England areas fit the broader composite view of loyalists, but exhibit regional variation with the Chesapeake loyalists and even among themselves. The New England loyalist primarily came from coastal, urban environments, and demographically, there was a correlation between open support and a British presence. In Massachusetts and Rhode Island, the merchants and mariners dominated over a smattering of individuals from other backgrounds. In Connecticut, however, there was a higher percentage of men from other walks of life. Among the men of both the upper and lower regions, there was a high percentage of native born and a minimal amount of ethnic and racial representation. Despite the fact some of these men supported pre-war anti-British protest, there is no evidence of equivocalness among them. At the same time, there is evidence indicating neutral behavior by some. Motivational factors were typically varied, and a large number suffered some form of abuse at the hands of the rebels. Signifi-
Figure 3: The Upper New England Maritime Region.
cantly, a many of these men acted in a variety of capacities other than as privateers to support the British, which reflects their serious level of commitment. It should be noted that research has failed to identify any loyalist privateers from New Hampshire. It would be very surprising, however, to find that colony produced none, especially from Portsmouth.

The upper New England merchants and mariners who would become privateers were primarily from coastal urban areas. From the Boston merchant class came Frederick William Geyer, Joseph Taylor, Samuel Rogers, George Leonard, James Anderson, Alexander Brymer, Nathaniel Coffin, Philip Dumaresque, and Francis Green. Sandwich produced merchant Samuel Perry. Brymer was agent for Robert Grant of London, contractor for provisions for the British fleet in American waters. Leonard dealt in grain. Some of these Bostonians, Geyer for instance, were exceedingly wealthy. Others were well educated. Green and Taylor were Harvard graduates.²

On the Maine coast, Falmouth (Portland) produced merchants Robert Pagan and his brothers, William and Thomas, partners in Pagan & Co. Robert Pagan was a popular young immigrant from Scotland who maintained business ties there. In addition, he operated a large store, traded in lumber, and built vessels for sale in Europe.³

As noted, a number of loyal skippers hailed from the region as well. Those from Massachusetts, though still from within the Boston area, were more demographically dispersed than the merchants. William Gallop, master of a vessel making runs to North Carolina and the West Indies, was the only identifiable mariner from Boston proper. Antill Gallop, however, was from Cambridge and Jacob Rogers resided in Charlestown. In addition, William Lewis came from Lynn, Issacher Woodbury hailed from Salem, and Ebenezer Hathaway was from Freetown. Perry, of Sandwich, was a mariner as well as a merchant. The maritime expertise
of Antill Gallop, Lewis, Woodbury, Hathaway, and Perry is deduced from the fact that all five later commanded privateers. That merchant George Leonard later commanded a squadron of privateers indicates he possessed a very strong maritime background too.⁴

On the Maine coast, a small concentration of loyalist mariners existed in Pownalborough (Wiscasset). These included Charles Callahan (sometimes Callaghan), Edmund Doharty, and Nathaniel Gardiner. That these men were qualified seamen is apparent from their later roles as pilots and privateer captains. Also, mariners Thomas Wyer and Thomas Ross of Falmouth supported the royal cause, as did Richard Pomeroy of Medumcock (Friendship). In light of the later services he performed at sea as a pilot and prize master, it is apparent that Zebedee Linnekin of St. Georges was an experienced mariner as well.⁵

A few men from upper New England destined to become privateers were public officials. Joseph Goldthwaite held what must have been the exceedingly popular post of Barracks' Master in Boston. In the same city, Coffin served in another enviable position as the last Receiver-General and Cashier of his Majesty's Customs. Gardiner had been a magistrate in Rhode Island prior to moving to Maine. Wyer was a customs officer at Falmouth. Finally, Antill Gallop acted as High Sheriff of Middlesex County.⁶

Other occupations were represented. In addition to being seafarers, Callahan and Linnekin were farmers. Jacob Rogers possessed 3,000 acres in New Hampshire. Henry Cowe owned and operated a one-hundred acre "plantation" at Wexton, sixteen miles from Boston. His later role as a prize agent, indicates Brymer may have possessed some legal training.⁷

Four of these men had at least some prior military or naval experience. Green had served in the French and Indian conflict, and Goldthwaite went by the title "Major," indicating a military or, at
least, militia association. Jacob Rogers spent time as a lieutenant in the Royal Navy until court-martialed and forced to resign in 1773. Then, there was Dumaresque who may well have been the same Philip Dumaresque who commanded a privateer out of Boston during King George's War. If not, he was undoubtedly a close relative, and therefore, had some association with the activity. The Dumaresque family was associated with naval affairs in another manner. The son, Philip Jr., was a Royal Navy officer.

Between a number of these men there were family or business ties that may have affected their decision to remain loyal. Taylor and Samuel Rogers were business partners as were Coffin and Anderson. Anderson had strong entrepreneurial ties with a Scottish firm, and as shown, both he and Coffin did business with Jamieson in Virginia. The Pagan brothers had strong business affiliations with Scotland as well, and Brymer was agent for a London contractor. Their wives being sisters, Robert Pagan and Wyer were related by marriage. The Geyer and Coffin families, too, were linked in the same manner. Finally, it would seem likely there was some blood relationship between William and Antill Gallop. As will be seen, if these upper New England men were not known to each other at this point, many would soon become so.

Conforming to the established loyalist profile, but in contrast to loyalists of some other regions is the fact that a higher percentage of upper New England privateers were native born. Of the thirteen whose place of birth is known, six were colonials. In fact, some, such as Geyer, Leonard, and Coffin, emanated from well established families. Seven men, Cowe, Callaghan, Anderson, Brymer, and the Pagans, were immigrants. Cowe was from St. Thomas, Virgin Islands. Callaghan hailed from Ireland. The others were Scots, conforming to the established view that this ethnic group dominated the loyalist immigrant
element in the region. This immigrant figure is, however, skewed up-
ward by the fact that three of the men represent a single family.\textsuperscript{11}

Apart from a handful of Scots, minorities, both ethnic and ra-
cial, were minimally represented. With few exceptions, the surnames of
most of these individuals suggest that they were of English extrac-
tion. Dumaresque, however, suggests the strong possibility of some
French ancestry. Callahan indicates an Irish background. Known racial
minorities were represented only by Henry Cowe who described himself
as a mulatto. Although he did not specifically say so, all indications
such as property ownership support that he was a free man.\textsuperscript{12}

It need be noted that in the pre-war era, at least a couple of
these men were sympathetic to the rebel cause and even supported it.
Green was "an avowed enemy to the pretended unlimited power of Parlia-
mentary taxation," who lived in "hope of an honorable compromise,
without recourse to arms."\textsuperscript{13} In 1774, Robert Pagan backed the non-
importation of tea.\textsuperscript{14}

Of course, the Boston area constituted the very apex of revolu-
tionary activity during the opening months of the conflict. This, in
conjunction with the strong, countering, British military presence,
either forced people to declare for the King or made them feel safe
about doing so. For the most part, the Boston area merchants and mari-
ners for whom there is relevant information made their position known
early, joining the British.\textsuperscript{15} Taylor, however, initially displayed con-
duct indicating a desire to maintain a passive loyalist stance. Almost
immediately after the opening shots, he departed for England.\textsuperscript{16} Geyer
did the same.\textsuperscript{17} Cowe also must have adopted a passive or neutral posi-
tion, and he must have been adept at it. He did not leave his home un-
til 1778.\textsuperscript{18}

An established and accepted historical pattern for loyalist ac-
tivity indicates the further away one was from the action and a Brit-
ish military or naval presence, the need, desire, and/or urgency to declare decreased, and neutral loyalists were more in evidence. This trend is evident among the future privateersmen of upper New England. Though all in question would become very active, there was an increase in the number of neutral or passive loyalists proportionate to the further away one was from Boston. Perry, of Sandwich, Massachusetts, did not leave until September, 1777. At Falmouth, Wyer seems to have managed an unobtrusive, if tenuous, existence until the town was burned in October, 1775. The Pagans did the same, though Robert's and Thomas's support of the King was evident as early as May, 1775. Still, the brothers initially did not wish to become embroiled and did their best to avoid matters. Stating that he wanted no part of being in a country destined to be in a state of rebellion, Robert applied for permission to pack up everything, and leave with his family. His request was denied.

Further afield on the Maine coast, there is evidence of even greater neutral behavior. While decidedly loyal at heart, there were those who were not overly eager to take up arms, and seemingly content to passively sit out the war if not provoked. Callahan was such a person. He only became actively involved with the British after being repeatedly "drafted" by the rebels. Linnekin, on the other hand, bought his way out of rebel service, paying a fee of £30. Even though he also refused to take the rebel oath, this seems to have bought him some time as well, because he did not join the British until after their occupation of the Penobscot region in June, 1779.

As elsewhere, a high percentage of these men suffered various forms of abuse for their opinions. Interestingly, despite his political leanings, Green was the victim of mob violence. Wyer was repeatedly fined and then ultimately suffered a lengthy imprisonment for not subscribing to the rebels. Anderson lost two vessels to the rebels.
while carrying supplies to the British at Boston. The majority lost heavily in terms of real estate, fixed capital, personal property, shipping, and merchandise. 

A particularly personal manner in which the conflict affected these loyalists was the disruption of their families. In fact, amongst privateersmen, indications are that there was a higher rate of this form of incident in upper New England than in most places. Wyer, Ross, and Linnekin were forced to leave their families behind for a time, and in the case of Linnekin, after he left, the rebels took possession of his farm and turned his family out. Ultimately, Robert Pagan was able to send his to Barbados. Goldthwaite's wife was arrested and kept under guard despite ill-health. Even after her poor physical condition was acknowledged and measures were taken to accommodate her, she remained under the control and watchful eye of a committee of correspondence. Finally, although seemingly well cared for, Leonard's infant son was held in Boston for at least a large part of the war.

Of note, and reflecting the degree of their loyalty to the crown, is the fact that several of these men, William Gallop, the Pagans, and Wyer, suffered significantly at the hands of the British, yet their beliefs remained unshaken. On a voyage to St. Croix early in the conflict, Gallop "was obliged to take Bills on Philadelphia for his Wages and Adventure." To receive payment, he was required to go to that city. There, he bought 2/3rds of a vessel and while carrying a load of provisions in her to the British at New York, he was taken by H.M.S. Roebuck. The cargo was confiscated and distributed through the fleet. Shortly after, adding insult to injury, Gallop's vessel was wrecked and lost as a result of his having been detained.

As a resident of Falmouth in October, 1775, Wyer lost a house, merchandise, and a vessel in which he had interest when that place was burned by the British. The Pagans, one of whom attempted to keep
British naval Lieutenant Henry Mowat from firing on the town, lost heavily as well. A house and a store, the largest in town, went up in flames. The Pagans' misfortunes did not, however, end here. Robert's experiences serve as a good example of the ill-effects the Prohibatory Act could have on a loyalist merchant. One of his vessels had sailed for the West Indies prior to receipt of news about the Act. When word did arrive, fearing the vessel would be seized, resulting in a total loss, Pagan forwarded instructions that she be sold for considerably less than her actual value in an effort to salvage something of the venture. Then, finally managing to extricate themselves, the family sailed for Barbados on a second vessel, where, upon arrival, it, too, was seized by the British under the Act's authority.

While the Massachusetts Bay/Gulf of Maine Region produced a number of privateersmen (undoubtedly far more than are discussed here), and a fair number declared themselves for the King at an early date, with the exception of Pomeroy, there is no indication any of the men mentioned actually took up arms at sea until much later in the conflict. In fact, very little is known about aggressive loyalist activity at sea in the region up to the evacuation of Boston. Given the fact there was a decent Royal Navy presence in the area, it is possible that not too much reliance was placed on local talent. Yet, loyalist armed vessels did exist. This is evident from one of the most intriguing yet frustrating statements encountered in the course of doing research for this study. On January 26, 1776, Lt. Governor Thomas Oliver notified Lord Dartmouth that after receiving the approval of Major General William Howe and despite the fact he did not have the authorization to do so, he had been issuing letters of marque to merchantmen sailing to the West Indies. Howe was of the opinion these vessels would not only serve to distress the rebels, but might also
help supply the garrison. Exactly how many and to whom these were issued remains a mystery.  

Only one loyalist, George Sibbles, can be identified as being at sea in the service of the Crown at this time, in this area. Unfortunately, little is known about his background. Still, circumstantial evidence points to his having had a New England affiliation. He first appears in that area, and his early activities are centered there. Furthermore, the owners of a privateer he later commanded were all Boston men. In any case, as of November, 1775, he commanded the sloop General Gage. Armed with eight carriage guns and swivels, she has been variously described as a dispatch vessel, armed vessel, and tender. In fact, she was purchased at Boston in 1775 by the army's Quarter Master Department with the initial intention of using her as an armed transport and convoy escort. As will be seen, her role expanded over time. As her skipper, Sibbles holds the distinction of being the first loyalist known to command an armed vessel in ship-to-ship action against the rebels.

On January 25, 1776, off Boston harbor, Captain John Manly, commanding the Continental Schooner Hannah with six four-pounders and ten swivels, seized two merchantmen carrying supplies and provisions to the British. Having finished putting a prize crew on the second capture, Manly saw three additional vessels come into view. These proved to be the General Gage and two provision transports she was escorting from Halifax. The two captains and their vessels squared off. Sibbles, undoubtedly intent on protecting his two charges and perhaps with an eye to retaking Manly's second prize aggressively approached. Manly, clearly intent on maintaining his prize and possibly hoping to snap up yet another, moved to meet him. A brusque little action ensued lasting about half an hour, and ending in what can best be described as a draw. The engagement ceased when the Hannah ran low on cartridges and
the General Gage turned for Boston. Both vessels had succeeded in their primary goal of covering the vessels in their care or possession while failing to acquire any additional ones. Regardless of the outcome, Sibbles's status as an aggressive fighter rises in light of the fact that Manly had conducted his operation within a relatively short distance and in plain view of a number of British warships, not one of which made an effort to assist the beleaguered transports. Sibbles would soon be heard from again.34

The Narragansett Bay and Long Island Sound coastal areas of Rhode Island and Connecticut produced a significant number of loyalists privateersmen, too. In Rhode Island, all such individuals for whom there is relevant information emanated from the merchant and mariner classes. The former group included Joseph Durfee, Ezekiel Lewis, Thomas Wickham, a Mr. Pain, Samuel Whitehorne, Mathew Cozzens (variously spelled Cozens or Cozzins), Samuel Pearce, Thomas Hazard, Nicholas Lechmere, and the Wanton brothers, Joseph Jr. and William.35 Stanton Hazard, master of a vessel in the African trade, Francis I'annes (often anglicized as Ians), and a Captain Crendall represented the seafaring element.36 Finally, there was a Mr. Whipple about whom relatively little is known. He was, however, a shipowner.37 Because of their later activities at sea, Durfee as a pilot, and Thomas Hazard and Cozzens as privateer captains, it is evident these men possessed considerable maritime experience in addition to their other skills. Finally, young Jacob Eckstein, though referring to himself as a landowner, must have been an adept seaman as well to become the naval lieutenant that he did.38
Figure 4: The Lower New England Maritime Region.
Lechmere is the only one in the group who held a public office. He had the dubious honor of being Officer of the Customs in 1765 during the Stamp Act crisis. Though not office holders themselves, the Wanton brothers possessed serious political connections. Their father, Joseph, was Governor elect for the colony.39

Existing data points to a very high percentage having been native born, urban dwellers, which conforms to the established view of Rhode Island and New England loyalists in general. Of the eight for whom place of birth is known, Eckstein, Whitehorne, Durfee, Pearce, the Wantons, and both Hazards, all were colonials. Of the eight for whom place of residence can be established, six, Cozzens, Durfee, Lechmere, Whitehorne and the Wantons came from Newport, while Eckstein and Whipple were from Providence.40

For Connecticut, data exists concerning the occupation of fourteen individuals, and typically, the merchants and mariners constitute a majority. James Hayt Jr., Fitch and Samuel Rogers, Nathaniel Hubbard, and John Taylor all identified themselves as merchant/mariners.41 John Ketchum was master of a vessel in the West Indian trade, Jesse Hoyt, a shipowner, was in the merchant service, and Bemsley Peters and Neil McNeil referred to themselves as merchants. Peters owned at least one vessel as well, and the fact McNeil and Hoyt later commanded privateers supports the notion that they, too, were mariners of some skill.42 Charles Thomas later stated he spent the war involved in maritime operations. This in conjunction with his command of a privateer indicates he was a mariner also.43 Finally, although his exact occupation is not stated and he lived inland, Thomas Smith’s later post as an officer on a privateer marks him as a man used to the sea, too.44

Despite their majority, the merchants and mariners did not dominate as fully as elsewhere in New England. Accepting the small sample as representative, there is evidence of a sizable proportion of lands-
men emanating from Connecticut. James Hait, Joseph Hait, and Samuel Miles were landowners, and Hubbard and Peters described themselves as landowners in addition to being merchants. Philo Sandford was a farmer. Finally, the professional ranks were represented by surgeon Joseph Clarke. No references have been found to public office holders from Connecticut becoming privateers.  

