British-American Rivalry for the Support of the Indians of Maine and Nova Scotia, 1775-1783

Richard I. Hunt Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/etd

Part of the Cultural History Commons

Recommended Citation

This Open-Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UMaine. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UMaine. For more information, please contact um.library.technical.services@maine.edu.
During the American Revolution, the Penobscot, Passamaquoddy-Malecite and Micmac Indian tribes were a potentially powerful force in Maine and Nova Scotia. The white population of the region was small and scattered, and colonial leaders feared that the tribes would repeat their actions of the past wars, during which they had seriously harassed the frontiers. The officials of Nova Scotia and Massachusetts accordingly embarked upon a program to win the support of the Indians and to spare colonial settlements from attack. Both governments were sure that their opponents were trying to promote Indian warfare, and the resulting rivalry fed upon itself as each side secured minor victories. Both efforts were handicapped by serious problems, and neither side was able to defeat the other. The tribes were dependent upon goods and supplies secured from both sides and were forced to maintain relations with both contending parties.
BRITISH-AMERICAN RIVALRY FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE INDIANS
OF MAINE AND NOVA SCOTIA, 1775-1783

By
RICHARD I. HUNT, JR.

A THESIS
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
(in History)

The Graduate School
University of Maine at Orono
January, 1973
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would first like to express my appreciation to my Advisor and committee chairman, Dr. Alice R. Stewart, for her sound advice. I am also indebted to the faculty who have served on my committee, Dr. John W. Hakola, Dr. Jerome J. Nadelhaft, Dr. Edward O. Schriver and Professor William J. McAndrew, for their assistance and concern. The generous support of Professor Edgar McKay and the New England-Atlantic Provinces-Quebec Center was also greatly appreciated.

In the course of my research, I visited a number of institutions, all of which were most helpful. These were: the Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa; the Massachusetts Archives, the New England Historical and Genealogical Society and the Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston; the Maine Historical Society, Portland; and the Fogler Library at the University of Maine at Orono. The staff of the Colby College Library in Waterville, Maine, were especially kind.

My final debt is to my grandmother, Mrs. Irving M. Hunt. Without her clerical assistance in the preparation of this thesis, my task would have been much more difficult, and I am deeply appreciative of the time and effort she has expended on my behalf.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. PRE-WAR CONDITIONS DOWNEAST</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. OPENING MOVES: 1775-1776</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. GROWING CONFLICT: 1777</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. STALEMATE: 1778</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. A STRIKE BY THE BRITISH: 1779</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. DECLINING COMPETITION: 1780-1783</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. CONCLUSION</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDICES</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIOGRAPHY OF AUTHOR</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The Wendall Estimate</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Gyles' Statement</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 1790 Census</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Population of Nova Scotia, 1764</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Population of Nova Scotia, 1784</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. List of Abbreviations</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6. Map of Maine</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

During the War of the American Revolution, the competition for the friendship and assistance of the Indian tribes was a major factor in the struggle for the northeastern corner of the North American continent. British and American leaders believed that the Indians of the area held the balance of power. Convinced that their enemies would seek alliances with the tribes, these leaders plunged into frenzied efforts to woo the Indians and to save their people from the horror of Indian warfare. Reacting defensively, each side tried to gain Indian support for itself.

The failure of Nova Scotia to join the American Revolution prompted the struggle for Indian support. A number of authors have analyzed that colony's adherence to the British cause and stirred up a controversy.¹

J. B. Brebner focused on the isolation of Nova Scotia. The Yankees who had settled there were outside the mainstream of revolutionary thought, and the geography of the colony forced them into attempted neutrality, as it had their Acadian predecessors. According to Brebner, they were cut off from the power of the American colonies by the rough terrain of Maine and New Brunswick and by the sea. They could not stand alone against either power and sought to remain on good terms with both.

Another writer, D. C. Harvey, ascribed Nova Scotia's loyalty to the power of the British navy and the success of the Halifax government in suppressing the demand for town government on the New England model on the Bay of Fundy. Had the French navy been available to the Americans earlier, Harvey felt the colony might have fallen to the rebellion. The strong control of appointed town officials further gave the colonial government a check on the people and kept down revolution.

Other authors have seen religious revivalism as the primary reason for Nova Scotia's failure to rally to the American cause. Maurice W. Armstrong wrote that Nova Scotians were so engrossed in "other worldly" concerns that they simply ignored the conflict around them. S. D. Clark took this theory one step further. He thought that the religious movement represented a breakdown of traditional authority in the Yankee towns. The "New Lights," as the participants in the revival were called, represented a new
type of social revolution that tended to displace the political goals of the American Revolution.

In his biography of Henry Alline, leader of the revival in Nova Scotia, J. M. Bumsted also offered opinions on Nova Scotian loyalty. He noted Alline's spurning of the secular world and Quaker-like rejection of war and turmoil and concluded that Alline and the Great Awakening offered the colony an alternative to revolution and a safety valve for discontent. The New Lights left the world of politics and retreated to metaphysical realms.

Gordon Stewart, with the assistance of George Rawlyk, has produced something of a synthesis of the above views. He wrote that Nova Scotia's special circumstances of settlement and relative isolation removed its Yankee settlers from the turmoil in the colonies from which they had come. Nova Scotians were fighting for rights that were taken for granted in New England, and their position was weak, because of the power of the Halifax government, with its garrison and authoritarian traditions. Political opinion in Nova Scotia was ten years behind New England and, according to Stewart, never caught up. Conditions in Nova Scotia were not the same as those across the Bay of Fundy.

Stewart argued that what Brebner saw as innate neutrality was, in fact, moral confusion. Preoccupied by the religious revival, the Yankees of Nova Scotia doubted the morality of the Revolution. Basically friendly to the
Americans, they suspected that the violence of the rebel war effort damned its participants. Halifax, with its corruption and violence, was also evil, and the Yankees of Nova Scotia thus felt obliged to remain above the battle. Such aloofness was the path to salvation.

Stewart did not preclude the possibility of Nova Scotian participation in the American Revolution but felt that an American army would have been necessary to initiate the process. Nova Scotia was too far behind the Americans ideologically and too consumed with private concerns to break into revolution by herself.

Modern assessments of Nova Scotia's loyalty to Britain do not assign a critical role to the Indians. While no significant evidence exists indicating that fear of Indian attack played any part in the development of Nova Scotian loyalism, a number of authors feel that Indian support preserved their region from conquest. Writers in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Maine have expressed this thought. Although they have also claimed victory in the struggle for Indian support, both sides could not have decisively won this competition, and the mutual claims of victory indicate something of stalemate.

American commentators tended to evaluate the situation in much the same way as W. H. Kilby did in his *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*. Kilby wrote that during the American Revolution, "the friendliness of the Indians was held to be the means of saving the eastern settlements and
giving our nation the important point of possession when the war closed and the treaty was to be made. 2 Kilby also asserted that, "had not the neutrality of the Penobscot, Passamaquoddy, St. John and Micmac Indians been secured, the settlers of Eastern Maine could hardly have maintained their existence." 3

Other American writers expressed views similar to those of Kilby. 4 Marion Jacques Smith wrote that the American effort among the Indians was a defensive measure to prevent attacks instigated by the British. 5 G. W. Drisko thought that this work among the tribes saved the region for the United States. 6 Drisko's opinion was shared by two other writers, M. E. C. Smith and J. D. Weston, both of whom were sure that with Indian help, the


3Ibid., p. 437.

4 Many American authors of local histories and other works dealing with eastern Maine do not mention Indian participation in the Revolution. In some cases, the author felt that such participation was irrelevant to his effort because the town with which he was dealing was settled after the Revolution. Others ignored the whole question when they might legitimately have dealt with it. See the Bibliography for local histories examined.


6 Narrative of the Town of Machias (Machias: no publisher, 1904), p. 65. Mr. Drisko evidently saw the capture of the Margaretta and the battle of Machias as the entire Revolution in the town. He wrote almost nothing about John Allan.
British could have swept through much of eastern Maine.  

Canadian authors have felt much the same way and have been much more likely to mention the struggle for Indian support during the Revolution. Most felt that the British won the competition for Indian goodwill after initial American successes, but that American control of the Indians would not necessarily have led to the fall of Nova Scotia to the Americans.

The older Canadian opinion was expressed by James Hannay, who felt that John Allan, whose career as American Indian Superintendent will be discussed in later chapters, constantly attempted to incite the Indians to mischief. The Americans treated the Indians so badly, however, that few would aid the rebels. W. Stewart MacNutt expressed a similar view in a later treatment of the subject, although he did not state that the Americans actively mistreated the Indians. Other Canadian writers simply asserted that the Indians supported the British during the war and were


an important consideration to settlers within Nova Scotia.\(^9\)

Several authors stressed early American dominance among the Indians. They felt that Michael Francklin, Nova Scotian Indian Superintendent, won the Indians back to the British and kept them from doing serious damage to the colony. The most significant of these writers was J. B. Brebner, who wrote of the "uncertain" business of seeking Indian support. He felt that Francklin finally beat Allan, the American agent, secured the St. John valley and loosened Allan's hold over the Indians in the territory dominated by the Americans. Brebner attributed Francklin's victory to an excellent talent for Indian relations and the greater supply of trade goods available to him. The American agent held an orphan command, according to Brebner, constantly shunted between the Continental Congress and the General Court of Massachusetts. He was never properly supplied and therefore could not hold

the support of the Indian tribes.\textsuperscript{10}

Canadian authors who mention Indian participation in the Revolution thus tend to agree in substance.\textsuperscript{11} They may disagree on the details, such as when the British became dominant among the Indians, but they agree that Halifax dominated the Indians throughout most of the war. They were less likely to stress the danger to Nova Scotia had the Indians gone completely over to the Americans, but a number of them mentioned such possibilities. A few felt that the colony might have fallen under such attack, but most were more confident.

Canadian and American writers thus tended to see the struggle for Indian support on different levels. The Americans felt that loss in the competition would have

\textsuperscript{10}Brebner, The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia, pp. 322, 324-7. Other writers voicing similar opinions included W. Stewart MacNutt, who on pages 83-4 of his The Atlantic Provinces, The Emergence of Colonial Society, 1712-1857 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965) gave a different but non-contradictory view of the struggle from the account in his History of New Brunswick (see note 11). George Frederick Clark agreed that Francklin won the Indians back, although he said very little about the Revolution. His book, Someone Before Us (Fredericton, New Brunswick: Brunswick Press, 1970), was mainly concerned with archaeology. Harold B. Davis, an American writer, also agreed with Brebner on this point. In his An International Community on the St. Croix, University of Maine Studies, 2nd ser., No. 64 (Orono: University of Maine Press, 1950), p. 13, he wrote that the Indians "were finally won away by Michael Francklin." The Passamaquoddies remained loyal, but their devotion weakened.

\textsuperscript{11}A number of Canadian authors who dealt with the Revolution did not mention the Indians at all.
delivered much of Maine into British hands. The Canadians felt that Nova Scotia would probably have survived Indian hostility. They were so sure that Halifax was the decisive victor in the struggle that most did not analyze the possibilities of defeat. Authors on both sides felt that their people would have sustained heavy damage from Indian hostility, but the Americans seemed more aware of the possibility of total defeat.

The claims of victory by both sides in the competition for the Indians present an interesting aspect of this problem. The American commentators were aware of weakness in the closing years of the war, and the Canadian writers admitted an initial weakness, but both adamantly claim overall victory. Both sides were partially justified in their claims. Each of the contending parties were successful enough in their efforts with the Indians to achieve many of their war aims. This becomes evident when their basic goals among the Indians are examined.

When the war broke out, both sides feared the Indians. Although the ability and willingness of the Indians to harm either side was questionable, the governments of Massachusetts and Nova Scotia believed that the tribes of the region could do them great damage. Both immediately set forth a policy of winning Indian friendship. Massachusetts was totally successful in this; her settlements in the disputed area downeast suffered no Indian assaults. Nova Scotia was slightly less successful
and underwent several minor assaults and alarms; she did not, however, suffer any serious harm at the hands of the Indians. The Halifax government therefore could also claim victory in this struggle. Thus, in their initial aim, that of preventing Indian assaults upon themselves, both sides were successful and could claim victory.

The greater assurance of victory among Canadian writers may have sprung from the modest goals Halifax set for Indian work. The government's agent, Michael Francklin, was merely to recall the Indians to their allegiance to King George. The Indians were willing to give such assurances of loyalty in return for trade goods. The Nova Scotian leaders gave little thought to recruiting the Indians to fight the Americans, and the Indians accordingly had few obligations as a consequence of the professed allegiance to the Crown. The Nova Scotians did not trust the Indians enough to raise them militarily against the rebels. They felt it better to leave the tribes peacefully in the woods. Once the Halifax government got pledges of allegiance from the tribes and ended the minor assaults, their goals were accomplished, and their victory was complete.

The Americans had other goals beyond the mere winning of friendship, and these account for the reluctance of the American authors to claim total victory. Massachusetts and General Washington unsuccessfully sought Indian troops for the Continental army in the early part
of the war. Furthermore, Colonel John Allan, the American Indian agent, hoped to use the tribes in the conquest of Nova Scotia, the ultimate American goal. Although he caused some difficulty for the British, he was rarely able to use the Indians offensively. He and the Americans thus failed to achieve all their ambitions. For this reason, American writers have tended to stress the successful defense of eastern Maine and to claim victory on that basis; they play down the failure to achieve their other goals.

Both sides thus achieved at least partial success in their war aims among the tribes of Maine and Nova Scotia. These goals were set because the governments of Massachusetts and Nova Scotia were sure that their enemies would use the Indians against the settlements downeast. The war aims of the two governments were determined by what their leaders believed, not by the actual situation. In this case, these leaders believed that the Indians could do their interests grave damage. The early moves of both sides reinforced the conviction that mischief was intended among the Indians. The struggle for Indian friendship was thus self-intensifying, growing in bitterness and desperation as each side won minor victories. Once begun, it had a life of its own, at times almost unrelated to the realities of the situation.

In this work, the growth of this competition for Indian support will be explored, and the relative strengths
and weaknesses of each side will be examined. In the face of existing claims and counter-claims of victory, it will be necessary to arrive at a judgement regarding the apparent successes of each effort. Who was directing these efforts, to what degree were they tied into the British and American war measures, and why did they succeed or fail? These questions must be answered before a balanced view of the events can be achieved. The study will also provide information on the methods and flavor of day-to-day operations among the men who dealt with the Indians. Perhaps in this way it will be possible to arrive at true appreciation and interpretation of the work of the major participants.
Chapter 1

PRE-WAR CONDITIONS DOWNEAST

The American Revolution thrust Massachusetts and Nova Scotia into the first hostilities since the expulsion of French power from North America. Once again, opposing forces faced each other across the Bay of Fundy and in the wilderness of eastern Maine and the St. John valley, but this time, the conflict was between Englishmen, subjects of King George III. The style and progress of that conflict were largely determined by the conditions existing when the war broke out. These conditions, which had been developing since the European race first appeared in North America, are a vital prelude to the more detailed study of the competition for the support of the Indians of Maine and Nova Scotia.

1. One of the necessary conditions for the development of this contest for Indian friendship was the continued loyalty of Nova Scotia to the British Empire, which was discussed above.

2. A second condition shaping the competition in eastern Maine and Nova Scotia was the active support of the rebellion by Machias, which immediately made it a focus of action for the American cause. Little has been written to explain Machias' devotion to the rebellion. Earlier
authors tended to see it as a normal, "patriotic" response and accepted it without further investigation. The only later historian to deal with this subject has been John Howard Ahlin, in his Maine Rubicon; Downeast Settlers during the American Revolution.¹ He attributed Machias' revolutionary zeal to frustration over repeated failure to win royal recognition of land titles, neglect by the Massachusetts government, unsettled governmental conditions downeast, traditional rebellion against the laws governing the harvest of mast trees and the natural "anti-authority" tendencies of frontier people. These conditions created a situation in which a break with established authority came rather easily. Ahlin also noted that the lumber industry of Machias was strongly tied to the Boston area and that any measures of government that harmed the economy of Boston also affected the rather fragile economic condition of Machias. Ahlin thus felt that the Machias region was susceptible to rebellion, and rather naturally followed the colony of Massachusetts into the Revolution.²

²Ahlin also noted that there was little agricultural activity at Machias; much food and hay came from Nova Scotia or Boston. As the war progressed and as shortages developed due to Nova Scotian loyalism and the British navy on the Maine coast, many people downeast may have regretted their initial rush to rebellion.
The third, and most important, circumstance in Maine and Nova Scotia was the presence of the Indian tribes. Their economic and political status, which shaped the thrust of the programs to win their support, had been determined by developments stretching back into their history beyond even their first contacts with European culture.

The tribes that were to play a role in the Revolution were the remnants of a broad band of culturally-similar, associated tribes that had once stretched from the Nipmucks of New Hampshire to the Malecites on the St. John River. The Micmacs, who lived along the eastern coast of present day New Brunswick and in Nova Scotia proper, were associated with the tribes to the west but were never members of the Abnaki Confederacy, to which their neighbors belonged. They may have aided the Confederacy in war, but remained outside at other times.

The Abnaki Confederacy maintained a considerable number of cultural contacts, aided by the mutually intelligible dialects spoken throughout the region. There were three major dialectal groups. The tribes of New Hampshire and the Saco valley used the first of these. The second,

---

spoken by the Androscoggin, Kennebec and Penobscot tribes, outlasted its western counterpart, but is now virtually extinct as a spoken language. The third has survived among the Passamaquoddies and Malecites. This similarity of language, along with the geography of the region, was a key factor in maintaining cultural homogeneity throughout the Confederacy.

The Indians of the Abnaki Confederacy were migratory, seeking the most abundant sources of food. Their villages were little more than "base camps" for winter living. After planting their crops in the villages each spring, they left their inland settlements for the coast and a summer of fishing. They returned to the villages in the fall, harvested and stored their crops, and prepared for a winter of hunting and trapping. The practices differed slightly from tribe to tribe. Among the Indians studied in this work, the Malecites were the most active agriculturally. The Micmacs did very little planting depending almost entirely upon game for sustenance.

---

4 Eckstorm, "Indians of Maine," p. 44.

5 Bear, "Concept of Unity," p. 65.

Abnaki and Micmac chiefs traditionally had very little authority. Among the Penobscots, for example, a chief was very weak, more a leader than a ruler. He represented the group in extra-tribal affairs and provided advice and leadership in time of war. Although sons occasionally succeeded fathers, the chieftainship was not hereditary. Micmac chiefs were evidently weaker than their Abnaki counterparts. Their main duty was the assigning of hunting areas to the family bands. They frequently did not lead the tribe in war but surrendered that duty to war leaders, men skilled in war. The position of the chiefs improved somewhat as the tribes came into increasing contact with Europeans. They became commercial leaders in the trading that followed the new contacts. Their new economic status buttressed the chiefs' positions and weakened the more democratic forms that had previously prevailed.

---


9 Alfred Goldsworth Bailey, *The Conflict of European
The Indian culture that spread across Maine and Nova Scotia received devastating blows from the European civilization that appeared with the first exploring ships along the North American coast. When confronted with the results of European technology, ancient skills soon disappeared, and traditional patterns of life faded into a growing dependency upon European goods obtained through trade. The French, with their thirst for furs and zeal to Christianize, weakened the tribal structure and life styles. The English, with their need for land and growing contempt of the Indian, destroyed several tribes and drove the survivors from the lands where they had lived for generations. Both were enemies of Indian tradition and contributed to the decline of the tribes.

The root of the conflict between the English and the Indians lay in the conflicting systems of land tenure. When the Indians made a grant to whites, they intended merely to allow the purchaser to take up traditional Indian uses of the land. The French understood this and made no attempt to dispossess the Indians; with their small population they had no need to do so. The English, however, under the pressure of a rapidly growing population, took active and exclusive possession of the lands they purchased. Furthermore, the English mode of settlement which placed them squarely astride traditional Indian routes to the sea,
sowed seeds of almost constant conflict.¹⁰

The small conflicts in Maine were part of the massive English-French struggle for control of the continent, but the basic causes had little to do with the larger conflict. The Indians were fighting for their lands and way of life; for them, no compromise was possible.¹¹ The several wars were too numerous to detail here, but, beginning in 1675 and continuing until the end of the French and Indian War in 1763, English forces slowly, and with many reverses, destroyed the tribes of western Maine and reduced the other tribes of Nova Scotia and Maine to exhaustion and peace. Under the stress, the Abnaki Confederacy broke down, and self-interest dominated. The tribes were never able to strike a decisive blow against the English, and one by one, the tribes of western Maine were broken into tiny, dispirited remnants, some of who simply vanished.¹²

By 1765, only the Penobscot, Malecite-Passamaquoddy and Micmac tribes maintained their tribal structures with


¹²Bear, "Concept of Unity," p. 106.
any strength. The Malecites and Passamaquoddies had not been touched by the expansionist English movements, and the light settlement of Nova Scotia left the Micmacs virtually intact.

The expulsion of the French from North America deprived the Indians of more than a mere ally. They no longer had two sources of supply for manufactured goods. All goods henceforth would have to come from the English. After the fall of New France, therefore, the Indians were prisoners of their need for certain goods, and the British colonial governments now used this need to control the tribes.

A small group of Indians also remained on the Androscoggin River and eventually sought some assistance from Massachusetts during the Revolution. Other Indians remained throughout western and central Maine. Arnold's expedition met a number of them as they ascended the Kennebec River. They were too few to figure significantly in the war. For the references to Indians during the Arnold expedition, see Kenneth Roberts, March to Quebec, Journals of the Members of Arnold's Expedition (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1938). The references occur in the following journals: Lieutenant John Montresor, pp. 7, 19; Doctor Isaac Senter, p. 215; John Joseph Henry, pp. 313-5, 317, 344.

The Indians' need for manufactured goods had been developing for many years. They had obtained these goods through trade with Europeans since the first explorers dropped anchor along the coasts of New England and the Maritimes. When settlers followed explorers, opportunities to gain manufactured goods were greatly increased. The new items the Indians got in return for their furs were far superior to the traditional implements; the standard of living among the tribes shot up, but the traditional way of life was lost in the process. Iron, steel and copper goods replaced the older stone implements, and handicrafts practiced for centuries disappeared in a very few generations. The metal kettle or axe became essential as the Indians forgot how to live without them. So great was the need for the newer articles that the tribal way of life shifted, and the acquisition of iron became its main focus.¹⁵ By the outbreak of the American Revolution, this process had been going on for over 150 years, and Indian dependence upon manufactured goods was established.

The dependence upon manufactured goods changed the Indian style of life in other ways. To get the necessary goods, the tribes had to trade with the whites and needed commodities for exchange. Wampum was used occasionally,

¹⁵Bailey, Conflict of Culture, pp. 10-2, 46-7.
but the basic medium was furs.16

As the need for furs increased, the Indians soon realized the usefulness of firearms and sought them. Once the Indians got guns, the new weapons had a greater effect upon them than any other manufactured item brought to America by the Europeans. In spite of abusive use of individual weapons, guns revolutionized hunting and warfare. Poor gun management and maintenance increased the Indian need for guns, and when the supply of furs decreased due to overhunting, the Indians, with nothing to trade, were often unable to obtain replacement weapons.17

Guns led the Indians to overhunt their lands and further harmed the traditional way of life. When animals were killed chiefly for fur and not for food, the kill was much larger. Utilization of the whole carcass declined, and eventually a shortage of food and furs developed. The increased time spent hunting also caused the decline of agriculture and greater dependence upon white sources of food. The Micmacs, who never practiced much agriculture, were particularly hard hit as the game animals became scarce. The search for hunting territories and markets for

16Ibid., p. 49.

furs increased the desperation of war. Conflict, made more deadly by firearms, replaced the old blood feud, and casualties were greater. Old behavioral norms broke down under the pressure of the search for furs. The result was often the failure of food supplies, drunkenness, disease and depopulation.18

Elizabeth Ann Hutton detailed the process of decline in her study of the Micmacs.19 As game declined due to overhunting, the Indians had to travel further to find enough for their needs. The increased time spent in travel lessened the time available to provide the basic needs of life. The same shortage of game reduced the food supplies available, and the Indians had to purchase provisions. They finally became so dependent upon white supplies that charity was necessary.

The Indians of Nova Scotia had become dependent upon manufactured goods and foods produced by whites during the wars between the English and French. This made them submissive to the whites when they needed goods. J. B. Brebner stated that the Nova Scotia Indians had to make peace in 1760 because they needed supplies that they

18 Bailey, Conflict of Culture, pp. 13, 57-8, 97-8, 114-5.
could get no other way. Their survival depended upon it. After the war, the Indians attempted to re-establish dual sources of supply by trading with the French on the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, but the Nova Scotian authorities moved quickly to interdict these supply lines. They wanted no repetition of the situation before the fall of New France, when the Indians played the warring parties against each other.

The Indian dependence upon manufactured goods and English provisions did not lessen before the American Revolution. In 1764, Governor Wilmot of Nova Scotia wrote the Board of Trade that "The custom of giving them provisions and clothing has been too long established to be broke with Safety." To refuse more supplies would simply make them hostile. Subsequent reports from Nova Scotia noted similar demands from the Indians. The government attempted to introduce methods by which the Indians could support themselves; the new colony of Nova Scotia could ill


afford the expense of maintaining large numbers of Indians.23

Once the Indian dependence upon the English became apparent, the colonial governments attempted to take control of the tribes by exploiting their needs. In Maine in the early 1700's, Massachusetts attempted a policy of peace through trade and truck houses, or trading posts, at Saco and on Casco Bay. In 1726, the General Court took control of the operation and fixed the prices of furs. The system thus established lasted with only minor changes until the Revolution.

