Feelings in Politics: How American Foreign Policy Can Benefit from Interpersonal Communication

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FEELINGS IN POLITICS: HOW AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY CAN BENEFIT
FROM INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION

by
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A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for a Degree with Honors
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Misperception clouds good decision-making in international politics. American foreign policy doesn’t currently allow for ample strategic communication training for the President of the United States to prevent misperception from becoming an issue in international relations. Looking at influential political theorists, it’s easy to discover that they all warn of the detriment that comes with an ineffective communicator in the highest power position in the country.

My research provides an overview of different perceptions formed by the United States and China of each other throughout the Presidency of Donald Trump and his counterpart in Beijing, President Xi Jinping. By analyzing the official press releases of each country about the foreign policy moves of the other, I was able to discover the points of weak policy where relations plummeted and where ‘sunshine politics’ prevailed, allowing for further development in the relationship between the two countries’ leaders.

When the two leaders were sticking to their agreement of having frequent meetings involving dialogue that both countries held in high precedent, perceptions were positive and relations were amicable. The opposite happened when the dialogue was infrequent and American Message-Influence foreign policy prevailed (Corman, 2008) where there was increased unilateral action towards China without dialogue.
Sidonia Rosemary Stanton is my absolute favorite person in the entire world.

Most things in my life are dedicated to them, so I will just add this one to the list.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The United States has a communication problem.

As the country is struggling to hold its stance as the global hegemon, American spokespeople are distancing themselves, and the whole country, from the world (Corman and Trethewey, *A New Communication Model For The 21st Century*, 156). Without a communication strategy that focuses on global cooperation, diplomacy will be unreliable in promoting the country’s international image as the protector of democracy and freedom.

Recent cases of ill-communicated intentions have led America to propagate conflict in numerous ways. Our allies in Europe have become more unwilling to defer to American leadership and have actively distanced themselves from the U.S. sphere of influence. President Trump’s attendance last May for the 2017 NATO Summit and his refusal to reaffirm NATO’s famous Article 5, the guarantee of mutual defense, left German Chancellor Angela Merkel pessimistic about U.S. leadership. She announced in an impromptu press conference afterwards that, “The times in which we could completely depend on others are on the way out... We Europeans truly have to take our

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1 This thought came from the text Stephen Corman and Angela Trethewey’s essay, *A New Communication Model For The 21st Century*, (Peter Lang Publishing, 2008) where they describe that the current American international communication strategy could be based off of their theory of the Message-Influence Model that describes the United States’ spokespeople as communicating ideas to foreign nations without properly conveying the intended meaning, so both sides grow in conflict because their perceptions differ so greatly from their dialogue. I don’t agree with the label it throws over all American diplomatic communication, but the focus on the “meaning-making” process prompted my research into the ways our dialogue is inefficiently conducted.
fate into our own hands.” (Frum, *The Atlantic*, May 2017). This was a decisive landmark indicator of leadership decline.

More conflicts continue unresolved with little diplomatic effort left in the United States to repair broken relations constructively. Afghanistan has been the longest standing war in American history, encouraged by the foreign policy spokespeople\(^2\) of both sides of the aisle to continue the war (Joyner, *The Atlantic*, May 2011). This interventionist foreign policy has persisted since the Cold War ended and has helped the United States keep to its guns to solve the War on Terror.

While still handling the old war, the president and his foreign policy actions have been flirting with revisiting conflict in North Korea. Denouncing previous administrations’ efforts, the current administration has demanded crushing sanctions be implemented by U.N. Security Council members on North Korea (Lynch and De Luce, *Foreign Policy*, April 2017). This continues even after Secretary Tillerson’s sacking. This has been supplemented by belittling language between the two countries’ leaders without any productive attempts at peace building or understanding. All of these foreign policy methods are counterintuitive to the international position of peace we advertise (Whitehead, 6).

The United States has a communication problem and the public is interested in knowing why. Since the United States played its crucial role in ending World War II, it’s enjoyed being a unilateral actor in international politics, and even more so after the Cold

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\(^2\) James Joyner, founder and editor-in-chief of the weblog Outside The Beltway, denominates the two political groups who’ve become most prominent in U.S. foreign policy to create these destructive communication methods: *neoconservatives and liberal interventionists*. Neoconservatives as perpetuating war in order to spread American ideologies through permanent marks left by the military. Liberal interventionists center around the Responsibility to Protect individuals abroad against their governments and military groups. Both have a readily available war option.
War. New trends of interstate relations have become increasingly compromising and more dividing than ever before. In attempt to draw the hardline argument, American executive and ambassadorial representatives are sending messages to other countries of national prioritization. Allies and adversaries alike are being subject to the distancing that’s taking place, which declines hope for a more unified world.

This strategy is a clear abandonment of the nation’s soft power that is gravely wounded. ‘Soft Power’, is a term coined by Joseph Nye in 1990, “which occurs when one country gets other countries to want what it wants… in contrast with the hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants.” (Nye, *Foreign Affairs*, 2004). This is a delicate power. Having a cooperative relationship between two counties is a virtue of trust building and understanding, but it’s crucial to human existence.

Our declining ‘Soft Power’ is the bottom line motivation to create institutional change in government. Non-governmental organizations and government liaison councils have been attempted and failed. In 2004, the Council on Foreign Relations recommended creating a "White House Public Diplomacy Coordinating Structure," led by a presidentially appointed head, and a nonprofit "Corporation for Public Diplomacy" for the private sector to maintain outreach (Nye, *Foreign Affairs*, 2004). Neither of these suggestions were put into action. According to a Gallup poll done in January 2018 of 134 countries, median percentage approval for U.S. leadership dropped to 30% from 48% in 2016 (Ray, *Gallup*, 2018). Since the newly elected administration came into power, the ratings have continued sliding down to new lows in American confidence (Ray, *Gallup*, 2018).
To find a trajectory that will restore American leadership confidence, the world and the United States must be able to express their own worldviews and listen to each other. This cooperation can best be achieved through utilizing a communication process that is already well-used in international affairs between high ranking individuals. Interpersonal Communication is a process that has no beginning or end, moving through different stages in competence of one’s own emotions and the emotions of the other participants in the conflict (Trenholm et Jensen, *Interpersonal Communication*, 5). The specific model of communication that I’m proposing in my research is the Model of Communication Competence designed by the leading academics in communication science, Sarah Trenholm and Arthur Jensen, for use by the president and the cabinet. They must be trained in this communication form to lead and represent the United States with awareness when communicating with leaders of other nations.

Made clear by the lack of this strategic practice, the literature on the functions and benefits of this strategy is virtually non-existent. The idea that heads of state should follow a process that allows all parties to be legitimized in negotiation is a threat to the identities of participants, and thus a non-starter in its consideration as a viable practice. In multiple studies by the Harvard International Negotiation Program, the identity

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3 This comes from the ‘Tribes Effect’ that was outlined in *Negotiating the Nonnegotiable: How to Resolve Your Most Emotionally Charged Conflicts* by founder and director of the Harvard International Negotiation Program, Daniel Shapiro. The ‘Tribes Effect’ outlined the main levels for conflict resolution to be rationality, emotions, and identity. Primarily and on the surface level, people try to resolve conflicts rationally to maximize mutual gains. But if this fails, each level poses new more difficult challenges to resolve. Emotions cloud judgement and rationality, but with proper emotional awareness can tell you when a situation is working in your favor or something ethereal is obstructing further progress. Finally, the issue of identity is the most difficult to reconcile. This behavior model is crucial to understand in the realm of this thesis because it’s something virtually unchangeable in the human consciousness. It deals with the principle of human need to find meaning in their existence, which involves devotion to religious, cultural and ethical value systems that supersede all other variables in their lives.
becomes the indicator of who you are and most defended aspect of yourself (Shapiro, *Negotiating the Nonnegotiable*, pp. 7-10). This is exactly what Trenholm and Jensen address with the Model of Communication Competence and its intention to unlock identity to create transparency between all negotiation parties and minimize all forms of misperception. Chapter Two will focus on the theoretical explanation of this model and its applicability in foreign policy.

The Foreign Service and the Department of State are tasked with managing and creating foreign policy decisions for the president and the executive offices (Childs, *American Foreign Service*, 36). Developed interpersonal communication skills is already a prerequisite for working in the State Department. Extending this necessary skill set to executive positions is a natural next step to improve international competence. In Chapter Three, the case will be made to exemplify the successes associated with foreign policy practiced through the State Department’s use of interpersonal communication and that the way the method taught to diplomats and foreign service officers is an exemplary way of training good dialogue practiced to the president and members of the cabinet.

Chapter Four is where the prominent research of my thesis is tested. To support my claim for executive interpersonal relations training, I’ve outlined a crucial case in international politics with an outcome that is greatly dependent on negotiation. America’s relations with China have been on the forefront of many political analysts’ research and the advice from experts on what policies to adopt is continuously mixed. My research is analyzing the communication styles of the United States and of China by dissecting the press releases about each other and determining which tactics foster the friendliest bilateral relations. I will be analyzing the agreements, disagreements and tone of the press
releases from the executive offices of the United States and China during the presidential term of Donald Trump. My methodology assigns a number to each press release using the 5-point Likert Scale based on the number of new agreements, revisited agreements, revisited disagreements, and new disagreements that determine the successes of ideas that’ve been communicated between the two negotiating parties to come to a consensus. The grading scale and details on the rubric used are explained further later in this chapter.