Connecticut privateers fit the image of loyalists in general from the colony and from New England with regards to place of birth. Information on the seven who stated where they were born indicates a commanding percentage were natives. Six were born in the colony. Taylor was a Scot who had arrived as recently as 1768.  

As to place of residence, in a broad sense, Connecticut privateers conform to the general view of loyalists in that they were predominantly coastal and urban. At the same time, they conform to the accepted perception of Connecticut loyalist in particular, which is, in fact, a departure from demographic patterns elsewhere. This is to say that although there were small enclaves of the King's supporters in Norwalk and Stamford, no specific urban locale can be defined as a hub of regional activity. Then again, taking matters of residence a step further, the Connecticut privateers also diverge to a degree from the pattern for Connecticut loyalists in general. In the colony, loyalists as a whole were scattered along the entire coastal area with a somewhat greater density in the southwestern corner. This increase might be proportional to the nearness of New York, the ultimate center of loyalist activity and the base of a large British military and naval force. In any case, with one marginal exception, all Connecticut privateers for whom place of residence is known emanated from the rather limited span of southwestern coastal area between the Stamford and New Haven areas. Within this zone, density increased the further west one went. Hubbard and both Haits lived in Stamford. Hayt, Hoyt,
the Rogers, and Ketchum hailed from Norwalk. Thomas Smith was from Ridgefield. Clarke came from Stratford. Sandford dwelt near New Haven, as did Taylor who lived in Branford. The only individual to depart from this pattern was Miles who came from New Milford, further north, but still in the very western part of the colony.47

There is no direct evidence of business affiliations between the men of either Rhode Island or Connecticut. In the case of Rhode Island, despite this, given that a fair number of these men resided in Newport and were in the same occupations as merchants and mariners, it seems likely that at least some of these individuals were at least familiar with each other. The fact that William Wanton, Lewis, Wickham, Lechmere and Pain later invested in a privateer together while still residing in Newport suggests the possibility of long-standing acquaintance.48 Having been transported together after arrest, there can be little doubt Joseph Wanton, Jr. and Lechmere knew each other. Family ties were in evidence. Of course, the Wantons were brothers. In addition, it would seem likely that Thomas and Stanton Hazard were linked to the prominent Rhode Island family of that name and so, were related in some manner.

In Connecticut, the demographically scattered nature of the men discussed precludes concluding that there may have been business and social ties between most. There were, however, family groups. Fitch and Samuel Rogers were, of course, brothers. In addition, it would seem likely that James and Joseph Hait bore some family relationship with each other.49

Of all the individuals from this region, only three can be discerned as having had prior martial experience. Clark had served as a surgeon in a provincial regiment during the French and Indian War. More specifically, Joseph Wanton, Jr. had been interested in privateers during the same conflict, and Hait had actually commanded one.50
No racial minorities have been detected among the region's privateers. The very English surnames of the majority supports that ethnic minorities from the region were minimal as well. Only Eckstein and I'annes bear names reflecting ancestry other than British. I'annes is of note in that he is likely a representative of the Portuguese community in Rhode Island.

As to religious minorities, it is somewhat surprising that no firm evidence has been found linking the Hart family, especially Isaac, to the activity. The Harts were leading merchants in Newport's Jewish community, and family members had been seriously involved in privateering during the French and Indian War. At that time, Isaac was a partner with Joseph Wanton, Jr. in at least one such venture. During the Revolution, the family (in particular, Isaac) was decidedly loyalist. Yet, no substantial evidence has associated this group with privateering during that time. Additional research might prove otherwise.51

With regards to abuse at the hands of the rebels, the situation was somewhat unique for the denizens of both Rhode Island and Connecticut. In the former colony, specifically in Newport, this was due to the fact that during 1775 and 1776, while the rebels controlled the inland areas, a relatively strong British naval presence, dominating at sea, kept Newport under its guns.52 This put Newport in the position of being somewhat of a no-man's land in which people of opposing political leanings were able to co-exist, however uncomfortably, until that port was occupied by the British Army in December, 1776. Troops would remain until October, 1779. Their presence may account for the comparatively fewer and less severe examples of persecution there. Still, there were instances.

The Wanton family was the focal point of considerable harassment. Though the brothers' father, Joseph, was Governor elect, the re-
bel dominated assembly refused to swear him in. In turn, Joseph, Jr. was arrested and sent under guard to Providence when he refused to take the rebel oath. Lechmere accompanied Wanton for the same reason. Whitehorne's stance was strong enough that he was forced to flee with his family and go into hiding in the country until the arrival of British troops at Newport.

Perhaps one of the most interesting examples of persecution concerned Stanton Hazard. As far away as Point Petre, Guadeloupe, while on a voyage, he was forced to endure the indignity of an extra-legal drumhead interrogation at the hands of a group of ten New England captains who felt he had broken the Articles of Association. This group of captains went so far as to convey their suspicions and findings to the Rhode Island General Assembly. Hazard would have something to commiserate about with his future employers, Sheddon and Goodrich. Later, in October, 1777, the rebels seized Hazard's sloop.

As elsewhere, the privateersmen of Rhode Island initially reflected various levels of commitment. Despite Joseph Wanton Jr.'s treatment by the rebels, initially, he was actually quite sympathetic towards them and attempted to maintain a middle-of-the-road position. His brother, William, when pressured had fewer scruples about taking the oath when tendered. This submission resulted in post-war censorship when the Claims Commissioners viewed his action as the "Speck in that Loyalty which destroys all its Lustre." Quite the opposite of Joseph, Jr. was Lechmere. As Officer of the Customs during the Stamp Act problems, fearing for his life, he was forced to seek refuge on a naval vessel. Since that time, Lechmere had made his unswerving support of government well known. That Whitehorne was actually forced into hiding at an early date when others were still managing to co-exist says he must have been very open in his support of the King as well. The fact that Pearce left the colony relatively early, as did
Whipple, foregoing Newport in the process, indicates their strong support of royal government also. On the other hand, while the Royal Navy's presence undoubtedly helped in allowing them to remain, it would seem likely that at least some Newport loyalists were initially passive, thus further accounting for their ability to remain in their homes until the British Army's occupation.

In Connecticut, the treatment of loyalists was markedly different in terms of both volume and severity. Several of the men in question, McNeil, Thomas Smith, Joseph Hait, and Sandford were forced to flee the colony. Sandford was in trouble for aiding a British officer. Smith was declared an enemy of the state. Hait must have clearly endeared himself to the rebels in that he was forced to flee as early as January, 1775. McNeil was mobbed, abused, and insulted several times, then jailed, tried, and acquitted for treason before departing in fear of his life.

In fact, there was a high rate of incarcerations among Connecticut loyalist privateers. Peters was imprisoned for treason as well. Hait, Fitch Rogers, and Hubbard were jailed too, Rogers several times. Hait had also been jailed earlier on suspicion of smuggling tea, and adding insult to injury, in conjunction with his last confinement, the mob seized his vessel and plundered his trade goods and personal belongings. Joseph Hait's imprisonment was made all the worse by the fact he successfully managed to reach the refuge of Governor Tryon's ship at New York only to be turned out due to a lack of room and told he would have to fend for himself. After being mobbed and abused, Hait was jailed for thirteen months. He and Peters ultimately escaped. Hubbard posted bond and subsequently gave leg-bail. How exactly the others achieved their freedom is unknown.

Ketchum's experience with the rebels is noteworthy. In his case, in addition to mobbings and insults, the rebels kept him from doing
business. Consequently, he finally decided to pack up and leave. Ironically, even though it would seem the rebels had achieved their intent, Ketchum found himself in even greater trouble for his efforts. His vessel and her contents were confiscated. It was evidently a no-win situation for John Ketchum.64

In light of the treatment received from the rebels, it is evident that in general, the men from Connecticut were firmly committed in their political stance from an early date. Charles Thomas would later boast that "he never wavered in his attachment to his King." This, in turn, reflects a break in the established historical view of loyalist actions in that in an area that was relatively calm and remote from a protective British presence, individuals were far less passive than elsewhere. Certainly, the nearness of New York may account for some of this confident behavior, but New York was not that close, a secure British influence did not extend into Connecticut, and the British did not even begin to establish a firm grip on the city until the summer of 1776. In fact the only passive exception was Samuel Miles who admitted attempting to keep a low profile. In his efforts to avoid involvement, like Linnekin in Maine, he too, hired a substitute to serve in his stead with the rebels. Regardless, he could not put off the inevitable for long. He left for New York in the Fall of 1776.65

Almost all of these men, both from Rhode Island and Connecticut, suffered in another way. They, too, lost heavily in terms of real estate, personal property, shipping, trade goods, and livestock. There are, however, indications that the people of Newport suffered somewhat less, incurring losses primarily in real estate only, having time to ship off other goods and possessions, because of the British occupation.66
Furthermore, several suffered affronts from the British as well. British troops destroyed a distillery on which Whitehorne held the mortgage. The Wantons lost a vessel to the British. With Eckstein, whatever crops and livestock the rebels failed to take from his estate the British seized.  

As with their possessions, the Newport loyalists had time to extricate their families when they left. This, unfortunately, was not always possible for Connecticut loyalists. Rivaling upper New England in numbers, McNeil, Joseph Hait, John Taylor, and Ketchum were all forced to leave their families behind and remain separated from them for some time. 

For the Long Island Sound and Narragansett Bay region, there is even less evidence of early loyalist activity at sea. Only one tantalizing reference has been found, and it is questionable. On October 6, 1775, a rebel report mentioned a privateer brig being with the British squadron off Newport. The log books of the naval vessels that were present, however, make no reference to such being in company. The only reference to a brig is to the naval vessel Bolton. At the same time, however, the logs do refer to the presence of several tenders which remain unidentified in terms of both name and type. So, the possibility exists that a privately owned and manned vessel was acting as a tender to a British man-of-war. Of course, if such a craft existed, she could not have been a true privateer, because no one was issuing even extra-legal letters of marque at that time. Then again, it is just as possible the recorder was mistaken in his identification altogether. 

From this point, discussion of individuals from the Upper and Lower New England regions will be merged for the sake of clarity and
convenience. Most of the men from the Boston area remained in that city until the British evacuated it in March, 1776. At that time, they began their refugee odyssey that would take many at New York. Coffin, Dumaresque, Green, and Rogers departed for Halifax and then went to New York. Geyer, who actually departed in 1775, left for Halifax, too, and then spent some time in England before returning to the colonies to also take up residence in New York. From that port, Samuel Rogers left for England, while partner Joseph Taylor relocated yet again to take his place in that city. Leonard turned up in New York, too, following a spell in Halifax and then Newport. Other Massachusetts loyalists who found their way to New York were William Gallop, Lewis, Cowe, Anderson, and Goldthwaite. Also, Hathaway at least operated in the New York area

Several Boston area men relocated elsewhere. Woodbury went to Halifax and remained. Brymer left for Halifax as well, and though he would later sometimes refer to himself as based in London, and there are hints he may have spent some time in New York, all indications are that he was predominantly associated with the Nova Scotia port for the remainder of the war. Perry moved to Newport where we lose track of him.

Among the loyalists on the Maine coast, those further south at Falmouth, Wyer, Ross, and Robert and William Pagan, made their way to New York. Wyer, however, upon escaping from jail went first to Annapolis, Nova Scotia. Thomas Pagan ended up in Bermuda. Those residing further north, Callahan and Doharty, opted to relocate to Halifax, and there are indications Pomeroy turned up there as well. After his stint in New York, Ross, too, went to Halifax. With the British occupation of the Penobscot region, in 1779, a number of upper New England Loyalists decided to move yet again and take up residence there. This group included Robert Pagan, William Gallop, Wyer, Pomeroy, and Do-
harty. Late comer Linnekin also sought refuge there. Gardiner at least operated in the region although there is evidence he may have later been based in New York.82

In lower New England, the situation differed, mainly because of the unique situation of Newport. Evidence indicates most Rhode Island loyalists, the Wantons, Whitehorne, both Hazards, Durfee, Cozzens, Lechmere, Pain, Ezekiel Lewis, Wickham, I'annes, and Crendall, remained in that port during the British occupation. Of this group, the Wantons, Whitehorne, the Hazards, Durfee (after a spell in England), and Cozzens are known to have arrived in New York. Having left earlier, Pearce was already there. Eckstein went there as well.83

New York was also the destination of choice for Connecticut loyalists. Of the fourteen individuals whose place of refuge is known, James Hayt, Jr., the Rogers brothers, James Hait, Hubbard, Clarke, Ketchum, Joseph Hait, McNeil, Thomas, Hoyt, and Miles went there. Sandford also spent time in that port before leaving for England and joining the crew of a privateer there. John Taylor also spent time in New York as well as in Canada and the West Indies. Thomas Smith served on a privateer operating in New York waters. In fact, only two men from the whole lower New England region are known not to have gone to New York. Lechmere departed for England and Whipple went to Antigua.84

Upon reaching their various destinations, a large percentage of these men from both upper and lower New England involved themselves in activities other than privateering, reflecting a desire to aid the war effort. A fair number served in a military capacity in loyalist militia or provincial units, generally holding commissions as officers. This group included Joseph Taylor, Anderson, Hayt, Fitch Rogers, Clarke, William Wanton, Joseph Taylor, McNeil, Durfee, Pearce, and Hathaway.85 Others served in a naval capacity. Ketchum commanded an government vessel, Eckstein served as a lieutenant on a naval galley,
Joseph Hait was a lieutenant in the Armed Boatmen, and John Taylor was a naval volunteer. William Gallop, Linnekin, Callahan, Durfee and Hoyt all served as pilots for the navy. Wyer was in the transport service. Linnekin also served on a tender. Cowe spent time on an armed government vessel. There was involvement in other activities as well. Miles and Leonard were employed by the commissary department and Doharty did government work of some nature. Hayt was a cashier to the Barracks' Master and a clerk in the Travel Department. Joseph Hait carried dispatches and did intelligence work for Governor Tryon, and was captured and imprisoned twice more for his efforts. Finally, a few of these men held public office. At Halifax, Coffin was appointed a magistrate and Brymer ultimately attained a seat on the council. While at Newport, Joseph Wanton, Jr. was Superintendent General of Police. At New York, Durfee held the post of Superintendent of Small Craft while William Wanton acted as Purveyor to the Hospital.

As to the privateering activities of these men, Coffin, Geyer, Green, Goldthwaite, all three Pagans, Anderson, Lechmere, the Wantons, Durfee, Dumaresque, Ezekiel Lewis, Wickham, Pain, Pearce, Whitehorne, Joseph Taylor, Samuel Rogers (Massachusetts), John Taylor, Brymer, and Whipple became owners. Involved in no less than twenty cruisers, Pearce was a major figure in the activity. Stanton Hazard, I'annes, Hayt Fitch and Samuel Rogers, Wyer, Crendall, Jacob Rogers, Antill Gallop, William Lewis, Ketchum, Hoyt, Thomas, Callahan, Doharty, Gardiner, Woodbury, Ross, Pomeroy, Cozzens, and McNeil, became captains. Thomas's, Gardiner's and Hoyt's craft operated with the Associated Loyalists. Perry, Thomas Hazard, and Hathaway each owned and skippered privateers, and Eckstein owned and served on such. Leonard owned and commanded a small squadron comprising seven privateers, plus auxiliary craft. Sandford acted as a purser, and Thomas Smith was an officer on a cruiser. Peters was Captain of Marines on a private
man-of-war. William Gallop, Cowe, and Hubbard are known to have spent time on privateers, but the capacity in which they served is unknown. Linnekin served as prize master on such a vessel. Finally, Joseph Hait, James Hait, Miles, Clark, and again, Hubbard, were members of the Associated Loyalists, and Leonard served on the Board of that organization.

Having established the identities and backgrounds of these individuals and examined their experiences, motivations, and levels of commitment, an assessment can be made of them as a group. In both regions, they were primarily comprised of native-born men of English heritage. While the merchant and mariner classes made up the largest proportion, these men still reflected a cross-section of established, respectable colonial society in terms of occupational and socio-economic background. Their motivations and experiences, with regards to persecution, can be viewed as typical for men who became privateers. Their general lack of equivocalness combined with their other efforts in support of the war show these men to have been highly dedicated to their course of action.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 6

1Memorial of George Leonard to Germain, [1780], Headquarters Papers, 22/2695, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Library, Colonial Williamsburg.

