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THE ONE-EYED MAN AND THE WICKED BOAR

by

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A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for a Degree with Honors
(International Affairs)

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines territorial authoritarian threats to the Western world through an examination of historical and contemporary case studies. The historical examples used in this thesis are from Eastern Europe, since it had many chances to engage in international law with the authoritarian state, leading its people to understand the nature of one of the oldest authoritarian states: Russia. The four case studies used are: 1) Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918), 2) Soviet Invasion of Poland (1939-1940), 3) Soviet Occupation of Baltic states (1939-1945), and 4) Russian Annexation of Crimea (2014). Meanwhile, the thesis presents a table of predictions to theorize on the success/outcomes of territorial invasions from the expansionist authoritarian state while using past observations as reliable references. However, the core question of the thesis is to examine whether military aid serves as the best deterrence against authoritarian invasion, or potential attacks. Lastly, while using existing academic literature and primary resources, this work also notes how the authoritarian regime uses international law and the community's trust to advance its own agenda while creating a veneer of a trustworthy democratic partner.

DEDICATIONS

To my Mother and Father, for love, patience, and all the support you have been giving me over the years, so I could be where I am today.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The expansion of the European Union, shared liberal democratic norms of governance, and remarkable cooperation on the continent have led to optimistic assessments of the efficacy of international law and shared values and norms. More pessimism is warranted. The 2014 invasion and annexation of Ukraine's peninsula by Russia showed that territorial revanchism was alive and should be considered as a big threat to both East and West of Europe.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia moved to rebrand itself as a democracy, and in the 1990s did begin to build institutions that resembled a democracy. With this change of image, Russia began to join international organizations such as the WTO, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and, surprisingly, even the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), in addition to the trappings of international law and the normative language of Europe and the West. However, by the time of the 2014 events in Europe, Russia had proved itself to be a competitive authoritarian regime rather than a democracy. However, the country still surprisingly maintained its membership in international organizations and outwardly participated in the institutions of international law even though many of their actions were abrogations of legal commitments. At the same time, Russia's neighbors continued to use the framework of international law in their diplomatic and security relations with the country, even as Russia often abandoned these same principles. This contrast motivates this thesis: why

many sovereign governments continue to pursue international legal commitments while others simply use these agreements to advance their own narrow agenda.

As this thesis will demonstrate, there are many historic signs and expectations that should have warned the European West and its allies in America not to credit post-Soviet Russia as an overly trustworthy partner or consider treating it as an equally democratic state. However, because some scholars assumed that Russia moved away from its long authoritarian or totalitarian past after the end of the Cold War,¹ today there exists a naivete that Western European countries and their allies still hold when it comes to the rebranded Soviet Russia.

In many ways, Russia's actions follow a standard realist playbook. However, as realist scholar Mearsheimer once pointed out, "intentions can change quickly, so a state's intentions can be benign one day and hostile the next."² It appears, nonetheless, that some of the European and American scholars and leaders are following a liberal playbook and assuming the opposite as if one's neighbor is going to act the same way or will have similar values like oneself. As Mearsheimer argued, "the great powers... are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final goal."³ From this perspective, the liberal embrace of international law is a far departure from the mechanisms of the real world.

Consequently, although some international leaders may believe that the mission to spread democracy and its values has been largely successful,⁴ and there is no need to

¹ Mikael Baaz. *International law is different in different places: Russian interpretations and outlooks*. (International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2016) p.272.

² John J. Mearsheimer. *The tragedy of Great Power politics*. (New York: Norton, 2001) p.31.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Liz Ford. *Obama: 'The World Has Never Been Healthier, Wealthier or Less Violent'*. (The Guardian, 2017).

worry about territorial sovereignty or rather a territorial claim anymore (at least when compared to the 20th century), such a perspective is a mistake. Although the Western European countries have majorly succeeded in achieving democracy and trying to sustain their values and encouraging other states to follow a similar set of values through economic and other cooperation, these assumptions are neither pragmatic nor realistic. The recent annexation of Eastern European territories has shown the unstable relation between the Western European leaders and Russia. Additionally, the potential threat of Russian intervention into the domestic politics of Western European countries is attached to treating the idea of the authoritarian-Russian danger as a myth. Moreover, supposing that Eastern Europe will effectively work as the primary buffer against Russian authoritarianism and intervention, where its seizure will end Russia's strive for territorial expansion, is also a misguided conclusion.

In this thesis, I argue that the threat of Russia's authoritarian objective to invade European territories and its resources is as real as it was in the 20th century. Furthermore, although it might seem that authoritarian Russia has rebranded its name and regime to become closer and seem more trustworthy to its European neighbors, in actuality, Russia has not forgotten its broader goals of territorial expansion and regional dominance.

The thesis primarily focuses on one authoritarian actor - today known as the Russian Federation - which was previously known for various invasions and dispossessions of European resources under the name of the Soviet Union, and even before that, the pre-Soviet Russia or the All-Russian Imperia. However, one should recognize that although it might seem at first that there are two different regimes - Soviet Russia and the current Russian Federation - the change in its appearance is minimally

meaningful to the policy, as the change was in name only. This particular authoritarian actor has not reformed its methods, leaving its strategy, tools, and ways of using fundamental values of international relations to the advantage of its goals of territorial expansion, with the same set of policies, tools, and rhetoric used throughout the 20th century. In this thesis, I argue that the authoritarian regime's apparent reliance on international law and the community's dedication to honoring foreign relations actually entails an attempt to undermine the international order and, thus, endangers its future existence.

Although there is not a concrete and formally agreed definition that would perfectly represent what is meant by international order, the closest concise and apprehensive definition describes it as:

a pattern of activity between and among states that sustains the basic goals of the society of states, which include: (1) preservation of the system and society of states itself, (2) maintaining the independence or external sovereignty of individual states, (3) preserving peace, in terms of the absence of war, (4) general goals of social life (limitation of violence, keeping a promise, stability of possession).⁵

Hedley Bull argues that the main goal of the international community is to preserve individual, sovereign states while also monitoring any external threats to the social structure of stability of each individual state, which would essentially help out with avoiding unnecessary wars, bringing peace and stability to social life (to citizens, civilians, etc.). The core existence and continuity of life of the international order at this scale depend on how efficiently Bull's points are followed and if the international community is willing to do everything possible to achieve peace as a result. However, it

⁵ Hedley Bull. *The Concept of Order in World Politics. In: The Anarchical Society.* (London: Palgrave, 1977) p.16-18.

is impossible not to witness how almost every one of the four key points is rejected, omitted, or constantly violated through the 20th and 21st centuries in Europe by the Russian authoritarian actor. The evidence presented in this thesis will suggest that the international order, and thus peace, is indeed under a huge threat from the hidden (and not-so-hidden) acts of the rebranded authoritarian state.

To test my argument, I use a case study approach that allows me to explore variation across key variables. As will be described in depth in Chapter III, Russia consistently uses similar international law and discourse tactics in territorial disputes. However, the efficacy of these tactics differs depending on the target-state and the strength of their international treaties, specifically their military support. These variables arose inductively from observation of the events of the 2014 annexation of Crimea in Ukraine. In that case, the biggest issues came from the insufficient military resources of Ukraine and the lack of military assistance from its European and Western allies, who provided only humanitarian aid. From this case, I was driven to see if this pattern was more general. Given different configurations of state strength and outside military aid, how would the efficacy of attempted incursions by an outside state differ?

As a result, the creation of Table 1 started with the conception of certain necessary variables, as well as their definitions. At first, there are *strong states*, which are constituted by a coherent vertical line of governmental power, with a balance between society and government in place. In other words, as Max Weber puts it, “a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory...[where] the dominated must obey the authority

claimed by the powers that be.”⁶ Following this definition from Weber, strong states have clear hierarchies, where those on the top are able to plan policies and have them implemented by those below them. However, one should not confuse it with coercive power or regime, since I rather intended for the strong regime variable to represent a mixture of a Traditional type of authority, which is “resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under rule,”⁷ and the Rational legal authority, “resting on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of that elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands”⁸ where the population sees such political order as legal, bringing in concepts like natural law, normative order, and legal codes together. The mixture of these two, where one type can prevail over the other, has the potential to show a relatively strong connection between the government and its people, making the chances of fighting back successfully higher and deserving the name of a strong state.

On the contrary, the *Weak state* is then somewhat of a state that lacks this cohesion between the two parties to such an extent that in the time of an attack, especially when we look at the authoritarian attacks, we see bluntness and non-cohesion between the government, even within different bureaucratic groups, and for most - there is no distinct cooperation between the citizens and the government; which leads to a higher chance of confusion and thus - invasion. Meanwhile, the *Diplomatic Treaties & Military Agreements* variable signifies the state’s interrelation with international law, agreements, and diplomacy, topped with its engagement in military agreements as well. On the other

⁶ Max Weber. *Politics As a Vocation*. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965).

⁷ Max Weber. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology* (CA: University of California Press, 1978) p.215.

⁸ Ibid.

hand, the variable *Only Diplomatic Treaties* only pertains to the state having good or even strong international relations through treaties and signed agreements, yet these do not presuppose any of the military assistance in case of an attack or invasion on the state.

Table 1.

Territorial Disputes And International Law	<i>Strong State</i>	<i>Weak State</i>
<i>Diplomatic Treaties & Military Agreements</i>	<p>Prediction I</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Potential attempts to invade the state could be made but should not be effective due to domestic and foreign military resources - Successful annexation = improbable 	<p>Prediction II</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Possibility of territorial invasion due to weak governmental structure and instability - Successful annexation = however, due to foreign military aid, a chance remains to remove invaders
<i>Diplomatic Treaties with no guarantee of military assistance</i>	<p>Prediction III</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stable and cohesive government but no military help from the outside - Possible occupation of territories but constant attempts to change the status of being “invaded.” - Successful annexation = possible, but even if successful, it is not maintained for extremely long 	<p>Prediction IV</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unstable government and no cohesion between its plans and actions - No military support from others (weak weaponry resources on the domestic side) - Successful annexation = evident and possible to last a while

Table 1 serves as a guideline to four predictions connected to the interrelation between the different variables, which predict four different outcomes. Prediction I has a strong state with robust diplomacy and military agreements, deterring any serious occupation from the authoritarian actor. Meanwhile, Prediction II is when a weak state has chances to be invaded by the authoritarian actor but also can extort them because of its military agreements with other more powerful international state members. Prediction III represents a scenario where there is a strong state but with no military aid from more powerful allies, which marks the annexation more possible but decreases chances of it being maintained for a very long period of time. Lastly, Prediction IV is when a state is weak and lacks military aid from its stronger allies or partners, making the efficacy of authoritarian strategies successful and the most long-lasting out of the other four predictions.

Table 2 shows the events explored in depth in Chapter III, which includes case studies on Eastern Europe-Russia relations. This chapter contains four specific historical examples from Eastern Europe to test the hypothesis and see if historical outcomes support or oppose the predictions made in Table 1. Since Russia is located at the border of Eastern Europe, the case study is primarily concentrated on the Eastern European territories, due to their close engagement with Russia's foreign politics and its territorial invasions, specifically in the 20th-21st centuries. These cases were carefully selected to highlight variation on the explanatory variables: state strength and the level of foreign support. In building these case studies, I relied on secondary sources as well as primary sources like official documents, newspapers, interviews, memoirs, and documents produced by government agencies to present a better understanding of the historical

events and their outcomes. Therefore, the combination of the two gave me the mobility to see if the predictions made in Table 1 held up to the real events.

Table 2.

Territorial Disputes And International Law	<i>Strong State</i>	<i>Weak State</i>
<i>Diplomatic Treaties & Military Agreements</i>	Prediction I Case: Soviet Invasion of Poland (1939-1940)	Prediction II Case: Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918)
<i>Only Diplomatic Treaties</i>	Prediction III Case: Soviet Occupation of Baltic states (1939-1945)	Prediction IV Case: Russian Annexation of Crimea (2014)

As I address in conclusion, the dynamics revealed in the case studies are more broadly applicable to other cases beyond the Eastern Europe-Russia case. Thus, the question of this thesis lies within the issues of international law and relations, examining whether military agreements can be more effective in deterring authoritarian aggression from partaking in a territorial claim. As a result, to fully comprehend the reality and urgency of the authoritarian threat to international law, I also consult various international theories, such as liberalism and realism, to see if they have a potential answer to the question of how to deal with authoritarian actors and their aggressive plans for territorial expansion. It is then necessary to look at data of compliance versus non-compliance to understand why Russia has been engaging in international law, and if, as suspected, why Russia mostly tends to pretend its involvement with the international community and its rules, what are the motives? Chapter II: Theory And Commitment Vs. Non-Commitment introduces theoretical perspectives and academic findings from

international relations before diving into the details produced in the body of Chapter III: Eastern European Case-Studies.

And so, the story of “The One Eyed-Man And The Wicked Boar” begins, where the One-Eyed Man represents the Western world and its international order. The Wicked Boar - inspired by George Orwell’s work - is one of the oldest existing authoritarian states: post-Soviet Russia or the Russian Federation. While reading this thesis and seeing how history has evolved, one can uncover the story of how the One-Eyed Man lost his left eye and why he is not trying to get it back. We will also uncover why it is an extremely bad idea to ignore the existence of a Wicked Boar living near one’s land, especially when he is making plans to get Man’s right eye, claiming it belongs to him.

CHAPTER II

THEORY AND COMMITMENT VS. NON-COMMITMENT

To further explore the dynamics of authoritarianism and non-compliance in international law, as well as how to succeed in deterring such actors from trying to occupy and invade territories, I first turn to two key theories of international relations - realism and liberalism - and then introduce a third alternative. Although there are countless academic and scholarly works dedicated to examining the essences of both theories, exploring the core of these broad paradigms is not the intent of this paper. I rather take a more narrow approach and consult with them to see the overall position of each on territorial integrity and military takeovers.

According to the theory of realism, specifically classical realism, one of the reasons why states might want to engage in military operations is “because the desire for more power is rooted in the flawed nature of humanity, states are continuously engaged in a struggle to increase their capabilities.”⁹ Therefore, when Thucydides was writing in the fifth century BCE in ancient Greece, he essentially established the three points of classical political realism: (1) states (or city-states) are the key units of action; (2) they seek power, either as an end in itself or as a means to other ends; and (3) they behave in ways that are, by and large, rational, and therefore comprehensible to outsiders in rational terms.¹⁰ Moreover, while transcribing the events of the Peloponnesian War, many argue that the philosopher also was observing political and cultural differences among city-

⁹ Paul Williams and Matt McDonald. *Security Studies: An Introduction* (Routledge, 2018) p.19.

