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The Search for Security Maine after Penobscot

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The Penobscot campaign of 1779 made little impact on the military outcome of the American Revolution. The focus of military action was shifting to the southern states when the British seized Bagaduce (Castine) at the mouth of the Penobscot River and defeated the expedition dispatched by Massachusetts to drive them out. For people in the District of Maine, however, the Penobscot defeat represented a calamity of the first order. During the rest of the war, they had to contend with a garrison of regular British troops in their midst. To Bagaduce flocked loyalists who, with a vigor sharpened by vengeance, joined the regulars in plundering the coast. Active loyalist participation injected a new note of personal vindictiveness in what now became a civil war. Amid internal dissension and a growing sense of isolation and despair, unified defense collapsed throughout the District. Through the chaos, three different solutions gave residents some hope for security. A reorganized defense plan and the enforcement of martial law seemed to offer the most immediate relief. Concurrently, a new state constitution held out the promise of more effective civil government. When these failed, several of the easternmost towns sought security by withdrawing from the war entirely. That scheme did not work either; through the rest of the war, Maine simply suffered and endured in isolation.

Massachusetts could do little to protect its eastern counties because the Penobscot disaster had left the state virtually bankrupt. The Massachusetts Board of War declared that it was enveloped in “difficulties and embarrassments inextricable, and ... insurmountable” in
trying to meet its financial obligations, and in 1781 the
state purchasing officer reported that his credit was
exhausted and he could no longer obtain provisions
without cash. About the same time, the legislature
received the alarming news that the state armories
contained no more than three hundred firearms. While
the government managed to obtain two small armed
vessels to patrol the coast, neither offered much hindrance
to enemy privateers. The commander of one declared that
his vessel “Sails so amaizing Bad that Every thing I gave
Chase to will out Sail us.” A short time later, both vessels
got up for sale.

Without much success, Massachusetts sought outside
assistance in protecting the eastern district. The
Continental Congress continued to accept the costs of
defending Machias, which played a strategic role in Indian
affairs, but declined becoming involved in a second
expedition against Bagaduce. The idea tempted French
commanders in America, but General Washington
adamantly opposed the further expenditure of resources
on so isolated an objective. Nearby New Hampshire
expressed sympathy but noted that it had its own frontiers
to defend. Consequently, the defense of Maine would
have to come from the District’s limited internal resources.

The burden of meeting the challenge from Bagaduce
fell squarely on the citizen-soldiers of Maine, a
responsibility that only emphasized the militia’s
inadequacies. Smoldering feuds in key towns brought
defense preparations to a standstill. At Machias, a
controversy arose between civil and military authority.
With the enemy to the east in Nova Scotia and to the west
at Bagaduce, and with numerous towns resuming their
allegiance to the king, Colonel John Allan, the commander
at Machias, ordered in the militia to strengthen the town’s
fortifications and to provide a garrison. Despite the
danger of attack, the militia refused to obey. A spokesman boldly informed Allan that "there was No Authority for Calling in the Militia for Such Business," and that to do so was an "Infringement Upon the peoples rights." Authorities had to jail one protestor, but although he was soon released, Allan wrote that the controversy "Has Extended the Clamour every where to the Eastward of Penobscot." A year later, Allan was still noting that whenever he called in the militia, "Altercations Arises & Inflamed by men of Not the Best Principles for America about the Lawfulness of such things .. it Generally Terminates so, as to be no Service or use." Regardless of the danger, Machias townsmen were not about to surrender their constitutional scruples to military expediency, but some were willing to give up Colonel John Allan.

One local leader whom Allan had tried to prosecute for illegal trade with the Indians now sought his removal. Stephen Jones, chairman of the Machias Committee of Safety, forwarded a series of proposals to the General Court concerning the defense of the town. Included was a recommendation that Allan be relieved of command, presumably so that he could spend more time in his role as superintendent to the eastern Indians. Allan had his supporters; the nearby town of Narraguagus presented a memorial stoutly defending his dual role. While the General Court simply ignored Jones's scheme, Allan was never free from the gnawing fear that enemies were at work trying to undermine his reputation and force his removal.

In many respects the situation in Falmouth was similar. With the British at Bagaduce, Falmouth remained in constant turmoil, fearing an attack. Responsibility for providing a militia guard fell to Brigadier General Samuel Thompson of Brunswick. A longtime political opponent
of Falmouth's leaders, Thompson had caused a major crisis just before the war by leading a mob into Falmouth to seize a British naval officer. Although Thompson eventually released his prisoner unharmed, the event undoubtedly influenced the British decision to bombard the town on October 18, 1775. Falmouth never forgot. Now, four years later, when the general was tardy in providing guards, town leaders thought they had a means of getting rid of him. Led by Falmouth, committees of safety claiming to represent a majority of Cumberland County towns met in convention and forwarded a scathing indictment of the county militia to the General Court. Under Thompson's direction, they declared, the militia was a virtual mob, unarmed, undisciplined, and poorly equipped. Since the brigadier general, the colonels, and the majors were obviously ignorant of their duty and unfit for public service, the convention presented its own slate of officers, starting with a replacement for Thompson.13