2Memorial of Frederick William Geyer, March 22, 1784, PRO, A013/98/163; John H. Stark, The Loyalists of Massachusetts and the Other Side of the American Revolution, (Boston: John H. Stark, 1907, 1910; Salem, Massachusetts: Salem Press Co., 1910), pp. 350-351; Memorial of Joseph Taylor, April 29, 1786, PRO, A013/24/448; Evidence on the Claim of George Leonard, November 9, 1786, PRO, A012/10/406; Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, May 1, 1779, PRO, CO5/1109/82, 125; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:273, 397, 468, 492, 2:346; Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 238, 487; Clark, NDAR, 1:646 n. 2; George Washington to John Hancock, December 4, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2:1258; Letter of Agency of
the Captain and Officers of H.M.S. Glasgow, April 30, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:1322; Jamieson to Anderson or Coffin, November 28, 1775, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 4:487; and Claim of Samuel Perry, [illeg.] 25, 1783, A013/93/158.


Memorial of William Gallop, March [illeg.], 1786, PRO, A013/50/376; Claim of Antill Gallop, December 5, 1785, PRO, A013/26/125; Claim of Jacob Rogers, n.d., PRO, A012/105/18; Petition of William Lewis, June 21, 1783, PRO, A013/74/553; Benjamin Edes's The Boston Gazette and The Country Journal, December 13, 1779, p. 3; Court of Vice Admiralty Register, June, 1777 - September, 1782, RG1, Vol. 496 (Vol. 6), p. 527, Public Archives of Nova Scotia, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:525; Claim of Perry, PRO, A013/93/158; Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 304, 740; and Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, PRO, CO5/1109/82.


Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:287; Memorial of Linnekin, PRO, A012/11/149; Claim of Jacob Rogers, PRO, A012/105/18; Review of Henry Cowe's Claim, 1784, PRO, A012/101/106; and Letter of Agency for Vice Admiral Molyneux Shuldham, June 5, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:376.

Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:397, 492-493, 479; Claim of Jacob Rogers, PRO, A012/105/18; and Swanson, Predators, pp. 66-67, 87.
9 Memorial of Joseph Taylor, PRO, A013/24/448; Washington to Hancock, December 4 and 7, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2:1258, 1322; Jamieson to Anderson or Coffin, November 28, 1775, in Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 4:487; Claim of Robert Pagan, and Evidence on the Claim of Robert Pagan, PRO, A012/11/73, 75; Clark, NDAR, 1:646 n. 2; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 2:142-143, 463; and Stark, Loyalists of Massachusetts, p. 350.


11 Review of Cowe's Claim, A012/101/106; Palmer, Loyalists, p. 127; Stephen Moylan to Colonel Joseph Reed, December 5, 1775, and editorial note, in Clark, NDAR, 2:1284, 1286 n. 2; Boston Gazette, January 1, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 3:554-555; Evidence on the Claim of Robert Pagan, PRO, A012/11/75; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 2:142-143; and Brown, King's Friends, p. 21.

12 Review of Cowe's Claim, PRO, A012/101/106.

13 Francis Green, quoted in Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:493

14 Ibid., 2:142.


16 Memorial of Joseph Taylor, PRO, A013/24/448.

17 Memorial of Geyer, PRO, A013/98/163.

18 Review of Cowe's Claim, PRO, A012/101/106.


21 Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:286.

22 Palmer, Loyalists, p. 495.

23 Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:273, 286-287, 397, 468, 479, 493-495, 525; Memorial of Wyer, PRO, A012/11/93; Machias Committee of Safety to the Massachusetts General Court, October 14, 1775, and Washington to Hancock, December 7, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2:445-446, 1322; London Chronicle, January 9-11, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 3:497; Memorial of Geyer, PRO, A013/98/168; Memorial of Joseph Taylor, and Account Estimate of Amory, Taylor and Rogers, March 21, 1775, PRO, A013/24/448,


26 Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:479.


28 Memorial of William Gallop, PRO, A013/50/376.

29 Memorial of Wyer, PRO, A012/11/93; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 2:462; and Account of Losses Sustained at Falmouth, October, 1775, in Baxter, Documentary History of Maine, 14:307.

30 Extract of Letter from Reverend Jacob Bailey, [October 17, 1775], in Clark, NDAR, 2:487; Evidence on the Claim of Robert Pagan, PRO, A012/11/75; Further Evidence on the Claim of Robert Pagan, PRO, A012/11/76; and Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 2:142.

31 Pomeroy's early activities at sea will be discussed in the more appropriate context of Nova Scotia in a following chapter.

32 Lieutenant Governor Thomas Oliver to Dartmouth, Boston, January 26, 1776, PRO, CO5/175/73.

and Chester G. Hearn, George Washington's Schooners: The First American Navy (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1995), pp. 128-129. In this last source, the General Gage is mistakenly treated as if she was a British naval vessel.

34 Watson to Washington, January 26, 1776, Extract of a Letter from Whitehaven, June 18, 1776, New England Chronicle, January 25-February 1, 1776, Boston Gazette, February 5, 1776 and editorial comments, in Clark NDAR, 3: 995, 996 ns. 2 and 3, 1031, 1033 n. 2, 1075-1076, 1076 n. 4, 1132-1133, 1133 n. 3; and Hearn, Washington's Schooners, pp. 128-129.

35 Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, and May 1, 1779, PRO, CO5/1109/82, 125; Memorial of Samuel Whitehorne, March 27, 1786, PRO, A013/24/502; Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 184, 676; Libel, Mathew Cozzins vs. sloop Reformation, December 4, 1782, PRO, HCA/443/c (CW); Edes's Boston Gazette, November 1, 1779, p. 3; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:526-527, 2:8, 398-399; Review of William Wanton's Claim, April 20, 1784, PRO, A012/100/223; and Leon Hühner, "Jews Interested in Privateering in America during the Eighteenth Century," Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society 24 (1915): 166.


38 Palmer, Loyalists, p. 243; Bond for privateer schooner York, Captain Thomas Hazard, January 31, 1783, PRO, HCA49/91/2/2; Libel, Cozzins vs. Reformation, PRO, HCA32/443/c (CW); and Memorial of Jacob Eckstein, n.d., PRO, A013/100/62.

39 Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 2:8, 398-399.

40 Brown, King's Friends, pp. 45, 259-260; Nelson, American Tory, p. 87; and Callahan, Flight from the Republic, p. 2; Memorial of Eckstein, PRO, A013/100/62; Memorial of Whitehorne, PRO, A013/24/502; Memorial of William Wanton, PRO, A012/100/223; Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 184, 243, 676; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:526-527, 2:398-399; and Dixon & Hunter's Virginia Gazette, July 10, 1778, p. 1. The two Hazards are included, because they were undoubtedly members of the Hazard clan, a well established Rhode Island Family.

41 Evidence on the Claim of James Hayt, November 14, 1786, PRO, A012/1/76; Evidence on the Claim of Elizabeth Rogers, November 21, 1786, PRO, A012/1/127; Memorial of Nathaniel Hubbard, n.d., PRO, A012/1/172; Memorial of John Taylor, November 10, 1784, in Hugh Edward Egerton, ed., The Royal Commission on the Losses and Services of American Loyalists 1783-1785: Being the Notes of Mr. Daniel Parker Coke, M.P. One of the Commissioners during that Period (Oxford: MDC-


43 Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 2:252; Gaine's New-York Gazette, May 13, 1782, p. 3; Rivington's Royal Gazette, July 14, 1781, p. 3.


45 Brown, King's Friends, p. 60; Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 347, 408, 604, 761; Memorial of Joseph Hait, February 24, 1786, PRO, A013/21/200; Memorial of Peters, PRO, AO12/99/30; and Evidence on the Claim of Joseph Clarke, February 5, 1787, PRO, A012/1/299.


47 Ibid. Though a native of Norwalk, Ketchum was actually residing in Hartford at the outbreak of hostilities; Memorial of Joseph Hait, PRO, AO12/21/200; Evidence on the Claim of James Hait, January 9, 1787, PRO, AO12/1/160; Evidence on the Claim of Hayt, PRO, AO12/1/76; Evidence on the Claim of Elizabeth Rogers, PRO, AO12/1/127; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 2:318; Evidence on the Claim of Clarke, PRO, AO12/1/99; and Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 407, 761.

48 Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, PRO, COS/1109/82.

49 Evidence on the Claim of Elizabeth Rogers, PRO, A012/1/127.


51 Hühner, "Jews Interested in Privateering," pp. 165-167; and Brown, King's Friends, p. 54.

52 Brown, King's Friends, pp. 46, 50-51, 55.

53 Review of William Wanton's Claim, PRO, A012/100/223; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 2:398-399; Diary of Dr. Ezra Stiles, [Newport] June 17, [1775], in Clark, NDAR, 1:705; and Diary of Stiles, December 26, [1775], and Brigadier General William West to Governor Nicholas Cooke, Middletown, January 24, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 3:257, 954.
54 Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 2:8; and Diary of Stiles, December 26, [1775], and West to Cooke, January 24, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 3:257, 954.

55 Memorial of Whitehorne, PRO, AO13/24/502.

56 New England Shipmasters to Rhode Island General Assembly, September 19, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2:156;157; Memorial of Sheddon & Goodrich, May 22, 1783, Headquarters Papers, 92/10109, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Library, Colonial Williamsburg; Gaine's New-York Gazette, June 24, 1782, p. 3; and The Gazette of the State of South-Carolina, November 4, 1777, p. 3.

57 Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 2:398-399.

58 Loyalist Claims Commissioners, Loyalist Transcripts VI, quoted in Brown, King's Friends, p. 52.

59 Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 2:8.

60 Memorial of Whitehorne, PRO, AO13/24/502.


63 Memorial of Peters, PRO, AO12/99/30; Evidence on the Claim of Hayt, PRO, AO12/1/76; Memorial of Hubbard, PRO, AO12/1/172; Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 372-373, 408, 740; and Memorial of Joseph Hait, PRO, AO13/21/200.

64 Memorial of Ketchum, PRO, AO12/1/310; and Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 460-461.


66 Memorial of John Taylor, in Egerton, Royal Commission, pp. 256-257; Memorial of Ketchum, and John Ketchum's Claim, May 13, 1787, PRO, AO12/1/310, 312; Memorial of Joseph Hait, PRO, AO13/21/200; Memorial of Peters, PRO, AO12/99/30; Evidence on the Claim of Hait, PRO, AO12/1/76; Evidence on the Claim of Elizabeth Rogers, PRO, AO12/1/127; Schedule of Nathaniel Hubbard's Real & Personal Estate, PRO, AO12/1/175; Evidence on the Claim of Clarke, PRO, AO12/1/99; Memorial of Whitehorne, PRO, AO13/24/502; Review of William Wanton's Claim, PRO, AO12/100/223; Memorial of Eckstein, PRO, AO13/100/62; Memorial of McNeil, Headquarters Papers, 76/8561, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Library, Colonial Williamsburg; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:526-527; and Palmer, Loyalists, PP. 156, 243, 348, 372, 408, 461, 604, 676, 686, 740.

67 Memorial of Whitehorne, PRO, AO13/24/502; Memorial of Eckstein, PRO, AO13/100/62; and Journal, H.M.S. Rose, Captain James Wallace, March 10, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:283.


Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:323-324, 397, 494; Memorial of Joseph Taylor, PRO, A013/24/448; and Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, PRO, C05/1109/82.

Memorial of Geyer, PRO, A013/98/163; and Providence Gazette, September 13, 1777, in Morgan, NDAR, 9:923.

Memorial of Joseph Taylor, PRO, A013/24/448.

Evidence on the Claim of Leonard, PRO, A012/10/406; and Palmer, Loyalists, p. 487.

Memorial of William Gallop, PRO, A013/50/376; Palmer, Loyalists, p. 304; Petition of William Lewis, PRO, A013/74/553; Review of Cowe's Claim, PRO, A012/101/106; Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, PRO, C05/1109/82; and Hathaway, "Account of Prisoners," p. 444.

Boston Gazette, December 13, 1779, p. 3; Vice Admiralty Register, RGI/496/527, Public Archives of Nova Scotia.

Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:273; Letter of Agency for the Captain and Officers of H.M.S. Glasgow, April 30, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:1322; Letter of Agency of the Captain and Officers of H.M.S. Milford, May 11, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 5:45; Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, PRO, C05/1109/82; and Vice Admiralty Register, RGI/496/164, 514, 516, 531, 539, 543, 545, Public Archives of Nova Scotia.

Claim of Perry, PRO, A013/93/158; and Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, May 1, 1779, PRO, C05/1109/125.

Memorial of Wyer, PRO, A012/11/93; Evidence on the Claim of Wyer, PRO, A012/11/97; Thomas Bradbury to Jer. Powell, Falmouth, August 29, 1779, in Baxter, Documentary History of Maine, 16:238-239; Petition of Barbara Ross, September 1, 1780, and Petition of Codman, [September, 1780], in Baxter, Documentary History of Maine, 18:386, 387; Evidence on the Claim of Robert Pagan, PRO, A012/11/75; Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, PRO, C05/1109/82; and Stevens, Records of the Chamber of Commerce, p. 302.

80 Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:286, 383; Gaine's New-York Gazette, March 31, 1777, p. 2. The reference in the New-York Gazette initially seems to refer to a Captain Ponversoy. The printing, however, was roughly executed, the type was poorly set, and the type-script of several letters was irregular, not matching any other in the edition. The print has also deteriorated with age and there are indications it has been enhanced by hand. Consequently after close examination it seems likely the reference is to a Captain Pomeroy, in essence, Pomeroy. Richard Pomeroy was the only known privateer captain operating on the Nova Scotia/Maine coast with a name resembling this.

81 Petition of Barbara Ross, September 1, 1780, and Petition of Codman, [September, 1780], in Baxter, Documentary History of Maine, 18:386, 387.


83 Review of William Wanton's Claim, PRO, AO12/100/223; Memorial of Whitehorne, PRO, AO13/24/502; Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, and Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, May 1, 1779, PRO, CO5/1109/82, 125; Boston Gazette, November 1, 1779, p. 3; Deposition of John Horan, in National Archives, Revolutionary War Prize Cases, M162/6/50; Sheffield, Privateers of Newport, p. 32; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:526, 2:398-399; Libel, Cozzins vs. Reformation, PRO, HCA32/443/c (CW); Memorial of Eckstein, PRO, AO13/100/62; and Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 243, 676.

84 Evidence on the Claim of Hayt, PRO, AO12/1/76; Evidence on the Claim of Elizabeth Rogers, PRO, AO12/1/127; Evidence on the Claim of James Hait, PRO, AO12/1/160; Memorial of Hubbard, PRO, AO12/1/172; Evidence on the Claim of Clarke, PRO, AO12/1/299; Memorial of Ketchum, PRO, AO12/1/310; Memorial of Joseph Hait, PRO, AO13/21/200; Memorial of McNeil, Headquarters Papers, 76:8561, John D. Rockefeller Jr. Library, Colonial Williamsburg; Gaine's New-York Gazette, May 13, 1782, p. 3; and Rivington's Royal Gazette, July 14, 1781, p. 3; Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, PRO, CO5/1109/82; Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 156, 407, 604, 761; Memorial of John Taylor, in Egeron, Royal Commission, pp. 256-257; Hathaway, "Account of Prisoners," p. 444; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 2:8; and Dixon & Hunter's Virginia Gazette, July 10, 1778, p. 1.

85 Memorial of Joseph Taylor, PRO, AO13/24/448; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:525; Stephen Moylan to Colonel Joseph Reed, Cambridge, December 5, 1775, and Washington, to Hancock, December 7, 1775, in Clarke, NDAR, 2:1284, 1322; Evidence on the Claim of Hayt, PRO, AO12/1/76; Evidence on the Claim of Elizabeth Rogers, PRO, AO12/1/127; Evidence on the Claim of Clark, PRO, AO12/1/299; Review of William Wanton's Claim, PRO, AO12/100/223; Memorial of John Taylor, in Egeron, Royal Commission, pp. 256-257; Memorial of McNeil, Headquarters Papers, 76:8561, John D. Rockefeller Jr. Library, Colonial Williams-
burg; Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 243, 676; and Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:525.

86 Memorial of Ketchum, PRO, A012/1/310; Memorial of Eckstein, PRO, A013/100/62; Memorial of Joseph Hait, PRO, A013/21/200; and Memorial of John Taylor, in Egerton, Royal Commission, pp. 256-257.

87 Memorial of William Gallop, PRO, A013/50/376; Evidence on the Claim of Linnekin, PRO, A012/11/151; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:286; and Palmer, Loyalists, p. 243, 407.

88 Evidence on the Claim of Wyer, PRO, A012/11/97.

89 Evidence on the Claim of Linnekin, PRO, A012/11/97.

90 Review of Cowe's Claim, PRO, A012/101/106.

91 Evidence on the Claim of Leonard, PRO, A012/10/406; Palmer, Loyalists, p. 604; and Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:273, 494.