¹⁰ Johnson Bagby and M. Laurie. *The Use and Abuse of Thucydides in International Relations* (The MIT Press, 1994) p. 132.

states before and during the war, as it was a significant piece to understanding why Athenians and Spartans acted and behaved in one or another way.¹¹

Meanwhile, the liberalism theory illustrates a more hopeful prospect for the future of globalized cooperation and unity because it believes that many states want to cooperate, have a mutual pursuit for freedom, and want to share benefits, and such characteristics and economic benefits will eventually circumvent states from engaging in a war.¹² Nonetheless, let us turn to the constructivist theory, an alternative theory that should be considered when talking about Russian authoritarianism.

As a result, constructivists believe that it is essential to “[outline] the central concern in... the relationship between security and identity,” as well as state’s identity (and related historical and cultural experiences, when trying to determine the content of its interests and thus the way this particular state will “act” in global politics.¹³

Additionally, the theory of constructivism also purports that “contestation between different actors elaborating different visions of ‘our’ values and how ‘we’ should act,”¹⁴ which, as we will see, plays a vital role when trying to explain why authoritarian actors should not be approached with the same (democratic or pro-democratic values) scheme as the majority of the international community is used to show and receive from its closest (usually democratic) partners.

Effectively, as the world has adopted at least the language of democratic virtues and values, there has been a conception of everyone unanimously agreeing to the terms and thus tacitly agreeing to honor them. In other words, as the liberal theory argues,

¹¹ (Bagby and Laurie, p.133).

¹² Immanuel Kant. *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795).

¹³ Ted Hopf. *The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory* (The MIT Press, 1998).

¹⁴ (Williams and McDonald, p.54).

“liberal states tend to trust other liberal states and to expect to resolve conflict through discussion and compromise.”¹⁵ Of course, it should not be a surprise since it proceeds with logical aftermath. However, as I state in the introduction, even though Russia may have rebranded itself and given its legal institutions the veneer of democracy, such changes should not be accepted too quickly as a sign of strategic or normative change within the state. Instead, there is a need to use a more contemporary approach of the neorealist school, where observing how the state acts at both domestic and international levels leads to knowing if the regime has been fully replaced. I argue in this thesis that the Russian Federation never shed its authoritarian skin and has continued its authoritarian mission of military invasion and occupation since its times of controlling and dominating the captured nations in the USSR. Moreover, if my hypothesis is correct, the potential dangers certainly exist if liberal states “eschew the use of force in relation to other democracies”¹⁶ and continue to avoid acknowledging the true nature and goals of a rebranded authoritarian actor.

Consequently, because liberal states tend to associate the international commitments with their alliances, the action gets embedded in the state’s domestic law and institutions, which, when combined with the general respect for legal commitments, enhances the ability of leaders in liberal democracies to engage in international law and relations successfully.¹⁷ However, the described association might be shaken if an unacknowledged authoritarian actor uses the system while not planning to obey the international rules and follow the unwritten moral codex of international order, therefore,

¹⁵ (Williams and McDonald, p.41).

¹⁶ Michael W. Doyle. *Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2* (Wiley, 1983) p. 323-353.

¹⁷ (Williams. and McDonald, p. 273-274).

using the method of international reciprocity, yet not participating in it or pretending to do so, essentially implementing its authoritarian agenda successfully.

Section 1 On Compliance v. Non-Compliance

A core question in this section of the thesis is when states (even authoritarian ones) do comply with their international legal commitments and when they do not. If compliance was perfect, then concern over territorial integrity would be greatly curtailed, and Russia's neighbors would not need to worry. Treaties, in short, would hold. However, such is not the case.

It is not a secret to anyone that various states and actors “instead of simply ‘complying’ with international legal rules may bargain in light of them, and around them.”¹⁸ Therefore, realist scholars argue that international compliance is often seen as a central problem for international legal scholarship, where the law is presented as a “real law” only when it is accompanied by authoritative interpretation and enforcement; in other words, a law which does not envision punishment - is a weak law, if a law at all.¹⁹ However, the followers of realism do not even give a contrary thought a second chance since they believe that “international law does not really matter, because the ultimate causes of state behavior are to be found in self-interest in the face of an anarchic and insecure world, not legal obligation.”²⁰

Meanwhile, the liberal theorists perceive commitment and international law to be fruitful and still effective enough to bring peace and stability to the international

¹⁸ Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel. *Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International Law Really Matters* (Global Policy, 2010) p.127.

¹⁹ (Howse and Teitel, p.128).

²⁰ (Howse and Teitel, p.129).

community and order, especially when one looks at various examples of peace agreements or disarmament treaties, where “international legal norms... have reciprocity as their fundamental normative and/or functional premise.”²¹ Nevertheless, although in theory, such premise should have been credible and stable, as the events of Peace of Riga or a Soviet-Polish peace, as well as the Budapest Memorandum signed by various states in 1994, had an opposite outcome to the initial liberal predictions, since the “reciprocity as their fundamental normative and/or functional premise” has failed when engaged with an authoritarian actor. Moreover, when pre or post-1990s Russia does engage in international law and seems to be a loyal partner to the mission of international order, it does so to late justify its actions in universalist terms, meaning to explain why one or the other action of the authoritarian state, which usually would be deemed inexcusable by the international community, is overlooked in the name of some justifying rhetoric.²² Though, it is important to note that unlike in more democratic countries where the audience of rhetorical justification would primarily be their own citizens to build support for going against the country’s established international agreements, a different story plays out with the Russian society and its authoritarian mentality. Russian people support its government’s actions of territorial expansion and abrogation of international conditions within agreements.²³ Rather, the primary audience of Russia’s rhetoric is the international community and its leaders, who ask for evidence but do not require such to have factual and solid grounds. Furthermore, it is surprising to see so much credibility

²¹ Ibid.

²² (Howse and Teitel, p.134).

²³ Volodymyr Gorbulin. *Crimea. War: Preconditions of Russian Aggression*. (National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, 2016).

and belief given to the Russian explanations when it comes to territorial claim since historical evidence and data suggest the opposite:

(i) the country's historically unique, on-and-off, and periodically **antagonistic relationship with Europe and, more broadly, the West**; (ii) Russia's **historically established tendency to authoritarian rule**; (iii) **its relative weakness regarding the rule of law within [its own] country**; and (iv) the **desire to maintain the territorial integrity of Russia as the world's largest territorial state**.²⁴

A discussion of compliance and non-compliance in international trade treaties illustrates an example of how to approach questions of international law when working with an authoritarian regime concerning territorial integrity. These studies on compliance have yielded some insights into the mechanisms or devices, including monitoring, verification, third party guarantees, self-help/retaliation – that are all available to address the concerns in regard to compliance. Because there is little trust between the parties and no trust in the complete effectiveness of the international law, there is an extensive need in having a third party to facilitate compliance. In the case of territorial integrity, the third party is the presence of committed military aid from a foreign partner.²⁵ That being said, because international law “can provide useful communication and coordination mechanisms where states seek to cooperate on the basis of mutual or reciprocal self-interest... it cannot compel obedience against interests,”²⁶ where military aid from the third party, serving as a supporting element to avoid major disobedience in following the terms of an agreement between the two parties, makes a great counterargument. One of such examples, which shall be depicted in more detail in Chapter III, is the foreign aid

²⁴ (Baaz, p.265)

²⁵ (Howse and Teitel, p.129).

²⁶ Ibid.

provided by the Weimar Republic or German Reich in 1918 to the Ukrainian National Republic, to effectively confront and remove Russian troops from its territories.

Given the overall skepticism of authoritarian regimes complying with international law presented thus far, it is necessary to ask why sovereign governments make international legal commitments in the first place and whether they have any effects on state behavior.²⁷ One of the simpler explanations is the reputational concerns that make different states to disclose patterns of compliance. Thus, liberal scholars have been arguing that “legal commitment has an extremely positive effect on governments that have recently removed restrictive policies, which indicates a desire to reestablish a reputation for compliance.”²⁸ However, one should see the danger in applying such logic to the authoritarian regime or any other regime that does not have deep intentions to reestablish its values considering the regime or domestic/foreign policies. Only because “liberal democracies are likely to commit to rules...and to comply with them”, where the “norms are set and reputations are assessed among groups of roughly comparable countries,”²⁹ it does not mean the more-restrictive and unpredictable neighbors will do the same. To put it differently, those regimes based on clear principles of the rule of law (like American and European democracies) are far more likely to comply with their commitments, since “they provide a stable framework of law and system of property rights domestically are more likely to do the same for international economic transactions,” as well as other international agreements.³⁰ Therefore, with such

²⁷ Beth A. Simmons. *International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs* (The American Political Science Review, 2000) p. 819.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ (Simmons, p.832).

³⁰ Ibid.

intentional and abiding implementation, these “rule-of-law governments” have a lot to lose from non-compliance with an international legal obligation, which is hard to say the same with those “more capricious regime[s].”³¹

Consequently, one should ask if the Western world has been hard on those states who have vigorously and continuously been engaging in the reputational costs of renegeing, and held accountable for their state’s behavior?³² Or have the European democracies and its close partners been too lenient or a bit too “forgiving” with some of the aggression shown by the neighboring authoritarian state? The case studies presented in Chapter III will examine these questions in detail.

Section 2 International Law Means Different Things In Different Cases: Outlook On Russian Behavioral Patterns

As described above, and as it will be seen throughout the case studies, the “civilizational”³³ values in Russia differ from the liberal democratic norms and values. Despite Russian attempts to be “liberalized’ since the end of the Cold War, the country is increasingly seen as an autocracy, in which freedom of press, non-governmental organizations and academia have all been restricted in recent years.”³⁴ Furthermore, although some would want to imply that there is positive progress with the recent showing of academic freedom in modern Russia, when compared to the USSR, it does not automatically imply that international law scholars will be more liberal than the

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ (Baaz, p.265, 268).

³⁴ (Baaz, p.268).

government,³⁵ and does not deny cooperation between them either. As a result, there are Russian scholars who are critical of the classical liberal notion of the constitutionalization of international law and the Kantian idea that the future of international law might be a “global government.”³⁶ Therefore, the Russian approach to international law tends to be rather theoretical and philosophical when interpreting it.³⁷

From another perspective, one of the fundamental characteristics of the Russian understanding of international society over the past century is a strong belief in state sovereignty as the fundamental principle in international law.³⁸ Russia does not share the idea of “popular sovereignty,”³⁹ which in particular relates to a US constitutional idea. It is rather only “the Russian Federation (i.e., the state), and not the people of the Federation, that can be the bearer of sovereignty—regardless of whether Russia is a democracy or autocracy,” making its sovereignty absolute, indivisible and unlimited.⁴⁰ Russia thus keeps “international law itself at a safe distance from Russia’s domestic law,” a stance also reflected in the country's position on international human rights law, *jus ad bellum*, international criminal law, and especially when it comes to the issues of the disputed territories.⁴¹ As Allison explains in his work, “Russia comes across as a pluralist rather than solidarist country, perceiving a thinner set of common values than the West,”⁴² whereas Mälksoo explains the Russian approach by looking at its Soviet Russian practice of international law - “understanding of international law as a means for

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ (Baaz, p.269).

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ A doctrine in political theory that government is created by and subject to the will of the people. *Popular Sovereignty*. (Merriam-Webster).

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ (Baaz, p.270).

⁴² (Baaz, p.271).

coexistence rather than as a means to promote cooperation.”⁴³ In other words, what shall be illustrated in more detail in Chapter III, are the different patterns of Soviet Russia, which also can be seen in the Russian Federation, is the usage of international law to “fit in” with other democracies and international leaders. Therefore, there are many instances of Soviet Russia or Russia partaking in multiple international agreements, but only to an extent it benefits Russia’s agenda. That is why Chapter III is filled with concrete examples of international treaties and agreements being violated by the authoritarian actor. However, as mentioned earlier, what is even more surprising, is that the international powers continue to accept Russian propagandistic explanations and excuses for violating the international commitments, thus further providing the “welcoming stay” and putting Europe, in particular, under a big territorial threat.

Nonetheless, it should be further noted that Russia had never given up its plans to try and create an alternative world to that of the democratic one, like when “Soviet writers held that socialism was the inevitable outcome of social processes and—with its triumph—the state and law (including international law) would be eradicated given that they are the products of class division.”⁴⁴ Hence, post-Soviet Russia continues to pose an ideological opposition to the Western ideology of peace and cooperation, thus limiting international law and its universalities. As Mälksoo emphasizes: “Russia’s commitment to Europe is not as strong as Western politicians and scholars had assumed after the end of the Cold War... [since] Processes of globalization do not automatically make different places more similar to one another; nor is influence, from the West to the rest, a one-way

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ (Baaz, p.273).

street.”⁴⁵ Therefore, it is in the West’s best interest to keep an eye on what is happening in its neighborhood, especially when it has an authoritarian neighbor with a long history of misconduct.

⁴⁵ (Baaz, p.272).

CHAPTER III

EASTERN EUROPEAN CASE STUDY

Section 1 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918)

This chapter employs the comparative case method to study the questions introduced in previous chapters. All four of the cases entail complex and dense events within their own specific historical context. As we can see in Table 1, these four cases give us insight into how authoritarian regimes act in regards to the treaties they sign, as well as their overall behavior towards international agreements and commitment.

Terms for Brest-Litovsk case:

- CCU (Central Council of Ukraine)
- UNR (Ukrainian National Republic)
- RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic)
- CPC of RSFSR (Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic)

Brest-Litovsk

The first case study addresses the events of a lesser-known treaty called Brest-Litovsk, signed on the evening of February 9, 1918 in the city with the same name (today located in Belarus territory). The signatories were the Central Powers (Germany, Austro-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria) and the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR). As Andriy Kudryachenko wrote, “for Ukraine, which had gone through many obstacles, armed

confrontations with Russia,” this treaty opened a window of opportunities.⁴⁶ Ukraine had already experienced many conflicts with its neighbor Russia and struggled to maintain its borders, culture, and independence. However, these opportunities were not only about showing Ukrainian representation at the international political arena, since the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was the first international-legal act that recognized the UNR as a subject of international law, but also dramatically tipped the balance of powers away from post-revolutionary Russia.⁴⁷ Nonetheless, although the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk caused a shift in this power-dynamic in favor of Ukraine, the question to explore is how and why did Petrograd so persistently try to occupy Ukrainian territories in 1917-1918? Moreover, it is essential to explore how successful the attacks and maneuver warfare was during the implementation of the treaty, and what happened after the treaty was terminated.

The terms of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty included: the ending of military actions, managing in or finalizing Ukraine’s western borders, establishing diplomatic and advisory relations, stipulating principles of trading relations, and the exchanging of prisoners of war and civil internee. Therefore, because of the treaty, Ukraine formally achieved the status of an independent and neutral state, and as a matter of fact, also became the major resource supplier (primarily in grain) to Europe.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, before looking into the complexity of Russia’s plans to make the most of the international law and the dynamic of the international relation to use in its territorial claim later on, let us

⁴⁶ Andryi Kudryachenko. *Brest Peace of Ukraine in 1918: Geopolitical imperatives and international significance* (2020).

