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King Philip's War in Maine

John O. Noble Jr.

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KING PHILIP'S WAR IN MAINE

By

JOHN O. NOBLE, JR.

A THESIS
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
(in History)

The Graduate School
University of Maine
Orono
January, 1970
KING PHILIP'S WAR IN MAINE

By John O. Noble, Jr.


A study was made of the Indian war in Maine, which started in the late summer of 1675 and continued until the spring of 1678. The causes and consequences of the war are presented as they relate to the situation on the Northern colonial frontier (Maine), and as they contrast to the war and social situation in southern New England.

The two major campaigns of the war in Maine are examined in detail. Three political questions are discussed as related to the war: (1) the legal control of Maine; (2) the support of the war effort by the United Colonies of New England; and (3) the pacification effort of Massachusetts and New York to subdue the Maine Indians.

The historiographical significance of the thesis is that it completes the story of King Philip's War started in the doctoral dissertation of Douglas E. Leach at Harvard University. It is also a preliminary inquiry into the issue of French involvement in New England affairs, prior to King William's War, an issue not discussed by Leach.
As a member of the first generation raised on Television, some of the author's earliest remembrances of the "Tube" are stories of conflict between "cowboys and Indians." These melodramas, stylized and usually inaccurate, presented a picture of earlier America which cannot be ignored. The combination of these memories and the later awareness of their distortions left a feeling of hopelessness. There was not much a person could do about the systematic repression and injustices perpetrated on the American Indians. This issue, the author felt, was an impossible one for a student to do much about.

However, when in graduate school, it was necessary to begin the search for a thesis topic. The search led to Boston and the Massachusetts Archives where the author met Mr. and Mrs. Leo Flaherty. After speaking of his interest in the Indians, Mr. Flaherty suggested that he read Douglas Leach's *Flintlock and Tomahawk*. It was discovered that Leach's book, although well-written and thorough, ignored the war situation north of the Merrimack River. The author now had a thesis topic and an opportunity to investigate one of the first major conflicts between white colonists and Indian natives in America.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

During his thesis research, the author met many people. He would like to thank all of them personally, but in some cases, this is an impossibility. He would like to thank Dr. Jerome J. Nadelhaft, his advisor and thesis committee chairman; Dr. John W. Hakola, and Dr. Edward O. Schriver, committee members, whose gentle prodding has seen him through this project; and Dr. Alice R. Stewart, Dr. David C. Smith, Dr. David W. Trafford, Dr. Robert Seager II, and Dr. William H. Pease who have encouraged him along what he thought was an endless path. Also, gratitude is expressed to Dr. James MacCampbell and Mrs. Jean Hogan of the Fogler Library, the Ladies of the Bangor Public Library, and the staff of the Maine Historical Society for having made his work much easier. Gratitude is expressed to friends and fellow graduate students who have put up with his preachments about King Philip's War in Maine, especially Mr. Kenneth M. Morrison, his fellow Maine "Indiophile." For help and assistance in the actual production of the finished copy, his typist, Mrs. Betsey M. Shaffer, deserves an extra note of thanks.

Finally, the author wishes to express a very special word of thanks to his family.
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CHAPTER I

MAINE IN THE 1670'S

On September 9, 1675, the full fury of War swept up the coast of Maine. The John Wakley family was massacred at their farm at Pejepscot.¹ The attack was the first major violent act that would eventually lead to a full-scale war between the white settlers on the northern New England coast and the Indians of the Abnaki Confederacy.² The fighting paralleled and merged with a war in southern New England. In June, 1675, Metacomet, named Philip by the English in earlier peaceful days, led his people into a war against the English settlers who


were gaining complete ascendancy over their culture and lands. He was not alone in this struggle. Soon several tribes in Philip's locality in the western part of Plymouth Colony and eastern Rhode Island and southern Massachusetts joined in the struggle against this alien culture of the aggressive English settlers.

This war that broke out in southern New England during those same summer months of 1675 has been examined extensively by such modern historians as Douglas Leach, Alden Vaughan, George Ellis, and John Morris. These studies present in detail the situation either before or during the war period in southern New England. They all have one central weakness: they do not present the situation in Maine at all, or in detail enough to do justice to this critical period in Maine history.  

The documentary evidence for the early history is not as extensive as that for the southern New England colonies. This may be why scholars have not examined the available evidence. But it is significant to note that Maine, with a population of approximately 3,500 suffered

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260 casualties missing and dead. The casualties for the entire war period in southern New England are usually put at between 800 to 1,000 settlers killed from a much larger population of almost 50,000. These, of course, are only rough estimates.

The conflict between two alien cultures, forced to exist in a limited geographic area would play a major role in the development of the causes of this war. This issue will be examined from several perspectives.

The sharp increase in population from several hundred in the 1620's to almost 50,000 by the mid-1670's is part of the cause of the war. Leach treats extensively the need for land in southern New England to support this large population. There the settlers and speculators were mounting a concerted effort to gain control of the prime Indian lands for the fantastic influx of settlers in these areas. The colonies made an effort to keep these


6 Ellis and Morris, King Philip's War, p. 293.
land transactions with the Indians legal, setting up procedures by which land could be acquired only by prior permission from the colonial governments. This did not eliminate fraud in all cases, but it did limit the number of such cases.

Another part of the land problem was the concept of ownership. The Indians held almost all land in common; they used only what they needed. Everyone could use the land. The English settlers brought with them the concept of private ownership of land with neatly fenced fields. This idea was alien to the Indians, who did not understand the English notion that once they received payment for a piece of property the purchaser had the exclusive use of it. Conflict over ownership was a serious problem in the south. These conflicts led to court cases, in English courts, with English judges and English juries. The Indians soon began to realize that they were losing control of their surroundings to a people of an alien culture. It was not just land differences. In almost all

7 Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, p. 19.
8 Ibid., p. 18.
9 Ibid., pp. 2, 4, 15.
dealings between the two races, the English settlers were able to maintain their superior position.10

The colonies in southern New England set up "Praying-Towns" for Indians who took up the settlers' culture and religion.11 In reality, they were reservations under strict colonial control. These Praying-Indians "fit into a humble niche in the edifice of colonial religion, economy and government."12 Those Indians who would not follow this practice "sooner or later would have to be driven away or crushed."13 This was the situation in southern New England between the Indians and the settlers. Interracial conflict in New England reached its second boiling point within a half-century after English colonial expansion had begun.14

The situation on the coast of Maine presented a very different picture. Less than 4,000 whites lived in a

10 Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, p. 21.
11 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
12 Ibid., p. 22.
13 Ibid.
14 The first conflict being the Pequot War of 1637.
geographic area equal in size to that in which 45,000 whites lived in southern New England. The acquisition of land from the Indians was not as important or pressing as it was to the south. Most of the people were fishermen. What crops were grown were mostly raised in coastal swamps to feed cattle.\textsuperscript{15} Lumbering was not yet an industry.\textsuperscript{16} Therefore control of the forests was not yet a major issue.

Despite the differences, there is one area in which similarities can be found. The issue of racial conflict is evident, not always on the surface, but always near enough to cause serious trouble on the Maine frontier.

Unscrupulous traders and merchants were raiding the Maine coast, capturing individual Indians, and selling them into slavery in Plymouth Colony and the West Indies.\textsuperscript{17} This was a major issue. Secondly, the Indians

\begin{itemize}


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felt that they were being cheated by the white traders and merchants. Adding to the tension, Philip sent ambassadors to the Kennebec region. Their purpose was to encourage the natives to resist European advancement into their holdings.

Another reason for the coming conflict was the lack of powder to kill game during the winter of 1674-1675. The General Court in 1674 put severe restrictions on the sale of ammunition to the Indians in eastern Maine whose loyalty could not be proved. As a consequence the English traders did not supply all the ammunition that was needed to maintain adequate food supplies for all the tribal members. In addition, Indian crops had failed and starvation was imminent for many of the natives.

There were other scattered incidents which took on a racial overtone during these tense years of settlement

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18 Petition of Thomas Gardner and Others to Governor Leverett, August 21, 1676, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, p. 118; Letter from some Indians to Governor Leverett, July 1, 1677, Ibid., pp. 177-178.

19 Petition of Gardner, August 21, 1676, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, p. 118.

20 Ibid., p. 119.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.
in Maine. Squando, a powerful sachem of the Sokiki tribe in southern Maine, had long been a friend of the white settlers. His attitude changed after his wife and baby were molested by some English sailors attempting to prove that Indian babies could swim naturally by instinct. Squando's son drowned and his wife became ill and died after attempting to rescue her child.23

There were incidents and activities that caused racial conflicts, but in general the Indians of Maine were not pressured into adopting the white man's culture. Granted they used the rifle, but this fitted into a traditional type of food production, hunting.

