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NEW IRELAND
MEN IN PURSUIT OF A FORLORN HOPE,
1779-1784

In the late spring of 1779 a British armada sailed from Halifax, Nova Scotia, crossed the mouth of the Bay of Fundy, and entered Penobscot Bay where it occupied the present-day site of Castine, Maine. While one of its purposes was to establish a military base from which new strategy in the American Revolution could in part be implemented, it was also to make the place a haven for refugee American Loyalists fleeing from rebel persecution. More precisely, the haven was to be the cornerstone of a new British colony whose east-west boundaries were to be the Penobscot and St. Croix rivers. Called New Ireland, the colony was intended to be a permanent one.

The three people who originated the idea for the colony included two Americans, Loyalists John Calef and John Nutting, and one Englishman, William Knox, under-secretary of state for the colonies in the British cabinet headed by Lord Frederick North. Calef and Nutting, although they did not know each other prior to the establishment of New Ireland, had much in common. Both had homes near Boston, Massachusetts, which they had lost because they were Loyalists. Both had developed connections with eastern Maine before the war. And each of them, separately, contacted the British government regarding the future of that region. Nutting's communication was more direct, at least with Under-secretary Knox, the man who would be the prime mover of the scheme in England, but Calef's came first.

Calef, a doctor of medicine and former representative to the Massachusetts provincial assembly,¹ first became linked with the Penobscot Bay area in 1772 when Thomas Hutchinson, lieutenant-governor of Massachusetts, sent him to England to represent settlers at Penobscot who wanted their land claims confirmed by royal grant. Calef presented their case and returned home.

The land confirmations were not yet completed when the rebellion began, and in the meantime, three months before Lexington and Concord, Dr. Calef wrote to Sir Francis Bernard, former governor of Massachusetts now living in London, that the Penobscot people desired the establishment of a separate government for the area. When Bernard passed the idea on to the earl of Dartmouth, then secretary of state for the colonies, he urged its acceptance because it would make a "resort for the persecuted loyalists of New England."² There is no evidence to indicate that the proposal was ever delivered to Dartmouth's successor, Lord George Germain. But, since William Knox held his position under both Dartmouth and Germain, he may have kept it in mind. It did not arise again, however, until John Nutting appeared in England two years later.

Nutting's association in the lumber trade along the Maine coast and his purchase of timber lands on Penobscot Bay indirectly resulted in his involvement in the establishment of New Ireland. His business enterprises attracted the attention of British military authorities in Boston when barracks were needed for incoming troops in 1774. Nutting was asked to supervise their construction and he accepted.

Nutting's continued association with the British after the war began led to his meeting William Knox. His repeated work for the military, building barracks in Boston until its evacuation, then building fortifications at Halifax, Nova Scotia, earned for him a trip to England in 1777. He went

to report on the naval failure to take the rebel outpost of Machias. The office to which he reported was the colonial office; the officer was Knox.³ Nutting and Knox found a mutual interest in the future of Penobscot and, while it is not recorded who initiated discussion on the topic, in January 1778, Knox induced Nutting to write to Lord Germain about the possibility of establishing a post there.

Nutting responded enthusiastically. He described a peninsula whose harbor could hold the entire British navy and was so easily defensible that a thousand men and two ships could protect it against any continental force. He noted how the people of the area were well disposed to British control and how the post would be strategically located to carry the war to New England as well as to protect Nova Scotia from attack.⁴

Nutting did not specifically mention the place as a refuge for Loyalists, but his emphasis (or that of Knox) upon its strategic value was sure to bring a receptive response from Germain. At this particular time Lord George Germain was in need of new military plans. He had become colonial secretary in 1775 because he believed that the rebellion should be suppressed. Given responsibility for planning British strategy in the war,⁵ he employed tactics that had been quite successful early in the struggle; but now, in 1778, events were posing threats to both his position and strategy. The prolonged fighting, the defeat of General John Burgoyne at Saratoga in October of 1777, and the possibility of a French alliance with the Americans were all contributing to the growing demand in England to end the war. In fact, parliamentary opposition would soon cause Prime Minister North to send commissioners to America to discuss peace. In the meantime Germain had to continue military operations, and it was in the midst of this two-way approach to the struggle that Knox had Nutting introduce the potential of Penobscot.⁶