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ O. Lupandin. *Brest Peace Treaty with the states of the Fourth Union on February 9, 1918* (Institute of Ukrainian History NASU, 2003).

go through the most significant political events of the timeline to try and understand the whole picture.

First, it is important to note that Ukraine, or the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR), on November 20, 1917 had passed a third state-political act that proclaimed its existence and gave it the ability to develop as an independent nation.⁴⁹ However, on December 22, the Bolsheviks and their military units disregarded Ukrainian statements and seized Kharkiv (a city in Eastern Ukraine) to establish control over the city. With orders from Petrograd and under the surveillance of Russian forces, “Ukrainian Bolsheviks,” which were sent by Soviet Russia, organized the First All-Ukrainian Council Gathering of 1917.⁵⁰ At this meeting, the masked Russian Bolsheviks announced Ukraine was the Soviet Republic and a federative part of Soviet Russia.

However, because the Russian Bolsheviks could not send all of their units to Eastern and Central Ukraine, Soviet Russia thus gathered their strike forces in Kharkiv and started an official attack on the UNR, moving forward to the western territories of Donbas.⁵¹ Secondly, the head actors of Petrograd continued to present the following events in Ukraine as a civil or domestic conflict between the Revolutionary Council of workers and soldiers against the Central Council of Ukraine (CCU). Side note, one will see that calling a “foreign intervention” a “civil conflict” is a common strategy used by Russian forces when it comes to territorial disputes. As a result, these interpretations from Soviet historiography are even sometimes trusted today, submitting to the idea that

⁴⁹ O. Shus. *War of the RSFRR and UNR 1918-1919* (Institute of Ukrainian History NASU, 2003).

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ K. Galushko . *First Ukrainian-Russian War. Brest Peace Treaty*. (Institute of Ukrainian History NASU, 2019).

it was not a military conflict but a civil war,⁵² where modern Ukraine recognizes it as an international conflict, with the extreme aggression from Bolshevik Russia (or RSFSR) against the Ukrainian National Republic.⁵³

That being said, the official documents state that military actions between Ukraine and Soviet Russia, under Vladimir Lenin, officially began in December 1917 and ended by May 1918. However, these dates do not consider various negotiations and ceasefires made between the two states, which were consistently interrupted and violated by the Russian forces throughout the course of the war. For example, on January 6, 1918, after the two sides started the deliberation process for a ceasefire, the Russian commissar “on a fight against counter-revolution on South of Russia,” V. Antonov-Ovseyenko, ordered a general attack on January 7, 1918, on Kyiv on behalf of the Central Election Commission created in Kharkiv (again, which was now under Soviet Russians).

Consequently, the Soviet Russian government then decided to send 32,000 Russian Red Guards’ “workers,” soldiers, and sailors into Ukraine by the end of January.⁵⁴ At that moment, because a large territory of the left-bank of Ukraine was already under Bolshevik control, the Ukrainian government failed to successfully fight back against the Bolshevik’s invasion since there were no military forces in place.⁵⁵ Thus, the UNR was rushed into creating multiple army units to further battle with Soviet Russia and its people.

⁵² Manilov and Yastrebov. *1917 in Kyiv region* (President’s Library Named After B. Yeltzin, 1928).

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ O. Boyko. *First War of Soviet Russia against the UNR 1917-1918* (Institute of Ukrainian History NASU).

⁵⁵ Ibid.

The unpreparedness of the governmental elite is one of the indications that the Ukrainian National Republic was a weak state since the hierarchy of power was unstable and lacked extensive foreign support.

Therefore, after the UNR signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on February 9, 1918, while fleeing Kyiv to Volyn (because Kyiv was now in ruins after Russian Bolsheviks had managed to get to it), the Soviet Russian expansion grew on Ukrainian territories. As a result, after the treaty was ratified and active, the Ukrainian government understood that they had to ask their new allies for military aid because of their own lack of military power and resources. Three days after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was ratified, the Ukrainian side had requested the Weimar Germany forces to have their military units enter Ukraine to help restore the already occupied territories by the Bolshevik aggressor. The Weimar Germany was not reluctant as it acknowledged the urgency of the situation and gave the green light the day after the Ukrainian officials had requested military assistance. Officially, German forces entered Ukraine on February 21, 1918, where they and Austro-Hungarian and Ukrainian troops defeated and annihilated Bolsheviks' armies from all of Ukraine by the end of April 1918.

As a result of such military success, on March 3, 1918, the Soviet leaders voted to utilize logic and referred to international law once more and Soviet Russia became the signatory of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

Although Soviet Russian leaders were still not too enthusiastic about accepting certain sections of the treaty, like Section 6, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was obligated (to the government of the German block) to recognize the right of Ukrainian people to self-determination and the legality of the Central Council

of Ukraine's (CCU's) leadership. Consequently, the Soviet leaders also had to accept the unquestionable legality of the treaty that the Ukrainian National Republic signed on February 9, 1918. Lastly, and probably most importantly, it also envisaged stopping the war between UNR and RSFSR.⁵⁶

On the other hand, according to the terms of the treaty, certain Eastern European countries also benefited as some were obliged to be left alone and separated from Russia, such as Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, parts of Belarus, and Latvia. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was setting the principles regarding the destinies of these regions, where RSFSR was now restrained from intervening in Eastern European domestic matters. Furthermore, it also had to recognize the sovereignty of these governments' legal and international relations, and to give the ability for these regions to determine their own fate.⁵⁷ Hence, after the RSFSR was forced to make peace with UNR, it immediately had to take out its formation of Red Guards from Ukrainian territories and stop any agitation and propaganda against the Ukrainian government and its civil institutions⁵⁸ and establish firm borders between Soviet Russia and UNR.⁵⁹

Without a doubt, because of international law and international affairs, Ukraine achieved enormous aid (largely military aid) from the Central Powers to deal with the Russian Bolsheviks' interference. However, it is important to emphasize that in this particular case, Ukrainian territories were freed from thousands of Red Guards not because of its long negotiations and tedious meetings with Russia but because of the

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ O. Lupandin, *Brest Peace Treaty of the RSFRR with the states of the Fourth Union 3 March 1918* (Institute of Ukrainian History NASU, 2003).

⁵⁹ (Boyko).

military power that German troops provided to help in Ukraine's international conflicts. Hence, Germany and its military assistance gave a chance to stop Soviet Russian invasion and eliminate the Russian Bolshevik and Red Army from Ukrainian territories.

Accordingly, here, the realism theory has proven itself to have a point on "self-help," which the Ukrainian government managed not fully by its own means (due to weak and mostly unprepared government), but through engaging with the Central Powers and their commitments to the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. However, I would also like to point out that if it was not for German leaders, who understood the nature of Soviet Russian foreign relations and its tendency to violate new or old treaties, there is a high chance UNR would have never deterred Soviet Russian forces successfully and fast.

A month forward, on May 6, 1918, after removing Bolsheviks from Ukraine and somewhat leaving Soviet Russians with no other option but to join the treaty, the representatives of the German-Ukrainian military forces and the RSFSR's troops, in Konotop, signed a ceasefire agreement. Such measures were taken due to occasional attacks from the Soviet Russian forces, as they were still trying to set their people and militia on Ukrainian territories, despite all of the previous obligations Russia agreed to after signing into the treaty.⁶⁰

Overall, the typical reader would think that the story ends here till the tragic events of the subsequent massive occupation and loss of Ukraine's sovereignty, which unfortunately will come in a couple of years. However, for now, there was a cycle of negotiation, re-negotiation, strategic maneuvering, another set of negotiations, authoritarian plan-attack, all leading to another charge on Ukraine. Accordingly, based on

⁶⁰ Ibid.

the historic evidence, one should understand that the negotiation process did not mean much to the heads of the RSFSR because they utilized it only to provide extra time to gather more troops to initiate the next attack, in secret, of course.

Thus, the uncertainty begs the question what was the reason for a ceasefire on the May 6, if in two weeks Russians would be asking for another deliberation on May 23, 1918? By the way, the second deliberation lasted only till October 4, 1918 and, again, never led to anything as it was mainly used for stopping the Ukrainian army and its allies from growing and acquiring a better position.⁶¹

If one could summarize the events of May, they would probably say, “Not again?!” Moreover, just to illustrate the point a bit further, during the May-October deliberations, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian National Republic signed another preliminary peace agreement on June 12, 1918, where the parties also established the line of demarcation - temporal differentiation of territory between Ukraine and Soviet Russia.⁶² Meanwhile, the Ukrainian and Russian sides were obliged to respect one’s sovereignty and domestic relations, though the RSFSR did quite the opposite.

First, they violated Section 6 of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which they signed with the Central Powers on March 3, 1918, in addition to the agreement about the ceasefire, which Soviet Russia signed with German-Ukrainian military forces. Furthermore, they neglected to follow the basic principles of negotiation. Why would there be a need for another deliberation between the two countries if they had already

⁶¹ O. Lupandin. *Peace negotiations between the Ukrainian state and RSFRD 1918* (Institute of Ukrainian History NASU, 2009).

⁶² (Boyko).

agreed to peaceful negotiations? The understanding of what is meant by treaties was probably somewhere lost in translation for Russians.

Nonetheless, the madness of these negotiations eventually stopped as one of Ukraine's strongest allies capitulated on October 5, 1918. Therefore, October 4, 1918, was the last day Russians had to negotiate with Ukrainian representatives instead of fighting them. Unfortunately for the Ukrainian National Republic, the Weimar Republic's capitulation before the Antanta Union (commonly known as Allied Powers) brought expected nullification of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty by RSFSR. Now, Soviet Russia was free from "following" the terms of the treaty and those agreements obtained during Ukrainian-Russian negotiations. However, one should not feel upset, at least not for this reason, since the Russian side was either way violating old and new peaceful treaties, agreements, and ceasefires.⁶³

Meanwhile, it is interesting to point out the most hated section of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk by the Soviet Russians, Section 6. Not only did it have "the audacity" to ask the "Great Soviet Russia" to acknowledge Ukrainian National Republic's independence and sovereignty, but it also banned them from influencing domestic policies and determining the next steps of the Ukrainian nation. Nonetheless, the biggest obligation Section 6 entailed was the establishment of a Neutral Zone between UNR and RSFSR. As a result, after failing to maintain control over at least a small piece of Ukrainian territory, and a threat of having Ukraine and its allies fight on Russian territories, it compelled the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR to offer Ukrainian government to "stop belligerency between two states and admit a separate

⁶³ (Lupandin, 2009).

agreement to manage our borders and our legal relations;”⁶⁴ funny enough, such commentary came from the continuously belligerent state. Therefore, in May 1918, Ukrainian-German forces and Soviet military delegations at the station Korenevo (next to Kursk) agreed on the line that would separate the parties’ military forces. It was 10-40 kilometers in width from the line of Surazg-Unecha-Starodub- Novgorod-Siverskyi-Gluhiv-Rylsk-Kolontayivka-Sudzga-Belenihino-Kupyansk. According to the agreement, both actors were supposed to take away their military units from this territory, which received the name - “N.Z.” or “Neutral Zone.” However, the Soviet government had different plans for N.Z. and actively used it to extract various grain cultures (this could remind some of the leading events of Holodomor in 1932-33), as well as for preparations to invade and occupy Ukraine in the future. Furthermore, the Neutral Zone served as a hiding place for Soviet soldiers since the incidents in the summer and autumn of 1918 showed that the rising pro-Bolshevik units were running away to the Neutral Zone after being defeated during the Anti-Getmanski Povstannya (uprising).⁶⁵

Nevertheless, the Neutral Zone was also taken into exploitation, especially in September of 1918, when the Russian government (special committee) ordered the creation of two military units formed by the end of October. These units were to be the center of the Kursk military unit (practically a Ukrainian front/border), created because of an order from the Russian Council of People’s Commissars way back in March 1918.⁶⁶ In other words, the Soviet Russian leaders left all of their “good-hearted hopes” to stop that “belligerency between two states” and had stimulated their troops in the winter of 1918.

⁶⁴ O. Ganja. *Neutral Zone* (Institute of Ukrainian History NASU, 2010).

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

Hence, the cycle of war was never paused between the “always to be enemies” neighboring states.⁶⁷

As a result, at the end of this section, the appropriate lesson learned and facts taken into future considerations from this case study would have to be:

1. As General Otto von Bismarck once spoke of Russians: “Do not expect that once taking advantage of Russia’s weakness, you will receive dividends forever. Russian has always come for their money. And when they come - do not rely on an agreement signed by you, you are supposed to justify. They are not worth the paper it is written on.”⁶⁸ In other words, it shows that Weimar Germany (and even Germany during the Third Reich) was quite knowledgeable of how Russia treated those established treaties. Therefore, Bismarck notes that one always has to control and make sure that Russia commits to the signed agreements, even if it means having done so under 24/7 military surveillance.
2. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk showed that the Russian regime mainly understands force and power, even when it comes to international law and negotiations. Hence, international diplomacy in the classical sense (that being democratic or pertaining to liberal theory) does not work and should be adjusted to the quality of negotiation that authoritarian regimes understand - power and force.

Regular tactics used by Russian authoritarians during the period of Brest-Litovsk:

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Luk'yanyuk, Volodymyr. *The Rules of Life, Otto Von Bismarck. (This Day In History, 2021).*

1. Using periods of negotiations as a distraction to maximize one's powers and ensure extra time to collect more soldiers and weaponry to attack as soon as possible.
2. Using Russian-made-uprisings of the working class or "Russian ethnic minorities" (with no evidential credentials) as a justification for further attacks on the targeted state and use such "evidence" as justification for the "righteous intentions to save the poor Russian brothers" to the international leaders; unfortunately, who tend to agree with these illicit actions, nonetheless.
3. Delaying the finalization of an agreement, where Russian representatives come up with more questions and uncertainties in regards to the agreement, which is then used to collect massive military preparations and forces to raid the targeted state (i.e. N.Z. and Ukraine's resources).
4. Russian government uses international law and fundamental principles of international relations misleadingly and strategically against the neighboring state (i.e. Eastern and Central Ukraine).

Section 2 Soviet Invasion of Poland (1939-1940)

This case study addresses Poland's fall to the Russian invasion in 1939. However, unlike in the Ukrainian National Republic's case, Poland in 1939 was a strong state. Furthermore, as we shall see, it also had enough treaties and international agreements to garner international support. However, even though such a powerful state had both of the beneficial qualities from Table 1, the prediction does not follow since these factors did not prevent Soviet Russia from placing their intentions to invade Polish territories. It is also important to emphasize that the invasionist process was done while Soviet Russia was part of multiple international agreements and various advantageous treaties with Poland and other respectful countries. Nonetheless, the Soviet Russian officials ultimately decided to ignore their obligations, thus allowing themselves to violate the agreements' terms. However, their approach was different since they decided to start with occupying Poland by first negotiating preferable terms to the Polish government to put Polish alertness to sleep while making more extensive plans to invade it a bit later.