Three basic posts served until the close of the French and Indian War. These were at St. George's, at Richmond on the Kennebec River and at Union Falls on the Saco River. When peace came after the fall of Quebec, two new posts were added at Fort Halifax in Winslow and Fort Pownall in Prospect on the Penobscot River.24 Massachusetts' system seemed popular with the Indians and was used substantially, but, of course, they had an alternative until 1760.25


25Douglas Leach, Northern Colonial Frontier, pp. 147-9.
Nova Scotia did not adopt the truck house system as whole-heartedly as did Massachusetts. The colonial authorities encouraged the Indians to trade at Halifax after the colony fell to Britain but did not set up a system of truck houses until 1760-1761, when six trading stations were established under Benjamin Gerrish, the new Agent of Indian Affairs. The government appointed and supervised the truck masters and provided the trade goods, but the Nova Scotian system never worked. Gerrish's method of obtaining trade goods at great profit to himself and his friends created a scandal and discredited the system. The truck houses also ran into debt because of the large numbers of gifts that they were forced to give to the Indians. After an unsuccessful attempt at reform, the government abandoned the system in 1764. The colony could no longer bear the expense. To protect the Indians, trade was then opened at certain locations supervised by the government.  

By 1775, the process of decline, growing dependence and control by colonial governments had reduced the Indians to three tribes, the Penobscots, the Malecite- 

---

Passamaquoddies and the Micmacs. These three groups were the remnants of the Abnaki Confederacy and the most faithful to the old spirit of the alliance. The tribes easily maintained close and friendly relations among themselves because of the similarity of culture discussed above.

The relative strength of the three tribes is very difficult to determine. Alden Vaughn estimated that there were only 16,000 to 18,000 Indians in all New England after the great epidemic of 1616-1617. He further noted that most of these lived in southern New England where the Indian population was always denser than that in the

---

27 Writers have disagreed over the relationship between the Malecites and the Passamaquoddies. Most writers have seen them as one tribe or two subdivisions of the same tribe. F. G. Speck and W. S. Hadlock, in their "Report on Tribal Boundaries and Hunting Areas of the Malecite Indians," p. 374, wrote that without an exhaustive study of the dialects of both groups, one could not determine their relationship. For the purposes of this thesis, the Malecite-Passamaquoddies were regarded as essentially two groups within one tribe. The distinction made was mostly geographical, between groups around Passamaquoddy Bay and on the St. John River.

28 According to Speck and Hadlock, "Tribal Boundaries," p. 355, the Penobscots were linguistically closer to the Abnakis, and the Malecites had a similar relationship with the Micmacs. They all were separate parts of the Wabanaki culture and dialectic group. For references to the Abnaki Confederacy and relations among these three tribes, see Speck and Hadlock, "Tribal Boundaries," p. 359; Davis, International Community, p. 3; F. G. Speck, "Eastern Algonkian Confederacy," pp. 493, 497.
According to the Wendall Estimate, in 1690 there were 1,480 Indian men in Maine and 2,740 in Nova Scotia. This is the earliest figure available for the Indian population of Maine and Nova Scotia and seems quite high. If each of these warriors had two or three dependents, the Indian population of Maine would have been between 3,000 and 5,000 souls. According to the same calculations, at the same time between 5,000 and 8,500 Indians were living

---

29 Alden Vaughn, The New England Frontier, Puritans and Indians, 1620-1765 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), p.28. Two estimates of Indian population were made in 1726, one of which also gave figures for the relative strength of the tribes in 1690. Both evaluations are valuable but of limited usefulness because of the precipitate decline of the Indian population in the middle years of the eighteenth century. These two sources were "An Estimate of the Inhabitants, English and Indian, in the North American Colonies, also their Extent in Miles-1726," New England Historical and Genealogical Register, XX, 1 (1966), pp. 7-9 (cited hereafter as the Wendall Estimate), and "John Gyles' Statement on the Number of Indians," Collections of the Maine Historical Society, III (1852), 355-8 (cited hereafter as Gyles' Statement). Little is known about the Wendall Estimate save that it was preserved in the papers of the Wendall family. Gyles' Statement was the work of one John Gyles, who served the government of Massachusetts for many years on the Maine frontier. He commanded several military posts and was a captive among the Indians for eight years, a unique, if unwelcome, opportunity to study the tribes of Maine. See also "Narrative of Captivity among the Indians of Cap't John Gyles, 1689-1698," Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 4th ser., V (1661), 449-454. Both Gyles' Statement and the Wendall Estimate are reproduced in the Appendices 1 and 2.

30 Wendall Estimate, p. 9.
in Nova Scotia. These figures may have suffered from a common problem experienced by early estimates of Indian population. They were inflated by men who could not believe that so few Indians could do so much damage. A truer assessment of Indian strength would probably be about one-half the numbers given by the Wendall Estimate.  

With a rough idea of the earlier Indian population, estimates of Indian numbers during the Revolution can be approached more realistically. Most of the tribes noted in the earlier assessments had virtually disappeared by then, and those who remained were much reduced in power.  

The Penobscots were the westernmost surviving tribe with a role in the struggle for Indian support between the British and American forces in Maine and Nova Scotia. Gyles estimated their strength at 130 men, and the Wendall Estimate gave them forty men less. By 1776, however, their numbers were still smaller, and they claimed only  

---

31 Hutton gives estimates that substantiate the inflation of the Wendall figures. She cites an appraisal of Indian strength made by Gargas in 1687-1688, which placed the Indian population of Nova Scotia at about 2,000 people. A second and smaller estimate indicated a male population of about 400, or a total population of 800 to 1,200 souls. See her "Micmac Indians of Nova Scotia," pp. 231, 134.  


33 Gyles' Statement, p. 357; Wendall Estimate, p. 9.
fifty fighting men. The whole tribe then numbered between 150 and 250 souls.

The size of the Passamaquoddy and Malecite tribe by 1775 was more difficult to determine. In 1726, Gyles numbered them at 140 men at Machias, Passamaquoddy Bay and on the St. John River. The Wendall Estimate gave a total of 115 men in the same three locations. These two figures would indicate a total population of between two hundred and four hundred people. In 1776, Chief Ambrose St. Aubin told the government of Massachusetts in Watertown that there were sixty men in his village on the St. John River. Government documents showed that 126 men, excluding Penobscots and Micmacs, served the United States in some way before 1780; fifteen of these lived at Passamaquoddy. These men had 253 dependents, of whom 38 were living at Passamaquoddy. Since all the men of the Malecite-

---

34 Minutes of a conference between Chief Orono of the Penobscots and Benjamin Greenleaf, July 20, 1776, Massachusetts Archives, XXIX, 530.

35 Gyles' Statement, p. 357.

36 Wendall Estimate, p. 9.

37 Return of Indians in or who have been in United States Service, July 28, 1780, by Frederick Delesdernier, aid to Colonel John Allan at Machias, in Frederick Kidder, Military Operations in Eastern Maine and Nova Scotia during the Revolution, Chiefly Compiled from the Journals and Letters of Colonel John Allan (Albany: J. Munsell, 1867), p. 284-5.
Passamaquoddy tribe were unlikely to have served the American cause, one may assume that the tribe had more members than the 379 listed in Delesdernier's return. These figures, incomplete as they are, seem to indicate that the Malecites and their kinsmen at Passamaquoddy, isolated from the wars that weakened other tribes, maintained a steady level of population at least until the Revolution. They probably still had the 400 to 600 people that Gyles reported in 1726.\(^\text{38}\)

The Micmacs to the east of the St. John River were the largest of the tribes involved in the American Revolution in Maine and Nova Scotia. As seen above, their numbers were estimated at about two thousand almost a century before the Revolution.\(^\text{39}\) In 1776, representatives of the tribe told officials of Massachusetts at Watertown that there were over ten villages of Micmacs. The five villages

---

\(^{\text{38}}\)Reports of the various conferences held during the war tend to substantiate this estimate. The Nova Scotian Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Michael Francklin, held a conference on the St. John in 1781 that 381 Indians attended. In 1777, when Francklin's American counterpart, John Allan, removed most of the Indians from the St. John valley to Machias, he reported that about 500 Indians made the trip. One conference under Francklin on the St. John reportedly drew 300 Indian men and 600 dependents, but this particular affair was set up to include significant numbers of Micmac and Canadian Indians as well. See Nova Scotia A, C, 194-5, CI, 265-6; Kidder, Military Operations, p. 313.

\(^{\text{39}}\)See note 31 above.
represented at the conference had a total of 280 men. Counting dependents, these villages would probably have held between 800 and 1,100 persons, and the whole tribe conceivably could have had as many as 2,500 members. Lieutenant Governor Francklin suggested a more plausible figure in 1768, however, when he wrote that 500 Indian warriors lived in Nova Scotia. Most of these men were probably Micmacs. With about 500 men, the tribe would presumably have had between 1,500 and 2,000 members.

As one can see from the above figures, the number of Indians for which the British and Americans were competing was not large. At the very most, there were probably no more than three thousand Indians in the whole region, and the actual figure was probably little more than two thousand. There were no more than eight hundred warriors, most of whom were Micmacs. The tribe that profited most from the competition, the Malecites, at the center of the disputed area, probably had no more than one hundred and fifty warriors.

---


The numbers and distribution of the white population of Nova Scotia and Maine was as significant a factor in the region as was the size and distribution of the Indian tribes. The small and widely scattered population of the territory strongly influenced the tactics of both sides. Had the area been securely settled by large numbers of whites, the Indians would have been much less significant.

The authorities of both colonies were well aware of the damage that relatively small numbers of Indians could inflict upon small and isolated settlements. Most remembered the previous Indian wars and the terrors of surprise attack from the forest. These memories stimulated the struggle and imparted a certain desperation to it, particularly on the American side, where the settlements were especially scattered.

Unfortunately, accurate population statistics for Maine and Nova Scotia in this era are not available. Sources for Maine are especially rare.

John Ahlin was able to find no firm statistics for the immediate area with which he was dealing. He used a description of the entire District of Maine by John Calef.42

---

Calef, a Loyalist from the Penobscot, stated that the total population of Maine was 13,190 people. On the basis of this figure and other information on the settlements east of the Penobscot, Ahlin arrived at a figure of 4,000 settlers for eastern Maine in 1776.43

In the absence of other data, the 1790 census of the United States can shed some light on downeast population distribution during the Revolution. Fifteen years elapsed between the opening of the war and the taking of the census, but seven of them were war years during which the area lost population as men fled to safer regions. The census showed an increase of only five hundred people over Ahlin's estimate for 1775. Some areas vacant in 1775 had been settled by 1790, but overall growth in the area was slow. All Maine east of Camden held only 12,308 souls, and seven years after the end of the war, a small band of Indians could have done great damage in this region.44

A comparison of the population in individual towns is even more instructive. Machias, the largest town in Washington County in 1790, had only 818 people, of whom 177 were men above the age of sixteen. The only other

43 Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, p. 7.

incorporated town in the county, Buck's Harbor, had 62 people, of whom twelve were men of sixteen or older. The largest plantation east of Machias, Number Eight (present day Eastport and Lubec), had 244 people. There were only 98 people between Passamaquoddy Bay and Machias. The largest Washington County plantation west of Machias was Number Four (incorporated as Steuben) with 71 men of sixteen or older in a population of 233. Total population in the area was 792 with 203 males above the age of sixteen.\(^{45}\)

Coastal settlement in Hancock County was more substantial than in Washington County and probably had grown significantly between 1783 and 1790. The largest town was Penobscot (now Penobscot, Castine and Brooksville) with 1,048 inhabitants. The second largest town, Mount Desert, encompassing that whole island, had a population of 744 people. The rest of the district east of the Penobscot had slightly over 4,000 people.

Eastern Maine was thus weak and open to attack when the Revolution began. The population was centered at Machias, Jonesboro, Addison, the Narraguagus valley and Gouldsboro.\(^{46}\) None of these settlements was secure from

\(^{45}\)Other plantations with settlement in 1790 lay in a line immediately north of the coastal townships and probably had little significant population during the war. They were: Number 11 (Cherryfield), Numbers 12 and 13 (Columbia and Columbia Falls).

\(^{46}\)Memorial of the Centennial Anniversary of the Settlement of Machias, p. 39.
Indian attack, and memories of such assaults spurred the Massachusetts government and the people of Maine to seek with considerable urgency the friendship of the downeast Indians.

The distribution and size of the white population of Nova Scotia rendered much of that colony as vulnerable to Indian attack as eastern Maine. Centered in clusters of villages along the coast, the population was open to raids from the virtually unsettled interior of the province. While Indian attacks probably would not have brought down the colony, assaults on the isolated areas of the St. John valley and the outlying districts on the peninsula would have caused heavy damage and great suffering. Like their Massachusetts counterparts, the Nova Scotian authorities set out to woo the Indians and prevent such hostilities.

The population of Nova Scotia varied during the war. Thomas C. Haliburton estimated that the colony had about 13,000 inhabitants in 1764. By 1772, it had risen to 19,100, including 2,100 Acadians, of whom 800 lived on Cape Breton. The numbers decreased to 12,000 by 1781, but by 1784, after the influx of Loyalists, the population had climbed to 20,400.47

Most of this population lived within the borders of

the present-day province. A few did not, however, and were particularly exposed to Indian and American attack. About thirty families had settled on Passamaquoddy Bay at the very borders of Massachusetts. Behind them, 1,200 to 1,500 British and 400 Acadians inhabited the St. John valley. 48

In 1764 Halifax was the largest settlement on the peninsula, holding 3,000 people. 49 East of the capital, to Canso and beyond, the coast was occupied by only 381 people. The South Shore to the west of Halifax had 2,300 people, of whom 1,600 lived around Lunenburg. 50

The Cape Sable Shore was very sparsely populated. Barrington, behind Cape Sable Island, had three hundred inhabitants, and Yarmouth had only 150.

The most thickly settled area of Nova Scotia was the shore of the Bay of Fundy, with its transplanted New England Yankees. Annapolis County had 1,000 settlers. Other towns, mostly around Minas Basin, were Cornwallis with 518 people, Horton with 670, Falmouth with 278, Newport with 251 and the Cobequid region with 400 settlers.


49 Haliburton's estimates for 1764 are the best available guide to Nova Scotian population distribution. It should be remembered that many of the figures given are probably smaller than the actual population in that area during the Revolution.

Nova Scotia, with her sparse and scattered population, thus seemed as vulnerable to Indian attack as did Maine. Any settlement with less than five hundred people was threatened. If isolated, it could be damaged severely by the Indians present in the colony. Remote farms, even those around the larger settlements, were even more exposed. War parties could roam the wild and vacant interior of the colony and strike at will. Few towns could be completely secure. Nova Scotia thus had no less interest in securing Indian friendship than Massachusetts.

The adherence of the Indians to the Roman Catholic faith was another of the factors affecting the struggle for their friendship. A Massachusetts law forbidding priests to settle within the colony kept Catholic religious leaders away from the Maine Indians. Before the war, the Penobscots had asked for priests, but the authorities refused permission. The British did provide priests for the tribes when the situation warranted it, but they would have preferred to convert the Indians to Protestantism. A new priest, Mathurin Bourg, arrived in Nova Scotia from Canada in the summer of 1773 to replace Father Bailly as Indian missionary under the auspices of the British government. When the Revolution began, the Malecites were afraid of joining the Americans lest they lose Bourg's services. The Americans in Boston promised them a replacement but could
not find one.\(^{51}\) The Indian desire for religious personnel remained a factor throughout the war and caused frantic American efforts to secure priests to counter the influences of British sponsored missionaries, who, as will be seen, never hesitated to use their priestly powers to sway the tribes into the British sphere of influence.

Thus, conditions in the disputed area determined the shape of the competition for Indian friendship. Loyal Nova Scotia and fervently rebellious Machias forced a confrontation downeast. Within the area of that confrontation lived the Penobscot, Passamaquoddy-Malecite and Micmac tribes of Indians. The colonial governments of Nova Scotia and Massachusetts opened a campaign to win the friendship of these tribes and prevent assaults upon their scattered settlements in the area. Once in motion, the efforts among the Indians flowed along courses set by the long history of Indian and white contact throughout the region, and the conflicts of the Revolution followed many of the old patterns.

Chapter 2

OPENING MOVES: 1775-1776

When the American Revolution broke out around Boston early in 1775, the leaders of Massachusetts and Nova Scotia faced radically different circumstances. The rebel government of Massachusetts was challenging a great empire that had recently won a considerable victory over its traditional enemy, France. Even if the other colonies in North America followed her lead, Massachusetts was still embarking upon a struggle in which there appeared to be little chance of success. Nova Scotia, on the other hand was controlled by a tight but unsteady oligarchy in Halifax. Governor Francis Legge, appointed in 1773, had challenged its rule and had sought to expel its corrupt members from the government. The oligarchy's initial reaction was to employ the Revolution to get rid of Legge, who was accused of fomenting unrest. With the spread of sedition in the other colonies, the Crown dared not call the oligarchy's bluff and removed Legge from office. Only then did the Nova Scotian government apply itself seriously to the problems of the Revolution.

The different positions in which the Nova Scotian and Massachusetts governments found themselves produced different reactions to the problem of the Indians at the
beginning of the war. Nova Scotia, with its divided government, made few attempts to court the tribes. The contacts consisted mainly of warnings to the Indians to avoid the treason of the Americans. Few organized attempts to gain the support of the Malecites and Micmacs were made.\(^1\) Massachusetts, on the other hand, was much more attentive to all the tribes of Maine and Nova Scotia. The leaders of the colony sought all the help they could enlist. Desperation drove them to strive to win (or neutralize) the potential power groups around them. Deeply conscious of their weakness, they well knew that they could afford no additional enemies; they were already hard-pressed to defend their outlying territories. Faced with such insecurity, they naturally made great efforts to secure the friendship and military assistance of the Indians, efforts much greater than those made by Nova Scotia.

In the early years of the war, the Massachusetts authorities had some definite advantages in their dealings with the Indians on their eastern borders. They had a good understanding of the Indian mind and knew how to impress it. They were able to translate their conflict with Britain into terms that moved the tribes to their side. They had an established policy of Indian trade and

\(^1\)The Penobscots lived too far from the Nova Scotian sphere of influence to be of concern to the government in Halifax at this time.
a system to implement it. They also had the element of fear on their side. The natives were familiar with the colonial methods of Indian warfare, which they had seen destroy their neighbors to the west. The shattered remnants of the western tribes were a constant reminder of the folly of armed opposition to Massachusetts. Skillful utilization of these advantages permitted Massachusetts to retain her eastern lands when the war ended.

Massachusetts made her first move to secure tribal goodwill on May 15, 1775, when the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, or General Court, dispatched a letter to its "Friends and good Brothers," the Eastern Indians of Maine and Nova Scotia, warning of the "great wickedness of such as should be our friends but are our enemies." These evil men wanted to enslave and impoverish both Americans and Indians and take away all guns, so that neither colonists nor natives could hunt. The Congress then wrote of other British transgressions and asked the tribes to do what they could to dissuade the Canadian Indians from joining the British. The Congregationalists of Massachusetts then called the blessing of God down on the Catholic Indians (an indication of colonial desperation), and promised to supply them with anything they wanted or needed.

The letter to the Indians had tangible results for

\(^2\)Baxter MSS., XIV (1910), 244-5; see also Kidder, Military Operations, pp. 51-2.
Massachusetts. Joseph Orono, chief of the Penobscots, journeyed to Watertown, where the government was meeting because of the British occupation of Boston. On June 21, 1775, he pledged conditional support to the colonies. "In behalf of the whole Penobscot tribe," he said, "I hereby declare to you, if the grievances, under which our people labor were removed, they would aid, with their whole force, to defend the country." The grievances mentioned by Orono were dishonest traders, trespass upon their timberlands by whites and the absence of a priest among them. Anxious to gain every possible adherent, the Massachusetts Congress moved with unusual speed to correct the Penobscots' problems. They were not willing to give written permission for a priest, although they made it plain that they had no objection to a priest among the Penobscots. This was a direct violation of a Massachusetts law that prohibited priests within the colony. Action was also taken to provide trade goods for the Indians and to pay the expense of their trip home.

Other Indian chiefs also came to Massachusetts during the summer of 1775. Chief Swashan and four others

3 Quoted in Bangor Daily Commercial, October 13, 1911, as clipped and preserved in Eckstorm Manuscripts, Bangor Public Library.

from St. Francis appeared in Watertown and told the Massachusetts government that four or five tribes with two thousand men were ready to aid the colonies. Swashan reported that both the French and Indians of Canada supported the colonies, but the French were afraid to take up arms. Lewis, a chief of the Caughnawaga Mohawks, was also in town in August.

The Malecite chiefs of the St. John River did not visit Massachusetts during the summer of 1775 but sent a letter of friendship to the colony. When head chief Ambrose and second chief Pierre Toma heard of the war, they went to the Penobscot truck house and sent a message to Boston promising to stand firm with the Penobscots in resisting British encroachments upon American liberties. They also demanded a truck house on the St. John River and a Catholic priest from the Americans. They had a priest under British auspices but feared that he would be lost if they joined the colonists.

---

5 Nova Scotia Gazette [Halifax], October 17, 1775, quoting an unspecified Boston newspaper; Massachusetts, House of Representatives, Journal, August 17, 1775, p. 81. St. Francis was an Indian center in Canada, northwest of Maine, south of the St. Lawrence River. The term "Canada," is used in this thesis to designate the St. Lawrence colony; it does not include Nova Scotia.

6 Massachusetts, House of Representatives, Journal, August 2, 1775, pp. 34-5.

7 Ibid., October 11, 1775, p. 148; Lord, et el., Archdiocese of Boston, I, 281-2.
The Massachusetts reply to the letter from the Malecites followed a form that was rapidly becoming standard. It expressed love and brotherhood for the tribes and vilified the British; it also contained little concrete response to the Indian demands. The government ignored the request for a truck house on the St. John but promised to send supplies for the Malecites to the existing truck house at Penobscot. Massachusetts did not object to a priest among the tribe but made no promise to help obtain one. The government urged the Indians to send down all future request and complaints, hoping in this way to prevent Indian contact with the British.⁸

In response to the Malecites' letter, Massachusetts drew up a policy statement for their conduct of the competition for Indian support. On October 11, 1775, a committee of the government reported that it would be of great advantage "to cultivate a good Harmony with the Tribes of Indians near the Settlements in North America"⁹ and to prevent them from trading with the enemy. The members of the committee, therefore, recommended that the government send ammunition, provisions and clothing to the Penobscot truck house to be traded for furs. They also suggested

⁹ Ibid., p. 155.
that the Indians be sent gifts and letters of friendship to insure their good will towards the colony.

For the remainder of the war, Massachusetts followed the policy of supplying goods to the Indians, although the process underwent very basic changes. The committee recommended that the natives be allowed to trade furs for provisions, but as the number of dependent Indians grew, this policy was abandoned. The Indians were then given supplies to prevent them from returning to British-held areas. The basic policy of attempting to hold tribal allegiance through the native dependence upon manufactured goods did not change, however.

The committee also recommended that letters of friendship be sent to all the tribes. This device was very effectively used by the Massachusetts government in the early war years. Such letters flattered the Indians by stressing their importance and interpreted the conflict in terms that appealed to them. The first letter the colony sent to the "Eastern Indians" on May 15, 1775 used this approach. It warned the natives that the British were trying to take away guns and goods, while stressing that the colonists had no quarrel with the British and merely

sought peace. These points were readily understandable by the Indians. After years of war, the tribes merely wanted to be left in peace. If the colonists were being harrassed by the British, the Indians could sympathize with them. The natives could also understand what deprivation of manufactured goods would mean. Dependent upon them, but unable to obtain enough of them to live comfortably, the tribes had lived for years in a state of economic depression. The Indians thus had personal experience with the problems faced by the colonists and were bound to sympathize with them.

A basic Indian fear of the Americans aided colonial propaganda. The last conflict between English colonists and the natives had ended little more than ten years before the American Revolution. During the Indian-colonial wars, the tribes on the east of the Penobscot had seen the tribes of western Maine virtually destroyed, and the survivors driven from their ancestral lands by colonial forces. The Indians outside Nova Scotia had had little contact with British regulars, but they were well aware of the ruthless and bloody exploits of the colonial troops. After the previous war, the Indians were interested mainly in preserving tribal lands and life styles; a conflict with the colonies would endanger these aims.