The most conclusive evidence to the fact that they were not systematically pressured into copying English society is that there were no "Praying-Towns" in Maine. There was no great population to provide with land, and most settlers in Maine were not ardent Puritans. They were notorious for their anti-religious attitudes which infested almost all the towns of coastal Maine.24 In fact

23 Ellis and Morris, King Philip's War, p. 297.

almost all Maine towns were at some point in this era brought before the York County Court, which was controlled by Massachusetts, for either not providing catechism training for the young or not hiring ministers for the local citizenry, or both.\textsuperscript{25} The people of Maine were not interested in converting the Indians to Christianity or turning them into models of English society.

The \textit{Maine Province and Court Records} point up another difference between Maine and the southern New England colonies. There are no cases listed of Indians being tried for criminal or civil offenses in Maine. Leach sees the problems between English law and the Indians of southern New England as a major area of conflict, which led to the war.\textsuperscript{26}

This was the situation in Maine, in the fall of 1675 as Lieutenant Thomas Gardner wrote Governor Leverett in Boston telling him,


\textsuperscript{26}Index of Persons and Places, p. 553; Index of Subjects, p. 556, \textit{MPCR}. 
Sir[,] I Conceive the Reason of our Troubles here may be occasioned not only by som[e] southern Indianes which Com[e] this way[,] But by our owne Actings. . . upon first Newes of the wares. . . divers person[s] from Kenibek & Shepscott gott together. . . went up Kenibek River & demanded the Indianes Armes who Came downe Quietly. . . my doubt is seeing these Indianes Amoungst us live most by Hunting as your Honnor well Knoweth, how we Can Take Away their Armes whose livelyhood dependeth on it. . . . Sir[,] I do not find by Any thing I Can discerne that the Indianes East of us ar[e] in the least our Ennimies. . . 27

The reaction in Boston was not favorable to Gardner's letter. The Massachusetts government had apparently already decided on War with the Indians in Maine. The General Court proceeded to send out orders to the different town militia to prepare for War.28 Gardner was arrested on charges of illegal trade with the Indians.29

27 Thomas Gardner to Governor Leverett, September 22, 1675, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, pp. 91-92.

28 Order of the Council to the Town of Wells, December 9, 1675, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, pp. 103-104.

29 Order to the Constables of Pemaquid from the Council in Boston for the Arrest of Lt. Thomas Gardner, October 18, 1675, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, p. 97.
This charge was later dropped for lack of evidence.\textsuperscript{30} In view of the pressure from Boston, a full-scale war was inevitable. Boston ordered out the Yorkshire militia to "persue, kill & destroy" the Maine Indians.\textsuperscript{31}

In addition, in the spring of 1676, the General Court offered a bounty of three pounds for every Indian killed or captured south of the Piscataqua River.\textsuperscript{32} It would not have been difficult and it would have been profitable for some enterprising settler to capture and kill an Indian north of that line and take the scalp across the river to collect the bounty. This bounty can be viewed only as an intensification of the war and a direct effort on the part of the General Court of Massachusetts Bay to exterminate the Indians of New England.

War had come to Maine, but before an account of the War is presented, it would be helpful to examine the


\textsuperscript{31} Order from Major General Daniel Denison to Major Richard Waldron, August 17, 1675, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, p. 88.

societies of both the settlers and the Indians as they were in the 1670's. John Josselyn, an English visitor to coastal Maine just prior to the War period, wrote a detailed description of Maine and its people.

He divided the settlers into several categories, magistrates, planters, and fishermen. The majority were fishermen. He found most of the inhabitants were "perverse spirits."\(^3^3\) Undoubtedly to this English squire, this comment refers to the settlers' coarse frontier habits and manners. Most of the farmers also fished, but they grew food for themselves and their families and food for their livestock. Sheep wool provided most of their clothing.\(^3^4\) Most families were poor. There were few craftsmen, scattered mills, and the prices of goods supplied by Massachusetts merchants were very high.\(^3^5\)

Josselyn described the Indians of Maine as physically a well-developed people.\(^3^6\) He described their character as,

\(^3^3\) Josselyn, *Voyages*, p. 249.
\(^3^4\) Ibid.
\(^3^5\) Ibid., p. 250.
\(^3^6\) Ibid., p. 294.
very inconsistent, crafty, timorous, quick of apprehension, and very ingenious, soon angry, and so malicious that they seldom forget any injury, and barbariously cruel . . . 37

Although these views are those of an English gentleman, they give us some idea of how the English settler must have viewed the natives of that area. If this was true, then when it came to remembering injuries at the outbreak of war, the Indians had almost a century of wrongs to correct. 38

The weapons of the Indians were generally bows and arrows, but as Josselyn commented, "he is a poor Indian that is not the master of two Guns." 39 He stated that they were excellent marksmen. Josselyn also relates that they had hatchets, tomahawks, and knives in their arsenals. 40 Their method of warfare was described as "Ambushments and Surprises, coming upon another unawares." 41

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38 Lauber, Studies in History, pp. 155-156.
39 Josselyn, Voyages, p. 309.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., p. 310.
Estimates of the number of Indian warriors is another problem that the researcher has to contend with. By combining different sets of estimates and figures given in accounts of various peace parleys, there were most likely 400 Indian men under arms as compared to the approximately 700 men in the Yorkshire militia.  

Another problem concerning the Indians is that it is almost impossible to tell exactly who was fighting at any one time and who their leaders were. It is also difficult to determine what tribes were initially involved and what tribes were subsequently included in the war, either as willing allies of the Indian uprising or forced to fight to defend themselves after being attacked by the English. The problem stems from one of identification. The settlers usually left good records as to casualties and damage, but seldom identified either the settlers or Indians who were involved in any

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43 Group of Indians to Governor Leverett, July 1, 1677, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, pp. 177-178.
particular engagement.\footnote{44}{Captain Joshua Scottow to Governor Leverett, November 6, 1675, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, pp. 99-102.} There is also difficulty in placing some Indian leaders with their proper tribes.\footnote{45}{Ellis and Morris, King Philip's War, p. 307.} Therefore at times it might appear as though there has been an effort to ignore or minimize the Indians' effort in the struggle. In fact it is only the lack of substantive evidence that places their side of the story on such an impersonal basis.\footnote{46}{Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, p. vii; Deogenes Madousqurabet to Governor Leverett, n.d., Baxter Manuscripts, VI, pp. 178-179.}

Maine in 1675 consisted of thirteen English settlements. Kittery, the largest, included the settlements on the northeastern side of the Piscataqua River and the Berwick area. The settlement at York included Cape Neddic. The next populated area up the coast was Wells, Cape Porpoise. The settlement at Saco was on both sides of the Saco River and included the area of Biddeford. The Scarborough settlement included Black Point and Blue Point peninsulas. Present-day Portland, known then as Falmouth, included Stroudwater (Westbrook), Spurwink, and Prepoondunk (Cape Elizabeth). At the lower
falls of the Androscoggin River was the Pejepscot settlement. The settlements on the Kennebec River included Cushnoc and Arrowsic Island. The remaining settlements, situated up the coast, towards the French possessions beyond the Penobscot River were Sheepscot, Capenwagen, Damariscotta, and the Damariscove Islands, Pemaquid, and the Mohegan Islands.\textsuperscript{47}

Pemaquid and the surrounding area was under the nominal control of the Duke of York, with the governor of New York as the official representative of the Duke.\textsuperscript{48} The rest of the coastal region was under the nominal control of Massachusetts Bay Colony, but its title was not clear, since the heirs of Gorges and Mason were attempting to regain control of the colony.\textsuperscript{49}

As the autumn of 1675 approached in Maine, the peaceful environment of these fishing villages began to stir. The isolated and poorly equipped settlements of Maine on the eastern frontier were swept up into this devastating cultural conflict.

\textsuperscript{47} Williamson, History of Maine, p. 515.

\textsuperscript{48} Ellis and Morris, King Philip's War, p. 313.

\textsuperscript{49} Williamson, History of Maine, p. 450.
CHAPTER II

THE FIRST CAMPAIGN

By July 11, 1675, news of the War reached southern Maine. Henry Sawyer, a prominent citizen of York, sent a messenger up the coast to Sagadahoc with information about the outbreak of fighting. The Committee that the General Court of Massachusetts Bay had appointed earlier that year to maintain "military power over the eastern parts" met at the home of Captain Richard Patteshall to discuss the situation. The other members of the Committee, with a group of other settlers, made their way up the Kennebec River, met with some representatives of Anasagunticook and Canibas Indians, and demanded that the

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Indians surrender their arms. The Indians agreed.² During the parley tensions were very strong. An incident developed between a settler and an Indian, but it was settled at the session. On July 19, 1675, the day after the meeting, a great feast was held and the sachem, called Robinhood, who was chief negotiator for the Indians, performed a dance to celebrate the peace and settlement of the incident.³ The French in Canada became involved in the war only because the local magistrates, who were openly sympathetic to all things from Massachusetts and more importantly owed their positions to the colonial government in Boston, attempted to enforce a policy of confiscating the weapons of the Indians. The Indians had to turn somewhere for hunting supplies, so they turned to the French traders in the Penobscot area.⁴ Thus as the French government attempted to enforce colonial neutrality, Massachusetts' policies toward the Indians throughout this period were not very effective, due, in part, to the

²Williamson, History of Maine, p. 519.
³Hubbard, Narratives (1775), p. 212.
French traders' aid to her Indian enemies.\(^5\) The fear of the French Catholics among all the New England Protestants was aroused, and as the stories of French assistance to the Indians on the northern frontier spread southward through New England, these tales became more exaggerated.\(^6\)

During the first week of September the Indians in the Pejepscot area carried out minor raids. The home of Thomas Purchase was visited under the pretext of engaging in trade. When the Indians learned that all the men were away, they began to seize weapons, ammunition, and liquor. Purchase's son returned and was chased away by some of the raiders, but before they left, the Indians, according to legend, told Mrs. Purchase that "others will soon come and treat them worse."\(^7\)

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\(^6\) Records of the General Court, September 6, 1676, p. 113; Records of the General Court, June 1, 1677; Shurtleff, ed., Records. . .Massachusetts Bay, V, p. 141.