One of the more essential agreements formed and signed before the Russian invasion of Poland was the creation of the Peace of Riga on March 18, 1921, hence ending the Polish-Soviet War in 1921.⁶⁹ Because Poland was highly interested in the Ukrainian National Republic's western borders, including some of those from western Belarus, the Soviets and Polish had come to plan for the division of these two territories. The Soviets essentially promised to stay away from occupying those territories in the future and let the conflict between Polish leaders and the Ukrainian National Republic

⁶⁹ Britannica. *Treaty of Riga* (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2011).

play out (especially when Poland violated one of the agreements earlier signed and established with the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists).

On the other hand, it is crucial to note why Soviet Russia was interested in having so many states in its “union.” To put it simply, Russian leaders sought more voting abilities at the UN table.⁷⁰ To achieve more votes, they needed to have many federative states under their control, with their already pro-Russian government installed. For example, although the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was one of the Founding Fathers of the UN, Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic were also part of the UN-creators. Therefore, one of the reasons why the Soviets wanted to control many of the foreign states was to give the USSR (i.e., Russian leaders) an immense advantage to set and push the Russian agenda at the UN meetings.⁷¹

In any event, there was also an outcome of the Munich Agreement of 1938, where Germany, Poland, and Hungary took turns dividing Czechoslovakia since, like Germany, the Polish government claimed that there were territories highly populated with its people. Nonetheless, Poland’s and Nazi Germany’s pleasantries ended quickly after Hitler demanded Gdańsk to be returned to Germany because of its Prussian and German roots. As a result, Hitler argued for the creation of the Danzig Corridor. Despite expecting and seeing evident pressure and further unfriendly intentions from Nazi Germany, the Polish government also started to see similar signs from the Russian side as the western and eastern corridor was closing on them.⁷²

⁷⁰ Volodymyr Lukyanyuk. *22 August 1945* (This day in history, 2015).

⁷¹ *Founding Member States* (UN Library).

⁷² Britannica. *Polish Corridor* (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1998).

Consequently, the creation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, also known as the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), was signed in Moscow on August 23, 1939 by German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov.⁷³ The two parties were forbidden from attacking each other and agreed to stay neutral when it comes to third party skirmishes. Overall, the pact predicated no violence against each other, “straightforwardly or through other parties or means,” as well as sharing information pertaining to the interest of both actors.⁷⁴ In addition to the publicly-announced stipulations of the non-aggression between the USSR and Nazi Germany, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact also included the Secret Protocol, where the leaders defined the potential borders of the Soviet and German influence across Eastern European countries due to the future “politico-territorial reconstruction” plans. Furthermore, the Secret Protocol also recognized Soviet interest in Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Eastern Poland, and Bessarabia.⁷⁵

As a result, not long after, on September 1, 1939, the Soviet troops already entered Poland, while on September 17, the Red Army under the name of “liberation campaign” was already on the western Ukrainian and Belarusian fronts, which were earlier given to Poland as a peace offering between the USSR and Poland. Interestingly, the Russians later used this very territory to justify to international actors why Soviet Russia decided to invade Poland.⁷⁶ Therefore, Poland’s division between the USSR and Germany was over by September 28, 1939, following a treaty of “friendship and border-

⁷³ Britannica. *German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact* (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2020).

⁷⁴ Lysenko and Pulyavets. *Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 1939* (Institute of Ukrainian History NASU).

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

establishment” named the German-Soviet Frontier Treaty.⁷⁷ However, present day Russian historians try to convince the international community that the reason Soviet Russia decided to sign the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Secret Pact was to postpone the USSR’s involvement in WWII. They claim that such a decision was made to win some time to prepare for the war, strengthen their geopolitical position and their defense capabilities, and advance the USSR’s technical modernization of military powers.⁷⁸ Of course, despite various pretenses made by the Russian historians, countless lawyers and politicians worldwide argue that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact should be classified as a crime against peace, as it concerned the interests of different third parties without them ever being included in this pact.⁷⁹

On the other hand, let us recognize a few reasons why the invasion of Poland was achieved relatively quickly, besides acknowledging the obvious significance Nazi Germany’s forces and partaking in the “division” of Poland with the Soviets. As a result, it is important to emphasize that the Nazis and the Soviet Russians were acting together as a unit, preparing for their personal goals to be attainable in real life. This particular aspect is significant to underline because the world has primarily put the faults of Polish horrors from the 1940s mainly on Nazi Germany, where the rest of the horrific actions done by the Soviet Russians are omitted or somewhat deemphasized.

Accordingly, it is essential to acknowledge multiple preparations and unorthodox ways that the Russian leaders used to capture Poland. As mentioned in the Secret Pact, Ukraine’s and Belarus’s western territories were previously in the sphere of Soviet

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

interest to seize, which meant that to attack Poland, Russians had to use massive troops to charge simultaneously from multiple directions. Therefore, the Soviet parts of Belarusian and Ukrainian fronts (mainly from Kyiv and Kharkiv) were primarily utilized as core troops in Poland's invasion. The general number of the first echelon of both fronts counted more than 617,000 soldiers, almost 5,000 guns and mortars, around 4.8 thousand tanks, and 3.3 thousand combat aircraft, while also adding 16.5 thousand NKVD border guards to place with the other army units.⁸⁰

In any event, one of the fundamental reasons why Polish forces were not effective enough in defending their positions was due to the fact they were not anticipating any hostilities from the Soviet Union. In other words, it is because the USSR's preparation to engage in Poland's occupation began in the form of covert or secret military mobilization. The Polish government had no idea about Russian mobilization being a theater of war production. Secondly, the Poles were also sure if things did get intense, their military agreements with British and French allies would serve them well against the Soviet Russian peril.⁸¹ Even so, on September 3, 1939, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) had other plans as they decided to secretly extend the service of the Red Army's soldiers and junior commanders who had already been subjected to demobilization for another month; more than 310,000 people were held back for the attack.⁸²

⁸⁰ A. Rukkas. *Polish-Soviet War 1939* (Institute of Ukrainian History NASU).

⁸¹ Anita Prazmowska. *Britain and Poland 1939–1943: The Betrayed Ally* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) p.44.

⁸² V. Grinevich. *Red Army in wars and military conflicts 1939-1940: Military-political, ideological and socio-psychological aspects* (2003) p.342.

Meanwhile, on September 6, from about 11:00 pm to 12:00 pm, the command of the seven military districts, including KMD (Kyiv Military District) and KMD (Kharkiv Military District), received a directive from the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, to conduct a covert mobilization in the form of a "Great Training Meeting." It was decided to summon all the registered staff to the "training meeting" to mobilize vehicles and horses and organize food and fodder stocks. On September 7, in Moscow, Soviet Officer Voroshilov held a meeting with the command of the districts from Kyiv, Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkiv, Kalinin, Orel, and other parts of Belarus to prepare for a large offensive operation on the territory of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus.⁸³

As a result, on September 9, the People's Commissar for Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army issued orders No 16633 to the BMD's (Byelorussian Military District) Military Council and No 16634 to the KMD's Military Council (Kyiv's Military District) to prepare for hostilities against Poland. The command asked to provide a regrouping of troops by September 11 to "secretly concentrate and be ready for a decisive attack to defeat the opposing enemy forces with a lightning strike."⁸⁴ Furthermore, on September 14, the Moscow newspaper *Pravda* published an editorial, "On the Internal Causes of Poland's Military Defeat," prepared by Zhdanov, who was a Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The propaganda served as an ideological explanation behind the Soviet's entry into Poland; in other words, to save "Western Ukrainian and Western Belarusian brothers." Furthermore, Zhdanov also emphasized that the Polish army's defeat was not primarily due to German military equipment and superiority, and not because Great Britain and France decided not

⁸³ M. Meltuhov. *Sovetsko-Polish Voyages. Military-Political Highlights 1918-1939 Years* (2001) p.283.

⁸⁴ (Meltuhov, p.111).

to go through with their military obligations to Poland. Zhdanov had claimed, “the defeat” of Poland was largely due to the Polish state’s internal contradictions,⁸⁵ which had a multinational character where its national minorities were suppressed; hence the “saving of the Western Ukrainian and Western Belarusian brothers.”

Coincidentally, on September 17, 1939, at 3:15 am, the Polish Ambassador to Moscow, V. Gzhibovsky, was handed a note from the Soviet government, stating “the Polish state and its government have virtually ceased to exist...[and] since the state is left without leadership, Poland has become a convenient field for all sorts of tragic cases and surprises that could pose a threat to the USSR,” making them act immediately.⁸⁶ Therefore, Russians used their favorite tactic as intended, stating that in order to prevent those “tragic cases and surprises” and to protect the lives and property of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, the Soviet Russians ordered the General Commander of the Red Army to cross the Polish border.⁸⁷

However, what is even more intriguing is that Zhdanov put out a big question on the effectiveness or strength of Anglo-Franco-Polish diplomatic and military bonds. The Soviet newspaper mainly referred to the alliance made between the United Kingdom and the Polish Second Republic, the Anglo-Polish Agreement in 1939, which later resulted in the Polish-British Common Defense Pact, including a French partnership called the Franco-Polish Alliance of 1921.

Despite having a robust military union between Britain and Poland, it is remarkable how little it seemed to have mattered to Lord Halifax (a senior British

⁸⁵ Stanislav Kulchytsky. *Red Challenge. History of Communism in Ukraine from its birth to death.* (2013) p.16.

⁸⁶ (Rukkas).

⁸⁷ Ibid.

politician and diplomat in the 1930s) that Germany and the Soviet Union were acting jointly. When Raczyński (a Polish diplomat) called in the Foreign Office with a suggestion that the Polish government considered clause 1(b) of the Anglo-Polish Agreement, which applied to outside aggression (but from a “European Power”) as related to the possibility of aggression by the Soviet Union, Halifax’s response was straightforwardly hostile. He told Raczyński: “As regards to Soviet aggression we were free to take our own decision and to decide whether to declare war on the USSR or not.”⁸⁸ Moreover, the Chief of Staff of Britain and France had such a low opinion of the Soviet military capability that this view reinforced the government’s later indecisive attitude towards the Soviet Union, leaving Poland in the Soviet hands. Nonetheless, such a tendency will be seen in a couple of years down the road, when the international community will make the same decision during the annexation of Crimea in 2014.⁸⁹

It is also arguable that if France and Britain had not refrained from a critical reaction to the Soviet invasion and annexation of eastern Poland, it could have prevented Poland’s following dismembering and division. Not to mention that a powerful military reply could have prevented WWII overall if these Western European governments were persistent enough in honoring their initial military agreements. However, of course, it did not happen.

⁸⁸ Anita J. Prazmowska. *Britain and Poland 1939–1943: The Betrayed Ally* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) p.44.

John Hiden and Thomas Lane. *The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War* (Cambridge University Press, 2003) p.148.

⁸⁹ (Prazmowska, 1995, p.44).

Lastly, without any hesitation, at the sunrise on September 17, while never declaring war on Poland, yet authorizing hostilities against its army, the Stalinist leadership thereby violated:

1. The Peace of Riga (March 18 of 1921).
2. The pact from February 9, 1929, called The Kellogg–Briand Pact, also known as General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy. It was an international agreement where the signatory states were prohibited from using war as an instrument of national politics.
3. Conventions for the Definition of Aggression, signed on 3 and 4 July 1933, prohibited and defined aggression as:
 - (1) Declaration of war upon another state;
 - (2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another state;
 - (3) Attack by land, naval, or air forces, with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels, or aircraft of another state;
 - (4) Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another state;
 - (5) Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take, in its own territory, all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.
4. The Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact from June 25, 1932, and active until 1945.

5. Violation of the Litvinov Protocol. It was signed in Paris on August 27, 1928, by the Republic of Estonia, the President of Latvian Republic, the President of the Republic of Poland, His Majesty the King of Romania, and the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union Socialist Republics. The protocol was the treaty of renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.⁹⁰

Furthermore, the invasion of Poland and further annexation of its territories caused grave consequences like:

1. The disappearance of the Polish state from the political map of the world.
2. Mass arrests of Polish, Ukrainians, Belarusians (usually at 3-5 in the morning for fewer witnesses) led to further Soviet Russian repressions (eviction to remote areas of the USSR, arrests and imprisonment of intellectuals, executions of those political prisoners perceived to be dangerous to the Soviet government).⁹¹
3. The events of Katyn Massacre (generalized name of a war crime) - mass executions of Polish citizens by the USSR's NKVD by a top-secret order of the USSR's party-state leadership.

⁹⁰ *Protocol on the introduction of a Paris Treaty* (1928).

⁹¹ *Soviet period 1939-1941* (National Museum-Memorial Victims of Occupation).

Section 3 Soviet Occupation of Baltic States (1939-1945)

As we have already seen what Poland's experience was like in its engagement with one of the oldest authoritarian actors, it is time to follow the next target on the Soviet authoritarian list - the Baltics. In the meantime, before diving deeper into the Baltic occupation, it should be acknowledged first that Soviet Russia had never accepted Finish, Latvian, and Estonian independence in 1920, which predetermined Moscow's following steps regarding its economic and foreign policies, on top of elaborating military-strategic plans in the direction of capturing Baltic states.⁹²

Unlike the previous two cases, this particular one starts with a bit of gambling and paranoia from the authoritarian forces. Threatened by Hitler's extraordinary military successes in Western Europe, Moscow, in June 1940, decided to quash the perceived threat and "shore up the Soviet military-political position in the Baltic."⁹³ Moreover, the so-called "Baltic conspiracy," or the events of a Polish submarine's escape from Tallinn, Estonia's capital, on September 18, 1939, made Russian officials claim that the Baltics were preparing to attack the USSR.⁹⁴ Although this announcement was later used as a pretext for the Soviet takeover of the Baltic states in the mid-1940s, the Soviets regarded that because the Baltic states previously enjoyed their neutrality and did not intervene during the Russian occupation of Poland and Finland, the Baltic states must be plotting against them; which eventually was proved to be only a myth, well expropriated by Soviet Russians.⁹⁵

⁹² Tonu Tannberg and Enn Tarvel. *Documents on the Soviet military occupation of Estonia in 1940* (Trames, 2006) p. 81+.

⁹³ Geoffrey Roberts. *Soviet policy and the Baltic States, 1939-1940 a reappraisal*. (London: Frank Cass, 1995) p.696.