In response to this attempted purge, pro-Thompson delegates, chiefly from inland communities like Brunswick, Gorham, Gray, Windham, and Bakerstown (Poland and Minot), held a meeting of their own. Claiming that some of them had been excluded from the previous convention, they asserted that the Cumberland militia was as well disciplined, equipped, and led as any in the state. They defended Thompson as a "true friend of his Country" and denied that he had discriminated against Falmouth in failing to provide for its defense.14 After hearing testimony from both sides, the General Court dismissed all accusations and commended the present militia officers for doing their best under difficult circumstances.15 The leaders of mercantile Falmouth had again lost in their recurring struggle with Samuel Thompson and his rural supporters.
The General Court assigned the task of putting together a coherent defense from these discordant elements to Brigadier General Peleg Wadsworth, the only American officer to emerge from the Penobscot disaster with a heightened reputation. In March 1780, Wadsworth was promised six hundred troops, to be detached from the local militia, and the authority to declare martial law in Lincoln County where the population showed an alarming tendency to cooperate with the enemy. Wadsworth's plan of defense rested on a highly realistic assessment of local conditions. He was aware that most inhabitants were well disposed to the American cause, but that "they are Inhabitants of a new settled Country; thinly scattered over the Wilderness; ... at a distance from the seat of Government; know but little of what passes there; & small in their own eyes." Wadsworth concluded that most of the settlers would willingly assist any force offering them some reasonable measure of protection, but failing that, they would readily take an oath of allegiance to Great Britain rather than have their property destroyed.

Wadsworth's defensive measures were designed to stimulate local self-confidence while also isolating the British in their base at Bagaduce, which he could not destroy. To dispel the sense of isolation and promote a feeling of identity between the District and Massachusetts, Wadsworth urged that the government distribute newspapers among the more easterly towns. More important, however, he sought to isolate Bagaduce through the use of martial law and troops who used whaleboats to block enemy raiding parties.

On April 18, Wadsworth placed the offshore islands and all Lincoln County settlements within ten miles of the sea under martial law. Few eastern communities were exempt; Lincoln County included the eastern half of Maine and Wadsworth interpreted "the sea" to include all
rivers and inlets navigable by armed vessels. Within the proscibed area, military authorities could arrest any persons of questionable loyalty and subject them to trial by military tribunals, which could impose the death penalty. Effectively enforced, martial law would have severed Bagaduce from its mainland sources of information, supplies, and reinforcements.

To isolate Bagaduce by sea, Wadsworth described a line across Penobscot Bay, extending from Owl's Head to the southern tip of Vinalhaven, around the outer side of Deer Isle, and to the mainland, beyond which no American vessel could legally proceed. However, the residents of the numerous islands in the bay were in a different category. Wadsworth recognized their defenseless situation had induced most of them to take the oath to the crown. Consequently, he proclaimed them neutrals, free to travel from island to island and to and from the mainland, but forbidden to trade with Bagaduce. As neutrals, the islanders were protected from molestation by American forces. They had recourse to Massachusetts courts, where they could seek satisfaction from American troops and privateersmen who might occasionally violate their neutrality. In this manner the inhabitants retained their rights and loyalties as citizens of Massachusetts despite British control of their region.

Although martial law lasted only six months, authorities seized and condemned several vessels for trading with the enemy and arrested numerous individuals engaged in treasonous activity. For example, Jeremiah Baum was convicted of guiding a British raiding party and was hanged at Thomaston. Most others were merely detained and then released on bond for good behavior. Wadsworth shipped dangerous suspects to Boston for more secure confinement than was available in the crumbling jails of Pownalborough or Falmouth.
General Peleg Wadsworth
1748-1829
Martial law, however, proved as unpopular with patriots as with British sympathizers. As at Machias it endowed the military with arbitrary power, itself a form of tyranny. On several occasions, the General Court interfered on behalf of individuals arrested by Wadsworth and also sought the release of confiscated vessels. Wadsworth, reacting indignantly to the implied criticism, demanded a clarification from the General Court concerning the enforcement of martial law and protested to the governor that his actions, taken only against persons known to be enemies to the American cause, were entirely legal. Yet Wadsworth was not above reproach. On one occasion he imprisoned Judge Timothy Langdon for the “treasonous activity” of having issued a writ requiring the return of confiscated property.

The most serious failing with martial law was that it simply did not work. Despite the threat of arbitrary arrest and the death penalty, British sympathizers continued to assist the enemy and to participate in their devastating raids. A loyalist refugee from Thomaston, for example, led a party to his hometown and returned to Bagaduce in triumph with a loaded vessel as a prize. In the fall of 1779 and again in 1780, Camden refugees directed British raiders to the town where they burned houses, barns, and sawmills, and carried off livestock. It happened yet again a year later. Guided by two former residents, a detachment of seventy-five British soldiers from Bagaduce captured Camden’s little garrison and its commanding officer without firing a shot. The raiders disarmed the population, destroyed the military structures, and then carried most of the town’s military stores back to Bagaduce in captured vessels. Perhaps the most notorious episode occurred in the summer of 1780 when loyalists tried to kidnap Captain Levi Soule at his farm on Broad Cove. They shot him dead when he tried to escape, and either wounded or intentionally mutilated Soule’s wife when she
tried to aid him. In retaliation, Wadsworth inflicted the
death penalty on Jeremiah Baum, a feebleminded person,
who was hardly responsible for his actions in assisting the
enemy.