Then in Chapter Five, I will discuss how an ideal function of international negotiation will become like how Truth and Reconciliation Commissions operate to dissolve conflict and lay ground work of non-violence. Using the successful example of the first commission established in post-apartheid South Africa, the benefits of choosing “peace over justice” are historically proven to unite two sides of a deeply dividing conflict such as national racial relations (Hayner, *International Review of the Red Cross*, 2006). This example will provide context to my claim of promoting interpersonal communication in international politics and frame the way the United States can better its foreign policy in order to propagate world peace.
REFERENCES


The topic of effective methods of negotiation is pertinent because of the amazing need for understanding communications in a politically, socially, and culturally globalized world. These types of dialogue are used to solve the world’s toughest problems in territory negotiations, peace talks, climate change discussion, and all internationally pertinent issues that require collaboration between nations. Research in this field is deeply important to the security of the United States, and how heads of state can be prepared to handle contentious issues. I evaluate the most effective communication strategies for maintaining and promoting peace to implement in high-pressure international, political and diplomatic negotiation between representatives of the United States and leaders that represent foreign nations. In this chapter, I will focus on the crucial theoretical origins of international relations theory in accordance with advanced realist thinking. Then with an analysis of the existing communication methodology literature, an explanation of the theoretical arguments behind the communication methods being used contemporarily in liberal international relations theory. Finally, the theoretical framework of the communication model I believed to be the most effective and universally beneficial communication method in my preliminary research.
Misperception: The Bread and Butter Of Conflict

The realist school of thought in international relations is based on an anarchic international system. There is only so much that can be done to regulate the fighting between nations and whether or not they can attain peace after they’ve engaged in conflict. Central to these conflicts, why they start and why they end, is the perception and trust the two nations have with each other. When misperceptions seem more factual than speculative, a dangerous transformation occurs and the two countries become more unwilling to hear from the other side of the conflict. These notions are built into widely accepted realist international relations theory to explain the rationality of why nations choose war. This section outlines great realist theory that try to explain why misperception exists and the destruction it can cause if it goes unsolved. Waltz, Meirshiemer, Copeland, Morganthau, and Allison and Thucydides are the primary theorists that I will be using to discuss how misperception is central to realist international relations theory.

Kenneth Waltz is the preeminent scholar of the post-war era in international relations theory and has influenced numerous politicians and other theorists (Walt, “Kenneth N. Waltz, 1924-2013”, Foreign Policy, 2013). His career was kicked off by his published book, Man, the State and War in 1959 when he outlined one of his most important theoretical analyses of his time. Waltz proposed that there are three lenses, or ‘images’ of theoretical analysis when it comes to why conflict and war occurs, each more effective than the last.

The first image is ‘Man’, or the individual, that has huge consequence on the political sway of a nation-state. The charisma, decisiveness and common sense a person
has is defining for how the leadership role will be carried out. Conflict that is coaxed by individuals can be because of the nature of political leaders. He exemplifies Hitler and Napoleon in this part, and their psychology being relative to the time period of angst, need for dominance and a superiority complex.¹

The second image is ‘State’, which is usually a nation-state made of people with common history, culture and/or language, and a presiding government. States have movements and surges of nationalism dependent on other nations around it, driving competition and bolstering rhetoric of, again, superiority. Waltz argues that colonialism was a state’s need to expand its enterprises and spread culture to the weak.

The third and inarguably most important image was the International System. He claimed that this is the originator of war, and that because the international system is anarchical, there’s nothing to prevent war from happening. Thus this permits all other theories of war to be permissible. Nothing can stop war other than the realization that war isn’t what the people want. What perpetuates the necessity to be prepared for a war is its uncertainty. The possibility exists as long as there is distrust in the other state, which can lead to something as dangerous as a security dilemma (Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism: a Study in Theories and Realities, 1951). The security dilemma is an important aspect in exemplifying misperception in international relations, also described by Herz as the Spiral Model, is defined as the distrustful relations countries form by increasing military strength to make the other country increase its military strength. This

¹ The main body of my research stems from the first image being a key element in how other nations perceive the United States. Representing the will of the United States is the primary job of the president of each country. Xi Jinping and Donald Trump make invaluable impressions for the people of the other country about the one they represent, and it’s because of the platform they’re given as described by Kenneth Waltz’s theory.
causes tension between the two countries to grow and reason for reconciliation to worsen to the point where they have no trust left between them. This creates a void where trust once belonged, but now conflict can grow and possibly lead to war.

Another great theorist in realist international relations is John Mearsheimer who originated ‘Offensive Realism’, founding that states look to gain power over others at the expense of other states (Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 2001). He delineates that states can never be certain about other states' intentions, which causes misperceptions, and leads to rising conflicts. He also describes how the United States has become a vessel for textbook liberal foreign policy because of the optimistic worldview we claim and how we use it to motivate our government and non-state actors to help improve national welfare and the world’s.

Another influential voice in realist political thought that contributes to the definition of misperception is Dale Copeland, author of *The Origins of Major War*, and strong proponent of the Balance of Power Theory. He says great powers that anticipate deep and inevitable decline are more likely to initiate wars or hard-line policies that substantially increase the risk of major war through inadvertent escalation (Copeland, *The Origins of Major War*, 2000). This sentiment of inevitability that he describes is attributed to feeling helpless in maintaining peace because it’s seemingly impossible to avoid viewing the other side as a threat when observing them prepare for conflict. It’s as if peering you’re out a train car window to see the train heading towards a track block and the train isn’t slowing down to not crash into it.

Hans Morgenthau is a classical realist whose realist theories took hold in the early 20th century (Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics*, 1946). He’s most notable
for believing that conflict is based in human nature, and countries’ reactions to events or uneven powers dynamics is to assert their dominance or stand their ground in the face of conflict for their own survival. This school of thought is the purest realist creed in international relations, and calls for the observation of certain objectivity in human nature. He explains best in his quote from *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*:

> Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences, men will challenge them only at the risk of failure. (Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 1978, pg. 4)

In his book, he takes this notion of objective laws rooted in human nature and expands it to include survivalism in the context of observing when other nations are preparing for military conflict without explanation. He argues that misperception is very likely to happen in international politics because human nature prompts us to jump to conclusions of high cost for the sake of survival. Whether or not action is taken by the nation is influenced heavily by the head of state, even in the highest-functioning democracies.

Lastly, of the most notable realist international relations theorists who speak about misperception and its effects, Graham Allison and Thucydides, two prolific academics separated by thousands of years of international diplomatic and war history agree on a very particular theory. Coined as the Thucydides Trap, the ancient Greek historian told his *History of the Peloponnesian War* and described how Athens was a rising power in a Spartan-dominated region where their powers were beginning to conflict and the Sparta
saw Athens’ potential to overtake the rank of regional hegemon (Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 1910). It was this advanced anxiety about being overtaken by the new might of Athens that allowed Sparta to believe that engaging in war has become seemingly inevitable.

Allison takes this theory and sees its applicability in a variety of cases throughout history. He builds a database of highly charged conflicts when a rising power threatened the established power who declares war to prevent its own decline and because of the security dilemma, as referenced previously by Herz and Waltz (Allison, *Destined For War: Can America and China Escape the Thucydides’s Trap?*, 2017). He discusses this scenario in the case study of China, being a rising power, and the United States, being challenged as an established power. His data of China’s rise is irrefutable, claiming that the United States has been left behind in purchasing power parity (PPP), number of active duty military, and although many of Allison’s descriptions and assumptions of China have been claimed to be exaggerated, professional economists and foreign policy wonks are at least weary about the data projections (Buruma, Ian, “Are China and the United States Headed for War?”, *The New Yorker*, 2017). Allison describes the nervous reasoning that many tense relations where the United States is predicted to be economically eclipsed by China in the next two decades, many countries have succumbed to the Thucydides’ Trap under less grave circumstances. It’s believed that the cost of war would be too high to enter a great power conflict at this point in military technological development (Buruma, 2017). As tensions in East Asian politics, economic competition, and proxy conflicts continue rising, he warns that small frictions have the potential to amplify under high-pressure context and become explosive.
Misperception is one of the most dangerous symptoms of pre-war conditions that realist international theorists describe and nearly all of them warn of this reality. Realists claim that to defend against misperception and the cause of war, transparency is necessary to build trust between nations. Although the realist agenda doesn’t prescribe supranational organizations to manage interstate affairs to dilute conflict potential, they do promote bilateral trust building, which calls for both nations understanding each other’s perspectives.

**Liberal and Contemporary Theory Reacts**

Realist international relations theory has roots in human nature being the foundation for all international decisions made by a country, and which allows for misperception to take place. Liberal international relations decree that there’s more at work than just human nature, and that to maintain peace, freedom and human rights promotes this cooperation between nations. Alexis de Tocqueville, Thomas Paine, Immanuel Kant in the 1700s and more recent theorists like Andrew Moravcsik and Francis Fukuyama advocate that there are major variables within the international system that help support peace and that help deteriorate it that go beyond human nature. Misperception isn’t delineated as a core variable by liberal theorists, but that there must be transparency in the behavior of nations to maintain peace.

