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
DAVID L. GHERE

EASTERN ABENAKI AUTONOMY AND FRENCH
FRUSTRATIONS, 1745-1760

Most Abenaki Indians became French allies between 1745 and 1760, but in effect it was English policy that ultimately drove them into this alliance. While the Western Abenakis were generally reliable allies, French officials were repeatedly frustrated by their limited influence over the Eastern Abenakis and by the restrained reaction of these Indians to English provocations. Eastern Abenakis became reluctant French allies.

As the English-French struggle for the continent approached its conclusion in February 1759, a group of Penobscot Indians appeared at Fort St. Georges (near Thomaston), seeking to reestablish peace and trade relations with Massachusetts. They carried with them a letter indicating a growing French frustration over their unwillingness to renew hostilities against the English. This situation, which contrasted so sharply with the expectations of French Governor la Jonquiere that the Abenaki would be the "most faithful allies [of France], and will never forget what [he had] done for them," illustrates an important feature of Abenaki diplomacy during the later Indian wars.¹


Abenaki warriors accompanied almost every French military operation during the mid-1700s from the Ohio valley to Cape Breton Island. Yet the strongest support for France came from the Western Abenakis, in present-day Vermont, New Hampshire, and Quebec, who, in previous wars, had enjoyed more direct French support, and had repeatedly conducted successful frontier raids from relatively secure primary villages at



With French support and encouragement, Abenaki warriors raided settlements all along Maine's English frontier, but they never succumbed entirely to French influence.
Inset illustration from Samuel Souther, CENTENNIAL CELEBRATION OF THE SETTLEMENT OF FRYEBURG, MAINE, Frank Deering Collection, University of Maine Special Collections Department

St. Francis, Becancour, and Missiquoi. The Eastern Abenakis, those tribes located between the Saco River and the Machias River, were more vulnerable to English militia attacks and more frustrated by limited French support in the past. During Dummer's War (1722-1727), they had suffered several significant military defeats, including the destruction of their two principal villages, Penobscot (at Old Town) and Norridgewock (on the Kennebec).² For the Eastern Abenaki, the matter of French or English alliances was much less certain.

All of the major Abenaki villages consisted in whole or part of refugees driven from their traditional homes further south by a half-century of warfare and expansion of English settlements. Many chose to migrate to the Canadian missions at St. Francis and Becancour, aware that this placed them under the protec-



The Northeastern Frontier, 1745-1760

Map courtesy of the author.

tion and influence of the French. Eastern Abenakis, whether refugee or original inhabitant, largely rejected the safety of Canada, thereby retaining a greater degree of autonomy.


The Eastern Abenakis were politically divided during the eighteenth century. Factionalism resulted primarily from internal disputes over diplomatic relations with the English. The English government claimed sovereignty over the Eastern Abenakis and sought to force them to act like subjects of the king. The militia posed a threat to the safety of their villages, and the expansion of English settlements into Abenaki territory ultimately jeopardized their subsistence and culture. Consequently, while relations with the French might be confused or troublesome, the focus of Abenaki political dissension was with the English.³ Members of the conciliatory factions believed that trade and peaceful co-existence with the English would preserve their land and culture. They sought to avoid becoming involved in disputes between the French and English, repeatedly professed their desire for peace, and warned English

settlers when raids were imminent. Members of the confrontational faction thought that English domination could only be prevented through repeated, unswerving resistance to every English settlement expansion or encroachment on Abenaki hunting and fishing areas. When an English-French conflict erupted, these Abenakis migrated to the Canadian missions, welcomed French support for their raids on the Maine frontier, and participated in French campaigns.

French and English diplomatic rivalry intensified during the two decades of peace (1725-1745) that followed Dummer's War. French officials sought alliances by issuing officer commissions with pay, awarding medals, and distributing shares of the fur-trade revenue to them. They hoped to gain influence over the conciliatory faction by reducing the prices of their trade goods and by presenting ever larger quantities of gifts. The French even considered a proposal to send Abenaki leaders to visit Paris.¹

French policy makers faced a confusing dilemma regarding those Abenakis who remained on the Maine frontier. Large numbers of Indians would counter English land claims, retard English settlement expansion, and block the Kennebec River invasion route to Quebec, but French officials feared that close proximity would expose Abenakis to English influence. Following Dummer's War, Father Laverjat was directed to continue serving at the Penobscot mission, and another Jesuit missionary was appointed to the Norridgewock mission on the Kennebec River in 1728. However, in the early 1730s, French officials, attempting to reduce the number of Indians moving to Norridgewock where they could be subverted by English trade, intimidation and presents, removed the missionaries from the frontier.⁵

Despite these various French efforts, the conciliatory faction dominated Eastern Abenaki-Anglo relations in the early decades of the eighteenth century. There were occasional raids on settlers' livestock, angry moments at conferences, and strong reactions when English settlements expanded near St. Georges River, but friendly relations predominated.⁶ A deteriorating



The Maine Frontier, 1745-1760.

Map courtesy of the author.

