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
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Detail of Joseph F. W. Des Barres' 1782 chart of the New England coast showing Penobscot Bay. Joseph F. W. Des Barres, *The Atlantic Neptune* (reprint; Barre, Mass., Barre Pub. Co., 1966–69).

MURDER ON ISLE AU HAUT: VIOLENCE AND JEFFERSON'S EMBARGO IN COASTAL MAINE, 1807–1809

By JOSHUA M. SMITH

Maine's early nineteenth-century smugglers also capture the attention of Joshua Smith. In his study of the events surrounding the Isle au Haut murder of a customhouse officer with the improbable name of Lazaro Bogdomovitch, Smith finds, like Alan Taylor, that Maine communities both overtly and covertly resisted the imposition of laws inimical to their economic well-being. Joshua Smith is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Maine, where he is completing a dissertation entitled "The Rogues of 'Quoddy: Smuggling in the Maine-New Brunswick Borderlands, 1783–1820."

MURDER on a remote Maine island one dark and stormy night would seem to be the stuff of novels, but the real life events surrounding the murder of a federal customhouse officer on Isle au Haut ultimately proved far stranger than any tale concocted by a mystery writer. In November 1808, smugglers murdered a customs guard named Lazaro Bogdomovitch on Isle au Haut and cast his body adrift. Officials captured and jailed the perpetrators after a harrowing sea chase, but a mob of men disguised as women attacked the jail and released most of the prisoners. At the ensuing trial the court was forced to let the remaining prisoners go free because no witnesses would come forward. The federal court system finally apprehended two suspects and tried them, but one escaped and lived in exile for the rest of his life, and the other languished in prison until a drunken sailor murdered him in 1815.

This series of events, with all its twists and turns, raises many questions. Who was Lazaro Bogdomovitch, and why did smugglers murder him? Why did witnesses refuse to come forward to identify his murderers? What does this murder and the events surrounding it tell us about Penobscot Bay or about smuggling in the early nineteenth century? The answers have been difficult to find. Bogdomovitch was a foreigner without family, whose corpse was buried in an unmarked grave somewhere

in Castine.¹ The unwillingness of witnesses to come forward, too, remains a mystery. Local histories do not mention the incident, and, to this day, some people on Isle au Haut insist that no murder has ever occurred there.² Yet court records, government reports, newspaper accounts, and the letter of a son whose father died in the incident verify that smugglers murdered a man named Bogdomovitch on Isle au Haut in the fall of 1808.³ The historical amnesia about Bagdomovitch's murder suggests that the incident was not merely forgotten but actively and purposefully obscured, omitted from the public memory because it reflected badly on the community as a whole. What then was the significance of these events to Penobscot Bay communities? Bagdomovitch's murder reveals that political and economic tensions tore coastal Maine communities apart in the early nineteenth century. The key issue in this conflict was the role of government in regulating seaborne commerce. Ultimately Bogdomovitch's murder resulted from hostilities emerging from a single question: Did the coastal populace have a right to trade overseas and to fish coastal waters without governmental interference?


Conflict over government regulation of maritime trade in Maine's coastal communities parallels the often violent disputes erupting between absentee landowners and agrarian squatters in Maine's inland communities. The similarities are in fact quite stunning. Less than a year after the Isle au Haut murder an armed group of squatters in Malta (modern Windsor) attacked and killed a land surveyor named Paul Chadwick. A failed jailbreak followed, and the jury refused to convict the accused murderers. In both instances, public sentiment supported the accused, resulting in their release. The squatters murdered Chadwick because they believed that they possessed rights to farmland superseding the rights of landed proprietors and state law. Similarly, on Isle au Haut smugglers believed they had a right to pursue maritime trade despite federal laws to the contrary. Questions about the pursuit of economic happiness, it would seem, divided Maine communities to the point where murder became an option partially sanctioned by the community.