\(^7\) Williamson, History of Maine, p. 520; Lieutenant George Ingersol to Lieutenant Augur, September 10, 1675, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, p. 90.
On September 9, 1675, Maine began to feel the full impact of the war. The John Wakley family farm at Brunswick was attacked and the family murdered. Lieutenant George Ingersol, the commander of a small party of men, arrived on the tenth and described the scene in this way:

...when I came to ye place, I found an house burnt downe & Six persons killed, & three of ye same family could not be found. an old Man & Woman were half in & half out of ye house, neer half burnt; their owne Son was shot through ye body, & also his head dashed to pieces; this young mans Wife was dead, her head skinned, she was big with Child. two Children having their heads dashed in pieces, & Laid by one another with their bellys to ye ground, & an Oake planke laid upon their backs. 8

The news of the attack spread quickly up and down the coast. Within a month it was necessary for Major Richard Waldron, military commander of Maine and New Hampshire and Speaker of the Massachusetts General Court to forbid anyone "from goinge outt of there owne towne to any other place to inhabitt in." 9 The settlers of

8 Lieutenant George Ingersol to Lieutenant Augur, September 10, 1675, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, p. 89.

9 Order of Richard Waldron, October 6, 1675, Baxter Manuscripts, IV, pp. 348-349.
coastal Maine were not prepared for war. The troops at the Black Point garrison pleaded with Major Waldron for relief and ammunition, since the shot they had was of poor quality and in short supply as of September 16, 1675.\footnote{John Davese and John Wincoll to Major Waldron, September 16, 1675, \textit{Baxter Manuscripts}, VI, pp. 90-91; Letter from the Council to Captain Scottow, November 16, 1675, \textit{Baxter Manuscripts}, VI, pp. 102-103.}

The Black Point garrison was going to send men up to the Casco Bay area, but the commander soon realized that the whole coastal area was in danger. His command was not clear; therefore he left the military decisions to Major Waldron, at Dover, to decide how the troops were to be deployed.\footnote{John Davese and John Wincoll to Major Waldron, September 16, 1675, \textit{Baxter Manuscripts}, VI, p. 91.}

Within ten days of the outbreak of fighting, six or seven houses on the Kennebec River had been robbed of supplies. Some of the inhabitants of the houses were killed and some escaped to Monhegan Island. Nine settlers in the Casco Bay area were killed.\footnote{Thomas Gardner to Governor Leverett, September 22, 1675, \textit{Baxter Manuscripts}, VI, p. 91.}
On Saturday, September 18, Squando and a band of thirty-six warriors were preparing to attack Captain Bonython's home on the east side of the Saco River. Bonython was warned by a friendly Indian. He and his family were able to flee to safety to Major William Phillips' compound across the river as their home was being enveloped in smoke behind them. The Indians pursued them across the river and set fire to Phillips' mill. Phillips was one of the largest landowners in Maine, and the Indians hoped to draw the defenders of the garrison house out and into a fight.\(^\text{13}\) They were prepared to defend the house against the Indians, but not the outer buildings. The fifty or so frightened settlers remained in the house all night as the Indians continued firing into the compound. About nine o'clock on Sunday morning the Indians left. They had wounded three of the defenders slightly and burned the small outbuildings, using birch soaked in turpentine as torches.\(^\text{14}\) That same week at least twenty-seven homes were burned in


Scarborough. There was also an attack on some settlers in Spurwink.  

The first organized attempt on the part of the settlers to resist took place the same week. Captain John Wincoll of Newichawannock (South Berwick) with sixteen volunteers set out for Winter Harbor, but upon arrival they were ambushed and several of the volunteers were killed.  

Ellis and Morris believed that all the attacks in the Saco area were led by Squando, who, in many ways, was the most controversial and important of the Indian sachems involved in the War in Maine. One of his prisoners related that during his captivity Squando said "that god doth speak to him and doth tell him that god hath left our nacion to them [English] to destroy..." Yet he is the same sachem who, as a gesture of friendship, later returned English captives whom he had successfully


16 John Libby and Others, July 15, 1676, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, p. 115.

17 Ellis and Morris, King Philip's War, p. 296.

recovered from other tribes.\textsuperscript{19} He will be heard from again when negotiations between the two groups are held; he will then emerge as one of the leaders for peace.

On October 1, 1675, the War moved inland to a frontier garrison house on the Salmon Falls River. John Tozer was away on the Wincoll expedition. In his home were fifteen women and children. Andrew of the Sokiki and Hopehood, son of Robinhood, of the Canibas tribe led a joint attack.\textsuperscript{20} A desperate act of heroism on the part of a young girl saved all the lives of the inhabitants. She held the door to the cabin shut as the rest of the terrified settlers fled out the rear door. She was finally overcome, attacked, left for dead, but she recovered from her wounds.\textsuperscript{21} The next day the farm of John Wincoll was attacked by a larger raiding party and destroyed. The Indians, short on supplies, took the one hundred barrels of corn stored in the barn before they put it to the torch.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{19} Hubbard, Narratives, (1865), p. 104; (1775), p. 214.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., (1775), p. 220.

\textsuperscript{21} Williamson, History of Maine, p. 525.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p. 527.
On Saturday, October 16, 1675, the John Tozer home was again attacked, but this time Tozer was unfortunately home. He was killed in the attack and his son was captured. About a mile away from the Tozer home was the town garrison, commanded by Lieutenant Roger Plaisted, who sent a small party of men out to help the Tozer family fight the Indian attack. Before they could reach the hopelessly outnumbered defenders, they were ambushed, and three of the nine men were killed. The others made a hasty retreat back to the fort, as the men in the garrison helplessly watched both attacks take place.  

Plaisted sent the following letter to Major Waldron:

These are to inform you that the Indians are just now engaging us with at least one hundred men, and have slain four of our men already. . .Sirs, if ever you have any love for us and the country, now shew yourselves with men to help us, or else we all are in great danger to be slain, unless our God wonderfully appears for our deliverence. . .  

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The plight of the frontier settlers was extremely severe by mid-October, 1675. The area around the Salmon Falls and South Berwick was held under heavy attack for several more days, before the major scene of the War moved to the Wells area, where settlers were killed in mid-October. The Indians who attacked that settlement were particularly interested in destroying the holdings of William Symonds, a wealthy landowner and official, but he and his family were safe in the garrison at Wells. This was the last major attack for the fall and winter months.

The settlers, caught completely by surprise, were very low on supplies. The practice of commandeering what was needed by the shire militia was instituted. This practice was resisted by the fiercely independent settlers, as witnessed by the refusal of one John Andrews to turn over his powder supply to the militia. He insisted that he had bought it for the defense of his family and neighbors who came to his home for protection. He was arrested and brought before the local defense committee at Falmouth and held prisoner until he agreed to surrender the powder. On petition to Boston the

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colonial government ordered the defense committee to return twenty pounds of powder to Andrews for local defense. This incident indicates the state of chaos Maine was in during those critical early months of the War.

The figures on the Maine casualties vary from one account to another. The low figure is about fifty white settlers and ninety Indians killed in 1675. The figure for the settlers is sometimes put as high as eighty dead. The lower figure is probably most accurate, since it is believed the Indians suffered casualties at the ratio of two-to-one throughout the War.

During the winter months the survivors of the thirty-eight Massachusetts troops sent to defend Maine the preceding fall by the General Court sent a letter in their own behalf concerning the desperate conditions which they were suffering at the garrison at Black Point. Their plea was for clothing. Several of the men had died,


28 Willis, History of Portland, p. 139; Williamson, History of Maine, p. 529.

29 Petition of Henry Josselyn and Others, January 24, 1676, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, p. 106.
and the survivors warned the Court that unless aid was forthcoming, they might all be expected to die. The General Court Directed Joshua Scottow to provide for the fort. His record in this area was poor. He was later accused of not fulfilling his duties at the fort and forced to appear before the General Court in Boston on these charges, on which he was found negligent.30

The snow that started to fall on October 16 was a welcome reprieve, probably for both sides. Many settlers had fled in spite of Major Waldron's order to remain. Monhegan Island began to look like a refugee camp. This situation would grow worse by the late summer of 1676.31

Williamson discusses the settler's reaction in detail. His description is interesting, but since no documentary verification or additional information has been acquired by him, his views might be a combination of legend, and substantial evidence available to him has since been lost or destroyed.32


31 Petition from Thomas Gardner and the Other Inhabitants of Pemaquid, April 21, 1676, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, pp. 118-119.