⁹⁴ David Crowe. *The Impact of Soviet Imposed Mutual Assistance Pact on the Governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, 1939* (Cambridge University Press, 2018) p.108.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

Nonetheless, such promotion of “Baltic hostility” gave momentum to the Soviet Russians to pressure all of the Baltic states and Finland to sign the mutual assistance treaties. However, these pacts were built to benefit the Soviets, as they guaranteed that the signatories would not engage in hostilities between each other, which played out to Russia’s advantage while submitting all of the Baltic actors under its umbrella of Soviet influence and rule.

It all had started with Estonia fully accepting the ultimatum given by Moscow to agree to the Mutual Assistance Pact.⁹⁶ Besides, the Soviet negotiators also insisted on establishing multiple military bases in Estonia, to which the Estonian government also agreed, gesturing its conformity with the pact. Meanwhile, despite obvious political pressure from the Russian institutions, the Soviet press tried to reassure everyone and printed out articles saying how the Soviets believed in the principles of independence and national self-determination. At this point, *Bolshevik*, the leading Soviet Party journal, commented:⁹⁷

Aggression and the desire to oppress smaller nations are alien to the spirit of the USSR. The Soviet people is [sic] interested in lasting peace and in fraternal collaboration. This can be realized only if it is based on mutual trust and the principle of noninterference in each other’s internal affairs. Because it respects the sovereignty of other states, the Soviet Union does not interfere in their internal affairs.

Notwithstanding, the following situation in due course awaited Latvia and Lithuania, as the new Soviet-Baltic relationship not only signaled the return of the Russian sphere of influence but also had foreseen the complete absorption of Baltic states

⁹⁶ David J. Smith. *The Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania* (Psychology Press, 2002) p 24.

⁹⁷ William J. H. Hough, III. *The Annexation of the Baltic States and Its Effect on the Development of Law Prohibiting Forcible Seizure of Territory* (NYLS Journal of International and Comparative Law, 1985) p.371.

the following year.⁹⁸ After the Soviet Russian leaders had pressured the Estonian government to sign the Mutual Assistance Pact on September 28, 1939, the Latvian government was next.

Mistakenly, Latvian officials agreed to sign the pact due to their extreme belief that Germany would serve as a military force that, in case of a threat, would step in against Russia's disturbance of the Baltic status quo or invasion of Latvian territories. Thus, the decision was made, and Latvia joined the Mutual Assistance Pact on October 5, 1939.⁹⁹ However, the most complicated negotiations occurred with the last Baltic state during the Lithuanian-Soviet negotiation package.

In this case, the settlement's finalized terms were harder to reach between Moscow and Kaunas (a city in south-central Lithuania), where Stalin had to return an ancient capital Vilnius to Lithuanians. As Stalin agreed, the deal was secured on October 10, 1939.¹⁰⁰

Nonetheless, like with Estonia, all of the Baltic-Soviet pacts required the Baltic actors to establish Soviet military bases all over their homeland by the end of October. Around 25, 000 soldiers were stationed in Estonia, 30, 000 in Latvia, and 20, 000 in Lithuania.¹⁰¹ To be exact, one should keep in mind that the placing of the Soviet troops in the Baltic region was only the beginning of the invasionist plan.

Meanwhile, the vast majority of the Soviet Russian soldiers and civilians were spreading Soviet propaganda around all of the Baltics, which eventually altered the

⁹⁸ (Crowe, p107).

⁹⁹ (Crowe, p.112).

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ (Smith, p.24). (Hough, p.372). Yana Primachenko. *Soviet Occupation of the Baltic Countries* (This day in history, 2018).

countries' existing political, social, and economic institutions, which ultimately led to the public's frustration with the government.¹⁰² The particular insertion of military resources into the Baltic countries, overall, compromised their previously established neutral status, domestic security, and the process of decision-making on foreign policy, where the full invasion was still ahead.¹⁰³

The year 1940 indeed entailed a different scenario for the Baltic nations.

According to the Directive of the Peoples' Commissar for Defense of the USSR No.-02622ss of June 9, 1940, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet (Soviet Russian Fleet) was assigned the following to be ready by June 12:¹⁰⁴

1. To capture all vessels of the Estonian and Latvian naval forces both at bases as well as at sea, to capture the naval forces of Lithuania.
2. To capture mercantile marine and vessels of Estonia, Latvia, to disrupt sea connections between these countries.
3. To prepare and organize the landing of troops in Paldiski [Baltic Sea port situated on the Pakri peninsula of northwestern Estonia] and Tallinn [Estonia's capital on the Baltic Sea], to seize the ports of Tallinn and batteries [powerful strike force] on the islands Nargen and Vulf, to be prepared to seize the Suurupi battery from the mainland.
4. To block the Gulf of Riga [a bay of the Baltic Sea between Latvia and Estonia] and the coasts of Estonia and Latvia on the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea, to prevent evacuation of the governments of these countries or troops and property.

¹⁰² (Crowe, p.109).

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ *Excerpts from the report of the Commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Vice Admiral V.F. Tributs (Republic of Estonia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1940).*

5. To organize permanent and secure patrol service: on the Gulf of Finland - from the direction of Finland, and on the Baltic Sea - from the direction of Sweden and from the south.
6. To assist, in close collaboration with armed forces, the troops of the Leningrad military district in their advance towards Rakvere [a town in northern Estonia; 20 km south of the Gulf of Finland of the Baltic Sea].
7. To prevent, by using the air force, the air fleet of Estonia and Latvia from flying to Finland and Sweden.

After the intensive preparations, on June 14, 1940, Vyacheslav Molotov, the USSR's Minister of Foreign Affairs, issued a claim to the Lithuanian state and the other two Baltic countries. Once again, Russian authorities claimed these countries were conspiring against the Soviet Union and showing an anti-Soviet character in their actions, thus violating all three mutual pacts between the USSR and the Baltic states.¹⁰⁵ As a result, because the Bolsheviks already had the upper hand from stationing many troops, including the weaponry, in Baltic countries, and the terms accounted in the Mutual Assistant Pact, ultimately cleared the path to annexation. Furthermore, given the international isolation, as the world was busy paying attention to the fall of France (and Nazi Germany's expansion), the Baltic nations had to accept the Soviet ultimatum, giving up their independence and accepting the future of coinciding with a communist coup d'état.¹⁰⁶

Although the outcome was similar for all three countries, it is important to single out one of the strongest actors from the Baltic region, where Lithuania had one of the

¹⁰⁵ (Hough, p.376).

¹⁰⁶ (Tannberg and Tarvel, p. 81+)

strongest governments from all the three, as we shall see. Its nationalistic government and strong spirit to fight against the Soviet invasion¹⁰⁷ brought an enormous amount of uncertainty to the Russians when they finally achieved complete infiltration and invasion. Hence, even after Lithuania accepted the ultimatum to be part of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Russian leaders feared Lithuanian capabilities so much that they demanded to arrest Lithuania's highest officials in the police, and those Soviet Russia thought to conspire against the Soviet forces.

However, one should see these accusations and orders as illogical since Lithuanians were fending off the invaders and trying to protect their state. Therefore, the Soviet stipulation followed with forming a pro-Soviet government in Lithuania while allowing further settlement of the unlimited numbers of Soviet troops on the republic's territory.¹⁰⁸ Nonetheless, the Lithuanian invasion showed the true nature of Russian international relations when they gave Lithuania another ultimatum. Russians demanded Lithuanian forces to surrender by 10:00 am on June 15, 1940, where Lithuanian answer did not matter since Moscow promised to send their troops even if Lithuania surrendered. Therefore, on June 15, Lithuania lost its independence while accepting the Soviet-communist-ultimatum.¹⁰⁹

All things considered, the Soviet leaders did not only occupy and annex Lithuanian, Estonian, and Latvian territories but also had to show why their deeds were righteous and provide explanations as evidence to the international leaders. Thus, the

¹⁰⁷ One can see the significant pattern, as Lithuania is the last to sign the Mutual Assistance Pact with the Soviet Russians, last to coincide with the terms of later submission to the USSR's annexation, and showed constant rebellion movements against the Soviet regime. Lithuanians were also the first to get their independence back out of the three Baltic states.

¹⁰⁸ *Pre-Baltic Operation 1940* (Hrono).

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

Soviet Russian officials believed for their whole operation not to be a military occupation and annexation of the Baltic region, but rather a socialist revolution initiated by the local population itself (which sounds incredibly familiar), and, coincidentally, also demanded to be part of the Soviet Union.¹¹⁰

Therefore, “local Lithuanians’ will” was heard as the full infiltration of Soviet semi-legal procedures occurred, like overtaking the governmental institutions’ control and installing Soviet Russia’s puppets and candidates into the government. As mentioned earlier, the new pro-Soviet party, The People’s Seimas, later proclaimed the creation of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic and petitioned to be admitted into the Soviet Union.¹¹¹ Not surprisingly, the same procedure followed in Latvia and Estonia, as the Supreme Soviet of the USSR accepted all three requests, proving that all Baltic states had simultaneously carried out socialist revolutions and voluntarily requested to join the Soviet Union. That being said, the Baltic states had to coincide with the Marxist-Leninist ideology, create the socialist-Soviet citizenry, Soviet politics, and agree to the widespread extortion of resources from private property, industrialization, transportation, banks, and even the general commerce which managed the Baltic land.¹¹² The Baltics’ occupation and coercion continued until states regained their independence by the end of the 20th century; 1990 for Lithuania, then Estonia in 1991, and Latvia later that same year.

One of the reasons why the Baltic events are presented in Table 2 under a strong state variable is because of Lithuania and its extreme dedication to independence and sovereignty. However, although all of the Baltic countries were trying to leave Soviet

¹¹⁰ Stanley Vytas Vardys and Judith B. Sedaitis. *Lithuania: The Rebel Nation* (WestviewPress, 1997) p.50.

¹¹¹ *Liaudies Seimas* (Lithuanian Enciklopedia).

¹¹² Kevin O'Connor. *The History of the Baltic States* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003) p.117.

influence, Lithuania was one of the most persistent. Not to mention how much the Soviet Russian officials struggled with occupying Lithuania through diplomatic means as well as sustaining its rule after the invasion happened. For example, when the Lithuanians had overthrown the Soviet rule two days before the Germans arrived in Kaunas, in 1941, Lithuanian people saw the Third Reich's occupation as a chance to gain their independence back. Nonetheless, many would be surprised to hear that Nazi Germany allowed the Provisional Government of Lithuania to function for over a month, but it is true. Furthermore, as history tells when WWII was coming to its end, and the prognosis was not looking good for Nazi Germans, many Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians joined the German forces because they hoped that by engaging in the war, the Baltic countries would have had a chance to attract Western attention to gain independence from the USSR.¹¹³ Even though, despite the clear partnership between Hitler and Stalin in dividing and subjugating Europe (from August 1939 until June 1941), the USSR's allies, Britain and the United States still took a pragmatic approach to the region, accepting the de facto, if not de jure, and put Eastern Europe under the Soviet sphere of influence once again, after the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945.¹¹⁴

Consequently, the British and American leaders had little interest in the Baltic situation since their main preoccupation was with Nazi Germany. Hence, the Allied powers were rather indifferent to the destiny of the Baltic countries and the Eastern Europe overall, if it meant getting Stalin's cooperation; though many argue today that if the Western leaders waited a bit longer, the Soviets would come to them instead,

¹¹³ Graham Smith. *The Baltic States: The National Self-Determination of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania* (Palgrave Macmillan, 1994) p.92.

¹¹⁴ (O'Connor, p.117).

implored for help. In other words, the members of the Western world were comfortable with sharing the authoritarian view of Soviet Russia that the Baltic states “naturally” belonged to the Soviet Union and that such inclusion is in the interest of the European states (“natural defense perimeter”).¹¹⁵ For example, here is what Prime Minister Churchill wrote to President Franklin D. Roosevelt about the Baltic states in March 1942: “The increasing gravity of the war has led me to feel that the principles of the Atlantic Charter ought not to be construed so as to deny Russia the frontiers she occupied when Germany attacked here... I hope therefore that you will be able to give us a free hand to sign the treaty which Stalin desires as soon as possible,”¹¹⁶ to which President FDR agreed, as the states of Eastern Europe were all given up to Stalin and his authoritarian regime.

Moreover, according to the Archbishop, later Cardinal, Francis Spellman of New York, who was a frequent visitor at the White House said that during one of the meetings with President FDR in New York on September 3, 1943, FDR said: “The European people [rather Eastern European] will simply have to endure Russian domination, in the hope that in ten or twenty years they will be able to live well with the Russians.”¹¹⁷ Thus later, FDR calmly envisaged Stalin acquiring Finland, the Baltic States, Eastern Poland, and Bessarabia, adding that “There is no point to oppose these desires of Stalin, because he has the power to get them anyhow. So better give them gracefully.”¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ Kristian Gerner and Stefan Hedlund. *The Baltic States and the end of the Soviet Empire* (Routledge, 1993) p.60.

¹¹⁶ Potts Berthon. *Warlords: An Extraordinary Re-Creation of World War II Through the Eyes and Minds of Hitler, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin* (Da Capo Press and Methuen Publishing, 2006) p.138.

¹¹⁷ Anna M. Cienciala. *The United States And Poland In World War* (University of Illinois Press, 2009) p.190.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

On other occasions, FDR stated that because Russia was already invaded twice by the Germans, “That is why we shall give her a part of Poland and recompense Poland with part of Germany.”¹¹⁹ Finally, when speaking of J. Stalin, FDR noted: “He is just another practical man who wants peace and prosperity.”¹²⁰ Therefore, during the FDR’s and Stalin’s meeting on December 1, 1943, FDR supported Stalin’s intentions, saying that “he fully realized the three Baltic Republics had in history and again more recently been part of Russia and jokingly added, that when the Soviet armies re-occupied these areas, he did not intend to go to war with the Soviet Union on this point.”¹²¹

However, there was a similar talk going around in Britain as well. A year before the end of WWII, Prime Minister Churchill had a meeting with Stalin in Moscow, where they penciled out the post-war partition of Europe. As Churchill recounts in his memoirs: “At length I said, 'Might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed that we had disposed of these issues, so fateful to millions of people, in such an offhand manner? Let us burn the paper.' — 'No, you keep it,' said Stalin.”¹²²

As a result, the phrase “history tends to repeat itself” is quite fitting as we are about to move to our last case, and although it now happened in the 21st century, the overall authoritarian background, tactics, and its approach should be familiar to this thesis’ readers.

Nevertheless, per usual, here are some of the tactics used in this case:

1. Using international agreements, pacts, treaties as one of the ways to infiltrate the territory that is planned to be annexed in the future (military infiltration and social

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Marjorie M. Whiteman. *Digest of International Law* (1964) p.221.