Moravesik attributes liberal international relations theory as being a “bottom-up” approach to how relationships between countries are formed (Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics”, *International Organization*, 1997). The two assumptions within liberalism that define the school of thought are that the core actors in international relations are the individuals and
prosperous groups that make intra-national relations possible, and second, that the political institutions that run every state represent a particular subset of the country it represents and not the whole will of the people (Moravcsik, 1997). These two basic assumptions fuel liberal concerns of how easily a head of state can undermine the positive development fostered by intra-national leaders and that they can do this without having full consent from their constituents. This leaves a wide berth for nations to misperceive each other’s intentions and the real will of the people, which most theorists agree is to remain alive and not at war.

The other notable liberal international relations theorist who is crucial to this literature analysis of misperception is Francis Fukuyama who professed that liberalism has become the global thought that allows other thoughts to exist but not prevail over it (Fukuyama, “The End of History?”, The National Interest, 1989). It’s owed to “Common Marketization” that has brought the whole world into the global market sphere and made trade the diplomacy that links everyone together, becoming the single most effective deterrent to war in the world. He warns readers in his article:

Failure to understand that the roots of economic behavior lie in the realm of consciousness and culture leads to the common mistake of attributing material causes to phenomena that are essentially ideal in nature. (Fukuyama, 1989)

Maintaining healthy economics already prevents the majority of risky political moves, but when economics and politics turn unhealthy between two countries, what happens to relations? What prevents them from sparking conflict? This question made me turn to modern communication strategies and theories to search further for an answer.
Reviewing literature on the topic of international political communication means getting a broad and specific understanding of mistakes and theories of the negotiation process that could help expand our perspective of human interaction. We must observe an essential problem at the forefront of U.S. rhetoric that expresses distrust and instigates alienation towards foreigners (Hess, Aaron; Justus, H. S. Redefining The Long War: Toward a New Vocabulary of International Terrorism, 2008) in the words that are used by spokespeople and leaders of the American government. Aaron Hess proposes the assembly of a new list of vocabulary to be used by the U.S. government when speaking about issues like terrorism and especially the actions of our military against people who live in these origins of mass terror groups formed against the West. He makes one thing critical; that the U.S. must refer to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) as what it is by definition: a global problem, not a problem of America against the world. This way, there’s less targeting of languages and regions, makes it easier and more profitable to determine success, reduces a ‘terrorist’ to just a criminal, and creates a broader partnership within the international community against smaller and unjust group of people.

Specifically, the authors propose that terrorists should be scrutinized under the international laws in place that incriminate them that have been decided on by a global judicial body such as the ICJ. This way, citizens sympathize with more multilateral efforts and organizations to fight in unity against injustice and no one wants to join a futile and desperate movement to destabilize a strong, united world. This exemplifies the importance of diction in constructive and wise communication as a function of peace and consensus. Political dialogue has necessary communication outlines of which, if not
adhered to, will deconstruct progress and set people further apart from understanding the other’s point of view.

Critically important to exploring available methodologies in international communication is analyzing those already used in the United States Department of State. Esteemed political science academics, Tretheway and Corman, described the department’s rhetoric and communication using the message-influence model, characterized as projecting agendas or manipulating circumstances in order to attain self-oriented goals without a negotiation partner’s consent. The new communication method that they see would be more globally-minded is the pragmatic complexity model (Tretheway, Corman, *A New Communication Model For The 21st Century, 2008*), which is the agreement between participants to form an active resolution that the two sides must always feel is mutually beneficial, or the resolution must be renegotiated.

These two methods are excellent examples of methods already put in place in the international political landscape and that create a great base for my proposition, by adding interpersonal communication. The authors described the United States’ communication methods as a “nation to other nations” (Baxter, Braithwaite, *Engaging Theories in Interpersonal Communication: Multiple Perspectives, 2008*), saying that although the country is portrayed as a credible source and the most powerful single voice on the international stage, the country must work to down play its influences to a low-credibility source. We must regain legitimacy as a credible power by changing our short and long term communication strategies.

The goal is to cultivate constructive negotiation strategies that can be used across platforms in international relations. In Corman et al.’s work, *Weapons of Mass*
Persuasion: Strategic Communication to Combat Extremism, the authors reference the Message Influence Model as being the current method of communication for international negotiation for the U.S. government and the state department. The way the strategy works is that when an American official conveys a proposition or idea to someone representing a foreign entity, the message must demonstrate the power of the United States and encourages them to understand the concept through the American perspective. I agree with the authors’ sentiments that this is not beneficial for all participants in discussion. Though, what I disagree with the authors on is their solution, which was the Pragmatic Complexity Model, which illustrates joint gains being created in the course of a deal will need to be allocated between the parties of that deal. It’s centered around an agreement of “double contingency” that blocks a resolution completely if one part of it is not agreed upon by both/all parties, which could create endless gridlock. This is an example of what happens when the wrong communication forms have been used for so long to persuade and manipulate others to heed our wills. Avoiding these backtracks, it’s necessary to cast aside the ego of the vain “perceived self” and create an equal value with negotiating partners.

We do not assume that influence and coercion are absent from negotiation by definition, that parties always negotiate in good faith, or that negotiated agreements are all “win-win” relative to the status quo. Using interpersonal communication makes goals and favorable long term resolutions that yield better results when the negotiations are inclusive and egalitarian. An excellent account I found in my research of a successful use of this method was the Good Friday agreements negotiated by in Belfast, Northern Ireland between the British and the Irish about the Northern Irish territory (Wolff, “The
The Good Friday Agreement and the Conflict in Northern Ireland, 2001), which featured famously a long discussion between parliamentary members of each nation mediated by United States special envoys to create a consensual agreement to end terrorism in the region and pacify the border region.

Another important article created a roadmap for a successful political dialogue by American scholar, Andries Odendaal, shows necessary pre-conditions, present climate, and post-resolution initiative for a lasting political consensus. He sets up the dialogue steps as prerequisites for “objective, reliable analysis of the conflict” (Odendaal, The Role of Political Dialogue in Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 2011), first by telling the reader what to keep in mind throughout dialogue and to commit to “leadership and inclusion” of all parties. The steps to follow for good dialogue first begins with assembling pre-established groups to give input on the issue(s) being discussed, then finding the proper mediator/mediating body, and finally applying the strategies to interpersonal conflict resolution.

The scholar points out that this process laid out is also not rigid or authoritarian by having outlines and rules. This type of political dialogue is the situation universally beneficial and applicable. Summit dialogue is used for high-tension negotiations of interstate involvement and two track dialogue is between individuals or non-state actors of concern to other nation states (Grarnham, Contribution to a Political Economy of Mass-Communication, 1979). The multi-level dialogue is what would be most exemplified in my working paper, because I want to include all levels of interstate dialogue and bring it to an individual-based interpersonal level when it comes to leaders debating amongst each other.
To prove the applicability of my research findings, I read literary pieces on intergroup dialogue outside the direct context of international relations and security so see if there are aspects of civilian interactions that can be incorporated into improving standards of diplomatic communication. I read about an inter-university group dialogue organization formed in hopes of creating more tolerance and acceptance of all communities involved in the university system and its community. Although this isn’t directly in correlation with politics like the focus of my research, this is an excellent example of how I propose nations work with one another. The organization’s historical context has origins in schools across America creating inter-race and inter-faith groups in wake of the massive changes thrust forward during *Brown vs. The Board of Education (1954)*. To diffuse tensions in educational and community environments, school boards organized dialogue groups to discuss ways to integrate and overcome grievances of the massive social change brought upon the nation by the Supreme Court decision.

What I researched explains that a lot of these groups founded in universities across the country now still combat many racial and faith related issues and the groups continue to serve this main function. The author interviewed several people unaffiliated with groups that say that there’s a feeling of woe associated with being inactive and unknown to the diversity of their own community (*Gurin, et al. Intergroup Dialogue: Its Role in Contemporary Society*, 2013). This is the primary cause of barriers, prejudices and xenophobic aggressions being formed in communities. I propose that this is very relatable to the need for international discussion groups not only among political leaders elected, but normal citizens from different countries. The details in the inter-community dialogue situation serve as a great microcosm example of how international dialogue through
group expression and familiarity will help people become more comfortable with one another.

Another important communication aspect I explored in the body literature available that has an effect on the outcome of international debate is the “Culture Industry” as a marker of communication marketing that is changing the face of mass communication and how governments express their ideas to their people and the world. The concept suggests that the materialistic nature of new communication platforms which once was the prevalence of television and radio, but it is now social media and smartphones technology. Communicating politics is changing to disseminate new information faster and for more opinions to form more quickly. I would use this to create a platform for new communication that can improve government accountability and honesty and help aid relations with other nations, convincing the representatives to adopt a consensual approach to international negotiations that would help promote empathy and understanding.

Lastly and one of the most important areas of interest to think about in the context of international political communication is the importance of the people in keeping government communication transparent and reporting the truth to the common folk. Democracy calls for the freedom of speech to maintain honest and open negotiations, this author writes. He says that some selfishly campaigned politicians is that “the more they communicate, the more they are doubted. Hence, the trust which is a fundamental to the workings of a democratic system is constantly being undermined. I consider statistics and philosophical examples of government distrust as being a non-starter for honest dialogue
and communication, between the hierarchy of the international system as well as its own people.

My theoretical analysis includes primary definitions of three different communication types: the message-influence model, the pragmatic complexity model, and interpersonal communication. The message-influence model is described as operating like an old wire telephone, that the information source transmits information to the receiver in the exact way and vision of the information source, without consideration of the receiver or how the receiver’s perspective would interpret the information. The pragmatic complexity model is based on an A discussant and a B discussant, where A and B form a mutually-assured resolution agreement, but discussant A has more of the power and direct stake in the conflict. A’s behavior is dependent on external conflict conditions and B’s feelings and expressions, and B’s behavior is dependent almost completely on A’s feelings on the situation. Lastly, interpersonal communication is the strategy of projecting equality and consideration of all feelings and sentiments on the issue, considering the matter an issue that must have a mutually consensual resolution to succeed, independent of self-first oriented negotiation.