Germain accepted the idea and plans for the post were completed in England in September 1778. Although Germain was primarily concerned with military operations, he broadened the scheme to include the establishment of a new colony in the Penobscot area. Situated between New England and Nova Scotia, it would be called New Ireland,⁷ and it would be a haven for refugee Loyalists, whether or not the war was won.⁸ On September 2 Germain drafted the following orders for General George Clinton, commander-in-chief of British forces in North America:

The distress of the King's loyal American subjects who have been driven from their habitations and deprived of their property by the rebels has been an object of attention with His Majesty and Parliament from the first appearance of the rebellion; and very considerable sums have been expended in furnishing them with a temporary support. But, as their number is daily increasing and is much to be apprehended (if a reconciliation does not soon take place) that scarcely any who retain their principles will be suffered to remain in the revolted provinces, it is judged proper in that event that a permanent provision should be made by which they may be enabled to support themselves and their families without being a continual burden upon the revenue of Great Britain.

The tract of country that lies between Penobscot River and the River St. Croix, the boundary of Nova Scotia on that side, offers itself for the reception of those meritorious but distressed people. And it is the King's intention to erect it into a province . . .

As the first step toward making this establishment it is His Majesty's pleasure, if peace has not taken place and the season of the year is not too far advanced before you receive this, that you do send such a detachment of troops at Nova Scotia, or of the provincials under your immediate command, as you shall judge proper and sufficient to defend themselves against any attempt the rebels in those parts may be able to make during the winter to take post on Penobscot River, taking with them all necessary implements for erecting a fort, together with such ordnance and stores as may be proper for its defense, and a sufficient supply of provisions.⁹

Germain also cited other reasons for the post, repeating the claims that Nutting had listed in his January letter. But he had his own motives as well for the operation. In a November directive to Clinton that was marked "very secret," he reminded the general that keeping the coasts constantly alarmed and destroying or disrupting enemy shipping could be important enough to return the provinces to British allegiance.¹⁰ Note should be made of the earlier suggestion by Germain that provincials be used. With the forthcoming southern campaigns that would ultimately take Lord Charles Cornwallis to Yorktown and defeat, Loyalists were to get their opportunity to support their cause more actively.

The colonial office decided that John Nutting should deliver the orders to General Clinton. Germain and Knox felt that, since Nutting had been a "longtime resident" of the Penobscot region, the personal contact would expedite matters. They also recommended that he be the engineer for the proposed fortifications.¹¹

Nutting sailed immediately for America but ran into trouble on the way. The mail packet on which he was traveling encountered an American privateer, and after a brief battle in which Nutting was wounded (he sank the dispatches he was carrying), he and the packet crew found themselves captives. They were taken to Corunna, Spain, where Nutting was exchanged,¹² and whence he promptly wrote to Knox of his adventures and plight.¹³ Knox in turn communicated a rather forlorn note to Germain. "Poor Nutting and the Penobscot orders," he wrote, "have missed their way for this year and I fear something will happen to prevent our taking possession of the country in the spring."¹⁴

Knox need not have worried. Nutting's copy of the orders for General Clinton was not the only one sent. Consequently, by the time that Nutting got to New York

the following March, many arrangements for the establishment of the post had already been made. And thus Castine was occupied by the British armada in June.

No progress toward official recognition of New Ireland was attempted during the winter and spring of 1779-1780. In October of the first year Germain and Knox approached former Massachusetts Lieutenant-Governor Thomas Hutchinson about the possibility of his becoming the first governor of the new province. Hutchinson's reluctance about the position and his apprehensions for the whole scheme, however, dampened the officials' enthusiasm and they did nothing more about New Ireland's status until the next year.¹⁵

Then, in June 1780, Dr. John Calef made another appearance in London. As he had twice already in the past, Calef came to England as a representative of the Penobscot inhabitants in order to petition the royal government for confirmation of prewar land grants. This time, he had other requests as well. Calef stressed the great needs of a people "destitute of Law and Gospel" and asked for two things for them. A very loyal people who lived in an area of exceptional economic potential, he wrote in his petition, desired that a government separate from Massachusetts Bay be established at Penobscot and that a minister of the Church of England be sent to them.¹⁶ In brief, it was a fine appeal for God, king, and good government, and it gave Germain's office substantial reasons to persuade the rest of the government to establish a new royal colony.