92 Evidence on the Claim of Hayt, PRO, A012/1/76.

93 Memorial of Joseph Hait, PRO, A013/21/200.

94 Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:273, 494.

95 The South-Carolina and American General Gazette, May 29, 1779, p. 2.

96 Palmer, Loyalists, p. 243; and Review of William Wanton's Claim, PRO, A012/100/223.

97 Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, May 1, 1779, and Account of Warrants Issued by Governor Tryon, May 1, to July 31, 1779, PRO, C05/1109/82, 125, 170; Palmer, Loyalists, p. 676; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:495; Memorial of Whitehorne, PRO, A013/24/502; Memorial of Joseph Taylor, PRO, A013/24/448; Agreement respecting the sloop General Leslie, March 3, 1779, Lovering/Taylor Papers, Box 9, Financial and Business Papers/Associated Loyalists, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Memorial of John Taylor, in Egerton, Royal Commission, p. 257; Vice Admiralty Register, RG1/496/164, 514, 516, 531, 539, 543, 545, Nova Scotia Public Archives; and Dixon & Hunter's Virginia Gazette, July 10, 1778, p. 1.

98 Palmer, Loyalists, p. 676.

99 Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, and Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, May 1, 1779, PRO, C05/1109/82, 125; Deposition of Horan, National Archives, Revolutionary War Prize Cases, M162/6/50; Evidence on the Claim of Wyer, PRO, A012/11/97; Sheffield, Privateers of Newport, pp. 32-33; Claim of Jacob Rogers, PRO, A012/105/18; Claim of Antill Gallop, PRO, A013/26/125; Petition of William Lewis, PRO, A013/74/553; Memorial of Ketchum, PRO, A012/1/310; Gaine's, New-York Gazette, July 2, 1781, p. 1, July 9, 1781, p. 3, and May 13, 1782, p. 3; Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 407, 461; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:286, 383, 462, 2:252; Text and Journal of Rev. Bailey, quoted in Mullane, "Privateers of Nova Scotia," pp. 39, 41; Massachusetts Board of War to Captains Simeon Samson and
Jonathan Haraden, November 21, 1777, Massachusetts Archives, Vol. 157, Massachusetts Maritime Miscellaneous, P. 93, Massachusetts State Archives, Boston, Massachusetts (see also in NDAR, 10:555-556); Rivington's Royal Gazette, September 19, 1778, p. 3; Gaine's New-York Gazette, June 19, 1780, p. 3; Parole of Cushing, August 31, 1780, in Baxter, Documentary History of Maine, 18:384; Vice Admiralty Register, RG1/496/283, 383, 496, 518, 527, Nova Scotia Public Archives; Edes's Boston Gazette, December 13, 1779, p. 3; Perkins, Diary, text and editorial note, 2:14-15, 14 n.4; Little to Governor, November 3, 1782, in Baxter, Documentary History of Maine, 20:129; Libel, Cozzins vs. Reformation, PRO, HCA32/443/c (CW); Account Book of Musquito, pp. 1-2, Papers of Joseph M. Toner, Box 279, Library of Congress; and Wilber H. Siebert, "Privateering in Florida Waters and Northwards in the Revolution," Florida Historical Quarterly, XXII (October, 1943): 73. In his Memorial, Antill Gallop does not specifically state he was captain of a privateer. He only says he commanded a vessel called the Sir Andrew Hammond. At least two vessels of this name existed and both are known to have been privateers. While Gallop is not mentioned as captain of either, it is entirely possible he was the skipper of one or another at a different time. Knox's Bermuda Prize List, February 14, 1781, PRO, CO37/22, typescript copy at Naval History Center, Washington, D.C.; and Vice Admiralty Register, RG1/496/433, 539, Public Archives of Nova Scotia.

100 Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, May 1, 1779, PRO, CO5/1109/125; Bond for York, PRO, HCA49/91/2/2; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:525; Hathaway, "Account of Prisoners," pp. 444-445; and Memorial of Eckstein, PRO, A013/100/62.

101 Memorial of Leonard, PRO, A012/10/394; Evidence on the Claim of Leonard, PRO, A012/10/406; and Palmer, Loyalists, p. 487.

102 Palmer, Loyalists, p. 761; and Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 2:318.

103 Memorial of Peters, PRO, A012/99/30.

104 Memorial of William Gallop, PRO, A013/50/376; Review of Cowe's Claim, PRO, A012/101/106; and Palmer, Loyalists, p. 408.

105 Evidence on the Claim of Linnekin, April 5, 1787, PRO, A012/11/151.

106 Memorial of Joseph Hait, PRO, A013/21/200; Evidence on the Claim of James Hait, PRO, A012/1/160; Evidence on the Claim of Clarke, PRO, A012/1/299; Memorial of Hubbard, PRO, A012/1/172; and Palmer, Loyalists, p. 156, 347, 487, 604.
CHAPTER 7

"IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE UNHAPPY DISSENSIONS:” THE LOYALIST PRIVATEERS OF THE DELAWARE BAY AND NEW JERSEY MARITIME REGION

The mid-Atlantic coastal area of New Jersey and Delaware Bay, with Philadelphia as the region’s key port, also produced its share of loyalist privateersmen. Background information exists for forty-nine of these individuals from the three colonies comprising the region, New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania. While data concerning some of these men is limited and sketchy, it is sufficient to show that while the mid-Atlantic loyalist privateers conform to the broader image of loyalists in general in terms of diversity, they nevertheless exhibit some significant regional variation in relation to privateers elsewhere. Most noticeable is the fact that while there were a considerable number of mariners from the area, the number of merchants who would become involved in privateering was proportionately smaller in comparison with other regional groups. At the same time, there was also an increased ratio of men representing other occupational backgrounds. Although a strong urban element existed, and the majority could claim coastal status (though marginal in some instances), there was also a high proportion of men from rural environments. There is no evidence of racial involvement, and ethnic presence was minimal. Information on place of birth shows a mix of native and foreign born for the region as a whole, but significant variations between the colonies comprising it. Another notable aspect of these men that departs from
Figure 5: The Delaware Bay and New Jersey Maritime Region.
the norm elsewhere, is that there was a high instance of not only neutral behavior, but equivocal as well. Also, although there are examples of rebel affronts, they were not as widespread as in other areas.

One characteristic of the region's privateers in which deviation from other regions is apparent is occupation. With fifteen individuals representing all three colonies, the merchant element which would become involved in privateering, while still substantial in number, nevertheless constituted a comparatively smaller proportion of the known whole and was not as significant a factor as in other areas. The men of this group included William Luce and John Stites of Elizabethtown, New Jersey, William Burton of New Brunswick, New Jersey, Edmund Seaman of Hackensack, New Jersey, Thomas Crowell of Monmouth County, New Jersey, Joseph Shoemaker (brother of noted loyalist Samuel Shoemaker), Benjamin Booth, and David Sproat of Philadelphia, William Caldwell of Union Township, Pennsylvania, James Rankin of York Township, Pennsylvania, Nehemiah Field, Samuel Edwards, and Levin Turner of Sussex County, Delaware, and Jacob Caulk of Newcastle County, Delaware. Merchant Thomas Skelton hailed from New Jersey as well, but his exact place of residence is unknown.

The already comparatively diminished presence of the region's mercantile faction should probably be lowered even more. There are indications that Burton's, Rankin's, Field's, and Edwards' involvement in trade was either a secondary occupation or one they moved into after being deprived of their usual sources of income due to the war. A document pertaining to their later privateering activities clearly refers to them as merchants, but in materials referencing their pre- and early war existences, there is no mention of such activities, and as will be seen, at that time, their efforts were directed elsewhere.

While a proportionately smaller number of merchants is in keeping with the general, established loyalist profiles for New Jersey and
Delaware, it is at odds with that for Pennsylvania. There, mostly associated with the urban center of Philadelphia, the commercial elements held a dominant place in the loyalists ranks. Yet, in contrast with other locales this group seemingly produced proportionately fewer privateers. This discrepancy may be accounted for by the fact that many of the merchants were Quakers, as such, were loath become involved in anything warlike.

Another deviation is evident with the place of residence of these merchants. While the majority of men from New Jersey and Pennsylvania were typically urban dwellers, a noticeable rural element existed as well. This factor was even more in evidence in Delaware where all concerned were from such an environment. These rural merchants were in contrast with the merchant groups elsewhere who entered into privateering.

On the other hand, and more in keeping with the scheme of things, evidence points to the region having produced a significant number of experienced seamen. Logically, the majority of Pennsylvania mariners were associated with the port and urban center of Philadelphia. This group included William Austin, John Henderson (previously of Georgia), Jacob Getsheus (sometimes Gatcheus), William Raddon, John Papley, and Robert White. Gideon Vernon came from Providence Township, Chester County. Merchants Shoemaker and Caldwell were mariners as well. Finally, seafarer Samuel Saunders, if not from the colony, was undoubtedly from the region. He joined the British at Philadelphia. With regards to all but Getsheus, Henderson, Raddon, and White, marine skills are surmised on the basis that all later served as pilots or captains of privateers.

With the mariners of New Jersey and Delaware, a unique situation is also encountered in terms of their environs. While still coastal, as one might expect, here, too, there was a strong rural element. This
is actually in keeping with the nature of loyalism in general within both colonies, but it is atypical for privateersmen. A significant majority of New Jersey mariners was concentrated in Monmouth County. Morford Taylor, Conrad Hendricks of Monmouth Township, and Philip White, Clayton Tilton, and Richard Lippincott of Shrewsbury, resided within its boundaries, as did Crowell who was a master mariner as well as a merchant. Luce, who was also a seafarer, and John Cox of Woolwich Township, Gloucester County, were the exceptions. Apart from Cox, Crowell, Luce, and Tilton the seafaring abilities of these men is again based on their later service as pilots, privateer captains, or ship's officers.

Nine individuals constitute Delaware's identifiable contribution to the loyalist privateering community. Of these, at least six were skilled mariners. Little is known of the background of Joseph Hewes Burton other than that he was from the colony and clearly possessed seafaring experience given his later command of a privateer. As to the other men, Levin Turner, William Milby, Edwards, and Field were all from Sussex County, and the last three were pilots. Milby also owned and skippered a merchantman, and Field was master of a trading vessel as well. There was also Jesse Turner. His place of residence is unknown, but he is often mentioned in association with Levin Turner, suggesting some family relationship between the two, and they were therefore, probably from the same locale. Both Jesse's and Levin's expertise as seamen is derived from the fact both later commanded privateers. Finally, there are indications that Jacob Caulk either owned or was master of a vessel.

The rural background of these men is further emphasized by the fact that no less than six of the New Jersey and Delaware mariners, Field, Milby, Edwards, Taylor, Cox and Hendricks, and two of the merchants, Stites and Burton, referred to themselves as being farmers or
substantial landowners. In fact, in the case of all but Cox and Stite, working the land is emphasized as the primary occupation. Cox is of note for the fact that while distinctly referring to himself as a professional seaman, he also mentions having cleared seventy-four of his one-hundred and eighty-three plus acres, indicating he was at least contemplating a career change to the more staid existence of a farmer. Three additional New Jersey privateers were specifically tied to the land. Northurp Marple of Gloucester Township possessed several estates one of which was comprised of three-hundred acres of undeveloped land. Joseph Williams of Shrewsbury, Monmouth County, possessed a modest estate. Elijah Groom of Middlesex County raised livestock on his father's farm. In Pennsylvania, Gideon Vernon was a landowner, too. In fact, the data available on him indicates his estate was his primary concern.  

Taking this a step further, various levels of rural wealth were represented by this group. Taylor, with four-thousand acres, and Marple clearly were men of substance. Burton described his eighty-four acres as fit for the life-style of a gentleman. Representative of more middle-class, yeoman farmers were Field, Edwards and Milby. Groom, it would seem, represented the lower end of the economic spectrum.

The high rate of agrarian occupation is, in turn, reflective of another unique aspect of the region's privateers. There was a comparatively high rate of non-mercantile and non-maritime oriented individuals. White, clearly qualified as a seaman, was actually a carpenter by profession. Jacob Bostwick of Newcastle County, Delaware, was also a carpenter, and there are indications Caulk, too, could add that skill to his growing list of occupations. In the same vein, Daniel McDonald was a joiner from Philadelphia. John Connel of Chester County, Pennsylvania, was a school master, and Daniel Coxe of New Jersey was both a barrister and an attorney. Princeton graduate Jonathan Odell, resi-
dent of Burlington County, New Jersey, was the rector of churches at Burlington and Mount Holly. He was also a missionary for the Society of the Propagation of the Gospel.¹⁴

Four men from the region held public office. William Morris was High Constable at Philadelphia. Rankin served as a member of the Pennsylvania Assembly. Robert White acted as a Warden of the Port of Philadelphia. William Franklin was Governor of New Jersey.¹⁵

Several additional men can be linked to these colonies but additional pertinent, background information is limited. Aaron White, Philip's brother, was probably from Monmouth County, New Jersey as well. Charles McClain, Charles McBride, William Ryan, and James Thompson came from Pennsylvania. Indications are that John McDonald came from that colony as well. If not, the fact he joined the British at Philadelphia supports he was probably from the region. Finally, there was William Caulk of Newcastle County, Delaware.¹⁶

Demographic concentrations can be ascertained. In New Jersey, a pattern similar to that in Connecticut can be discerned. The majority of individuals were concentrated in the coastal areas of the four counties closest to New York City, Monmouth, Middlesex, Essex, and Bergen. A few more were scattered in Gloucester and Burlington Counties across the Delaware River from Philadelphia. In other words, concentrations exist close to spheres of British influence. In Pennsylvania, the vast majority of the men in question hailed from Philadelphia. These patterns are in keeping with those for Loyalists in general from both colonies.¹⁷ Delaware is of note because of the relatively large number of mariners from Sussex County. In addition, several additional men came from Newcastle county.

Data on place of birth is best for New Jersey. There, Luce, Williams, Philip and Aaron White, Cox, Tilton, Stite, Hendricks, Groom, Lippincott, and Odell were natives, while Burton had only recently ar-
rived from England in 1772, and Skelton had come from Jamaica in 1771. This dominance of natives over immigrants is in line with the view of the colony's loyalists in general. Similar information for Pennsylvania is extremely limited. Rankin was the only identifiable native. Caldwell was from England, and Henderson, Sproat, and Robert White were Scots. Sproat had arrived in 1760. Though hardly a representative figure, the fact four out of five men were immigrants does comply with the established view of Pennsylvania loyalists. Nothing is known about the birth places of any of the Delaware men.

As elsewhere, there existed family and professional ties between some of these men. The Caulks were brothers, as were Philip and Aaron White, and if the Turners were not, they were, in all likelihood, related. Lippincott and the Whites were brothers-in-law. Having joined the British together, it is evident Sussex County pilots Field and Edwards maintained at least a professional relationship, and it would be surprising to find they were not associated with Milby.

Somewhat surprisingly, especially in light of Philadelphia's cosmopolitan order, among the region's loyalist privateers, no evidence of racial minorities has been discerned, and apart from a few Scots, that for ethnic minorities is very minimal. With the exception of Getsheus, the majority of surnames suggest English ancestries.

The region does, however, offer a rare glimpse of the religious affiliations of three men. Odell was Anglican. Williams and Shoemaker were Quakers.

Only one individual, Crowell, has been identified as having prior experience with privateering. During the Seven Years War, he commanded a cruiser out of New York.

The region is unique in that no other area produced as many identifiable privateers who were initially passive or neutral. This is very much in keeping with the established view of the nature of loy-
alism in general in at least New Jersey and Pennsylvania where such trends have been ascertained. One historian has attributed the number of passive loyalists, and as will be seen, equivocal ones as well, to the fact the people were, by nature, generally peaceful or politically moderate. In conjunction, the region exemplifies the effect a British military presence could have fostering a sense of security that allowed individuals to confidently and openly declare their loyalty.

Of the forty men for whom it is known when they declared for the British, only five, Caldwell and Morris of Pennsylvania, and Odell, Burton, and Luce, of New Jersey did so in 1775. In fact, Luce is reported to have been the first man in New Jersey to oppose the rebellion. Burton, reflecting an impulse to avoid the developing situation, left for England upon hearing news of the fight at Lexington. While this act clearly defined Burton's loyalist sentiments it also marked his initial desire to avoid trouble and maintain a state of neutrality.