The Canibas tribe, under Madacawando, had been living in close contact with the settlers on the lower Kennebec. When the War broke out, this area was initially spared. As soon as some Indians were killed in the Casco Bay area and some of their crops were destroyed by local settlers, they moved up River to Taconic Falls to avoid open conflict. 33 Thomas Lake and Thomas Clark, Boston merchants, had a trading outpost there under the direct control of Captain Silvanus Davis, their resident agent on the Kennebec.

The frontiersmen had now developed a hostile attitude toward all Indians. They did not differentiate between the openly hostile natives and those who were satisfied with the existing pattern of society that had been developing, since the first white traders and settlers had come among the tribes of central Maine more than fifty years before. 34 Captain Davis sent a messenger, who, to the Indian settlement at Taconic

33 Ellis and Morris, King Philip's War, p. 300; Fanny Hardy Eckstrom, Indian Place Names of the Penobscot Valley and the Maine Coast (Bromo: University of Maine Studies, No. 55, 1941), p. 153.

34 Williamson, History of Maine, p. 526; Letter from Some Indians to Governor Leverett, July 1, 1677, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, p. 177.
Falls, violated his orders. Instead of asking the Indians to move down river, near the main trading center, where Captain Davis could insure that no settlers would molest them and that their needs could be taken care of by Davis, he told the Indians that they had to return with him and surrender their weapons. The Indians became so alarmed at this message that they moved to the Penobscot area, and held conferences at the Baron de St. Castine's residence with other Indian tribes of the area to plan alternative action.35

John Earthy, a tavernkeeper at Pemaquid and a trusted friend of the Indians, held a meeting with the sachems of the affected tribes.36 He convinced them that there could be peace with the English. He had the committee of the General Court issue warrants forbidding anyone to interfere with those Indians who were at peace with the English.37 How the settlers were to decide who was a peace and who was at war is not made clear.

Relations between the two groups sank to the level where


36 Hubbard, Narratives (1865), p. 149.

37 Ibid., p. 151.
the refugees and residents on Monhegan Island were offering a bounty of five pounds on any Indian scalp, with the apparent blessing of Massachusetts Bay. 38

The General Court ordered a winter campaign in an attempt to regain the initiative in the War. Maine and New Hampshire units were ordered to attack the Indians in their winter quarters at Pegwacket, Ossipee, and Pejepscot. These planned attacks were never carried out, because by the time they were ready to march (December 10, 1675), the depth of the snow was approximately four feet, making it impossible to carry out a long-range military operation without snowshoes, which they were not supplied with. 39

During the next few months there is no record of any disturbances on the northern frontier of New England. At the February, 1676, meeting of the General Court in Boston, Majors Richard Waldron and Nicholas Shapleigh were appointed Commissioners to negotiate a treaty with

38 Williamson, History of Maine, p. 526. There is no evidence that Massachusetts ever attempted to stop this practice of the Monhegan Islanders.

39 Hubbard, Narratives (1775), p. 228.
the Eastern Indians. This move was reciprocated by the Indians during the winter months. They brought several captives into Major Waldron at Dover. Negotiations commenced from that point and continued throughout the spring of 1676. It was not only the settlers who were dislocated by the war but the Indians whose corn crops were lost and whose lack of ammunition made it impossible to hunt for food. Both sides were negotiating from about equally poor positions.

There is no record of military activity in Maine by either side during the spring of 1676. The scene of all military operations appeared to have been directed against Philip and his allies in the south.

The negotiations between the Commissioners and the seven sachems resulted in a short but straightforward affirmation of Indian and settlers' rights. If any Englishman molested an Indian's person or property, he

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40 Records of the Special Session of the General Court of Massachusetts Bay Colony, February 21, 1676, Shurtleff, ed., Records...Massachusetts Bay, V, p. 72.

was to be reported to the English authorities to be prosecuted. The same treatment was to hold true for an Indian who interfered with a settler's person or property. The third clause required the Indians of Maine to report enemy Indians of the English to the authorities and were to receive a bounty of three pounds for every enemy Indian captured.⁴²

This Treaty, signed on July 3, 1676, at Dover, makes no mention of the events the previous fall. No one was to be tried for activities on either side. Squando was one of the signers, and he was not required to pay damages or stand trial. No English reparations were to be paid for destroyed crops or peaceful villages sacked. All appeared to be forgiven on both sides. With the signing of this Treaty the first phase of the War in Maine drew to a close. The War in the south would soon be over, the English in total victory.

CHAPTER III

THE SECOND CAMPAIGN

In mid-summer 1676 three of Philip's closest allies made their way north to the Merrimack River area. They most likely realized that the effort they had made in southern New England to rid their lands of the English settlers was in the final process of being crushed. These men, Andrew, Peter, and Simon, "The Yankee-Killer," attempted to hide among the Pennacooks and Abnakis. After the trio and their followers became involved in an attack on the Thomas Kimball family in New Hampshire, the Pennacooks turned them over to Major Waldron at Dover. Late in July they escaped and made their way to the Casco Bay area.¹ They were apparently responsible for convincing Squando that there was still a chance to

¹Williamson, History of Maine, p. 534.
defeat the English in Maine and capture and destroy the city of Boston. It was here they became involved with Squando and his warriors. Soon after their arrival in this region there were a series of raids in which at least thirty-four people were killed or carried into captivity. The area was so devastated that it remained effectively deserted until after April, 1678.

August 12, 1676 marked the end of King Philip's War in southern New England. On that day, the once powerful and proud sachem of the Wampanoags was killed by a special English force sent to pursue and kill him. But the end of fighting in the south marked the revival of the war in Maine. On August 13, 1676, William Hammond and fourteen settlers who had taken refuge in his compound on Arrowsic Island were killed by a raiding party led by Mugg of the Sokiki tribe. One young woman escaped the


3 Willis, History of Portland, p. 152.

4 Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, pp. 233-237.

massacre and fled to Sheepscot, giving the alarm of renewed warfare on the eastern frontier of New England.6

Reports of an attack on Falmouth in which sixteen adults and sixteen children were taken captive reached Boston. Major General Daniel Denison was ordered to raise a joint New Hampshire-Maine force to "Repell & Destroy the Ennemy...said to be a two hundred [band of warriors]."7 On Monday, August 20, 1676, the General Court began to speed up its activities for the defense of Maine. George Munjoy, one of the most prominent settlers in the Casco Bay area, was given the power to impress a Boston ship and crew to bring fifteen hundred pounds of bread to the Casco Bay area for relief.8

After the attack on Hammond Fort, a party of eleven Indians went up the Kennebec River to Francis Card's farm and captured him and his family. The remainder of the original war party went to the Arrowsic Island garrison and seized that compound. Within two weeks after these attacks they went down the Kennebec to

6 Ellis and Morris, King Philip's War, p. 303.

7 The General Court to Major General Daniel Denison, August 14, 1676, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, pp. 116-117.

8 Order of the General Court to George Munjoy, August 20, 1676, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, p. 117.
Damariscotta and killed cattle and burned some farms. The war party then split up again, part going to Jewell's Island and the rest to Sagadahoc. At Sagadahoc, some of the warriors took a skallop and proceeded to Damariscotta Island, where they captured a sloop and killed one fisherman in the process. They left Damariscotta and joined the unit that had attacked Jewell's Island. There were now about a hundred warriors, and they proceeded to Black Point. On October 12, 1676, these Indians under Mugg attacked the fort at Black Point, which was then under the command of Captain Henry Josselyn. Josselyn, knowing Mugg, called for a parley. While they were meeting, the inhabitants and defenders left the compound and escaped by sea. Josselyn and his family were not harmed when the escape was discovered, and they soon followed the others to safety.

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9 Report from Lieutenant Edward Crick to Major Waldron, August 27, 1676, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, p. 121.


12 Ellis and Morris, King Philip's War, p. 308.
Captain Thomas Lake was not as lucky. In mid-August, Lake was visiting his trading post, still under the direction of Captain Silvannus Davis. The Indians took the trading post by surprise early on the morning of August 14. The sentry on guard at the gate left his post; the gate was stormed, and the post taken. Davis, Lake, and two others escaped in a canoe. The Indians followed and fired into the canoe, wounding Davis and Lake, who made their way to Mill Island. Davis hid in the rocks. Lake was found and murdered. The other two men escaped unhurt.  

Back at Dover, Major Waldron soon planned an action which would cause trouble between settlers and Indians on the northern frontier for another generation.  

Major Waldron had gathered about four hundred Indians around the garrison which he commanded there and promised them protection. This was his way of maintaining order in the area. Out of this group, about two hundred had fled southern New England after the death of King Philip.

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13 Ellis and Morris, *King Philip's War*, pp. 304-305.