The severity of martial law seemed only to inspire the
enemy to greater defiance. In 1780 John Jones, a
notorious Tory formerly of Pownalborough, had the
bravado to return home one night in mid-July. It was a
homecoming the town did not soon forget: Jones and his
band of followers kidnapped the town’s leading citizen,
Charles Cushing. Cushing was sheriff, justice of the peace,
and brigadier general of the Lincoln County militia, and
although he was later paroled and exchanged, the patriots
of Pownalborough could no longer sleep soundly. Several
local leaders hired guards, while Cushing, himself, soon
resigned his various offices and permanently left
Pownalborough.

Had Wadsworth received the six hundred troops
promised by the General Court, he might have had more
success in enforcing martial law and blunting enemy
attacks. Instead, he may have received half that number
and virtually no logistical support from an impoverished
Massachusetts. In April 1780 he was complaining that only
fifty men had arrived, despite his repeated requests to the
county brigadiers that they meet their quotas. By the end
of May, Wadsworth announced receipt of some two
hundred men who had been “dropping in by degrees for
two Months without being reduc’d to order & discipline.”
For supplies he had camping utensils for
only one hundred men, ten days’ supply of meat, and
enough bread to last for two days. When the provisions
ran out, the general proposed to set his men to fishing.
That would keep them from starving but only at the
expense of their military effectiveness. It would not keep
them content, however. By July the troops at Camden had
gone hungry long enough. Determined to leave, they "slung their packs," and only with difficulty could Wadsworth persuade them to remain.36 By the end of the year, however, the troops still lacked bread and were "almost unfit for any duty for want of clothes," so Wadsworth discharged them early. Now, he observed, "the whole Country on either Side [of] Bagaduce from this Place to Machias, but for the Inhabitants, lays open to the Enemy." In disgust, he requested a discharge from his command, stating that he found himself "quite unequal to the Task, where there are some Intricacies, more perplexities & much Service to be done &... but very little to do with."37 However, before Wadsworth could take leave of his command, the British, succeeded in capturing not only Captain Daniel Sullivan of Frenchman's Bay, the brother of General John Sullivan, but Brigadier General Peleg Wadsworth, himself.

Guided by enemy sympathizers, twenty-five British soldiers surprised the general and his family at Thomaston on a February night in 1781. While the militia guard fled at the first sight of the enemy, the raiders had their hands full with Wadsworth alone. Armed with a brace of pistols, a blunderbuss, a musket, and a bayonet, he fought off the attackers, wounding three, two of whom soon died. Only when shot through the arm did the general finally yield. His captors hurried him back to Bagaduce where they imprisoned him in Fort George with Major Benjamin Burton, another new captive. When Wadsworth recovered from his wound, several months later, the two captives escaped from their prison by cutting through the ceiling, clambering over the walls of the fort, and making their way overland to safety.38 But where in Maine was safety? Burton soon departed for Boston, fearing that British sympathizers in his hometown of Cushing might reveal his presence to the enemy.39
Wadsworth, already having resigned his command prior to being captured, left Maine as well.

Captain Daniel Sullivan, the militia commander at Frenchman’s Bay, fell into British hands in much the same way as had Wadsworth and Charles Cushing. Just before dawn, in late February 1781, a party from a British privateer surrounded Sullivan’s house and took him captive after a brief struggle.40 In a final effort to escape, Sullivan tried to bribe his guard “with most advantageous offers, such as his daughter to command etc.”41 His offer rejected, Sullivan had to watch in helpless frustration as the British fired his house and that of a neighbor. His one satisfaction lay in the knowledge that the enemy had missed capturing John Allan, who had left Sullivan’s residence only hours before the attack.42

John Allan narrowly escaped several British-inspired attempts at capture as he labored among the Indians, trying to restore their confidence in the American cause after the Penobscot defeat. More than ever the Americans needed Indian support in defending Maine, but the Indians were understandably impressed with British success and distressed at the interruption of their supplies from Massachusetts. After the Penobscot campaign, the state lacked funds with which to obtain provisions for the Indians and the means to transport them. British privateers operating out of Bagaduce made the supply route between Boston and Machias precarious at best. Since the supplies that did get through were a mere fraction of what Allan required, he was forced to extend his personal credit and was reduced to becoming “a Pedlar & Hawker, Going myself from place to place to Collect Vegetables in Exchange for Butter.”43

Despite Allan’s efforts, the Indians appeared to have yielded to British influence in the summer of 1780 when many who had settled around Machias under American
hegemony left to attend a British-sponsored gathering at Fort Howe on the Saint John River.\textsuperscript{44} News that Malecite Indians acted as guards for workers cutting masts for the royal navy provided another sign of the disturbing relationship developing between the Indians and the British.\textsuperscript{45} Allan remained reasonably confident the Indians would not attack the Americans, but he believed that the only thing preventing the British from overrunning Maine was their fear of the Indians. If that dread was overcome, warned Allan, there would be no holding the region.\textsuperscript{46} Fortunately, the powerful French presence in America provided Allan with a means of countering British influence. Since the seventeenth century, the eastern Indians had drawn heavily on French culture and support against the English. Now, since France supported the Americans, many Indians looked upon the Revolution with favor, not, however, to the extent of becoming active belligerents. On leaving Machias for the Fort Howe conference, one Malecite assured Allan that “our Language to the Britains is from our Lips only, but when we address the Americans & French its from our hearts.”\textsuperscript{47} Allan consciously played on Indian fondness for the French and for Catholicism by obtaining the services of priests from French naval units operating off the New England coast. Allan reported the Indians were delighted with the opportunity to participate in their familiar religious ceremonies, and that they expressed “the Greatest Affection for the French, the Connection with whome, much cements their union with us.”\textsuperscript{48} In another demonstration of support in 1781, the French dispatched a frigate to eastern waters to show the flag to the inhabitants, both red and white.\textsuperscript{49}