Of those remaining, based on what is known of them, twenty-four can be classified as initially passive or neutral. In New Jersey, six men, all from eastern counties, did not declare themselves until 1776, and in all but one instance in which a more specific date is known, it coincides with the establishment of British control over nearby New York or their consequent occupation of the colony. Hendricks made his position clear earlier in the year. Williams and Coxe did not join the British until 1777, and Cox did not join them until 1778. Coxe's response to affairs is of interest. Despite the fact he was not in the rebel's good graces, rather than join the British when they arrived in 1776, he opted to remove to rebel-held Philadelphia instead. In Pennsylvania, the men in question were even slower to make their position known. It was not until at least 1777 that another nine men joined the British at Philadelphia. Papley did not declare until December, 1778,
long after the British had evacuated the region, and it was 1780 when Daniel McDonald sided with the King. In Delaware, Milby did not confirm his position until May, 1776, and Bostwick and the Caulk brothers were not open loyalists until 1781.

In addition to having the highest rate of initially passive privateers, the region is also noteworthy for having the most equivocal. Again, this is in keeping with the nature of loyalism in general for the area. All of the eleven remaining men began the war openly supporting the rebels in one way or another. In turn, the majority came from Pennsylvania. Rankin's situation is of note and also somewhat confusing. Initially, he must have maintained a degree of support for the British in light of the fact that at some point in 1776 he was in trouble with rebel powers for speaking his mind. At that time he formally confessed "that he had publicly misrepresented and personally insulted the Whig Committee of York." Asking to be forgiven, Rankin promised "on the faith and honor of an honest man, to respect the Continental Congress and behave as a good citizen." That same year, he both served in the Pennsylvania Assembly and held the rank of colonel of rebel militia. There is, however, some contradiction between his activities in that by one account he resigned his colonelcy after hearing of the Declaration for Independence, indicating a break with the rebels at that time, but by another, he maintained his seat in the assembly until October of the same year. Whatever the exact sequence of events, it is apparent Rankin suffered a degree of equivocalness.

Robert White was a member of the Pennsylvania Committee of Safety. In Philadelphia, as late as January, 1777, Sproat was acting as a business agent - for rebel naval vessels. He joined the British at New York shortly after.

Stites, Lippincott, and Shoemaker also served in rebel military units. Stites took the rebel oath of association and both he and Lip-
pincott trained with the New Jersey militia. To Stites' credit, when push came to shove, he refused to actually present a musket at British troops. Lippincott joined the British in October, 1776. Shoemaker actually held a commission as an officer in the rebel army. The Declaration of Independence evidently gave some of these men reason to reconsider their position and marked a turning point in their dissidence. The account of Rankin having resigned his commission over the matter has already been noted. Shoemaker did the same upon hearing of the colonies' intention. Obviously for such men, a complete break from England was going too far.  

Two men, McBride and Edwards were in the Pennsylvania State Navy. McBride served on a galley. Edwards commanded a small patrol vessel, but perhaps to his credit, he was dismissed, because the rebels thought little of his zeal and attention to duty. He joined the British in August, 1777, and McBride deserted and changed his allegiance at some point during the occupation of Philadelphia.

Getsheus, Field, Raddon, and Robert White each commanded merchantmen in rebel service. Of interest is the fact that like the Goodrichs, Getsheus and Field were contracted to procure and transport arms and munitions for the rebels. In the course of this undertaking, Getsheus was captured and confined in the Whitby prison ship. Those who worked for his exchange deemed him a "very honest" master. Raddon and White, too, were captured and lost vessels to the British. After escaping, Raddon took command of a rebel letter of marque, and later, he was captured again in a third vessel. Field adopted his pro-British stance in August, 1777, and Getsheus did the same at some point during that year. White joined the British at Philadelphia in 1778. When Raddon went over is unknown, but it was no earlier than April, 1777.

Of interest is the trio of Milby, Field, and Edwards. All were yeoman farmers and pilots from Sussex County Delaware, and all joined
the British. In fact, after serving the rebels, Field and Edwards crossed over together. The unanswerable question is whether or not these men also shared some common motive for joining the British. One possible hint is that early in the war, Edwards was among a group of pilots who presented a petition of grievances to the Continental Congress. They maintained that existing rules governing pilotage were unfair. To the detriment of the pilots at the mouth of the Delaware Bay, Philadelphia pilots legally received preferential treatment having priority to operate on the bay and river. This and his lack of enthusiasm for commanding a rebel vessel indicates that Edwards was not happy.  

Generally, because of the moderate nature of the people in combination with the area's initial remoteness from the scene of action, it appears the denizens of the region were able to co-exist until the arrival of the British brought the focus of activity to their doorsteps and coaxed or forced a show of hands. This is supported by the fact that unlike other areas, in the early stages, the persecution of loyalists was comparatively minimal. Nevertheless, there were instances of avowed loyalists being persecuted, and when they occurred, they were serious.

For his early defense of the loyalist position, Luce awoke one morning to find the mob had erected a gallows in front of his door. Sensibly intimidated, he fled to the West Indies. In October, 1775, an incriminating letter penned by Odell was intercepted and resulted in his arrest. Considered an enemy, he was arrested again in 1776 and confined to the limits of his parish. Then, on December 12 of that year, the crew of a rebel galley came ashore with the intent of securing him dead or alive. In the ensuing house to house search, Odell managed to elude his pursuers until his parishioners were unable to hide him any longer. At that point, he sought refuge within the Brit-
ish lines. In Pennsylvania, in 1775, Caldwell was tried by the Committee of Safety, perhaps facing Robert White while doing so. This resulted in his store's merchandise being confiscated. Worse, he was the recipient of a coat of tar and feathers.

Persecution escalated when the arrival of the British drew people out. Several individuals were arrested, including Governor William Franklin. Hendricks was seized and tried several times, but he could not be convicted. Lippincott and Cox were apprehended for aiding the British, and then escaped. Milby was imprisoned twice, first for aiding the British and then when his vessel was taken by a rebel privateer. Although not actually jailed, Coxe, the recipient of abundant insults, thought the potentiality of incarceration real enough that he decided to flee. Crowell, Skelton (for associating with the British), and Sproat were also forced to depart their respective colonies.

As in all areas, the stance these men took resulted in at least the majority losing considerably in terms of real estate, personal property, business, merchandise, livestock, and shipping. Also as elsewhere, families were split. Caldwell, Skelton, Philip White, and possibly Papley were forced to leave wives and children behind. In fact, as a result of a nocturnal visit to the Jersey shore, possibly to visit his family, White would be captured and brutally executed. In the case of Governor Franklin, his lengthy imprisonment effectively separated him from his wife. Distraught over the situation, she passed away, it is said, from a broken heart.

Again at least a couple of these men suffered losses to the British. After Coxe fled his home, the British arrived and billeted a Hessian contingent in it. Apparently the structure did not fare well during their tenancy. With Milby, the ill-effects of the Prohibitory Act on loyalist merchants can again be seen. He, too, lost a vessel to the Royal Navy under the Act's authority. Adding insult to injury,
when Milby put in a post-war claim for his loss, the British government rejected it on the grounds that he had not followed proper procedure. 48

The destination of forty-six of these men is known. While a number first spent time in Philadelphia during the British occupation, ultimately, after departing their respective colonies, all but two turned up in New York. This figure includes Luce who returned from the West Indies, and Burton who came back from England. The three remaining men were Bostwick, Jacob Caulk, and Daniel McDonald. The first two intended for New York, but the former was taken prisoner before arriving, and Caulk decided rather quickly that privateering was not for him. Whether or not McDonald had actually been to New York before joining a privateer and being captured is unknown. 49

At both Philadelphia and New York, a number of these individuals were involved in activities, other than privateering, that reflected their high level of personal commitment. In a naval capacity, Milby and Henderson acted as pilots, while Austin, as a master's mate, and Cox served on naval vessels. 50 Sproat, Odell, as a chaplain, Williams, Groom, Lippincott, Tilton, Crowell, Luce, Hendricks, Connel, and Thompson all served with provincial commands or the British Army. 51 Coxe was influential in raising the New Jersey Volunteers. 52 Marple, Vernon, and Caldwell acted as guides for the British, and Caldwell and Groom conducted espionage activities. In fact, Caldwell was caught at one point and sentenced to be executed, but escaped. 53

Others acted behind the scenes conducting essential functions and performing public duties. In addition to their naval service, both Milby and Cox were involved supplying provisions to the British forces. 54 At Philadelphia, Coxe was appointed Magistrate of Police, Morris was Coroner and a constable, Odell was Superintendent of the Printing Office, and Henderson was made Warden of the Port. 55 At New
York, Crowell became Warden of the Port, Burton and Sproat, successively, held the post of Commissary General of Naval Prisoners, and Sproat also filled in as Commissary of Prisoners for the Army. Also, Odell acted as General Sir Guy Carleton's French and Spanish translator while Coxe served as a peace commissioner.

Then, there was the privateering activity of these men. Nine of these men invested in cruisers or letters of marque as owners. This group included Stites, Skelton, Seaman, Edwards, Field, Burton, Sproat, Booth, and Rankin. Fourteen, Cox, Philip White, Hewes Burton, Shoemaker, Getsheus, Raddon, Papley, Henderson, Jesse Turner, Robert White, Austin, Taylor, Vernon, and Lippincott commanded vessels. The last two did so with the Associated Loyalists. Caldwell, Crowell, Milby, and Levin Turner were both owners and skippers. Lesser officers were represented by Hendricks who served as a Lieutenant, Ryan who acted as a Captain of Marines, and Saunders who was a pilot. Groom, Bostwick, the Caulk brothers, Connel, McBride, McClain, both McDonalds, Thompson, and Aaron White were crew members. New Jersey, like Connecticut, produced a number of men who would become Associated Loyalists. Two have been mentioned. Others were Williams, Marple, Luce, Morris, and Tilton. Coxe was on the Board of that organization and Odell served as Assistant Secretary. Franklin was President.

As in the New England regions, indications are that the Delaware Bay and New Jersey privateers were primarily of British heritage and a large proportion were native born. Their varied occupational background shows that at least many these men were established and respected. The high level of neutral behavior conveys that they were initially quite moderate in their political views. The high rate of equivocalness indicates that others were quite confused. Once they became active loyalists, however, their level of commitment, as exempli-
fied not only by their privateering, but also the other roles many performed, was unquestionable.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 7

1Petition of William Milby, April 6, 1789, PRO, AO13/26/248.

2Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 121, 126, 251, 271, 529, 715, 769; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 2:210, 310, 324, 482, 514; Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, PRO, C05/1109/82; Rivington's Royal Gazette, March 31, 1779, p. 2; Commission for privateer boat, Tartar, Captain Joseph Mulliner, May 18, 21st year of the reign, Hartford Maritime Court, RG3/653/1481, Connecticut State Library and Archives; Notice of Inquisition, Monmouth County, July 29, 1778, in Archives of the State of New Jersey, second series, Documents Relating to the Revolutionary History of the State of New Jersey, vol. II, Francis B. Lee, ed., Extracts from Newspapers, 1778 (Trenton, New Jersey: The John Murphy Publishing Co., 1903), pp. 386-387; Memorial of David Sproat, n.d., PRO, AO12/42/345; Claim of Nehemiah Field, February 28, 1786, PRO, AO13/26/103; Bonds for privateer barge, Hunter, Captain Jesse Turner, November 21, 1782, and Captain Samuel Herbert, March 11, 1783, PRO, HCA49/91/2/4, 61; and Examination of Caspar Israelow, May 3, 1781, and Examination of Jacob Bostwick, May 3, 1781, Commonwealth vs. Caspar Israelow (Israelow), Record Group 33, Records of the Supreme Court, Eastern District, Court of Admiralty, Proceedings, 1781, Division of Archives and Manuscripts (Pennsylvania State Archives), Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

3Palmer, Loyalists, p. 789; and Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, PRO, C05/1109/82.

4Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 121, 251, 271, 715; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 2:210, 514; Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, PRO, C05/1109/82; and List of Property Lost by Nehemiah Field, February 28, 1786, PRO, AO13/26/103.

5Brown, King's Friends, pp. 111, 120-121, 141, 159, 161-162.

6ibid., p. 141.

7Dr. Liam Riordan, personal communication.

8Memorial of William Austin, n.d., PRO, AO12/40/56; Evidence on the Claim of William Austin, April 3, 1786, PRO, AO12/40/56; Memorial of John Henderson, June 6, 1787, PRO, AO12/42/362; Extract, List of ...vessels...cleared Outward, Annapolis, Maryland, 1774, in Clark, NDAR, 1:1362; Willing, Morris & Co. to Gregory & Guille in Barcelona, March 1, 1776, and Deposition of William Raddon, March 5, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:128, 184; Gaine's New-York Gazette, July 9, 1781, p. 3; Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 126, 377, 892, 924; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:465, 2: 141, 301, 574; and Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, and July 31, 1779, PRO, C05/1109/82, 170.
9Brown, King's Friends, PP. 111, 117, 120-121, 159, 161-162.


11Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 2:490, 514, 557; Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 251, 271, 605; Commission of privateer schooner Foxe, Captain Joseph Hughes (Hewes) Burton, November 7, 22nd year of the reign, Hartford Maritime Court, RG3/652/1376, Connecticut State Library and Archives; Examinations of Israelow and Bostwick, Commonwealth vs. Israelow, RG33, Court of Admiralty, Proceedings, 1781, Pennsylvania State Archives; Henry Fisher and Delaware Bay Pilots to the Pennsylvania Committee of Safety, Lewes Town, September, 27, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2:220; Editorial note, Extract of a Letter from the Commanding Officer at Lewes, April 9, 1776, and Pennsylvania Gazette, April 17, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 4:701 n. 2, 741, 871; Intelligence from the Delaware Capes, August 22, 1777, 8 o'clock a.m., in Morgan, NDAR, 9:696; An Estimate of Losses Sustained by William Milby, February 7, 1786, PRO, A013/26/245; and Bond for Hunter, November 21, 1782, PRO, HCA49/91/2/61.


13Estimate of Losses of Marple, and Evidence on the Claim of Marple, PRO, A012/16/361, 362; Property Lost by Field, PRO, A013/26/104; Losses Sustained by Groom, and Evidence on the Claim of Groom, PRO, A012/16/426, 427; Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 251, 271, 344, 585-586, 849; and Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 2:557.

14Mayo, Washington's Dilemma, p. 77; Examination of Bostwick, Commonwealth vs. Israelow, RG33, Court of Admiralty, Proceedings, 1781
Pennsylvania State Archives; Indictment, Commonwealth vs. Donald McDaniel, July, 1781, Record Group 33, Records of the Supreme Court, Eastern District, Court of Admiralty, Proceedings, 1781-1788, Division of Archives and Manuscripts (Pennsylvania State Archives), Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. In this particular document, the name given is Donald McDaniel, but in several others in the same group pertaining to the same case and individual, the name is Daniel McDonald. Therefore, based on weight of evidence, it is assumed Daniel McDonald is the correct name; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:330; Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 183, 653; and Memorial of Jonathan Odell, March 23, 1784, and Evidence on the Claim of Jonathan Odell, February 28, 1787, PRO, A012/16/296, 302.

15Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 626, 715, 924.
16Mayo, Washington's Dilemma, p. 78; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 2:54, 250, 551, 552, 586; and Examination of Bostwick, Commonwealth vs. Israelow, RG33, Court of Admiralty, Proceedings, 1781, Pennsylvania State Archives.

17Brown, King's Friends, pp. 117-118, 138-139.
18Evidence on the Forgoing Memorial of William Luce, February 18, 1785, PRO, A012/13/344; Mayo, Washington's Dilemma, p. 77-78; Memorial of Clayton Tilton, February 22, 1790, PRO, A013/112/381; Evidence on the Claim of Lippincott, PRO, A012/16/332; and Palmer, Loyalists, 121, 183, 344, 377, 509, 653, 798, 832, 934.

19Brown, King's Friends, p. 118; and Jones, Loyalists of New Jersey, pp. 6-7.
20Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 126, 715, 817, 924.
21Brown, King's Friends, pp. 140-141.
22Examination of Bostwick, Commonwealth vs. Israelow, RG33, Court of Admiralty, Proceedings, 1781, Pennsylvania State Archives; Mayo, Washington's Dilemma, p. 78; George T. Dennison quoted in Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 2:19, and Intelligence from the Delaware Capes, August 17, 1776, in Morgan, N DAR, 9:696.

23Memorial of Odell, and Evidence on the Claim of Odell, PRO, A012/16/296, 302; Testimonial of John Leonard for Joseph Williams, with Evidence on the Claim of Williams, PRO, A012/16/374; Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 653, 934; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 2:301; and Brown, King's Friends, p. 132.

24Fish, Privateers of New York, p. 84.
25Brown, King's Friends, pp. 112-113, 131-134, 137.
26Ibid., pp. 125, 149.
27Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 121, 126, 509, 627, 653; Memorial of Odell, PRO, A012/16/296.

28Memorial of Tilton, PRO, A012/16/117; Evidence on the Claim of Groom, PRO, A012/16/427; Memorial of Conrad Hendricks, n.d., but re-
Evidence on the Claim of Williams, PRO, A012/16/374; Memorial of Daniel Coxe, n.d. PRO, A012/13/181; Evidence on the Claim of Cox, PRO, A012/16/406; and Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 183, 934.

