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THE EFFECT OF THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 TERROR ATTACKS ON POLICING
IN MAINE: THE OFFICERS POINT OF VIEW

by

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of the Requirements for a Degree with Honors
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ABSTRACT

There was a marked change in policing after the terror attacks on September 11, 2001. While much research has examined this change in other areas of the country, less is known about how 9/11 impacted policing in Maine. To fill this research gap, the present study examined police officers' perceptions of job change since the 9/11 terrorist attack. Data from semi-structured interviews with ten police officers were analyzed using focused content coding. The data analysis revealed three general themes that represent how police officers thought that their jobs had changed: (1) national security, (2) local policing, and (3) fusion centers. This paper concludes with recommendations for police and policymakers on the future of local policing.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

American Civil Liberties Union	ACLU
Defense Logistics Agency	DLA
Department of Defense	DOD
Department of Homeland Security	DHS
Federal Bureau of Investigation	FBI
Government Accountability Office	GAO
Law Enforcement Agency	LEA
Maine Information and Analysis Center	MIAC
Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle	MRAP
Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative	NSI
New York Police Department	NYPD
Suspicious Activity Reporting	SAR

INTRODUCTION

There was a scramble in the law enforcement community in the aftermath of the terror attacks on September 11, 2001. Security and law enforcement agencies were unsure how to best protect the American people from this new type of terrorism. In response to this lack of preparedness, policing institutions were forced to reassess their methods for protecting U.S. citizens (Davis, 2010). For example, counterterrorism units were developed and deployed in large cities. These units were issued machine guns and allocated armored vehicles, and they received military training. Some large cities also partnered with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to create terrorism taskforces dedicated to those cities (Davis, 2010).

Maine has no cities that are large enough to have experienced these changes; however, there are more subtle changes that are widespread throughout the country that are present in Maine. Intelligence-led policing has been one of these changes. Intelligence-led policing is the idea that police officers know the background and history of the person that they are interacting with before the officer encounters them (Gonzales, 2005). Another change has been the federal 1033 program, which provides decommissioned military equipment to local law enforcement agencies. The result of this program has increased allocations to police forces in the theory of better arming police officers against the threat of terrorism.

Another shift since 9/11 is that local police have become integral parts of the national security system (Schafer, 2009). They are responsible for investigating local tips reported by the public for terrorism credibility and passing on pertinent information to the FBI. Local police are also essential for protecting critical infrastructure (Schafer, 2009).

Given those established changes, this study seeks to understand to what extent local police in Maine think their job has changed since 9/11, and if the officers think they have any impact on national security. In the current research 10 police officers in Maine who were officers on 9/11 were interviewed to determine if and how they thought their jobs had changed. In the following section I summarize the extant literature on intelligence-led policing and the 1033 program.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Intelligence-Led Policing

Intelligence-led policing is one of the biggest changes since 9/11. Intelligence-led policing is the idea that the police officer responding to a call-for-service knows the record of the person involved and has more information in general before police arrive (Gonzales, 2005). This policing strategy also involves analyzing all the information that has been gathered by police through prior contact and given to police by the public and using this analysis to identify people who are more likely to become repeat offenders (LeCates, 2018). Because the officer has more information before interacting with the person, intelligence-led policing is said to be the best way to operate in the 21st century (Price, 2013).

One of the most integral parts of intelligence-led policing is the fusion center. Fusion centers are information databases that operate at the state level in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the FBI. Since 9/11, 78 fusion centers have been established across the United States (Price, 2013). Each fusion center has its own mission statement and operates by the rules set by the state or municipality that it operates under. Even with these differences, the basic function of each remains the same: collect, store, and disseminate information across and between the federal government and state and local law enforcement agencies (“National Network of Fusion Center Fact Sheet,” n.d.). Members of the law enforcement community argue fusion centers promote better preparedness among local law enforcement agencies (Price, 2013).

The fusion center in Maine is called the Maine Information and Analysis Center (MIAC) (“Maine Information and Analysis Center,” n.d.). MIAC was established in 2006 by an executive order from then-governor John Baldacci. The mission of MIAC is:

To collect, process, analyze, and appropriately share intelligence between the federal government and the State of Maine. This shall be accomplished through the combination of resources from principal agencies, and the establishment of relationships from all levels of government and the private sector (“Maine Information and Analysis Center,” n.d.).

There are some issues with the mission statement of MIAC. The mission statement does not define what “appropriately share” means, giving the officers who have access to the information a wide amount of leeway with a great deal of sensitive information (Mistler, 2020). The mission statement of MIAC also does not include the word ‘terrorism’ even though fusion centers were established to help prevent another terrorist attack (Davis, 2010).

MIAC is housed in and funded at the state level through the Maine State Police. MIAC works with agencies to protect critical infrastructure and prevent terrorism. Critical infrastructure includes assets essential for the functioning of society and economy, such as communications, energy, food and agriculture, government facilities, transportation, and nuclear materials (“Critical Infrastructure Sectors,” n.d.). MIAC also collects information that police officers use to combat the drug war, such as collecting car information of people who frequently travel between Maine and cities known to be sources of illegal drugs (Byrne, 2020).

MIAC collaborates with local law enforcement and the public to see threats that law enforcement would ordinarily miss. In 2010, DHS rolled out a new program called “If You See Something, Say Something” (“What is Suspicious Activity,” 2020). This program relies on the public to inform local law enforcement if they notice anything suspicious or out of the ordinary. The DHS attempts to make it clear that suspicious activity is not dependent on a person's religion, race, or ethnicity. Examples of suspicious activity include unattended backpacks or packages, or someone breaking into a restricted area (“What is Suspicious Activity,” 2020).

All of these tips are reported and investigated locally. The tips credible for criminal activity remain at the local level while the tips credible for terrorism are passed through MIAC to the FBI. MIAC keeps records of all the information that is reported to them and can give that information to the FBI or local law enforcement agencies as needed (“Maine Information and Analysis Center,” n.d.).

There has been a great deal of controversy surrounding MIAC. One issue is that the information that was being stored in MIAC was not secure. In June of 2020, the so-called “Blueleaks” hacks occurred exposing the personal information of thousands of citizens that the fusion center had information on. All of this information was put on the internet for anyone to find (Rhoda, 2020).