This situation was acceptable to Massachusetts until the news of renewed trouble at Casco Bay and in the Kennebec region reached Boston. Captain William Hawthorne and one hundred thirty men from the Massachusetts Militia and forty Natick Indians were ordered north to subdue the troublemakers and to seize all Indians that had taken part in the recently ended war. They arrived at Dover on September 6, 1676.

Waldron stopped the Massachusetts troops from attacking the Indians at once. He devised a plan, however, to ensure the capture of the refugee Indians. He planned a "sham" training session in which the Indians fired their weapons. Once their guns had been fired, the troops seized the disarmed refugees from the south. Approximately ten percent of the Indians found guilty of shedding English blood were executed. The remainder, about one hundred ninety men, women, and children, were sold into slavery outside of New England.

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15 Lanber, Indian Slavery, p. 147.

remaining two hundred or so Pennacook Indians, who had not shed blood, under their sachem Wonnoloncat, were released.

The Pennacooks, who had been neutral in the war, were shocked and saw this as an act of treachery. Williamson summed up the feelings of the settlers concerning this event, "some applauded, some doubted, some censured; but the government [Massachusetts Bay] approved." 17

After the incident at Dover was settled, Hawthorne and his men moved eastward towards the troubled area. They were guided by "Blind Will," sachem of the Newichawannocks and eight of his men. Before they reached the Casco Bay area, they captured a sachem of the Pequacket tribe, which had been involved in the war. They questioned him, and he said that the Canibas Indians were moving down to the Casco area within a day or so. His statement that the French had not been aiding them was considered a lie, so Hawthorne had him executed as a traitor by the accompanying Indians. 18

Hawthorne's troops were ambushed as they crossed one of the rivers in the Casco Bay area. They fought off

17 Williamson, History of Maine, p. 539.

18 William Hawthorne to Major Waldron, September 22, 1676, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, p. 123.
the Indians and killed an attacker named John Sampson. The Indians from Dover who were accompanying them knew him and said that he was a leader of the Indians in Maine.\(^\text{19}\)

Hawthorne, in his first letter to Waldron, told of the difficult time the English troops were having in engaging the Indians in an open fight. He said that they continuously fell back along the numerous rivers and peninsulas in the area. He realized that the further he went from Dover, the further he was from supplies. By 9 P. M. on September 22, Hawthorne and his men had been without food for three days, and no supplies were in sight. He pleaded with Waldron to make sure that his supply lines remained open and moving during this expedition.\(^\text{20}\) They had no success in their effort to meet the Indians in battle, probably because they had a party of over two hundred fifty men. It would have been difficult for the Indians to muster an equally large unit and arm them to do battle on such a large scale.\(^\text{21}\) They


left the Casco Bay area on October 12, 1676, and returned to Newichawannock. This expedition caused political and defense problems. The settlement at York was greatly dissatisfied with the conduct of the operation, in which units from Maine were impressed into Hawthorne's unit. It petitioned the General Court that the men of York not be sent outside the town, since once they were gone, the town was subject to enemy attack with impunity. The request was granted by the government in Boston. This decision, along with the policy of granting individual releases from military services, was humane and considerate to the frontiersmen, but its effect on military matters was a variable which made the continued prosecution of the war more difficult for Waldron. Was Massachusetts trying to

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22 Williamson, History of Maine, p. 540; George Munjoy and Others to General Court, September 11, 1676, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, p. 122.

23 Petition of the Town of York to General Court, October 19, 1676, Baxter Manuscripts, IV, p. 371.

24 Order of the General Court, October 19, 1676, Baxter Manuscripts, IV, p. 372.

25 Petition of George Manning, October 9, 1676, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, p. 136; Petition of Ambrose Berry, March 26, 1677, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, pp. 159-160, et passim.
win the loyalty of the towns and citizens of Maine? Or was Massachusetts attempting to show England that Gorges and Mason could do nothing to defend this Province, and that Massachusetts would have to have a free hand to solve the problems of Maine, once the war was ended? These and the other issues surrounding the politics of the war will be discussed later, but they must be kept in mind as Massachusetts begins to play a larger role in the war on the northern frontier.

Richmond Island, in Casco Bay, was the next focus point in the renewed war.26 Walter Gendell and a group of other refugees who had stored most of their possessions on the Island before they fled to the Portsmouth area. They persuaded Nathaniel Fryer, the owner of a thirty-ton ketch, to take them up to the Island to retrieve their possessions.27 The ship was captained by John Abbot, and Fryer's son, James, was a member of the crew.28 While the men were loading the vessel, the group was attacked

26 Hubbard, Narratives (1865), p. 74.


by a party of Indians led by Mugg. Those on shore were seized, those on board attempted to hide below deck but were seen. The Indians cut the hawser, and the vessel drifted ashore, where the crew was captured.\(^{29}\) An agreement was reached by which two of the men would return to Portsmouth to gather a ransom for the rest of the men and return by November 1.\(^{30}\)

Since several Abnaki tribes were involved in the raid, they all wanted a share of the prisoners to insure a good portion of the ransom. Five of the men were taken to the Kennebec and Penobscot areas. Mugg took his prisoners to the Wells area, where there was a garrison of settlers.

In the meantime, the men who were sent for the ransom returned early, only to be attacked by another group of Indians, unaware of the earlier raid. One of the men was killed and the ransom stolen.\(^{31}\) Back at Wells, Mugg sent Walter Gendell into the garrison to convince the defenders to surrender and leave peacefully, but they refused.\(^{32}\) Mugg took James Fryer to Portsmouth, where


\(^{31}\)Ibid.

shortly after his return he died from wounds suffered during the attack on Richmond Island. Mugg, for some unknown reason, promised to return without ransom the prisoners taken at Richmond Island. Mugg, in concert, apparently, with Madocawando and Cheberria, sachems from the east (Penobscot), whose men were participants in the summer campaign, proposed a Peace Treaty between the Indians and the settlers. This was probably prompted by the approach of winter and the long string of successes the Indians had that fall. Mugg, as the chief negotiator for the Indians, was given a letter of safe conduct to Boston. He was a good choice as representative. He had first been seen at the signing of the Treaty of Dover (July 3, 1676). Mugg had not been involved in the first campaign of the war. He was of the Sokiki tribe, as was Squando, who was a leader of the first campaign. Mugg became a leader during the second campaign and led the attack on Black Point, which provided a great psychological victory for the Indians when they gained control of it without any loss of life. He was fluent

33 Williamson, History of Maine, p. 542.
34 Edward Rawson to Major Waldron, March 9, 1677, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, p. 201.
in English and could apparently understand the puritan and frontier mentality of the English.  

When he reached Boston, he was accorded the "Rights of an Independent Belligerent," and negotiated directly with Governor John Leverett and the General Court.  It is interesting to note that this proposed treaty, unlike the one signed in July, was not negotiated in the field. The Colony of Massachusetts Bay was going to insure that all concerned realized that it was Boston, not the local officials in Maine, that had the power to end this conflict. In summary, the proposed treaty called for an end of hostilities; restoration of all captives and goods; restitution by the Indians for all damages to English property; and provisioning Indians with needed ammunition, but only through traders authorized by the Governor. Those Indians involved in the attack on Richmond Island were to be turned over to the colonial government for punishment, if the hostages were not returned. Madockawando and Cheberria, the sachems that Mugg was representing, were pledged to become allies of the English against the Androscoggins and their allies if


37 Hubbard, Narratives (1865), p. 189.
the war should continue. Mugg was to be the hostage until all the provisions were completed.  

Mugg was probably the most capable Indian to deal with the English. But being removed from his native surroundings and forced to negotiate the treaty in a completely hostile setting the size of Boston, the overwhelming technological superiority of the English may have forced him into a position where he did not realize that he was compromising on many issues that would prove detrimental to the Indians, such as restitution only by the Indians.  

This treaty cannot be called a favorable one from the standpoint of the Maine Indians.

On November 21, Captain Samuel Moore was sent to the Penobscot Bay area with a vessel and Mugg to present the treaty to the sachems for ratification and to return with the captives. On December 2, the Treaty was ratified and the captives turned over to the English authorities. Mugg then convinced Moore to let him go to Taconic Falls, to the Canibas headquarters, and convince them to join the

38 Hubbard, Narratives (1775), p. 264.

peace and release the captives that they had acquired in their fall campaign. He told Moore that he would return in four days, but he did not and, according to legend, said to the Canibas tribe,

I know how we can even burn Boston, and drive all the country before us; - we must go to the fishing Islands, and take all the white men's vessels.

When Mugg did not return, Moore waited ten days and then, with his charges, made his way back to Boston by way of Black Point.

Mugg, when he returned to his allies, realized that it was a poor treaty and that he had lost favor among his fellow warriors. They were very happy with their booty and neither feared an invasion by the English, nor did they see the need for this Treaty. To regain favor, Mugg donned the war paint again.

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42 Hight, "Mugg...", Proceedings, VI, p. 258.