To some extent, Allan and his French connection proved too successful. By the end of 1780, almost four hundred Indians had gathered around Machias; all had to be provisioned from the scanty American resources.\textsuperscript{50}
difficulty of procuring adequate supplies from Massachusetts threatened to undo Allan's diplomacy. He reported discontent and uneasiness among some of the Indians who again had begun drifting back to the Saint John for the more plentiful provisions provided by the British. In the spring of 1782, Allan, "destitute of subsistence," sent a special representative to Boston to plead for supplies. A year later he personally appeared before the governor and the legislature to beg for support in keeping the Indians from British corruption. Despite their wavering, however, the Indians remained non-belligerent throughout the entire war.

Although unspectacular, Indian neutrality was a victory for the Americans, who constantly feared British-incited Indian raids on the eastern frontier. To credit this accomplishment to John Allan and the French, however, ignores the fact the Indians never had any intention of participating in the war; therefore, non-belligerency was a victory for Indian diplomacy as well. Allan's special triumph was in convincing the Indians that, despite the defeat on the Penobscot, the provisions undelivered, and the promises unfulfilled, the American cause remained a viable alternative to that of the British, thus leaving the Indians to follow their own neutralist inclinations. It also meant that enough Indians remained around Machias to protect the eastern approaches, while the rest of Maine lay open to the enemy.

Maine's search for military security coincided with a statewide effort to find political security through a new constitutional order. More than most areas of Massachusetts, Maine had reason to feel neglected, even abused, by the government; but convinced of its own inferiority and engrossed in the immediacy of war, Maine did not play a leading role in the movement for constitutional reform. Paradoxically, the impetus for change came from that part of Massachusetts least

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touched by war, Worcester, Hampshire, and Berkshire counties. Separation from Britain stimulated agitators there to demand a government more expressive of the popular will than the old royal charter of 1691, which, even without a governor, still served as the basis of government. Through newspapers, petitions, conventions, and the disruption of the courts, the westerners prodded the rest of the state into action. In the spring of 1777, towns throughout Massachusetts authorized their delegates to the General Court to assume responsibility for drafting a constitution, which would then be returned to the towns for ratification.

The frame of government referred to the towns in 1778 was a compromise between the democratic aspirations of the western, rural, and underdeveloped regions and the more conservative interest of the commercial east. The westerners favored a broad franchise, a unicameral legislature, and a weak governor; the easterners advocated high property qualifications for voting and for holding office, a bicameral legislature, and a powerful governor. In an effort to satisfy both positions, the General Court proposed a weak governor presiding over a bicameral legislature. The franchise for the lower house included all tax-paying adult white males, but for the upper house and chief executive, voters had to possess property worth £60. Officeholders had to own property ranging from £1,000 for the governor to £200 for representatives. In the spring of 1778, the towns overwhelmingly rejected this plan. The compromise alienated more people than it satisfied, and there was a growing conviction that drafting a constitution was too important a task for a mere legislature. To do the job properly required a convention elected especially for that purpose.

Maine towns generally concurred with the repudiation of the new constitution, and their responses reveal the
political opinion of the District just before the British occupation of Bagaduce (see table below). Overall, the returns from Maine suggest that interest in the new frame of government and in political democracy progressed in an easterly direction from York to Lincoln County, from the commercial to the less commercial areas. Twenty-four Maine towns voted on the constitution: five in York County, eight in Cumberland, and eleven in Lincoln. The percentage of voter participation also increased in the same direction: York County averaged 25 percent; Cumberland, 27; and Lincoln, 29. Willingness to accept constitutional change followed the same pattern. Not a single town in York County favored the new frame of government. Two towns in Cumberland voted approval, while five in Lincoln County indicated that the proposed plan was more acceptable than the status quo. Finally, Georgetown and Boothbay, both in Lincoln County, produced the most vibrant expressions of political democracy. One of the reasons Georgetown rejected the new frame of government was that “a Man being born in Afraca, India or ancient America or even being much Sun burnt deprived him of having a Vote for Representative.” In Boothbay, sixty-three townspeople unanimously opposed any institution, such as a senate or council, which limited or “corrected” the more numerous representatives of the people. This lively concern with popular liberties also convinced the town to propose eliminating the positions of governor and lieutenant governor. The offices were expensive and “needless in a free State,” and, what is worse, potentially “dangerous to the liberties of the People.”

Only Gorham matched Boothbay’s political radicalism, and that occurred the following year when many towns were instructing the delegates elected to a special convention charged with drafting a new constitution. Gorham had been one of the most radical towns in
### Constitutional Vote, 1778