A second issue surrounding MIAC is the tactics that the center employed. A former trooper claimed that the fusion center was regularly breaking privacy laws and tracking people who were not breaking any laws. One alleged example was the fusion center keeping the personal information of people who were applying for gun licenses, creating a de facto registry of gun owners, and violating state law (Byrne, 2020).

A third ongoing complaint lodged against MIAC is that it is no longer focused on terrorism but instead works with police departments in investigating routine crimes, such as theft and drug crimes (Byrne, 2020). This activity is not in conflict with the mission statement of MIAC; however, there are people who believe the fusion center should be more focused on terrorism than on minor crimes (Mistler, 2015).

MIAC has exhibited a significant amount of “mission creep” or intentional expansion of responsibilities at the fusion center (McQuade, 2019). MIAC was created with the intention to focus on terrorism and prevent a terror attack in Maine. The mission of MIAC has unofficially expanded to combating drug trafficking and monitoring people participating in protests. MIAC officials have used these new duties to argue that they should have more money and resources (Byrne, 2020). These new activities are done outside of the law that established MIAC (McQuade, 2019).

One of the more recent incidents of criticism involved MIAC's tracking of protesters in the Black Lives Matter movement in the summer of 2020 and the tracking of protesters of the Central Maine Power Corridor. There were bulletins issued about the activities of these ‘left-wing’ protests, and police departments were told to be on the lookout for violent activities from these protesters (Byrne, 2020). MIAC was accused of racial bias because it did not track any people involved in right-wing protests that exhibited that potential for more serious crimes because of the weapons possessed by this group of protesters (Tipping, 2020). The spokesman for MIAC denied that the center had a racial bias when it analyzed information on protestors and emphasized that MIAC did not collect the information. MIAC only stored information given to it by other agencies (Tipping, 2020).

There has been a general criticism of fusion centers in that they keep more information about people of color and of religious minorities than they do for white people. Fusion center officials publicly make it clear that they protect the rights of minorities. Fusion center officials also claim that they receive more tips from the public through the “If you See Something, Say Something” program on people of color and religious minorities which explains the difference in the amount of information. The DHS makes it very clear that “Factors such as race, ethnicity, and/or religious affiliation are not suspicious. The public should report all suspicious behavior and situations (e.g., an unattended backpack or package, or someone breaking into a restricted area)” (“What is Suspicious Activity,” 2020). Despite this, people are more likely to report activity they deem to be suspicious when the person involved is of a religious or ethnic minority (Tipping, 2020). Nevertheless, racial complaints have been raised about MIAC numerous times and there are calls to investigate the agency on racial discrimination complaints (Mistler, 2020).

MIAC officials claim there would be less controversy surrounding their operations if the public understood how the fusion center works. MIAC does not collect any information on its own, nor does it conduct any investigations; all MIAC does is compile information that is given to it through reports from the FBI’s “If You See Something, Say Something” program and information that Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) collect (“Maine Information and Analysis Center,” n.d.). This information is analyzed and then kept on servers that are available for local police officers to search through when they pull someone over or are on a scene with a person who they deem suspicious. In addition to this, if MIAC gets a tip deemed to be “credible,” they will issue

a bulletin on this person that can be seen by all agencies with access to the system (“Maine Information and Analysis Center,” n.d.).

There have been many evaluations of fusion centers, their effectiveness, and options for where the nations go with fusion centers. The Congressional Research Service compiled a report for congress on the issues with fusion centers and the options that were available to congress for how to move forward. This report found that mission creep - going beyond terrorism and looking at more day-to-day crimes - is a problem for many fusion centers across the country. Fusion centers are no longer focused on terrorism and are now looking at more drug crimes and keeping track of people suspected of everyday crimes (Masse, 2007). The report also found that the initial proposal from DHS had more oversight intended for fusion centers including more strict requirements for information gathering. However, once fusion centers were up and running this oversight did not occur and fusion centers had more leeway than they were intended to (Masse, 2007).

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) also conducted an evaluation of fusion centers and found that there are many issues with fusion centers. The main issue that they found with fusion centers is that there are serious privacy issues with fusion centers because they have a combination of new technology and governmental powers that come with the war on terror. The analysis of the ACLU is that this results in unprecedented possibilities of infringements on civil rights (German, 2007). Another critique that the ACLU has is that fusion centers are not effective in preventing terrorism. The ACLU argues that fusion centers have been funded and implemented without the prerequisite research on if fusion centers are effective (German, 2007). The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations issued a

report on fusion centers and evaluated that the effectiveness of fusion centers is low compared to the amount of money that is put into them (Barnosky, 2015). A third criticism that the ACLU found is that because fusion centers cross state, local and federal lines, they have ambiguous lines of authority. This allows fusion centers to engage in a practice of ‘policy shopping’ or looking for the regulation that fusion center leaders want to follow and using that as their guide. They most often pick the regulation that allows for the most amount of leeway (German, 2007).

1033 Program

The 1033 program, also known as the Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO), was established in 1997 but increased its operations in 2002. The 1033 program is a part of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) under the Department of Defense (DOD) and is one of the main ways that local police and the military are intertwined (“1033 Program FAQs,” n.d.). The program was created in response to demands from local law enforcement that they needed more weapons to combat terrorism. The purpose of this program was to take decommissioned and surplus military equipment and transfer it to local police departments in need of equipment and supplies. This program has provided more than 8,000 LEAs with surplus and decommissioned military equipment since it started (“1033 Program FAQs,” n.d.). In 2019, \$293 million in property was transferred to law enforcement agencies (“Law Enforcement Support Office,” n.d.).

There are currently 8,200 LEAs that participate in the 1033 program (“1033 Program FAQs,” n.d.). In order for agencies within a state to participate, the governor must appoint a coordinator for the state. After states have joined the program, agencies in the state can see the online inventory of items available to request. All requests from

agencies go through this coordinator before they go to the DLA. Requests must include justification as to why the equipment is needed. Requests are approved by the state coordinator as well as LESO personnel (“1033 Program FAQs,” n.d.).