43 Ibid.
While Mugg was in the spotlight, Captain Hawthorne left Newichawannock. On November 1, they started to march for the Indians' winter quarters on the Ossipee River. This mission also proved useless. No Indians were spotted in this traditional winter quarters area. The only success which he apparently had was building Fort Loyal on the south shore of Casco Bay. This fort would serve as the headquarters for Massachusetts authority in the post-war period in Maine.

Captain Joshua Scottow proposed in late October, 1676, a campaign to retake the garrison at Black Point, which was the key to regaining control of the region from the Piscataqua to the Kennebec. On October 24, 1676, the General Court approved Scottow's plan, and he was placed in charge of the expedition. He made Lieutenant

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44 Williamson, History of Maine, p. 542.


46 Williamson, History of Maine, p. 563.

47 Petition of Joshua Scottow to the General Court, October, 1676, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, pp. 139-140.

48 Order of General Court, October 24, 1676, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, p. 140.
Bartholomew Tippin commander of the troops. By May, 1677, Tippin had taken the fort and rebuilt it.

By this time Mugg and his warriors, accompanied by Simon, "The Yankee-Killer," and Andrew, leading some Pequots and Narragansetts, came and demanded that it be surrendered. This time Mugg did not take the fort by accident; a major battle was fought. The Indians laid siege to the garrison house for three days in the final attack on the fort. Mugg, the capable Indian leader of Maine who took up Philip's cause, died defending his own people.

During the early weeks of the second campaign, Major Waldron issued general warrants indiscriminately to all who applied to seize enemy Indians who had been involved in the attacks on the colony. This, like the promise of scalp bounties by Massachusetts, only served to infuriate the peaceful Indians, and confirm the suspicions of those Indians who believed the English were in

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49 Hight, "Mugg. . .," Proceedings (1895), VI, p. 260; Petition of Soldiers at Black Point to the General Court, January 8, 1677, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, pp. 148-149.


the process of destroying the Indians. The warrant gave people the perfect pretext to seize any Indian who might be suspected of wrong-doings in the colony.\textsuperscript{52}

The Indians had another success that fall. Cape Neddick was attacked and at least forty residents were slain or carried into captivity. Little else is known about this particular incident.\textsuperscript{53} This attack and others confirmed in the 'settlers' minds as they fled the frontier that it was not being defended by local forces and that Massachusetts would have to play a larger role in the defense of the Province. In January, 1677, three of Maine's leading citizens answered a request from the government in Boston concerning "how the ruins and desolations by the heathen may be solved."\textsuperscript{54} They suggested a large two-part expedition, with one group at Casco Bay and the other landing at Pemaquid and moving towards Damariscotta or Sheepscot. They believed that this two-pronged attack during the winter months would so

\textsuperscript{52}Williamson, History of Maine, p. 531; Hubbard, Narratives (1865), pp. 136-137.

\textsuperscript{53}Daniel Denison to the General Court, September 26, 1676, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, p. 124.

\textsuperscript{54}Silvannus Davis and Others to the Governor, January 8, 1677, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, p. 147.
surprise the Indians of Maine that a small tactical force could capture Madacawando at his Penobscot headquarters.55

They also suggested that Mohawks, traditional enemies of the Abnakis, be hired to aid the English cause in Maine for two reasons because that would "save much English Blood and cut off much of the expense which will otherwise rise unavoidably."56 The hiring of the Mohawks was viewed as a long-range pacification effort. It was believed by Davis and others in Maine that the Mohawks could be induced to leave New York and resettle on the Maine Coast and man garrison houses to protect the vital fishing industry. The cost, according to Silvannus Davis and his associates, would be less than continued large military expeditions and it would be a more efficient way of ending the threat of the Abnakis.57

Late in January the General Court started to implement the proposals. A force of two hundred men was

55 Silvannus Davis and Others to the Governor, January 8, 1677, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, pp. 147-148.
56 Ibid., p. 148.
57 Ibid.
ordered "raised, fitted & furnished with all expedition." Richard Waldron was given command of the operation. Waldron was empowered to impress sixty men from Dover, Portsmouth, and York counties along with ammunition, provisions, and vessels. Major Gookin was ordered to impress eighty Indians and twenty English from the regiments at Charlestown and Boston. They were to be ready to sail for Black Point on February 5, 1677. Major Clarke was ordered to have a regiment of thirty men ready with sufficient vessels and supplies to transport the Massachusetts contingent to the Maine battlefront. They were ordered to the Kennebec area to first rescue all the English captives. If this effort failed they were to

by all means in your power to disturb & destroy the enemy, unless you shall have such overtures from them & may give some competent assurance that an honorable & safe peace may be concluded with them.60


59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.
Waldron and his troops landed near Brunswick on February 18, 1677. During the first few hours there they encountered a group of Indians. A conference was held. Hubbard stated that the Indians were asked by Waldron why the Treaty which he had made with them was broken. Simon, "The Yankee-Killer," replied that it had been "Blind Will" who had instigated the renewal of the war, the issue being Waldron himself. He was to be killed in vengeance, apparently for his treachery in the affair at Dover with the refugee Indians. Waldron stated that his purpose this day was to recover the English captives. Simon said that all the captives were in good health and that Squando would bring them in. When Waldron heard this he called for Squando. Squando refused to come. He said that he would meet him half-way. The haughty old Major refused to set foot in the leaky canoe that the Indians provided for this proposed meeting. Waldron was so mad that he told the messenger that the Treaty was ended.

The next day, the Indians were seen off in the distance, and soon afterwards smoke was seen rising above

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61 Williamson, History of Maine, p. 545.


63 Hubbard, Narratives (1865), p. 214.
the trees. Some of Waldron's men under Captain Charles Forest were sent to investigate. They became involved in a skirmish, several of the Indians were killed, and a truce was called and another meeting held. Simon met Waldron's representative half-way. Simon said the house that burned was not their fault; he said the English scouts challenged them to a fight. As for the captives, Simon blamed the weather conditions for the delay in bringing in the prisoners, who he said would arrive on Wednesday the twentieth of February. 64

Waldron and his men set sail for the Kennebec on Thursday. At sunset they arrived at the lower end of Arrowsic Island. By Sunday the twenty-fifth of February they decided upon a place to set up a garrison. The site was at the lower end of Arrowsic Island, near a cover, so that ships could anchor without difficulty and supplies be brought in very conveniently. 65

On Monday, February 26, Waldron set sail with sixty men in two vessels for Penobscot Bay. The rest of the men remained on Arrowsic to build the garrison.

64 Hubbard, Narratives (1775), pp. 280-281.

65 Ibid., p. 282.
While they were sailing up the coast, several Indians in a canoe stopped them and told them that there were many Indians with English captives at Pemaquid. Waldron changed course and headed for Pemaquid. They arrived at 4 P. M. John Pain went ashore as Waldron's representative to survey the situation. He found several sachems and tribes represented among the Indians residing there. The entire morning of the twenty-seventh was spent in negotiations, after both sides had laid down their arms and submitted to a thorough search of their persons. The main obstacle to settling the disputes and ending the devastating war was Major Waldron's insistence that the Indians there supply him with men and canoes to assist him in an attack on the Androscoggin Indians. 66 The question of returning the captives was settled when Waldron agreed to pay twelve beaver skins and some liquor per captive for their return. The Indians produced only three captives, and Waldron promised to return in the afternoon with the pelts. When they returned, Waldron became suspicious and noticed the point of a lance protruding from some coverings. A "Free-for-all" fight broke out when Waldron

called the Indians on this. A young squaw grabbed a bundle of rifles and took off into the woods. Waldron swung his cap over his head, a gesture used to signal his soldiers still on board to come ashore. Major Frost captured Magunnaway, who, it was later learned, was from Connecticut, and placed him on board Waldron's ship. The old sachem Mattahando and at least nine Indians were shot or drowned as a result of this incident. Waldron captured at least four prisoners and recovered about a thousand pounds of booty. The intruder from Connecticut was shot on orders from Waldron.

According to Williamson, this incident "must have reminded the Indians of the mock-fight at Dover, and served to increase their prejudices." On February 28, Waldron and the others sailed for Arrowsic, where they killed two Indians caught plundering. They also picked up some more abandoned booty of the Indians and left forty troops under Captain Silvannus Davis to maintain the garrison house. The sister of Madockawando, who was


68 Silvannus Davis and Others to Governor Leverett, April 23, 1677, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, pp. 164-165.
captured in the Pemaquid Affair, was sent to Taconic Falls to arrange a prisoner exchange. 69

Soon after March 1, 1677, Waldron and his men sailed for Boston, arriving there on March 11, without suffering one fatality in this winter campaign. He also returned the body of Captain Lake to his family. By mid-April, 1677, Waldron had returned to Dover and reported on recent events. On April 11, Wells was attacked, and two men were killed. York was attacked on April 12, and seven people were killed. Simon, "The Yankee-Killer," attacked Kittery on April 13, 1677, a house was burned and two old people were captured. 70

On April 14 this series of attacks spread into New Hampshire, when two women were captured and a man killed near Portsmouth. On April 16 Greenland, New Hampshire, was attacked, several houses burned, and one man killed. Some of Waldron's men freed one of the women captured two days before. She said that only a few Indians were involved in these raids. 71 If this was the case, this


70 Richard Waldron to Massachusetts Bay Officials, April 18, 1677, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, pp. 162-164.  