Anglo-French diplomatic situation in Europe in 1743 prompted concern over the loyalty of the Eastern Abenaki in a colonial war between the two powers. France declared war on England in March 1744, and when this news arrived in the colonies nine canoes of confrontational Penobscot warriors immediately set out for Canada, as did a smaller group of Norridgewocks. Conciliatory Penobscots and Norridgewocks professed a desire for peace and provided Massachusetts with information on Micmac and Maliseet raids in Nova Scotia in 1744.⁷

Both French and English officials were disappointed in this minimal support for their respective countries and vigorously sought to win the allegiance of the Eastern Abenakis. Canadian Governor Beauharnois offered them military protection and supplies if they relocated to Canada and pledged the support of the Western Abenakis. He recruited the confrontational Norridgewocks and Penobscots visiting Canada to join in the attacks on English settlements in Nova Scotia, offering presents and supplies as incentives. Massachu-

setts Governor Shirley sought to maintain peace with the Eastern Abenakis through a combination of incentives (continued trade and generous presents) and intimidation (threats of retaliation). Massachusetts demanded that they join in an alliance against the Micmac and Maliseet Indians.⁸

The Eastern Abenakis who remained in Maine refused the alliance with Massachusetts but continued to profess their desire for peace. Then, in October 1744, a group of English scalp hunters killed one Penobscot and wounded several others along the Penobscot River (over a hundred miles from the nearest established area for bounties). The murderers were never identified, but Massachusetts officials, following the advice of conciliatory Penobscots, gave the widow presents to compensate for the loss of her husband, as was Abenaki custom. Despite this atrocity, Massachusetts renewed its demand for an alliance on November 14, and was quickly turned down. This refusal and reports of Penobscot involvement in attacks in Nova Scotia increased the distrust of Massachusetts officials, but open trade was maintained.⁹

French Governor Beauharnois, also disappointed by the Abenaki reaction to these events, remained determined to turn the Eastern Abenaki against the New England settlements. The growing tensions between Abenakis and English offered an opportunity, and in April 1745 the French king directed the governor to promote Abenaki raids in an effort to force a break in Anglo-Abenaki relations. In July a war party from Canada attacked Fort St. Georges, and the confrontational factions of the Norridgewocks and Penobscots assaulted Pemaquid. These were the first significant attacks on the Maine frontier in sixteen months of war; and they prompted Massachusetts to declare war against the Eastern Abenakis on August 23.¹⁰

The declaration of war prompted more Eastern Abenakis to migrate. French officials promised supplies to Eastern Abenaki allies along the St. John River, but these proved inadequate, resulting in an additional influx of Eastern Abenakis to Quebec in November.¹¹ During the next two years, these Abenakis engaged in various raids on the Maine frontier and participated

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in French military expeditions to Beaubassin (on the Nova Scotia border) and the Lake Champlain Valley in 1746 and 1747.¹² A group of conciliatory Penobscots remained in the Penobscot River Valley, but shortages of food and supplies worsened, and the prospect of French provisions in the refugee villages near Quebec loomed as a powerful inducement for these Indians. French records indicate at least five villages of Indians from Acadia in the Quebec area during the early winter of 1747, with two, totaling 600 people, containing the “greater portion of the village of Pannaouamske [Penobscot].” This significant increase in the number of Eastern Abenaki in Quebec suggests widespread hunger.¹³ Surviving records of the last year of the war – 1748 – provide little specific details, but most of the migrants from the previous fall seem to have remained near Quebec, while other Eastern Abenaki migrants (probably Norridgewocks) were living at Becancour.¹⁴

The English-French conflict was resolved with the treaty of Aix la Chapelle in October 1748. French colonial officials had already canceled scalp bounties and prisoner ransoms and had ordered attacks on the English to cease. However, many of the confrontational Abenakis ignored these proclamations and continued to launch sporadic raids until the summer of 1749. Meanwhile, the conciliatory Penobscots and Norridgewocks sent a delegation to Boston to arrange a peace conference for late September. Early that month a letter from confrontational Penobscots urged the postponement of the conference, and the late arrival of the Penobscot delegation ultimately delayed the meeting until mid-October. The Treaty of Falmouth marked the official end of hostilities on October 16, 1749, but none of the Penobscot confrontational leaders signed the treaty and there is no indication of their presence at the conference.¹⁵

The friendly relations that followed this treaty were extremely brief. A small group of Abenakis returning from the peace conference was attacked near Wiscasset on December 2, 1749. One was killed and several others wounded.¹⁶ The Western Abenakis favored immediate revenge upon Wiscasset settlers, while conciliatory factions

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among the Norridgewocks and Penobscots urged Massachusetts to “cover the blood” with compensatory presents. The confrontational factions of the Eastern Abenakis demanded swift and severe punishment for the men responsible, but did not yet propose attacks on settlers to avenge the atrocity.¹⁷

Massachusetts officials sought to soothe the anger of the Indians with condolences and compensatory presents, and by assuring them of justice against the murderers. However, angry mobs thwarted the initial arrests and, after numerous delays, the trial ended in an acquittal in June 1750.¹⁸ Confrontational Abenakis responded to this and other incidents by killing cattle near St. Georges in early June. Massachusetts sent another set of presents to the victim’s relatives and hoped that the annual distribution of presents in early October would further appease the Abenakis.¹⁹