Shortly afterwards, Germain and Knox drew up a constitution for New Ireland for presentation to the cabinet as a whole.¹⁷ It called for a government directed by a governor and privy council and supported by an upper house of legislature which would be appointed by the crown. There would be an elected assembly but its con-

trol of finances – a sore point in previous colonial governmental structures – was to be limited. The executive was to receive a fixed income plus sufficient permanent revenue to support the government. An oath of allegiance would be required of all citizens who, in turn, would be granted parcels of land, the more meritorious Loyalists receiving larger grants, thereby assuring, by their presence, an aristocratic element to the society. The Church of England would be the officially recognized church and its ministers' salaries would be guaranteed by the government. Any questions regarding what English laws would prevail in the colony would be decided by the attorney general's office in London.

Germain presented the constitution to the rest of Lord North's cabinet on August 10 where it was accepted immediately, and the next day George III added his royal approval.¹⁸ But shortly after that, the plan received its first major blow when Attorney General Alexander Wedderburn returned an opinion regarding the government's right to establish another colony in New England. Despite the fact that Massachusetts Bay was then in open rebellion, he declared that such an establishment violated that colony's charter rights; the British government could not organize a new colony within the boundaries of an already established one.¹⁹

Fearing that the law office's decision would hinder any attempt to gain support for the project from the House of Commons, the cabinet turned the project back to the Colonial Office, where Germain decided on a different tack. He would maintain possession of Penobscot as a conquered territory, extend British control as far into the rest of Maine as possible, and leave the whole question of charter violations for the final peace settlement.²⁰ With those intentions in mind he sent off orders to the British commanders in America to make preparations for taking additional territory.²¹

In the meantime Dr. Calef and John Nutting became involved in the new arrangement. Calef attempted to gain support for the colony from William Petty, earl of Shelburne, former secretary of state for the southern department, which had been in charge of American colonial affairs. Although Shelburne had opposed the present administration's handling of the rebellion, he was a man whose influence would be invaluable to New Ireland regardless of the outcome of the war.²² As for Nutting, he was also to take part in the new plans. Having come to London in 1780, he had accepted temporary employment as an engineer for coastal fortifications; and Germain intended that he be sent back to New York for the purpose of joining the force which would occupy Falmouth and there assist in erecting defenses as he had done at Penobscot.²³ Nutting was to have sailed for America in 1781.

The year 1781, however, was an ominous year for the colonial proposal. Nutting did not leave England at the time because there were no further regular offensive military operations in Maine. Two things prevented continued warfare: in the first place, Germain's orders to General Clinton, including the plans for taking Falmouth, fell into the hands of the Americans; and in the second, the secretary's overall strategy was dealt a fatal blow when British General Charles Cornwallis was defeated by Washington at Yorktown in October.²⁴ Well might Germain rationalize the loss of his orders; he could claim that, while they might incite the rebels to strengthen defenses at Falmouth, their publication would certainly induce more Loyalists to move to Penobscot.²⁵ But the disaster at Yorktown was something else. Not only did it destroy any hope for offensives in Maine, it was the final blow to the already tottering administration of Prime Minister Frederick North.

In March 1782, North resigned. He had long been a reluctant officeholder and stayed until then only at the behest of the king. When he left, Germain of course went with him, as did William Knox whose post as undersecretary of state for colonial affairs was abolished.²⁶ Gone was the cabinet that had promoted New Ireland and gone were the British officials who had championed its cause. The colony had received its second major blow.

Undaunted by the loss of so much official support, Calef persisted in his dream. Once again he turned to the earl of Shelburne, now secretary of state for colonial affairs. Hardly had Shelburne been installed in office when Calef presented him with an imposing packet of information dealing with Penobscot. There were letters recommending the doctor.²⁷ Then there was also a document written by Calef and entitled "The State of the Inhabitants of the District of Penobscot, March, 1782." There was a "Memorandum," also by Calef, which lauded the potential growth and development of eastern Maine, included a memorial from the inhabitants of Penobscot requesting a "Royal government," and suggested several methods for bettering the military situation against Massachusetts. There was a supporting document written by Colonel Goldthwaite. And Calef added three more papers: a survey he had made in 1772, an account of the annual exports of the Bagaduce area for the period 1772-1775, and a copy of an opinion (dated December 18, 1717) listing the crown restrictions on the granting of lands east of the Penobscot River.²⁸