Baxter MSS. XIV, 254-5.
The Indians preferred to avoid the known evil of American hostility rather than to submit to the unknown benefit of British protection.\textsuperscript{12}

With its Indian policies set, during the remainder of 1775, Massachusetts occupied itself with the mechanics of supplying the tribes. Jedediah Preble was chosen truck-master for Penobscot on October 14 and was given £300 for the purchase of "provisions, ammunition and goods." The government later ordered quick payment of the money and immediate transportation of the goods downeast because of the lateness of the season.\textsuperscript{13}

While Massachusetts was inaugurating a basically sound policy toward the Indians in the spring and fall of 1775, the Nova Scotian colonial government was following a less effective course of action. After years of virtually ignoring the tribes because of lack of money and inclination, the government was unsure of their loyalty. The situation worsened in the summer of 1775 when the Nova

\textsuperscript{12} William L. Lucey felt that the tribes of eastern Maine and Nova Scotia held a mere shadow of their former strength, knew it, and were in no mood to fight. Their wooing by Massachusetts merely reflected colonial desperation (see his Catholic Church in Maine, p. 22). His comments were not entirely true, however, as one can see from the relative population figures for the area where the conflict occurred. Even in their weakened state, the Indians of Nova Scotia and Maine could have done great damage if they had conducted a traditional war against either side.

\textsuperscript{13} Massachusetts, House of Representatives, \textit{Journal}, October 14 and 17, 1775, pp. 163-4, 171-2.
Scotian Assembly prohibited the coastal trade in gunpowder without special license. Gunpowder immediately became very scarce, and the Indians were enraged. When Governor Legge learned of this, he called the tribal chiefs to Halifax for a conference and gave them many gifts but could not win them to his side. The Indians left with the conviction that the British were indeed seeking to deprive them of their firearms, as the Americans had told them. 14

Aside from this heavy-handed attempt to repair an initial blunder, the governor and council of Nova Scotia did nothing else to secure Indian support until prodded to do so by General Thomas Gage, governor of Massachusetts and commander-in-chief of British forces in North America. "If you can fall upon the means to secure the Indians to our Side," he wrote from Boston June 7, 1775, "it will be of great use and I may possibly have occasion for them, in these parts." 15

In response to Gage's letter, the Council proposed that Joseph Goreham, commander at Fort Cumberland on the Isthmus of Chignecto, raise several companies of Indians and Acadians and thus secure them to the government of Nova

---


15 Letter, Gage to Legge, enclosed in a letter from Legge to the Earl of Dartmouth, a Secretary of State in the British government, in Nova Scotia A, XCIV, 133.
Scotia. The attempt failed, however, and Governor Legge suggested that it be dropped.16

Nova Scotia was even having problems maintaining contacts with the tribes around the Bay of Fundy. Joseph Goreham at Fort Cumberland was their source of intelligence about the activities of the tribe, and the information he was sending to Halifax was not encouraging. He reported that the Indians were suffering from a severe shortage of ammunition and provisions and begged the Council to take action to improve the situation.17

By late 1775, the government of Nova Scotia was becoming concerned with conditions among the Indians and increasingly aware of the importance of the tribes in the growing conflict. Governor Legge reported to Lord Dartmouth that:

as the Americans are trying every means to gain /the Indians/ over to their party, we shall not only lose the benefit of them for our own defense, but should they gain them to take up arms against us, they wou'd be more formidable to the Settlers here than an army of Americans.18

In response to the American threat, Legge sent Captain John Stanton to the St. John River to contact the

16 Letter, Joseph Goreham to Legge, November 2, 1775, in Nova Scotia A, XCIV, 231. Goreham was asking that the Council rescind its action directing him to recruit Indians and Acadians. He wanted no responsibility for carrying out orders that were contrary to Governor Legge's wishes.


Indians there. Stanton's mission failed, however, when he was unable to reach the St. John after being delayed at Annapolis for seventeen days by foul weather. When the people there told him that the unusually cold weather would have frozen the river and made passage to the Indian villages difficult, he gave up the attempt to cross the Bay of Fundy and turned back without any effort to determine personally conditions on the St. John. 19 Legge dutifully reported this failure to Dartmouth and promised a new attempt to reach the St. John Indians as soon as weather permitted. 20

Thus, by the end of 1775, Nova Scotian authorities had failed to establish contact with the St. John Indians, the tribe most likely to harm the colony. This failure must be viewed in light of the promises of Massachusetts to provide this tribe with provisions and ammunition. Nova Scotia had also failed to formulate a policy for Indian affairs. Informed of Indian distress, the Nova Scotian Council made no move to relieve it. Their idea of winning Indian loyalty was the dispatch of a captain of infantry to the villages, where the Indians were to rally to the crown out of sheer devotion. Great adjustments in thinking would

have had to occur before Nova Scotia could have made any headway among the Indians.

The actions of Nova Scotia and Massachusetts during 1775 reflected vast differences in practical experience in Indian relations and a very different strategic outlook. The men running the rebel government of Massachusetts were following an established pattern. Massachusetts' old policy of controlling the frontier through trade and diplomacy gave its leaders a basic knowledge of the tribes. The leaders of Nova Scotia, on the other hand, British appointees of Halifax merchants, usually knew little about the Indians. They presumed the basic loyalty of the tribes and expected that a mere summons in the name of the King would bring the Indians to obedience. They completely failed to understand the severe economic depression under which the Indians lived and which was driving them into the supply-laden arms of Massachusetts.

During 1775, the two colonies showed great differences in motivation as well as experience. Massachusetts could afford no more enemies. Faced with the necessity of defending a large and thinly populated area, supported by an uncertain coalition of rebellious colonies, and unsettled by the British occupation of her capital, the colony was desperate for allies. Anxious to defend Maine, her traditional buffer to the north, but with few troops to do so, Massachusetts looked to the Indians for assistance.

Nova Scotia, on the other hand, complacently passed
the first year of the war. Her government was involved in internal feuding, and her leaders expected an early end to the revolt. Halifax was slow to realize the potential damage the Indians could do and distinctly sluggish in assembling the apparatus to counter Massachusetts' early moves. Nova Scotian leaders were undisturbed when half-hearted efforts to win tribal support failed, and urgent warnings of Indian dissatisfaction went unheeded.

The year 1776, which would see increased effort among the Indians by both sides, opened with a flood of problems in Massachusetts' Indian operation. In February, the Provincial Congress received a petition from the inhabitants of eastern Maine seeking more support for the Indians. Rumors downeast told of a big Nova Scotian effort to win the Indians to the British side, although the Nova Scotian government had done very little in this regard. The petition from eastern Maine, however, commented on the lack of clothing and ammunition among the Indians and stated "That the Government of Nova Scotia have offered to support them with all necessary's provided they will join the enemies of the United Colonies."21 The Indians had

21 Kidder, Military Operations, pp. 55-6. Rumors were flying around the two colonies. Reports made in the meetings of the Nova Scotia Council were fantastic. One report on August 15, 1775, spoke of a projected invasion of Nova Scotia by two thousand men, who were supposedly waiting in Machias for orders to move out. See Public Archives of Canada, Nova Scotia B, Executive Council Minutes, 1720-1785, XVI, 148-50. It was not beyond the realm of possibility that the Indians started the rumor about massive Nova Scotian
refused the offer, according to the petition, preferring to support the colonies, but they would have to have goods to trade for their furs. The petitioners accordingly asked for the establishment of a truck house at Machias to meet Indian needs. The colony immediately agreed to the request; £400 was appropriated for goods for the truck house. Stephen Smith was unanimously elected truck master by the Provincial Congress.

The Massachusetts government soon learned, however, that Indian policy was not just the establishment of trading centers for the Indians. Complaints poured in. The Penobscots protested that their wishes in regard to the appointment of a truckmaster had not been followed and strongly implied that colonial promises were worthless. The General Court replied that the changes in truck house personnel had been made at the request of two Indians in Boston, whom the authorities assumed were representatives of the tribe. The Indians eventually accepted a compromise and a Massachusetts promise to fulfill previous agreements. The government asked the Indians to sign all future letters carefully to prevent further deceptions of the colony by imposters.

Complaints came in from the white settlers on the St. John.

aid in order to gain their goal of a Massachusetts truck house on the St. John or in adjacent parts of Maine.


The Indians there had become unruly in the American cause, partially as a result of a letter from George Washington, who had urged them to support the colonies. Anyone suspected of being a Tory was being plundered, and order had completely broken down. Stephen Smith, the new truck master at Machias, was also unhappy. He complained about dishonest white traders, Indians with exaggerated ideas of their own importance and the general lack of money for his establishment. Smith got some relief in the form of £1,000 for more goods. He also got increased duties among the Micmacs and Malecites.24

In an effort to deal with the complaints and difficulties that had arisen, Massachusetts held a conference with a number of Micmacs and Malecites who were in Watertown in response to letters from the Massachusetts Council and George Washington. The conference was held in the Watertown meeting house where the House of Representatives had been sitting. James Bowdoin, President of the Council and head of the government, presided. The Malecites from the St. John attended, including Ambrose St. Aubin, their head chief, along with two Micmacs from Windsor, two from Miramichi and Richibucto, one from Beausejour in Cumberland,

---

one from Le Heve and one from the Gaspe. Five of the eleven Micmac villages sent representatives; the rest had not been reached in time to make the trip but favored the colonial cause. Unfortunately, unknown to the colonial authorities, a number of the Indians present had no authority to make agreements in the name of their tribes. For this reason, the Micmacs of Nova Scotia would not honor the final treaty.\footnote{Baxter MSS., XXIV, 166-8, 179; Kidder, Military Operations, pp. 172-3. In his first report to the Massachusetts government, Allan described the consternation among the Micmac chiefs when their delegation returned from Watertown. They finally decided not to accept the treaty, although they remained friendly to the rebel cause. For other accounts of the Watertown Conference, see Lord, et al., Archdiocese of Boston, I, 268-90, and Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, pp. 36-7.}

Chief Ambrose of the Malecites spoke for the assembled Indians on July 12, 1776. He proclaimed the unity of the Malecite and Micmac tribes and the oneness of purpose between colonists and Indians in fighting the British. The tribes promised to ignore all British entreaties for aid and to "worship or obey \textit{only} Jesus Christ, and General Washington." Ambrose then presented material demands. He wanted Massachusetts to help the Indians obtain a priest. The Indians also wanted a truck house closer to their lands than Machias and sought to have a number of Acadians removed from their lands.\footnote{Minutes of the Watertown Conference, Baxter MSS., XXIV, 168-70.}
Council President Bowdoin answered Ambrose. He spoke for the other colonies as well, for Massachusetts had been designated Continental agent for relations with these tribes. Bowdoin reserved replies to specific Indian demands until the government could deliberate on them but set forth the general colonial line of propaganda. He told the chiefs that the government was very impressed with the devotion of the tribes to the American cause. The English, he said, were making war on the Americans to satisfy British greed. The English had once been respected by the Americans as older brothers, according to Bowdoin, but when they had wasted their own money, they had to steal American wealth to support their luxury. The British were even trying to enslave the colonists. The Americans bore this patiently at first and petitioned for relief. Finally, however, the colonists could take no more and resisted the demands. The British retaliated by seizing the colonial towns into which they had been freely admitted and by marching about the countryside, killing, stealing and burning. A great Congress in Philadelphia had chosen "That Great Warrior General Washington" to fight the enemy, and he had driven the British from Boston and would soon free all America, some small American

27Bowdoin spoke as agent for all the American colonies. The Continental Congress had designated Massachusetts as its agent for matters concerning the Eastern Indians.
reverses in Canada notwithstanding. 28

Having provided for the American victory, Bowdoin turned to the colonial relationship with the Indians. He had given them the facts, he said, so that they would not be deluded by what they heard from Halifax. He promised that Massachusetts would do everything possible to protect the tribes and to be their brothers. He was not asking the Indians to go to war but would be happy to have them fight if they so desired. Bowdoin, however, hardened the rhetoric of brotherhood with a direct threat. The government of Nova Scotia was likely to try to turn them against the United Colonies, but the Indians must not be deceived. "If they should engage you in a War against us," Bowdoin warned, "you will be undone, and will be a ruened people." 29 Bowdoin mentioned this as friendly advice, but the Indians were sufficiently familiar with New England Indian warfare to be sobered by it.

Bowdoin replied to specific Indian demands the following day, July 13, after consultation with the rest of the government. The Americans were most anxious for the Indians to have a priest but could not get one. Massachusetts would be happy to furnish a Protestant minister if the Indians

---


29 Ibid., pp. 172-4.
wanted one, which, of course, they did not. The government again refused to establish a truck house on the St. John, because an installation would be beyond the colony's borders. They did promise to send more goods to Machias and to offer better prices for the Indian furs.30

Following Bowdoin's answer to their demands, the Indians announced that they would join the colonies in war. Their love for Boston prevented them from standing by while she was abused. In making the announcement, however, Ambrose again demanded a trading station on the St. John, in spite of Bowdoin's refusal. Three Indians were willing to enlist immediately, Ambrose continued, and the minutes of the conference recorded that "Upon this tree of them went from their seats into the Isle and manifested a great desire to go."31

Upon hearing of the Indian desire to go to war, Bowdoin informed Ambrose and the other Indians that the colony proposed to raise a special regiment, composed of five hundred Indians and two hundred fifty colonists; field officers were to be colonists, the other officers were to be evenly divided between Indians and colonials. All would receive the same pay and provisions. The Indians expressed pleasure with the proposed arrangement.32

30Ibid., pp. 174-5. 31Ibid., pp. 177-8. 32Ibid., pp. 180-1.
The Indians were perfectly willing to talk about eternal friendship and regimental organization, but when the Council wanted to discuss the number of men each village would provide and when they would enter military service, the Indians' fervor evaporated. In spite of previous promises, the Indians began to realize that they could not guarantee enlistments. The Council was planning to send the new regiment to the Continental Army by fall, but the Indians now suddenly discovered that they could not possibly get any men to Boston before spring. President Bowdoin was unyielding but could get no firm commitment.33

As most Indian villages without their men would have been short of winter provisions, the Indians had legitimate reasons for not wanting to serve during winter; they were quiet about them, however, in hope of gaining more concessions from Massachusetts.

The conference closed on July 17, 1776 with the signing of a treaty. In this "Treaty of Alliance and Friendship," the Indians recognized the independence of "the United States of America in General Congress Assembled." Massachusetts (and through her, the other colonies) and the Indians agreed to be peaceful friends and brothers and to set up machinery for the settlement of disputes. The Indians also agreed, despite their previous objections, to provide without delay six hundred men to serve with

-----

33Ibid., pp. 183-5
Washington for terms not exceeding three years. The Indian delegates were to use their influence to persuade other Indians to enlist. Massachusetts agreed to provide provisions at her truck house at Machias. Both sides repudiated any previous agreements repugnant to this one, and the Indians agreed not to give assistance to adherents of the King. The colony then provided passage home for the delegates.

The efforts of the Massachusetts government to recruit Indians sprang from pressure by Washington, who had become interested in gaining Indian service in July of 1776. He wrote a letter to the Continental Congress suggesting the use of the Eastern Indians to counteract British use of the tribes on the western frontier. He had information that five or six hundred of "the St. Johns, Nova Scotia, Penobscot &ca" might be enlisted. Such enlistments would tie the Indians to the colonial cause and provide a first line of defense should the British try to penetrate New England. If Congress approved (and they did), Washington proposed to allow the Massachusetts General Court to execute the measure. The Indian promise at Watertown of six

---

34 Text of Watertown Treaty, July 17, 1776, Baxter MSS., XXIV, 189-92. The Indians signed the agreement to provide the men for the army with no idea of how to enforce it. They had no way of forcing men to enlist to fill the quota. They may have simply signed the treaty without protest to keep the Americans feeling favorably towards them.

35 Minutes of the Watertown Conference, Baxter MSS., XIV, 185-6.
hundred men for the Continental Army was the result of Washington's interest.

The promises secured by Massachusetts at Watertown, however, were nearly worthless. The Indians had no way of guaranteeing that men would come forward to enlist. Furthermore, while there probably were six hundred men of fighting age in the region, their enlistment would have caused grave dislocations within the tribes. The removal of so many men would have left few in the villages, and those remaining would have been unable to support the women and children.

Under these conditions, few Indians enlisted, and Washington became impatient. On August 5, 1776, he sent a letter to the Massachusetts government urging speed and terming the effort a "Matter of the greatest consequence." In response to this letter, the colony sent agents to the Penobscots and Passamaquoddies. Agent Thomas Fletcher got a typical reaction among the Penobscots. He read his instructions and Washington's request to the assembled Indians, but, expressing regret, they refused to send a contingent. They had heard that many troops had arrived in Canada and feared an attack.

Fletcher thus obtained nothing from the Indians but promises to scout the area, to assist a force of rangers if one was sent to the region, and to pass along any intelligence gained. The Penobscots again used the occasion to request the removal of white trespassers from their lands. Under pressure to get troops, Fletcher promised action on this demand. He also attempted to buy Indian recruits with £30 in bribe money sent from Boston; this also failed. 37

The Micmacs also failed to honor the Watertown treaty. A conference of chiefs held in September of 1776 sent a letter to Boston informing the government that the Micmacs at Watertown had had no right to speak for the tribe and that no men could be spared for the Continental army. The tribe's natural inclination was for peace, and the chiefs sent the treaty back to Massachusetts. 38

By October, Washington's ardor for Indian troops had cooled, and the pressure on Massachusetts slackened. Facing a winter with few supplies, Washington feared that any Indians in the Continental camps might become disillusioned and hostile. He therefore urged Massachusetts to retain any tribal recruits for future use at a central

38 Kidder, Military Operations, pp. 57-8. John Allan, later to be Chief Continental Agent to the Eastern Indians, made his debut in Indian-colonial affairs when he hand-delivered this note from the Micmacs to the government in Boston.
location within its borders. Washington's fears were unwarranted, however, because he was not about to be inundated with Indian volunteers.

The year 1776 closed in Eastern Maine with the disastrous Eddy expedition, in which seventy-two men attempted to capture Nova Scotia. The failure of the people of Cumberland to rise in support of the invaders and the subsequent American defeat at Fort Cumberland brought the expedition to an inglorious end. The defeat dealt a real blow to colonial prestige among the Indians, a number of whom were present at the defeat, among them head chief Ambrose St. Aubin of the Malecites. Letters from George Washington, which never failed to impress the natives, were on the way, however, and would provide a rallying point for American efforts among the tribes. Washington's letters, dated "On the banks of the great river Delaware, December 24, 1776," were addressed to the Passamaquoddy and St. John Indians. The letter


[40] Return of the Indians present during the attack upon Fort Cumberland, no date, in Kidder, Military Operations, p. 78. For a more complete account of the Eddy expedition, see Chapter IV, "On to Fort Cumberland," in Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, pp. 42-60.

[41] Washington wrote these letters on the day that he and his army crossed the Delaware River and attacked Trenton.
to the Malecites on the St. John expressed the general's satisfaction with the tribe's continued support of the colonial cause. He was also pleased to hear that they would soon have a truck house on the St. John River. The letter to the Passamaquoddies was less friendly in tone. While acknowledging the continued friendship of the tribe, Washington expressed disappointment in their refusal to send warriors to him. At first, he had taken this as a sign of broken fellowship. He later realized, according to the letter, that the men were hunting and unavailable for war, but he hoped that in the future they would send warriors to him as the Penobscots and Malecites had. The general further warned against disloyalty to the Americans, telling the tribe of Indian affairs in the South. The King, he wrote, had tried to incite all the tribes to war against the colonies, but most had refused. The Cherokees and other southern tribes, however, had attacked white settlements. Colonial troops then "went into their country, burnt their houses, destroyed their corn, and obliged them

---

42 Massachusetts was making plans for the truck house on the St. John when Washington wrote his letter. According to the General's letter, Pierre Toma, the man who presented the request for the truck house, had not yet returned to the St. John. Washington's letter may therefore have been the first notification of the new installation to reach the tribes.
to sue for peace, and give up hostages for their future good behavior." Washington closed with an admonition never to "let the King's wicked counsellors turn your hearts against me and your brethren of this country." 43

Washington's name was a major force among the Indians. He received every delegation from the east and knew how to make a good impression. He was a man of great dignity and ease of manner with a certain complacency that never failed to impress tribal visitors. 44 The Indians singled him out among the Americans and held him in rather high esteem. At the Watertown Conference, for example, the Indians present promised to "worship or obey [only] Jesus Christ, and General Washington." 45

The reasons for the Indians' high regard for Washington are hard to discern. The traits of personality noted above must have had great effect upon the Indians he met. Evidently Washington was the kind of grave, distant leadership figure that the Indians respected. Furthermore, he was the most visible and one of the most important of the American leaders. The tribes, victims of official neglect for many years, were greatly impressed when this

43 Fitspatrick (ed.), Writings of Washington, VI, 434-6.

44 Lord, et al., Archdiocese of Boston, I, 283.

45 Speech by Chief Ambrose St. Aubin of the Malecites, Minutes of the Watertown Conference, Baxter MSS., XIV, 265-70.
great man deigned to meet them or send letters. Washington considered the Indians to be of great importance and spared no effort to woo them. The impact of his exertions among the Indians was magnified by the lack of a similar effort among the British. To the Indians, Washington appeared to be the leader of the Americans; his opposite number would have been the King, who was above such propaganda efforts. It seemed that the leader of the British was ignoring them, while the great General Washington understood their "true worth" and was treating them accordingly.

Washington's letters to the Malecite and Passamaquoddy tribe illustrated the very thinly veiled threat of violence that underlay relations between Indians and colonials. Washington's stern warnings, given in terms of friendly advice, were typical of the admonitions dealt to the Indians, who were never allowed to forget that should they step out of line, American retaliation would be swift and terrible. The tribes were very familiar with the colonial methods of dealing with troublesome tribes and did not give the Americans any chance to employ them.

The Indians did not have to fear hostile action from Nova Scotia during 1776. In fact, they might have wondered if the British authorities had forgotten their existence. While Massachusetts was setting up truck houses, entertaining chiefs and attempting to recruit Indians into the Continental Army, Nova Scotia was embroiled in a dispute between Governor Francis Legge and the local power
structure. Only after Legge's recall did the Nova Scotian authorities begin a determined drive to prevent the Massachusetts colonials from winning the Indians to the American cause.

The first reference to the struggle for Indian support in Nova Scotia in 1776 occurred in a letter from Michael Francklin to John Pownall, secretary to the Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations. The letter, written May 4, after the removal of Legge, expressed regret:

that the Indians have been too much neglected ever since M' Legge's Administration to the great concern of the King's Servants here, and the frequent uneasiness of the people; had they been cherished and taken care of we should have found them useful for intelligence and other Services, instead of which it is possible and not unlikely ... that they may be seduced to act against us.  

---

Francis Legge became Governor of Nova Scotia in 1773 and opened his tenure with a campaign to reform and streamline the colonial government. His reforms immediately brought him into conflict with the governmental methods of the ruling oligarchy, which, at the very least, bordered on the corrupt. With their positions threatened, the leading figures of the colony sought to oust Legge, who resisted fiercely and pressed his reform attempts. His efforts to curtail smuggling activities further destroyed his support outside Halifax, where he might have looked for support against the clique in the capital. Finally, in desperation, the opposition to his government threatened to take Nova Scotia into the rebel camp if he were not removed. The Crown dared not call their bluff and removed Legge in 1776. Lieutenant Governor Arbuthnot then assumed the government. Michael Francklin, who had served as Lieutenant Governor under Legge, had been removed from that office before Legge was recalled and thus lost a chance to assume the top post, to which he had long aspired. For more details of Legge's tenure, see Viola F. Barnes, "Francis Legge, Governor of Loyalist Nova Scotia, 1773-1776," New England Quarterly, IV, 3 (July 1931), 420-447.

Francklin had just learned that he was not to be Governor of Nova Scotia. He was asking instead to be made Lieutenant Governor with a salary of £300 a year and Superintendent of Indian Affairs with a salary of £200 a year. In these capacities he planned to reside in Cumberland, where a dependable officer of the government was needed. He felt that he would be particularly effective as Superintendent of Indian Affairs because his "having been a Prisoner in the Lands of the Indians in my Younger Days and my speaking French have always given me a very considerable influence among the Savages." Unfortunately for British relations with the Indians, Francklin would not receive the desired appointment during 1776.

The attempt to win Indian support for Nova Scotia, carried out under the colonial government in the early years, was usually hampered by lack of funds. The assembly was most unwilling to vote money to support the struggle, maintaining that the British government should pay the cost. Nova Scotia was a sparsely settled colony, dependent upon Britain for a subsidy and could ill afford to assume any new obligations. The Assembly's reluctance in these matters was shown in its treatment of a petition for payment of

---

48 Michael Francklin was a long-time member of the Halifax structure with a broad commercial and political background.

money advanced for relief of distressed Indians in Kings and Windsor counties. Governor William Campbell had ordered Secretary Bulkeley to send some provisions to the Indians, and Bulkeley, who had done so at his own expense, was asking repayment of the money. Although the sum was small, a little over £9, the Assembly refused payment and demanded that he be paid out of the contingency fund, which was small and over burdened in these difficult times.  

The Nova Scotian records and correspondence for the rest of the year contain no mention of any efforts to win the friendship of the Indians. Franklin, displeased that he had been given no position in the government, was not using his influence among the Indians, and those on the St. John and in other remote parts of the colony seemed likely to be won over to the American side. Furthermore, inasmuch as some of these areas were controlled, they were in American hands. The settlements on the St. John River had given their allegiance to Massachusetts in May of 1776, placing the Malecite tribe primarily under American influence.  

Eddy's assault on Fort Cumberland, while failing disastrously, shook British power by providing a rallying point for the Indians and American sympathizers in the area. This assault finally drove the Nova Scotian

---

51 Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, p. 48.
authorities to begin a determined campaign for influence on their northwestern frontier.