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| **Cumberland County**|       |            |                   |     |     |
| Falmouth         | 669   | 68         | 10                | x   |     |
| Brunswick        | 192   | 78         | 40                | x   |     |
| Cape Elizabeth   | 402   | 31         | 8                 | x   |     |
| New Gloucester   | 134   | 109        | 81                | x   |     |
| Pearsonstown     | 70    | 21         | 30                | x   |     |
| Gorham           | 321   | 55         | 17                | x   |     |
| N. Yarmouth      | 386   | 84         | 22                | x   |     |
| Scarborough      | 372   | 39         | 10                | x   |     |
| **Mean**         |       |            |                   |     | 27.37|

| **Lincoln County**|       |            |                   |     |     |
| Pownalborough    | 296   | 42         | 14                | x   |     |
| Georgetown       | 386   | 45         | 12                | x   |     |
| Newcastle (refused to vote) | | | | | |
| Winthrop         | 108   | 21         | 19                | x   |     |
| Edgecomb         | 127   | 15         | 12                | x   |     |
| Vassalborough    | 116   | 26         | 22                | x   |     |
| Bristol          | 234   | 103        | 44                | x   |     |
| Boothbay*        | 179   | 63         | 35                | x   |     |
| Blue Hill        | 44**  | 26         | 59                | x   |     |
| Deer Isle        | 116** | 46         | 40                | x   |     |
| Penobscot        | 109** | -          | -                 | x   |     |
| **Mean**         |       |            |                   |     | 28.7|

*Identified as Townsend in Greene and Harrington, *American Population*, p. 39

**Polls from 1776 census**
Cumberland County and a particular critic of Falmouth. Its radicalism reappeared in 1779 when it advocated a unicameral legislature on the model of the ancient Hebrews or the uncorrupted Roman senate. Governors and council were "not only unnecessary [sic] but inconvenient, and perhaps dangerous," and the town expressed the hope that "they will never exist in this state."59

Maine's statistical and political response to the 1778 constitution, contains considerable variation, but the results suggest that political democracy and a desire for constitutional change existed more strongly in downeast Lincoln County than in coastal York and Cumberland counties. In effect, there was an affinity of interest between Maine's frontier areas and the westernmost counties of Massachusetts, which became more important and potentially dangerous in the postwar era. For the present, however, these characteristics were obscured by the trauma of invasion, internal disorder, and the problem of wavering Indian loyalties.

These wartime crises preoccupied much of Maine during 1780 while the state convention met and drafted the new constitution, which was submitted to the towns in the spring. Since eastern delegates controlled the convention, the new constitution was no compromise. It was based on the concept of a separation of powers, providing for a powerful governor with authority to make appointments and veto legislation, a bicameral legislature representing population in the lower house and property in the senate, and an independent judiciary, appointed by the governor and his council and holding office during good behavior. Property qualifications for holding elective office were comparable to those in the rejected plan of 1778, and the franchise was limited to adult white males having an annual income of £3 or owning property worth £60. The document's long preamble guaranteed such
fundamental rights as the freedom of worship for all Christians, but, paradoxically, the legislature was empowered to enforce this freedom by taxation.⁶⁰

Reaction to the new constitution was complex and difficult to evaluate. Some towns voted on the entire document; others did so article by article but failed to come to an overall conclusion. Still others approved the document conditional to the acceptance of proposed amendments. The constitutional convention was left with the task of making sense out of these responses. In tabulating the returns, it made sure its labors were not wasted. On June 16, it declared the constitution ratified; on October 25, the new frame of government took effect.⁶¹

In his study of politics in revolutionary Massachusetts, Stephen Patterson implies that Maine's favorable reaction to the 1780 constitution resulted from the influence exercised in the District by the commercial interests of eastern Massachusetts.⁶² Such might have been the case under normal circumstances, but conditions in Maine were anything but normal in 1780. Lincoln County, for example, was under martial law, subject to devastating raids from Bagaduce, and virtually severed from the rest of the state. Cumberland County, too, was unsettled, nervously expecting a British descent upon Falmouth. Only York appeared unaffected, although it was deeply concerned about conditions to the eastward. These immediate realities, more than an eastern commercial influence, shaped the response of Maine towns to the 1780 constitution.

The voting patterns established in 1778 completely broke apart in 1780 (see table below). Fewer towns and people took an interest in the second constitution, and the results show no coherent pattern. Only seventeen towns voted on the document; eight in York, four in
Constitutional Vote, 1780

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*See Gorham Town Records, April 25, May 24, 1780, MeSA. Forty-seven townspeople voted to accept and six to reject the report of the committee on the constitution. The town records do not include the report but the Boston Gazette, June 12, 1780, published a report on the constitution by a committee from Gorham, probably the one noted in the town records. The report is sharply critical of what it calls the constitution’s “spiritual tyranny” but comes to no overall conclusion on the document itself.

**By implication.
Cumberland, and five in Lincoln. Voter participation also declined from an average of 26 percent in 1778 to about 14 percent in 1780, with Lincoln County again recording the highest average participation and York the lowest. Nonetheless there is no significant east-west progression of towns opposing the new constitution. Of the six that disapproved two were in York, one in Cumberland, and three in Lincoln County. Since four of the opposing towns registered their disapproval by refusing to pass a vote, the basis of their opposition is unclear. Only Pownalborough in Lincoln County and Buxton in York explained their reservations. For Pownalborough, “the invasions of the Enemy and the Divisions among ourselves made it improper if not dangerous at this Time to introduce a new mode of government.” Buxton, a relatively new town, defined its opposition in political terms. Located in York County just southwest of Gorham, the town produced Maine’s only radical criticism of the 1780 constitution, explaining that “the Legislative Authority ought not consist of More branches thane [sic] One House” because “the Inconveniency arising in Negatives and Long debates, is more Injurious to the Good people of this State than Errors which may be Committed without Such Separate branches.”