French officials were disappointed at the Eastern Abenakis’ reaction to the Wiscasset incident. The French foreign minister informed Governor Lajonquiere that nothing was of greater importance than maintaining the support of their Indian allies and authorized him to distribute the gifts necessary to accomplish that goal. Intendant Bigot complained that the conciliatory factions were “so connected with the English, that they did not wish to insist on justice.” He and Governor Lajonquiere used their influence to convince the Abenakis that it would disgrace their people if the crimes went unpunished. They also promised to provision retaliatory raids against the Maine frontier.²⁰

These efforts were only partially successful. In late August a large number of Western Abenakis arrived at the Penobscot and Norridgewock villages urging retaliation for the murder. On September 11, 1750, thirty Penobscot warriors, along with eighty Western Abenakis, attacked Fort Richmond on the lower Kennebec River.²¹ When Western Abenakis continued the raids through the spring and summer of 1751, conciliatory Penobscot and Norridgewock leaders professed their desire for peace and warned English settlers whenever assaults were imminent.²² These events placed the Norridgewocks in a very precarious position. Shortly after the assault on Fort Richmond, twenty-one

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warriors migrated to the Canadian missions where they resided for about eighteen months. Many families of the Norridgewock conciliatory faction journeyed to the Penobscot village, and a third group stayed at Norridgewock, professing a desire for peace and facing the threat of retaliation from the militia or angry settlers.²³

Penobscot peace efforts resulted in a preliminary conference in late August 1751, but frontier tensions continued. A month after the conference, a Penobscot letter warned Governor Shirley of French efforts to incite the Norridgewock migrants and Western Abenakis to renewed hostilities. The Penobscots sent emissaries to Canada to dissuade the other Abenakis from attacking the frontier. After a year without incidents, a treaty was finally signed in October 1752 with representatives from the Norridgewocks, Penobscots, Maliseets, and Western Abenakis.²⁴

Peace enabled the Norridgewock migrants to return to their village, but a new source of tension quickly surfaced. In 1751, a new settlement was established north of Fort Richmond and, at the 1753 conference, for the first time, Massachusetts revealed that English land claims extended fifty-five miles above Fort Richmond to within six miles of Norridgewock village.²⁵ This caused a dramatic shift in Norridgewock attitudes, as indicated by hostile interactions with settlers. The Penobscot confrontational faction likewise expressed their displeasure.²⁶ French officials also grew concerned, since new settlements would open the Kennebec River as an invasion route to Quebec. Governor Duquesne urged the Norridgewocks to resist the settlements, promised forts and troops to protect them, and dispatched Fathers Audran and Gaunon along with numerous Western Abenakis to the Maine frontier to lend their support.²⁷

Anglo-Abenaki tensions increased dramatically in the months following the 1753 conference. Late in the year two St. Francis Indians were murdered on the New Hampshire frontier, and in March 1754 two Penobscots were murdered on an island near St. Georges.²⁸ In January, some Norridgewock Indians informed Captain Lithgow, commander




Abenakis who remained on the Kennebec frontier were vulnerable to English influence. French officials first sent Jesuit missionaries to cement their alliance, then removed them to persuade the Abenaki to seek refuge in the Saint Lawrence Valley.

Inset illustration from William Frederick Poole, THE POPHAM COLONY, Deering Collection.

of Fort Richmond, of a new French fortress and settlement at the head of the Kennebec River.²⁹

The report, although verified by other parties, was false, but it may have been the result of confusion over Duquesne's promise to provide forts or a Norridgewock tactic for intimidating settlers. In any case, Governor Shirley proposed a military expedition to eliminate any French installations on the Kennebec River and to construct an English fortress at Taconic Falls, thirty-seven miles above Fort Richmond. Before the expedition was launched, the English scheduled a conference with the Eastern Abenakis, largely to intimidate them with a large militia force.³⁰



Fort Halifax, built on the upper Kennebec River in 1754, prompted some Abenakis to migrate to Canada, while others sought to resume normal trade relations with the English.

Inset Illustration from S.H. Whitney, THE KENNEBEC VALLEY, Deering Collection.

Despite Abenaki protests and repeated assurances that no French fort existed, Shirley's expedition began moving up the Kennebec River on July 6. Construction of the fort at Taconic began on July 25 while the main body of the expedition (500 men) ascended to the headwaters to attack the French fort. After a thorough search, the militia determined that no French installations existed. By October 17, Fort Halifax was completed, and all the contractors and non-garrison militiamen dismissed.³¹ The expedition presented a crisis for the Norridgewocks, resulting in divisions and migrations similar to those following the Wiscasset incident three years earlier. A small group remained at the

village and informed Colonel Winslow at Fort Halifax of their desire to live in peace.³²