During 1776, Nova Scotia's main responses to American incursions, military and political, into her territory were defensive and often ineffective. When some of the "rebels" from Cumberland visited "Rebellious territory" to encourage the invasion of Nova Scotia and then returned, Governor Arbuthnot, who had replaced Legge, reported to Secretary of State Lord George Germain on July 8, 1776 that they had come to "corrupt" the St. John Indians. Arbuthnot had sent a message to the Indians to counteract the rebel moves and had put a price of twenty guineas on the heads of these traitors. So far, he wrote, the Indians had merely become insolent, stealing cattle and disrupting trade.52 Similar steps were taken when the Eddy expedition arrived in Nova Scotia. Jonathan Eddy, William Howe, Samuel Rogers and John Allan, "who has been also deeply concerned in exciting the said Rebellion," had prices of £200 put on their heads.53 Putting prices on heads, while dramatic, was not the way to secure Indian friendship or end the rebellion.

By the end of 1776, Nova Scotian failure to deal


with Indians was so pronounced that Sir George Collier, who commanded the British Navy in Nova Scotian waters, was complaining about it to Lord Germain. He was concerned that Indians had participated in hostilities at Fort Cumberland on the side of the Americans. He felt that this could have been avoided had any attention been paid to their chiefs.\(^{54}\)

The years of 1775 and 1776 thus saw Massachusetts jump into the lead in the struggle for the support of the Indians. Her active and effective programs of Indian affairs enabled her to move quickly and to gain Indian sympathy on her eastern frontier. Nova Scotia, on the other hand, by the end of the second year of the war had failed to deal effectively with the Indians, and Massachusetts was extending operations into Nova Scotian territory. Countermeasures were not far in the future, however, as Nova Scotia prepared to act in 1777.

\(^{54}\)Letter, Collier to Germain, November 21, 1776, Nova Scotia A, XCVI, 322.
Chapter 3

GROWING CONFLICT: 1777

When 1777 dawned, Massachusetts was waging her campaign for Indian support in the forests of Maine and Nova Scotia and encountering little opposition from Halifax, where the Nova Scotian government was still without an effective counter-policy. Increasingly fearful of unrest as the British failed to quickly crush the rebellion, Halifax was now beginning to respond to American advances among the Indians. By the end of the year, Nova Scotia would have made good progress; for the moment, Massachusetts retained the initiative.

While Halifax struggled to assemble a coherent policy towards the Indians, Boston pushed resolutely forward in an effort to hold Indian support already won and to overcome Eddy's defeat at Fort Cumberland. Encouraged by the adherence of the Indians and settlers on the St. John to the American cause, Massachusetts reversed an earlier decision and moved to secure its hold over the Malecites with a traditional ploy, the establishment of a truck house. John Preble arrived at the mouth of the St. John on January 13, 1777, with the necessary supplies. The river was frozen, and Preble had to send the provisions over the ice for sixty miles. The Indians were already complaining about the prices, which were high because the government
still expected truck houses to support themselves, and the increased cost of transportation further raised the costs. As a result, the Indians threatened to trade with the enemy, despite their current poor relations with the British. Furthermore, those Indians who had served with Eddy were unpaid, and the Indians were unhappy about that.  
Massachusetts' relations with the Indians, particularly on the St. John, were at a low point for the early years of the Revolution, but the imminent arrival of John Allan would soon bring improvement.  

John Allan, the son of a British veteran who migrated to Nova Scotia in 1749, held the primary responsibility for the American operation among the Eastern Indians through most of the war. He may have been formally educated in Boston, and probably gained his excellent practical knowledge of the Indian culture around Fort Cumberland where he grew up. His first involvement in the Revolution came in 1775 when the Micmacs were upset by the Nova Scotian prohibition of the shipping of gunpowder. Allan, to whom the tribe often turned for advice, promoted the colonial cause among them until he fled Nova Scotia to escape arrest in July of 1776, arriving in Machias on

---

August 13.\(^2\)

From Machias, Allan went to Boston and Philadelphia to explain the situation in Nova Scotia. He dined with General Washington at Trenton and eventually returned to Boston with Continental commissions designating him a colonel in the infantry and superintendent of the Eastern Indians. In Boston he obtained funds for his work, and he returned to Machias in May of 1777. He planned a three point program: the protection of eastern Maine, the isolation of Nova Scotia from Canada by closing the St. John valley to British messengers, and the conquest (or liberation) of Nova Scotia.\(^3\)

Allan carried on his work with the help of three assistants: "Cap’t Preble, Mess’r Lewis Delesdernier & James Avery, all of whom the Indians are much attached to." Delesdernier spoke perfect French and some Indian and was of tremendous service. Avery was very capable as well, although his linguistic abilities were more limited than Delesdernier’s.\(^4\)


\(^4\)Allan’s report to Mass. govt., November 18, 1777, Baxter MSS., XV, 1910, 298.
Allan had received complaints from the Indians before he left Boston and was anxious to meet the tribes as soon as possible. He therefore left Machias for the St. John River on June 1, 1777, and arrived at Aukpaque four days later. The Indians gave him a tumultuous welcome. In the conference that followed, Allan attempted to gain a strong alliance with the Indians and was somewhat successful. He was given the same powers within the tribe formerly held by the agent of France. 

Allan's hard work came to nothing, however. The arrival of a British vessel, the Vulture, in the mouth of the St. John, heralded increased British activity on the river. After several months of congratulating themselves on their victory at Cumberland and vying with each other to claim credit for it, the Nova Scotian and British authorities launched a determined campaign to regain the St. John River and its Indians. Francklin was appointed Nova Scotian Superintendent of Indian Affairs in early 1777.

---


6 Letter, Germain to Lt. Gov. Arbuthnot, January 14, 1777, in which Germain also congratulated Francklin and the New Windsor militia for their prompt action, which the King appreciated. See also letters, General Massey, commander of troops in Nova Scotia, to Germain, January 30 and February 10, 1777, *Nova Scotia A*, XCVII, 84-6, 110, 119.
with a salary of £300 a year. For the first time Nova Scotia had both a viable instrument and the desire to deal effectively with the Indians.

The ship, Vulture, sent to the St. John River in response to Allan's arrival there, carried Colonel Arthur Gould, member of the Council of Nova Scotia. On his arrival, Gould issued a proclamation to the Indians in a sterling example of colonial French.

Je suis venu ... de reallumer cette ancienne amitie que tousjours Subsiste entre vous et ... Le Roy les plus juste et protecteur de son Peuple.

Nous oublieront tout le passe et attribueron la folle de Panne passe de une petit nombre de vos enfants a la Consequence de agir san consideracion et aux Impression fait par des mauvais conseille et persuade vous mon frere que it n'a point de protection pour vous et votre just-et-puissant Roy.

Et pour le mieux reetablir cette Amitie notre Indulgent Gouverneur desire que vous laissera venir avec moi a Halifax quatre de vos principaux Sauvages pour Confirmer cette amitie, Ils seront retourne avec la plus grand soin et mauquera pour votre tribe.

Gould then spoke with the same chiefs that Allan had recently met and promised to hire Father Bourg to provide the Indians with the spiritual guidance they had sought for so long. The chiefs were friendly, and a

---

7Letter, William Knox to Arbuthnot, March 5, 1777, Nova Scotia A, XCVII, 130.


9Ibid., pp. 189-90; Lord, et al., Archdiocese of Boston, I, 292.
number of them took an oath of allegiance. Second Chief Pierre Toma now swung his support to the British, but many of the others refused to follow his example.¹⁰

The confrontation between Gould and Allan on the St. John demonstrated the difficulty of dealing with the Indians. While Gould was reporting the oaths of allegiance taken by the chiefs, the tribe was harboring Allan, and only Pierre Toma favored Britain, according to Allan's reports. Such activities might be seen as double-dealing, but the Indians were simply anxious to avoid hostilities with anyone. It was easy to be friends with both sides as long as no concrete actions were demanded. In this situation, the Indians managed to promise both sides what they wanted.

Some Indians, determined to adhere to the Americans, were understandably uneasy when the British burned the houses of persons who had aided Allan. For safety, Allan persuaded them to return with him to Machias. With the British in pursuit, Allan, twenty-one of his men and many of the Malecites retired up the St. John to Meductic and portaged south into American territory. The journey was a difficult one; many elderly people among the Indians had to be carried. The monotony was occasionally broken,

however. On the morning of July 20, "a large Moose passed with great speed through Allan's camp, the Indians and dogs in pursuit." Allan did not reach Machias with his party until August 8, after traveling for nearly a month.

The British authorities were pleased with the events on the St. John. Arthur Gould reported that they arrived at the mouth of the river at a fortunate time because Allan and others had assembled there, hoping to harass the borders of Nova Scotia. Gould's forces captured Allan's boat and two small schooners loaded with Indian supplies and dispersed the Americans into the woods. Major Studholme learned that the retreating colonists had gone up the river and pursued them with a small force. He failed to intercept them, however, because the captain of the Vulture had no orders governing such a situation and refused to act without them.

---

11 Allan's Journal, entries for June 11 and 19, July 6, 7, 11, 12 and 20, August 8, 1777, in Kidder, Military Operations, pp. 99, 109, 113-4, 116, 119, 125. The number of Indians who came to Machias with Allan is unknown. The journal entry for July 13 (Kidder, p. 117) seemed to describe a large group. Furthermore, groups of Indians kept arriving in the camp as the party neared Machias. From this information, it would seem that Allan brought a substantial portion of the Malecite tribe back to Machias with him.


While Allan was on the St. John, the Indians and settlers on the upper reaches of most Maine rivers were alarmed by reports of a large force marching toward them from Canada. The first such information, which came from the truck house at Penobscot, disclosed that a force of eighty Indians with some regulars under the command of Monsieur Lunier was coming to destroy American settlements on the Kennebec, Penobscot and St. John Rivers. Alarmed, the settlements east of the Penobscot hoped to intercept this group with a message of surrender before it reached them. Norridgewock on the Kennebec was shaken by similar fears.\textsuperscript{14} The reports of a British descent through the northern forests added urgency to Allan's work. If any portion of the tribes joined such a force, the damage to

\textsuperscript{14}Letters, Joshua Brewer to the Mass. govt., May 27, 1777, Samuel Jordan to Mass. govt., June 7, 1777, petition, inhabitants of Norridgewock to General Court, June 8, 1777, Baxter MSS., XIV, 113-4, 425, 110-1. Monsieur Lunier was supposed by the Americans to be a British agent on the upper Penobscot River. An elusive figure of questionable efficacy, he loomed large in the minds of men who feared British control of the Indians. He was never mentioned in Nova Scotian records, and his true role is more obscure. Ahlin was also unsuccessful in pinning down the man and discovered him only through the American sources. None of the Americans who reported his existence ever saw him; all gained knowledge of him from the Penobscons. Andrew Gilman, commander of a small force on the Penobscot, first learned of him while at Old Town and passed the word to Boston. See Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, pp. 106, 183. There is no evidence, however, that the man, if he existed, was a British agent; he could have been a French trapper who worked the upper Penobscot. Whatever he was, his influence over the Indians was small, and he evidently did not seriously hurt the American cause.
Maine could be enormous.

When the British attacked, however, they came from the sea. On August 13, 1777, less than a week after Allan's return from the St. John, a small British fleet sailed to Machias Harbor while he was conducting a conference with the Penobscot, Passamaquoddy and Malecite Indians outside the town. Allan and the Indians rushed to the scene of the fighting. The raid failed. After the battle, in his report to the Massachusetts Council, Allan noted his satisfaction with the Indian participation in the combat. "None Deserves Greater Applause," he wrote, "than our Indian friends." The officers commanding the defense have assured him that none "Beheaved more Gallantly, Exposing themselves openly to the fire of the Cannon and Small arms, very diff't then what has been Generely Practised by Indians." Jonathan Eddy also praised the Indians. "It happened extremely well for us," he wrote, "that Mr Allan and Mr Preble had arrive here with about 40 Indians who were of great service to us and assisted us greatly."

The highly praised Indian role did not involve any

---


16 Ibid.

heavy fighting. The Indians mostly ran about the area of battle loosing hideous cries that intimidated the British. The major action in which the warriors participated took place on the morning of August 15, when about forty of them under Captain Smith, took part in an action that prevented the British from moving up the river to attack the town. Once again, war cries and sharpshooting disconcerted the attackers and foiled their plans.\textsuperscript{18}

The Battle of Machias was among the very few military actions in which the Americans got significant aid from the Eastern Indians, and the tribes were trapped into helping. Conferences such as this one in progress usually began with heavy rhetoric pledging undying support for the colonial cause. On this occasion, these words were hardly spoken when the sound of guns echoed upriver from Machias. The Indians had to fight or lose face. Once committed they were brave and determined fighters; they were too proud not to be.

This battle strengthened the ties between the Indians and colonists by adding the camaraderie of combat to the previously rather weak bond of affection. Machias was the first British defeat the Indians had seen; the

\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{18}Smith, "Machias in the Revolution," pp. 682-4. For a more complete account of the Battle of Machias, see Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, pp. 86-92. Unfortunately, this account does not give details of the Indian participation. Beyond the brief statement in the text, few other details are available.
\end{footnote}
memories of Fort Cumberland and the St. John were replaced in many Indian minds by the victory at Machias, in which they had participated.

British and Nova Scotian reactions to the unsuccessful raid on Machias were mixed. Collier, who commanded the attack, put the best interpretation on it in his reports to superiors. He said that his assault had dispersed the rebels around Machias, destroyed their stores and forced them to abandon plans for the invasion of Nova Scotia. In his proclamation to the people of Machias, Collier declared that his raid upon the town was a reprisal for raids on Nova Scotia and that he would burn Machias if the inhabitants of that town continued their depredations.¹⁹

General Massey was not pleased with Collier and his assault on Machias. Collier's action had thoroughly alarmed

¹⁹Letter, Collier to Germain, October 11, 1777, and proclamation, Collier to inhabitants of Machias, October 11, 1777, Nova Scotia A, XCVII, 311-2, 320-5. Collier told Machias in his proclamation that only his mercy had prevented him from burning the town. This seemed unlikely, because during the attack, the British burned most of the buildings that fell into their hands and because Collier's forces never got close enough to the town to put it to the torch. Collier's mercy thus appeared less formidable than he would have had people think. After the attack on Machias, Collier cruised down the coast, according to his letter, to harass the enemy, to cut supply lines and to keep the militia from joining the forces opposing Burgoyne. If Collier really believed that the Maine militia was a threat to Burgoyne, he had an exaggerated idea of American mobility. He may, of course, simply have been seeking to make a good impression upon Germain.
all eastern Maine, forcing Major Small, who was marching on Machias, under Massey's orders, to turn back at the St. John. Massey felt that, had he been informed of Collier's plans, he could have sent along a number of his own men, who might have carried the day. As it was, the opportunity for a surprise strike at Machias was lost. 20

Collier's action alarmed Machias and the government in Boston. On August 12, 1777, the expedition to regain the St. John River was disbanded on orders from the General Court. 21 All efforts were to be concentrated on strengthening Machias as the forward American base, as the colony went over to defense.

Once the excitement of the British attack died down, Allan was left to cope with the problem of keeping the Malecites supplied and content. From the time he left Aukpaque he had had doubts about bringing these Indians to Machias. He reported to the government that "My coming to Machias was a matter more of Necessity than Inclination." 22 He feared that drunken quarrelling would be a problem and that the expense of his operation would greatly increase.

---


He had been forced to bring them along, he wrote, because they were destitute; to have left them on the St. John would have been to deliver them into British hands.\textsuperscript{23}

The presence of these new dependents greatly increased Allan's supply problems. From the time they arrived in Machias, he had to furnish them with nearly all their provisions. He also tried to find them work as messengers, fearing that "otherwise they will certainly go of\textsuperscript{24}"

The fiction of trade now had been dropped, and Allan got very little in return for the goods he dispensed. Failure of the supply line from Boston would almost certainly have led to a mass defection of Indians, and the British navy was harassing the coast in an attempt to break that supply line. Allan assured the government that he was using all possible economy, but provisions were being used at an alarming rate. The Indians, however, had abandoned their homes and corn fields on the St. John to serve the American cause, and Allan had to supply them as fully as possible.\textsuperscript{25}

The Indians were homesick as well as destitute. They wanted to return to the St. John and expected a colonial army to help them. As the summer of 1777 wore on,

\textsuperscript{23}\textit{Ibid.} \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{24}\textit{Ibid.}

Allan worried about the lack of such an army and had increasing difficulty making excuses to the tribe. As seen above, Massachusetts abandoned all preparations to assault the St. John after the British raid on Machias.

The presence on the St. John of Michael Francklin, the Nova Scotian Superintendent of Indian Affairs, made it important for Allan to retain the confidence and goodwill of the Malecites at Machias. Had they returned to their homes, they would have been under strong British influence. The portion of the tribe on the St. John was unlikely to attack the Americans while another part of the tribe under their head chief, Ambrose, was encamped at Machias. Francklin's efforts on the river were great, but he had little success because of the schism in the tribe. Stephen Smith, the truck master at Machias, wrote that Francklin was "exerting himself to the utmost, in order to bring over all the Indians he can meet with, to a sense of what he calls their duty, but with little success."27

Francklin was more successful among the Micmacs. On August 18, 1777, Allan wrote the government that he had hoped "to have been among the Micmacs" by that time. The British government was attempting to win them over, and


"every shop in Halifax is open for them to Demand as they please.\textsuperscript{28} If no one opposed him, Francklin would likely gain the Micmacs to his side, but Allan's influence among the Micmacs was shaky, due to their nearness to British power and distance from Allan's base at Machias.

Francklin's activities and the British military operations downeast disturbed the General Court, and they raised a new force of several hundred men to be stationed at Machias. The General Court also felt that it would "greatly promote the Service of the United American States to have the same person Commander of the troops to be ... stationed at Machias, that is appointed over the Indians.\textsuperscript{29} The General Court, realizing the importance of Allan's work among the Indians, also appointed a lieutenant colonel to carry on the details of command. Allan was to be a roving commander, and the lieutenant colonel was to obey "such orders as \he shall from time to time Receive from Col. Allan."\textsuperscript{30}

The remainder of 1777 passed without any major alarms downeast. Francklin's efforts tended to decrease


\textsuperscript{30}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 217-8.
in winter, and the British authorities were still not making a determined Indian effort on the scale and scope of Mr. Allan's enterprise. By the end of 1777, both sides were so busy heeding imagined threats that neither was engaged in any offense.

Allan still had many of the Indians from the St. John with him and remained confident of their devotion to the American cause. The Micmacs had sent him tokens of friendship and promised to make no agreement with the British before they met him. Allan was awaiting Indian delegates from Nova Scotia for a conference.31

The Penobscots were troublesome. They were often in Machias "making heavy Complaint of Impositions & Extortions."32 The supposed British agent on the upper Penobscot, Lunier, was trying to turn them from their loyalty to Massachusetts and possibly was gaining intelligence from them, according to Allan's reports. Allan legally could not deal with that tribe; neither the Continental Congress nor the Massachusetts General Court had given him authority in regard to them. He had received reports of embezzlement at the Penobscot truck house and recommended an investigation. Whether or not Lowder, the truck master, was guilty of peculation, Allan felt that he was overly

32Ibid.
concerned with profit and was sacrificing influence over the tribe to get it.\textsuperscript{33}

Allan had intelligence problems with the Passamaquoddi as well as with the Penobscots. That tribe made frequent trips to Machias and had many contacts with British vessels along the coast. Information flowed both ways through them. Allan felt that the colonial cause could not bear such an exchange. He forbade the Passamaquoddi to come to Machias unless they brought their families and took up residence. All others would be forcibly detained. When Allan wanted to meet the tribe, he went to the St. Croix.\textsuperscript{34}

As the season progressed, Allan's problems with the Indians increased. Their "fluctuating turn of mind" and susceptibility to liquor kept them aroused and disorderly most of the time, and Allan could admit only a few to town.\textsuperscript{35} During the late summer and fall of 1777, morale was unsteady. Allan tried to keep the men busy by sending them on hunts to help defray his enormous expenses for maintaining them. In September, their morale was good; "they were much elated by the News and the Notice taken

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid.; report, Allan to Mass. Board of War, September 25, 1777, Baxter MSS., XV, 229-31.
\textsuperscript{34}Report, Allan to Mass. govt., October 12, 1777. Baxter MSS., XV, 243.
of them." The "news" and "notice" was a letter from the Massachusetts Council congratulating them for their part in the Battle of Machias, reporting new American victories, and promising new shipments of goods for them. The promise of more supplies was particularly heartening, because shortages of goods had been a major cause of Indian dissatisfaction. By November, however, old problems had reappeared, and Allan reported that it was beyond his power "to keep my Indian Soldiers in Such Regular order as I would chuse." As winter set in, inactivity bred boredom, and drunkenness increased.

Allan's problems with his Indian soldiers sprang partially from an attempt by the government to put the Indians under military discipline. Allan had been authorized to commission three captains and six lieutenants among the Indians. He had given out some of the commissions, mostly to natural tribal leaders. Officers, however, did not make a tribe into a regiment, and military discipline did not develop. The officers refused to take extra pay,

and the money was divided among the privates. The basic equality of Indian society was not to be so easily overcome.  

Allan's problems with the Indians sprang from other sources as well. In frontier Maine, cheating the Indians was an old and honored practice. Stephen Smith, truck master at Machias, warned the government about this. "Avaricious persons," he wrote, "gave the Indians liquor, got them intoxicated and cheated them of their furs," thus depriving the state of revenue. The General Court realized that good will as well as money was at stake and passed a law forbidding the practice. The new law forbade any person to "give, sell, Truck, Barter or Exchange," anything an Indian had in his possession for "strong beer, cyder, wine, rum, brandy, or any other strong liquor." Penalties were a forty shilling fine or two months in jail. Allan duly proclaimed the new law, but enforcement was nearly impossible. 

By the end of 1777, Allan's relationship with the Continental and Massachusetts authorities had settled into

---

place. He was Continental Indian agent in western Maine and Nova Scotia working through the Massachusetts govern-
ment. His funds came from Boston, but Massachusetts ex-
pected to be repaid by Congress after the war. He reported
infrequently to Congress, expecting Massachusetts officials
to keep them informed. The Continental authorities, who
felt that Massachusetts had the experience and resources
to handle any problems with the Indians, seldom interfered.
Allan, conscious of his Continental authority, used the
term "United States" in several ventures actually bank-
rolled by Massachusetts. 43

In 1777, the use of trade and supply to hold Indi-
an allegiance became well established. The Americans had
made an early start in the trade but were hampered by
lengthy supply lines and shortages of goods. The British
and Nova Scotian authorities had somewhat better sources of
trade items and were more inclined to give supplies freely
to the Indians; the Americans took furs in return. During
the early part of the war the British traded from ships
along the coast, but these appeared irregularly, forcing
the Indians to depend upon the American truck houses. Sup-
ply problems slowly made the truck houses inadequate, how-
ever, and British progress into the area lessened Indian
dependence upon them.

43Ahlin, Maine Rubicon. pp. 108-9; Baxter MSS.,
XV. 195.
The American attitude toward Indian trade changed as the war progressed. In 1775, the Massachusetts government sought trade with the Indians to keep them away from British influences. Later, the government lowered the prices on their goods to hold Indian friendship. By 1777, the Americans felt they were merely buying Indian goodwill, although the fiction of trade was maintained in some areas. Allan was giving provisions to the Malecites at Machias on the pretext that they were soldiers. Letters from downeast reflected the new American attitude. One June 6, 1777, Francis Shaw, an officer at Machias, wrote that he had no doubt that Indian friendship "must be dearly bought" and depended upon well-stocked truck houses. Indian behavior reinforced the American view. Colonel Benjamin Foster wrote to the Council on August 27, 1777 that "the Indians among us appear dejected and apprehend they shall be obliged to join the enemy for support." In other words, the Indians' hearts might be for the Americans, but they would join the British if colonial support and supplies were lacking.

The shortages in eastern Maine made the Indian attitude seem all the more mercenary to the colonists.

---


45 Baxter MSS., XV, 25-6.
Machias was a lumbering center before the war, importing most of its supplies from the west. British naval activity endangered this supply line, and needs of military reinforcements and Indians increased the demand for supplies. The result was constant shortage. The people of Machias made great sacrifices for the American cause; the Indians threatened to join the British if they were not constantly supplied. Machias men could hardly be blamed for belittling Indian devotion to the American cause.  

The shortages in Machias created another problem for Allan. He discovered that the Indians were selling the provisions they obtained at the truck house to the settlers. They then returned to the truck house and demanded more goods. With his supply problems, Allan could not provide them with essentials.

---

46 For reports on shortages in Machias, see letters from Stephen Smith, truck master, to Mass. gov't., July 4, and August 28, 1777, also Mass. Council order, October 10, 1777, Baxter MSS., XV, 154-5, 13, 234-5. The Indians required substantial quantities of goods. On June 21, 1777, the government ordered the following to be sent to Machias: 200 gallons of rum, 200 bushels of corn, 60 bushels of salt, 200 gallons of molasses, 6 barrels of pork, 200 pounds of hog fat, 1,000 yards of various cloths, 200 pounds sugar, one cask of wine, 100 pounds of powder, 400 pounds of balls, one cask of raisins, 12,000 wampum, 1,000 tobacco pipes and varying quantities of hats, hatchets, knives, ribbons binding, tin kettles, steel beads and coarse lace thread. See Baxter MSS., XV, 150-1.