While York County produced the most radical of Maine’s responses to the constitution of 1780, it also produced the most conservative. Although the town of Wells approved the constitution, it recommended an amendment that would grant the governor an absolute veto over all acts of the assembly. Claiming to speak on behalf of small towns distant from the capital and seldom represented, Wells feared legislative tyranny more than executive tyranny. Wells idealized the chief executive as “the Sole Representative of the whole Commonwealth; The Center of the Union to all the several parts and members of the political Body; . . the Guardian of the
Constitution and of the Rights and Interests of the whole State.” In the governor, every town “shall always have a Representative,” one in whom any town, regardless of size, “may claim an equal Interest . . . with the other parts of the State.” By idealizing the governor and setting him above faction and self-interest, Wells tried to solve the problem of representation that Buxton answered with a unicameral legislature unfettered by senate or governor. One view was “radical,” the other “conservative,” but their objectives were similar.

The striking contrast between the returns of 1778 and those of 1780 reveals the impact of the war on Maine. The returns of 1780 are a measure of the chaos within Maine society. They fail to perpetuate any of the earlier patterns and do not establish any new ones. In addition there is no consistency in attitude regarding the two constitutions. The radicals of 1778, like Boothbay, are silent in 1780 or, like Georgetown and Gorham, supporters of the more conservative second frame of government. On the other hand, Wells and Buxton, the extremists of 1780, were silent or unexceptional in 1778. The two sets of returns are illustrative of widely differing conditions in Maine; those from 1778 more accurately reveal Maine’s political attitudes; those of 1780, Maine’s disruption.

Collectively, the combined returns emphasize that a sizeable majority of Maine’s electorate, 73 to 85 percent, failed to participate in the two constitutional debates. Of course the deteriorating military situation in 1780 helps to explain the increase in nonparticipation, but even in 1778 a remarkable number of people stood aside. Some thought it was a poor time to be tampering with the form of government, for the “hurry of war did not permit that calm deliberation necessary to form a constitution for a government of duration.” More frequently, towns revealed a profound sense of inferiority, a feeling that may have deterred their consideration of so weighty a
matter. No one put it as poignantly as the selectman of Blue Hill, who, in 1778, apologetically forwarded his town's return with the comment, "Sur and if there is Aney thing that we have Ommetted in the Return I Would have you Let us know . . . for we Are so as it ware Out of the Wourld that we Dont hardley know Wither we Do Rite or Rong But we mean to Do as Well as We Can." In addition, bad weather discouraged some people from attending meetings, but others were simply too busy fishing, farming, and making a living to be bothered. This sense of detachment, isolation, and inferiority had deep roots in the communities of Lincoln County. As Peleg Wadsworth aptly observed, many of them were far removed from the seat of government, ignorant of what went on there, and were "small in their own eyes." For them neither martial law nor state constitutions offered any hope of relief from a situation rapidly becoming intolerable. For such towns, the only other remedy was withdrawal from the war.

By mid-March 1781, such a proposal was in circulation among some of the Lincoln County towns. John Allan reported that rumors of neutrality were creating confusion and setting communities "much upon the wavering Hand." The proposal came from Francis Shaw, Jr., of Gouldsborough, merchant, colonel of militia, and chairman of the town's committee of correspondence, safety and inspection. Shaw claimed to have had a conversation with John Hancock, the new governor of Massachusetts, about conditions downeast and quoted him as saying that since the state was unable to protect the eastern communities the inhabitants had an "undoubted Right" to make the best terms possible for the protection of life, family, and property. Shortly after the British had kidnapped Captain Sullivan from Frenchman's Bay, committees from that and the neighboring communities of Gouldsborough, Narraguagus, and Number Four met to
draft a petition requesting both the British and Massachusetts to recognize a condition of neutrality from Penobscot Bay to the Saint Croix River. If the convention sent a proposal to the British at Bagaduce, no copy now exists, but Francis Shaw sent one to Machias with instructions that it be forwarded to several other Lincoln County towns.

The neutrality agreement rested squarely on the premise that “Allegiance & protection are Reciprocal” and inseparable. The eastern towns declared that they had suffered more than their share for the common cause, and that Massachusetts had been as unresponsive to their repeated requests for assistance as the British Parliament had been to the prewar petitions from Massachusetts asking for redress. Instead of receiving help, the eastern towns had been subjected to plundering, devastation, and “the additionl Grievance” of martial law. The petition therefore concluded that “... the Government of Massachusetts (from what cause is totally Immaterial,) have Refused or Neglected to give Protection to us the said Inhabitants in Return for our Allegiance, so that in Justice to our selves, our Familys, & Posterity founded on the Universal Concurrence of Nations we are constrained to Ask of your Excellency & Honours, an Act of Neutrality.” By drawing on revolutionary precedent and by an appeal to first principles, the neutralists defended their withdrawal from the war. It may have seemed like a reasonable scheme given the prevailing circumstances but in Machias it caused a storm of opposition.

There, outraged patriotism brought the neutrality movement to a halt. In a series of resolutions directed to the neighboring towns and to Governor Hancock, a “very full” town meeting expressed its “utmost abhorence” of neutrality. Sweeping aside all theoretical justifications, the meeting accused Francis Shaw of having had “private Interest at heart, more than the good of his Country.” The
townspeople emphasized their own loyalty to the cause of freedom and declared it “an indisputable truth, those that are not for us, are against us.” Led by Stephen Jones, the Machias Committee of Correspondence, Safety, and Inspection, drafted an accompanying letter to the resolves that again denounced Shaw and accused him, Nathan Jones of Jonesborough, and William Nickells of Narraguagus, of conspiring to restore the region east of Penobscot Bay to British control in order to continue their trade with the enemy without fear of interruption.