¹²² (LIFE, 1953) p.59.

propagation), no matter whether the agreement was reached due to mutual views or through pressures and ultimatums.

2. Although Russian negotiation and ultimatum appear to have two options, the Russian side does not actually provide a choice, leaving a negotiating state with only an ultimatum.
3. Soviet Russia used previously established means of propaganda and civil infiltration of Soviet citizens in the soon-to-be annexed territory to use as an explanation why such invasion should be overlooked. Thus, using “the will of local people” as a means to establish Soviet governmental structure while spreading its authoritarian politics, social formation, and the overall transformation into a pro-Soviet state.
4. The Russian slogan: “saving our people” means nothing concrete for the Russian state but is only used as an excuse for the invasion of one’s country. In other words, when the Lithuanian government already signed the Lithuania-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact and was cracking down on disruptive leftist or pro-communist elements in its country in 1939, one of the Lithuanian diplomats revealed a part of his talk with Molotov (USSR’s Minister of Foreign Affairs). The Lithuanian diplomat said that Molotov “had been quite understanding about Lithuanian concern over local communist activities, and said the Smetona government [quote] could shoot them if necessary.”¹²³ However, the following year Molotov expressed a radically opposite opinion on “pro-Soviet people being in danger.” When it was convenient for the Soviet Russian leaders, the USSR’s

¹²³ (Crowe, p.115).

Minister of Foreign Affairs used it as a reason to explain why the USSR occupied Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in 1940. Such comparison suggests that Russians are more reluctant to “save their people” if the targeted state’s regime is more cohesive and coherent.

5. Lastly, as Kazys Bizauskas, the Activity Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, once predicted, “Russians apparently have learned the new art of warfare which entails the peaceful seizing of territory from the nation to be despoiled...” but also felt that resistance to such “salvation” would be instantly met with Soviet “gunfire.”¹²⁴

¹²⁴ (Crowe, p.114).

Section 4 Russian Annexation of Crimea (2014)

The Russian-Ukrainian war, also referred to as the Russian Armed Aggression Against Ukraine has been going on since the beginning of 2014 (related events are: the Revolution of Dignity and EuroMaydan).¹²⁵ The war has involved both direct and indirect use of armed forces by the Russian Federation against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. The important events of Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine include Russian invasion of Crimea in February-March 2014, as well as the beginning of war in eastern part of Ukraine (mainly in Donbas and later Lugansk) between the undercover Russian forces and its manufactured forces such as the Donetsk National Republic and the Lugansk National Republic (since April 2014).¹²⁶

Although both events deserve equal attention and are complex in their own ways, for this thesis's purposes, I will be mainly focusing on the first component: the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

One of the primary reasons why the example of Crimea's annexation is fitting is because it is the most recent attack on sovereignty in Europe. Secondly, because it has the same but rebranded invader with now an alleged democratic regime. However, the reader shall see that Russia's preparations, strategy, and tools equipped are all the same. In other words, the patterns of Brest-Litovsk in 1917-18, during Poland's invasion in 1930-40, and similarly to the Baltic occupation in 1939-45 can all be reflected in the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula.

¹²⁵ *About Maidan* (National Museum To The Heavenly Hundred Heroes And Revolution of Dignity Museum).

¹²⁶ V. Vasilenko. *Russian-Ukrainian War 2014: reasons, progress and political and legal assessments* (Ukrainian, 2014) p. 28-42.

After a pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovich fled Ukraine in February 2014,¹²⁷ his removal from executive power meant that Ukraine was finally coming out of the Russian shadow of influence.¹²⁸ As a result, Russian leaders faced a dilemma: 1) to accept the collapse of its imperial project or 2) to resort to military troops and territorial aggression.¹²⁹ According to the previous observations, it is not unexpected the Russian Federation leaned in favor of military aggression against Ukraine. Therefore, according to the testimonies of separatist leaders placed by the Russian government in Crimea, the preparations for the annexation of Crimea were first suggested by the Russian businessman K. Malofeev and D. Sablin, a member of the Federation Council of the

¹²⁷ “November 21, 2013, 1500 people came to the central square to protest the fact that pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovich had suddenly refused to sign the long-anticipated agreement on Ukraine's associate membership in the European Union - a document that embodied the nation's European aspirations in the years following Independence. On the night of November 30, several hundred activists, mostly students who had continued to remain on the square, were brutally dispersed by the police. In response, on December 1, hundreds of thousands of people gathered in the center of Kyiv to protest the beatings. The tyrannical actions of the police were the catalyst for people outraged by corruption, usurpation of power, the regime's Russification policy, and rapprochement with Russia.

Against a backdrop of Eurointegration slogans, the protest became known as the EuroMaydan. Eventually, the protest moved toward a complete reboot of the state system known as the Revolution of Dignity. The people demanded the punishment of the police responsible for brutally attacking the student protestors.

On the 61st day of the Maydan, the first two protestors were shot dead on the street. By that time, there were already two more dead further outside the area of confrontation. Throughout the following month, the authorities tried to force the protestors out of the city center. Most of the Heavenly Hundred heroes died of gunshot wounds on February 20, 2014. [Not including other numbers] 107 victims of the Revolution of Dignity have been officially identified.

On the night of February 22, 2014, President Yanukovich fled to Russia on a charter flight.” (taken from *National Museum To The Heavenly Hundred Heroes And Revolution of Dignity Museum*).

¹²⁸ Ukrainian justice department has found the former president Viktor Yanukovich guilty of treason by inviting Russia to invade Ukraine and reverse a pro-Western revolution that eventually toppled his government.

Yanukovich also was charged with asking Vladimir Putin to send Russian troops to invade Ukraine. The Obolonskiy court in Kyiv sentenced him 13 years in prison.

Andrew E. Kramer. *Ukraine's Ex-President Is Convicted of Treason* (New York Times, 2019).

¹²⁹ Golovko, V. “Russian Annexation of Crimea.” *Institute of Ukrainian History NASU*, Encyclopedia of History of Ukraine, 2019. history.org.ua/?termin=2.19.13. Accessed March 2021. (translated by author).

Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. Although Malofeev denies he had anything to do with the plan of action, according to the Russian newspaper *Novaya Gazeta*, at the beginning of February 2014, with the initiative of K. Malofeev, there was an analytical note sent to the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, which justified the need to occupy Crimea.¹³⁰

In the middle of February 2014, Russia moved from talking to acting, namely, attempting to destabilize the political situation in Ukraine. Additionally, Russian separatists also acknowledged that they played secondary roles, like infiltrating and establishing multiple paid anti-Ukrainian rallies in Crimean regions, while Russia took care of the major parts. Generally speaking, the intel says that the annexation-plan was outlined during V. Konstantinov's (is a Crimean and Russian politician serving the current Chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea) visit to Moscow on February 19-20.¹³¹

Meanwhile, the official statement from the Security Service of Ukraine supports the earlier mentioned intel by stating that: "The armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine began on February 20, 2014, due to the first registered cases of violation of international legal obligations of the Russian Federation in regards to crossing the state border of Ukraine to block Ukrainian military units. Such violation was first witnessed in Kerch Strait, where their military formations were already stationed in Crimea, due to the Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the status

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

and conditions of the Russian Federation's settlement of the Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Ukraine starting on May 28, 1997.”¹³²

On the other hand, the Russian government also has evidence which suggest that the beginning of annexation of Crimea happened on February 20, since such date is carved on the medals awarded to the Russian servicemen - members of the troops who participated in the military operations in Crimea in 2014. Furthermore, 200 of such “awarded Russian members” were Russian civilians, in addition to 450 “Kuban Cossacks,” whose mission was to block Ukrainian soldiers from trying to stabilize the situation from the inside. More importantly, it should be emphasized that these sent-in Russians were disguised as Ukrainian civilians to prevent Ukrainian forces from taking measures. Hence, these undercover Russian troops and groups were responsible for continuously constructing the necessary picture needed for the Russian and international media to show “pro-Russian character in Crimea.”¹³³

Nevertheless, on February 24, Russian Federation transferred more of its military units, including airborne forces, which, again, would immediately remove Russian insignias from their uniforms when landing in Crimea to prevent Ukrainian military units from recognizing their military standing. Thus, a stream of Russian participants like paramilitary and those “wishing to participate in military actions” organizations flooded the Peninsula's territory. ¹³⁴ Nonetheless, a turning point for Crimea happened on February 27, 2014, when Russian soldiers without identification (in the Western and Ukrainian media, referred to as the “green men” because Russia denied them to be its

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

servicemen) blocked the building of the Crimean Parliament and the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Simferopol. As a result, the meeting of deputies of the Crimean autonomy was held under the barrels of Russian machine guns, during which the head of the Crimean Peninsula was replaced by S. Aksyonov, the leader of the “Russian Unity” party.¹³⁵

One of the most popular Russian strategies that the Ukrainian government dealt with at that time was the Russian cover-up of its servicemen and Russian “volunteering fighters” in Crimea. Such implementation was used to try and provoke the Ukrainian state to engage in a military operation, which would give them a chance to legitimize sending its troops to Ukraine. Though, because many of Russia’s people already were in Crimea and some regions of the Eastern Ukraine, the theater was mainly made for the international community. Therefore, one of the pieces of evidence that supports suggested idea is the statement made by the head of Russian Duma, S. Naryshkin, who called O. Turchynov (an acting president of Ukraine from February 23-June 7 2014) and threatened him on behalf of the Russian President, V. Putin, that if at least one Russian serviceman dies, then Ukrainian government as well as Ukrainian soldiers will be announced as criminals and will be chased all around the world. However, although the statement is illogical since Russian forces had already infiltrated and invaded some of the Ukrainian territories, it signified that Russian troops were indeed in Ukraine. However, instead of crossing the Crimean border and utilizing the leftover military resources, the Ukrainian government decided to use any possible international measures, following the liberalist playbook.¹³⁶

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

The Ukrainian government decided to appeal to the international community, particularly to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum signatories. The terms of the “Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,”¹³⁷ essentially known as the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, confirms the following:

1. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the Independence and Sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.
2. [...] reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
6. [...] will consult in the event a situation arises which raises a question concerning these commitments.

While referring to titles 1 and 2, although it is clear that the Russian Federation violated both, the other signatories made little progress in coming together to consult and decide what should be done to prevent further violation of “Independence and Sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.” However, the lack of action was resolved as some of the most powerful actors stated, the document which was traded for

¹³⁷ *Memorandum on safety guarantees in connection with the accession of Ukraine to an Agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons Ukraine, Russian Federation, Great Britain [...]; Memorandum, International document from 05.12.1994.*

the disarmament of the third biggest nuclear arsenal, the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 “is not a security assurance agreement.”

Meanwhile, other nuclear states, like France and China (who signed the Budapest Memorandum later and gave somewhat weaker individual assurances in separate documents) interpreted its provisions in such a way that they themselves did not threaten Ukraine and also have no obligation to force third states to implement the memorandum. Additionally, France declared its support for Ukraine, while China refrained from any statements. The Russian Federation, however, rejected taking into account the Budapest Memorandum at all, since it was quite clear that Bismark’s remarks about Russia and its respect for international legal obligations were accurate.

Nevertheless, on February 28, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine called on the Russian Federation to stop aggressive actions while called on other Budapest Memorandum members to reinforce Ukraine’s security guarantees. Additionally, there were multiple invitations sent out to OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) and the Council of Europe to confront the situation. However, after having no substantial reply for two weeks, the Ukrainian government sent out another appeal to the Russian Federation, demanding its aggression to stop and its troops to be called away from Ukrainian regions. Meanwhile, Ukrainian officials also requested the guarantor states of the Budapest Memorandum - “to take practical measures aimed at ensuring the territorial integrity and defense of Ukraine.”¹³⁸ However, the hope for the effectiveness of the Budapest Memorandum was in vain since though the United States and the United Kingdom made various spoken and written statements of their support for Ukraine’s

¹³⁸ Ibid.

territorial integrity, the two also indicated that the de jure document (Budapest Memorandum of 1994) is not a security assurance agreement.¹³⁹

After March 4, 2014, however, when Russian President Putin received the consent of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation to use regular Russian troops to begin the total invasion of Ukraine, some argue that the momentum was somewhat gone. In other words, the Russian President knew that the events of an early election of the President of Ukraine would make Moscow lose its main argument about the “illegitimate power” in Kyiv after Yanukovich fled Ukraine to Russia.¹⁴⁰ Hence, on March 18, the “Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on the admission of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation and the formation of new entities within the Russian Federation” was signed by the self-proclaimed leaders of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by Alexey Chaly, who also happens to be a Russian citizen. Thus, till March 21, Russian authorities quickly carried out all the formal procedures for the inclusion of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol as a part of the Russian Federation, thus establishing the Crimean Federal District.

International Response

This section analyzes the international aid aspect of this case study. Therefore, although there were many instances of verbal and written support for Ukrainian sovereignty (from various presidents to their representatives in Ukraine) and them

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Similar thought-process was made during the invasion of Poland, when the Soviet Russian officials notified Polish ambassador that Poland no longer exists, and thus needs to be occupied to prevent from any misfortunes happening; as if it was a big concern or a threat for the USSR.

condemning Russian belligerence towards Ukraine, and even though some implemented economic and political sanctions, there was no military aid in sight. Above all, the Western leaders also discouraged the Ukrainian government from using any militia or try to counter-attack the Russian Federation. In other words, Ukraine's Western partners were vigorously and persistently discouraging the use of the Ukrainian military and weaponry to protect its territories from Russian soldiers and their attacks. Nonetheless, Western partners later explained that these decisions were because they had underestimated Russia's aggressive intentions, which is similar to the outcome of Poland's invasion and its allies' failure to follow through with their established military agreements. Therefore, the Western European leaders and its American partners hoped that the Russian military aggression would only be used to threaten Ukraine with weapons and that the resolution of the conflict would eventually return to the normal ways of political negotiations and diplomacy. Nevertheless, it is now clear that they misinterpreted the Russian intentions by a big margin: the attacks and violation of any international norms continue to be violated by the Russian government as of this writing in 2021 (not to mention the current gathering of militia and servicemen on the new Ukrainian-Russian border once again as of April 2021).