Predictably, the French were upset by the events of 1754. The strategic implications of Fort Halifax were of particular concern, and Governor Duquesne was incensed that the Eastern Abenakis had not resisted its construction more vigorously. Fathers Audran and Gaunon had failed in their efforts to influence Eastern Abenaki diplomacy, and even the Western Abenakis had violated Duquesne's orders in some ways. Recognizing the Norridgewock's vulnerability, he encouraged their emigration to Canada and caused the recall of Father Audran to facilitate this action. The French provided supplies for an Abenaki attack on Fort Halifax, and officials began urging all the Abenaki, Maliseet and Micmac Indians to engage in a united war against the English.³³ Many Abenakis needed little encouragement. A large war party of 110 Western Abenakis and Norridgewock emigrants departed from the Canadian missions hoping to surprise and overpower Fort Halifax. On October 30, they encountered a six-man logging detachment near the fort, killing or capturing all but one member. The subsequent attack was unsuccessful and the raiders returned to Canada.³⁴

Although Governor Shirley's expedition and the subsequent hostilities prompted some Penobscots to migrate to Canada, others sought to resume normal trade relations. Conciliatory Penobscots sent three letters to Shirley professing their desire for peace and pledging to warn the settlers of future Indian raids. They also sought to reduce the chance of frontier incidents by moving their village upriver and requesting that a supply ship be sent to trade with them at their village.³⁵ Massachusetts responded by lifting trade restrictions and distributing annual presents. However, the movement upriver was interpreted as a possible preparation for assaults on the English frontier, so the request for a supply ship was denied.³⁶

Abenaki raids resumed in April and May 1755 in western Maine, prompting Massachusetts to declare war on all the Abenakis except the Penobscots. Then, in June, Abenaki warriors from the Canadian missions

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(accompanied most likely by migrant Penobscots) conducted a series of attacks in the St. Georges area, causing many settlers and colonial leaders to assume the Penobscots were responsible.³⁷ The resulting tensions prompted Massachusetts to propose that the Penobscots move their village to the “protection” of Fort St. Georges and that their warriors join the English in attacking hostile Indians. After these proposals were read on June 27, 1755, the local militia refused to allow the Penobscot leaders to leave Fort St. Georges without accepting the demands and leaving hostages. The Penobscots reluctantly agreed, but five days later English scalp hunters attacked them and their families at nearby Owls Head, killing fourteen Indians. These events prompted another group of Penobscots to migrate to the Canadian missions.³⁸

Massachusetts officials sought to soothe the anger of the Penobscots with condolences, promises of justice, and compensatory presents. The summer was spent in an exchange of letters between angry Penobscots and consoling Englishmen. By September it appeared that Anglo-Penobscot peace would be preserved.³⁹ Then, on September 24, 1755, Abenaki warriors from Canada bypassed Fort Halifax to attack the St. Georges area again. Massachusetts, suspecting Penobscot involvement, renewed its demands for an alliance. Fearing scalp hunters or militia attacks, the Penobscots failed to return to Fort St. Georges. The deteriorating situation finally resulted in a Massachusetts declaration of war against the Penobscots on November 1, 1755.⁴⁰

Even though the Penobscots and Norridgewocks were officially at war with the English, many refused to ally with the French. These tensions prompted some Penobscots (probably including the conciliatory Norridgewocks) to migrate to the relative safety of the Maliseet villages in Acadia. Others retreated up the Penobscot River and generally avoided contact with the English, except for occasional attempts to sell their furs.⁴¹ For the next two years, these conciliatory Penobscots and Norridgewocks remained inactive in the Anglo-French dispute; those still on the Penobscot even attempted to initiate peace

negotiations.¹²

The confrontational factions of the Eastern Abenakis remained near Quebec and participated in raids on the Maine frontier during 1756 and 1757.¹³ Abenaki warriors were praised for their scouting and fighting capabilities during successful French military operations near Lake Champlain, but the Penobscots were criticized by General Montcalm for attacking the English after their surrender at Fort William Henry. Widespread famine in 1757 and 1758 ultimately forced some conciliatory Eastern Abenakis to become French auxiliaries. In 1758 the Penobscots in Acadia joined several hundred Maliseet warriors and French militia in operations east of the St. John River, and conciliatory Norridgewocks joined their kinsmen at Quebec.¹⁴

The largest French and Indian expedition in the history of the Maine frontier occurred in late August 1758. The French wanted the Penobscots, Maliseets, and French militia operating in Acadia to move to Cape Breton Island to help defend Louisbourg. The Indians rejected the request in favor of a surprise attack on Fort St. Georges. As a result, an expedition of 50 French militia and over 250 Penobscots and Maliseets made their way into eastern Maine and on August 26, 1758, attacked Fort St. Georges. They were unsuccessful, since the fort and nearby settlements had received prior warning. After several days of siege, the warriors broke into small bands and roamed the area throughout the following month.¹⁵ The Franco-Indian attempt on Fort St. Georges and subsequent raids were the last attacks of the war on the Maine frontier. For the remaining years of the war, the Abenaki avoided contacts with the English, except to trade occasionally. A French official lamented that their Indian allies were “unwilling to go fight unless we feed their women and children.” Then, in February 1759 Penobscot representatives sought to initiate peace talks and indicated French anger at their decision.¹⁶

Throughout this stormy period of diplomacy with the French and English, the Eastern Abenakis maintained their autonomy. Several very fluid political