From the start Francis Shaw had been concerned that Machias might oppose the neutrality proposal. To Stephen Jones, Shaw had written, “how it may be Receiv’d by your Town I can’t Say, (As they are in part Supported) But I dare say it will be Agreed to this way, as we are not, nor cannot be protected.” Shaw’s distinction is important in explaining Machias’ adamant opposition to neutrality. The war had affected Machias differently than neighboring towns. Gouldsborough, Jonesborough, Number Four, Narraguagus and Frenchman’s Bay were vulnerably located within easy reach of British privateers. Physically and psychologically the war had taken a heavy toll upon these isolated settlements. To some extent Machias shared many of the same tribulations, but the war enhanced the town’s importance. Indeed, it became even more important than Pownalborough, the county seat. Machias was the easternmost fortified town in Maine, a haven for Nova Scotian refugees, a staging area for invasions of British-held territory, and, most importantly, a bastion against British invasion. As long as Machias held out, the smaller neighboring settlements took strength, and the British could never control the region. Machias could hold out as long as the Indians remained friendly, but their friendship depended largely on the provisions and diplomacy administered by John Allan at Machias. The town was so strategically important that both
Massachusetts and the Continental Congress contributed to its defense. Screened by friendly Indians, supported by state and nation, and situated well up the Machias River beyond easy reach of unfriendly vessels, Machias understandably assumed an uncompromising attitude toward such trimmers as Shaw, Jones, and Nickells, whose neutrality scheme would undo the town's newfound importance.

The opposition of Machias effectively destroyed the neutralist movement, which was weakened from the beginning by the dubious motives and reputations of its leaders. Neutralism is both elusive and dangerous in a war where morality has become polarized. Enemies at least hold to some principles, erroneous as they may be. Neutrals, however, are open to the charge of being without principles and of seeking the best of both sides without risk of personal commitment. As the town of Pleasant River phrased it, neutrals were interested in catching the hare while other beat the bush. Only the state could bestow neutrality without tainting its beneficiaries with self-interest. Wadsworth had managed this for the residents of Penobscot Bay. In that case, neutrality coincided with the best interest of Massachusetts; it provided a subtle means of preserving loyalty where the state had no effective power. On the other hand, the Shaw, Jones, and Nickells proposal for the inhabitants east of the Penobscot worked to their own personal advantage and not to that of the state. When Machias quickly exploited this weakness the adherents fell away, fearing the accusations of their neighbors more than enemy raids. Even Francis Shaw sought to hide behind anonymity of a committee decision.

The only neutralist movement able to withstand popular hostility emanated from the Society of Friends, or Quakers. Their refusal to take sides in the Revolution arose from Christian pacifism and an extreme religious
democracy, principles for which the sect was well known, even notorious. Long before trouble erupted between Britain and her colonies, Quakerism had spread to Maine and expanded rapidly during the war. By 1768 Falmouth Quakers were sufficiently numerous as to require a meeting house 40-by-32-feet square with a gallery. The 1777 census listed sixty-four Quakers in Falmouth who, by 1781, were forced to enlarge their meeting house once again. In many towns Quakers actively resisted public taxation for support of the established church, and by onset of the Revolution, they had won exemption from religious taxation in Windham and Falmouth. Nevertheless, the Falmouth Quakers continued to provoke excitement and controversy by attending Congregational services where they ostentatiously refused to remove their hats and tried to proselytize the congregation.

During the war they aroused even more resentment by refusing to pay war taxes, to serve in the military, and to take loyalty oaths to the American cause. Quaker Nathaniel Palmer of Bristol defended his inability to take the loyalty oath in a moving address to the authorities. “If I shuld affairm to Be true to war,” he wrote, “then I Shuld make Shipwrack of faith and good Conchance: for Love is that New Command, which I hope I have Received Ritten on my heart—that I Shuld Love one another: But your Law my friends Strikes as the very Scorce and foundation of all my Religion which is my Live [life].” Palmer declared his abhorrence of “Whigs” and “Tories” as “Revengeful Parties distroying Eaich other,” yet he affirmed he was a “true and Reall friend to my Cuntry” and would never assist its enemies. The local authorities and the General Assembly remained skeptical; Palmer testified to his convictions by going to jail.

Palmer’s experience was not unique. Although Quakers had a reputation among critics for personally profiting
from their pacifism, they frequently gave witness to their principles by submitting to the distraint of property for their refusal to pay military taxes, and they disciplined their own members who attended auctions where confiscated Quaker goods were sold.\textsuperscript{84} When the selectmen of Berwick divided their town into groups or “classes,” each to provide a recruit for the army, the officials lumped all the Quakers into one “class,” confident they would default and thereby face fines and further losses of property for persevering in their religious scruples.\textsuperscript{85}

The Quakers maintained their pacifism and neutrality throughout the Revolution, and they sought no escape from hardship. Indeed, they accepted public resentment and legal harrassment as both a test of their own spiritual convictions and as a means of witnessing to their religious beliefs. In glaring contrast, the secular neutralism of Francis Shaw was an effort to escape the burdens of a cause he and his adherents had once espoused; no matter how justified, Lincoln County neutralism appeared to be desertion. Belatedly, the neutralists discovered that their proposals, far from offering an escape, were far more burdensome than they had ever anticipated or were willing to accept.