Once a request has been approved, the equipment is packaged and shipped to the local agency. LEAs do not pay for any of the equipment that they get from the 1033 program, but they do have to pay for shipping (“1033 Program FAQs,” n.d.). Once departments receive equipment, training is supposed to be set up for their officers on the proper use of the equipment and the situations in which it should be used; however, there is no accountability to ensure that this training occurs. This creates a problematic opening for officers to handle equipment without proper training or supervision (Musgrave, 2014).

The 1033 program has drawn three major criticisms in its history: (1) it is too easy for the police to get military equipment, (2) there is not enough oversight of the program, and (3) that police do not need this equipment. There have been many cases of departments receiving equipment that was disproportionate to the amount of people that they serve. For example, the Winthrop Harbor Police Department in Illinois, a town of 6,700 people, received 10 helicopters, a mine-resistant ambush protected vehicle (MRAP), two Humvees, and more than 6.5 million dollars in other equipment. Police in Johnston, Rhode Island, with a population less than 29,000, acquired two bomb disposal robots, 10 tactical trucks, 35 assault rifles, more than 100 infrared gun sights. A Los Angeles school district initially received three grenade launchers and more than 60 M-16s; however, they returned the grenade launchers after public outcry in the city

(Musgrave, 2014). All these distributions highlight the issues with the 1033 program and the lack of accountability within the allocation process.

In order to show how easy it is for LEAs to get equipment and test the oversight of the 1033 program, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) formed a fake LEA. This fake LEA applied for and were sent 1.2 million dollars in military gear including rifles and pipe bomb equipment. No one at the DLA did any research into this department. A simple Google search would have shown that this was a fake department (Hager, 2017). To add to this, some of this information only came to light because of a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act. The DOD and LEAs did not want the general public to know how over-armed they are or about the mistakes that were made when handing out equipment (Musgrave, 2014).

Furthermore, there is no evidence that having more military equipment makes that community safer. A 2020 meta-analysis by Gunderson and colleagues (2020) found that there was no relationship between how much equipment a police department received from the Federal Government and the crime rate in the area that the department patrolled (2020). This suggests that police departments do not need the equipment that they have received from the federal government and could mean that the 1033 program should be terminated as it is ineffective at lowering the crime rate (Gunderson Et. Al, 2020).

The 1033 program is not the only way in which military equipment is transferred to police departments. Certain pieces of equipment that LEAs cannot get from the 1033 program can be obtained through different types of property transfers or grants. Included in this are military uniforms, body armor, Kevlar helmets, and any vehicle or plane that has weaponry attached to it (i.e. tanks, armed drones, or fighting vehicles) (“1033

Program FAQs,” n.d.). These transferal programs are less transparent than the 1033 program, so it is unknown how much or to where the equipment has been transferred.

Police departments in the state of Maine have received more than 13 million dollars in equipment from the 1033 program since it was started. 79 police departments received rifles. 7 police departments - Caribou Police Department, Cumberland County Sheriff Department, Knox County Sheriff Department, Lewiston Police Department, Old Orchard Beach Police Department, Sanford Police Department, and Scarborough Police Department - received explosive ordnance disposal robots. Portland Police Department and Cumberland County Sheriff department both received armored trucks, and Cumberland County Sheriff Department and Sanford Police Department received mine resistant vehicles. Wells police department also received two boats to perform water patrols (Musgrave, 2014). Given all of the equipment that departments in Maine received, it is important to understand what impact the officers using the equipment believe that it has - which is what the current study seeks to do. Two-thirds of the departments from the officers that I interviewed received equipment. One department only received rifles and the other three departments received larger pieces of equipment.

Policing Studies

In the year following 9/11, the New York Police Department (NYPD) saw the most drastic changes to their overall policing structure. Bornstein used both qualitative and quantitative methods to examine the changes that NYPD officers experienced (2005). On 9/11 officers who normally ran background checks, drove prisoner busses, or taught at the academy were instead on the streets helping people and protecting the landmarks in New York City. The NYPD also changed from eight hour shifts to 12 hour shifts in order

to provide a greater show of force in the city. There was also a large display of high-powered machine guns across the city in an attempt to deter any further attacks (Bornstein, 2005).

Broader quantitative studies have been done on the impact of 9/11 on policing in the rest of the country. One example of this is "Measuring Homeland Security Innovation in Small Municipal Agencies" by Schafer and colleagues. This study looked at rural policing in Illinois and relied on data collected as a part of the Illinois Homeland Security Survey (2009). This study found that even though officials in rural departments rated perceived threats of terror to be low, the majority of departments have been taking steps to ensure that they are prepared for a terror attack. Some of these preparations have included assigning liaisons to other agencies, training staff on terrorism preparedness, and participating in terrorism-related field training exercises (Schafer, 2009).

The Council of State Governments also conducted a study to determine the impact of terrorism on the functions of state police (Foster, 2005). They collected survey data from the chiefs' state and local police departments on their operational responsibilities, the federal agencies that they interact with, and employment patterns. The study found that more state police organizations (75%) thought that terrorism prevention was a part of their operational responsibility than local agencies (60%) (Foster, 2005). Even with these studies, there has never been a qualitative study that investigated individual officers' opinions on their role in policing terrorism, national security, and other changes that may have occurred since 9/11.

CURRENT STUDY

This study seeks to fill the gap in the literature surrounding the effect of 9/11 and national security policing on law enforcement in Maine. There has never been a study done that focuses on policing in Maine. There has also never been a qualitative study done in this area which could lead to new insights at the individual level. This study seeks to fill this gap in the research by conducting semi-structured interviews with 10 police officers in Maine.