While the Isle au Haut murder has remained obscure, the Malta incident recently received attention in Alan Taylor's study of agrarian resistance in Maine, *Liberty Men and Great Proprietors*. Taylor found that Maine's squatters presumed that they had a right to low-priced land in the aftermath of the American Revolution and bitterly resented the land speculation of men such as Henry Knox. The squatter resistance was initially a community-based effort framed in terms of morality, but, eventually, it found a stronger voice in the form of party politics. The Penob-

scot Bay smugglers used methods very similar to those of agrarian squatters to defend their right to engage in maritime pursuits.¹

While Maine's squatters resisted the pressure of landed proprietors to eject them from their hardscrabble farms, coastal smugglers objected to the control of federal customs officers. The proprietors' skillful manipulation of the legal system to force squatters off disputed lands produced a simmering conflict. Squatters disguised as "White Indians" harassed deputy sheriffs and surveyors, usually through intimidation rather than actual use of force. Smugglers, too, organized a collective resistance that emphasized stealth and intimidation over actual violence. Unlike the agrarian protests, however, smugglers first attempted to use political means to resolve the conflict. When those efforts failed, coastal residents resorted to similar methods of popular violence used by squatters.

Resistance to federal trade regulations differs from agrarian resistance in another important aspect: the precipitate speed with which New England's maritime communities turned against the federal government. While the squatter resistance predated the American Revolution, maritime communities generally ranked among the staunchest supporters of the federal government after 1789. Port communities benefited from



Woodcut of smugglers from a children's book entitled *The Book of Commerce by Sea or Land* (Philadelphia: Uriah Hunt, 1837).

federal trade policies that provided generous tariff breaks to American merchants, gave cod bounties for fishermen, protected American shipping with a navy, and built lighthouses at the mouths of harbors. The complacency with which Maine port communities regarded the federal government quickly gave way to horror, however, when President Thomas Jefferson attempted to halt overseas trade completely in an effort to punish European powers for their transgressions against American shipping and mariners in his infamous embargo of 1807–1809.

Historians have not done a very good job of unpacking the embargo's meaning for nineteenth-century Americans. Local historians often dwell on the collapse of great fortunes and resultant suicides of previously prosperous merchants. Political historians have concentrated on the political consequences of the embargo, debating its effectiveness and importance at the national level. Maritime historians inevitably lament the embargo as a tragedy while biographers of Thomas Jefferson have both lauded and vilified him for his policies. But there exists no full-length analysis of the embargo's political, economic, and social effects. This is unfortunate, for the embargo can tell us a great deal about ordinary people's vision of the new republic's economic future.⁵

Maine's Penobscot Bay region offers an ideal laboratory in which to analyze the embargo's effects. According to more than one observer, no section of the nation was harder hit by the embargo than Maine. Although communities all along the eastern seaboard faced economic crisis, Maine's reliance on the production and export of staples such as timber or fish made it somewhat of an oddity in the United States.⁶ Maine struggled more than other maritime regions under the embargo restrictions because it could not produce its own food, especially flour. Halting international commerce, the coasting trade, and fishing, the embargo devastated all social classes, not least of all because food (and credit to buy provisions) became scarce. In Hancock County there were complaints of starvation and threats of violence by woodsmen who could not procure credit to buy flour for their hungry families. Coastal Maine's almost exclusive reliance on seaborne commerce explains both the resistance to trade restrictions and, perhaps, the period's inland unrest. The squatters who so fiercely resisted landed proprietors and their surveyors in the woods may have been driven to desperation by the economic impact of Jefferson's embargo. Not only were timber prices decimated, but coastal merchants could not afford to offer inland customers credit to buy provisions.⁷

Episodes of resistance to the embargo are one measure of the policy's

impact. The federal customs collectors stationed in various ports bore the brunt of enforcing the embargo laws. In the Penobscot district active resistance culminated in the murder of customs guard Lazaro Bogdomovitch. Through it all the local customs collector, Josiah Hook of Castine, stood firm in his enforcement of the unpopular laws. His particularly intransigent approach brought about a correspondingly violent reaction from Penobscot Bay communities and resulted in crowd actions against him and his followers.⁶