Memorial of Henderson, PRO, A012/42/362; Memorial of Austin, PRO, A012/40/56; Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 377, 892; and Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:330, 2:54, 250, 552, 574, 586.


Estimate of Losses Sustained by Milby, PRO, A013/26/245; and Examination of Bostwick, Commonwealth vs. Israelow, RG33, Court of Admiralty, Proceedings, 1781, Pennsylvania State Archives.

Brown, King's Friends, pp. 113, 131.

Sabine, Biographical Sketches, quoting James Rankin, 2:210; Palmer, Loyalists, p. 715, and Brown, King's Friends, p. 132.

Palmer, Loyalists, p. 924.

Commodore Esek Hopkins to John Bradford, Providence, January 27, 1777, and Hopkins to Captain John Paul Jones, Providence, February 11, 1777, in Morgan, NDAR, 7:1044-1045, 1166.

Palmer, Loyalists, p. 832; Evidence on the Claim of Lippincott, PRO, A012/16/332; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 2:301; and Brown, King's Friends, p. 132.


Minutes of the Pennsylvania Council of Safety, September 16, 1775, and Fisher and Delaware Pilots to Committee of Safety, September 27, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2:120-122, 220; and Intelligence from the Delaware Capes, April 17, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 9:696.

Palmer, Loyalists, p. 509.

Memorial of Odell, PRO, A012/16/296.

Palmer, Loyalists, p. 126.

Memorial of Hendricks, PRO, A013/18/211; Evidence on the Claim of Lippincott, PRO, A012/16/332; Evidence on the Claim of Cox, PRO, A012/16/407; Estimate of Losses by Milby, PRO, A013/26/245; Memorial of Coxe, PRO, A012/13/181; Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 190, 789; and Memorial of Sproat, PRO, A012/42/345.

Memorial of Coxe, PRO, A012/13/181; List of Property Lost by Field, PRO, A013/26/104; Memorial of Tilton, PRO, A012/16/117; Schedule of Property Confiscated in New Jersey from Jonathan Odell, n.d., PRO, A012/16/301; True Estimate of the Losses of Marple, and Evidence on the Claim of Marple, PRO, A012/16/362, 362; Inventory of the Estate of Williams, and Evidence on the Claim of Williams, PRO, A012/16/373, 374; True Account of the Real and Personal Estate of Cox, PRO, A012/16/406; Losses Sustained by Groom, PRO, A012/16/426; Memorial of Austin, PRO, A012/40/56; Memorial of Sproat, PRO, A012/42/345; Memorial of Henderson, PRO, A012/42/362; Memorial of Hendricks, PRO, A013/18/211; Estimate of Losses by Milby, PRO, A013/26/245; Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 121, 126, 190, 251, 271, 509, 604, 627, 715, 749, 769, 832, 849, 892; and Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 2:422.


Memorial of Coxe, PRO, A012/13/181.

Estimate of Losses by Milby, PRO, A013/26/245.

Memorial of Coxe, PRO, A012/13/181; Evidence on the Foregoing Memorial of Luce, PRO, A012/13/344; Evidence on the Foregoing Memorial of John Stites, October 27, 1786, PRO, A012/14/231; Memorial of Odell, PRO, A012/16/296; Evidence on the Claim of Marple, PRO, A012/16/326; Evidence on the Claim of Williams, PRO, A012/16/374; Evidence on the Claim of Cox, PRO, A012/16/406; Evidence on the Claim of Groom, PRO, A012/16/427; Memorial of Lippincott, PRO, A012/16/330; Evidence on the Claim of Austin, PRO, A012/40/59; Memorial of Sproat, PRO, A012/42/345; Memorial of Henderson, PRO, A012/42/362; Petition of William Milby, February 8, 1786, PRO, A013/26/246; Captain's Commission for Clayton Tilton, January 15, 1781, PRO, A013/112/383; Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 121, 126, 190, 271, 344, 377, 509, 586, 627, 769, 789, 832, 892, 924, 934; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:465, 2:210, 301, 422; Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, and July 31, 1779, PRO, C05/1109/82, 170; Bond for Hunter, November 21, 1782, PRO, HCA, 49/91/2/61; Examination of Bostwick, and Indictment, Commonwealth vs. McDaniel, RG33, Court of Admiralty, Proceedings, 1781, and Proceedings, 1781-1787, Pennsylvania State Archives; and Mayo, Washing-
ton's Dilemma, p. 78. A couple of the men cited above do not specifically state they went to New York, but do state facts supporting they did. For instance, Marple refers to serving with the Associated Loyalists and Groom fought with Skinner's provincial command. As is well known, both of these outfits were garrisoned in New York. Several additional men, Connel, Ryan, McDonald, Thompson, Saunders, and McClain, are deemed to have gone to New York based on the fact the privateers they served on, the Intrepid, Impertinent, and Jenny, were based there. In the case of McBride, he joined the British at Philadelphia and was captured at sea in the mid-Atlantic area in 1779. It would therefore seem likely that he went to New York with the British during the evacuation in 1778. Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:465, 330, 2:54, 250, 551, 552, 574, 586; Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, and July 31, 1779, PRO, CO5/1109/82, 170; A List of Letters of Marque for the Port of New York, whose Names or Commanders have been changed, [July 31, 1779], PRO, CO5/1109/175; and Captain James Montgomery to Pres. Reed, June 9, 1779, in Delaware Archives, vol. 3, Revolutionary War (Wilmington, Delaware: Charles L. Story Company Press and The Public Archives Commission of Delaware, 1919; reprint ed., New York: AMS Press, 1974), p. 1376.

50 Estimate of Losses by Milby, PRO, A013/26/245; Memorial of Henderson, PRO, A012/42/362; Evidence on the Claim of Austin, PRO, A012/42/59; Evidence on the Claim of Cox, PRO, A012/16/407; and Parker, Loyalists, p. 183.

51 Memorial of Sproat, PRO, A012/42/345; Memorial of Odell, PRO, A012/16/296; Evidence on the Claim of Williams, PRO, A012/16/374; Evidence on the Claim of Groom, PRO, A012/16/427; Memorial of Lippincott, PRO, A012/16/330; Memorial of Tilton, PRO, A013/112/381; Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 190, 344, 377, 509, 653, 934; and Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:330, 2:586.

52 Evidence on the Foregoing Memorial of Daniel Coxe, November 29, 1784, PRO, A012/13/181.

53 Evidence on the Claim of Marple, PRO, A012/16/362; Evidence on the Claim of Groom, PRO, A012/16/427; Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 126, 344, 586, 892.

54 Evidence on the Claim of Cox, PRO, A012/16/407; and Estimate of the Losses by Milby, PRO, A013/26/245.

55 Memorial of Coxe, PRO, A012/13/181; Memorial of Odell, PRO, A012/16/296; Memorial of Henderson, PRO, A012/42/362; and Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 183, 372, 627, 653.

56 Memorial of Sproat, PRO, A012/42/345; and Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 121, 190, 817.

57 Memorial of Odell, PRO, A012/16/296; Memorial of Coxe, PRO, A012/13/181; and Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 183, 693.

58 Evidence on the Memorial of Stites, PRO, A012/14/231; Rivington's Royal Gazette, March 31, 1779, p. 2; and Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, PRO, CO5/1109/82.

59 Evidence on the Claim of Cox, PRO, A012/16/407; Rivington's Royal Gazette, March 31, 1780, p. 3; Mayo, Washington's Dilemma, P.
78; Minute Books, New York Vice Admiralty Court, March 28, August 29, and December 19, 1781, PRO, HCA49/92/6/396, 7/444, 8/471; Commission for Foxe, Hartford Maritime Court, RG3/652/1376, Connecticut State Archives; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:465, 2:301, 422; Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, and July 31, 1779, and List of Letters of Marque...whose Names or Commanders have been changed, PRO, CO5/1109/82, 170, 175; Answer and Claim, Samuel Davis, et. al., ad. Joseph Atwood, [August 26, 1783], Maritime Records, 1779-1788, Massachusetts State Archives, Boston, Massachusetts; Memorial of Henderson, PRO, AO12/42/362; Bond for Hunter, PRO, HCA49/91/2/61; President William Moore of the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania to Governor William Livingston, Philadelphia, April 23, 1782, and John Bray to Governor Livingston, Raritan Landing, April 24, 1782, in Richard J. Koke, ed., "War, Profit, and Privateers Along the New Jersey Coast: Letters of 1782 Relating to an Obscure Warfront of the American Revolution," The New-York Historical Society Quarterly, XLI (July, 1957); 321-323; Memorial of Austin, PRO, AO12/40/56; Instance and Decree, Bridger Goodrich and William Austin, vs. schooner Boston, July 8, 1779, Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, Record Group NA45.7, Area File 8, 1775-1910, #0246, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; Gaine's New-York Gazette, December 4, 1780, p. 3, and July 9, 1781, p. 3; Palmer, Loyalists-, p. 892; Rivington's Royal Gazette, March 28, 1781, p.3; and Report of Lippincot, Headquarters Papers, 38/4387, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Library, Colonial Williamsburg.

60. Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, PRO, CO5/1109/82; Commission for privateer sloop Revenge, Captain Robert Bland, January 8, 19th year of the reign, Ward Chipman Papers, Lawrence Collection, Political and Official, Admiralty, MG 23/D 1/1/9/70, Public Archives of Canada; Knox's Bermuda Prize List, PRO, CO37/22, typescript copy, Naval History Center; Commission for Tartar, Hartford Maritime Court, RG3/653/1481, Connecticut State Archives; Bond for privateer brigantine Charming Polly, Captain William Milby, December 19, 1782, PRO, HCA49/91/2/15; Minute Book, New York Vice Admiralty Court, July 13 and 18, 1781, PRO, HCA/49/92/7/428, 430; and Commission for privateer schooner Victory, Captain Daniel Collier, August 9, 20th year of the Reign, Revolutionary War Prize Cases, M162/8/70; Examination of Israelo, Commonwealth vs. Israelow, RG33, Court of Admiralty, Proceedings, 1781, Pennsylvania State Archives; and Bond for Hunter, PRO, HCA49/91/2/61.

61. Testimonial of Leonard for Hendricks, PRO, A013/18/213; and Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 2:250, 574.

62. Evidence on the Claim of Groom, PRO, AO12/16/427; Examination of Bostwick, Commonwealth vs. Israelow, RG33, Court of Admiralty, Proceedings, 1781, Pennsylvania State Archives; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:331, 2:54, 551, 552, 586; and Mayo, Washington's Dilemma, p. 78. There is no specific reference to McBride serving on a privateer, but all evidence points to the likelihood of his having done so. First of all, he was captured at sea during 1779. The reference to this fact is found in Sabine who mentions a number of other men who were captured at sea, all of whom served on privateers and all of whom were seized that same year. The fact McBride was to be tried for treason indicates he was openly active against the rebels and not merely serving on a merchant vessel. This leaves only privateering or naval service, with the former being far more likely. Privateering would un-
doubtedly have been the occupation of choice at a time when comparatively fewer naval vessels were captured.

Evidence on the Claim of Williams, PRO, A012/16/374; Evidence on the Claim of Marple, PRO, A012/16/362; Evidence on the Claim of Tilton, PRO, A012/16/119; Jones, *Loyalists of New Jersey*, p. 134; Memorial of Coxe, PRO, A012/13/181; Memorial of Odell, PRO, A012/16/296; and Palmer, *Loyalists*, pp. 509, 586, 627, 653, 892, 934.
"EVERYMAN WHO KNOWS THE VALUE OF FREEDOM AND THE BLESSINGS OF
A BRITISH SUBJECT:" THE LOYALIST PRIVATEERS OF THE
SOUTHERN MARITIME REGION

The Outer Banks and Barrier Islands of North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Georgia constituted the maritime region of the southern
colonies. There, Charlestown was the key port with Savannah having po-
tential as a significant runner-up. Background information is avail-
able for only twenty-four individuals from the entire area, and much
of what exists is sketchy and even tenuous. Furthermore, three of the
men in question never actually sailed on a true privateer. With such a
limited data base, it is sometimes difficult to say anything concrete
about certain aspects of the southern coastal loyalist privateers. In
other instances, enough information exists to be able to at least make
suggestions, if not statements of fact, concerning the nature of these
men relative to privateers elsewhere, and loyalists in general. The
largest percentage of identified men were mariners. Merchants were
present in a smaller ratio. In association there was a smattering of
individuals from other occupations. Typically, these men were from ur-
ban, coastal environments, but there is some evidence of a small back
country element among them. There was a high percentage of foreign
born and evidence of ethnic and racial involvement. Examples of neu-
tral and equivocal behavior were minimal, and a number of these men
individuals endured ill-treatment from the rebels. Finally, as did men
Figure 6: The Southern Maritime Region. The North Carolina Coastline.
Figure 7: Southern Maritime Region. The Carolinas and Georgia.
in most other locales, some of these southerners were active in roles other than privateering.

This limited number of men is interesting in that at the same time, it is both non-reflective and reflective of loyalist privateering in the region. The figure does not exemplify the state of affairs in that as in all the maritime regions discussed so far, clearly many more people were involved in the activity. At one specific point in 1779, according to The Gazette of the State Of South-Carolina, there were at least six privateers fitted out in Georgia. Unfortunately, there is simply no information identifying the personnel or even the vessels. In fact, no privateer or commander specifically associated with Savannah is known by name. On the other hand, the minimal figure is clearly indicative of the fact that although Charlestown and Savannah were prime privateering ports, the activity was just not conducted there on anything like the same level as elsewhere, nor were men of the southern region as involved as those from the Chesapeake Bay, mid-Atlantic region, or New England. The region simply produced comparatively fewer privateersmen. This is further supported by the fact that so far, in terms of actually being fitted out, commissioned, or based there, only seven privateers have been identified as being associated with Charlestown during the British occupation.

To some degree, this lack of activity can be explained by the fact that once Savannah and Charlestown were occupied by the British, the reason for privateering in the area was largely eliminated. In essence, prior to the arrival of the British, loyalist privateers sailed from St. Augustine, just down the coast in East Florida, against the rebels operating out of the two ports in question. When those ports fell, the main cruising ground was greatly reduced, and the reasons for privateering in the immediate area diminished. Certainly, working the North Carolina Outer Banks was still an option, but it was a lim-
ited one. Vessels could also operate from Charlestown or Savannah and cruise in more remote areas, but not with the same convenience offered by other ports. For instance, New York's proximity was better suited for operations against the Delaware and Chesapeake Bays, while St. Augustine, the Bahamas, and Bermuda remained better ports for cruising the West Indies or intercepting vessels arriving from outside North America. In the case of Georgia, limited activity might also be explained by the fact that the relatively young colony had yet to establish a significant maritime presence. As of October, 1773, only thirty-five vessels were registered there.  

Regarding occupation, again, in general, the diverse background of the loyalist spectrum is evident despite the small sample. At the same time, the presence of the merchant class is even less apparent here than in the Delaware Bay region. Only five individuals, William Lowther and John Boggs of Edenton, North Carolina, John Hamilton of Halifax, North Carolina, John Cruden of Wilmington, North Carolina, and Thomas Stringer of Savannah, Georgia, state that they were traders. The higher number from North Carolina is in keeping with the nature of loyalism in general in that colony. There, the merchants formed a significant element in the loyalist composition. Yet, despite their number, only a comparatively small minority seem to have become involved in privateering. Of fourteen merchants from the colony examined while preparing this study, only the above five can be linked to the activity.  

Although the merchant class was weakly represented, this was not true of the mariners. A total of nine have been identified: Daniel Manson and John Macklin of Charlestown, Peter Bachop, William Finley (a local coaster whose name is spelled variously as Finlay and Findlay), Robert Schaw, Duncan MacLean, and William Giekie of South Carolina, John Lightenstone of Savannah, and John Dunlop, also from
the Edenton area, North Carolina. Giekie and Lightenstone were both Royal Navy veterans and the latter had commanded a colonial privateer during the French and Indian War. Despite this, it need be noted that while both are important to the story, neither ever commanded an actual privateer during the revolution.⁷

Qualifying comments concerning some of the others are also in order. Bachop is identified specifically with South Carolina on the basis of his seemingly close relationship with Henry Laurens for whom he commanded a merchant vessel.⁸ In the case of Daniel Manson, there is reference only to a Captain Manson operating out of Charlestown. Daniel Manson was a shipbuilder and occasional shipmaster from Charlestown whose return there during the British occupation coincides with the appearance of Captain Manson.⁹ In the cases of MacLean and Schaw as well as Manson, these three privateer captains are only mentioned in relationship to Charlestown during the British presence there. Therefore, it seems likely they were, in fact, from at least the colony if not the port. As with others, the assessment of some of these men's seafaring abilities is primarily based on their later command of privateers. This group includes Macklin, Schaw, Manson, MacLean, and Bachop.¹⁰

Trading and seafaring were not, however, the sole, or even the primary occupation of some of these men. As noted, Manson was a shipbuilder. Macklin was the proprietor of a tavern and the London Coffee House in Charlestown, and Giekie owned a substantial plantation outside the city. In North Carolina, Dunlop had tried his hand at tilling the land, but gave it up to return to the sea. Lowther was a justice of the peace. Though he was descended from a merchant/mariner family, Thomas Brown of Augusta, Georgia, was a planter and magistrate. The as yet unmentioned Josiah Martin, a relative of Samuel Martin of Virginia, was the Governor of North Carolina.¹¹
Another loyalist of note was John Collet (not the same John Collett encountered with Dunmore) from the Cape Fear region of North Carolina. There, he commanded Fort Johnston. Like Giekie and Lightenstein, Collet would not be involved with true privateering. He was, however, a somewhat significant and certainly interesting character who was associated with loyalist mariners during the opening phases of the war.  