METHODS

Participants

Table 1 Participants

Name	Age	Education	Rank	Gender	Region of Maine
Sam	49	Doctorate	Captain	Male	Southern Maine
Jake	50	Bachelors	Detective	Male	Southern Maine
Brian	43	Associates	Patrol Officer	Male	Southern Maine
Nate	54	Bachelors	Deputy Sheriff	Male	Southern Maine
Conner	51	Doctorate	Chief	Male	Eastern Maine
Ryan	62	Bachelors	Deputy Chief	Male	Southern Maine
Sally	52	Bachelors	Detective	Female	Southern Maine
Mike	50	Masters	Chief	Male	Southern Maine
Peter	58	High School	Trooper	Male	Central Maine
Tony	42	Bachelors	Lieutenant	Male	Southern Maine

There were two inclusion criteria that all participants had to meet. All participants must have been employed in Maine as a police officer before September 11, 2001 and be currently employed as police officers in Maine. It was important that officers meet this second criteria so they could experience the full range of changes that the policing profession has experienced. The researcher contacted every police and sheriff's department in Maine, as well as the Maine State Police, to recruit participants. Contact information was found on publicly available police department websites. An email was sent explaining the study and asking if there were any officers in the department who met the criteria and were willing to volunteer. Some department chiefs declined to participate

on behalf of their officers because of department policies, while others passed on information. Participants then contacted the researcher, and an interview was scheduled. The ten participants came from six different police departments.

There are limitations to a small-N qualitative study. The main limitation is that the findings generated from a small sample size cannot be generalized to a larger population (Mahoney, 2000). This limitation applies to this study because of the small number of participants and these results should not be extrapolated to other states or other police officers within Maine.

The specific aim in this study was to examine how these officers in Maine thought their jobs had changed since 9/11, as well as to understand the impact that these officers thought 9/11 had on policing in Maine. One advantage to a small-n study is that all interviews were heavily scrutinized, and the researcher was able to carefully examine each interview transcript.

Interviews

The author conducted semi-structured interviews with the participants. Semi-structured interviews start with a set of initial questions but allow deviation to go more in depth when warranted (Regin, 2019). Seven interviews were conducted over Zoom or Skype, one was conducted over the phone, and two were conducted over email. Conducting any interviews face-to-face was impossible due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The one phone interview was conducted because the participant was unable to figure out either Zoom or Skype. The two email interviews were conducted due to the availability of the participants and the researcher.

Zoom, phone, and email interviews all have their advantages and disadvantages. Because of the more limited ability to press participants over email, a preference was given to phone and zoom interviews. In addition to this, neither phone nor email interviews allow the researcher to watch the participants when they are answering questions and pick up on subtleties such as body language and facial expressions. Email interviews also do not allow the researcher to pick up on intonation of the voice, which allows more insight into the thoughts and feelings of the participants (Archibald, 2019). There is some evidence that phone interviews make the participant feel more comfortable because the interviewer cannot see them, and they feel less judged (Block, 2012).

On average interviews took 25 minutes, with the longest interview lasting 50 minutes and the shortest lasting 20. The length of the interviews was on average rather short; however, all the questions were very focused and valuable information was gained. It would have been ideal for the interviews to last longer; however, many participants gave short, direct answers and were not willing to elaborate when pressed. Even though the interview time was short there were still many different views that were expressed, and valuable information was learned.

Audio from the interviews was recorded and transcribed by the researcher. A set of initial questions was used with every participant, including demographic information (i.e., age, race, gender, rank, and marital status) and questions such as: What was being an officer like before 9/11? Where were you on 9/11? Were there any immediate changes to your job after 9/11? All the questions were focused on the topic of 9/11 and changes that have taken place since that event. There was a mix of open-ended questions and yes

or no questions. Participants were asked to elaborate on yes or no questions. Clarifying questions were asked based on the answers of the participants.

Analysis

Transcripts were read three times in order to determine what the officers' thought was important in each interview and to obtain analytical ideas. This was done through focused content coding. Focused content coding is a method for interpreting data where the interview transcripts are read in depth several times and a code - a word or phrase that captures what the participant was talking about - is assigned to each sentence (Saldana, 2008). In this study all the interviews were fully coded. These codes were then grouped into categories based on similarities. The most prevalent categories became the themes for this paper.

In this study there was only one coder. Because of the inexperience of the coder, the first three coded interviews were reviewed by an experienced researcher to ensure that the process was being done properly. After this, all interviews were coded by one coder. Reliability in qualitative research can be achieved by scrutinizing themes and features in the data multiple times, and by constantly shifting between the data and literature (Silverman, 2009). This was done throughout the coding process. In addition to this, the findings were compared with extant literature throughout the coding process to ensure reliability.

RESULTS

Each participant was asked to reflect on how their jobs changed after 9/11. While each participants' experience was unique, the data analysis revealed three themes present across the interviews: (1) the extent to which local and state officers were involved in policing national security; (2) the changing of the function of local police; and (3) the emphasis placed on intelligence collection and fusion centers.

National Security

After 9/11 many people in the federal government became obsessed with ensuring that an attack on that scale never happened again. DHS was created in an effort to achieve this goal and many people within the FBI were resigned to work on countering terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11. This extended to the state and local level, and programs were created to facilitate the passage of information between different levels of policing.

Participants had different views on the significance of national security in their day-to-day jobs. Some officers were convinced that they were helping with national security, while others were adamant that the national law enforcement agencies did not want them involved. The majority of the participants were somewhere in the middle.

Peter, an officer in the commercial traffic enforcement department, believed his unit played a significant role in protecting national security. Peter has worked in law enforcement since 1990 and has worked with the same department for his entire career, though he has had different positions within the department. When talking about national security, Peter stated:

... I don't think that the type of heightened threat comes into play every day, we don't see that as much, but it is still in the back of your mind like what is going on. You're always keyed into it. Is this truck hauling something or is this driver doing something they shouldn't do - is something wrong? So, it is there, but the country has kind of relaxed from that aspect of the terrorist attack thing. Until you come across a driver that is on the terrorist watch list, or maybe on the watchlist - then that heightened sense of security comes back (October 1, 2020).

Peter stated that he had come across a driver on the terrorist watch list a few times and that he had followed procedure by reporting it, but never knew what came of his actions. He was upset by this lack of follow-up from the Federal Government. Peter was the only officer that I interviewed who unequivocally thought that their job was now more oriented towards national security. This might be because of the unique position that this officer held: commercial traffic enforcement. Peter spends his days inspecting trucks and making sure that truckers in the state are following all the laws. Because of this, this officer interacts with many drivers daily. This officer stated that national security was in the back of his mind until he encountered a driver on the terrorist watch list, which was established as a result of 9/11.