*Inset illustration from Frederic Kidder,
THE EXPEDITIONS OF CAPT. JOHN LOVEWELL, Deering Collection.*

factions made decisions concerning war and migration in their own best interest, often frustrating the French by their restrained reaction to Anglo-French warfare, to the murder of their kinsmen, or to the expansion of English forts and settlements. Those who chose to become French allies often acted against French orders and refused to serve unless their families were well-supplied. Religion was of minimal importance in determining Eastern Abenaki allegiances during this period. No missionary lived in the Eastern Abenaki villages during the 1730s and 1740s, and the occasional visiting priests had little impact on tribal factionalism. When Fathers Audran and Gounon were dispatched to Maine in 1753-1754, they failed to have any influence on the crisis there.

The limited nature of French influence is further indicated by the lack of correlation between periods of Anglo-French war and Anglo-Abenaki hostilities. No significant Indian attacks occurred on the Maine frontier during the first sixteen months of King George's War, and Abenaki raids continued for seven months after the Anglo-French treaty. During the next war, the

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Massachusetts declaration of war on the Penobscots came a year and a half after the first French-supported Western Abenaki raids, while attacks on the Maine frontier ceased two years before the conquest of Canada was completed. The need in both wars for a declaration of war and a peace treaty with the Eastern Abenaki indicates their autonomy from the French.

Most Eastern Abenakis eventually became French allies during these wars, but not all by choice. The outbreak of hostilities in both wars prompted many confrontational members to journey to Canada, while a second migration generally occurred whenever Massachusetts declared war on the Eastern Abenakis. Then during the two conflicts, subsistence needs eventually forced some conciliatory members to migrate and become French allies to secure supplies. Clearly, French diplomatic efforts failed to win over the conciliatory factions, but the delay in migration of the second confrontational groups indicates limited success in cementing the loyalty of that faction as well. Ultimately, English actions drove the Eastern Abenakis into supporting the French despite their desperate efforts to remain neutral in these imperial wars between the European occupants of their homelands.

NOTES

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²Col. Otis Westbrook to Dummer, Mar. 23, 1723, *Massachusetts Historical Society Collections*, ser. 2, 8: 264-65; Samuel Sewall, "Diary of Samuel Sewall," *ibid.*, ser. 5, 7: 342-43; M. de Vaudreuil au ministre, Oct. 25, 1724, *Coll. de docs.*, 3: 109; Thomas Westbrook to Dummer, Mar. 23, 1722, June 22, 1725, *Bax. Mss.*, 10: 146-47, 289. For Western Abenaki, see Colin Calloway, *The Western Abenakis of Vermont, 1600-1800: War, Migration, and the Survival of an Indian People* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), pp. 113-131.

³See David Ghere, "Abenaki Factionalism, Emigration and Social Continuity: Indian Society in Northern New England, 1725 to 1765," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maine, 1988.

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⁶Massachusetts Bay Colony, *A Conference at Falmouth in Casco-Bay* [July 1732] (Boston: B. Green, 1732), p. 3; Memorandum of Indian Conference, Oct. 28, 1740, Maine Historical Society, Safe 1, Shelf 40, MS00-29; Testimony concerning livestock losses, Aug. 6, 1742, *Bax. Mss.*, 23: 283-85; Proclamation of Governor Belcher, Oct. 28, 1734, *Mass. Archives*, 295: 35; Assorted petitions by Samuel Waldo, July 5-27, 1736, *Bax. Mss.*, 11: 156-72; Belcher to Gyles, Feb. 28, 1735, *Mass. H.S., Collections*, 4: 505-6; Indian Conference at Boston, June 25, 1736, *Bax. Mss.*, 23: 236-38; *Journal of the House of Representatives*, June 25, July 2, 3, 1736; *Records of the Council*, May 17, June 25, July 2, 1736.

⁷Gov. to Bradbury, Dec. 9, 1743, *Bax. Mss.*, 23: 289-90; Gov. Shirley to Colonels [Fall, 1743], *ibid.*, 11: 290; Cols. Pepperell, Moulton, and Waldo to Shirley, Dec. 9, 1743, *ibid.*, pp. 291-92; Jabez Bradbury to Governor, June 18, 1744, *ibid.*, 23: 290-91; John Oulton to Shirley, Aug. 8, 1744, *ibid.*, 11: 298-300; Shirley to the Lords of Trade, Aug. 10, 1744, *Correspondence of William Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts and Military Commander in America, 1731-1760*, ed. Charles Henry Lincoln, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1912), 1: 138-39; M. de Beauharnois au ministre, Sept. 23, 1743, PAC, AC, A11A, 79: 148; M. de Beauharnois to Count de Maurepas, Oct. 8, 1744, *NYCD*, 9: 1107.

⁸M. de Beauharnois to Count de Maurepas, Oct. 8, 1744, *NYCD*, 9: 1106-09; M. de Beauharnois au ministre, Sept. 23, 1743, Oct. 8, 1744, PAC, AC, C11A, 79: 148, 81: 140; Jabez Bradbury to Governor, June 18, 1744, *Bax. Mss.*, 23: 291; Governor's Instructions to Commissioners, July 7, 1744, *ibid.*, pp. 293-95; Declaration of War, Oct. 19, 1744, *ibid.*, pp. 296-98.