71 Ibid., p. 163.
would tend to confirm what Williamson says, that, in many cases, it was primarily the young, whom the old sachems could not control, who continued their efforts to drive the English out of their tribal lands.  

Silvannus Davis reported to Boston on April 23, 1677, that Major Waldron had left him and his men without necessary supplies. In fact, stated Davis, the food supply situation was so bad that they had a hard time keeping the men fit for continued service. Davis thanked divine intervention for preventing the Indians from learning of their lack of materials and food. On May 3, 1677, the General Court ordered supplies sent to the garrison.

In June the General Court gave orders for another large expedition. This time the mission was to relieve the garrison at Black Point and destroy all unfriendly Indians in the area. They arrived at Black Point on

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72 Williamson, History of Maine, p. 546.

73 Silvannus Davis and Others, to Governor Leverett, April 23, 1677, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, pp. 164-165.

74 Order of the Commissioners, May 3, 1677, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, pp. 165-166.

75 Various orders and letters, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, pp. 171-175.
June 28, a company of thirty-six Indians and two hundred English. The commander of this operation was Captain Benjamin Swett, his aide was Lieutenant Richardson. On June 29, 1677, they led a large party out to assess the position of the Indians in the area. Many of the soldiers were young and inexperienced. They were ambushed. Swett was supposedly a brave and effective military commander, but he could not stop the slaughter of his unit. He successfully led the retreat back to the garrison, but he was killed at the gates of the fort. The unit suffered casualties of over sixty men, two-thirds of the unit that had started out that morning.

This victory was a devastating blow to both Massachusetts and to the individual settlers and fishermen on the Maine coast. During the month of July, twenty fishing vessels were captured along the Maine coast.

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77 Williamson, History of Maine, p. 550; Order to Major Gookin from Massachusetts General Court, June 15, 1677, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, p. 171.

78 William Hubbard, General History of New England From the Discovery to MDCLXXX (Cambridge: Hilliard & Metcalf, 1815), pp. 634-635.
coast. The Indians could not handle them and soon abandoned them, especially after some Salem merchants who owned several of the vessels sent a warship up to Maine to recover their lost ships.79

During the summer and fall little else is reported to have occurred directly between the settlers and the Maine Indians. The action at this point shifted to Boston and New York City, where the politics of the war began to overshadow the military events, especially after the disaster suffered at Black Point.

79 Hubbard, General History of New England From the Discovery to MDCLXXX, pp. 634-635.
CHAPTER IV

THE POLITICS OF THE WAR

Outside interest in Maine and its strategic coastline dates back to 1663 when the Earl of Clarendon, acting as agent for James Stuart, Duke of York, purchased from Henry, Earl of Sterling, his North American holdings, which included Martha's Vineyard, Nantucket, Long Island, and the part of Maine from the Kennebec River to the St. Croix River. The purchase price was 3,500 pounds. In 1664 the king confirmed his brother's title to the territory and included the former Dutch territories of New York, New Jersey, and Delaware in the Royal Charter he granted him.

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Little is known of the administration of the Maine holdings of the Duke during the ten-year period (1663-1673) in which the governor of New York acted as agent for the Duke. The settlers, like typical frontiersmen, did not appear to worry about the problem of a formal government. However, when the Dutch recaptured New York in 1673, Massachusetts Bay became involved and, in July, 1674, organized a local government for Pemaquid. When the English regained New York by the Peace of Westminister, the Duke of York regained his property and named Edmund Andros governor of his domain in North America.

New York became directly involved with the war in Maine, in September, 1676, when Governor Andros and his Council received a letter from Abraham Corbetts, telling of the destruction of much of Pemaquid by raiding Indians in August, 1676. Andros decided to send a sloop to Portsmouth, Salem, and Boston to bring the refugees from Pemaquid who were in these areas, to some other part of


the Duke's holdings and "supply them with land." This plan was not well received by the staunch anti-Stuart forces of Massachusetts. They viewed Andros' actions as an attempt to damage "his Majestie's intreste in those Parts," by which they most likely meant Massachusetts' interests. Andros, as a consequence of this rebuke to his plan, wrote the Privy Council in England that Massachusetts Bay Colony had made charges that citizens of New York were aiding Philip. He wanted Massachusetts to substantiate these charges and, if it could not, to be punished for making them. Andros added that he, as representative of the Duke of York for Pemaquid, had offered his services to Massachusetts to fight the war, that he had also attempted to control the Indians in the region and that he had prohibited the sale of powder to them in those areas. There is little evidence to substantiate his supposed concern for Pemaquid; but


equally vague is Massachusetts' claim that people from New York stirred Philip to war.\footnote{9}

The only known contact Philip had with New York came in the winter of 1675-1676, when he and some of his followers attempted to gain the support of the Mohawks. They proceeded to the Albany area, where they killed some of the Mohawks, hoping to blame the English for this incident. Their plan failed when one of those they left for dead survived and told the tribal officials what had occurred. Philip and his men were then expelled from the Mohawk lands—now without any hope of outside assistance.\footnote{10}

By June, 1677, the situation in Pemaquid was so critical, most of the population having deserted the region for the relief of the coastal region.\footnote{11}


Approximately a hundred men were sent in four well-supplied vessels. They built Fort Charles and a customs house to promote the fishing trade and to insure that the taxes levied for Pemaquid would be paid.  

The New York unit under the command of Lieutenant Anthony Brockles, Ensign Ceasar Knapton, and Mathias Nicolls then proceeded to make a peace agreement with some of the Indians in the area. They succeeded in having thirty-five captives and their possessions released. Thornton stated that Massachusetts was to be included in this treaty, but there is little evidence that Massachusetts was interested in a New York treaty negotiated on what was considered her territory.

Andros ordered the area around the well-garrisoned Fort Charles resettled. It had been completely depopulated of white settlers by the Indian raids of the preceding months. Governor Andros was determined that no further Indian troubles or raids were going to destroy the

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12 A Short Account of the General Concerns of New York, November 17, 1677, Brodhead, ed., Documents Relative, III, p. 256.

13 The identity of the Indians who made the peace settlement with the New York group is not known. There is no text of this agreement extant.

Duke's holdings on the Maine coast. All houses had to be built in groups of thirty or more, and individual forms were to be started. Clergy and schools were to be promoted. Trading was to be regulated by restricting it to the area of the fort. The settlers were to keep sufficient arms and ammunition for their protection.\footnote{15}

Despite other disagreements, the rulers of Massachusetts and New York agreed that intervention in the war in Maine would strengthen both of their positions. Silvannus Davis, in his report of January, 1677, suggested that Massachusetts import Mohawks to help the settlers put down the Abnaki disturbances in Maine. In May, 1677, Major John Pynchon went to Albany to negotiate with Governor Andros the sending of the Mohawks to Maine to protect the coastal fishing industry.\footnote{16} Agreement was reached between Andros and Pynchon, at least for temporary help. A small group of Mohawks were to come for a two-month period. Another group of warriors were to


follow for a period of equal length. Major Gendell, an aide of Major Waldron, was to insure that all the settlers and local officials knew that the Mohawks were coming in peace. To protect against misunderstandings, the Mohawks were to carry green bushes in the muzzles of their guns.

After the Mohawks arrived there were several incidents between them and the Indians of the region around Dover. At Major Waldron's headquarters, "Blind Will" and several other Indians were accidently killed by the Mohawks. The Mohawks did not make it a practice to check the loyalty of the New England Indians they came in contact with before they took action against them.17

The pacification program failed for two reasons: some of the settlers resented and disliked the "heathen" who were asked for help; and all the Indians, including the Pennacooks, who were allies of the English in northern New England, became alarmed with the introduction of their traditional enemies into this region. This was made more acute when "Blind Will" and his men were killed. William Hubbard, the most objective of the contemporary

17 Williamson, History of Maine, p. 548.
observers, believed that Indian allies of the English became convinced that the hiring of these mercenaries was the beginning of a general extermination of the Indian population of New England. 18

The other major concern during the war was the conflict over the ownership of southern Maine. This issue dates back to April, 1661, when the grandson of Sir Ferdinando Gorges asked that his inheritance, the Gorges Patent of 1639, be restored to him. Massachusetts Bay during the Interregnum had gained effective control over most of southern Maine, including the Gorges Patent. Now that the Restoration had occurred, Gorges, a royalist, expected swift relief from the new government. He did not get the immediate relief he expected. Therefore, in May, 1661, he appointed Francis Champernowne, Henry Josselyn, Robert Jordan, and Thomas Purchase as trustees of his holdings. These men then set up a government at Wells. 19 Massachusetts was notified by letter in December, 1661,