Three officers felt that their jobs had some levels of national security involvement but not to the extent that Peter did. Ryan, who had been promoted several times since 9/11, from a patrol officer in Southern Maine to the deputy chief of a different department in the same area, felt that he was only more aware of it because of his change in position:

No, [we do not focus more on national security] except that in the position that I am in now I see the big picture a little bit more and I see how maybe something seemingly maybe inconsequential in a small municipal department may actually be a part of something bigger and contribute to some national security issue (September 30, 2020).

Ryan described being more aware of the bigger picture and acknowledged how events that occur in his town could relate to larger events and could threaten national security. For example, how some of the 9/11 hijackers passed through the Portland jetport. A detective in Ryan's department, Jake, had a slightly different view. He said:

I don't know if I would say that we have more of a focus on [national security] but we are certainly more aware of it. I'll use an example. Every year... we have an event called the Christmas prelude. It is probably the biggest event that we prepare for, in the year. Six, eight, ten thousand people come in for this Christmas-time event. [After 9/11] we are more aware about large gatherings, a lot more goes into the planning of it. We think you know we are in this small downtown area, ...what if there was, you know somebody came down the middle of the street with a truck and started mowing people over. How do we react to that, how do we plan for that? ...We are more aware. Everyone learned to be more aware from 9/11. (September 9, 2020).

Jake identified soft targets (places that are not protected by the military, relatively easy to get to, and create fear for everyday citizens that they could also become targets) as something that they think about more since 9/11 as well as being more aware that there could be a threat against civilians. The twin towers were hit because the destruction of them was designed to make Americans scared in their everyday lives. He also discussed terrorism preparedness for soft targets and crowded places, something that was unimaginable before that day.

Unlike Peter, Ryan, and Jake above, the next two officers thought that their jobs had nothing to do with national security. When asked if he thought that he was more involved with national security Mike, a chief of a Southern Maine department responded with simply "No. not at all" (this interview was done over email and the officer did not

respond when asked to clarify in a follow-up), while Nate, Deputy Sheriff from a Southern Maine county stated:

No. The federal government made it abundantly clear that local police departments were not to deal with national security. That was for federal law enforcement agencies to deal with. Local law enforcement agencies were not smart enough to deal with national security and there was a concerted effort to make sure that we were not involved, except in increasing security at strategically sensitive areas. That attitude continues to this day (September 16, 2020).

The statement that these officers gave are completely false. The FBI and DHS rely on local police departments to give them tips on what is going on in their areas and countering violent extremism. It is possible that both Nate and Mike have had negative experiences with the federal government and that is why they have these opinions.

Overall, there was no consensus from the officers that I spoke to about whether or not their jobs were more oriented towards national security. One officer said that they definitely thought more about national security and actively participated in the process, two said that it did not at all, and the other seven fell somewhere in between.

Local police changing

Since 9/11, there have been large changes to local policing in large cities such as New York City and Los Angeles. In policing atmospheres such as this, there have been task forces with the FBI established, officers deployed to prominent places with high-powered weapons, and specialized counter terrorism units. There have not been changes to this extent in less populated areas; however, it is possible that there have been other changes in these less populated areas that are more subtle.

There was not a unanimous opinion from this study about if and how local policing had changed since 9/11. Some officers saw changes in their day-to-day work,

others felt that there were only changes in certain situations, and other officers said they saw no changes at all.

Sam, a captain from a Southern Maine department, who has worked in law enforcement since 1998, cited many changes that he had experienced:

We are recording more. We are trying to connect the dots more often. And I think that as opposed to just going to a call, taking a complaint about something, and writing a report, it is interconnected. ... We connect the data to other agencies. So, prior to going to a call, I am learning about what prior calls we have been on with this person, what have other towns responded to this person. We have a lot more data available to us as to the person that we are responding to (September 3, 2020).

This is one of the few examples of an officer who thought that 9/11 had changed the way that their job looked on a daily basis. Sam gave an example of intelligence-led policing, the concept that police officers responding to calls for service know the history of interactions that this person has had with the police. This new technique has changed the ways that police operate on a day-to-day basis.

Ryan, a deputy chief from a different Southern Maine department had a slightly different belief. When talking about how his job has changed since 9/11, he stated:

I don't know that it has changed appreciably except with more of an emphasis on situational awareness, being more alert to things that are around you. Such as things like infrastructure, you know, people paying undue attention to things that are potential, would be potential terror targets, things like that. As far as the day-to-day job goes, I don't think that it has changed a great deal at all. At least here in a municipal police department. (September 30, 2020).

This was one of the most popular opinions stated: that the day-to-day job had not changed at all, but the greater goals of policing had morphed into stopping terrorism and monitoring potential targets.

I had expected this to break down along lines of rank, with officers in leadership positions (such as chiefs and deputy chiefs) thinking that their jobs had changed and were more oriented towards national security because these officers are in charge of looking at the big picture. I also expected that patrol officers and other officers on the streets from day to day would think that there was not a great deal of change. This expectation was true in some cases; however, not in all like that of Mike, a chief from southern Maine who stated:

I'm sure that for agencies with large populations ... 9/11 had a necessary effect. Intelligence gathering in order to keep communities safe and stop threats took on a new urgency. For the vast majority of American police departments, 9/11 had little to no effect on our policing (October 19, 2020).

Mike drew direct comparisons between small-town and local policing and the type of policing that takes place in large cities. However, he also states that he did not see any change in the type of policing that his department does.

Overall, there was no consensus that local policing was impacted by 9/11. There was a wide variety of opinions on whether local policing had changed or not. Two officers felt that their jobs were different on a day-to-day basis, while four others felt that the use of technology had changed the way that they interacted with the public. Four other officers expressed that there were changes, but that they were minor and did not actively affect their day-to-day jobs.

Fusion Centers

Fusion centers are information databases that operate at the state level, in conjunction with DHS and the FBI. Each fusion center collects, keeps and disseminates information between federal, state, local, and county law enforcement agencies. The

fusion center in Maine is called the Maine Information and Analysis Center (MIAC). MIAC was established in 2006.