By the definition of Odell and Tingley, a political negotiation is successful when it meets two criteria: at a minimum, parties reach a mutual-gain deal (Odell et al. Political Negotiation, 2016) (one that would benefit the set of parties as a whole and many if not all of them individually) when such a deal is feasible, and that the negotiation reaches a deal that is more successful to the degree that it exhausts the potential for enhancing the parties’ utilities.
I propose that the communication method of interpersonal communication is the best format and environment for all groups represented to discuss, listen, analyze, express and observe all opinions on an international matter. This is also the best way to succeed in resolving a conflict non-violently, because it allows participants in the discussion to envision the other side(s) in their fullest humanity and compassion.

My hypothesis is a serious declaration that involves extensive background research into the kinds of interpersonal communication that gives the accusation legitimacy. It’s centered around the notion of conflict transformation, which is designed for ethical peace-embedded justice centered around respect for human rights and life. Advocation for non-violence is a way of life and work to supplement conflict transformation in making human relationships bilateral and communicative. John Paul Lederachl, author of *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*, explains that three lenses are necessary to see a situation fully in the moment to create the best solution to the issue (Lederach, *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*, 2003). First is the immediate situation, second is the analyzeation of the deeper relationship patterns creating the conflict, and third is the framework that holds all perspectives together contributing to the conflict. Conflict is a huge and natural part of human growth with each other and themselves. Mastering the empathy and compassion for others and then using that to promote growth in each other when there’s conflict makes a resolution that leaves all parties better off than when they came together in the first place.

It is important to both envision and respond to incur growth in conflict resolution. In international relations, diplomats negotiate in high stress situations often involving deeply hostile sides of an issue. To keep peace dynamic, adaptive, and changing in
resolution methods to find its most effective way, we must continue to analyze the structure and transform the methods based on the observations of how the last attempt went at resolving the international crises. Conflicts don’t get solved perfectly the first time or any other time for that matter. Conflict transformation, by definition, is relationship based, personal and experiential because it focuses on real core changes to resolve issues so the long term effect can stay relevant and helpful, as opposed to conflict resolution which is about relieving the pain of the current conflict through any possible method without acknowledgment of the future cases that could come into view (Gaber et al. *Too Much of a Good Thing*, 2007).

This aligns with the notion of progress being non-linear and that all normal parts of the retrogression & the expression change in a conflict. An epicenter or core issue of a conflict is a platform, which acts like a trampoline; very good to start from and jump into the transformation process. We have a capacity to envision & to present issues as a window that takes us beyond immediate situations by examining the situations in the long term and that the whole “mountain range” of issues provides a bigger picture that is imperative to compassion and maintaining the resolution attained. With this in mind, I’d like to propose that the method(s) that should be used in international negotiation should be respectful, considerate of all parties’ concerns, and able to apply to all people.

This project provides insight needed about an option in international conflict that is often easily forgotten: that continuously acknowledging the humanity in others is a realistic tactic that deserves more legitimacy that it receives. Interpersonal relations and communication methods involve a step by step process that it backed by contentions of non-violence. The kinds of negotiation that result in violence are the ones that promote
emotional ignorance, belligerent self-centeredness, and insensitivity to others’ points of view. How we move forward as a global society and a species is through the training of emotional literacy in our elected leaders. Through these methods, we can achieve this and incorporate it into the daily lives of all peoples.

**Interpersonal Communication Theory: Peace Through Equality**

Interpersonal Communication strategy has been developed to give all participants in the process a platform to hear, be heard, and understand the conflict from all sides. This theory has been developed and proven to effectively develop a working relationship between people where they can move towards a consensus in any conflict. Formatted by Dr. Sarah Trenholm and Dr. Arthur Jensen, the Model of Communicative Competence incorporates five core elements of being proficient in interpersonal communication (Trenholm and Jensen, *Interpersonal Communication*, 10). These focus points help combat prejudice and ethnocentric tendencies that are in human behavioral patterns, and that prevent productive problem-solving. Cross-cultural communication can be stifled easily by assumptions that prevent productive discussion of issues that affect everyone in the negotiations. Trenholm and Jensen have come up with the Model of Communicative Competence which maps the internal competence needed to become fluent in this form of communication.

The model, although not meant originally for international negotiation, is meant to defuse tensions and bridge the gap for understanding between people from fundamentally different backgrounds. Its basic purpose would be very useful in communications between heads of state. Very often, as we’ve seen in the conclusions of acclaimed theorists of international relations, heads of state make judgements and claims based on
misperceptions caused by inaccurate or incomplete information which leads to conflict. This process guides participants through their internal levels of decision-making to bring them to the most informed conclusion to act upon.

On the next page, Figure 2.1 shows the Model of Communicative Competence (Trenholm and Jensen, 10) mapped out to demonstrate the process one goes through to generate informed communication, both receiving and sending. These steps in the process are already parts of all communication and the point of this detailed outline is to improve ones’ self-awareness in new situations and receptiveness to new ideas in dialogue. The process begins in the model by receiving new information from an outside source and interpreting it. This involves analyzing the situation and people providing the information, understanding what the situation will potentially ask, and what is able to be provided. The information flows from the interpretation competence throughout the chart to address how the role, self, and goal competence interprets this information. Role competence is analyzing placement in the situation, what advice or information to give, and what behavior to exhibit in the environment to most accurately present ideas. Self-competence is central to understanding self-image, which is critical to how others perceive one’s actions that are devastating to be misconstrued in negotiations. Goal competence is delineating what the desired results are from their participation in dialogue and becoming informed of the other participants’ goals as well. These three steps of the process flow next into message competence, which involves the process of coding internal decision-making and reactions into an outward form of communication. This step includes verbal (linguistic tools), nonverbal (body language) and relational competence (conveying desired relationship), that when communicated unmindfully, can cause
misperception in the receiver when the information used to react isn’t processed fully through the previous steps. After all of these steps, there is performative competence which is the step where the user expresses their messages to others with the backing of their communicative competence process (Trenholm and Jensen, 10).

This methodology helps protect negotiations against becoming ill-informed and biased by gaining control over perceptions. Trenholm and Jensen refer to the Process of Perception when we are recognizing and appreciating complex internal competency and the individuality that must be taken into account (Trenholm and Jensen, 145). Their research has shown that emotions in addition to the ‘capacity to reason’ is what creates effective decisions (Trenholm and Jensen, 145). In the context of international negotiations between heads of state, this method combats the truths of the Sapir-Wharf Hypothesis, Expectancy Violations Theory, and rules of cooperative problem solving.

Figure 2.1
The Sapir-Wharf Hypothesis states that language determines that way we interpret the world through how we communicate ideas to one another. Otherwise known as Linguistic Relativity (Kay and Kempton, 1984), the hypothesis claims that speakers of different languages, and people from different cultures by extension, experience the world differently. Language and thought are permanently interlinked and definitions merge with thoughts until they become inseparable, as Nietzsche would agree. The implicit knowledge each person has from their own cumulative experiences creates their perception of the world, and the model helps guide the analysis of this information.

Expectancy Violations Theory measures the perception of someone’s actions that one has of another person based on their prejudice of them (Trenholm and Jensen, 1976). Whether the prejudice is positive or negative, this affects the perception of one’s actions and hinders their ability to be understood. The theory explains that people have different reactions between people who break the same rules or accomplish the same tasks based on their prejudice of them before the action. If dyads in interpersonal communication are crucial relationships that are the building blocks for lasting peace, then these aspects of the theory must be analyzed before decisions or communications are made to harm trust between people.

Within formalized cooperative negotiation, there are guidelines to streamline these efforts. From the gathered literature, there seem to be five core rules for cooperation problem solving. First, diagnosing personal goals to makes intentions clear and easy to

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5 Although he has little to do with international relations, Nietzsche has been accredited with core findings in inseparable bonds between language and thought and how in conjunction, they affect perception (Nietzsche, “On the Origin of Language (1869-70)”, 1989). How heads of state create misperceptions can also be traced back to his psychological findings within the framework of language and social norms that unconsciously define communication.
communicate. Second, making the effort to understand others’ interests and emotions will create trust and respect between all negotiators. Third, accepting that emotions can run high and are legitimate before formal negotiations begin. Fourth, focusing on interests instead of positions will direct attention away from identity issues that cannot be ‘solved’ or changed within the context of conflict negotiation, if ever. Lastly, if there are impasses in negotiations, to consider third party help to moderate and provide objective neutrality. These five rules provide clarity into issues by acknowledging biases that could prevent consensual problem solving.

Heads of state are susceptible to these human biases like anyone else, which is a basis of both interpersonal communication and international relations theory. The difference is that they are incumbents of immense power positions and their decisions are much more costly and effect many more people than whether or not a marriage ends or a student is expelled from school⁶. Heads of state are at the powerful focal point of where public and private communication meet, which means that all of their communications are being perceived and judged. They cannot escape the context that their jobs provide, but heads of state don’t receive training to prevent the formation of uninformed judgements. Strategic interaction can include directives/straight stalemates, persuasion, compliance, instrumental and relational communication, but all efforts will fail without trust between negotiators. Interpersonal relations humanizes conflict and enables dialogue on the pretense that all negotiators are equal in their humanity, a point which becomes lost in political context but is undeniable in everyone’s personal perception of conflict.