The Nova Scotians shared Allan's problems in commercial relations with the Indians. Neither side was able to furnish all the materials the Indians wanted, and neither side was able to control the Indians through trade policy as long as alternative sources of supply existed. As long as the Indians could trade with both sides, they abandoned neither.

The year of 1777 saw the substantial growth of British power in eastern Maine and Nova Scotia. Operating out of Halifax, the British secured the disputed territory around the St. John River and gained a foothold from which they could implement an Indian policy. The American effort under John Allan remained strong but was encountering difficulties as British power grew. By the end of 1777, the British had moved to terminate their weakness and were preparing to take the offensive in eastern Maine and adjacent parts of Nova Scotia.
Chapter 4

STALEMATE: 1778

The period 1778 and 1779 saw a basic shift of power in Maine and Nova Scotia. The British seizure and retention of Castine against a Massachusetts counterattack in 1779 put the Americans on the defensive in eastern Maine. John Allen and his compatriots were now operating from a position of weakness, and all their old problems of supply and lack of troops grew worse. Surprisingly, however, their position in the struggle for Indian support did not seriously deteriorate, and the American alliance with France in 1778 awakened old Indian loyalties. The Americans were able to use these loyalties to counter a well-planned and better supplied British drive for Indian allegiance. American control did slip as Michael Francklin moved among the Nova Scotian tribes, but neither side could gain complete dominance among the Indians.

The passage of several years of fighting had not altered strategic considerations in Nova Scotia and eastern Maine. The Indians remained an important factor in the situation, and the Battle of Machias showed that they would fight. Nova Scotia, although stronger than she had been at the opening of the war, distrusted the tribes, who seemed attached to the Americans and capable of doing much damage
in Nova Scotia. The alliance between the rebels and France, established in 1778, made the situation more volatile because of Indian devotion to the French. The Americans under Allan also were apprehensive. Eastern Maine was very weak, and only the Indians seemed able to defend it. Colonel Allan was plagued with shortages and knew that he could lose their support very quickly. Both Maine and Nova Scotia felt threatened by the Indians, therefore, and strove desperately for the friendship of the tribes.

The relative strengths of the two sides were reflected in the communications they were having with their superiors. On the St. John River, Major Studholme felt quite secure in his well-entrenched British fortification.¹ At the same time, Machias dreaded an attack from Nova Scotia. On January 24, 1778, the Machias Committee of Safety wrote the Massachusetts Executive Council that "our enemies mean to deprive us of every means of getting our lively hood in any Quietness and if possible make themselves masters of this part of the Country."²

The government of Massachusetts was concerned about the weakness of eastern Maine and sought to protect it from the British. A resolution passed on March 13, 1778 stated that the retention of Indian friendship to secure

²Baxter MSS., XV, 335. ³Baxter MSS., XV, 363-5.
the very valuable eastern part of the state was of "the utmost importance." ³ After this renewed commitment to defend eastern Maine, in April of 1778 the people of Machias petitioned the General Court to make Machias the "frontier," the most advanced outpost of the American cause. The government agreed that Machias was the best place on the coast to make a stand, and the town unofficially became the colony's first line of defense. ⁴

This support from Boston notwithstanding, Colonel John Allan was in the midst of a difficult period at the beginning of 1778. He was short of men, money and supplies. The British were endangering his communications with Boston, and the Indians were complaining as they usually did when supplies were short. A British truck house on the St. John was complicating his life by making the Indians even more difficult.

The new year had opened on an auspicious note for Allan in terms of money. On January 2, he was granted £300 by the government. Ten days later, however, he asked for £400 more to meet unexpected demands. Even this was not enough for his work, and Allan raised money on his own credit. Finally in April, the government repaid £237 that Allan had borrowed and granted him £1200 for his work,

³Baxter MSS., XV, 363-5.
⁴Baxter MSS., XVI (1910), 5-7.
ending his financial plight for a time.  

Allan was short of supplies as well as of money. Even when he had money available, he could not always get what he needed. Enemy activity and unsettled conditions had almost halted farming downeast, and the British navy was harassing shipments along the coast. Such a weakened supply system could not fill the needs of Allan's establishment. A government estimate of Allan's requirements for three hundred men for six months show the enormity of the task. This estimate called for 81,000 pounds of beef, 54,000 pounds of flour and bread, 365 bushels of peas, 3,900 pounds of rice, 618 pounds of soap, 50 pounds of candles plus war supplies such as ammunition. Excluding the war supplies, this was over 160,000 pounds of rather bulky material. Other supplies for the Indians would have increased the tonnage. Allan's difficulties in getting this material from Boston through the British patrols to Machias on small ships were immense, and he was often unsuccessful.

The shortages of supplies greatly hampered operation

---


of the truck house, now primarily a supply depot for the Indians. The older commercial role was much reduced. Allan determined what the Indians were "in want of & from time to time Orders Such Things from the Truck House." The Indians could also trade their furs for supplies and thus got a considerable amount of credit for additional provisions. Indians around Machias came in weekly for rations at the beginning of the year. Truck master Smith praised Allan for his frugality but still had to borrow supplies to meet the needs of the Indians.

The limited provisions at Machias had to be used for the soldiers as well as for the Indians. The great distress among these men forced Allan to take this step. Many of them did not receive their full rations, and in April, a number of officers at Machias petitioned the government for a monetary payment for rations not given. Some men had more than 150 rations due them.


8Allan's journal, the source of information regarding weekly supplies for the Indians around Machias, was not kept after January of 1778. There is no reason, however, to suppose that the practice was discontinued. See Allan's journal for January 3 and 10, 1778, in Kidder, Military Operations, pp. 161-2; letter, Machias Committee of Safety to Mass. govt., January 24, 1778, Baxter MSS., XV, 336-8.

Allan found it difficult to solve his supply problems by mail, and in late spring he sought an agent in Boston. He evidently felt that the bureaucracy was not paying sufficient attention to his requests by letter; a man on the spot could get some action by harassment of appropriate officials, speeding the shipment of supplies. No agent was permanently appointed, however.

Allan's force at Machias in the late winter and spring of 1778 was not large, although the supply problems would seem to indicate otherwise. Allan, who had the support and approval of the Machias authorities, commanded a total of 151 men on April 3, 1778. Earlier in the year he had commanded about seventy Indians, but the numbers dropped as hunting seasons approached. A fort was under construction in the area but was not complete. The Machias Committee of Safety had requested Continental troops to protect the area but did not get them. Massachusetts authorities instead authorized the raising of one hundred troops and one hundred Indians. The extra one

---

10 Petition to Mass. govt., James Avery on behalf of Allan, May 19, 1778, Baxter MSS., XVI, 9

11 The troops under Allan were one captain, three lieutenants with the rank of captain, one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, one commissary, two Indian chiefs, one conductor, one sergeant, one corporal, 133 privates, two fifes and drums and four couriers. See letter, Machias Committee of Safety to Mass. govt., January 24, 1778, and return of troops at Machias, April 4, 1778, Baxter MSS., XV, 336, 406.
hundred men were not raised, however, due to the severe economic depression under which most of Maine was laboring. ¹²

By May, the rising expense of the truck house at Machias was too much for Massachusetts, and her government decided that henceforth the cost was to be paid by the United States. Congress was notified, and all Allan's correspondence and accounts were sent to them with the hope that they would provide for future supply. ¹³

Conditions among the Indians on the Penobscot River were worse than those at Machias. The Massachusetts government liquidated its Indian operation there in January of 1778. The General Court resolved that there was no need for a truck house on the river and later ordered Colonel Lowder, the truck master, to repay the £400 he had been given for supplies. The guard force on the river under Andrew Gilman was also discharged, although Gilman was made government agent and interpreter among the Penobscot tribe. Except for one agent-spy, the whole Indian apparatus at Penobscot


¹³Resolve of Mass. govt., April 17, 1778, Baxter MSS., XV, 420-1.
was thus ended. 14

By April, the situation on the river had deteriorated seriously. Josiah Brewer wrote Colonel Lowder on April 12 that less than three weeks supply of corn remained and that the Indians were approaching desperation. No one could predict what they might do. The settlers were in similar straits. They had been forced to eat their seed potatoes and had none for planting. 15

The government in Boston could not ignore this situation. They re-opened their Indian trade and sent supplies to the Penobscot, combining for the first time under Allan's command the operations there and at Machias. The government also sent 150 bushels of corn to keep the Indians going until spring. 16

Aside from the ever present problems of supply, the early months of 1778 were relatively quiet for Allan and the Americans. In January, he commissioned a number of Indians to establish a post at Passamaquoddy. The officers of the force were chosen at a conference on January 5. The purpose of the new post was to cut off the communication and trade with Nova Scotia. The post was to seize

---


all British vessels and vessels with both British and American papers.\textsuperscript{17}

The selling of liquor to the Indians continued to be a problem, and the government increased the penalty to a fine of £50 or twelve months imprisonment.\textsuperscript{18} Allan had not been able to enforce the lesser punishment, however, and the stiffer penalties caused little change.

In May, discontent among the Penobscots all but cancelled the effect of the new alliance with France. Several Penobscots arrived in Allan's camp and announced that the Generals Gates and Lafayette wanted to meet some of the Passamaquoddi. A conference was held on May 16 with chiefs Ambrose St. Aubin and Pierre Toma in attendance. The Penobscots spoke as if the Indians were to go and put themselves under the direct command of the French. Ambrose and Pierre opposed such a move but were outnumbered. Allan finally consented although he had a feeling that something was wrong.\textsuperscript{19}

Allan's hunch proved to be right. In the evening of the fourteenth of May, he learned from several Indians that the Penobscots were unhappy with him. They thought

\textsuperscript{17}Allan's Journal, entries for January 3 and 5, 1778, in Kidder, Military Operations, pp. 161-2.

\textsuperscript{18}Resolve of Mass. govt., April 17, 1778, Baxter MSS., XV, 421.

\textsuperscript{19}Report, Allan to Mass. govt., May 22, 1778, Baxter MSS., XVI, 12-5.
he was diverting their supplies to Machias for his own use. They did not understand that the lack of supplies for them had been the result of the closing of the Penobscot truck house by the government. Some of them had, therefore, decided to return to their old friends, the French, who were once more in the country and wanted the Passamaquod-dies and Malecites to go with them. 20

Armed with this knowledge and aided by an improved state of mind among the Penobscots, Allan was able to dissuade the Indians from going en masse. He promised to visit the Penobscots as soon as possible to help with their problems and proposed a compromise in the matter of meeting the French. Two Indians would go to Boston to meet French officers and welcome their old allies. Two other Indians would go to Canada by way of the St. John River to spread the news of the new French-American alliance and find out how many men in the Canadian tribes would now turn out to fight the British. The Indians also hoped that the mission to Boston might at last result in the procuring of a priest. 21 With this result, the conference broke up amicably, and Allan thus managed to repair a serious breach between himself and the Penobscot tribe.

Despite the seeming success of the conference, Allan was uneasy. Many Tories were coming into the area

20 Ibid. 21 Ibid., pp. 13-5.
around Passamaquoddy, and he was afraid of the effect of this on the Indians. He also worried about the comparatively well-stocked British truck house on the St. John and its impact on his fickle "sauvages."  

While Allan struggled with many problems during early 1778, a much calmer attitude prevailed among the British and colonial authorities in Nova Scotia. General Massey, commander of the forces in the colony, had a bad moment or two in January when he received the preposterous news that Colonel Allan had 800 men under his command at Machias. This report stirred the colony to action, however, and Major Studholme was sent to the mouth of the St. John with a pre-framed blockhouse and a force to hold the river. By March 13, Massey reported to the Secretary of State, Lord Germain, that Studholme was well-entrenched and secure.  

The British authorities in North America were now mounting a concerted effort to hold Indian allegiances. Governor Carleton of Canada reported to Lieutenant Governor Arbuthnot of Nova Scotia that some of the St. John and Micmac Indians had been to Canada the previous summer. They were treated well and directed to apply to the Nova Scotian authorities for their needs. Carleton also felt

---

22 Ibid., pp. 14-5.

that the Canadian Indians would have a good effect in bringing "their Brethren below to a proper sense of their Duty." Carleton's actions were effective simply because he was in Quebec, the former center of the Indians' old French allies.

The Nova Scotian authorities were also taking steps to procure a priest. The Indians had been asking for one since the conflict opened. Only the British had a supply of French priests available, but were reluctant to promote Catholicism among the Indians. The provincial authorities were apprehensive about the reaction such a move would provoke in London and made every attempt to put it in the most favorable light, stressing the American effort to win the Indians and Allan's success in removing the Malecites from the St. John to Machias. A priest among the Indians would "prevent any further mischief," according to Lieutenant Governor Arbuthnot.

Once the authorities made the decision, obtaining a priest was no problem. Arbuthnot sent a letter to Carleton at Quebec in late December of 1777 asking the governor to obtain permission from the Bishop for one Father Bourg to come to Nova Scotia to serve the Indians. The priest was sent quickly to Halifax with Carleton's

\[24\text{Letter, February 23, 1778, Nova Scotia A, XCVIII, 59-60.}\]

\[25\text{Letter, Arbuthnot to Germain, April 8, 1778, Nova Scotia A, XCVIII, 56-7.}\]
recommendations.\textsuperscript{26}

The Nova Scotians wasted no time in taking advantage of their new priest. Even before Bourg arrived, Major Studholme at Fort Howe was inviting the Indians to come to the fort, get supplies and meet with the priest who was expected soon.\textsuperscript{27}

When war with France threatened, the British authorities were particularly anxious to get a priest. Arbuthnot wrote Germain on May 17, 1778 that "In the case of War with France, ... this Province has every Mischief and Hostility to apprehend from the Indians and French Acadians."\textsuperscript{28}

Arbuthnot further reported that the Indians had been under arms against the British at Fort Cumberland and on the St. John River, and he expected France to attempt to stir them up again in these areas.\textsuperscript{29}

Back in Machias, summer and the priest from Quebec brought more problems for Allan than the French-American alliance did for Francklin. The acute lack of supplies and men, inflation and heavy British sea power were


\textsuperscript{28}Nova Scotia A, XCVIII, 76.

\textsuperscript{29}Ibid.
critical in eastern Maine. Allan went into summer in an increasing desperation that belied the outward calm affected by the Americans in both Boston and Maine.

Word of the new pact with France reached Allan before May 22, 1778, and he and the Boston authorities soon took advantage of the effect of the new alliance upon the Indians. The Council sent a letter to the Malecite tribe on June 11 reminding them that their "Father the French King" had taken "the United States by the hand," and made their enemies his own. 30

The French alliance, however, did not save Allan from severe problems during the summer. The American Superintendent of Indian affairs, who had 106 Indians in service on July 31, 1778, still had tremendous supply problems. On August 4, he wrote an almost hysterical letter to the government explaining his problems and seeking aid. The goods he had ordered had not arrived, and those on hand would last no more than five weeks. Indians flocked into Machias with many women and children, and none could be refused without angering them all. There was so much coming and going that Allan could never be sure just whom he was supporting, and the Indians were careless of the supplies they were given. They spent much time "in

Common recreation Tearing Leggins, Coats Blankets, & Shirts, in Pieces." Many of the goods were poor and wore out quickly. If the Indians were the least bit in want, their clamor was tremendous, and Allan's standing among them fell because they blamed him personally.  

Allan had ordered supplies to remedy the situation and had tried to keep expenses down by giving the Indians far less than the French had formerly given, but the government sent him only one-third of the provisions necessary to do even this. The government had further ordered him to keep no more than one hundred Indians under arms. To do so, however, Allan had to support four hundred Indians because the families of those in service lived at Machias. These families gave their rations to others who were not being supplied and then demanded more from Allan and the truck house. The extra was charged to their accounts, but a reminder to them of their debts resulted in "a Speedy departure," making the debt uncollectable.  

In the absence of supplies, Allan was forced to hold the Indians by playing upon their emotions. Once he


\(^{33}\) Ibid., pp. 50-2
gained their trust, they confided in him and took everything he said seriously. He was able to adjust his allocation of the meager provisions accordingly; if they were in a bad mood, he gave them more than when they were in a good mood. Unfortunately, under this system, the Indians got more than their share of what came down to Machias, but Allan feared that otherwise he would lose them. 34

Allan now had secured another agent to try to expedite matters. He notified the Council that Francis Shaw, Sr. was to attempt to handle his business in Boston. All Allan himself could do, however, was to threaten the government with disaster should his needs not be met. He begged that the necessary supplies be speeded to him to "prevent those fatal Consequences which may happen in this part of the United States of America if Omitted." 35

Allan was aware of the peculiar problem of inflation in the securing of supplies for the Indians. He told the government that he realized how much prices had risen and that it was not for him to determine how the needed articles were purchased. He noted, however, that some articles were priced at 180% over the cost in sterling, a

34 Under this system, certain goods were more important than others. Allan was hindered, for example, by a lack of hats among the trade goods from Boston. He was forced to take hats from his friends and give them to the Indians. Hats were a highly prestigious possession among the Indians.

fact that "must make every honest Inclined person Shudder who has management of Public business." Allan tactfully suggested that he might buy goods to great advantage in Nova Scotia. Such goods would be much cheaper and of much better quality than the merchandise usually sent from Boston.

In addition to problems of supply, Allan had to deal with an active opponent. In the summer of 1778, he received rumors of a new British push for Indian support along with an attack on eastern Maine. Allan, who got this news through family connections in Nova Scotia, kept it to himself but began to take defensive steps.

The most important of these steps was an Indian conference at Passamaquoddy at which Allan planned to gather the Indians and prepare them for war. He met with some Indians there during the first week of July and gave them provisions and a pep talk. He then had several smaller meetings with various groups throughout the month. The Micmacs sent in a pledge of loyalty with the proviso that they could not go to war immediately, but they promised to act when called at a later time. Receiving information of British activity along the coast, Allan ordered

36 Ibid., p. 49
37 Ibid. The government did not accept his suggestion.
38 Report, Allan to Mass. govt., August 9, 1778, Baxter MSS., XVI, 60-1.
all the Indians to Machias, where on the thirtieth of July a general conference was held with Indians present from all tribes in eastern Maine and Nova Scotia. Allan demanded that the tribes get ready to fight, and they promised to do so. A "festival" concluded the conference. 39

By now many of the Malecites were coming into Machias in response to Allan's orders that they cease all contact with the British in preparation for war. With other Indians in the area, they were thoroughly aroused by the French alliance and called for action. They had seized a British vessel out of Nova Scotia and sought further instructions. They wanted to attack Fort Howe on the St. John, but Allan did not have the men or the supplies to mount such a campaign, much to his regret. 40

The St. John tribe was not to be denied, however, and Allan finally sent them to the area around the mouth of the river to harass the British garrison and destroy their provisions. The Indians were not to harm settlers. Allan felt this a good move. It was not expensive but gave the Indians a sense of participation in the American cause. 41

The Indian force proceeded to the St. John River and ordered the garrison to leave or be killed. They were

39 Ibid., pp. 63-5.
40 Ibid., pp. 65-7.
Americans, the Indians said, and the King of England never had any rights in their lands. They now knew that the American cause was just because the King of France supported it.\footnote{Letter, Indian forces to British officers at Fort Howe, drawn up at Machias on August 12, approved by Indians at Aukpaque on August 18, 1778, Baxter MSS., XVI, 74-5.} In spite of these brave words, the Indian force did not seriously harm the British.

While Allan was sending the Indians off to harass Fort Howe, Nova Scotia was consolidating her position and preparing an offensive of her own. The first item on her agenda was to secure financing for the priest among the Indians. The colony had previously been allowed money for such a purpose from Britain, but this money had ceased in 1773. When the province took Father Bourg into its service, it found it necessary to pay him from the treasury. The government now asked the British government to re-instate the priest's allowance and assume the burden.\footnote{Letter, Hughes to Germain, August 29, 1778, Nova Scotia A, XCVIII. 151-2; resolve of Nova Scotia Council, August 21, 1778, Nova Scotia B, XVII, 143.}

Now that Francklin had the assistance of a priest, he decided that the time had come for a major effort among the Indians. He accordingly sent a message to Pierre Toma and other Indians asking them to come to Fort Howe for a conference. In spite of efforts by Allan to keep them
away, a large number gathered for the meeting with the Nova Scotia representatives. 44

Francklin, Major Studholme, Father Bourg and several other Nova Scotian officials met the Indians at Menaguashe near Fort Howe on September 13, 1778 for a week of conferences. The Indians in attendance represented both the Malecite and Micmac tribes. The final treaty bound the British to construct a truck house at the falls of the St. John, in return for which the Indians took an oath of allegiance to the King, turning over to Francklin the presents they had received from General Washington and a copy of the treaty with Massachusetts signed at Watertown in 1776. 45

The Nova Scotian authorities were very pleased and relieved when this treaty was concluded. Lieutenant Governor Hughes wrote Lord Germain that:

we were really fortunate in this business, for these savages had actually sent in a formal Declaration of War to Major Studholme, and returned the British flag to him at Ft. Howe. 46

Allan, of course, was very worried by the conference on the St. John. He warned Boston that two hundred Micmacs

44Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, p. 116.
46Letter, October 12, 1778, Nova Scotia A, XCVIII, 180-3. The declaration of war was the letter the Indians had drawn up in Machias on August 12, 1778, and the Indians who sent it in were those that Allan sent from Machias to harass Fort Howe.
had gathered there with Francklin and the French priest. Allan did not know what was happening but knew it would probably bring trouble for him. 47

Colonel Francklin, something of a hero now, made his report to the Council on November 6, 1778. He reported that he had renewed the treaties of peace and friendship with the Indian tribes at a meeting on the St. John River and added at this time that the Malecite tribe was particularly strong in its devotion to these new treaties. 48

Francklin's popularity in the Council dipped, however, when he laid a bill for the conference before it. He had previously been granted £100 in advance to finance the meetings, but now he came forward with a bill for over £500 for additional expenses and "keeping a table" during the festivities surrounding the conference. The Council paid the bill, but ordered the colony to apply to the Secretary of State, Lord Germain, for repayment of the sum from the British treasury. 49

At this same meeting, the Council also confirmed Indian possession of a grant of land promised them in 1768.


49 Minutes of the Nova Scotia Council, August 21 and November 6, 1778, Nova Scotia B, XVII, 143, 15001.
As a further conciliatory measure, they appropriated £30 to build on the land a log house "for them to resort to." 50

By late summer, Nova Scotia was thus in a favorable position vis-à-vis Massachusetts in matters concerning the Indians. Allan, who had been somewhat short of supplies all summer, now had to face the winter with little prospect for improvement. The situation was not new for him, however, and he dealt with it as well as he could.

At the beginning of October, Allan's command contained eighty Indians and ninety-five soldiers at Machias and twenty-one Indians on the St. John. His supply needs were still very great, and he was fearful of British activity against him on the heels of the great British conference on the St. John. Some of the troops in Machias were soon to be disbanded, weakening that outpost even more. 51

Allan's major concern was the influence of Francklin and Bourg among the Indians. Father Bourg was a special threat. Allan expected him to lure the Indians from the Americans with conferences and religious services and

50 Minutes of the Nova Scotia Council, Nova Scotia B, XVII, 151.

51 Allan still needed large shipments of supplies for his reduced forces. For October and November of 1778, the General Court ordered the following for him: 21,505½ pounds of pork, 6,932 pounds of beef, 27,033 pounds of flour, 3,931¾ pounds of bread, 3,722½ pounds of rice, 308 gallons of molasses, 448 pounds of butter or hogfat and 56 bushels of peas. See resolve of Mass. govt., October 2, 1778, reports, James Avery to Mass. govt., Baxter MSS., XVI, 52, 97-8, 92.
introduce them to Francklin's influence at Fort Howe.\footnote{Report, Allan to Mass. govt., October 8, 1778, \textit{Baxter MSS.}, XVI, 111.} To counter Bourg's activity, Allan sent Lieutenant Gilman from the Penobscot down the St. John River to neutralize the propaganda moves by the British and their priest. This was successful, and they gathered intelligence as well.\footnote{Report, Allan to Mass. govt., \textit{Baxter MSS.}, XVI 126–8.} The Americans were crippled, of course, in the new situation, because one expedition of short duration could not compete with the permanent residence of a priest whose services were eagerly sought by the Indians.

To keep his rear as secure as possible, Allan also paid a fall visit to the Penobscot Indians. If he was seeking good news among them, he certainly did not get it. Orono, the Penobscot chief, presented him with a long list of complaints and made the tribe's dissatisfaction very clear. The promised truck house had not been built, complained Orono, and no supplies had been sent. The whites on the river supplied the Indians with liquor and took advantage of them, treating them more like enemies than allies. The whites continued to settle on Indian lands, and the Indians wanted assurances that their title to it would be honored. Allan reported that the basic
Indian demands were just and sought supplies for the Penobscots.\(^{54}\)

The problems of the Penobscot trip became somewhat easier to bear, however, when a delegation from the Restigouche Micmacs sought Allan to pledge their support for the American cause. Their new devotion was a result of the French alliance. Allan sent them along to Boston with the recommendation that no treaty be made with them because the last treaty with the Micmacs, early in the war, caused much resentment in the tribe.\(^{55}\)

The Americans were very weak in regard to the Micmacs. Allan remarked in his report that these Indians from Restigouche should be loyal to the British because of their proximity to Nova Scotian settlements. He was thus very pleased that they came. He also noted that other Micmacs had started for Machias but had been turned back by Father Bourg.\(^{56}\)

The Indians continued to establish contacts with

\(^{54}\)The same report gave an example of Allan's fundamental attitude toward the Indians. He did not sympathize with their basic aims. When the Indians on the Penobscot requested guarantees that their lands would be protected, Allan told the government that "a great pity would it be not to have such a fine country settled with Civilized Inhabitants." He advocated confirming only Indian hunting rights. See Baxter MSS., XVI, 99-105.