One finding that was consistent between the majority of the participants was that there was a new emphasis on intelligence collecting and information sharing. One officer from a Southern Maine police department was able to give this new emphasis a name; “I think we are more into intelligence-based policing and I think that is where the shift in policing has really occurred. I wouldn’t call it terrorism based so much as intelligence-based.” Intelligence-based policing (also known as intelligence-led policing) is the idea that the police officers responding to calls for service know the record of the person involved and have more information before they arrive. This has been one of the biggest changes in policing that has come out of 9/11 (Gonzales, 2005). Two officers that were interviewed directly named intelligence-based policing and three others talked about it indirectly.

One of the officers who talked indirectly about intelligence-based policing was Jake, an officer from another department in Southern Maine. He said:

I would say the biggest change has been information gathering and sharing. Before you know a lot of people were kind of territorial over information that they had. So, let’s say that Maine State police were working on a case involving a guy that might be a threat or have terrorist ties or something like that, they would do their investigation and gather information, but they wouldn't necessarily share that with anybody. They were possessive of the information - we developed this information we are running with it and there is no need to share it. Since 9/11 one of the biggest changes, probably the biggest change, is the Fusion center (September 9, 2020).

When asked to give an example of personal use of a fusion center, this officer stated:

So, let's say, like last summer we had some concerns about a guy that was in [place redacted] in [town redacted], he had some Middle Eastern ties and had created a scene over there. Well, we wanted to know is this guy just exercising his first amendment rights or this something that we should be really concerned about. Probably the first call would be to the fusion center to share that information, to get any information that they might have on the guy. So, it's a lot more sharing a lot better working relationships between agencies (September 9, 2020).

This officer essentially described how the process of using a fusion center in a real-life policing situation. Fusion centers have greatly expanded the information that police have access to while they are working. This allows police to be better prepared.

When Conner, a chief from a department in Eastern Maine, was asked if his job had changed since 9/11, he said:

I would say no. There was larger talk about interoperability and communication. That seemed to be the first change that came out. There was not a great system in place for that before ... Not as much [change] as I think we should have had. I think we have improved with the move, sort of going towards digital. and, but I don't know that we have done a great job, not inter-agency, but um ... different disciplines - such as public works - and agencies that are not normal emergency response entities. I don't know that we have done a great job bringing them into the fold so that we have better communications with those groups as well during a large-scale event (September 18, 2020).

This officer saw some changes in communication but felt that there was still room for improvement. In a different part of his interview, this officer also talked about the role that fusion centers play and the communication improvements that had occurred between his department and the intelligence sectors of the federal government. He also talked about the FBI's 'see something, say something' program and the reliance that police have on the general public for tips and information about suspicious people.

Peter, an officer who worked in a commercial traffic enforcement department was able to point to a concrete example of how the communication in his job had changed since 9/11:

The FBI started the joint terrorism task force with Homeland Security, and they created a database of everybody driving a commercial vehicle within the US and there were certain people who could get licensing for certain things - like they were screening any drivers who were taking any like hazardous shipment any kind of dangerous things (October 1, 2020).

All officers involved in commercial vehicle enforcement have access to this database and can consult it whenever they find a suspicious driver. Like fusion centers, this is a development in the goal of achieving national security.

The majority of the participants agreed that communication had changed greatly since 9/11, particularly with the federal government and the establishment of MIAC, Maine's fusion center. The establishment of fusion centers has been one of the biggest national changes since 9/11.

DISCUSSION

The FBI does not keep an official public list of domestic terrorist organizations, so it is impossible to know how many terrorist organizations are active in Maine (Bjelopera, 2017). There are lists compiled and made available by private entities. The Southern Poverty Law Center has published a list of anti-government movements in Maine. These include: The American Patriots Three Percent, a statewide organization. The Constitution Party, Maine Militia, Maine Volunteer Responders, Three Percenters, and We Are Change are all localized to specific towns or countries (“Anti Government Movements,” n.d.). These groups are all active in the state and have the potential to pose a threat to the public and the government (“Anti Government Movements,” n.d.).

The FBI has labeled “lone-wolf” attacks, (also known as leaderless jihad) or a person being radicalized and deciding to commit terrorism on their own, as a higher-level threat than attacks directed by a terrorist organization (Jenkins, 2011). This is because directed attacks are easier to detect as they are often accompanied by communications that can be monitored. There were a few years in the early 2010’s where the FBI was concerned that the rising population of Somali immigrants in Portland and Lewiston could have radicalized members and pose a risk for a domestic terrorist attack. After multiple investigations and years of monitoring activities, the FBI determined that there was little risk for radicalization among the Somali communities in Lewiston and Portland (Fisher, 2014). Based on this, it is likely that a terrorist attack in Maine would either come from a White Supremacist or from a person who does not live in the state (Fisher, 2014; Jenkins, 2011).

Key Findings

The results from this study can be broken down into three categories: national security, local police changing, and fusion centers. One notable finding is the lack of consensus among participants regarding two themes: national security and local police changing.

National Security

First, there was no agreement between the officers on whether 9/11 led to increased attention to national security. The officers who stated they thought that the federal government told local police that they should not be involved with national security matters were factually incorrect. There have been some federal programs that have attempted to engage local police in the national security process, including the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI), also known as the “If You See Something, Say Something” program. This program invites local law enforcement to investigate tips reported by the public for credibility of terrorism. If there is a possibility of terrorism, the tip should be passed along to the FBI; however, the FBI cannot investigate all possible terrorists across the United States, so they rely on local law enforcement to investigate initial reports. This brings local law enforcement into the terrorism sphere (“What is Suspicious Activity,” 2020).

There has also been an emphasis by the federal government on critical infrastructure protection at the local level (such as communications, energy, food and agriculture, government facilities, transportation, and nuclear materials) (“Critical Infrastructure Sectors,” n.d.). Local police are also instrumental in this goal as there is a great deal of critical infrastructure to protect and federal law enforcement cannot be

everywhere at once. Local police have become the front line in protecting their local critical infrastructure and their local community from terrorism. Some of the officers interviewed claimed that they were not involved with national security (Davis, 2010).