19 "Petition of Ferdinando Gorges to the King," April 4, 1661, Baxter Manuscripts, IV, pp. 143-144; "His Majesty's Commission for a Council for Foreign Plantations, December 1, 1664" Documents Relative, III, pp. 32-34.
of the developments in southern Maine.\textsuperscript{20} Massachusetts, in an attempt to keep her northern frontier secure, challenged this new government in May, 1662.\textsuperscript{21} So started a struggle that would last until King Philip's War with, as Moody stated, "two sets of counteracting officials" for the same region.\textsuperscript{22}

In 1673, when the Dutch retook New York, it became apparent to the English government that New England held the balance of power between the Dutch and English. The Earl of Sterling, Ferdinando Gorges, and the Mason heirs of New Hampshire devised a plan to destroy the overriding influence of Massachusetts in New England and reduce her to royal authority. Gorges and Mason would sell their Patents to the king and the king then could appoint a royal governor for Maine and New Hampshire.\textsuperscript{23} The ingenious Puritan politicians of Massachusetts Bay saw this plan as being potentially in their own benefit.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{20} The Commissioners of Sir Ferdinando Gorges to Massachusetts Bay Colony, December 24, 1661, \textit{MPCR}, I, pp. 195-198.
\bibitem{21} General Court to Major General Daniel Denison and Others, May 17, 1662, \textit{Baxter Manuscripts}, IV, pp. 173-174.
\bibitem{23} \textit{Ibid}.
\end{thebibliography}
They thought that they could convince Gorges to sell Maine to them. They did not think he could convince the king to buy a poor investment like Maine. 24

Resolution of this conflict over control of southern Maine began in 1676, during the war. Edward Randolph arrived in Boston as a Royal Commissioner to investigate the political situation and complaints from New England. 25 Massachusetts was not favorably disposed to Randolph, and Randolph's attitude toward Massachusetts was equally unfavorable. The result of his visit were several decisions that affected the future political history of New England: New Hampshire was given its own President and Council; the Mason claims to the land were upheld; 26 and Ferdinando Gorges' claim to his father's Patent was upheld.

Massachusetts, realizing that her claims were lost, used the war issue to her best advantage. She now demanded that Gorges reimburse her the 8,000 pounds spent in the defense of Maine. Gorges by this time


was becoming apprehensive about ever making a profit from his holdings. He was apparently also distressed by the aggressive attempt of Massachusetts to collect the war damages from him. On March 13, 1678, Gorges agreed to sell his holdings. He sold Maine to John Usher, a wealthy Massachusetts merchant for 1,650 pounds, who, in turn, deeded the province to Massachusetts.

While the political developments were causing great concern to Boston, the military situation in Maine was still a grave problem for the Magistrates. In June, 1677, the General Court attempted to enlist the aid of Plymouth and Connecticut in the prosecution of the war on the northern frontier. This also was a political act, since both colonies were bound by the Articles of Confederation of the United Colonies, which provided for mutual defense.

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However, on June 14 the Governor and Council of Connecticut replied that since "less than one hundred English, accompanied with two hundred Indians," would be sufficient to repulse the Indians of Maine, Governor Leete did not believe that it was necessary to send Connecticut troops and supplies to Maine, especially considering the great cost and heavy losses which they had just recently suffered in their own Colony. Plymouth, on similar ground, refused to send troops and materials on this ill-fated Black Point expedition of Benjamin Swett. The Black Point expedition was the last great battle of the war. The remaining months until April, 1678, were relatively calm. Massachusetts had now gained control of the political destiny of Maine. It was now necessary for Massachusetts to gain actual supremacy over the region.

In the spring of 1678, Massachusetts, in a major effort to consolidate her position, appointed Nicholas Shapleigh of Kittery, Francis Champernowne, one of Gorges' old Commissioners, and Captain Nathaniel Frye of

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30 Edward Rawson to Governor Leete, June 1, 1677, Shurtleff, ed., Records of Massachusetts Bay, V, p. 141.

Portsmouth to negotiate a peace treaty with the Maine Indians. The negotiations were held at Casco Bay, and on April 12, 1678, a treaty was signed. The provisions on both sides called for surrender of all prisoners without ransom. All who had left the Province could return at once and retake possession of their property. However, most important to the Indians, the settlers had to pay for their land by a quit-rent of a peck of corn a year per family. The payment in itself was small, but its significance was large when considered in view of the situation in southern New England. There was no need for a treaty. The Indians of that area were totally vanquished by the superior forces of the English. This treaty at Casco Bay was the first time the settlers had to concede an Indian victory on the battlefield. Grudgingly, the English had to admit that the Indians had a right to the land they were using, and as a result, the "quit-rent" was instituted to acknowledge this right. Thus the war in Maine ended on a spring morning at Casco Bay, almost three years after it had begun.32

32 Williamson, History of Maine, pp. 552-553.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

In view of the fact that the Maine colonists had not vanquished the natives on the battlefield, the Treaty of Casco (signed in the shadow of the defeat of the English at Black Point the previous year) was the most humiliating treaty that any New England government had to sign with the Indians of the region. The war in Maine had taken a different course from the war in southern New England. In the south, the colonies had marshalled their large population and materials for the war. The underpopulated, poor, and weak coastal towns of Maine could not, even with the support of Massachusetts and New York, hope to defend themselves and subdue the Indians of Maine, as the United Colonies had in defeating the Wampanoags and their allies.

The strategic significance of Maine had long been recognized. The struggle for control of Maine by
different English factions (Massachusetts, New York, and the Gorges family) was well into its second decade when the war began. The resolution of this conflict was most likely encouraged by the war; but the settlers were the people who paid the price for this situation in loss of life and property. This feuding caused poor government and produced an inability to cope with the Indian threat, which undoubtedly can be seen as one of the reasons for the high casualty rate for Maine in this war.¹

The inability of the southern New England colonies who were members of the United Colonies of New England to cooperate in helping to bring the war in Maine to an end marked a low point in inter-colonial cooperation. From this point on the concept of cooperation among the United Colonies became more of an empty form than a reality.

The major difference between the situation in Maine and southern New England at the close of the war was that the Indians of Maine were not defeated, although they were greatly weakened. Some of the natives moved to

¹MacFarlane, Indian Relations, p. 188.
Sillery, Quebec, where the French had earlier established a village for Indians from New England.\(^2\)

There is scattered evidence of individual French traders aiding the Indians, even though the official French policy was one of neutrality, based on the sincere belief that New France would benefit more from trade with New England than from open conflict. This war, however, helped lay the foundation for future direct French involvement, on the northern New England frontier, in the Great Imperial Conflict of the next hundred years between France and England.

The nominal "quit-rent" the settlers of Maine had to pay the Indians did not begin to repay the material and personal losses the members of the Abnaki Confederacy had suffered. The colonial records do not record the privations and hardships the Indians suffered before and during the war. Considering the dislocation, the Indian losses were severe. Mugg and other sachems were killed; crops were destroyed; and villages sacked. The two letters previously mentioned, from the Indians of Maine to the Massachusetts authorities relate the poor treatment

the Indians received from the settlers. Yet the signers of these letters wanted to live in peace. 3

The overall problem the English were unable to deal with was the simple fact the Indians were of a different culture. The Maine settlers and the Boston Magistrates, each for their own reasons, appeared to have not wanted to recognize this situation. As a result, the Indians resisted the encroachments of the English. The English had fanned the flames of war in such actions as: refusing to sell needed ammunition to the Maine Indians for hunting; issuing general orders to kill Indians on sight; being overly generous in bounty policies, and the issuance of indiscriminate warrants for the capture of Indians. None of these issues were mentioned by the English in the last peace treaty.

Slavery, one of the causes of the war in Maine, appeared to have lost its importance by the close of the war. This is in contrast to the policies of the other colonies, where individual soldiers were allowed to keep

3"Letters from Group of Indians to Governor Leverett," July 1, 1677, Baxter Manuscripts, VI, pp. 177-179.
Indians they captured as household slaves. It was also in contrast to the action of the Massachusetts authorities which ordered the selling of the Dover refugees into slavery in the West Indies after the defeat of Philip. Lauber does not indicate any enslavement of Indians after the settlement of the war in Maine.

The settlers of Maine suffered the greatest losses in the war of any region in New England. Casualties were estimated at 260 out of a population of 3,500 at the beginning of the conflict. These losses are in contrast to an estimated 800 to 1,000 deaths in the rest of New England out of a population of nearly 50,000. All of Maine east of Casco Bay was depopulated by 1677. West of Casco Bay only the major garrisons at such places as Black Point, Wells, and York had any significant number of inhabitants left when the war ended. Even the off-shore islands had not been free from the possibility of attack by Indians, once the Indians mastered the art of sailing the fishing vessels of the coastal settlers.

4 Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, p. 237.

5 Lauber, Indian Slavery in Colonial Times. ...
The war, although partly fought at the same time as the conflict in southern New England, was not the same war, even though some of the same people may have fought in both conflicts. This war had its own causes and consequences, separate and distinct from the war in which Philip was the chief protagonist. However, considering historical precedent, Philip's name must continue to be used to identify this conflict in Maine.
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