A final occupation of sorts is found among these southerners. Three slaves, representing a minority element, have been identified. Prior to his running away to join the British, Henry Brown had been owned by Samuel Thorpe of Blueford, South Carolina. Two other slaves, both named Ned, were owned by Hamilton. Hamilton put the two Neds on a privateer he had invested in, but apparently neither was overly thrilled about going to sea on a cruiser. Both jumped ship at an early date.

There were also several men whose occupations are unknown. Mathew Varnum hailed from near Orangeburgh, South Carolina. A Mr. Malcolm, a Mr. M'Guire, and a Mr. Johnson were also from that colony. Sabert Oglesby was from Stoll Island, somewhere along the South Carolina or Georgia coast.

For those whose place of residence is known, in the majority of cases, it was coastal and/or urban. There were, however exceptions. Orangeburgh, where Varnum lived, was about seventy-five miles inland. Coming from Augusta, Georgia, Thomas Brown qualifies as a back country denizen. In the case of the North Carolinians, there was a small concentration in the Albemarle region which coincides with the established demographic pattern for the colony's loyalists in general.

In keeping with the nature of southern loyalists in general and in contrast with the New England regions, there was a high percentage of foreign born, of which a commanding number were British including a
heavy leavening of Scots. Of the ten individuals for whom place of birth is known, all were foreign and nine were from Great Britain. Lowther and Macklin simply stated they were British. Manson and Thomas Brown were from England. Lightenstone was born in Russia of English parents. Stringer hailed from Ireland. Hamilton and Giekie were Scots. Dunlop is simply referred to as British as well. When he returned to Britain, however, he specifically went to Scotland, which in association with his name, supports the probability that he was from there originally. In addition, there can be little doubt that MacLean and M'Guire were of Scots or Scots/Irish lineage. Lowther had, by far, the longest tenure in the colonies, having arrived in the early 1750s. Dunlop, Lightenstone, and Giekie came between 1759 and 1763 during the latter part of the French and Indian conflict. The remaining three Britons for whom dates of immigration are known were very recent colonists. Stringer came in 1772, and both Macklin and Brown arrived as late as 1774.

Non-British ethnic minorities were also present among these men. Collet was a Swiss, and there are indications of others. The spelling of Schaw's name tends to indicate a Germanic ancestry. Bachop has a French quality to it. Perhaps he was a member of the South Carolina Huguenot community.

The sample is entirely too small and scattered to discern much in the way influential family or business ties. Having the same unusual last name, it would seem likely that Peter Bachop was related to Adam Bachop of St. Augustine, another loyalist privateer captain to be discussed in a following chapter. At Edenton, North Carolina, it is apparent that if Lowther and Boggs were not business associates, they were certainly familiar with each other. Finally, Hamilton was strongly associated with the Scottish firm of John Hamilton and Co., Glasgow.
Evidence of neutral or passive behavior is limited and restricted to North Carolina. There, the fact that Boggs did not depart for New York until 1777 indicates he was able to co-exist with the rebels to a degree. Lowther's activities are of interest, reflecting a sincere initial desire to remain detached from affairs. In 1771, due to the regulator disturbances, Lowther thought it prudent to leave the colony and reestablish himself in New York. He dwelt there until 1776 when increasing troubles again pressured him into questioning the wisdom of his place of residence. Believing affairs had resumed a more stable character in North Carolina, Lowther removed his family and possessions to reside in that colony once again. He arrived only to find that his assessment of the political atmosphere was greatly in error. In September, 1776, deciding that perhaps New York was not so bad after all, especially since the British had secured their possession of the city, Lowther again packed up his family and chattels, loaded them on a small, five ton decked boat, and set off on what must have been quite an odyssey. He did not arrive at his destination until June, 1777, and in the interim, had faced "many dangers." Unfortunately, this is all that is known about what must have been an adventurous sojourn.

More evidence exists for equivocal behavior, and every example of this form of conduct occurred in South Carolina where such conduct is considered to have been fairly common. Malcom, M'Guire, and Johnson all served in the rebel 1st South Carolina Regiment before deserting and joining a loyalist privateer. Macklin held the rank of sergeant in the Charlestown militia as late as 1778. To his credit, he somehow managed to avoid subscribing to the rebel oath during that time, and his forced departure from the colony was a direct result of his refusing to take it.
As far as is known, the remaining individuals were committed to their support of the British relatively early in 1775 and 1776. Thomas Brown, Finley, and Cruden had cast their lot with the King by the end of the first year. Manson, Giekie, and Stringer had established their positions by the summer of 1776.24

A number of these men underwent abuse in one form or another at the hands of the rebels. As elsewhere, a fair number lost considerably in terms of such things as real estate, personal property, and business.25 Because Cruden refused to subscribe to the Articles of Association, the rebels refused him the Rights of Free Men and boycotted him. Giekie was banned from returning ashore in Charlestown after carrying supplies to British vessels in the harbor. Manson was kicked out of South Carolina after a lengthy imprisonment and threats of execution as a felon, and Macklin was forced to flee the same colony. Accused of illegal trading, Finlay was hauled before the South Carolina Committee of Safety. We can only imagine the conversations of shared experiences he had with his future employers, Sheddon & Goodrich.26

Excellent accounts exist of the even greater trials undergone by Thomas Brown. Sabine agreed with a Mr. Simms in viewing Brown's experience as a classic example of how a single act of persecution could radically transform a personality while serving no useful purpose other than to promote and buttress loyalist sentiments. By July, 1775, there was considerable agitation over the Articles of Association in upcountry Georgia. Brown had just been made a magistrate and so felt a logical obligation to do his duty and enforce the law in the name of his King. He viewed the Association as illegal, and in response, he was integral in establishing a counter-association. In the process, he emerged as a leading backcountry loyalist. Still, to this point, indications are that while politically active he was not militant.27
On August 2, roughly one-hundred Sons of Liberty converged on New Richmond, South Carolina, a plantation where Brown was staying at the time, to force him to take the oath. Stepping out onto the porch to confront the mob, Brown, without giving offense, argued his passive position, diplomatically offering reasons why he could not take the oath. For instance, he maintained that submitting to the rebel oath would be an act contradictory to his oath as magistrate. The crowd grew impatient and declared that Brown simply could not remain neutral. He was either for them or against them, to which Brown replied that they could not deprive him of the privilege of his thoughts. He then went inside. Following this, the agitated mob began to call for the destruction of Brown's property.

Clearly sensing that rational discussion was about to cease, if it was not already at an end, Brown prepared for the worst. He put a brace of pistols in his pockets and returned to the porch. Having supplemented his persuasiveness and obviously feeling a bit more authoritative and in control, he demanded to know just what the rebels intended to do. They responded that they would physically drag him to Augusta and force him to sign the Articles. To this, Brown commented that if the mob felt so strongly about public liberty, then they should feel the same about private liberty and leave him alone. This retort had some effect. About half saw the logic in Brown's reply and departed. Unfortunately, the remaining half grew even more aggressive, threatening Brown as they did so. In turn, Brown gave them fair warning of the consequences, and at that, perhaps as many as eight men drew their swords and lunged. Brown resorted to his pistols and fired. The first shot was a misfire. The second struck home, hitting the rebel ringleader in the foot. Pressing their attack, the assailants wrested the pistols from Brown, but Brown was not done. Gamely drawing his sword, he proceeded to offer clear evidence that he was quite
adept with a blade, keeping multiple attackers at bay for a time. The set-to ended when Brown was struck from behind with a musket butt which fractured his skull and knocked him senseless.\textsuperscript{29}

The ordeal was far from over. Good for their word, the Sons of Liberty proceeded to trundle the seriously injured Brown to Augusta. There, they tied him to a tree and placed burning splints of wood beneath his feet, and his hair was stripped off with a knife resulting in his actually being scalped in three or four places. Finally, he was tarred and feathered. By one account, Brown was made to recant and denounce his loyalist association. If so, it need be noted that he was insensible, due to the blow to the head, for the two days during which this supposedly occurred. It took Brown several months to be able to walk again, and the incident cost him two toes and a lifetime of severe headaches. All the Sons of Liberty seem to have accomplished for their efforts was the transformation of a man into one of the most feared and militantly resolute loyalists in the southern theater.\textsuperscript{30}

At least a couple of these men also suffered at the hands of the British. When Lowther finally arrived back in New York, he found British troops quartered in his relatively new warehouse. They would remain there for the duration.\textsuperscript{31}

Manson's story is more pertinent, reflecting further the trials suffered by loyalist mariners and shipowners under the mandates of the Prohibitory Act. Following the unsuccessful British attack on Charlestown in June, 1776, Manson and his partner, William Begbie, decided to load their possessions and a cargo of rice on a schooner in which Manson then sailed for the West Indies. En route, the vessel was seized by the Royal Navy, carried into Jamaica, and condemned as lawful prize. Manson returned to South Carolina, and in 1778, following a stint of imprisonment, he and Begbie sold off their holdings at a loss and purchased the ship \textit{Providence} and brig \textit{Speedwell}, with the intent
of going to England. A passenger on the Providence, Louisa Susannah Wells, left an excellent account conveying the concerns and tensions that arose at sea during efforts to avoid the rebels and French on one hand and the Royal Navy on the other. Despite the fact a special course was laid to avoid the British, the Providence had the misfortune to be seized not just by the Royal Navy, but by Captain James Reid, a man who even his fellow officers considered over-zealous in the pursuit of his duty seizing American vessels.\textsuperscript{32}

Taken into New York, Manson began the long process of filing Answer and Claim against Libel. Only "after a tedious and expensive suit" was the Providence restored to him, but it did him little good. Because of the trade restrictions, he could not depart with vessel or cargo and was forced to sell both at a loss.\textsuperscript{33}

The Speedwell, perhaps misnamed, fared no better. She was taken by William Chambers (about whom we shall hear more) and the privateer Gayton. Chambers sent his prize into Kingston, Jamaica for libeling. During the court proceedings it came out that the Speedwell was, in fact, a recapture, having been seized earlier from British subjects by a rebel privateer. The court decreed she should be returned to her original owners. Some consolation may have been found in the fact Begbie and Manson were allowed to retain the Speedwell's cargo even though they did have to undergo the ordeal of transshipping it.\textsuperscript{34}

The destinations of these men were more varied than elsewhere. Cruden, Lowther, Boggs, and Hamilton went to New York.\textsuperscript{35} Manson went there too although his intent had been to go to England. Thomas Brown, Varnum, Bachop, MacLean, M'Guire, Johnson, and Macklin removed to St. Augustine.\textsuperscript{36} Giekie went there as well before going to Britain.\textsuperscript{37} Henry Brown also went to Britain.\textsuperscript{38} Dunlop was so fed up with the rebels that he went to Scotland with the express intention of fitting out a privateer with which to harass them.\textsuperscript{39} Stringer's odyssey took him first to
Halifax and then the West Indies before he ultimately arrived in England.\textsuperscript{40} Finley seems to have gone to Bermuda first and then New York.\textsuperscript{41} Ultimately, Cruden and Manson returned to Charlestown.\textsuperscript{42}

Upon reaching their destinations, some of these men were involved in activities other than privateering. Macklin, Bachop, and Henry Brown served with the Royal Navy, and the former also spent time commanding a vessel in the provincial East Florida maritime force.\textsuperscript{43} Stringer acted with a military unit of some nature, Cruden was a provincial colonel, and Thomas Brown commanded and Varnum served in the East Florida Rangers.\textsuperscript{44} Cruden also held the post of Commissioner of Sequestered Estates in South Carolina.\textsuperscript{45} Hamilton was truly an active loyalist. Enlisting as mere private, he rose to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel commanding the North Carolina Volunteers. In this capacity, he led his battalion through the various campaigns in the south. Seeing action at Savannah, Charlestown, Yorktown, and during Cornwallis's advance through the Carolinas, Hamilton was wounded three times and captured twice.\textsuperscript{46}

As to their privateering activities, Lowther, Hamilton, Cruden, Thomas Brown, and Stringer became owners.\textsuperscript{47} Bachop, Macklin, Finlay, Schaw, Manson, and MacLean all commanded privateers.\textsuperscript{48} Dunlop seems to have been both owner and captain.\textsuperscript{49} Boggs was a captain of marines and Oglesby acted as a guide.\textsuperscript{50} Henry Brown, Malcom, M'Guire, Johnson, and Varnum served before the mast.\textsuperscript{51} Martin became a board member of the Associated Loyalists.\textsuperscript{52} Also, late in the war, Cruden suggested the founding of a group that appears to have been intended as a southern equivalent to Franklin's Associated Loyalists at New York. All indications are that the proposal was rejected.\textsuperscript{53}
In each of the three rebellious southern colonies, a scenario played out that bore similarities to events in Virginia, although in no instance did affairs transpire on the same level. Governors Josiah Martin, William Campbell, and James Wright of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, respectively, each realized the need for a substantial naval presence and desired that vessels be sent to assist in bolstering royal authority and maintaining control over the colonies. Like Dunmore, all three were eventually forced to take refuge on naval vessels, establishing floating pockets of resistance from which they directed operations. While a few loyalists commanded armed vessels under them, none of the three governors promoted the concept of a loyalist naval force.

In North Carolina, as early as April 7, 1775, Governor Martin declared the Royal Government to be in a state of collapse. At the beginning of June, he fled the capital at New Bern and went to Fort Johnston on the Cape Fear River. There, he went aboard H.M. Sloop Cruizer, seeking safety and the assistance of the navy.54

The Outer Banks form a coastal barrier to mainland North Carolina. Key to this navigational obstruction was Ocracoke Inlet. At the time, it was the only passage through the Outer Banks that could be negotiated by anything but the smallest vessels. Thus, the inlet, like the Virginia Capes, acted as a funnel for all of North Carolina's maritime trade. It also served much of Virginia's, and it was particularly crucial to that colony as the only alternative passage at times when the capes were blockaded. Vessels entering through Ocracoke could sail through Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds to the Chowan River. Further up on this water course the Blackwater River branched off and led to South Quay, Virginia, where goods were unloaded, sent overland to Suffolk, and reshipped on the Nansemond River. From there, cargoes could be carried into the James River for a variety of more distant destina-
tions as far away as Maryland and Pennsylvania when necessary. Of course, when used in reverse, the same route allowed goods to be shipped from the interior as well.\textsuperscript{55}

Martin was clearly aware of the importance of Ocracoke Inlet, and it was, in part, to stop the influx of rebel war materials that he desired a substantial naval presence. In July, he stated the necessity of having at least three, preferably four, more warships to patrol the coast. These would certainly help bolster royal authority as well. Of course, the Royal Navy had no craft to spare at the time, and Admiral Graves communicated this fact to Martin in August.\textsuperscript{56}

As July progressed, rebel forces threatened Fort Johnston. Because the installation and garrison were deemed too weak to withstand an attack, all removed to H.M.S. Cruizer. Then, the rebels sacked the fort and burned the personal dwelling and other structures belonging to the commandant, Captain John Collet. With Collet we get a rare glimpse of a rather reprehensible loyalist. The rebels described him as "A pert audacious little scoundrel." Even his loyalist peers were uneasy about his over-zealous nature which he displayed in conjunction with an almost complete lack of tact. Accordingly, if not actually embarrassed, other loyalists were duly concerned about his conduct. By one account, when the rebels served him with writs for debts, he treated them "with the shameful contempt of wiping his backside with them."\textsuperscript{57}