⁹Declaration of War, Oct. 19, 1744, *ibid.*, pp. 296-98; Proclamation on Bounties, Oct. 19, 1749, *ibid.*, p. 298; Shirley to Capt. Bradbury, Jan. 25, 1744 [1745], *ibid.*, pp. 298-99; Letter to Capt. Bradbury, Jan. 25, 1744 [1745], *Bax. Mss.*, 23: 298-99; Bradbury to Governor, June 18, 1744, *ibid.*, pp. 290-91; William Willis, ed., *Journal of the Rev. Thomas Smith and the Rev. Samuel Deane* (Portland: Joseph S. Bailey, 1849), p. 116; William D. Williamson, *The History of the State of Maine*, 2 vols. (Hallowell, Me.: Glazier, Masters, 1832), 2: 218.

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¹⁴Occurrences in Canada during the year 1747-8, *NYCD*, pp. 153-54, 158, 160, 163-66, 172-74; Samuel Waldo to Jeremiah Powell, Sept. 5, Oct. 1, 1748, Maine H.S., Jeremiah Powell Papers, Coll. 7, Box 1/3; Gov. Raymond au M. Rouille, Nov. 19, 1751, PAC, AC, C11B, 31: 63; M. Bigot au ministre, Nov. 7, 1748, PAC, AC, C11A, 92: 195.

¹⁵Occurrences in Canada during the year 1747-48, *NYCD*, pp. 174-78; Journal Extract, May 18, 29, July 19, 1748, *Coll. de docs.*, 3: 405, 408; Indian Conference, June 23-27, 1749, *Bax. Mss.*, 23: 306-15; Governor's Letter About Indians, June 3, 1749, *ibid.*, p. 319; Indian Letters, Sept. 4, 7, 1749, *ibid.*, pp. 320-321; Jabez Bradbury Letters, Sept. 5, 9, 1749, *ibid.*, pp. 319-320, 22; Massachusetts Bay Province, *A Journal of the Proceedings... of the Peace... at Falmouth*, (Boston: Draper, [1749]).

¹⁶Samuell Denny to Lieutenant Governor Phipps, Dec. 9, 1749, *Mass. Archives*, 31: 666-67; Josiah Willard to Shirley, Dec. 19, 1749, *Correspondence of William Shirley*, 1: 493; Henry O. Thayer, "A Page of Indian History," Maine Historical Society, *Collections* ser. 2, 10 (1899): 81-86.

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¹⁸*Records of the Council*, Dec. 13, 28-30, 1749; Capt. Lithgow to Phipps, Feb. 2, 1750, *Mass. Archives*, 31: 688-89; Jere. Moulton to Josiah Willard, Feb. 24, 1750, *Bax. Mss.*, 23: 325; M. Bigot to M. Rouille, Aug. 6, 1750, *NYCD*, 10: 218; Thayer, "A Page of Indian History," pp. 81-103.

¹⁹Bradbury to Phipps, Apr. 9, 1750, *Bax. Mss.*, 23: 327-28; Indians to Massachusetts, June 9, 1750, *ibid.*, p. 329; Indian Conference, Aug. 6, 1750, *ibid.*, pp. 365-66; Complaint of William Davis, July 9, 1750, *Mass. Archives*, 32: 49; Thayer, "A Page of Indian History," p. 99.

²⁰Bigot to M. Rouille, Aug. 6, 1750, *NYCD*, 10: 218-19; Minister to Gov. Lajonquiere Sept. 11, 1750, in Nash, *French Regime*, p. 145; M. Bigot au ministre, Oct. 18, 1750, PAC, AC, C11A, 96: 51; M. Bigot to M. Rouille, Aug. 6, 1750, *NYCD*, 10: 218-19; Governor Lajonquiere au ministre, Oct. 18, 1750, *Coll. de docs.*, 3: 493-94; Lithgow to Shirley, May 15, 1751, *Mass. Archives*, 32: 136-38; Penobscot letter, Sept. 12-25, 1751, *ibid.*, pp. 199-200.

²¹Rapport de Francis Bigot, Aug. 6, 1750, *Coll. de docs.*, 3: 490; Governor Lajonquiere au ministre, Oct. 18, 1750, *ibid.*, pp. 493-94; Lithgow to Phipps, Mar. 4, 1751, *Bax. Mss.*, 23: 377; Assorted letters, Sept. 7-12, *ibid.*, 12: 80-87; Lithgow to Phipps, Oct. 6, 1750, *ibid.*, p. 101.