\(^{56}\)Ibid.
the French during late 1778, much to the benefit of the Americans. On November 9, 1778, the Independent Ledger of Boston reported that Indian chiefs and delegates from the Penobscot River and Nova Scotia had visited Count D'Estaing and declared their attachment to France. D'Estaing told them of the French alliance with the Americans, gave them gifts and sent them happily away.57

The visit of the Indians to Boston was the last major event of 1778 in the struggle between Massachusetts and Nova Scotia. Winter usually brought a lull, and the winter of 1778-1779 was no exception. Difficulty of communication and movement effectively ended most activities except those concerned with survival. That year marked the end of American offensive activities in Maine. In 1779, the British would seize the initiative at Majabagaduce, and, for the rest of the war, Allan and Massachusetts would be reduced to hanging on desperately to Maine and reinforcing the wavering allegiance of the people in the threatened areas. In spite of American supply shortages and the ministrations of Nova Scotia's French priest, Allan maintained the friendship of the Indians. If his control had loosened somewhat, he could at least be sure that the basic sympathies of the tribes were with him, and the danger of an Indian attack on the Americans in Maine was slight. Neither

57 Independent Ledger /Boston/, November 9, 1778, p. 3.
side, however, was deriving much benefit from the Indians, on whom they were spending considerable sums of money. This state of affairs would persist through 1779.
Chapter 5

A STRIKE BY THE BRITISH: 1779

The year 1779 was a disastrous one for the American cause downeast. The British seized Majabaduce and inflicted a major defeat upon the forces sent to expel them. The British action reduced the Americans to a desperate struggle to retain their outposts in Maine, where, even as 1779 opened, conditions were severe.

The new British thrust made the Americans all the more anxious to retain the friendship and support of the tribes. Machias now had enemy forces to her rear and lived under the constant threat of attack. Indian troops and militia constituted the bulk of her defense; defection of the Indians would nearly destroy her ability to defend herself. Furthermore, in the unlikely event that an American offensive was attempted, Indians would be needed for any chance of success. Allan thus continued to wage a desperate campaign for Indian friendship in the full knowledge that an Indian attack would probably sweep all eastern Maine into British hands.

Nova Scotia no longer felt endangered by the Indians. Its garrisons had been reinforced and held the colony securely. The government remained anxious to avoid hostilities with the tribes but no longer saw a threat to the
colony's existence in an Indian war. Lord Germain in London had suggested recruiting Indians to fight the Americans, and, while the colonial authorities resisted this, they felt quite secure behind the shield provided by the British Empire.

In Machias, the winter had been quiet, as it was in Nova Scotia. The lumber industry, the major means of support around the town, was dead, due to the war and the British fleet, and on January 22, 1779 the people petitioned the government for relief. The problems persisted into spring; in late April, 1779, Allan was seeking assistance from Boston because he simply could not get the goods he needed and which had been promised.¹

Conditions on the Penobscot were little better. British cruisers had cut communications, and the Indians were in poor shape. Jonathan Lowder feared that they would join the British unless more supplies arrived. No matter what the Indians did, Lowder was now pessimistically predicting the fall of eastern Maine.²

Allan made a trip to Boston in late April to seek, with some success, more men and supplies for his command.


He received authorization to raise one hundred rangers and three hundred other troops for Machias. He was also successful in gaining supplies, some of which were to be borrowed from Continental stores. These were not clear victories, for promised goods were frequently never delivered. Allan was also forced to seek aid in recruiting the additional troops. He could not raise them soon enough to meet the urgency of the situation.³

Allan returned to Machias on May 18 and reported that the men he had left in charge had held the Indians together in spite of the British. Other conditions in eastern Maine were bad, however, and Allan reported that American supporters were suffering under depredations of British vessels and American privateers.⁴

The Indians remained basically pro-American but were constantly visiting the British posts and received many supplies from them. English goods were plentiful in the province and were easily obtainable by the Indians. Francklin and Father Bourg were at work along the eastern coast, and by now, their efforts seemed to have freed


Nova Scotians from fear of the Indians.  

Francklin's work among the Indians had attracted attention in high places. Lord Germain wrote to him on May 3, 1779, informing him that the King was pleased with the treaty made on the St. John the previous September. Germain included a slight rebuke with his praise, however; he cautioned Francklin about writing to him on matters that did not concern the Indians. Similar praise (without the criticism) appeared in a letter written to Lieutenant Governor Hughes on the same day.

Germain's letter to Francklin also revealed British policy in regard to Maine and Nova Scotia for the following year. Germain wrote that there was a good chance that the coast of Maine would be invaded, and he was sure that Francklin's influence over the Indians would enable him to secure their aid in this assault. As an added inducement, Germain was asking the Treasury for £500 for gifts to the tribes.

Germain's prediction of an assault on the Maine

---


6 Nova Scotia A, XCIX, 74-6. 66-7. In the letter to Hughes, Germain's lack of exhaustive knowledge of America was revealed. He refers to the Indians of Nova Scotia as the "Merrimacks," substituting the name of a river in northern Massachusetts for the tribal name "Micmacs."

7 Nova Scotia A, XCIX, 75.
coast could not have been more accurate. On June 17, 1779, about seven hundred troops under the command of Brigadier General Francis McLean landed at Majabagaduce, present day Castine, on Penobscot Bay and proceeded to construct fortifications. The British thrust was part of a plan to secure the Penobscot country for Britain when peace was made. The British planned to erect a new province here by the name of New Ireland, and use it as a place of refuge for displaced loyalists.®

The establishment of a British post between Machias and Boston was a devastating blow to Allan and his work. Already harassed unmercifully by British cruisers, his fragile line of supply and communication to Boston was now even more exposed. Furthermore, he had no way of knowing what the latest British move might portend for Machias.

Allan's first action upon receiving word of the British landing was to send word to Boston, which he did on June 23, 1779. Allan had had intelligence that the British had sailed in secret from Halifax, but this news came too late to be of assistance in repelling the invaders.®

Once he had warned Boston, Allan set out to calm the downeast settlers and infuse them with a will to resist.

---

®Ahlin, Downeast Rubicon, pp. 123-5. For a full account of the battle for Majabagaduce, see the above, Chapter XI, pp. 121-36.

One can imagine that this latest British incursion had greatly alarmed them. Allan therefore issued a proclamation on June 23, promising to do all possible to defend the area and claiming that there was little danger of an Indian attack. Most of the Indians in the area were supposed to be sufficiently pro-American to keep them out of British control. As further encouragement, Allan added the dubious information that the St. Francis Indians had recently declared against the British.¹⁰

Allan's report to Boston, sent the same day as his proclamation was issued, indicated that the situation was not so rosy as the general population was told. He informed the government that the Indians were very uneasy. The British on the St. John were supplying them more lavishly than Allan could ever hope to match. He had not heard from the Penobscots since the invasion and did not know what was going on among them. He would have to have more troops and supplies if he was to hold the Indians to the American cause.¹¹

In spite of the initial alarm and continuing uneasiness, the British presence on the Penobscot proved to have little immediate effect upon the American post at Machias. The people were in bad shape with few provisions but were

¹⁰Continental Journal /Boston/, July 15, 1779, no page.
¹¹June 23, 1779, Baxter MSS., XVI, 300-1.
resolved to resist any British assault upon them. They were building blockhouses for defense, and Allan was seeking to bring in as many loyal Indians as possible. Morale was hard to maintain, however, as supplies were used and not replaced. Allan reported on July 16, 1779, that for the past three weeks, bread rations had been down to two pounds each.\(^{12}\)

The British, however, were not the only significant new presence in eastern Maine during the summer of 1779. Allan had finally secured a priest for the Indians. At first he was very pleased with the conduct of Father de la Motte, who was obtained from the French fleet in American waters. He was sent to gather friendly Indians to help defend Machias and later went among the Penobscots who were upset by the British on the lower river. In July, Allan reported that the priest's "Behavior & Conduct has given me much satisfaction. He is Indefatiguable in the business."\(^{13}\)

Allan's opinions of the priest changed, however. By October 27, 1779, Allan wrote that de la Motte had become a problem. He was a great expense, and his bad disposition made him dangerous to the American cause among the Indians, and "as to Ecclesiastical matters he will be

---

\(^{12}\)Reports, Allan to Mass. gavt., June 23 and July 16, 1779, Baxter MSS., 299-300, 363.

\(^{13}\)Ahlin, Downeast Rubicon, p.118; reports, Allan to Mass. govt., June 23 and July 16, 1779, Baxter MSS., XVI, 300, 362, 365; Lucey, Catholic Church in Maine, pp. 22-3.
of no use without a Reformation." ¹⁴

De la Mottee's arrival at Machias and his early work there encompassed a very confusing period for Allan and his command. Allan was anxious to do everything possible to expel the British from the position to his rear on Penobscot Bay, but his role was limited. Massachusetts assembled a fleet to retake the British-held position, but there seemed to have been few efforts to draw Allan tightly into the plans. There was no thought that Allan's forces might make a significant attack on the British.

The American colonial authorities were interested in securing Indian help for the expedition, however. On July 2, the Council voted long-sought supplies for the Penobscot tribe provided they help in the coming struggle against the British. On July 12, 1779, Brigadier General Lovell, who was to command the Penobscot expedition, was given similar orders in regard to these Indian supplies.¹⁵

At Machias, Allan was also making arrangements to employ the Indians in the operation. Captain John Preble

¹⁴ Letter, Allan to unknown person, probably in the Mass. gov't., October 27, 1779, Baxter MSS., XVII (1913), 409-10. It was not possible to discover the exact nature of Allan's theological problems with de la Motte. Ahlin (Maine Rubicon) was of no help; he took no notice of this problem at all, simply stating on page 118 that the priest served until August 5, 1781. This was incorrect, however; Ahlin confused de la Motte with a later priest who served the Indians. Father Frederick De Bourger served with Allan from August, 1780 until August 1781.

was sent to the Penobscot River to command the Indians if the American commander on the river approved, which he did. Preble and twenty Indians were waiting when the American fleet arrived in Penobscot Bay. He wrote the President of the Council that sixty more Indians from Passamaquoddy were awaiting orders to join his present force. Preble was sure the Indians would fight. General Lovell, seeking more Indian support, issued a proclamation noting the friendship and cooperation of the Indians and hoping that more of them would come forward to serve. 16

The auspicious beginnings came to naught, however, as the Penobscot expedition met a disastrous end. Unable to seize the British post, the fleet was driven up the Penobscot by the surprise arrival of a British fleet and most of the ships were captured or sunk. The troops marched home overland.17

Preble, Allan's man on the scene, expressed his dissatisfaction with the leadership of the attack in a


17 There are few records fully describing the role of Preble and his Indians in the battles, or even to reveal the tribes to which the participating Indians belonged. The only scrap of such evidence is noted in the next paragraph. A conference cited below indicated that at least some of the Penobscots present were killed or wounded. For a more complete account of the American defeat, see Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, pp. 126–36.
letter to the Council on August 20, 1779. In it he expressed the wish that Allan might have been present; had he been, Preble felt a better result might have been achieved. Preble briefly described his own role as serving alternately with the Massachusetts troops and the Indians. He closed the letter with assurances of continuing Indian friendship, although he had feared that defeat would drive the tribes into Britain's arms.\(^1\)

An impromptu piece of Indian diplomacy took place almost immediately after the American defeat when the commander of the troops tried to cushion the impact of his defeat upon the Penobscots. The tribe had evidently fled up the river from their settlement, because General Lovell apologized for the necessity of flight and promised to restore their previous condition as soon as possible. The chiefs were sympathetic; they knew he had lost everything and pledged him their assistance. They promised not to join the British, who had hurt their young men. The chiefs re-affirmed their adherence to George Washington and the King of France.\(^2\)

During the meetings with Lovell, the chiefs asked that no more of their supplies be sent to Machias. Lovell was forced to promise a truck house on the Kennebec River

---

\(^{18}\) Baxter MSS., XVII, 35-6.

\(^{19}\) Minutes of conference, General Lovell and Penobscot chiefs, August 8, 1779, Baxter MSS., XVII, 12-3.
when the Indians swore they could not live without it. Following this promise, eight Indians escorted the General overland to the Kennebec and Fort Western for two dollars a day, hard money. This route, and that of most of the other survivors of the defeat, was by way of the Sebasticook River.  

Colonel Allan was rather isolated from the action during the battle on the Penobscot. He had called the Indians together for the voyage to Castine but found that they were quarreling among themselves over religion and the news from the St. John. Allan was able to gather forty-seven Indians and twenty whites in spite of the disputes but delayed sailing due to poor weather and reports of an impending British attack on Machias. He finally set out on August 15, 1779, turning back when he learned of the British victory and the scattering of the American forces.  

Preparations for the attack on Castine were not the only activities in Nova Scotia during the summer of 1779. Francklin and Father Bourg were active, and the government was attempting in every way to cement the Indians' allegiance. Land grants to the Indians were made and goods

---

20 Ibid; letters, General Lovell to Mass. govt., August 28, 1779, F. H. Tarkson to Powell, August 28, 1779, Baxter MSS., XVII, 62, 57. To Lovell's credit, he was persistent in seeking fulfillment of his promises to the Penobscots, following up his initial report with a letter seeking action on the matter. See Baxter MSS., XVII, 66.

were distributed.²²

Lord Germain had hoped that Francklin could provide Indians to assist in the Penobscot operation, but Francklin had refused. The Nova Scotian Indian superintendent was simply too unsure of his charges to put them into the field. He was not certain that his Indians would fight the people of New England, for whom they evidently felt some affection or fear. He had gotten some cooperation from the tribes in resisting privateers but could guarantee nothing more. If the Indians could be enlisted, the cost would be very great; families of the men who went to war had to be supported. Finally, Francklin very much feared the French influence among them. If Nova Scotia armed the tribes and organized them into a fighting force, the appearance of a French vessel or other force might cause them to defect and do great damage to the thinly populated colony.²³

In early August of 1779, Francklin also had a new problem. Although constantly short of money for his activities, he had been able to supply the Indians rather lavishly through his access to the King's Stores in Halifax. A new commanding officer of the army had now cut this off.


Francklin would soon be short of both money and supplies; he begged Germain to arrange support for him from military funds and to reopen the stores for the Indians. If this were not done, Francklin could not guarantee to hold the Indians.  

Francklin's reputation in London may have worked against him as he sought to regain access to the military supplies. Corruption had long reigned in the Nova Scotian government, and Francklin had been at the center of the group that perpetrated it. The Board of Trade was "uneasy" about him and had received complaints about his arbitrary manner. They also suspected him of using his positions for his own profit and to aid his friends. The suspicions of the Board of Trade probably contributed to the appointment of another to govern Nova Scotia after Legge's dismissal. Lord Germain was happy to have Francklin's talents among the Indians when the Nova Scotian situation was desperate, but as that colony became more secure, the old suspicions re-emerged, and the Secretary of State took steps to remove Francklin's hand from the till. Francklin's shortage of supplies was particularly critical at that time because of the arrival and circulation among the tribes of the priest from the French fleet.

\[\text{Ibid.}, \text{pp.} \ 103-4.\]

\[\text{Brebner,} \ \text{Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia}, \ \text{pp.} \ 224, 226, 239.\]
The superintendent told Germain of this and said that he was sending Father Bourg and one of his agents to try to hold the Indians and keep them from being used against the post on the Penobscot. Francklin himself was not going among the Indians because they would expect that which he could not give them.26

In spite of his problems, Francklin was increasingly confident. As the news of the American defeat upon the Penobscot spread, Britain's stock among the Indians was sure to rise. The St. John Indians in contact with Francklin, had refused to join the Americans, and Bourg was well-received among them. Francklin now had hopes of winning over the remainder of the tribe that had previously sided with Colonel Allan and the Americans. Difficulties remained, however, as many of the most loyal Indians complained that they were ignored more than they should be under the circumstances.27

General McLean on the Penobscot was also attempting to win over the Indians of that river. General Lovell reported to Boston on September 4, 1779, that McLean had sent a flag of truce to the Penobscots seeking friendship.

Lovell expected that he would get a poor reception.\textsuperscript{28}

In September of 1779, the Nova Scotian authorities had Indian troubles in a rather strange quarter. Some Indians of the Miramichi region (in present-day northeast New Brunswick) suddenly rose in the rebel cause and plundered a number of loyal citizens. This was an area far from Allan's sphere of influence, but the Indians there had been in contact with him, expressing sympathy for the Revolution. A British warship was in the area, and its captain went ashore and quickly quelled the disturbance, killing one Indian and capturing sixteen more, three of whom were released almost at once. The rest were carried away. Their families were supplied by the British, and Francklin felt that the loyal Indians of the area would not take offense. Father Bourg was well-received in the region, and there seemed a chance that the disaffected could be won over in the aftermath of the Penobscot victory.\textsuperscript{29}

The capture of the troublemakers did not end the affair, however. They were carried to Quebec in the Viper, the vessel that had captured them. The Nova Scotia Council


\textsuperscript{29}Letter, Francklin to Germain, Nova Scotia A, XCIX, 128-30. At Machias, Allan reported the incident to the authorities in Boston with the hope that it would aid him in his duties. See Baxter MSS., XVII, 109-10.
asked General Haldimand, the governor of Canada, to hold them until he could decide what should be done. In the meantime, a deputation of the tribe came to Francklin to seek more aid for the families of the prisoners, and Francklin used the occasion to secure a new treaty with the Indians of the Miramichi.  

This treaty, if kept, would provide good relations between the Miramichi Indians and the colonial government. The Indians promised to behave themselves, to protect the whites in the region and to seize and hand over any of their number who molested the settlers. They also promised to shun contact with John Allan and all other enemies of Britain and to use their influence with other Indians to encourage them to do the same. All former treaties were ratified again, and the government promised to keep its troops and subjects from interfering in Indian hunting or fishing.  

The treaty marked the formal end of the incident and seemed to be regarded in Halifax as the solution to the problem. The Council refused to send troops to protect further the settlements in the area. They felt no additional force was needed, as the Indians had been "brought to

---


31 Treaty signed by Francklin and the Indian delegates from Miramichi, September 22, 1779, enclosed in letter, Francklin to Germain, September 26, 1779, Nova Scotia B, XVII, 142-7.
Peace and good temper," by Captain Hervey and the Viper. General Haldimand sent the captive Indians to Halifax in mid-October, and the Council ordered all but two released on October 14. The two held were the foremost troublemakers and were to be hostages for the good behavior of the rest of the tribe. The rest departed for home in good spirits and the incident was over.  

By fall, Francklin's problems at Miramichi and elsewhere were minor compared to John Allan's at Machias. He was still coping with the aftermath of the defeat at Penobscot, which had an unfortunate effect on Indian-American relations. The Indians around Machias were sure that the defense of the region depended upon them and were making all manner of threats and demands. Some of them, certain that Machias would soon fall, fled north to the lakes, between the St. John River and Machias, from which Allan supposed they would join those of their tribe who supported Nova Scotia. In spite of all this, Allan did not expect them to become hostile to the Americans. They were deeply divided by religious and other matters, and he was using every trick he knew to keep them friendly. 

32 Minutes of Council, September 28, 1779, Nova Scotia B, XVII, 199.

33 Minutes of the Council, October 14, 1779, Nova Scotia B, XVII, 201.

The Penobscot tribe, now in desperate straits, sent a delegation to Boston to try to get results that they had failed to get from Allan. They told the committee that met with them that they were destitute, having received no supplies for two years. They were devoted to the American cause and their former French sovereign but had to have supplies. The committee assured the Indians of the continuing friendship of France and promised to try to get food for them.35

The Penobscot visit to Boston set off an investigation of the supply effort on the river. The Board of War was ordered to furnish an account of the supplies they had delivered for the Eastern Indians. Allan informed the government that he had given the Penobscot tribe close to $2,000, but they had spent most of it for rum, in spite of efforts to curb the liquor traffic.36

The committee on the Penobscots' demands found no evidence of wrong-doing and moved to seek solutions rather than scapegoats. Their major recommendation was that a truck house be set up for the Penobscots. On September 24, the House and Council adopted their recommendation and ordered a truck house to be established at Fort Halifax on


the Kennebec at the mouth of the Sepasticook River. Colonel Josiah Brewer was to be the truck master with £60 a year salary. He was to have all necessary supplies but could give them to none but Indians. Furs were to be taken in trade when possible, all profits going to the state. 37

Allan, freed by the Kennebec truck house from the care of the Penobscots, had plenty of problems to keep him occupied. He was quite successful even now in keeping Indians around Machias, but he lacked the goods to supply them once they came. On October 20, 1779, he reported that the expense in keeping the Indians away from the British on the St. John was immense and that the priest was less help than he had supposed. Furthermore, as a result of his influence, many Indians were coming in to the camp at Passamaquoddy and there would be heavy new demands on already scarce supplies. A week later he reported that these new arrivals were eager to fight, but that he dared not attempt it. With forty regulars, however, he would attack Fort Howe on the St. John. 38

The supply problem under this new influx of men was serious enough to cause Allan to threaten to resign if he did not get some assistance from Boston. "The Court may


38Report, Allan to Mass. govt., October 20, 1779, and letter, Allan to unknown person, October 27, 1779, Baxter MSS., XVII, 399, 412.
suppose many things Comes here," he wrote, "but there is seldom more than two thirds & often not more than one half what they Vote, & that of the most Inferior sort." 39

By November, Allan felt that he could no longer handle both command of the garrison at Machias and the work with the Indians. He hinted in his letters to Boston that he would like his military command terminated, and the Machias Committee of Safety supported him. Allan felt weighted down by the cares of the garrison, especially the "perpetual Broils" between townspeople and soldiers. The government, however, refused to go along and kept him in command of both departments. 40

Allan's work among the Indians, no matter how hemmed in by other considerations, was still tremendously successful. In early November, he went east to meet the Malecites and found them basically favorable to the Americans, in spite of strong efforts by the British. Allan now decided that he must take the Indians back to Machias to free them from British influence, and, as a measure of his own influence, was able to persuade 280 of the tribe to make the move. These forty-six wigwams would be added to

39 Letter, Allan to unknown person, October 27, 1779, Baxter MSS., XVII, 411.

thirty-six already around Machias.41

For Allan, short of supplies as usual, to have gathered so many Indians so far from their homes was a considerable triumph and proof of his success with the Indians. Francklin simply did not have the power to command Indians on this scale. Such events point to a continued American influence, at least among the Indians on the St. John. Coupled with the recent disturbances at Miramichi, in which a number of Indians had risen in the American cause, this indicated strong American hold on many of the Maine and Nova Scotia tribes as late as 1779.

Among the Indians Allan brought back to Machias was Pierre Toma, the second chief of the Malecites, who had taken the British side since 1775. His defection was a major blow to Nova Scotia's efforts. Both chiefs of the St. John tribe now favored the Americans. Chief Ambrose had a been a follower of Allan since the beginning of Allan's service at Machias.

Shortly after arrival in Machias, Pierre Toma made a speech in which he discussed his situation and why he had come over to the Americans. He had supported the British out of fear, he said, but had never been hostile to the

41 Report, Allan to Mass. govt., November 10, 1779, Baxter MSS., XVII, 428-31. If 46 wigwams contained 90 men and 190 other Indians, 36 wigwams would have held approximately 180 Indians, including about 60 men. Allan thus had between 450 and 500 Indians to support, although only about 150 were men of fighting age.
colonies. Now he came to fight for the Americans and the French, "our old Allies." Toma stressed, however, that the tribe was now almost totally dependent upon Allan and the Massachusetts government for supplies. The Indian old people and children must be supported or the Malecites could not remain around Machias.\footnote{Baxter MSS., XVII, 32-4.}

Allan was fortunate to have the added Indian forces because he was dependent upon them for defense. As he went into winter, the Indians were quiet and peaceful but apprehensive in regard to spring, when they expected an onslaught of Canadians.\footnote{Report, Allan to Mass. govt., November 29, 1779, Baxter MSS., XVIII, 16.}

During the winter, Nova Scotia's efforts to win the Indians slackened. Except for the usual wrangling over money and supplies, all was quiet. In December, Francklin received the rather disturbing news that supplies for his department had been sent to New York to be forwarded to Halifax, an occurrence that would give him much trouble. He also was refused extra funds by Germain, who informed him that when he was given a salary of £300 per year, it was intended that there should be no further expense. If the army wanted Indians on its side it would have to pay
for them itself. 44

The year 1779 thus ended quietly. It had seen a major British military victory on the Penobscot and a sound American triumph in removing most of the St. John Indians to Machias. The American agent, John Allan, continued to hold the "hearts and minds" of most of the Indians, although lack of supplies prevented him from cementing his hold over them.