As early as October, Martin was noting the potential problems that would arise through an accumulation of prizes seized under the Restraining Acts in conjunction with the lack of a vice admiralty court. In particular, he pointed out that if prizes could not be rapidly condemned, then, the officers responsible for seizing them might well be open to law suits.\textsuperscript{58}
Martin's flotilla increased in size when, on November 12, H.M. Sloop Scorpion arrived, followed on January 2, 1776, by H.M.S. Syren. The Log of the latter mentions that in addition to the three naval vessels there were three other ships and two sloops present. On January 10, Martin issued his proclamation calling on all loyal subjects to rally to the royal standard he was raising and assist in the restoration of government. In response, although their numbers were never anything like those in Virginia, over time, a number of loyalists joined the governor on vessels in the river. If during this time, Martin caused any loyalist vessels to be fitted out, their identity has been lost to us.\textsuperscript{59}

William Campbell only arrived to take up his post as Governor of South Carolina in June, 1775. By the end of that month, he was already pointing out the value of additional naval forces for his coast and suggesting such should be sent. Throughout the summer, he bemoaned his lack of warships until late August or early September when word arrived that rather than receive additional naval support, he would actually lose H.M. Sloop Tamar, his only naval vessel. As it turned out, the Tamar stayed on station, and on September 7, she was joined by H.M. Armed Ship Cherokee. On September 15, 1775, with the political climate clearly turning against him, Campbell departed the city to seek safe refuge on the Tamar in the harbor.\textsuperscript{60}

On January 5, 1776, William Giekie undertook to supply the British in the harbor with provisions. In doing so, he incurred the displeasure of the rebellious citizenry who refused to let him return ashore. Having no alternative, Giekie remained with Campbell's meager forces.\textsuperscript{61}

The following day, Campbell, accompanied by his small flotilla, departed Charlestown Harbor. The governor first sailed for Savannah. Then, leaving the Tamar and Cherokee behind, he left to join Martin on
the Cape Fear River where he arrived on February 6. At some point during the voyage, Campbell acquired a schooner which he named the Lady William and personally fitted her out as an armed vessel. In all probability she was commanded at this time by Giekie. Later, in August, he is known to have been her skipper, and there is no evidence to suggest he was not at this earlier time as well.62

Although the Royal Navy vessels operating off North Carolina had taken prizes earlier, there was clearly a jump in activity beginning in January and increasing in February as additional vessels began to arrive to augment the force. By March 1, eight prizes were reported with the British on the Cape Fear River. By March 20, the number had increased to "many prizes." During this period, the Lady William, referred to as a tender, was active as a naval auxiliary vessel, and at least on one occasion, she took an active part in capturing an armed pilot schooner.63

The increasing number of prizes became problematic. For a time, rather than being able to utilize badly needed cargoes of captured provisions, Martin was forced to secure them under lock and key, because there was no means to proceed legally against them. Finally, however, with no practical alternatives, Martin exceeded his authority and established a vice admiralty court to deal with the situation. In addition to the arguments that the existing court system was simply inconvenient and would hurt the navy's efficiency by draining off manpower, Martin offered a battery of shaky legal arguments to justify his actions, and even implied that he had received General Sir Henry Clinton's approval. In any case, the court was operational by the beginning of April.64

In mid-February, the naval force at Cape Fear was augmented with the arrival of George Sibbles and the General Gage from Boston. By this time, the rebels were referring to the General Gage as a priva-
sloop Joseph, which with her cargo was valued at £1,295.3.7 (Pennsylvania currency), and the sloop Charming Sally, with a valuable mixed cargo of salt, dry goods, wine, spirits, sundries, and a small quantity of munitions. Of interest is the fact that the Joseph was skippered by none other than William Raddon.65

Collet, who had earlier gone to Boston, was returning to North Carolina as a passenger on Sibbles' sloop. During the voyage he further endeared himself to the rebels and undoubtedly embarrassed his British and loyalist associates even more by tactlessly declaring to a prisoner that concerning the rebels "he would kill man, woman, and child, reserving all the young ladies for his private pleasures."66

During March, Sibbles, with Collet aboard, raided the North Carolina coast. Their activities, which included burning the houses of two rebel leaders plus the dwellings of two pilots, were described by the rebels as piratical and larcenous. As in Virginia, loyalists were beginning to respond to ill-treatment in kind and affairs were taking a nasty turn. On April 29, after assisting a transport in distress, Sibbles set out on the more mundane mission of carrying dispatches to Halifax for Clinton.67

A month later, on May 31, Martin gave up his grip on North Carolina. Upon his departure, he and the naval vessels under his direction joined the ill-fated expedition against Charleston. Of note during that operation were the services performed by the Lady William. At Long Island, to the north of the city, she participated in the landing of British troops and was then stationed to cover their movements. On June 21, the Lady William was engaged by rebel troops and field batteries on Sullivan's Island. The following day, during the main Brit-
ish attack on the harbor defenses, she gave cover fire during the intended British amphibious attack.68

Georgia is generally accepted as having been the most loyal of all the rebellious colonies, and this would seem to be reflected in the fact that Governor James Wright was able to remain ashore longer than his colleagues to the north.69 During this time, he, too, fretted over the lack of a naval presence in his colony. For a long while, the only vessel he had to rely on was a "scout boat" commanded by John Lightenstone. One of Lightenstone's duties involved acting as a communications liaison between Wright and the Navy when they finally arrived in the Savannah River. The scouting vessel was captured in January, 1776. Of interest is the fact that despite a lack of naval vessels, Wright still took it upon himself to set up a vice admiralty court which was in operation as early as November, 1775. Not until February 11, did Wright go aboard a naval vessel, H.M.S. Scarborough which had only recently arrived, joining the vessels that had just come with Campbell. On March 30, 1776, Wright released his grasp on his colony, and with Lightenstone, sailed from the Georgia coast for Halifax.70

As has been shown, early loyalist maritime activity in the three rebellious southern colonies was minimal, and consequently, its effect on the British war effort during the opening phases of the conflict was limited. In actuality, it was only on the North Carolina coast that loyalist mariners asserted any influence on affairs, and even there, the vessels were from other locales, inclusive of those sent there from Virginia under Dunmore's authority and discussed earlier. Furthermore, the vessels patrolling the coast were unsuccessful in halting rebel trade. Nevertheless, efforts to blockade the Outer Banks did involve loyalist vessels, and so, their presence was a factor in provoking a response from the rebels. That response involved the ex-
penditure of time, money, and energy, and tied up materials and man-
power in the defense of the coastline. In December, 1775, the Provin-
cial Council of North Carolina authorized the purchase and fitting out of three armed vessels for the express purpose of protecting the col-
ony's trade. Then, North Carolina and Virginia entered into a partner-
ship to build two armed galleys at South Quay for the same purpose. Finally, in the spring of 1776, the North Carolina rebel government voted to raise five independent companies of troops to garrison the Outer Banks. 71

In South Carolina and Georgia, early Rebel naval efforts were almost exclusively a response to Royal Navy activity. With the aban-
donment of the three colonies by their governors and supporting naval contingents, the coastline and ports of the region were secure from any immediate internal threat. It would not be long, however, before St. Augustine would emerge as an important British base from which privateering operations could be mounted against Georgia and the Caro-
linas.

As in other regions, these southerners appear to have been mod-
erate, established, respectable individuals. The combined merchant/ mariner element dominated occupationally. In association with the men of Virginia and Maryland, they indicate that southern privateers in general were more likely to be foreign born and incorporate racial and ethnic elements. There was a limited amount of neutral and equivocal behavior in combination with a fair number of instances of abuse. On the other-hand, minimal numbers, limited involvement in early naval operations, and the relatively small number of privateers that would later be associated with the region, indicates that these southern loyalists were less enthusiastic about privateering than their breth-
ren to the north.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 8

1 Proclamation, Governor Josiah Martin, North Carolina, January 10, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 3:724.

2 The Gazette of the State of South-Carolina, April 14, 1779, p. 3.


4 An Account of the Number of Vessels...in the Province of Georgia, Customs House, Savannah, October 18, 1773, in Georgia Historical Quarterly, "Letters from Sir James Wright," Collections of the Georgia Historical Society, vol. 3 (Savannah: Published at the Morning News Office, 1873), p. 175.

5 Evidence on the Claim of William Lowther, November 5, 1789, PRO, A012/30/382; Testimonial of John Boggs for William Lowther, October 1, 1789, PRO, A013/122/176; Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 352-353, 508; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:511; DeMond, Loyalists in North Carolina, p. 236; Catherine S. Crary, ed., The Price of Loyalty: Tory Writings from the Revolutionary Era (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1977), pp. 291-291 n. 4; Wilber Henry Siebert, Loyalists in East Florida, 1774-1785; the Most Important Documents Pertaining Thereto, 2 vols., Publications of the Florida State Historical Society, Number Nine, (Deland, Florida: Florida State Historical Society, 1929), 1:169; and Memorial of Thomas Stringer, November 11, 1784, in Egerton, Royal Commission, p. 258. Stringer's memorial was rejected as fraudulent. An examination of the supporting testimony, however, on which the rejection was based indicates a different Thomas Stringer was being discussed. It seems two men with the same name were being confused with each other, and there is no reason to disbelieve the information in the memorial in question.

6 Brown, King's Friends, p. 198; DeMond, Loyalists in North Carolina, pp. 52-54.

to Henry Laurens, June 17, 1778 and editorial note, in Chestnut, Papers of Laurens, 13:483-484, 484 n.6; Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, PRO, C05/1109/82; The Gazette of the State of South-Carolina, October 14, 1778, p. 2; John Wells, Jr. to Henry Laurens, October 14, 1778, and editorial notes, in Chestnut, Papers of Laurens, 14:416, 416 ns. 7, 8; Wells' Royal Gazette, February 16-20, 1782, p. 1, and April 20-24, 1782, p. 2; Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 240, 310, 491; Governor Patrick Tryon to Captain Thomas Bishop, August 6, 1776, in Morgan, NDAR, 6:90; and Memorial of William Dunlop, n.d. PRO, A012/36/319.


Memorial of Manson, Audit Office Transcripts, 55/IV/293, New York Public Library; and Wells' Royal Gazette, July 25-28, 1781, p. 3


Captain John Collet to General Thomas Gage, July 8, 1775, and editorial note, in Clark, NDAR, 1:844, 845 n.2; and Scribner, Revolutionary Virginia, 5:204 n.3, 412 n.3.

Palmer, Loyalists, p. 99; Rivington's Royal Gazette, November 18, 1778, p. 3; and Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, PRO, C05/1109/82.

Gazette of the State of South-Carolina, July 8, 1778, p. 2, and April 17, 1779, p. 3; and Wells' South-Carolina and American General Gazette, July 30, 1778, p. 3.

Gazette of the State of South-Carolina, July 8, 1778, p. 2; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:260; Cashin, King's Ranger, p. 20; and DeMond, Loyalists in North Carolina, p. 54.

Brown, King's Friends, pp. 199, 219, 232; Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, p. 306; and DeMond, Loyalists in North Carolina, pp. 50-54.
Memorial of William Lowther, n.d., PRO, A013/122/170; Memorial of Manson, Audit Office Transcripts, 55/IV/243, New York Public Library; Cashin, King's Ranger, p. 1; Memorial of Stringer, in Egerton, Royal Commission, p. 258; Palmer, Loyalists, pp. 240, 310, 352-353, 491, 563; and Memorial of Dunlop, PRO, A012/36/319.

Clark, NDAR, 1:845 n.2.


Testimonial of Boggs, PRO, A013/122/176.

Memorial of Lowther, and Testimonial of Boggs, PRO, A013/122/170, 176.

Brown, King's Friends, pp. 216-217; and Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, p. 306.

South-Carolina and American General Gazette, July 30, 1778, p. 3; and Palmer, Loyalists, p. 563.

Cashin, King's Ranger, pp. 25-29; Chestnutt, Papers of Laurens, 14:416 n. 8; Crary, Price of Loyalty, pp. 291-292 n. 4; Memorial of Manson, Audit Office Transcripts, 55/IV/293, New York Public Library; Palmer, Loyalists, p. 310; and Memorial of Stringer, Egerton, Royal Commission, p. 258.


Crary, Price of Loyalty, pp. 291-292 n. 4; Palmer, Loyalists, p. 310; Memorial Manson and Memorial of Macklin, Audit Office Transcripts, 55/IV/293 and 56/V/92, New York Public Library; Chestnutt, Papers of Laurens, 14:416 n. 8; and Gazette of the State of South Carolina, October 14, 1778, p. 2.

Sabine, Biographical Sketches, quoting a Mr. Simms, 1:260-261; and Cashin, King's Ranger, pp. 25-29.

Cashin, King's Ranger, pp. 25-29.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Testimonial of Boggs, PRO, A013/122/176.

Memorial of Manson, Audit Office Transcripts, 55/IV/293, New York Public Library; Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, p. 63; and Louisa Susannah Wells, The Journal of a Voyage from Charlestown, S.C., to London..., The John Devine Jones Fund Series of Histories and Mem-

33Memorial of Manson, Audit Office Transcripts, 55/IV/293, New York Public Library.

34Ibid.

35Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, PRO, CO5/1109/82; Siebert, Loyalists in East Florida, 1:169; Memorial of Lowther and Testimonial of Boggs, PRO, A013/122/170, 176; and DeMond, Loyalists in North Carolina, pp. 181-182.

36Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:261; Gazette of the State of South-Carolina, June 24, 1778, p. 2, and July 8, 1778, p. 2; South-Carolina and American General Gazette, July 30, 1778, p. 3. Malcom, M'Guire, and Johnson served on a privateer commanded by George Osborne. As will be seen, this vessel was commissioned, fitted out, and based in St. Augustine; and Memorial of Macklin, Audit Office Transcripts, 56/V/92, New York Public Library.

37Palmer, Loyalists, p. 310.

38Ibid., p. 99.

39Memorial of Dunlop, PRO, A012/36/319.

40Memorial of Stringer, in Egerton, Royal Commission, p. 258.

41Gazette of the State of South-Carolina, October 14, 1778; Gaine's New-York Gazette, January 18, 1779, p. 3; and Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, PRO, CO5/1109/82.

42Siebert, Loyalists in East Florida, 1:169; Wells' Royal Gazette, May 25-29, 1782, p. 1; and Memorial of Manson, Audit Office Transcripts, 55/IV/293, New York Public Library.


44Memorial of Stringer, in Egerton, Royal Commission, p. 258; Siebert, Loyalists in East Florida, 1:169; and Gazette of the State of South-Carolina, July 8, 1778, p. 3.

45Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, p. 236; and Crary, Price of Loyalty, pp. 291-292 n. 4.

46Palmer, Loyalists, p. 353; DeMond, Loyalists in North Carolina, p. 182; and Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 1:511.

47Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, PRO, CO5/1109/82; Testimonial of Boggs, PRO, A013/122/176; Rivington's Royal Gazette, November 18, 1778, p. 3; Wells' Royal Gazette, April 20-24, 1782, p. 2, and May 25-29, 1782, p. 1; Cashin, King's Ranger,

48 Chestnutt, Papers of Laurens, 13:484 n. 6; Memorial of Macklin, Audit Office Transcripts, 56/V/92, New York Public Library; Gaine's New-York Gazette, March 15, 1779, p. 3; Account of Warrants Issued by Tryon, February 5, 1779, C05/1109/82; Gazette of the State of South-Carolina, October 14, 1778, p. 2; Robertson's Royal South-Carolina Gazette, April 30, 1782, and Wells' Royal Gazette, July 25–28, 1781, p. 3, and February 16–20, 1782, p. 1.

49 Memorial of Dunlop, PRO, A012/36/319; and Palmer, Loyalists, p. 240.

50 Testimonial of Boggs, PRO, A013/122/176; and Gazette of the State of South-Carolina, April 17, 1779, p. 2.

51 Palmer, Loyalists, p. 99; Wells' South-Carolina and American General Gazette, July 30, 1778, p. 3; and Gazette of the State of South-Carolina, July 8, 1778, p. 2.


53 Extract, John Cruden to General Clinton, February 19, 1782, in Crary, Price of Loyalty, pp. 292–293.

54 Martin to Lord Dartmouth, April 7, 1775, Traugott Gage's Narrative of Events in North Carolina..., and Journal of H.M. Sloop Cruizer, Francis Parry Commanding, off Ft [Johnston], June 2, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 1:172, 590–591, 599.


56 Delaney, "Outer Banks," p. 4; and Martin to Dartmouth, June 30, 1775, Martin to Admiral Graves, July 8, 1775, and Admiral Graves to Martin, Boston, August 22, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 1:790–791, 843, 1204.


58 Martin to Dartmouth, October 16, in Clark, NDAR, 2:485.

59 Martin to Dartmouth, November 12, 1775, in Clark, NDAR, 2:1002; Journal of H.M.S. Syren, Captain Tobias Furneaux, January 2–3, 1776, and Proclamation of Governor Josiah Martin, January 10, 1776, in Clark, NDAR, 3:622, 724; Martin to Clinton, April 12, 1776, in Clark,
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Still, North Carolina's Navy, pp. 1, 3; and Delaney, "Outer Banks," pp. 3-6.