Before sailing back to America in April, Calef made several last-minute efforts for support for the colony. He met numerous times with General Guy Carleton, who was to replace General Clinton as commander of British forces in America, and discussed with him the future of Maine.²⁹ He again got the support of Nutting, who wrote to Lord

Shelburne on Calef's behalf and stressed the importance of Penobscot's retention.³⁰ And, finally, he had a last audience with Shelburne before he and Nutting departed from England.³¹

Calef's endeavors were complicated by changes in government. The government of which Shelburne was a member was first headed by the marquis of Rockingham and was furnished with authority by the House of Commons to treat for peace with the Americans, even at the cost of rebel independence. Rockingham died on July 1 and Shelburne took his place as prime minister, holding that position long enough to gain a preliminary peace treaty. During its negotiations Shelburne did not entirely give up the idea of a Loyalist refuge in Maine. In April, while colonial secretary, he had ordered reinforcements to Nova Scotia, elements of which were transferred to Penobscot.³² And until November he had General Carleton devote some attention to the increased protection of Fort George and surrounding territory.³³

By strengthening Great Britain's claim to the eastern territory, Shelburne hoped to have more bargaining power in the negotiations then going on in Paris. Richard Oswald was commissioned to represent the royal government there, and in October Shelburne gave him his directions regarding Penobscot. Oswald was to insist upon as much Maine territory as possible to provide a Loyalist sanctuary. Should, however, the Americans be willing to "make a just provision for the Refugees," Oswald could bargain away the region.³⁴

At Paris Oswald was confronted by a determined John Adams of Massachusetts, one of the five joint commissioners elected by the American Congress to treat for peace with Great Britain. Adams had come to Paris in October well prepared to deal with the question of the Province of Maine. By November 10 all treaty terms

satisfied him except those concerning “Tories and Penobscot.” He saw no reason to compensate people in his country who were “Dishonours and Destroyers.” As for Penobscot, he furnished considerable evidence in support of Massachusetts’s claim to all of Maine, particularly the land east of the Penobscot River. That evidence included a record of the event in which Governor Pownall buried the lead plate in 1759 on the east bank of the Penobscot River, records of prewar town plans for such settlements as Mount Desert and Machias, copies of a grant made by James I to Sir William Alexander which described the western boundary of Nova Scotia (and therefore the eastern boundary of Massachusetts Bay) as the St. Croix River, and statements written by several previous governors of Massachusetts during their terms of office in which each of them claimed that the region was within his jurisdiction.³⁵

In the end the issue was settled by a vague compromise. Adams and the Americans wanted the eastern district; Oswald wanted some recognition of the Loyalists’ plight. What the Englishman got was sparse indeed; he gave up Great Britain’s claim to Maine in return for a treaty clause requiring that Congress recommend that each of the states indemnify their Loyalists for losses suffered by them in the war. The preliminary treaty was signed at the Palace of Versailles on November 30, 1782 – and any hope for New Ireland was gone.

Twenty-five years after the conclusion of the American war, Knox wrote a letter in which he blamed two people for the loss of Penobscot. A new province would have been erected, he wrote, “had not Mr. Wedderburn, the attorney-general, in resentment of not being made a peer . . ., refused to give his fiat to the commission; and Lord Shelburne, for ignorance of its importance, ceded it to the Americans.”³⁶ As for Wedderburn, Knox’s attitude probably had not changed over the years, although the

above was a more direct accusation than any earlier ones. For example, some time during the Revolution (1779?) he wrote "Curious Political Anecdotes" about various political figures, one of whom was Wedderburn. In them he described the attorney general as having "an assuming and forward manner," being most anxious for a peerage, and having been "deeply offended" by Lord Germain, who had expressed an opinion that Wedderburn should be content with the attorney generalship rather than aspire to a seat in the House of Lords.³⁷ Still piqued in 1789 by the wartime reversal of his colonial scheme, Knox described Wedderburn's part as follows:

It may however be proper to give some account of the cause of its (the establishment of New Ireland) not being carried into execution, especially as all the subjects of the British empire will thereby receive fresh proof, in addition to the many they are already possessed of, how great their happiness is, and how firm their security for their lives and properties, when a Magistrate [Wedderburn was now Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas] who is so scrupulously observant of the sacredness of charter rights that he would not suffer them in the least to be infringed, even in the case of the revolted subjects of the Massachusetts Bay.³⁸