44 Letters, Germain to Francklin, November 4 and December 4, 1779, Germain to Hughes, December 4, 1779, Nova Scotia A, XCIX, 177, 213-5, 209-12. According to an estimate sent to Germain, between June 10, 1773, and October 20, 1779, Nova Scotia spent £1543-2s-10½d on the Indians, for which they now hoped to be reimbursed. (See Nova Scotia A, XCIX, 169.) It was this expense that led Germain to warn the colony not to expect any more money from Parliament.
Chapter 6

DECLINING COMPETITION: 1780-1783

The final three years of the war were relatively quiet among the Indians of Maine and Nova Scotia. Lulled by British confidence that the danger was past, the Nova Scotian effort among the tribes dwindled, coming to an end with the death of Francklin in December, 1782. In Machias during the same period, the problems that had plagued Allan throughout the war almost overwhelmed him and severely restricted his ability to act.

By 1780, both sides had lost much of their fear of an Indian war. The tribes now seemed unlikely to participate in an offensive against either side. The British, with significant forces in the region, thus became less concerned with the Indians and cut back their efforts to keep them content. Francklin, the Nova Scotian Indian superintendent, was unhappy with the course of action ordered by London. The British government did not err in their judgment; Nova Scotia suffered no harm as a result.

The American position was very different from the British. American forces in eastern Maine were weak and nearly surrounded by British outposts. The British power that allowed Halifax to curtail its Indian operation was a real threat to the Americans, and one of the few forces
they had for defense was the Indians. Accordingly, Massachusetts maintained its Indian effort until very nearly the end of the war. Unfortunately, it was no longer within their power to mount a successful campaign for Indian friendship. They could not supply the manufactured goods and provisions sought by the tribes, and their support among the Indians waned. It may have been only Nova Scotia's growing lack of interest in the tribes that kept Massachusetts from suffering a serious setback in eastern Maine.

During these years of declining activity, the government of Nova Scotia and the British Crown spent considerable time quarrelling over the advisability of continuing the Indian program, the level at which it should be maintained and the financial responsibilities of its operations. Halifax wanted a substantial program at little cost to itself, while London sought to reduce expenses and halt a suspected boon to the sticky-fingered politicians of Nova Scotia.

The question of Francklin's access to army stores was at the center of the conflict. These stores had previously yielded up the provisions that Francklin thought necessary for the Indians, but General McLean had closed them to him. In March of 1780, Hughes appealed to Lord Germain for help in re-establishing Francklin's access to the supplies, assuring the Secretary of State that only the most frugal use would be made of the government's resources.
Francklin wrote a similar letter to Germain on May 4, 1780, and Hughes tried again on May 6, stressing the need for the supplies and the good use previously made of them.¹

This correspondence came to nothing, however; on May 18, 1780, Francklin sent Germain a letter in which he stated that he had learned that there was to be no money or supplies forthcoming. Francklin noted that the Indians were being strongly courted by the Americans, and if supplies were not available, such advantages as the mast-harvesting on the St. John and the overland communication with Canada might be lost.²

Germain proved adamant, and the supplies remained under McLean's control. Much abuse had arisen in America, Germain wrote, and must now be stopped. McLean was to judge what supplies were necessary. Rations would be given to Indians who were under orders from McLean or the Commander-in-Chief in America or who came into Halifax or the various posts with legitimate business. Visits to Halifax were to be discouraged, and the number of conferences were to be kept down, as they "Seldom answer any purpose save that of expense."³

Germain then told Francklin that there was to be no more money for Indian expenses in Nova Scotia except his salary. He felt that large expenditures were no longer needed. The British held the Penobscot, and Machias was nearly abandoned. The settlers of Nova Scotia thus had complete security by land, and a small fleet hopefully soon would protect them by sea. Germain felt that if they could not get along with the Indians under these conditions, it was their own fault.

Francklin was dismayed by this letter and accepted it with ill grace. He wrote Germain that no further expense would be incurred unless he had the money in advance. He hoped, however, that should an Indian disturbance occur, he would be held responsible only so far as it had been in his power to prevent it.

Francklin's little jab about lack of money brought a rebuke from Germain, who wrote that, "I do not apprehend you can have any reason to fear the King's Affairs will be allowed to suffer from the want of Provision to enable you

---

4 Although conditions were bad, to call Machias nearly abandoned was an exaggeration.


6 Letter, Francklin to Germain, November 21, 1780, Nova Scotia A, C, 196-7. The same letter gave an example of how the new restrictions might be evaded. Hughes as Navy Commissioner had paid one part of the Indians expenses, and Hughes as Lieutenant Governor had paid another.
to effect any really necessary and important service."⁷

Germain further stated that the province should assume all non-military Indian expenses but recommended that the Treasury in London pay those bills currently due because he did not think the province was going to pay them.⁸

When he became aware that there would be little additional money, Francklin moved to cut expenses. He had planned to meet with the Indians on the St. John on May 25, 1780, but cancelled his personal participation to save money. Major Studholme went in his place and conducted a successful mission.⁹

Although the conference was almost a month later than planned, it was well-attended; more than 900 Indians were present, including deputies from the Ottawas, Hurons, Algonkians, Abnakis and other Canadian tribes. The Canadian Indians informed the Nova Scotian tribes that they had declared war on the Americans and would not tolerate any further collaboration between Indians and the Americans. Francklin felt that this warning severely reduced the number

⁷Letter, Germain to Francklin, February 28, 1781, Nova Scotia A, CI, 64-5.

⁸Ibid. As his letter of August 5, 1781, showed (Nova Scotia A, CI, 134-5), Francklin continued to fear Indian uprisings, but none occurred.

of Indians frequenting Machias, although he was apprehensive about the arrival of a priest and several gentlemen from the French fleet in Rhode Island. 10

In these last lean years of Francklin's efforts, he was helped by a fortunate circumstance. Earlier in the war, as a reward for loyalty, the King had ordered £500 spent on gifts for the Indians on the St. John. The shipment had been sent to New York to be forwarded to Halifax but was lost in shipment. It had arrived in Halifax in 1780, but the letters with it were missing. Discovered again by accident late in the fall, it fell into the custody of the troublesome General McLean. His successor, General Campbell, finally released it to Francklin in the late summer. 11

Some of the St. John chiefs had been wavering, complaining of British neglect, and Francklin wanted to deliver the gifts as soon as possible. The Council awarded him £100 to defray the costs of delivery and on October 2, 1781, he met with the Indians about fifty-five miles up the river. About 380 Indians attended and were very pleased with the goods. 12


A number of other events occurred at this conference. Francklin intervened in a dispute over tribal elections, fearing that the struggle might split the tribe and send the losers into the American camps. Sir Andrew Hamond told the Indians that they were to have a priest once again, and, in gratitude, the Indians promised to plant corn to reduce their dependence upon government supplies and to influence other tribes to abandon the Americans. Francklin now felt that the Indians would take up arms for the Crown.\footnote{Letter, Francklin to Germain, November 11, 1781, Nova Scotia A, CI, 265-9.}

This conference, which received royal approval, was the last major Nova Scotian action of the war.\footnote{Letter, Germain to Francklin, February 28, 1782, Nova Scotia A, CII, 16.} The King's interest did not spur any major new grants of money. By this time, the war seemed to be nearly over, and Indian affairs were less important.

The only significant action taken after the conference was the appointment of a new priest to replace Bourg. Oliver Henley, an Irish priest who had been working with the Cape Breton Indians since 1778, came to the St. John in the spring of 1782. It was his imminent arrival that Francklin announced to the Indians during the last conference. No money was allowed for his maintenance, but the Council ordered that he be paid from the money appropriated
for the defense of the sea coast. 15

In his last report, Francklin noted that the Indians were quiet. The tribe on the St. John was especially useful because they were protecting the harvesting of masts on that river. 16

Michael Francklin died on December 5, 1782, in Halifax and was buried with the participation of about two hundred Indians. 17 A successor was appointed, but Francklin's death marked the dissolution of the wartime Indian effort. By then, peace was coming, and the province's attention was fixed upon other matters.

While Nova Scotia's Indian effort ended in lack of funds and official complacency, Massachusetts' operation under Allan was foundering under serious problems. At Machias, Allan still faced acute shortages of supplies and men, was beset with British posts on almost every side and was harassed by the British navy, whose assaults on his long and exposed line of communication further complicated the situation.

15 Hutton, "Micmac Indians of Nova Scotia," p. 192; memorial, Lewis Delesdernier to John Hancock, Governor of Massachusetts, no date, Baxter MSS., XX, 26; Minutes of Nova Scotia Council, March 23, 1782, Nova Scotia B, XVIII, 57. There is no record of what happened to Father Bourg, although it is likely that he returned to Canada.

16 Letter, Francklin to Earl of Shelburne, Secretary of State for the American Department, June 16, 1782, Nova Scotia A, CII, 52-3.

17 Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, p. 110.
his situation.

Allan's problems of supply were severe throughout the last years of the war. In February of 1780, he reported that he was, "Intirely Distitute of Every Assential to Defend this Post, or secure the Interest of the Indians." He had been supported so far by "kind Providence" but could expect little more such luck. The Indian effort depended upon provisions, and he had none. This lack was destroying the influence with the Indians that he had been building since childhood. If he could not have what he needed, he would resign. He refused to continue unless he could be effective.

Even when supplies were sent, however, they did not ease the situation significantly. When a shipment arrived at Machias in June of 1780, it disappeared quickly. Allan reported that when each Indian received a small amount, the whole shipment was gone, and none of the Indians was satisfied.

---

18 Letter, Allan to General Court, February 25, 1780, Baxter MSS., XVIII, 106-7.

19 Ibid. Allan's desperate reports on the state of his supplies were too numerous to be detailed in the text but can be found in Baxter MSS., XVIII, 60-1, 115-9, 165-6, 293, XIX, 22, 122-4, 189-90, 285-6, 370-2, 388, 439-40, XX, 26, 29, 53-4.

20 Report, Allan to Powell, President of Mass. Council, May 25, 1780, Baxter MSS., XVIII, 265-7. Reports of supplies or money sent to Allan can be found in Baxter MSS., XVIII, 76, 167, 188-9, 190, 412, XIX, 67-8, 153-4, 255.
The steady flow of provisions that would have been necessary to maintain the post at Machias in a proper manner simply could not be sustained; the Massachusetts government was plagued with shortages during the whole war. After 1780, Allan received little or none of the goods the General Court ordered for him. The situation hit bottom in the spring of 1781, when John Hancock, Governor of Massachusetts, informed the General Court that supplies recently assigned could not be delivered because the state simply did not have them.  

When goods were shipped, they often failed to arrive in Machias. In the spring of 1780, for example, a Mr. Parker, on the way to Machias with a supply of meat, was captured and taken into Majabagaduce. As a result, Allan had no meat at all.

The goods that were obtained and shipped past the British were often of such poor quality that the Indians did not want them. On at least one occasion the Indians told Allan they could get better supplies from the British on the St. John.  

---


23 Ibid.
In desperation, Allan tried a number of stop-gap measures. In the spring of 1780, he petitioned the towns west of Camden for provisions. He hoped that if any vessels arrived with such goods, these towns would send them on to Machias.24 That summer, he put all idle men to fishing in an effort to gain more food for the garrison and Indians.25

Allan also borrowed food from persons in the area, but even this worked poorly. Machias was in desperate shape, and eventually Allan found himself using up most of his shipments from Boston to repay loans. He also went deeply into debt personally. The government paid some of these debts, but by 1782, there was too little money in the treasury to pay the rest, and people who lent provisions were forced to petition Boston for repayment.26

The supply problem seriously weakened the American forces east of the Penobscot. All Allan's activities were hampered by it, and his effectiveness was reduced. After 1780, the situation was critical, for as he reported, any

24Letter, Allan to the several towns west of Camden, March 5, 1780, Baxter MSS., XVIII, 123. Allan probably derived no benefit from this action, because all Maine was distressed by this time, and some of these towns had already petitioned the government for help.


26Petition, George Stillman to Governor Hancock, April 6, 1781, memorial, Allan to Mass. govt., June 20, 1781, petition, James Avery to Mass. govt., January 18, 1782, report, Allan to Hancock, July 1, 1782, Baxter MSS., XIX, 189-90, 370-2, XX, 53-4.
British attack upon the area must certainly succeed; poverty had reduced the country to the point where they could not defend themselves.\(^ {27} \)

The sorry condition of the country made it impossible for Allan to raise troops to strengthen Machias. In 1780, he had hopes of gaining one hundred more men, and using them to halt the British lumber trade on the St. John and to keep the Indians out of the enemy camp. By fall, however, he was occupied solely with keeping a garrison for Machias, as expiring enlistments would soon leave him with only fifteen men.\(^ {28} \)

The government authorized the raising of additional men on several occasions, but few could be raised under the conditions prevailing in the area. By 1781, Allan was relying more and more on the militia as his regular garrison shrunk.\(^ {29} \)

Without supplies or men, Allan reported in early 1780 that he was surrounded with enemies, both British and Tories. The Indians were mostly at Passamaquoddy, nearer


\(^ {28}\) Reports, Allan to Mass. govt., May 15, 1780 and November 2, 1780, Baxter MSS., XVIII, 268, XX, 2-9.

their hunting grounds, and Allan was left dependent upon his shrinking garrison for defense.

In February he took a number of Indians with him on a sweep to the west to catch people trading with the British. A few were caught and held over-night, but Allan did not have the resources necessary for more permanent action. Most of the people were friendly but depressed by the poverty caused by the war. The area was almost defenseless, and Allan feared it would fall once the ice went out in the spring.  

Allan devoted his attention during the spring and summer of 1780 to a series of Indian conferences. He had called the first of the conferences for Passamaquoddy on May 25 and asked the Penobscots, Malecites, St. John, Micmacs, Madawaska and other friends of the Americans to attend. The Indians remained attentive to Allan at the meeting but no longer did his bidding. They demanded supplies that he did not have and thus maintained considerable independence of purpose. Allan was unable to keep them from boarding a British vessel that arrived in the bay during the conference; they were determined to seek supplies wherever they could be found.  

---


Allan's conference at Passamaquoddy was held just before a large Nova Scotian meeting on the St. John. Anxious for news, Allan sent Ambrose St. Aubin to the river to meet with the gathering Indians. They assured him of their continued friendship for the Americans, whom they had no intention of attacking.32

This news from the St. John was cheering, but Allan's own conference was not entirely successful. Pierre Toma told him that the Indians appreciated the huge effort he had made to support them last winter, but the tribe had become poor in the American service. For the good of their souls, they must now go to see the priest at the Nova Scotian conference. Ambrose brought the same message from the Malecites on the St. John. Allan, who feared the British priest's influence, could not dissuade them, although he was reassured by the words of the St. John Malecites, who told him that "We are to Assure you, that our Language to the Britons is from our Lips only, but when we address the Americans & French, its from our hearts."33

Allan's fears were well-placed. The priest tried to persuade the gathered Indians to go to Halifax, promising them free access to every town in Nova Scotia. The Indians,


however, refused, telling the priest that they would remain friends of the Americans, who would protect them from the British. The Indians then withdrew to the lakes north of Machias.34

By the summer of 1780, the number of Indians in American service was greatly reduced. According to Frederick Delesdernier, one of Allan's aids, there were 187 men on the rolls at this time. This was not a coherent force, however, because they were widely scattered. Fifteen men were at Passamaquoddy, thirty-one were at Schoodic on the lakes, and eighty were Malecites and Passamaquoddies who were not gathered in any particular place. Fifty-one were Penobscots who may or may not have been available to Allan at Machias.35

Allan and the American cause received a new blow in late summer or fall of 1780 when Ambrose St. Aubin died. Allan sent the tribe a letter of consolation, and his grief was real.36 Ambrose had been a true friend of the Americans. He had taken their side early in the war and never wavered. By contrast, the other major chief of the St. John Malecites, Pierre Toma, showed a distressing tendency to side with the

34Ibid., 339-40.

35Return of the Indians in or who have been in United States Service, Frederick Delesdernier, July 28, 1780, in Kidder, Military Operations, pp. 284-5. The 187 men supported 172 women and 193 children.

36Message, Allan to St. John tribe, no date, enclosed in letter, Franklin to Germain, November 21, 1780, Nova Scotia A, 0, 200-1.
British, although he swore that this was for the sake of expediency.

By late fall and winter of 1780-1781, Allan's spirits had picked up, and he was showing new confidence. Although their leaders often had contact with the British, most of the settlers were strong for the American cause. The Indians were uneasy over rumors of an attack upon them from Canada but remained inland north of Passamaquoddy, away from the British. Allan met with many of them on January 3, 1781, and, although he could not deliver promised supplies, he was in the company of a priest from the French fleet at Newport. The Indians were very pleased and declared their strong attachment to the Americans and French. If he could get supplies, Allan was sure he could gain their assistance in "any sort of Business the States may require."

Spring brought conditions to dampen anyone's feelings, however. British ships were roaming the coast and burning the houses of American sympathizers; several leaders of the area east of Penobscot were attempting to have the area declared neutral. Allan had been put in command of all the militia east of Frenchman's Bay and had orders to act against the Tories in the area. He now had no regular troops and asked permission to move his headquarters east, nearer

\[37\text{Reports, Allan to Mass. govt., November 2, 1780 and January 26, 1781, Baxter MSS., XIX. 24-31. 106-9. The visit of the priest is discussed more fully below.}\]
to the Indians, closing the operation at Machias.\textsuperscript{38}

In June of 1781, an event occurred that impressed the Indians and cost Allan very little in effort or supplies. A French frigate, the Marrs, arrived at Machias and cruised down the coast to Passamaquoddy. The Indians were thrilled, as they always were by any major contact with the French.\textsuperscript{39}

Unfortunately for Allan, the Indians needed more concrete gestures. Their stomachs were not filled by the visit of a French frigate. Accordingly, when Allan visited the Indians at Passamaquoddy later in June, he found them despondent and surly.\textsuperscript{40} They had left their river for the Americans and expected to be cared for. They had not hunted, according to their spokesman, because they were busy defending the country, and now had no furs to trade and little to eat. They had expected more from their American friends. Allan tried to soothe them but with limited success.\textsuperscript{41}

The situation was unimproved by the fall of 1781. Most of the Indians had returned to the lakes, and Allan dreaded their coming to Machias, because he had no supplies for them. He wrote Hancock that his situation was very bad,


\textsuperscript{39}\textit{Report,} Allan to Hancock, June 16, 1781, \textit{Baxter MSS.}, XIX, 283-4.

\textsuperscript{40}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 284. \textsuperscript{41}\textit{Ibid.}
but he was relieved that the season of danger was over and hoped that the war would soon end.\footnote{Report, Allan to Hancock, October 17, 1781, \textit{Baxter MSS.}, XIX, 355-6.}

By the fall of 1781, Allan again was seeking permission to move his operation closer to the Indians, who now seldom came to Machias. There were no longer any troops in Machias except the militia, and these were under good officers. Allan felt that a man of his rank was no longer needed. He wanted to move to the St. Croix River where the Indians were hunting. He felt that such a move would serve to hold the area for the United States.\footnote{Ibid.; report, Allan to Hancock, March 28, 1782, petition, Delesdernier to Mass. govt., March 28, 1782, \textit{Baxter MSS.}, XIX, 437-8, 437-8.}

Allan got the permission he needed to move in April of 1782 but could not go at once. Reports of British activity on the St. John kept him in Machias, although he sent his sons among the Indians as proof of his good intentions. He visited Passamaquoddy for a short time during the summer but was back in Machias in August. By November, however, Allan and his family had permanently moved to Passamaquoddy where they spent a hard winter.\footnote{Resolve of Mass. govt., April 29, 1782, reports, Allan to Hancock, June 4, August 22, 1782 and April 16, 1783, representation, inhabitants of Machias to Mass. govt., November 12, 1782, \textit{Baxter MSS.}, XX, 9, 28-9, 78, 218, 133-4.}
Not everyone was pleased with Allan's move. The people of Machias felt that he had taken too many supplies with him, particularly guns and ammunition. They felt it bad to have one man in command of troops and Indians, because the Indians got provisions and the troops did not. Now that Allan was gone, they sought more such goods and a captain to command the post; with these and their militia Machias promised to hold out. 45

Allan's move to the St. Croix was a good one. As early as the spring of 1782, most of the Indians were on the St. John. They had gone because of dissatisfaction over the supply situation the summer before, and the Nova Scotian authorities were trying to hold them there. 46

Allan met with the Passamaquoddies and some Malecites in August of 1782 and tried to explain why he was no longer able to provide for them as he once had. The Indians were surprised and unsympathetic. All the St. John Indians present intended to go at once to their old homes. Some of the Passamaquoddies were in Canada, and the rest were going inland to the lakes. Allan planned to remain nearby to keep American influence among them. 47

45 Representation, inhabitants of Machias to Mass. govt., November 12, 1782, Baxter MSS., XX, 134-5.

46 Report, Allan to Hancock, March 8, 1782, Baxter MSS., XIX, 437, 439.

47 Report, Allan to Hancock, August 22, 1782, Baxter MSS., XX, 76-8.
During 1780 and 1781, Allan had been assisted by another priest from the French fleet, Frederick de Bourger, who replaced Father de la Motte. Allan had been without a priest for some time when James Avery went to Rhode Island in August of 1780 and asked the French Admiral to send a suitable person to Maine. The request was granted, and the Indians were quickly notified; the lack of a priest had been one of the principle American weaknesses through-out most of the war.  

The new priest arrived shortly in Boston, where he was given provisions and the services of Gideon Delesdernier, the father of Frederick Delesdernier, one of Allan's aides. Although anxious to get to Machias before winter, de Bourger was delayed by lack of transportation for over a month but reached Machias in time for Christmas. The Indians were elated.

Allan was nearly as pleased as the Indians. The priest was very good, he reported, and he "Appears the Most Calculated for the Indians then Any U ever saw -- either from the French or the Britains. The Conduct he pursues

---


gives the Indians the Greatest Satisfaction." If he could stay in this area, he would be of great use. Furthermore, if supplies were sent to supplement the work of the priest, Allan even hoped to gain military assistance from the tribes.

De Bourger moved among the Indians for over six months and was used by Allan to quiet unhappy Indians. There was a limit, however, to what de Bourger could do, and the hardship caused by the lack of supplies cast a pall over his efforts. By the time he left in the summer of 1781, Allan was writing of a "Gloom & Coldness" among the Indians that even the church could not cure.

The British post on the Penobscot at Majabagaduce isolated Allan from the rest of his command. He was nominally in charge of efforts to keep the Penobscots friendly but no longer had much contact with them. As seen in the previous chapter, a truck house on the Kennebec River in Winslow now handled their needs and was virtually an independent operation controlled from Boston.

---

50 Ibid., pp. 106-9.
51 Reports, Allan to Hancock, March 17 and June 16, 1781, Baxter MSS., XIX, 189, 284. De Bourger left Maine sometime before September 5, 1781. On that date he was in Boston petitioning for back rations. See Baxter MSS., XIX, 320.
This second major Indian agency in Maine, the operation for the Penobscots, was centered at Fort Halifax. When the British arrived on the Penobscot, this tribe found itself adjacent to British power, but derived little benefit from it at first. General McLean, the first commander at Majabagaduce, ignored the Penobscots, thinking them perfidious and inconsequential. During the final years of the war, however, the British became more responsive to the tribe, realizing the need for their friendship in the accomplishment of the long-term British plans, the establishment of a new colony of loyalists.

In 1780, the Americans were also increasingly aware of the semi-displaced Penobscots. General Wadsworth, commander of the American forces in Maine, asked the

53 Massachusetts operated a third Indian agency late in the war. This agency, on the Androscoggin River, was an informal one and received little notice in the Massachusetts records. An agent to the Eastern Indians, one John Lane, had been appointed in 1775 but remained inactive through most of the war. In May of 1782, he was living at Fryeburg when the thirty-two Indians on the Androscoggin asked him to send a message to Boston. They expressed of the Canadian Indians, who were supporting the British, and sought a land grant upon which they could settle their families in safety and embark upon a more agricultural existence. They also had furs to barter for supplies, which they desperately needed. The government in Boston did not respond to their plea for land but did send supplies to Lane for the tribe. See petition, John Lane to Mass. govt., May 24, 1782, and resolve of the Mass. govt., June 10, 1782, Baxter MSS., XX, 20, 30-1.

Massachusetts Council to take more notice of the tribe and requested a priest, hopefully to be obtained from the French at Newport. Josiah Brewer, the truck master at Fort Halifax, took six Penobscots to visit the French in Rhode Island, hoping to impress the tribe with the French alliance.55

Demand for more attention also came from Chief Orono. The Penobscots had taken part in military actions with the Americans and felt themselves to be in American service. Orono reminded the Massachusetts authorities of this in a petition in October of 1780. The tribe, he wrote, had been driven from its home by the British and was in need. The Penobscots had four widows of men who had fallen in battle with the British and they needed special help. The British were now offering presents and supplies, he continued, but the Indians hoped the promises made by General Lovell following the defeat at Majabagaduce would be kept and that the truck house at Winslow would be supplied.56 Supplies arrived in Winslow in response to Orono's plea.57


57Resolve of Mass. govt., Baxter MSS., XVIII, 16.
The Penobscots were willing to enter American military service to get what supplies they needed. Orono made this offer in 1781 when the tribe found it hard to gather food with the British in possession of their old settlement.\(^{58}\)

The truck house at Fort Halifax, which the government intended to remedy the supply problems of the Penobscots, was established at the junction of the Kennebec and Sebasticook Rivers for the convenience of the Indians and the government. The Sebasticook formed part of the ancient Indian route from the Kennebec to the Penobscot; a truck house at its mouth was about the closest point to the Penobscots' hunting grounds that could be supplied from Massachusetts. Winslow was the head of navigation on the Kennebec River, and the supplies could be brought to the fort in small ships. Fort Halifax was therefore the most convenient spot for both parties.