The overall impression of this collective violence and intimidation is not one of a mob out of control but quite the reverse. Restraint seems to have ruled most popular reactions to the embargo. Resisters preferred threats and intimidation over actual violence. Crowd actions were not aimed at removing the customs collectors but, rather, at bringing them within a societal norm. When the community gathered to express its outrage over the embargo, it singled out the collectors and their assistants as violators of a perceived right to engage in marine commerce and fishing. By coming together, the crowd developed a tighter bond of solidarity, reaffirmed their commercial rights, and singled out the collectors as “deviants.” In so doing, they firmly established a boundary between right and wrong, deviant and conformist. These boundaries were moral in nature; the collective established a favorable identity for itself and an unfavorable one for the offender.⁷

Coastal communities began to deem customs officers as deviants when, in pursuit of smugglers, the federal officials turned to questionable shows of armed force. This occurred as early as June 1808. An informant in Buckstown (modern Bucksport) on the Penobscot River told the local customs collector that four hogsheads of rum had been smuggled and concealed in town. Hook soon arrived “full of consequence and bustle, breathing threats, penalties, and confiscations.” While searching the waterfront for rum, the collector saw three men in a wherry-boat rowing across the river with a barrel clearly visible between them. Suspecting evasion of the embargo laws, the collector ordered the boat to return. The men ignored the order and continued to row for the opposite shore. The enraged collector had an assistant fetch him a loaded musket and threatened to fire on the boat. The men did not respond but, instead, threw the supposed contraband into the water. The barrel, as it turns out, was completely empty and floated high in the water. An embarrassed Collector Hook soon departed Buckstown in high dudgeon. The local newspaper mocked the collector asking, “Shall the free citizens of this country have their lives endangered by every petty officer of the

customs, and be at the hazard of having their brains blown out every time they cross the river with a hogshead or barrel?" It was a gentle chiding, a part of the collector's continuing education in standards of behavior acceptable to the community. Later lessons were not to be so mild.¹⁰

Buckstown and other ports reacted collectively to the embargo. The community, almost as a whole, undermined Hook's efforts to prosecute embargo violators. Witnesses refused to appear at court, and juries refused to give guilty verdicts in smuggling cases. Buckstown's merchants, who had supported the uniform admiralty law offered by the federal government before the embargo, quickly reverted to a popular sense of law when free trade was threatened.¹¹ This communal resistance frustrated the collector immensely. It also frustrated President Jefferson, who initiated a series of punitive measures against the town. Jefferson did not aim these restrictions at individual Buckstown citizens but at the community as a whole because of the town's "general spirit of disobedience." If Buckstown and other towns were going to resist the embargo as a united society, then the executive branch would reciprocate, and punish them accordingly.¹² The local press saw Jefferson's reaction to resistance in Buckstown as a form of oppression equivalent with the infamous Boston Port Act of 1774, reminding readers that they were heirs to a tradition of Revolutionary resistance.¹³

The commercial orientation of Maine's coastal communities enabled them to present a largely united front against the embargo. Sociological studies of New England merchants suggest that they possessed communal values emphasizing consensus and friendship and that merchants ostracized individuals who deviated from that unity. This strong sense of community, combined with appeals to higher authority for relief, peaceful resistance of authority, and ritualized collective violence, suggests that the coastal populace may have been practicing a form of "moral economy."¹⁴

No discussion of moral economy is complete without a consideration of E. P. Thompson's work on that subject. Thompson found that working people in eighteenth-century England had devised a means of resisting the market economy when it threatened their access to food. Thompson defined this process as "a consistent traditional view of social norms and obligations, of the proper economic functions of several parties within the community, which, taken together, can be said to constitute the moral economy of the poor." He very carefully, however, states that this does not mean that working people had an inherent moral superiority. He uses the term moral to indicate that they possessed a set of

expectations based on patriarchal obligations. Nor does he attack the market economy as immoral but, rather, points out that rioters were themselves deeply involved in the market economy. Other British scholars have since refined the concept, indicating that, when times were tough, communities reacted with an ethos of self-help that drew loosely on memories of traditional forms of resistance.¹⁵