Knox had also written about Lord Shelburne in 1789, stating that after the latter had taken over the British government, he had asked Knox for his opinion about making peace with America. Knox thereupon explained to the prime minister that he had presented two plans to Lord Germain, both of them calling for the retention of some British control in the colonies. The second plan, the one most liked by Germain, had called for a treaty giving each side the territory which it controlled at the moment the fighting was concluded. The possibility of such a peace based on the war map, Knox told Shelburne, was what caused the attack on Penobscot and the campaigns in the South. Adding those lands to areas already held, such as New York, Long Island, Canada, and Nova Scotia, "would, I was convinced, secure to this country all the trade of

America which was worth having, at a much less charge to the Nation, which we hitherto had been at for that country. He [Shelburne] asked me if I thought America would treat with us on such grounds? I said, *that I had good reason to believe they would*, . . . His Lordship shook his head, and said, America would never agree to anything less than total independence."³⁹

There is one other detail about the former under-secretary's remembrances a quarter century after the American Revolution. He did not mention that Penobscot had been taken for the purpose of becoming a Loyalist colony. Instead, he stressed its strategic value of protecting Nova Scotia and even Lower Canada "so as to insure the future safety and prosperity of British North America."⁴⁰ He was, however, writing in 1808 in an advisory capacity with the expectation that another war might occur between Britain and the United States and therefore was proposing not only strategy — the taking of Bagaduce again — but a means of rectifying the treaty of 1783 by regaining eastern Maine for his country.⁴¹ Nevertheless, it is interesting that he concluded his estimate of Penobscot in the same manner he started it in 1778, by promoting its strategic value in wartime.

Perhaps New Ireland had always been a vain hope. Attorney General Wedderburn's decision, which opposed the colony's establishment within the boundaries of Massachusetts, stopped the British cabinet from continuing its efforts to complete a government for it. American representative John Adams, whose inflexible attitude opposed any loss of Massachusetts territory, especially for the sake of Tories, caused the English peace commission to reconsider its desire to retain the land meant for New Ireland. Prime Minister Shelburne, displaying the attitude that any peace with the Americans was preferable to the continuation of the war, was all too

willing to concede its territory to the rebels. The attitude of any one of these men could have been enough to kill the colonial plan; their combined actions were more than sufficient. William Knox had continued his efforts to preserve the colony for the Empire, but his effectiveness was considerably diminished when he was put out of office. John Nutting had become only an occasional contributor to the cause. The most conspicuous person, though, was Dr. John Calef. His motive was singular, his efforts consistent; he strove for the inclusion of New Ireland in the future of things British and he devoted the war years to its fulfillment. To him New Ireland was never a vain hope.

– NOTES –

¹ For family background on John Calef see David Russell Jack, "The Caleff Family," *Acadiensis* 7 (July 1907): 261-73. There are several spellings of the name; the most common is "Calef." For Calef's political and military background see "Calef, John, M.D.," *Biographical Data Relating to New Brunswick Families, Especially of Loyalist Descent*, collected by David Russell Jack, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (St. John, N.B.: New Brunswick Museum, 1965), 1: 142-55.

² Calef's prewar concerns with Penobscot settlers is found in E. Alfred Jones, *The Loyalists of Massachusetts, Their Memorials, Petitions and Claims* (London: The Saint Catherine Press, 1930), pp. 70-71 (hereafter cited as Jones, *Loyalists of Massachusetts*). Bernard's quote is found in these pages.

³ Samuel Francis Batchelder, *Bits of Cambridge History* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1930), pp. 282-308 (hereafter cited as Batchelder, *Bits*). One chapter is devoted to "The Adventures of John Nutting, Cambridge Loyalist."

⁴ Nutting to Germain, London, January 17, 1778, Public Records Office, London: Colonial Office Papers. C.O. 5, "America and West Indies, 1689-1819," vol. 155, no. 88, Ottawa (hereafter cited as "America and West Indies"). A year later, when Admiral George Collier asked him what could possibly have induced him to recommend a settlement there, Nutting denied that he had. See Collier to General George Clinton, Penobscot, August 24, 1779, "British Headquarters (Sir Guy Carleton) Papers, 1747 (1777)-1783," Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Report on American Manuscripts in the Royal Institute of Great Britain* (London: 1904-09), 2: 18-19 (hereafter cited as "British Headquarters Papers") In light of subsequent events, Nutting's figures for defense were amazingly accurate.