The government in Boston appointed Joshua Brewer to run the truck house in Winslow. Brewer, who had previously been active in the Indian operations on the Penobscot, faced many of the same problems that plagued Allan at Machias. He was frequently seeking supplies, often with little success. Although the situation was eased when the Indians returned to their hunting grounds, he occasionally

had as many as thirty Indians a day coming in to trade.\(^5^9\)

As seen above, Brewer had not been popular with the Penobscots when he had been in government service on the Penobscot, and reports of his dishonesty and of Indian dislike for him continued to reach Boston throughout the last years of the war. Juniper Berthiaume, a French religious instructor with the tribe, sent in a complaint against Brewer. The truck master persisted in cheating the Indians, according to the Frenchman, with dishonest weights and measures. He also kept back and sold items intended by the government as gifts. Berthiaume further accused Brewer of trading with the British. The Indians were so upset by this that they were driven to the British at Majabagaduce for their supplies. Two letters from William Lithgow, a prominent leader on the Kennebec and former trader at Fort Halifax, repeated the Indian accusations of fraud and suggested that a man whom the Indians hated was ill-suited to be the government's chief agent among them. Lithgow was careful to point out that he did not know whether the accusations were true. Brewer, himself, however, admitted after the war that he had been forced to employ sentries to keep the Indians in line when

they otherwise might have rushed the truck house. There was no record of any investigation in this matter, but the Indians were plainly dissatisfied with Brewer, although with how much justice is unknown.

The Indians hoped that Brewer would be replaced with Colonel Ezekial Pattee, a man who evidently had gained considerable prestige among them. Lithgow mentioned Pattee as a possible replacement for Brewer in his letters to Governor Hancock, and the Indians themselves requested that he be appointed.

Colonel Pattee had gained this following among the Indians during the winter of 1780-1781 when approximately one hundred of the Penobscots had settled in Winslow near the truck house. These Indians were frequently at Pattee's house, where, in the absence of supplies in the truck house and to keep the peace of the settlement, he furnished them with provisions. He had evidently done so at the request of Berthiaume, the French Recollet among the Indians, and Chief Orono, who later asked the Massachusetts government to repay him. Pattee later successfully petitioned the

---


61 Letters, William Lithgow to Hancock, August 13, 1782 and January 25, 1783, Baxter MSS., XX, 70-1, 157-8.
government for repayment of the money.  

Brewer, faced with Indian distrust and reluctant competition from Pattee, had yet another problem, the hostility of the people of Winslow, who petitioned to have the truck house moved elsewhere. When the Indians settled in Winslow during the winter of 1780-1781, they caused problems. At first the Penobscots bartered furs for provisions at the truck house. Eventually, however, both furs and supplies ran out, and the town was forced to provide relief for the Indians, who were very demanding. The Indians were disruptive as well as expensive. Drunkenness was a constant problem, and hordes of dogs, to whom the Indians were passionately attached, raised havoc among the settlers livestock. The people of Winslow thought the Indians would be more contented nearer their hunting grounds, and their departure would certainly help the town's state of mind.

Winslow's unhappiness with the operation in its midst, reports of Brewer's dishonesty, and recommendations from men like Lithgow that the truck house be closed made a strong impression in Boston, and in October of 1782, the


government ordered the termination of the operation and the dismissal of Brewer. The truck house was found to be unnecessary, although Brewer recently reported that thirty Indians a day were trading there. The closing marked the end of the official American effort among the Penobscots, but the truck house did not close immediately. Brewer was unaware of the government's decision until March 18, 1783 and kept the operation going. He could not have had many supplies to offer the Indians, but he maintained an American presence among the Penobscots and reduced the effect of the government's action until nearly the end of the war.

Two other individuals were independently active in the effort to retain Penobscot friendship. One of these was Juniper Berthiaume, already mentioned, and the other was Lieutenant Andrew Gilman.

Gilman lived with the Penobscots during the most of the war as an interpreter and resident representative of Massachusetts. He seems to have filled no major role, and his influence among the Indians was uncertain. His honesty

64 Letters, William Lithgow to Mass. govt., August 13, 1782, and January 25, 1783, resolve of Mass. govt., October 17, 1782, letter Brewer to Richard Devens, October 4, 1782, letter, Brewer to Hancock, October 31, 1783, Baxter MSS., XX, 70-1, 157-8, 112, 105-6, 274-5. By the end of the war, Brewer was in poor health and almost destitute. The British occupation of the Penobscot ruined him financially. In recognition of his efforts for the American cause, the government granted his request and allowed him to remain in a house at Fort Halifax for one year after the war. See letters, Brewer to Hancock, September 15 and October 22, 1783, resolve of Mass. govt., March 2, 1784, Baxter MSS., XX, 261, 308, 315.
and loyalty were questioned at times, but nothing was ever proved, nor, indeed, were any investigations made. He was finally dismissed along with Josiah Brewer in October of 1782, when the truck house at Winslow was closed. 65

The other member of the Massachusetts mission to the Penobscot tribe in the final years of the war was a French Recollect, Juniper Berthiaume. 66 Berthiaume was evidently obtained for the American service by the French consul in Boston in October, 1780. He was given the title of "Instructor" to the Penobscots, provided with supplies by the Massachusetts government, and sent northward to meet the Indians. He joined Gilman occasionally and worked with the tribe between the Kennebec and Penobscot Rivers. As did practically everyone in government service in Maine, he had problems getting his rations but usually lived on what the Indians gave him. 67

Berthiaume's sense of duty and devotion to the


66 The Recollects were a division of the Observant Franciscans who followed an especially strict rule.

Indians landed him in trouble. He reported the Indian dislike and distrust of Brewer to Boston, and Brewer evidently struck back. Berthiaume was shortly dismissed by the government on charges made by Brewer. The Indians were angry and declared the charges false. Berthiaume obtained and sent to Boston papers showing that Brewer's witnesses had drunkenly signed the depositions upon which he based his case.68

Berthiaume's dismissal caused great discontent among the Indians, and documents flowed into Boston in his behalf. Four Penobscots sent in a deposition affirming the Recollect's innocence, and Ezekial Pattee asserted that the Frenchman had been a great help to Winslow and that the Indians were less troublesome after his arrival. The tribe asked William Lithgow to write in Berthiaume's behalf, and he did, giving his opinion that the Recollect was a good man who tried to keep good relations between whites and Indians. His dismissal was a major grievance among the Indians, who were devoted to him, according to Lithgow, and his re-appointment would be of great benefit. Three other worthies of the Kennebec region, James Howard, Esq., Lieutenant Colonel William Howard and Colonel Joseph North, added their voices to the chorus. They felt Berthiaume was

an honest man, devoted to the United States, who had rendered good service and who should be returned to his post. Berthiaume himself reminded the government that problems were likely to arise if he was not re-instated. 69

Faced with such testimony regarding Berthiaume's worth, in October of 1782 the government returned him to his work. As the Indians demanded, Brewer and Gilman were dismissed and the truck house was closed at the same time that Berthiaume was re-instated. 70 It was unlikely that Brewer's actions in attempting by shady methods to secure Berthiaume's dismissal did his reputation little good in Boston and was a factor in his own sudden discharge.

Berthiaume evidently resumed his duties with great zeal and concern for the Penobscots. He operated out of a building at the junction of Mile Brook and the Sebasticook River in Winslow. The Indians remained devoted to him and usually followed his instructions. He continued his service officially until June 4, 1783, when he was once again dismissed by the government, which evidently felt him unnecessary in peacetime. He received no notice of his dismissal,


however, and continued his work until June of 1784, when he sought wages for his service from the time of dismissal until he learned of the action. He hoped to use the money to finance continued work among the Indians. He did continue his work after the war for an undetermined period. 71

Colonel John Allan, who was theoretically in charge of the waning activities of the Indian agencies at Winslow and throughout Maine, was in Boston when the first rumors of impending peace reached him. He had been seeking permission to make the trip since June of 1781 and finally went in April of 1783. The Indians were quiet, and he was not feeling well. He had thus decided to go to Boston and settle a number of affairs and report to the government in person. 72 Francklin was dead by this time, and Britain had shut off most of the money for Nova Scotian Indians, so the threat from that quarter was small. Much of Allan's influence with the Indians was gone, destroyed by the great lack of supplies during the past several years. Thus a relative

---

71 Henry D. Kingsbury and Simeon L. Deyo, *Illustrated History of Kennebec County, Maine* (New York: H. W. Blake, 1892), pp. 546, 550; resolve of Mass. govt., June 4, 1783, petition, Berthiaume to Mass. govt., June, 1784, Baxter MSS., XX, 233, 285. The information from the *History of Kennebec County* came from the work of Mrs. Elizabeth Freeman, a daughter of Ezekial Pattee who evidently wrote down a number of her childhood memories about the early history of Winslow.

72 Reports, Allan to Hancock, June 16 and October 17, 1781, March 8, 1782, and April 12 and 16, 1783, Baxter MSS., XIX, 287-8, 356, 436, XX, 217-8, 219.
calm had settled over the tribes of Maine and Nova Scotia.  

With peace in the air, Allan was given authority to settle accounts and to close out his operation. 73  

The peace treaty was finally signed in Paris on September 3, 1783, and the war ended. The conflict that had once again made the Indians important thus came to an end, and with it, the Indians' prosperity, meager though it was. Neither the Massachusetts nor the Nova Scotian authorities were likely to pay much attention to the Indians unless the tribes were useful to them in some way. With the end of the war, that usefulness ceased.  

The Indians east of the Penobscot fared somewhat better than their brethren on that river, whose truck house had already been dismantled and whose religious instructor was dismissed at the end of the war. After peace came, Allan laid his accounts before Congress and the Massachusetts authorities. Congress, vested with the control of Indian affairs, put the Indian agency on a peace basis and kept it in operation. In January of 1784, however, Massachusetts asked the Congress to end its Indian role in Maine, and Congress complied. The Indian agency was dissolved the following March, and the United States government took no further notice of the tribes. The government of Massachusetts did little to replace the former agency,  

73Letter, Allan to Hancock, April 25, 1783, petition, Allan to Mass. govt., June 2, 1784, Baxter MSS., XX, 222, 352.
and the Indians resumed the long slide into poverty and despair that had been temporarily slowed by the war.\textsuperscript{74}

John Allan, who had been established as a leader beyond the Penobscot by his wartime activity, continued to have influence among the settlers and Indians. In 1784, he was appointed an agent of the Massachusetts government to prevent British encroachment upon that state's land and continued to be active in matters concerning the border for the rest of his life. His influence among the Indians remained great and his advice was sought on the many problems they faced.\textsuperscript{75}

Thus the Indian effort in Maine and Nova Scotia faded and died. Fueled by mutual fear, it was dampened when the British government decided that there was no longer any need to fear the Americans in Maine. Supplies, so necessary to hold the Indians, were virtually cut off in Halifax, and Francklin's death gave Nova Scotia's effort the \textit{coup de grâce}. On the American side, the lack of supplies reduced John Allan to the exercise of psychological warfare. Beginning with the closing of the truck house at Fort Halifax, increased security caused Massachusetts to cut back its effort slowly, until the end of the

war found only Allan's small Continental agency near Passamaquoddy still in operation, and it, too, soon closed, as all sides lost interest in the people who had once seemed so important.
Chapter 7

CONCLUSION

The War of the American Revolution brought the Indians of eastern Maine and Nova Scotia into prominence once again for the first time since the French and Indian War and for the last time in their history. To the governments of rebellious Massachusetts and loyal Nova Scotia, these tribes of Indians seemed to hold the balance of power in a thinly settled region. If the Americans were going to win the whole of British North America, as they hoped, the Indians in these eastern regions would be most helpful in the thrust toward Nova Scotia. To lose their friendship would lead to the devastation and possible loss of a valuable part of the state. On the other side, threatened by the early American moves to win Indian friendship and combat assistance, Nova Scotia was forced to move to keep the Indians from attacking them. The leaders of the province never contemplated leading the Indians into the field against the Americans because they did not trust the tribes and feared such a maneuver would backfire.

When the Revolution broke out and the competition for the Indians began, eastern Maine and Nova Scotia were very thinly populated. Furthermore, even the largest settlements lay between the sea and miles of forest that
cloaked every Indian activity. Nova Scotia's population was centered around the long coastline of the peninsula. The wild interior of the colony offered an ideal base for attacks in every direction. Using these interior lines of communication, hostile Indians could strike many settlements before the news of hostility reached Halifax along the traditional route by sea around the coast. The small and weakened tribes of the area were thus in a position to do much damage, and the two colonial governments were soon forced to contend for their friendship.

From the start of the war, it was unlikely that the tribes would actually take to the field against either group. Demoralized by earlier defeats and economically depressed, the Indians of Maine and Nova Scotia were mainly concerned with survival and the preservation of what remained of their traditional lifestyle. The leaders of the colonial war efforts were not aware of this, however. They remembered too well the recent devastating struggles with the Indians and French and could see no reason why the tribes would not repeat their earlier performance. Both colonies thus believed that the Indians held the balance of power in the thinly settled area. Moves by either side only reinforced this initial impression, and the rivalry grew by feeding on itself.

From the beginning of the war, the Americans were helped by a reservoir of good will among the Indians. Although it is doubtful that the Indians understood the
issues of the war, emotionally they seemed to side with the Americans. The British had driven out the tribes' old French allies and remained rather distant in their relations with the Indians, who were more familiar with the Massachusetts colonial officials and such private individuals as John Allan of Nova Scotia. When these people became rebels and were supported in Indian affairs by important men such as George Washington, the Indians were impressed. Later in the war, when the French joined the Americans against the British, the Indians gave little further thought to any hostile acts against the friends of their old allies.

The American rapport with the Indians was continued and expanded under the leadership of John Allan, a long-time friend of the Micmacs, who became Continental Indian agent for eastern Maine and Nova Scotia. Allan's understanding of the Indians and their deep respect for him prevented hostilities between the Americans and the Indians throughout the war. Under the most difficult conditions, often armed only with the trust and knowledge established over many years, Allan protected the isolated settlements of eastern Maine from Indian attack. Even when the growth of British power drew the Indians into Nova Scotian forts and conferences, they constantly assured Allan that their hearts were with the Americans, whom they would not harm.

Most of the problems Allan faced sprang from the weakness of the American supply effort. Tribal friendship needed a constant flow of provisions into the camps to keep
it strong. The Indians had become dependent upon manufactured goods and provisions and naturally sought sources of such supplies. The Massachusetts truck house system was designed to fill these needs and was expanded in the war effort. The Americans, however, were soon faced with severe shortages. The supply from England dried up, of course, and native manufacturers could not make up the deficit. As a result, officers such as Allan in the outposts were soon faced with critical shortages in the goods needed to support the Indians. The problem worsened as British sea power disrupted the long American supply lines. As a result, the Indians were forced to depend at least partially on Nova Scotian sources of supplies. The Malecites for example, whom Allan had successfully isolated from the British, slowly began to return to their lands and the British posts. The Indian respect for the Americans held up, however, and kept the tribes from falling under the control of the Nova Scotia authorities.

Michael Francklin, the Indian agent in Nova Scotia, was aware of the Indian feelings for the Americans and never seriously considered using the tribes for military purposes. Faced with Massachusetts' stated intention to use the Indians militarily, Francklin and the provincial government labored mightily to prevent Allan from launching Indian hostilities against the sparsely settled province. They hoped to gain neutrality rather than alliance. Francklin knew of the Indians' fundamental friendship for
the Americans and was satisfied with the basic peace he maintained.

Francklin enjoyed several advantages over Allan in the struggle. Throughout most of the war, he had access to the supplies he needed for the Indians. Late in the conflict when the British government cut off the flow of provisions, the American supply effort had almost completely failed, and Allan reaped no benefit from the British economy move. Francklin also had access to Roman Catholic priests, who were in great demand among the Indians. Religion was a big factor in the lives of the Indians, and control of it served the British well. Priests worked on the American side only after France entered the war and then only for short periods. These advantages were crucial to Francklin in the battle to overcome the natural American inclination of the tribes.

The final years of the war and the British incursions into Maine demoralized the Americans and bred confidence in Nova Scotia. The failure of the American ability to act and resist was matched by reduced operations from Nova Scotia as the government of the United Kingdom attempted to save money in the area they considered secure. The war in Maine and Nova Scotia thus dwindled away into peace.

The Indians for whom the opponents fought—Penobscots, Malecites, Passamaquoddies and Micmacs—did indeed hold the balance of power in Maine and Nova Scotia, but the inability of either side to meet the demands of the Indian
dependence upon manufactured goods did not allow them to exercise that power. At no point in the war could the tribes survive comfortably on what they could obtain from one side. Their needs forced them to remain in peaceful relations to both sides, and neither Americans nor British could shake the Indians from this basic neutrality. The only winners in the competition were the Indians, who for a brief period were important once again.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. PRIMARY SOURCES

1. Manuscript Documents


Eckstorm, Fannie Hardy. The Eckstorm-Hardy Manuscripts and related material. Bangor Public Library.

Massachusetts Archives. Vol. XXIX, Indian Conferences, etc., 1713-1776. State House, Boston.


2. Published Documents


Bradman, Arthur. A Narrative of the Extraordinary Sufferings of Mr. Robert Forbes, his Wife and Five Children; during an Unfortunate Journey through the Wilderness, from the Kennebec River, in the Year 1784: in which Three of their Children were Starved to Death. Philadelphia: M. Carey, 1794.


B. BIBLIOGRAPHIES


Public Archives of Canada. Reports. Ottawa: Crown Printer, 1896-.


C. SECONDARY SOURCES

1. Books


Alger, A. L. *In Indian Tents, Stories Told by Penobscot, Passamaquoddy, and Micmac Indians*. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1897.


Bock, Philip K. *The Micmac Indians of Restigouche: History and Contemporary Description*. Ottawa: Department of the Secretary of State, 1966.


Brackenridge, Hugh Henry. *Indian Atrocities, Narratives of the Perils and Sufferings among the Indians during Revolutionary War*. Cincinnati: James, 1867.


Chase, Clifford G. A History of Baring, Compiled for the Centenary Celebration, July 4, 1925. No place: No publisher, No date.


Hanson, J. W. History of Gardiner, Pittston, and West Gardiner with a Sketch of the Kennebec Indians and New Plymouth Comprising Historical Matter from 1602 to 1852, with Genealogical Sketches of Many Families. Gardiner: W. Palmer, 1852.


 McGregor, J. History of Washington Lodge, No. 37, Free and Accepted Masons, Lubec, Me. No place: No publisher, 1892.


MacVicar, William M. A Short History of Annapolis Royal. Toronto: Copp, Clark, 1897.

Maine, Department of Indian Affairs. Indians of Maine. Augusta: By the author, 1867.


Memorial of the 100th Anniversary of the Settlement of Dennysville, Me., 1886. Portland: B. Thurston, 1886.

Memorial of the Centennial Anniversary of the Settlement of Machias. Machias: C. O. Furbush, 1865.


Sherwood, R. H. Missions in Maine from 1613 to 1854. New York: Catholic World, 1876.


Weston, J. D. History of Eastport and Vicinity; A Lecture, April 1834, before the Eastport Lyceum. Boston: No publisher, 1834.


Whipple, J. The History of Acadie, Penobscot Bay and River with a More Particular Geographical and Statistical View of the District of Maine Than has Ever Been Published. Bangor: Peter Edes, 1816.


2. Periodical Articles

Allan, George H. "Sketch of Colonel John Allan of Maine," New England Historical and Genealogical Register, XXX (1876), 353.


"Early Indian Tribes in Maine and Nova Scotia," Bangor Historical Magazine, VIII (1893), 69.


"Jedediah Preble, Jr.," Bangor Historical Magazine, VIII (1893), 90.


Siebert, Wilbur H. "The Exodus of Loyalists from Penobscot to Passamaquoddy," The Ohio State Bulletin, XVIII, 26 (April, 1914).


"Acadia and its Aborigines," Collections of the Maine Historical Society, VII (1876), 337-49.


3. Dissertations and Theses


D. NEWSPAPERS

Boston Newsletter, 1775-1776.
Continental Journal /Boston/, 1776-1783.
Essex Journal /Newburyport, Mass./, 1775-1777.
Halifax Gazette and Weekly Chronicle, 1775-1783.
Independent Chronicle /Boston/, 1776-1783.
Independent Ledger /Boston/, 1778-1783.
Appendix 1

THE WENDALL ESTIMATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Men in 1690</th>
<th>Men in 1726</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>In New Hampshire</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennacook</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In Maine</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pequaket</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saco</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Androscoggin</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norridgewock</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheepscot</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemaquid</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penobscot</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machias</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passamaquoddy</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total for Maine</strong></td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In Nova Scotia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. John River (Malecite)</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chignecto</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minas</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annapolis Royal</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Pubenque&quot;</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Port La-lore&quot;</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Have</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Mallagash&quot;</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Sachpogtogen&quot;</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Sheedorer&quot;</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Island Harbor</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richibucto</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Astegenash&quot;</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total for Nova Scotia</strong></td>
<td>2,740</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>4,310</td>
<td>506</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2

GYLES’ STATEMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Men above 16 years of age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Ersegontegog&quot;</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wowenoc</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. John River</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passamaquoddy</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machias</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penobscot</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norridgewock</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Androscoggin</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pequaket</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>389</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 3

#### 1790 Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Men of 16 years or older</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hancock County</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrettstown</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belfast</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bluehill</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camden</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canaan</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conuskeeg Plantation</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deer Isle</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ducktrap</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern River Twp. No. 2</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eddy Twp.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfort</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gouldsborough</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isleborough</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Desert</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orphan Island</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orrington</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penobscot</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>1,048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sedgwick</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small islands not belonging to any town</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sullivan</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trenton (including Twp. No 1, east side of Union River)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twp. No. 1 (Bucksport)</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twp. No. 6 (west side of Union River)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinalhaven</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,436</td>
<td>9,549</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Washington County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Men of 16 years or older</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bucks Harbor Neck</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machias</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plantations east of Machias</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 1 (Perry)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 2 (Pembroke, Dennysville)</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 4 (Robbinston)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 5 (Calais)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 3 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Men of 16 years or older</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. 8 (Eastport and Lubec)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 9 (Trescott Twp.)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 10 (Edmunds Twp.)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 11 (Cutler)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 12 (Whiting)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 13 (Marion Twp.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plantations west of Machias</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 4 (Steubon)</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 5 (Milbridge and Harrington)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 6 (Addison)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 11 (Cherryfield)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 12 (Columbia)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 15 (Columbia and Columbia Falls)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 22 (Jonesport, Jonesboro, Roque Bluffs and Beals Island)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>2,759</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


## Appendix 4

**POPULATION OF NOVA SCOTIA**

1764

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town or area</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Halifax</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chester</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunenburg</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dublin</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrington</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yarmouth</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annapolis County</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornwallis</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horton</td>
<td>670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falmouth</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newport</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cobequid region</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Cumberland County</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern coast</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the River St. John</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acadians throughout the colony</td>
<td>2,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the River St. John: 400
Acadians throughout the colony: 2,600

Total: 13,000
## Appendix 5

**POPULATION OF NOVA SCOTIA**  
**1784**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town or Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In and about Halifax</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the coast west of Halifax</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Shelburne</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County of Annapolis</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In and about Windsor</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumberland and Partridge Island</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halifax east to Chedabucto</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chedabucto to Isthmus of Cumberland</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>20,400</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 6
MAP OF MAINE

Gulf of Maine
Appendix 7
MAP OF NOVA SCOTIA
Appendix 8

MAP OF NORTHERN NEW ENGLAND AND THE MARITIMES
Appendix 9

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Baxter MSS.—Baxter Manuscripts
D. A. B.—Dictionary of American Biography
I.—Island
Ibid.—Ibidem
Mass.—Massachusetts
Mass. govt.—Massachusetts government
No.—Number
NS—New series
ser.—series
Twp.—Township
BIography

Richard Irving Hunt, Jr., was born in Waterville, Maine on March 11, 1948. He received his early education in public schools in Fairfield, Maine and was graduated from Lawrence High School in 1966.

In September of 1966, he entered Colby College in Waterville, Maine, where he participated for three years in Program II, a special program of independent study. He received a degree of Bachelor of Arts, with distinction in History, in June, 1970.

In September, 1970, he was enrolled for graduate study at the University of Maine as a Graduate Fellow. In 1971 and 1972 he was a New England-Atlantic Provinces Fellow. He is a candidate for the degree of Master of Arts in History from the University of Maine at Orono in January, 1973.

He is currently serving a term as President of the Fairfield, Maine, Historical Society.