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⁶ Interpersonal communication methods are used most notably in school systems, couples’ counseling, and domestic issues which is highlighted numerous times in Trenholm and Jensen’s works.
In the next chapter, I will address the current and historical efforts of the United States foreign policy to facilitate strategic communication and understand past president’s efforts to foster trusting relationships with other countries and their leadership.
REFERENCES


American foreign policy has experienced many inconsistent phases over the past 70 years since the end of World War II. The United States has had to satiate the world’s need for international leadership, as well as implement a “laissez-faire” relationship with the global community and foster their self-sustainability. In the American government’s attempt to satisfy both pleas, it adopted strategies of “maximalism” and “retrenchment” that succeeded in deepening American international involvement, expanding as an industrial powerhouse, and reassuring allies that global communism could never be realized. After the collapse of the U.S.S.R., regional adversaries sprouted from Cold War ashes in the Middle East and gave rise to the Global War on Terror. As the scope widened and unipolarity was the globally accepted American position, the strategies of maximalism and retrenchment continued to be toggled between. Although there has been discontinuity in foreign policy strategy between administrations, I would argue that the Trump administration has become an extreme anomaly in foreign policy change. The early actions and rhetoric we’ve observed from the current president demonstrates the significance of the next three to seven years he’ll hold office in reevaluating America’s alliances, international legislation, and the country’s image on the world stage as it takes a step back in liberal democratic leadership. This section will evaluate the successful and misdirected policies and actions of American foreign relations over the last 70 years, and why the president needs a formalized communication strategy. This paper will also
chronologically describe these events in the context of maximalist, retrenchment, and Trump’s current strategies that are unfolding.

Post-World War II era foreign policy is characterized by the success of nation-building and democratization in fostering new alliances. The European reconstruction era was ultimately a win for the “maximalist” mentality for maintaining American dominance, after employing the Marshall Plan (or the European Recovery Program, ERP), NSC-68 and the Containment Doctrine. In the Truman Doctrine given in March 1947, President Harry Truman said, “One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free of coercion,”(Truman, pg.3) and the new hopes for the future of Europe were realized. In this defense of international aid, Truman initiated the Marshall Plan’s full force and international aid to bring in Europe into line with the West. The United States initiated covert anti-communist aid and direct assistance to countries it thought could be swayed away from the Soviets without igniting direct war with them. The $4 billion congress gave Truman for the Marshall Plan in 1948 to rebuild its European allies (Ambrose pg.92) so they may rejoin the ranks against a new threat in Europe once they’ve regained hard-power and industrial abilities. In 1950, NSC-68 was put into immediate action after the Containment Doctrine was fully realized by the United States government on advice of the “Sources of Soviet Conduct”, by George Kennan. In this analysis, he outlined in depth the formation of the Russian government since its official American recognition in 1933 and its hostile views and foreign policy goals towards the West and its capitalist agenda. The Containment Doctrine and NSC-68 were paired in initiation to positively affect the other in symbiotic positive feedback to
convince third party countries to join the United States and other Western block states, but most importantly, to not join the communists in Russia and secondarily in China. This was demonstrating the active foreign policy the time called for in wake of Soviet aggressions in the Middle East and Eastern Europe as their sphere of influence grew with the Warsaw Pact and militaristic suppressions of insurrections within territorial influence. This is noted as a success in maximalist thinking and a bold beginning for the American legacy of advancing the strength our allies.

With the emergence of the Cold War came more weighted risk with major power engagement. Due to the prevalence of nuclear arms early in the conflict, the stakes rose quickly, causing rules of engagement to be informally set by 1949 when intelligence became informed of the U.S.S.R.’s first nuclear weapons test. The global dichotomy was solidified in the formation of nuclear weapons blocks as NATO was founded in 1949 and the Warsaw Pact in 1955 when both sides had acquired staggering nuclear arsenals. The country’s leadership in forming NATO was crucial to the Western bloc’s military and political unity throughout the Cold War. The maximalist support was waining by the end of Truman’s time in office when it became apparent that the nuclear arsenal growth in Russia wasn’t noticeably decreasing and the citizens were feeling the burn in heightened taxes going to support NATO and the UN that weren’t helping their cause. The retrenchment strategy was first implemented in the Eisenhower administration when he became president in 1953. Sestanovich said, “[Eisenhower] believed that Harry Truman’s approach to national security was neither successful nor sustainable,” and that his new administration was tasked with fixing his predecessor’s problems by having to “escape a military stalemate, cut the cost of defense, shift burdens to allies, replace stale ideological
rhetoric with more hopeful initiatives, and shore up domestic support.”(Sestanovich, 67) Retrenchment strategy was another successful American foreign policy, building stable foundations for more integrated international relations with allies in Western Europe and Asia as he sealed peace in Korea, and avoided nuclear escalation with the U.S.S.R.

Retrenchment won many non-interventionalist battles early in the conflict. In 1956, Eisenhower only diplomatically intervened in the seizure of the Suez Canal by Anglo-French forces, stating that this is a terrible message to be sending out to prospective allies in the Third World and to stop their military campaign against Egypt immediately. But the maximalist strategy pulled ahead when preservation of the Containment Doctrine became necessary through military intervention. The Korean War was bitterly fought to end aggressive expansion of communism in the Korean peninsula from Chinese and Russian support of North Korea and their Leader Kim Il Sung. United Nations forces, led predominantly by the United States, entered the war in 1950 to prevent a domino from falling, and to provide relief to the invaded South Koreans. But in the change of the presidency, Eisenhower ended the conflict with a ceasefire at the 38th parallel. The Vietnam War, however, was one of the worst interventions in world history, where the U.S. always held and carried out a maximalist interventionist view from supporting French recolonization after the end of World War II and then the Diem regime of South Vietnam, and finally its own military campaigns against anti-establishment guerrilla fighters and the communist Viet Cong. This will turn into arguably the most devastating foreign policy and military mistakes in U.S. history.

The election of John F. Kennedy in 1960 brought back the maximalist agenda by re-embracing NSC-68 and giving full financial and political support to our allies across
the globe. It wasn’t until the near catastrophe of October of 1962 when the Soviets moved
missiles in Cuba, that United States foreign policy perception became existentially
threatening. The reinitiating of nuclear threats caused the United States, led by President
Kennedy at this time, to reenter with full force of negotiations and militaristic
intimidations of deterrence. The maximalist method worked and the crisis ended without
nuclear war, but it once again reminded the West of the high stakes Russia was trying to
bring to the conflict and the need of active participation. The Cuban Missile Crisis ended
one part of the Cold War and opened the second part for the administrative war hawks to
administer more power in future violent conflicts with communism, particularly in the
country of Vietnam. “Two events—Vietnam and Watergate— have cast a long shadow of
our understanding of how American foreign policy unfolded in the 1970s.” (Sestanovich
192) Nixon’s Watergate scandal landed the executive branch in a period of tumult and
distrust, after having declared a resurgence of Retrenchment Strategy through the Nixon
Doctrine in trying to withdraw the United States from Vietnam. The violent ending to the
war came with a general animosity towards the United States from developing nations
after the demolition of Vietnam.

From the end of the Nixon administration through the Reagan years, the United
States foreign policy underwent a transformative process from détente strategy to a plan
to end the Cold War. Each presidency and administration adds another step in the
direction of this goal to leave this war in history from 1973 to 1989, as Reagan put it, to
make the foreign policy agenda about resolving the conflict instead of drawing out the
pain or prolonging the expensive game of attrition. Throughout this era of political
conservatism and uncertainty about the economic future, new tools of both war and
diplomacy were implemented by the executive and legislative branches to have effective changes in the Department of State and Department of Defense in the United States be more influential in its areas of conflict, mainly at the end of the Vietnam War, in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Central America.

After Nixon’s resignation, Gerald Ford inherited much of his cabinet and his foreign policy strategies, most influential to the relationship America had with the Third World was his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. The secretary’s statecraft tactics throughout Nixon, Ford and Carter’s presidencies were oriented with stabilizing our economic dependence on OPEC during the political tremors of the 1970s and to help align Third World nations with the United States as opposed to the U.S.S.R. by resolving regional conflict with diplomatic mediation. This primarily happened in the resolution of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 that settled peace for Israel and the surrounding Arab states, succeeded in negotiating "disengagement agreements" which put in place narrow demilitarized zones between the opposing forces in the Golan Heights, and next to the Suez Canal and began the Camp David Accords carried on by Jimmy Carter during his presidency. This was considered a diplomatic success until the deals were annulled by the assassination of President Sadat. During the late 1970s, the support plans for allies and interests of the United States were executed in geographic and cultural categories in a progressive policy strategy called “Regionalism” and was how the Arc of Crisis in 1979 was dealt with by the State Department and executive offices of President Carter. The Arc of Crisis threw off much of what he wanted to promote in global human rights by determining U.S. foreign aid grants and the government’s respect and protection of their

Iran continues to be an enormous foreign policy issue after its deposition of the U.S.-supported Shah regime in 1979 and installation of the new Islamic Republic under an ayatollah, or supreme religious leader. This new regional destabilizer was opposed by the Ba’athist Party military leader in Iraq, Saddam Hussain, who invaded Iran in September of 1980 with the support of America in hopes of countering Iran’s revolutionary power surge and dangerous autonomy. The war became tricky when in 1985 the United States also began selling military weapons to Iran to fund the Contras, a Nicaraguan political military group, in the debacle referred to as the Iran-Contra Scandal, which lasted until 1987 after Congress refused to militarily intervene in Nicaragua, which is what Reagan suggested, saying that “the Contras are ‘moral equivalents to our Founding Fathers’ and that ‘we owe them our help’” (Ambrose 327). This went on while the United States simultaneously supported “Operation Staunch” which in 1983, resolved that arms deals can only be made amongst its allies with Iraq and not Iran in this conflict during the terrible years of this war. Both of the Iran-Contra Scandal and Operation Staunch were morally corrupt policies that the United States carried out under Reagan’s maximalist agenda. The insurgent wars and foreign affairs tactical decisions are retrospectively difficult to justify, and supported by shady methods from World War II and Vietnam-era foreign policy.