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²³Lithgow to Phipps, Oct. 6, 1750, *Bax. Mss.*, 12: 101; Lithgow to Phipps, Mar. 4,

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²¹"Treaty with the Eastern Indians, 1751," Maine H.S., *Collections*, ser. 1, 4(1857): 171-78; Instructions to Treaty Commissioners, Aug. 15, 1751, *Bax. Mss.*, 23: 411; Squadook's letter, Sept. 12, 1751, *ibid.*, pp. 425-27; Loron's letter, Sept. 25, 1751, *ibid.*, p. 427; Bradbury to Shirley, Oct. 10, Nov. 25, 1751, *ibid.*, p. 428-30; Lithgow to Phipps, Mar. 9, June 12, Sept. 1, 1752, *ibid.*, 12: 201-2, 23: 432-36; Lt. Gov. Phipps to Bradbury, June 5, 1752, *ibid.*, 12: 179-80; Bradbury to Phipps, Aug. 31, 1752, *ibid.*, 23: 433-34.

²²Massachusetts Bay Province, *A Conference held at St. Georges* [1753] (Boston: Kneeland, 1753), pp. 3-21. On English land claims above Fort Richmond, See David Ghere, "Mistranslations and Misinformation: Diplomacy on the Maine Frontier, 1725 to 1755," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal*, 8: 4 (1984) pp. 3-26.

²³Shirley to Eastern Tribes, Mar. 1, 1754, *Mass. Archives*, 32: 467-69. The Penobscot letter has not survived but is referred to in Shirley's letter to them.

²⁴Shirley's speech, Mar. 28, 1754, *Bax. Mss.*, 12: 247; M. Duquesne au ministre, Oct. 1, 1753, PAC, AC, C11A, 99: 249; M. Duquesne au ministre, Oct. 10, 1754, *Coll. de docs.*, 3: 515.

²⁵Massachusetts Bay Province, *A Journal of the Proceedings at two Conferences* [1754] (Boston: Draper, 1754); Shirley's speech, Mar. 28, 1754, *Bax. Mss.*, 12: 247; Dr. Gardiner letter, Dec. 26, 1753, *ibid.*, pp. 235-36; Shirley to Sir Thomas Robinson, Aug. 19, 1754, *Correspondence of William Shirley*, 2: 74, 82; M. Duquesne au ministre, Oct. 10, 1754, *Coll. de docs.*, 3: 515.

²⁶*Records of the Council*, Feb. 8, 1754; *Journal of the House*, Apr. 12, 1754; Shirley to Col. John North, Apr. 25, 1754, *Mass. Archives*, 54: 298; Shirley to John Bane, Apr. 11, 1754, *ibid.*, 74: 291; Samuel Goodwin to Shirley, May 15, 1754, *ibid.*, 32: 519-520; Shirley to the Lords Commissioners, May 23, 1754, *Correspondence of William Shirley*, 2: 69.

²⁷*Records of the Council*, Feb. 8, 1754; Shirley to Eastern Tribes, Mar. 1, 1754, *Mass. Archives*, 32: 467-69; Shirley to Legislature, Oct. 18, 1754, *ibid.*, 108: 635. Shirley to the General Court, Mar. 28, 1754, *Correspondence of William Shirley*, 2: 36-37; Shirley to the Lords Commissioners, May 23, 1754, *ibid.*, p. 69; Sir Thomas Robinson to Shirley, June 21, 1754, *ibid.*, pp. 70-71; Shirley to Sir Thomas Robinson, Aug. 19, 1754, *ibid.*, pp. 74-75, 82; Shirley to the General Court, Mar. 28, 1754, *ibid.*, pp. 36-37; House of Representatives to Shirley, Apr. 10, 1754, *ibid.*, pp. 49-50.

²⁸William Goold, "Fort Halifax," Maine Historical Society, *Collections* ser. 1, 8 (1881): 226-38; Account of the expedition, *Boston Gazette*, Sept. 8, 1754.

²⁹Shirley speech, Oct. 18, 1754, *Bax. Mss.*, 12: 320-22; Shirley to Secretary Willard, Sept. 3, 1754, *ibid.*, p. 309; James Howard to Phipps, Oct. 11, 1754, *ibid.*, 12: 312-13.

³⁰M. Duquesne au ministre, Oct. 10, 1754, *Coll. de docs.*, pp. 515-16; *Journal of Two Conferences* [1754], pp. 3-6.

³¹*Ibid.*, Account of the expedition, *Boston Gazette*, Sept. 8, 1754; *Records of the Council*, Nov. 7, 1754; *Journal of the House*, Nov. 6, 1754; House and Council Resolution, Nov. 12, 1754, *Mass. Archives*, 32: 560, 565-66.

³²Kehoort's letter, Nov. 11, 1754, *Bax. Mss.*, 24: 21; Penobscots to Shirley, Dec. 9, 1754, Jan. 8, 1755, *ibid.*, pp. 22-25; Shirley to Council, Feb. 17, 1755, *ibid.*, p. 25; Robert Monckton to Shirley, July 3, 1755, *ibid.*, 12: 443; Memorial of William Ross, Dec. 30, 1757, *ibid.*, 24: 86-87.