Undoubtedly, though Ukrainian military forces were in bad shape after the presidency of Victor Yanukovich, Ukraine showed an incredible mobilization of its civilian-made forces. These self-organized voluntary battalions were not only highly effective in fighting against Russian forces in Donbas and Lugansk (the events of "Airport of Donetsk" in 2014 speak for themselves) but were the most potent Ukrainian power that deterred Russian forces from spreading deeper into Ukraine. Therefore, during

the judicial procedure on the treason of V. Yanukovich, on February 7, 2014, Igor Tenyukh, who was acting as Minister of Defense from February 27 to March 25 in 2014, emphasized the significance of these quickly civilian-made forces. Moreover, General Tenyukh also shared some revolutionary details on the Russian annexation of Crimea, where he said:

I will speak frankly. Today we do not have an army. It was systematically destroyed by Yanukovych and his entourage under the leadership of Russian intelligence... Today, we will be able to gather a military group of about 5,000 servicemen from all over the country capable of performing a combat mission.¹⁴¹

When Oleksandr Turchinov (who was an acting President after Yanukovich fled in 2014) asked General Tenyukh about the estimated numbers of Russian forces in Crimea, Tenyukh answered:

On the Russian side in Crimea, in addition to the Black Sea Fleet, there is a constant transfer of assault units of the armed forces and special forces of the GRU of the General Staff of the Russian Federation. Already, the combat component exceeds 20, 000 people. However, the number of Russian service members, military equipment, and weaponry, constantly increases.¹⁴²

Unfortunately, no matter how many recommendations and much guidance General Tenyukh tried to provide to the Ukrainian government, all of them were ignored because it seemed that the Ukrainian government still relied on diplomatic means (as previously recommended by the Western partners) and hoped Ukrainian allies would start acting soon.

¹⁴¹ *Stenogram Meeting of the National Security and Defense Council under the chairmanship of VO President of Ukraine, Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine O.V. Turchinov on February 28, 2014. On urgent measures to ensure national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine (Ukraine) p.11.*

¹⁴² (*Stenogram Meeting, p.12*).

During one of O. Turchinov's interviews¹⁴³ on the channel called *Crimea. Realities*, he shared some of his private conversations with American and European partners. He noted that Ukrainian Westerns partners were not too keen on providing him with weapons to protect Ukraine from Russian military invasion and recommended instead abandoning mobilization of Ukrainian forces so as not to "provoke Russia:"

The aggression begins. I instruct to contact all our strategic partners and guarantors of our security and demand the implementation of the Budapest Memorandum. Ambassadors of leading states came to me immediately. Obama sent me Joe Biden (then the US Vice President) and John Kerry (then the US Secretary of State)... I spoke with Angela Merkel (Federal Chancellor of Germany) and with many political leaders or their representatives. I was told: 'The Budapest Memorandum is a political declaration. Our soldiers will not fight on your side.' So, the nuclear weapons were real [reference to denuclearization of Ukrainian arsenal], and the treaty was a political declaration?

Thus, the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 seems to be rather a weak declaration since all Ukraine got was denuclearization and a weakened position to protect itself against non-other but one of the major authoritarian actors - Russia. All in all, it is certainly interesting to see how this particular memorandum had a significant trading point, where the Ukrainian side gave up a real object, and nothing substantial was received in return from other signatories of the international agreement.

As the interview went on, Mr. Turchinov continued:

I asked them to at least help us with weapons. After all, then we were catastrophically short of weapons and military equipment. And I was told: 'Sorry, we will help you only at the diplomatic level, only international diplomatic assistance. Because military supplies will provoke Russia to intensify aggression.' When they called me and asked to cancel the mobilization because we were 'provoking Russia,' I replied that we had no other options to defend the country... The main conclusion I made during those terrible events was that each country should rely only on itself. Our European partners are afraid of war.

¹⁴³ Angelik Rudenko and Victoria Veriva. *Pandora's Box' Putin and Tips of the West: Why Ukraine Did Not Get Crimea Back in 2014?* (Crimea.Realities, 2020).

It seems that some of the Ukrainian partners did not want to acknowledge the lack of Ukrainian military capabilities, despite countless requests from Ukrainian officials to purchase weapons from its partners or allies. For example, the US Administration of 2014 had this exact explanation when they claimed “Washington believed Ukraine had enough lethal aid and the types of weaponry requested for Ukraine would be of only marginal value. They had also emphasized the need for a diplomatic outcome.”¹⁴⁴ Moreover, during one of the 2015 CNN interviews¹⁴⁵ with President Obama, commentator Fareed Zakaria asked the President if Russia was ready to settle a political deal. The President responded:

You know, so far, what we’ve seen is a lot of talk in public – with Chancellor Merkel and President [UNINTELLIGIBLE] and ourselves – in which he will say one thing but his actions tell another tale. And what we’ve consistently seen is that the separatists are Russian financed, Russian trained; their strategy comes from Russia; Russian troops support them. And so we have not yet seen a recognition on the part of the Kremlin that it is in Russia’s interests to resolve this issue over the long term. So in addition to continuing to exact costs on Russia, one of the most important things we can do is to continue to support the Ukrainian economy and the reform efforts that are coming out of Kiev [Kyiv]... And so we’re going to keep on these dual tracks – putting more pressure on Russia, bolstering Ukraine, delivering a message to Mr. Putin that these off ramps and diplomatic resolutions remain available.

Nonetheless, there seems to be a contradiction, since at first, President Obama acknowledges that he knows how President Putin says one thing and then does another. However, he also concludes that the best option is to support Ukraine economically but still have “diplomatic resolutions remain available.” So if the first principle says that the

¹⁴⁴ Warren Strobel and Patricia Zengerle. *Exclusive: U.S. increasing non-lethal military aid to Ukraine* (Reuters, 2014).

¹⁴⁵ U.S. Embassy Kyiv. *CNN Interview with President Obama – Excerpts on Ukraine* (2015).

Russian actor does not possess any credibility in his words, why would it be optimal to follow the negotiation and diplomatic path?

Nevertheless, the US President also spoke about him not being “wildly optimistic at this point that his [V. Putin’s] orientation changes, partly because the one thing that’s been very successful for Mr. Putin is his politics...So he’s looking backwards, not forwards, and perhaps, over time, he changes his mind.” Thus, in the meantime, “we just have to make sure that we’re firm in protecting our allies and supporting the principles that have maintained peace in Europe for the entire post-war period.”

Once again, Western society tried to approach the Russian “democratic” state with its democratic values and ways of negotiating while not understanding that this approach is not successful when it comes to authoritarian states. As a result, the Ukrainian government could only rely on diplomatic (and humanitarian) aid since military assistance was absent from its US allies. Furthermore, Ukraine also had to face and struggle with the EU’s decision to place an arms embargo on Ukraine. Although the EU Foreign Affairs Council did not issue a decision or a regulation, making this embargo not legally binding but instead solely a political commitment, the EU members took it extremely seriously and followed through with the “political commitment.”¹⁴⁶ Nonetheless, to Ukraine’s fortune, the restriction to buy arms was eventually lifted from both the US and European partners on July 16, 2014.

Thus, one should see why I emphasized the importance of the realist theory and the efficiency of the constructivist approach in Chapter II, especially when considering military invasions or when dealing with an authoritarian regime. In other words, because

¹⁴⁶ *EU arms embargo on Ukraine* (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2014).

democratic or Western regimes hold different interpretations of the international order and international law from that of authoritarian, the history of violent occupations, invasions, and attacks from Russia onto Eastern Europe shall continue its cycle if the Western world continues to ignore these significant contrasts between the Western and the authoritarian-Russian world-views.

Nonetheless, like in other cases, here are some examples of Russian violations of the international law due to the Russian annexation of Crimea and invasion of Eastern Ukraine's regions:¹⁴⁷

1. Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, provides that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”
2. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2625: “Reaffirming in terms of the Charter of the United Nations that the maintenance of international peace and security and the development of friendly relations and cooperation between nations are among the fundamental purposes of the United Nations...”
3. Helsinki Accords signed at the closing meeting of the third phase of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
4. Budapest Memorandum of 1994.
5. Alma-Ata Protocol from December 21, 1991.

¹⁴⁷ *Assessment of the argumentation of the Russian Federation regarding the accession of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea* (The National Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015).

- i. This declaration, in particular, provided that the parties recognize and respect each other's territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders.
6. Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the further development of interstate relations dated June 23, 1992.
7. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation dated May 31, 1997.
8. The agreement about the Ukrainian-Russian state border since January 28, 2003.

On the other hand, the tactics used in the events of occupation and later annexation of Crimea:

1. Preparations beforehand for the future invasion of the targeted territory/state.
2. No declaration of war.
3. Engaging in international law and its obligations while using international standards of cooperation as a tool of advancing Russian planning to further seizing Ukraine's territories.
4. Sending out countless servicemen and troops without acknowledging their presence in the targeted state. Nonetheless, the deployment was initiated to attack Ukrainian territories.
5. Disguising Russian soldiers as Ukrainian civilians, knowing the democratic states will not shoot civilians. Meanwhile, when the Russian militia is present, it tends to hind behind civilian backs.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁸ Transcript of the video:

6. “Intervention...only for the good of the people” or “Saving our brothers and sisters” theme.
7. Using international leaders’ lack of understanding of Eastern European relation with Russia throughout history (culturally, historically, politically), which, if not for Russian propaganda, “we are all brothers,” might have had a better understanding, and there was a less positive association of Eastern Europeans with Russians.
 - i. “I expect Russia and Ukraine to have a strong relationship. They are historically bound together in all sorts of cultural and social ways...”¹⁴⁹

(One of V. Putin's 2014 press-conferences) This is only for the protection of Ukrainian citizens. And let one of the Ukrainian military personnel try shooting their people and we will stand behind them. Not in front of the citizens, but BEHIND them. Let them try shooting women and children.

(Another interview with V. Putin in 2021) After all, this is how terrorists act when they drive women and children ahead of them.

Putin Accidentally Admitted that Russia Acted As A Terrorist in Crimea (2014).

¹⁴⁹ *President Barack Obama’s Final News Conference* (2017).

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

The thesis' folklore of "The One-Eyed Man And The Wicked Boar" has many meanings, metaphors, and lessons. However, like history, this story also has an open-ended conclusion. In other words, what comes next depends on a next-generation or an abrupt event. Although the story of these two characters (the One-Eyed Man or the Western community with its international order and the Wicked Boar or the authoritarian actor, Russia) allegedly ended in the 20th century, especially with the fall of the USSR, the risks and uncertainties, as the history of 21st century shows, have not vanished. Nevertheless, after consulting international theories of realism, liberalism, and especially constructivism, as well as looking at different interactions between Eastern European states and Russia with its authoritarian nature, the patterns show themselves immediately. Although it might be upsetting to see such horrific historical events occur today, it should be even more alarming to the Western leaders since the severe threat might be closer than first presupposed.

One of the questions posed in Chapter I is about the relation between the case study and the made-up folklore story. On the one hand, the examples presented in the case study, which are: 1) Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918), 2) Soviet Invasion of Poland (1939-1940), 3) Soviet Occupation of Baltic States (1939-1945), and 4) Russian Annexation of Crimea (2014) can all represent the missing left eye of the Man. However, what was sad to discover was the fact that the Man did not even try to defend his eye equitably or, even when lost, try and get it back. Parallel to that, one would instantly

remember the quotations from Chapter III, where various Western leaders negated the necessity of helping Eastern European countries to come out of Soviet Russia's shadow, and instead, supported the idea of the region's "cultural and historical similarities." Moreover, as FDR implied, "European people [rather Eastern European] will simply have to endure Russian domination, in the hope that in ten or twenty years they will be able to live well with the Russians."¹⁵⁰ Hence, it is arguable that the One-Eyed Man lost his left eye, not in a fight against the Wicked Boar, but gave it away willingly, possibly hoping to save some part of his household, and most importantly, to keep his right eye.

Unfortunately, the One-Eyed Man had miscalculated the outcome by a large margin. As J. Mearsheimer once noted in his work, "Political competition among states is a much more dangerous business than mere economic intercourse; the former can lead to war, and war often means mass killing on the battlefields as well as mass murder of civilians."¹⁵¹ Therefore, the Wicked Boar came back to pay another visit to an old foe when he annexed part of European regions in 2014, a piece of Ukraine, Crimean Peninsula.

Nonetheless, it is essential to acknowledge that the One-Eyed Man found himself in a grave position in the 20th century when a large part of his home was damaged and taken away. However, it was not only the economic resources that the Eastern European countries could have provided to the Western world, instead of having them taken away by the Soviet authoritarians, but it was a missed opportunity to build a truly strong barrier for Europe. As Mearsheimer said, "Even when a great power achieves a distinct military advantage over its rivals, it continues looking for chances to gain more power. The

¹⁵⁰ (Cienciala, p. 173-194).

¹⁵¹ (Mearsheimer, p.32-33).

pursuit of power stops only when hegemony is achieved,”¹⁵² which is something the Russian Empire, Soviet Russia, and nowadays the Russian Federation, all have sought as their primary goal.

To summarize the ultimate Russian goal or a dream in one sentence, one should refer to the famous words of Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovsky, who is an old Russian politician and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. Zhirinovsky explained that Russians dream of a day “when Russian soldiers can wash their boots in the warm waters of the Indian Ocean,”¹⁵³ and he certainly did not mean a vacation-like trip. Although Russia has many strategic ways of achieving such “dream,” it is also important to add that Russia certainly knows how to utilize its “post-imperial ideology [that] endows a sense of victimization, which in turn sets three foreign policy goals: to be recognized and empathized with as a victim by others in the international system, maximizing territorial sovereignty, and maximizing status. This ideology is also reflected in behavioral patterns: these nation-states adopt the position of victim and cast those it interacts with as victimizers, justify their international stances using a discourse of oppression and discrimination, hold stricter views on territorial inviolability, and are sensitive to perceived loss of face that relates to a desire to regain a 'lost' status.”¹⁵⁴

J. Mearsheimer puts it similarly, where he talks about the period when a great power starts to think and act offensively with regard to other states. As a result, three general patterns of behavior appear: fear, self-help, and power maximization.¹⁵⁵ When applied to the Russian case, the analysis presumes that the “fear” component is connected

¹⁵² (Mearsheimer, p.34).

¹⁵³ BBC. *EUROPE | Zhirinovsky: Russia's Political Eccentric* (BBC News, 2000).

¹⁵⁴ Harris Mylonas and Kendrick Kuo. *Nationalism and Foreign Policy* (2017).

¹⁵⁵ (Mearsheimer, p.32).

to the all-known idea of Western powers wanting to “get Russia.” The idea of engaging in a full-blown military conflict is somewhat fearful for the Russian Federation since Russia’s previous engagement with the US, for example, brought the USSR to its fall. The “self-help” portion of Mearsheimer’s theory mainly addresses the Russian government’s engagements with its people as they emphasize and propagate the invasion of foreign territories to be an act of freeing “Russian brothers and sisters,” even if those “potential relatives” have no connections whatsoever. Lastly, the concept of “power maximization” explains the overall mission of the Russia’s existence, which should have come across quite clearly after examining the chapter on Eastern European case study.