In the late 1970s, “in his relations with the Soviet Union, Carter’s major goals were to free America from its ‘inordinate fear of Communism’ and to complete a SALT II treaty that would reduce the chances of nuclear war.” (Ambrose 283) Reagan disagreed
with this apparently weaker stance against Russia, and when he won adopted a cavalier
doctrine in his “Full Court Press”, as Sestanovich calls it, he would regain America’s
strong independent voice. It wasn’t until his second presidential term that he exercised
peace-oriented negotiations and began working closely with Gorbachev to make peace
between the two nations. As Ambrose states about this time, “As a second-term president,
with his last election behind him, Reagan stopped calling the Soviet Union an “evil
empire” and started indicating that he might be willing to sit down with the new Soviet
leader, Gorbachev.” (Ambrose 332) Gorbachev coming to power in 1985 was, in
retrospect, what made the difference in Soviet-American peaceful negotiations in heading
towards the end of the U.S.S.R.

After the end of Reagan’s time in office, internal U.S.S.R. conflicts were seeming
to overflow and become too much for the Central Government to control. George H.W.
Bush’s administration oversaw the world’s transition from a bipolar Cold War system to
a unipolar system with the United States at the wheel and the Soviets without unified
support. As Sestanovich puts it, he was weary to accept the Cold War was officially
ending, proceeding with caution in relations with Moscow, and focusing on German
reunification. This allowed for more negotiations on START I with Russia, that paved the
way for further improvements during the Clinton Administration after the 1992 elections.
The Clinton-Yeltsin relationship subdued international tensions and institutionalized
nuclear weapons checks to make START treaties more effective. Bill Clinton aimed to
balance the federal budget, cut military costs, and expand NATO while making the
organization act to quail the Serbs attempt at mass ethnic genocide and play a primarily
diplomatic role in the conflict’s resolution through the Dayton Accords. The historical
account had more positive reactions in comparison to the Gulf War and the sequential
Iraq and Afghan invasions enacted by the George W. Bush administration after the terror
attacks of 9/11. Since then, the tumult of these wars has perpetuated weariness within our
allies that aren’t expressing the same confidence they had toward past administrations.
The post-9/11 Bush Doctrine, embracing unparalleled military strength for regime change
instead of diplomacy, made American Exceptionalism resurge and continue at high levels
to this present administration. The Obama Doctrine encouraged a “scaled-back energetic
interventionism” (Cole Lecture, 12/1) that was implemented through automated warfare
in the Arab Spring’s wake, especially with drone strikes in Afghanistan, Yemen, and the
new ISIS territories in Iraq and Syria that are continuously problematic for regional
stability.

In conclusion, I agree that it’s fair to say that retrenchment and maximalism both
worked at different times in foreign policy history, but were used appropriately and
intermittently, never holding to just one methodology. The Trump administration
represents a marked departure from what has come before in American international
relations. As exemplified by Dr. Ikenberry, “every U.S. president from Woodrow Wilson
to Barack Obama has maintained that an enduring community of liberal democracies
exists, and that democracies possess a unique capacity to cooperate… Trump disdains
this vision of the order, refusing to distinguish between liberal democratic friends and
autocratic rivals.” (Ikenberry, 8) Allies like Chancellor Merkel are proclaiming the U.S.
to be “unreliable for Europe” and its allies, after meeting the newly inaugurated
president. Other authors like Stewart Patrick claim that Trump in also abandoning the
U.S. global leadership position it’s held for the last 13 presidents, since Roosevelt, at a
time when the world needs a superpower advocating for free markets, internationally unifying treaties and combatants against climate change. His presidency follows an era of increasing American power that “between 1993 and 2014 the United States had more power than ever before but, in its foreign policy, experienced less success than ever before (Mandelbaum 368). Trump is an extreme internal reaction to Americans’ war-wariness, frustration with unwilling allies, and general distrust in the political and economic systems. As President Trump continues to isolate the U.S. further from the international community, the world will have to bear the consequences of our own past policy mistakes.
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CHAPTER FOUR

CASE STUDY: CHINA, THE UNITED STATES AND MISPERCEPTION

China and the United States have had one of the most variable relationships in history. The two nations have allied in battle, pitted against each other in proxy conflicts, and ultimately engaged in enormous economic interests that’ve kept them forcibly close. Keeping the countries apart is the inconsistency of trust and perception they have of one another. Instability in their relationship comes from the fundamental disagreements on governance, trade issues, geopolitical proxy conflicts, human rights, and conflicting views on spheres of political influence. Although diplomatic, economic, and even sporting strategies have been used to try and solve these problems, they have yielded only temporary headway and haven’t succeeded in creating a lasting friendship.

To build a relationship based on trust and mutual understanding, it’s crucial for these two countries to combat the forms of misperception in their negotiations. Finding out the history of their distrust is an essential start. Beginning with birth of the Communist Party of China in 1929 to the present, I’ll briefly discuss the periods of ill-communication and friendship between China and the United States. Bringing the trend of misperception up to the present, the main body of my research looks at the cause-and-effect relationship that the two countries have in their international policy towards each other and that there is more evidence of trust between them that we can expect to see expand in the future. By following the progress of President Trump in how he navigates his way through different types of diplomacy to work with President Xi Jinping, we
discover the current faults that this Message-Influence Model yields (Corman et al, 2008).

According to a Council of Foreign Relations report, in 2010 China surpassed Japan as the world’s second-largest economy after annual economic growth being between 7 and 15% since 1992 and is further predicted to overtake the United States as the number one economic power by 2027 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018). China has been a permanent member on the Security Council of the United Nations since its inception in 1945 with other emerging victors from World War II, and they’ve been a rising military power with the world’s largest standing army in history (Gertz, The National Interest, 2016). These achievements mark China’s determination to become the new superpower in the world. With great strides like these, the status quo power that China has come into competition with is the United States.

This won’t be the first time that they have faced off. Many accredited political theorists believe that the two countries will continue conflicting with one another, or in the most severe predictions, lead into war. Most notably, Graham Allison’s aforementioned predictions that the two countries could fall into the Thucydides’ Trap is among the most accredited (Allison, 2017). It’s important to outline the exact threatening symptoms that have been exhibited in recent history that have shown incapability of productive negotiations and avoiding conflict that could lead to violence.

The two countries have been adversaries through many international conflicts since the founding of the prevailing communist regime. The Korean War, Vietnam War, and the Taiwanese Strait Crises have all put China and the United States at odds.
During the Korean War, the United States and its allies in the United Nations, Australia, Britain and France came to the aid of South Korea when the Soviet-backed North Koreans invaded in 1950 (U.S. Relations with China: Timeline, CFR, 2018). When the South Korean alliance troops approached the Sino-Korean border, the Chinese aid to North Korea went from financial and resource assistance to complete military intervention. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) beat back the South Korean alliance troops and helped the North maintain military control over their borders until the ceasefire was signed in 1953. Since the ceasefire, China has kept its precarious relationship with the North Korean totalitarian regime by continuing to be its number one trade partner. As of 2016, China is responsible for 85% of North Korea’s exports and 90% of the goods that North Korea imports (World Fact Book, CIA, 2016), despite the pressure from the international community to enforce non-exemptible global sanctions to curb the country’s nuclear program.

The crises of the Taiwan Strait were undoubtedly the tensest times in Sino-American relations due to two misperceptions: the unpredictability of the Communist state for the United States and American unwillingness to recognize the communist state as legitimate over the nationalist party in Taiwan (U.S. Relations with China: Timeline, CFR, 2018). After supporting both the nationalist party and the communist party forces throughout World War II in combatting Japanese imperialist forces in China, the American government continued supporting only Chiang Kai Shek and his nationalist party (KMT) after the war had ended in 1945 (Tucker, 2009). Immediately following the end of World War II, the Chinese Civil War between the communists and the nationalists went into full thrust. Once it was clear that the communist party had gained the majority
of the population’s support\textsuperscript{7}, the war turned in favor of the communists, forcing the nationalist leaders and their ardent supporters to flee the country to the neighboring island of Taiwan. Since the nationalist party’s establishment of the Republic of China, independent from the mainland People’s Republic of China (PRC) which established itself officially in 1949, the two Chinas have been seeking recognition as the true China by the rest of the world. After the end of the civil war, the United States and other western powers continued supporting Taiwan as the officially recognized China. This caused issues of political existentialism and territoriality between the two Chinas that to a lesser degree still exist to this day (Albert, \textit{CFR}, 2016). When President Eisenhower lifted the blockade on Taiwan in August of 1953, Chaing Kai Shek gave permission for thousands of troops to move into the Quemoy and Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait which were prior occupied by the communist regime. The PLA began shelling the islands mercilessly from the mainland until the United States stepped in to threaten the PRC with nuclear retaliation unless it ceased its attacks (U.S. Relations with China: Timeline, \textit{CFR}, 2018). The United States signed a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan and the threats were observed by the PLA. This temporarily resolved the conflict from becoming an armed conflict, but crises similar to this involving the Taiwan Strait reoccurred in 1956 and even as recently as 1996 (U.S. Relations with China: Timeline, \textit{CFR}, 2018).