Only an end to the war brought relief to the District of Maine, but in 1782 and early 1783 peace seemed a long way off. When Indians from Canada attacked the settlement of Sudbury Canada (Bethel) in late summer 1781 tremors of fear rippled across the frontier.\textsuperscript{86} Machias was in no condition to inspire confidence; its defenses were “deplorable.” It had but one officer and six soldiers to garrison a fort containing but five small arms in working order.\textsuperscript{87} A Cumberland County convention, held in February 1783, expressed fears that Lincoln County might soon be too discouraged to resist the enemy any longer. If that were to happen, Cumberland would face an
enemy who appeared to be growing more vigorous as the war wound down elsewhere. Without adequate defenses, the Cumberland delegates expressed hope that "a part of the Continental Forces may be spared to defend this northern State to which the attention of the Enemy now seems to be directed." Unfortunately, no help appeared; no one outside of Maine much cared what happened there.

Even Massachusetts seemed to lose interest. Britain and the United States signed a preliminary peace treaty in November 1782, the provisions of which were embodied in the definitive treaty of September 1783. The British and their Loyalist allies, however, lingered at Bagaduce until 1784 without any official pressure to depart. Precisely when the last British detachment withdrew is not entirely clear. Two authorities suggest January, but as late as March 23, 1784, a resolve in the Massachusetts council referred to the British evacuation in the future tense. No American official was on hand when the British finally departed, and no state official formally assumed possession of the abandoned post until Samuel McCobb came over from Georgetown in the spring to make an inventory of what remained. Even then Maine was not entirely free of its foes. The troublesome Bagaduce loyalists moved only as far as Passamaquoddy Bay where they established Saint Andrews on the east side of the Saint Croix River. The bitter legacy of Bagaduce festered for the next fifteen years while the British and Americans quarreled over whether the settlement encroached on American territory, as John Allan furiously insisted. An international commission finally ended the dispute in 1798 by declaring the Saint Croix as the boundary between Maine and New Brunswick, thereby confirming the legality of the loyalist community.
boundary issue between Maine and Canada, however, dragged on for another forty years before finally being resolved.

NOTES


3 Gov. John Hancock’s address to the Mass. Senate and House relative to the deficiency of supplies, March 9, 1781, *ibid.*, pp. 181-82.


8 John Allan to Jeremiah Powell, Sept. 24, 1779, ibid., 17: 177.

9 Ibid., pp. 179-80.

10 John Allan to John Hancock, Nov. 2, 1780, Massachusetts Archives, State House, Boston (hereafter cited as MA), 230: 277.


12 Committee of Narraguagus to Joseph Wales, Nov. 6, 1779, ibid., p. 421.


14 Pro-Thompson convention to the Mass. General Court, Oct. 21, 1779, ibid., pp. 401-2.


19 Proclamation of martial law, April 18, 1780, ibid., pp. 222-24.

20 Ibid., p. 223.

21 Ibid.


26 Gould, British and Tory Marauders, p. 15.

27 John L. Locke, Sketches of the History of the Town of Camden, Maine, Including Incidental References to the Neighboring Places and Adjacent Waters (Hallowell, Me.: Masters, Smith & Co., 1859), pp. 32-34; list of damages at Camden, April 29, 1782, MA.


35 Ibid.


41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.


47 Conference with the Indians, Passamaquoddy Indian Camps, July 1, 1780, ibid., pp. 338-39.


49 John Allan to Gov. John Hancock, May 9, 1781, ibid., p. 257; Allan to Hancock, June 16, 1781, ibid., p. 283.


60 For the text of the 1780 constitution see *ibid.*, pp. 441-72.


63 Town returns and the number of people voting are from Handlin, *Popular Sources*, pp. 627-30, 726-40, 927-30. As before, all adult white males could vote on the constitution (Handlin, p. 23), and I have

64 Handlin, *Popular Sources*, pp. 628-29.


69 See returns for Edgecomb and Wheelersborough (Hampden), *ibid.*, pp. 297, 304.


73 Francis Shaw to the Governor, Council, Senate, and House of Representatives of Mass. (sent to Stephen Jones, March 17, 1781, for forwarding), *ibid.*, pp. 243-46.


75 Machias Committee of Correspondence, Safety and Inspection to Gov. John Hancock, April 10, 1781, *ibid.*, pp. 239-41.

76 Francis Shaw to Stephen Jones, March 17, 1781, *ibid.*, p. 236.

77 Pleasant River Committee of Correspondence to the Machias Committee of Correspondence, April 9, 1781, *ibid.*, p. 191.


By contrast, Bristol refused to clear Quakers from paying ministerial rates, see Bristol Town Records, April 5, 1784, McSA.

*82 Willis, Smith and Deane Journal*, p. 347.


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he is currently completing an in-depth study of the American Revolution in Maine, from which this essay is excerpted.

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BOOK REVIEWS


The Maine legislature created the Maine Historic Preservation Commission in 1971 to administer the National Register program in Maine. The commission surveys historic, architectural, and archaeological resources, nominates the most significant ones to the National Register of Historic Places, and administers a federal grants-in-aid program for the restoration of important buildings and the excavation of potential archaeological sites. Despite a limited budget, the director and his small staff have made great strides in identifying historic and architecturally significant buildings by working closely with local preservation and historical organizations. Lately, the commission has placed more emphasis on identifying and excavating Maine's rich archaeological sites.