⁵ John R. Alden, *A History of the American Revolution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1969), pp. 217-18 (hereafter cited as Alden, *American Revolution*).

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 383-87.

⁷ Batchelder, *Bits*, p. 312. The author speculates that the name was "perhaps in delicate reference to Knox's own nationality."

⁸ Former Massachusetts Lieutenant-Governor Thomas Hutchinson met Knox on September 19 and was told of the plan. He credited the undersecretary for originating it and wrote in his diary that night: "It put me in mind of Mr. Locke's story of Ld. Shaftsbury's friend, who, after he was privately married, sent for his Ldship and another friend, to ask their advice: and I observed the same rule so far as to find no fault with the preposterous measure, because already carrying into execution . . . However, I intend to make Mr. Knox acquainted . . . with my sentiments. See Peter Orlando Hutchinson, comp., *The Diary and Letters of His Excellency Thomas Hutchinson, Esq.* 2 vols. (London: S. Low, Marston, Scarle & Rivington, 1883), 2: 217-18 (hereafter cited as *Hutchinson Diary and Letters*). Hutchinson may have forgotten that before the war he had seen the likelihood of the area becoming a second province. See Hutchinson to earl of Dartmouth, Boston, December 30, 1772, "Shelburne Papers, 1757-1787" (transcripts), Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa, 66: 196 (hereafter cited as "Shelburne Papers").

⁹ Germain to Clinton, Whitehall, September 2, 1778, no. 11, "American Manuscripts (Carleton Papers), 1775-1783" (transcripts), Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa, vol. 7, no. 27, pp. 239-41 (hereafter cited as "Carleton Papers").

¹⁰ Germain to Clinton, Whitehall, November 4, 1778, "Carleton Papers," vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 249-51. Germain had long favored coastal

operations. See Germain to Knox, Stoneland Lodge, July 27, 1777, "Correspondence of William Knox, Chiefly in Relation to American Affairs, 1757-1808," Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Report on Massachusetts in Various Collections* (Dublin: 1909), 7: 133-34 (hereafter cited as "Knox Correspondence"). William Knox, at a much later date, added another reason for the post, the protection of Lower Canada as well as Nova Scotia. See Knox to E. Cooke, Ealing, January 17, 1808, "Knox Correspondence," pp. 227-28.

¹¹ Germain to Clinton, Whitehall, September 2, 1778, "Carleton Papers" (see note 9, above).

¹² Batchelder, *Bits*, pp. 314-17.

¹³ Nutting to Knox, Corunna, Spain, September 30, 1778, C.O. 5, "America and West Indies," vol. 155, no. 146, pp. 92-93.

¹⁴ Knox to Lord George Germain, Bath, October 31, 1778, "Knox Correspondence," pp. 153-54.

¹⁵ See *Hutchinson Diary and Letters*, 2: 290-91. In September of 1779, Hutchinson had already written in his diary that he saw little advantage to the establishment of the post at Penobscot. See 2: 285-86.

¹⁶ Memorial & Petition of John Calef, July 12, 1780, "Shelburne Papers," 66: 183-85. As further inducement for sending an Anglican minister, Calef added that the Indians were "fond of Ministers and forms of Divine worship." See also, letter, Captain Henry Mowatt to Lord Germain, *Albany*, Majabigwaduce, May 9, 1780, *ibid.*, 66: 180-85.

¹⁷ See letter, Germain to Knox, Stoneland Lodge, August 7, 1780, "Knox Correspondence," p. 169. A copy of the letter can be found in [William Knox], *Extra Official State Papers*, 2 vols. (London: Printed for J. Debrett, 1789), 2: 82 (hereafter cited as Knox, *State Papers*). For the constitution see "Shelburne Papers," 66: 216-21. A copy of it can be found in Joseph Williamson, "The Proposed Province of New Ireland," in Maine Historical Society, *Collections of the Maine Historical Society*, 3rd ser., 2 vols. (Portland, Maine: Published by the Society, 1904-06), 1: 147-57. Much of the conservation of New Ireland's constitution would, after the Revolution, find its way into the constitutions of such new or reorganized colonies as New Brunswick (1784) and Upper and Lower Canada (Constitution Act of 1791).