During the Vietnam War, the Viet Kong sent an envoy to China to ask for aid against the advancing American military threat in South Vietnam (Jian, 1995). In the

\textsuperscript{7} Chaing Kai Shek, the Chinese nationalist party leader, was losing support fast in the countryside first, holding on to population centers like Nanjing and Guangzhou until the final months of the war, but it’s important to note that Chaing lost much of the popular support because of his close ties with America and other Western powers that once forcibly colonized and manipulated much of China for its wealth in the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries (Kenley, 2012). This is the bedrock of Chinese distrust of American influence and Western political agenda.
early 1960s when this deal was being made, Mao Zedong armed Vietnamese battalions to prevent the American advancement on North Vietnam to protect their border region and provide a buffer from American influence, fearing another close-to-home combat war like what happened on the Korean Peninsula (Ross, 2001). This was an uncharacteristic move by China, who had traditionally been an adversary of Vietnam at best for centuries, but who distrusted American intentions more than the old enemies of China.

In addition to past close calls, two recent events sparked potential major conflicts in bilateral relations: 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the 2001 American spy plane incident. These flash points in international relations tested the tensions these two counties could face while still maintaining peaceful relations.

In her book *Powerful Patriots: National Protest in China’s Foreign Relations*, Weiss discusses two incidents between China and the United States in great depth. The 1999 Chinese Embassy bombing in Yugoslavia and the 2001 EP-3 plane collision created great riffs in Sino-American relations but they were handled very differently domestically in China for many reasons. The embassy bombing incident was extremely harmful to China’s dignity and viewed as a much more serious catastrophe than the collision. Three journalists died and 20 Chinese citizens were injured in the bombing and it inspired the people of China to file immediately for protesting rights in front of the U.S. embassy in Beijing. They were granting students and workers the rights to protest there for the first time since the last ones were brutally put down at Tiananmen Square in 1989 (Weiss, 2014).

This new ability for select citizens to demonstrate against the United States was potentially destabilizing for Chinese control. But at the same time, this was a powerful
demonstration for Chinese international image of projecting the raw political and people power that the government controls within its borders. It’s an intimidating visualization for America to see so many Chinese voicing against U.S. actions. These factors brought them back into the spotlight to apologize, but it was insufficient in the minds of Chinese leaders and citizens, but not insincere enough to further escalate the conflict.

The EP-3 incident when an American spy plane apparently swerved into a Chinese fighter within Chinese air space without permission, collided with the fighter, and sent it down into the South China Sea while the spy plane requested an emergency landing on Hainan Island in South China. This didn’t lead to uprisings to the magnitude of the embassy bombing, but the Chinese government chose to discourage anti-American protests. This time, because of the new “war hawk regime” of George Bush and the threats of repeated protest exposure of Chinese citizens to these dangerous freedoms of assembly and speech that hang in delicate balance within Chinese governance (Weiss, 2014).

With the importance of the Sino-American relationship growing politically every year to use their powers to solve regional and world issues together, the need for renewed and reinvigorated amicable relations between the two countries’ leadership to show that there’s great chance for prosperity in the future. To prove the need for this, my research maps the interactions between the Trump administration and the Xi administration in the past year and a half of their overlapped time in office.

Sino-American Relations Research: Perception Vs. Reality

In the previous chapters, theory and history have pointed to misperception in world politics being a deadly symptom of impending conflict. When leadership is elected
or chosen to represent the country, they are tasked with making clear goals and upholding peace with other nations to the best of their ability. As Morgenthau stated, human nature doesn’t want us to go to war, but when the survival of the state and national identity is threatened, any state will do what it must to survive (Morgenthau, 1978). By popular predictions from Allison, this could mean war for China and the United States (Allison, 2017).

The research purpose was to find areas of improvement for United States foreign policy that could prompt useful change in its communication methodology. Through the background research laid out in previous chapters of this thesis, I hypothesize that the basis of disagreement between China and the United States is misperception of each other’s goals and an unwillingness to initiate understanding of the other’s perspective to form consensus agreements. Diplomacy is a tool which allows both sides to voice their concerns over an issue, and after the viewpoints have been expressed that concessions would be made by both sides in order to find an agreeable solution. When two countries believe that their goals are too different and conflict too deeply, Clausewitz’s famous prophecy is doomed to be realized.8

Using the Office of the Press Secretary’s press releases, direct interpretation of Trump’s diplomatic intentions from his advisors is published. These publications about the president’s close relational encounters with President Xi Jinping of China are crucial to developing what misperceptions are being conveyed between high level political interactions. The Chinese Communist Party reactions are published through state

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8 This refers to the famous Prussian general, Carl Von Clausewitz, when he said that “war is the continuation of politics by other means”. This has been a keystone in realist international relations theory since On War was first published (Clausewitz, 1908).
sponsored media coverage of national and global events. The *China Daily*, an internationally printed state-approved media conglomerate, is the publication I’ve used in my research to determine reactions the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has to American political actions. The goal is to determine what events and news was being portrayed differently in each country having to do with their bilateral relations.

Measuring the reactions of each country’s leadership toward the other is a difficult task to take on. While reading press releases from each country, I noted each point of perception by the author of the press release and categorized each point of perception as a “New Agreement”, “Revisited Agreement”, “Revisited Disagreement”, or a “New Disagreement”. A “New Agreement” is deemed a positive interaction between the countries by the press release, fostering closer relations on a newly visited subject or bilateral agreement. A “Revisited Agreement” is also positive and deemed by the press release as a reaffirmation of a previous agreement. A “Revisited Disagreement” is a negative interaction between the two counties that yields setbacks from friendly relations, but that has already been established as a disagreement previously and hasn’t been solved. Finally, a “New Disagreement” is a negative interaction that has not been addressed before by China and the United States, which could create more problems for relations in the future.

To quantify the qualitative data of how well an interaction went between Presidents Trump and Xi by the Office of the Press Secretary, I assigned a points system

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9 I’ve chosen this news agency to represent the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China because they’re owned and operated by the Communist Party of China and the State Council Information Office and was established June 1st, 1981 by the organization to publish state news worldwide in English.  
10 I define “points of perception” as the author’s written take on an event in relation to its effects on bilateral relations between the United States and China.
to the agreement options. “New Agreements” are two points, “Revisited Agreements” are one point, “Revisited Disagreements” are negative one point, and “New Disagreements” are negative two points. The newly visited subjects in press releases are worth two points (positive or negative) because of the relevance to the current diplomatic climate and add much more significance to an interaction between heads of state and their future interactions. Communications that were documented in press releases from the Press Secretary Office between the United States and China included State Visits, phone calls, joint-press statements, trade agreements and memorandums, but were all scored the same way based on the negotiations that transpired.

The language analysis in the press releases was done by referencing a phrase list to understand how the author’s perception was taken. These analyses distinguish the points of perception whether they fall in the contributing to the “New Agreements” which are two points, “Revisited Agreements” which are one point, “Revisited Disagreements” which are negative one point, and “New Disagreements” which are negative two points. I compiled this phrase list from commonly used preambulary and operative words of the United Nations to describe a position the author is taking in official documents. The statements with positive and negative associations are modeled after the word list. Leading statements are phrases from the United Nations word list that signal that a point of perception is being formed in the sentence, but that it isn’t clear by only the phrase if the perception of the subject is going to be positive or negative. Using the leading statements, these are the phrases that indicate that with further context given in the information provided on the subject in the press release that there will be a disclosed
point of perception that can be accounted for in the data. The key word list can be found in Appendix D.

FIGURE 4.1 – Chinese Perception towards the United States
Results

On April 7th, 2017 at the beginning of President Trump and President Xi’s relationship, they agreed on an annual schedule called the United States-China Comprehensive Dialogue and has been a huge source of stability for bilateral relations. The two presidents oversee that the dialogue is carried out and that it has four pillars: the Diplomatic and Security Dialogue; the Comprehensive Economic Dialogue; the Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue; and the Social and Cultural Issues Dialogue (Press Secretary Spicer, 2017). For this reason, there were plenty of opportunities to gather sufficient data to make accurate tables\(^{11}\) and graphs\(^{12}\) to display the diplomatic events the two nations have experienced in relation to each other.

\(^{11}\) Tables used for data plotting and graphing Total Points of Perception located in Appendix A
\(^{12}\) Copies of graphs and results of the Total Points of Perception located in Appendix B
There are several issues that have scary potential to escalate if not swayed away from a deadly conflict that some leading academics warn about. The majority of issues surrounding potential fields of conflict and misperception are regional geopolitical issues, (Taiwan Strait and the Korean peninsula), human rights (Tibetan sovereignty, religious freedom, minority rights), trade relations, territorial and military expansions (South China Sea, International Law of the Sea abuse and the Diaoyudao/Senkaku Islands dispute). These issues were the majority of what was published on in the press releases and what caused such high-level debate.