The lack of consensus on national security among the officers that I interviewed was interesting. Four officers were able to cite specific programs and ways that they were involved in preventing terrorism. This finding suggests that some local police are aware that federal law enforcement need their help. However, two officers were adamant that the federal government did not want their help with terrorism prevention. It is possible that these officers have had a negative encounter with attempting to help federal law enforcement and have been put off by this experience. It is also possible that these officers were simply unaware of the programs that they were supposed to be participating in; however, this is unlikely as one of the officers was a deputy police chief.

This lack of consensus could mean a few things. It is possible that officers are not connecting some of their daily tasks that act as terrorism prevention to national security policing. Simple activities such as patrolling areas with critical infrastructure may not seem like terrorism prevention to an officer. It could also mean that police officers do not know why they are doing what they have been told to do and are simply following orders, like the example of patrolling critical infrastructure.

Local Police Changing

In addition to national security, there was also a lack of consensus about if and how local policing in general had changed. There were no patterns based on rank, department, town or country population size, or region of Maine that could be identified as to who thought their job had changed. Peter, a trooper, and Conner, a police chief, both

said that they felt their jobs had more to do with national security. Mike, a police chief, and Sally, a detective, both said that they thought that their jobs had nothing to do with national security.

This difference in job perception is important because the role of police should be clearly defined and understood by all officers. It is estimated that police officers only spend about 5-15% of their time on crime fighting activities (Robinson, 2018). The rest of the time is spent on administrative tasks, responding to non-emergent calls for service, and providing general public service. Very little time is spent responding to emergencies. Terror prevention and critical infrastructure monitoring usually fall into the category of patrol or when responding to non-emergent calls for service. It is possible that these officers have been told to patrol certain areas but have not been told why or what to look for (Aradau, 2020).

Two officers talked about making connections between departments and more collaboration taking place with other parts of the government. These changes have been documented. There is more interoperability between departments and more communication in general (Kwon, 2009). There are databases that police officers have access to at all points in time that contain information on a person's past run-ins with law enforcement. Officers use this information when they are responding to non-emergent calls for service ("National Network of Fusion Center Fact Sheet," n.d.).

It is unclear why some officers were so adamant that there had been no change in their jobs. After the first few interviews, I thought that the change in local policing might be related to rank. Meaning that police chiefs and other officers higher up in the chain of command would have seen more change because they think about the bigger picture

more often and patrol officers would have seen a minimal difference because they are more focused on day-to-day activities and the minutiae of policing. This was not the case as there was no correlation between any demographic and the perception of local police changing.

Fusion Centers

The only finding that was generally consistent between the majority of the participants was the communication differences between pre-9/11 policing and post-9/11 policing. The one communication innovation that 7 out of the 10 participants talked about was the creation of fusion centers. All the officers that mentioned fusion centers stated that they are advantageous to law enforcement. Three officers stated that they had made a report to MIAC and two stated that they had been given information about a suspicious person from MIAC.

MIAC is an information hub that receives, analyzes, and shares information. All police officers in the state have access to the information. Information is typically submitted to MIAC through email by officers. Anytime that an officer submits information to MIAC it is analyzed with all the information that MIAC already has. MIAC also analyzes the information for terrorism credibility and if there is anything actionable it is passed to the FBI or the DHS. MIAC is not an investigative agency, they only provide support and analysis to officers (“Maine Information and Analysis Center,” n.d.).

Communication, and MIAC in particular, being the only common change that all the officers spoke about, is a noteworthy finding because fusion centers are one of the most highly scrutinized innovations in policing since 9/11. There has been a great deal of

controversy surrounding MIAC, including having personal data hacked and leaked, mission creep, and accusations of civil rights violations. The “Blueleaks” hack exposed the personal information of thousands of people that MIAC had records on (Rhoda, 2020).

In addition to this, MIAC has expanded past its original conception of fighting terror and into the area of the drug war and monitoring protestors who pose no threat to national security (Byrne, 2020). MIAC has also been accused of being racist because they collected information on people involved with Black Lives Matter protests and not people involved in right wing extremist groups, as well as holding more information on people who are part of ethnic and racial minorities in general. (Tipping, 2020). MIAC officials claim that they only have more information on minorities because they receive more reports about people who are part of minorities through the FBI’s “If You See Something, Say Something” program (Byrne, 2020).

Recommendations

One recommendation that has come out of this research is clearly defining the role of local police officers in Maine. The officers that I interviewed have vastly different interpretations of the jobs that they should be doing. Some thought that their job was strictly local and had no effect on national security. Other officers understood the role that the federal government was asking them to fill. Police officers should have a role that is clearly defined and includes terrorism prevention and critical infrastructure protection.

Another recommendation is the reform of MIAC. Police officers have repeatedly stated that MIAC is an important law enforcement tool. They claim that it has helped them to keep track of would-be terrorists and disrupt possible terror attacks. However,

there have also been many issues with MIAC. There was a successful hack that resulted in thousands of people's personal information being exposed (Byrne, 2020). In addition to this MIAC has exhibited extensive mission creep that has resulted in civil rights violations (German, 2007). There have been many people who have called for the abolishment of MIAC because of these reasons, including the Maine State Legislature. There is currently a bill pending that would defund MIAC because of the results of the Senate report on fusion centers that found they are not effective and because of the civil rights violations uncovered by the ACLU (German, 2007; Barnosky, 2015).

Because of this dichotomy, the mission of MIAC should be more clearly defined and limited. The Maine State Legislature should pass legislation limiting the scope of MIAC to strictly terrorism - the original intent of the organization. The legislation should also focus on ensuring the civil rights of the people of Maine. However, the bill currently in the legislature goes too far. MIAC does serve a purpose in the terrorism sphere and if it were contained to this purpose would be a valuable asset.

Limitations and Future Research

One limitation of this study was the small number of participants. The response rate was much lower than anticipated. Many officers did not want to participate due to the political climate during which the study took place. In addition to this, 11 departments declined to participate altogether because of department policies. The goal of a minimum of 15 interviews was set at the beginning of the study. This goal was not reached and only 10 interviews were conducted.

A second limitation was the demographics of the police officers that were interviewed. All the officers were White and nine out ten officers were male. It is unclear

to what extent the demographics of the officers influenced their view of policing in Maine, but to better understand how policing has changed, a set of officers with a wider set of demographic characteristics should be interviewed. Maine does not collect demographic data about police officers in the state, so it is unclear how skewed this sample is from the population. Maine as a whole is 94.4% White so the sample demographics are similar to the state as a whole (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019).