¹⁸ See letter, Germain to Knox, [Stoneland Lodge?] August 11, 1780, Knox, *State Papers*, 2: 83.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 2: 60-61.

²⁰ Germain to Knox, Stoneland Lodge, September 18, 1780, "Knox Correspondence," p. 172.

²¹ Germain to Governor Hughes [of Nova Scotia], Whitehall, September 6, 1780; and Germain to General MacLean, Whitehall, February 28, 1781, both found in "Calendar of Papers Relating to Nova Scotia, 1603-1801," *Report on the Canadian Archives, 1894* (Ottawa: 1895), pp. 143-44, 53-58.

²² See Calef to Shelburne, Covent Garden, December 10, 1780; and, same to same, Russell Court, March 2, 1781, both in "Shelburne Papers," 66: 169-74, 175-76. The first letter suggests the means of capturing Boston – which "would be no inconsiderable step in closing the troubles in America" – or Portsmouth, or, finally, Falmouth.

²³ See Batchelder, *Bits*, pp. 331-35; also, letter, Germain to MacLean (see note 21, above).

²⁴ See two letters, the Rhode Island Delegates to the Governor of Rhode Island, Philadelphia, July 24, 1781; and Thomas McKean to Richard Henry Lee, Philadelphia, September 4, 1781, both in Edmund C. Burnett, comp., *Letters of Members of the Continental Congress*, 8 vols. (Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1921-36), 6: 157, 206.

²⁵ Germain to Clinton, Whitehall, October 12, 1781, "Carleton Papers," vol. 7, no. 110, pp. 259-64.

²⁶ For a general coverage of the change in government and subsequent mention of the peacemaking events see Alden, *American Revolution*, pp. 478-92. For Knox see *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. "Knox, William," by William Prideaux Courtney.

²⁷ See "Shelburne Papers," 66: 195; "British Headquarters Papers," 2: 407; and Jones, *Loyalists of Massachusetts*, p. 71.

²⁸ "Shelburne Papers," 66: 165-68, 176-79, 197-213, 214, 215, 222.

²⁹ See Calef to Shelburne, *ibid.*, 66: 160.

³⁰ Nutting to Shelburne, London, April 22, 1782, *ibid.*, 66: 190-94.

³¹ See letter (note 30, above). For Nutting's departure see Batchelder, *Bits*, p. 335.

³² Shelburne to Brigadier General Campbell, Whitehall, April 15, 1782, "Haldimand Papers," British Museum, Add. Mss., 21661-21892, Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers, 1760-1790, vol. 149, B.M. 21,809, p. 225; Shelburne to Carlton, Whitehall, April 19, 1782, "British Headquarters Papers," 2: 460.

³³ There were numerous exchanges of letters between Shelburne and various generals in America regarding the protection of Penobscot during May-November 1792. See "British Headquarters Papers," 2:

504, 542, and 3: 74-75, 79, 110-11, 123, 131, 133, 155, 197-98, 207-8, 217, 229, 229-30. See also Paterson to Shelburne, Halifax, October 29, 1782, "Shelburne Papers," 69: 95.

³⁴ Minute of the Cabinet, no. 3956, October 17, 1782, Sir John Fortesque, ed., *The Correspondence of King George the Third*, 6 vols. (London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1928), 6: 143-44.

³⁵ See entry of November 10, 1782, in L. H. Butterfield, ed., *Diary and Autobiography of John Adams*, 4 vols. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Atheneum Publishers, 1961), 3: 48-49.

³⁶ Knox to E. Cooke, Ealing, January 27, 1808, "Knox Correspondence," pp. 227-228.

³⁷ No. 5 of "Curious Political Anecdotes," *ibid.*, pp. 267-68.

³⁸ Knox, *State Papers*, 2: 60-61. Wedderburn was at least an opportunist; at the time of his decision on New Ireland he accepted the post of chief justice because he, having already switched from attacking the North ministry to joining it, saw that the cabinet would not last much longer. See *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. "Wedderburn, Alexander," by Arthur Hastie Millar.

³⁹ Knox, *State Papers*, 1: 26-28.

⁴⁰ Knox to the Committee of New Brunswick, Ealing, September 7, 1808, "Knox Correspondence," pp. 229-30.

⁴¹ Knox died before the outbreak of the War of 1812, but eastern Maine was reoccupied and Castine garrisoned by British troops.

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