American views of China were negative in times where there was very little direct contact between the two presidents. It was when they were apart for several months at a time, for example when the prospects over a trade war Trump was threatening beginning in January where after not being in the company of the Chinese president since the state visit in November the year before. Good relations were unfolding between the two nations after the state visit when the two presidents met with each other’s business leaders while in Beijing and made strides on economic cooperation. This was seemingly a move by Xi to destress the impending political situation with the memorandum Trump filed with the U.S. Commerce Department to investigate Chinese intellectual property theft and manipulation within China.

The U.S. first announced the tariffs on March 1st after a U.S. Commerce Department investigation under Section 232 of U.S. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to the dismay of Chinese businesses, showing a failure in Chinese diplomacy to reconcile with the American government.
The perceptions of China towards the United States dipped in moments of harsh criticism that the *China Daily* categorized as “hypocritical and unfair” (*China Daily*, April 21st, 2018). When the United States issued its annual human rights reports about each country the previous year, China was outraged to be called a “source of instability for the world” and was very vocal about denying this (*China Daily*, April 21st, 2018). In most recent months since the beginning of 2018, China has been attempting to combat America’s advances on the trade war Trump has progressed with targeting Chinese companies by imposing duties of 25 percent on steel and 10 percent on aluminum to counter cheap imports, especially from China (*Reuters*, 2018). These decisions were not made by international negotiation, phone calls with China, or visits with President Xi.

**Conclusion**

Friendly relations between nations and heads of state are developed, or catalyzed, by the direct contact between leaders. At the points of most contact between the presidents were when most trade relations, regional geopolitical issues and bilateral political relations improved most. The prospects Presidents Xi and Trump outlined for further relations on April 7th, 2017 was an excellent model for all nations, because it targeted the issues the two nations could profit most from discussing. This is either because they fervently disagreed with each other on them or they both had high stakes in continuing to strengthen their countries in this dialogue category.

My original hypothesis wasn’t disproven, because misperception continues to be a key variable in why the two countries don’t understand the other’s actions on a certain issue. This could be because of the communication shortfalls between the nations’ leaders during times of high political stress. The misperception could come from the personal
differences between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump that could have a huge influence on the foreign policies they adopt for their countries toward each other. As was discussed in Chapter II, Kenneth Waltz’s First Image accounts for the power human nature has in determining whether war occurs by the authority of a single leader with a high ranking of power (Waltz, 1959). Trump’s “America First” Doctrine, as discussed in Chapter III, has a lot to deal with the trade war prospects and his foreign policy unilateralism, while President Xi has also recently been granted the possibility of unlimited terms in office if he wishes (BBC World News, 2018) as well as nearly complete centralization of power through his designation as President of the PRC and Chair of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

In reference to my original thesis, I stand by what I’ve said: The United States has a communication problem. There is a record the country holds of using its preordained hegemonic capabilities to determine the fates of other countries, whether they comply with the American world image or not. The Message-Influence Model that we’ve grown accustomed to, where the President of the United States can decide to force China’s economic hand by unilaterally slapping on tariffs to their exports by executive order, is not harmonizing well with other countries. The frightening part is that the other countries are catching on to this model, and they’re moving on without the United States (Frum, 2017; Simon, 2018).

The hope exists in regulating negotiations. Interpersonal Communication Theory has given social scientists new hopes in what conflict resolution could become for interstate relations, and it’s already being exercised in truth and reconciliation commissions across the globe. Conflicts dealing with a government wrongdoing or non-
state actor causing harm to a community is just a couple of the functions, but they’ve proven to bridge gaps between communities and peoples that would have otherwise seemed impossible. There were Truth and Reconciliation Commissions established in Ireland after the Good Friday Agreements became internationally recognized to heal the communities affected by the conflict after former Maine senator and special diplomatic envoy George Mitchell helped bring Great Britain and Ireland to peace talks moderate their negotiation (Connolly, 2006).

These diplomatic victories don’t have to be uncommon. Most truth and reconciliation commissions follow the basic interpersonal relations formula designed by Trenholm and Jensen explained in Chapter II. The United States has an obligation to choose the best methods of negotiation to benefit Americans as we do our allies, potential friends in the international community, and to avoid war at all costs. To reinvigorate our ‘Soft Power’, American leadership must regulate its diplomatic practice and lead by example. Promote uncovering the truth, reconciling with our adversaries, and battling the dangerous clouds of misperception to propagate peace.

**Future Work Suggestions**

Finding the Chinese perception of the United States for future work is important. This research project was designed to analyze U.S. foreign policy strategies and the need to account for other countries’ perception of our nation.

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13 Truth and reconciliation commissions have been working in South Africa beginning in 1994 to heal communities after the abolition of apartheid (South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)), as a part of the Canadian Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement in 2012 to bring native populations into communities where they were relocated, to name two examples.
Comparing the communication strategies American executive administrations have with different heads of state from China. This could reveal different methods not thought of with China specifically, which could prove that this case study of the Trump administration with the Xi administration is just an anomaly in American foreign policy with China and its effects.
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# APPENDIX B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Press Releases (Dates)</th>
<th>New Agreements</th>
<th>Revisited Agreements</th>
<th>Revisited Disagreements</th>
<th>New Disagreements</th>
<th>Notes</th>
<th>Total points of Negotiation and Understanding</th>
<th>Month, Year</th>
<th>Total Points of Perception (U.S. towards China)</th>
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<td>President’s Call with President Xi (February 9, 2017)</td>
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<td>confrontation on trade, IP, maritime activity</td>
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<td>Total Points of Perception (China towards U.S.)</td>
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<td>potential negotiations, IMF warnings</td>
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<td>belt and road report ‘to expand econ and mil presence’</td>
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<td>Trump orders strikes against Syria (April 14, 2018)</td>
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<td>Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said China has urged dialogue</td>
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<td>China called for World Trade Organization members to oppose the US Section 301 trade sanction investigations</td>
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<td>US industries, china, world, all disagree with trumps actions</td>
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<td>Xi, Trump confer over Kim meeting (March 10, 2018)</td>
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<td>Yang, Tillerson pledge to address trade issues (February 9, 2018)</td>
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<td>Top dips hang in dc, pledge continued talks and</td>
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<td>Xi, Trump discuss Korean Peninsula (January 17, 2018)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>&quot;Making the cake of cooperation bigger&quot;, Xi said</td>
<td>17/1/2018</td>
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<td>Xi-Trump meeting: New consensus achieved (November 9, 2017)</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Met with ea. other’s business partners, econ cooperation, consensus</td>
<td>9/11/2017</td>
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<td>Unilateral probe of China's trade could hurt both Washington, Beijing (August 19, 2017)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>China supports 2.6 million american jobs</td>
<td>19/8/2017</td>
<td>-3</td>
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<td>China expresses 'grave concerns' about new US memorandum (August 15, 2017)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Respect international bilateral trade rules</td>
<td>15/8/2017</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wang, US counterpart hail interaction of two countries (August 7, 2017)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>ASEAN, Wang + Tillerson agreed on continuing dialogue and plan next 50 years</td>
<td>7/8/2017</td>
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<tr>
<td>China, US to join forces on economy (July 10, 2017)</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>China-100-day economic cooperation action plan, US maritime intrusion, NK</td>
<td>10/8/2017</td>
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<td>Xi's visit to US called constructive (April 10, 2017)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Smooth transition of China-US ties</td>
<td>10/4/2017</td>
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<tr>
<td>Xi, Trump to 'map out' Sino-US ties (April 1, 2017)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Optimistic</td>
<td>1/4/2017</td>
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## APPENDIX D

### United Nations Word Bank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITIVE</th>
<th>NEGATIVE</th>
<th>LEADING STATEMENTS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affirming</td>
<td>Alarmed</td>
<td>Bearing in mind</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commends</td>
<td>Concerned</td>
<td>Believing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appreciation</td>
<td>Deploring</td>
<td>Contemplating</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gratitude</td>
<td>Disturbed</td>
<td>Convinced</td>
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<tr>
<td>Satisfaction</td>
<td>Disagrees</td>
<td>Declaring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaffirming</td>
<td>Condemns</td>
<td>Deeply concerned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thanking</td>
<td>Denounces</td>
<td>Deeply conscious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrees</td>
<td>Discourages</td>
<td>Deeply convinced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approves</td>
<td>Rejects</td>
<td>Desiring</td>
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<tr>
<td>Endorses</td>
<td>Regretting</td>
<td>Emphasizing</td>
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<td>Supports</td>
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<td>Expecting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Welcoming</td>
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<td>Fulfilling</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trusts</td>
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<td>Fully aware</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Keeping in mind</td>
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<td>Observing</td>
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<td>Recalling</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Referring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Taking into consideration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Paden Stanton was born and raised in Bath, Maine in a loving split household with his parents, Heather Krausse, Brian Stanton, and Johnna Stanton and his sibling, Sidonia Stanton. He is an International Affairs major and Political Science minor in the Honors College at the University of Maine. He’s been involved in the French Club, Amnesty International university chapter and state coordinator, WMEB 91.9 campus radio station and study abroad advisor at the Office of International Programs during his time at UMaine.

Once he graduates in August 2018, he will be attending American University in Washington, D.C. for graduate studies in United States national security and foreign policy. He dreams of being a foreign service officer and continuing to travel frequently.