In addition to this, there was a lack of geographic diversity among the participants. The majority of the officers interviewed were from the southern region of the state. There was a significant shortage in all other areas. This is significant because the Lewiston area has a high population of Somali immigrants and the officers in this area may have vastly different opinions than the officers that were interviewed. There was also a lack of officers from areas near the border with Canada. These officers may feel that they have more of an impact on national security because of their geographic location and the border security actions that they may or may not take.

A third limitation is that the officers interviewed only focused on the impact of Salafism (or Islamic extremism). The officers did not discuss terrorism from White Supremacists or any other form of terrorism when talking about their collaborations with the federal government. Some officers mentioned incidents of terror attacks by White Supremacists, such as the Columbine shooting; however, this was only in passing and as an explanation for the evolution of weapons that local police carry.

It is possible that the framing of the questions caused this narrow definition of terrorism to be used, as most of the questions were centered around the 9/11 terrorist attacks. If a replication study were to be conducted, there should be broader questions

that allow officers an opportunity to speak about the threat of terrorism from any groups including white supremacy groups.

More studies with higher sample sizes and similar methods could be done to better understand what officers think the impact of 9/11 has been for law enforcement in the state. Studies with more participants would be able to assess a broader range of opinions and get a more in depth understanding of policing in the state. This method could also be expanded nationally to understand the differences in regional local policing. A study of this nature would be valuable because policing is highly localized.

Future research would benefit from a less politically charged time. Hopefully, this would result in more officers talking to a researcher the officers might be more candid with their responses. In addition to this a larger sample would be very valuable, ensuring that there would be officers from the Lewiston area. It would be interesting to hear what these officers' thoughts are on these topics because the Lewiston area has a high population of Somali immigrants. It would also be beneficial to conduct some participant observation to see how local police officers in Maine actually use fusion centers and how many actions they take to protect the national security of the country. In addition to this, interviews with people who participate in the NSI process at all levels would be valuable. This would include the officers who investigate the reports, the people who work in fusion centers, and FBI agents who investigate the reports that are determined to be credible for terrorism.

CONCLUSION

There has never been a study that focuses on how police in Maine think their jobs have changed since 9/11. Overall, there was a lack of consensus among the officers that I interviewed on their experiences as local police officers before and after 9/11. There was no agreement on if local policing had changed or if national security now makes up a larger part of local policing. The only aspect of policing that the majority of police that I interviewed agreed on was that there was more emphasis placed on communication between local police departments and national security agencies since 9/11 and that fusion centers aided in this. This study was relatively small, and the results cannot be generalized to the rest of police officers in Maine or the rest of the country. More studies would have to be done in order to understand this phenomenon on a broader scale.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: LIST OF INITIAL QUESTIONS

Demographics-related questions

Name, rank, department

Rank and department on 9/11

Year became an officer

Age

Salary

Education history

Marital status

Gender/Sex

Questions pertaining to 9/11

What was being an officer like before 9/11

Where were you on 9/11

Were there any immediate changes to your job after 9/11

Have these changes been permanent

Do you feel like your job is now more oriented towards national security

Have these changes affected the way that you interact with the public

How has your job changed since 9/11?

Questions if the officer's department has received equipment from the defense department

What equipment did your department receive

Do you think that this equipment has had an impact on the way that you do your job

What is this equipment used for

How has having this equipment impacted the community

How do you feel about having this type of equipment? Has it enhanced your effectiveness as a police officer?

Concluding questions

After having these experiences, what advice would you give to someone who has just become a police officer?

Is there something that you might not have thought about before that occurred to you during this interview?

Is there something else you think I should know to understand the effect of 9/11 on policing?

Is there anything you would like to ask me?

Is there anyone you think I should speak to?

APPENDIX B: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL LETTER

APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS

Protection of Human Subjects Review Board, 400 Corbett Hall

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Andrew King EMAIL: andrew.king2@maine.edu FACULTY SPONSOR: Karyn Sporer EMAIL: karyn.sporer@maine.edu (Required if PI is a student): TITLE OF PROJECT: Police Officers' View of the Militarization of Police in Maine START DATE: August 1, 2020 PI DEPARTMENT: Sociology STATUS OF PI: FACULTY/STAFF/GRADUATE/UNDERGRADUATE U (F,S,G,U) If PI is a student, is this research to be performed: ✓ for an honors thesis/senior thesis/capstone?

Submitting the application indicates the principal investigator's agreement to abide by the responsibilities outlined in Section I.E. of the Policies and Procedures for the Protection of Human Subjects.

Faculty Sponsors are responsible for oversight of research conducted by their students. The Faculty Sponsor ensures that he/she has read the application and that the conduct of such research will be in accordance with the University of Maine's Policies and Procedures for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research. REMINDER: if the principal investigator is an undergraduate student, the Faculty Sponsor MUST submit the application to the IRB.

Email this cover page and complete application to UMRIC@maine.edu

*****FOR IRB USE ONLY Application # 2020-07-08 Review (F/E): E Expedited

Category: I.I.3.g ACTION TAKEN:

Judged Exempt; category Modifications required? Accepted (date)

Approved as submitted. Date of next review: by Degree of Risk:

Approved pending modifications. Date of next review:

byn/a Degree of Risk: minimal Modifications accepted

(date): 7/27/2020

Not approved (see attached statement)

Judged not research with human subjects

FINAL APPROVAL TO BEGIN 7/27/2020

AUTHOR'S BIOGRAPHY

Andrew King was born in Columbus, Ohio on September 21, 1999. He was raised in Torrington, Connecticut and South Hadley, Massachusetts. He graduated from South Hadley High School in 2017. Andrew double majored in political science and sociology, with a concentration in crime, law, and justice. Throughout his time at the University of Maine, Andrew enjoyed playing trombone in the pep band and the concert band. Andrew is also an EMT and an officer in the University Volunteer Ambulance Corps.

Upon graduation, Andrew will spend time volunteering in AmeriCorps with the National Civilian Community Corps.