Thus, the One-Eyed Man should have realized earlier on that “The root of the problem is that power calculations alone do not determine which side wins a war. Clever strategies, for example, sometimes allow less powerful states to defeat more powerful foes.”¹⁵⁶ The idea can be seen in the case of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, where a weak state in cooperation with a powerful ally joined their military capabilities and successfully dispatched the Red Army, the Bolshevik groups, and other Russian civilians who were encroaching on Ukrainian domestic and international affairs.

As a result, maybe it was not in the One-Eyed Man’s best interest to give away a perfectly healthy and functioning eye, hoping the Wicked Boar would be satisfied just with that.

One of the other patterns seen throughout the four historical examples is the notion that the Western world is not inclined to investigate and essentially learn about the mechanics of Russian nature, which should be investigated through its people. Like any

¹⁵⁶ (Mearsheimer, p.34).

state, it is very important to look at its core, or its people, whose job is to keep its government in check, which recently means holding and exhibiting democratic values. However, such significant misunderstanding might be the key reason why the cycle of Russian attacks has not been broken. Maybe, there is no desire to acknowledge that a Wicked Boar is still a boar, especially if it shows up in a suit and starts to walk like a man. In other words, if the One-Eyed Man represents a democratic regime, then the Wicked Boar is an authoritarian regime suited up in a democratic packaging.

Nonetheless, to make the issue a bit clearer and to fathom what makes Russia a long-standing authoritarian regime, it is crucial to look at the Russian people and their goals for Russian state. Surely, there should be some answers.

Support for the Russian Authoritarian Regime

After the USSR was dissolved, the Russian leaders quickly gathered what was left of the states who had yet to rebel and succeed, and called it the Russian Federation. To keep up with the essential goal of creating a Russian world-system, where at first it was meant to be a communist world, where after the rebranding, the officials decided to keep up with the fashion and chose a democratic suit, all for the next Russian Empire to come into being. All in all, as President Putin said in 2005, “The collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the twentieth century.¹⁵⁷ Accordingly, this single phrase shows Putin’s true intentions to rebuild or come back to the olden days, where Russia was “the ‘boss’... of the synthetic state... strives to make the world believe that the other nations are natural members of one big Russian family whose papa sits in

¹⁵⁷ Reuters Staff. *Putin, before vote, says he'd reverse Soviet collapse if he could: agencies* (Reuters, 2018).

the Kremlin.”¹⁵⁸ Though, to see what Russian people seek in their leaders, one should consider why the first President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, who served from 1991 to 1999, decided to make Vladimir Putin (an ex-KGB official) his successor in 2000.

Generally speaking, Putin came to power because B. Yeltsin started to show weakness and an inability to persuade his people that he was still their “tzar,” a Russian leader with extreme power and a promise to build “Great Russia;” but mainly through expansion. Therefore, after Chechnya declared its independence, right after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, B. Yeltsin had to prove to the Russian people that he still possessed the qualities they wanted in their leading face - supreme power. Thus, on December 11, 1994, the Russian President signed a decree to employ a military operation in the Chechen Republic and begin a war.¹⁵⁹ However, Russian forces were not able to succeed in restoring Chechnya to the Russian brotherhood, as Yeltsin promised his people, since, on August 31, 1996, Russia settled for a peace agreement between the two independent countries. The agreement presupposed Russian troops being entirely removed from the Chechen Republic by December 31, 1996, and also required the Russian Federation to recognize its independence.¹⁶⁰ As *The Guardian* wrote in 1999 about the aftermath of Russian “defeat,” “Russian public opinion is notoriously fickle and the mood could swing against Mr. Yeltsin.”¹⁶¹ Nonetheless, the public opinion indeed caused the dreaded for the President internal pressure, which made Yeltsin resign by the

¹⁵⁸ Lev E. Dobriansky. *The Vulnerable Russians* (Pageant Press, 1967) p.127.

¹⁵⁹ This day in history. *First Chechen War*. (This day in history).

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ I. Traynor. *Three years after a bungled war that killed 80,000, Yeltsin plans another invasion of Chechnya* (The Guardian, 1999).

end of 1999 and appoint his chosen successor, former Russian Prime Minister - Vladimir Putin.

On the other hand, despite Yeltsin's extreme popularity in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which even gathered praise from some international faces for "democratizing" Russia, because he lost the violent war in Chechnya and essentially allowed it to break away from Russia, the Russian society saw it as a weakening point for their state. Therefore, because Yeltsin failed to show the expansionist Russian power, he was now looked down on, if not hated, by the Russian population, leading to his last impeachment allegations: guilty of treason, first-degree murder, and plotting to sell out Russia to the West.¹⁶² As a result, Yeltsin announced his resignation on December 31, 1999, and in his New Year speech, he asked the Russian people for forgiveness due to his past mistakes and disappointments, hence declaring his successor to take over; rather unique New Year present from President Yeltsin. Moreover, the reader should also understand the essence of Russia's character, which ultimately seeks chauvinistic-like power, since Vladimir Putin had to grant the former President Yeltsin immunity from being prosecuted for his failures.¹⁶³ However, unlike his predecessor, Vladimir Putin understood what he needed to give Russian people to stay in power. As *The New York Times* wrote in 2000, "Mr. Putin, a former KGB official, has become Russia's most popular politician because of his tough-minded conduct of the war in Chechnya. He is now more than ever considered a strong favorite for the March elections."¹⁶⁴ Nonetheless, the current "tzar" seems to be keeping his popularity and Russian throne, as he recently signed a law that allows him to

¹⁶² Guardian staff and agencies. *Yeltsin impeachment hearings begin*. (The Guardian, 1999).

¹⁶³ History.com Editors. *Boris Yeltsin* (History.com, 2009).

¹⁶⁴ C. Bohlen. *Yeltsin Resigns, Naming Putin as Acting President To Run in March Election* (The New York Times, 2000).

become a leader of the Russian state for another two terms, until 2038,¹⁶⁵ to plan out the future of “the Great Russia,” with new territories in mind. Moreover, President Putin also noted how far he is willing to go:

I hope that no one will think of crossing the so-called red line in relation to Russia. And where it will take place - we will determine in each specific case ourselves [he stressed]... However, if someone from foreign states perceives Moscow’s good intentions as weakness and intends to “burn all bridges”, then this country should know that Russia’s response will be “asymmetric, quick and tough.”¹⁶⁶

Therefore, after analyzing and looking at one of the modern examples (not to dismiss the past patterns), one can conclude that the authoritarian regime which has been representing the state for hundreds of years, couldn’t have survived and exist if it was not for the all-around support of the populace. Hence, it is unfortunate to see how the Western society continues to think of the masked authoritarian state or the Wicked Boar as of itself or the One-Eyed Man. Although it is nevertheless true that the Boar suited up and wears a tie today, such should not signify a drastic change. After all, if the One-Eyed Man paid enough attention to the true historical facts of the Eastern European history and its battles with Russia and did not submit to the “old Russian political tradition, [which] ordered a rewriting of the early histories of Ukraine, White Ruthenia, and Muscovy (Russia),”¹⁶⁷ today’s dangers of Russian annexation could have been avoided. Moreover, it is astonishing to see the cluelessness of many, since “Moscow not only complies dishonest records of its own history, but reaches far back to distort and twist the chronicles of earlier times to fit its propaganda,”¹⁶⁸ which somehow still holds with the

¹⁶⁵ Online.ua. *Putin signed a law on his own right to presidency by 2036*. (Online.ua, 2021).

¹⁶⁶ *Putin Warned Against Crossing ‘Red Lines’ In Relations With Russia* (RBK, 2021).

¹⁶⁷ (Dobriansky, p.133).

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

Western European education or politics as well as in the US. In other words, if the One-Eyed Man was certain that the Wicked Boar could have benefited him at large, thus trading his left eye for the possibility of the boar bringing him acorns but mostly leaving him in peace, in the 21st century, such proved itself to be an inadequate strategy. To put it differently, if Western Europe had chosen to fight instead of flight in the 20th century, Russia would not have had a chance to grow economically, because as Lev E. Dobriansky explained, “Russia would be a second-rate power if deprived of its economically rich captive nations.”¹⁶⁹

That being said, gathering human resources and food supplies for the Russian state is the key principle to keep it afloat. One of main reasons for Russia to initiate an armed aggression against Ukraine was always because of the systemic crisis of its statehood. Even today, the continuous authoritarian hostility against Ukraine shows how much Russian Federation seeks to absorb Ukraine, its material and human resources, which serve as one of the key prerequisites to deploy the Russian Imperial Project.¹⁷⁰ Thus, to reach the Russian-world-hegemony, where a big part of it was lost during the fall of the USSR, Russia first needs to establish its control over Ukrainian territories. As Immanuel Kant once said, “It is the desire of every state, or of its ruler, to arrive at a condition of perpetual peace by conquering the whole world, if that were possible.”¹⁷¹ However, though the idea of Soviet unity with Eastern Europe was previously supported by leaders like FDR, Churchill, and other influential officials, the world of “Russian peace,” in reality, has a very different pretext and does not stop at the Eastern European

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ukrainian Institute of National Memory. *To the 5th year-anniversary of the beginning of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine* (UINM, 2019).

¹⁷¹ (Mearsheimer, p.34).

border. The essential thinking had to be that because of the many engagements that Eastern European countries had with Russia, their history, culture, and plans for the future must be similar, which was nothing more than a fruit of well planted Soviet Russian propaganda. However, even today, certain interviews and decision-making show a similar perception of Russia and Eastern European states, which is not only unfortunate but extremely dangerous for Western Europe.

Consequences And Theoretical Scenario

Nonetheless, suppose the perspective and thus the situation does not change. The Western European community continues to hope for its eastern neighbors to be a substantial pay-off to the Wicked Board like it was in the past century, while also hoping that the suited-up Boar will not come for Man's leftover crops, household, and most importantly - his right eye. However, to change such a perspective on European necessities, it might be extremely useful to consult, if not with the Eastern European history, then with George Orwell's *Animal Farm*, which was inspired by the true and horrific events of Russian totalitarianism in Eastern Europe, while also serving as an inspiration in creating a tale for this thesis. On the other hand, to provide more substantial evidence that there is an objective basis for authoritarian Russia having its boots on Western European soil, it is beneficial to look at the events of 1945, the Division of Germany.

Although Eastern European countries had to endure an uncivil Soviet-authoritarian regime for almost 50 years, and for others even longer, some of Western Europe did have a chance to feel and go through similar experiences. The treatment of

East Germany and its people from 1945 to 1989 is a common chapter in various historical textbooks, where the creation of the wall was never attributed as pleasant or tolerable enough event to live in. Moreover, it is commonly acknowledged how hard the superpower leaders fought to break down the Berlin Wall and free the eastern portion of Germany, where people were suffering so much they were fearless of bullets or death, if that meant having a chance to reach the western side of the wall. With this image in mind, let us move our attention to the Eastern European states that serve as the guideline to this thesis.

Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, as well as other states were all sacrificed one way or another and admittedly put on hold for almost a century by Western leaders. Furthermore, after achieving their independence, these states were once again conjectured to have similarities in culture, language, and history with their captor. Therefore, if Western Europe mistakenly believes that possible and God-forbid, successful Russian corruption of Eastern Europe will not affect those states located in Western Europe and approach other continents down the road, it is at most important to revisit the archives of the 20th century Eastern Europe and look at the precedent event of the Division of Germany. The Russian position made in Crimea can be seen as a message that the Wicked Boar is coming, and it is yet to have received what it wants. Furthermore, though it might start with Ukraine, it is adequate to assume that Russian boots will not stop there and be ready to reach Western borders with even more power, people, and resources to occupy, seize, and invade.

Therefore, when the One-Eyed Man was close to losing his right eye (Division of Germany), as the Wicked Boar got too close to him, the Man realized which seeds he

planted to get such rotten fruit in the end. However, after the time had passed and the Wicked Boar started to dress in a suit, the alertness and feeling of danger passed away, and the One-Eyed Man went back to his usual back-scratching tactic, thinking that the rebranded Wicked Boar will not want to get his right eye.

On the other hand, why is the One-Eyed Man not mad if the Wicked Boar steals his crops and other resources? Why? Because the One-Eyed Man is missing his left eye, it is helpful to imply that he does not see any issues happening, especially if it is of convenience to him. In other words, he is using his missing left eye as an excuse if others ask him if he does not notice what is happening to his farm, his household. However, let us agree that the One-Eyed Man knows about these issues, but he might not want to acknowledge them, thinking that he might make the Wicked Boar angry. Plus, he thinks, “Has the Wicked Boar not changed and became a good neighbor?”

Despite all “but,” the lesson is clear. The nature of this Boar is wicked because he wants it all, and he wants it now, not stopping till he gets the wanted object. As a result, this leads one to question whether the Western allies are prepared to be willingly passive with this problematic and dangerous behavior and continue believing in Russian propaganda, and hence bear to witness another cycle of Russian territorial invasions, occupation, and annexation, making the undeniable and clear evidence of the past seem invisible once again.

Overall, this folklore entails many ideas, cautions, and overall predictions for the future, since the result of the Russian occupation and Western response seem to follow the same pattern for the past two centuries. Therefore, after losing stability and prosperity in Eastern Europe and placing them under Russian influence and superiority (losing the

left eye), the European continent has lost a significant part of its power. If we consult the history of the European continent before Russia was successful in meddling in European affairs to invade and corrupt, we see a strong European continent with multiple stable and promising nations. Consequently, today, the international order and its leaders, the One-Eyed Man, have a chance to bring their left eye back and put it back where it belongs, turning the One-Eyed Man into a Man again.

Lastly, as Serhiy Plokhii once noted in his work - Ukraine - is the gate of Europe, and although at first, I only partially understood what the title meant, after spending countless hours at various virtual historical archives, the realization of what has been happening and what is meant to cycle back was surreal. During one of the days, while researching the invasion of Poland, I stumbled across the official numbers of how many Central Ukrainians, who already were dispatched from serving, were sent out to Poland. The majority also came from Kyiv, which definitely took away all the air I had in my lungs. It took me five seconds to regain my composure to re-read the words and numbers, and then finally let out a wince because for some unknown reason, now, I was bawling my eyes out, even though I have never met these Ukrainian men and never knew them. Nevertheless, despite all, here I was, sitting and knowing that history is rather more predictable than many think, knowing that I might be reading the possible future scenario. And yes, maybe I did not know those men from the 20th century, but I know many from the 21st, and it shocked and irritated me, as I realized that history and time might have already prepared another verdict.

As a consequential ending, if the One-Eyed Man does not ultimately realize the true nature of the Wicked Boar and continues using his missing left eye as an excuse,

there might be a continuation of George Orwell's story, but in a less literary form and with horrific consequences for Western European and American future generations to deal with as a result. However, no one said the story's protagonist could not establish a strong military alliance with the old Eastern European gatekeepers to ensure the authoritarian agenda of the Wicked Boar does not spread beyond the Russian border.

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