³³Shirley to Council, Feb. 17, 1755, *ibid.*, p. 25; Legislative Committee Report, Feb. 24, 1755, *ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

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³⁷Declaration of War, June 9, 1755, *ibid.*, pp. 30-32; Thomas Fletcher to Shirley, May 9, 1755, *ibid.*, 12: 391; Lithgow to Shirley, May 11, 1755, *ibid.*, pp. 391-92; Benjamin Burton to Thomas Proctor, June 6, 1755, *ibid.*, p. 402; Memorial of William Ross, Dec. 30 1757, *ibid.*, pp. 86-87; Benjamin Burton to Shirley, June 6, 1755, *Mass. Archives*, 54: 453; Thomas Killpatrick to Shirley, June 14, 1755, *ibid.*, p. 465; M. Duquesne au ministre, June 12, July 12, 1755, PAC, AC, C11A, 100: 7, 24.

³⁸Shirley to Penobscots, June 17, 1755, *Bax. Mss.*, 24: 33-34; Phipps to Bradbury, Aug. 16, 1755, *ibid.*, pp. 50-51; Penobscots to Shirley, June 27, 1755, *Mass. Archives.*, 32: 647; Bradbury to Shirley, June 27, July 3, 1755, *ibid.*, 32: 648, 77: 382; James Cargill's Journal [July 14, 1755], *ibid.*, 38: 167; Bradbury to Phipps, July 17, 1755, *ibid.*, 32: 659.

³⁹Bradbury to Shirley, July 3, 1755, *ibid.*, 77: 382; Penobscots to Phipps, July 16, 25, Sept. 6, 1755, *ibid.*, 32: 661, 674; Phipps to Penobscots, July 10, 12, Aug. 18, 1755, *ibid.*, pp. 650, 652, 670-71; Bradbury to Phipps, July 17, 25, 1755, *ibid.*, pp. 659-60; Phipps to Bradbury, Aug. 16, 1755, *ibid.*, pp. 668-69, 672-73.

⁴⁰Lithgow to Phipps, Sept. 26, 1755, *Bax. Mss.*, 24: 54-55; Memorial of Jabez Bradbury, Sept. 26, 1755, *ibid.*, pp. 56-57; Legislative proposals, Sept. 27-Oct. 3, 1755, *ibid.*, pp. 57-58; Phipps to Bradbury, Oct. 3, 1755, *ibid.*, p. 59; Phipps to Penobscots [Oct. 3, 1755], *ibid.*, pp. 60-61; Bradbury to Phipps, Oct. 24, 1755, *ibid.*, p. 61; Declaration of War, Nov. 1, 1755, *ibid.*, p. 62.

⁴¹Bradbury to Phipps, Oct. 24, 1755, *Bax. Mss.*, 24: 61; Vaudreuil to Minister, Oct. 30, 1755, PAC, AC, C11A, 100: 130; Abbe de l'Isle Dieu to Minister, Nov. 29, 1755, *ibid.*, 100: 239; Willis, *Journal of Rev. Smith*, p. 165; Cyrus Eaton, *Annals of the Town of Warren* (Hallowell: Masters, Smith and Company, 1851), p. 97.

⁴²M. Franquet au ministre, June 18, 1757, PAC, AC, C11B, 37: 289-81; Memoire concernant les Sauvages, PAC, Archives de la Marine, B4, 76: 41-42; M. de Bougainville to M. De Paulmy, Aug. 19, 1757, *NYCD*, 10: 607, 611, 616; M. de Montcalm to Brigadier-General Webb, Aug. 14, 1757, *ibid.*, pp. 618-19.

⁴³M. de Vaudreuil au ministre, Aug. 1, Nov. 6, 1756, PAC, AC, A11A, 101: 72, 148; Memoire concernant les Sauvages, PAC, Archives de la Marine, B4, 76: 41-42; Willis, *Journal of Rev. Smith*, pp. 165, 168-69; Eaton, *Annals of Warren*, p. 97; Emma Lewis Coleman, *New England Captives Carried to Canada* (Portland: Southworth Press, 1925), pp. 275-77; M. de Montcalm to Lord Loudon, Aug. 14, 1757 *NYCD.*, pp. 619-20.

⁴⁴M. Montcalm au ministre, Apr. 10, 1758, *Coll. de docs.*, 4: 154-55; M. Vaudreuil au ministre, July 28, 1758, *ibid.*, p. 174; M. Vaudreuil au ministre, Apr. 18, Aug. 3, 1758, PAC, AC, C11A, 103: 84, 140-41; Coleman, *New England Captives*, 2: 281-84; Williamson, *History of Maine*, 2: 333.

⁴⁵M. Vaudreuil au ministre, Nov. 5, 1758, PAC, AC, C11C, 9: 199; Robert Monkton to Samuel Waldo, July 23, 1758, Maine H.S. Miscellaneous Box 17/1, MSOO-161X; Pownall to Robert Monkton, Aug. 30, 1758, Charles A.W. Pownall, *Thomas Pownall, Governor of Massachusetts Bay* (London: Henry Stevens, son and Stiles, 1908), p. 112; Pownall to Lords of Trade, Sept. 12, 1758, *ibid.*, p. 113.

⁴⁶"Memoir on Canada," [winter 1758-59], *NYCD*, 10: 933; John Mekechnie to Pownall, Feb. 12, 1759, *Bax. Mss.*, 13: 151-52.