American historians have developed their own theories of moral economy, always with reference to Thompson's 1971 groundbreaking article on the subject. The most famous example is Gary Nash's consideration of Boston food markets in *The Urban Crucible*. Barbara Clark Smith picked up on the theme of the moral economy of provision in her study of food rioters and found that American communities during and long after the Revolutionary period possessed "standards of obligation among neighbors" that linked moral and economic matters.¹⁶ American historians also moved beyond the bread nexus, however. Ruth Bogin's "Petitioning and the New Moral Economy of Post-Revolutionary America" argues that many petitioners of the period were "working to transform the traditional 'moral economy' into a defense of personal independence and moderate opportunity against perpetual exploitation and the threat of impoverishment by those who held the political reins." Bogin found that, in times of crisis, middling level individuals joined the poor in enforcing a moral economy, which expanded into a republican view of equality. According to Bogin, the food nexus in America was less important than the "land nexus": debt and taxes also created popular reactions. Many petitions expressed the grievances of poor Americans after the Revolution with "plain words and a direct assertiveness." The significance of these petitions was that they actively sought government intervention in the economy to create a "more just society," but this did not mean that petitioners rejected capitalism. Bogin's definition fits neatly with what inland Maine settlers sought from the landed proprietors.¹⁷

Moral economy has taken on many different meanings in different contexts, but historians agree on a set of distinctive characteristics. First, a common denominator of moral economy is a community's perception that an abuse of moral conventions regarding economics had occurred. Often this meant the price of bread, but it might be conflict over land ownership, or other events that threatened the good not only of individuals but the community or region as a whole. Second, collective violence, or its threat, were structured events in which participants only reluctantly resorted to bloodshed. Petitions or warnings usually preceded direct actions, which often possessed their own ritualized proceedings.

Whether legal or extralegal, community members thought that their actions represented a prior obligation to aid weaker members of the community. Third, the people involved in extralegal activities expected sympathy from the community and officialdom. Magistrates, soldiers, and others often chose to ignore, acquiesce to, or even participate in petitions and crowd actions. Finally, these attempts at economic correction were made at a local or regional level and might be to the detriment of the government's political economy, or to the nation as a whole.¹⁸

Applying the concepts of moral economy to coastal Maine provides a model that allows a greater understanding of resistance to Jefferson's embargo. Maine's ports and harbors were dedicated to a market economy, but this does not exclude the possibility that they acted under the terms of a moral economy as well. E. P. Thompson himself conceded the idea that fishing communities could adhere to a moral economy. Other scholars have gone a step further by suggesting that pirates took part in a marine moral economy and that sailors espoused a form of egalitarianism when they leaped into shoreside tumults.¹⁹

The waterfront had always been a rough area of America ports and also a place where sailors and other workers intruded into the political world. One need only think of the many affrays on Boston's waterfront before the American Revolution. Yet, the political thinkers of the day were hesitant to recognize the value of mariners and others to the young republic. Thomas Jefferson stands out as a politician who failed to understand the nature of maritime communities. Jefferson believed in a republic based upon independent "yeoman farmers." Merchants, sailors, shipbuilders, and fishermen were inherently inferior because they did not possess the self-reliance that Jefferson believed farmers possessed. The marine community, however, was not to be dismissed lightly, and it tormented Jefferson throughout his final year in office.²⁰

Mariners dominated Maine's crowd actions during the embargo and the crowning achievement of these riots was to sail away with a cargo. While many fled to the Maritime Provinces, however, others were left unemployed and penniless in port: a combination that was extremely conducive to mischief. Lumbermen enjoyed a reputation scarcely less boisterous than that of seamen, and, with markets denied the fruit of their labor, they too were idled. Fishermen also found themselves unemployed as the successive embargo laws made it virtually impossible for a fishing vessel to put to sea. These workers stood near the bottom of New England society, and they were the ones who formed the core of resistance to the embargo. But, as the effects of the embargo impoverished artisans and merchants, they joined sailors and fishermen, reinforcing the

unity of the community in antipathy against the commercial restrictions. The lower orders welcomed the leadership of merchants and sea captains because it legitimized their grievances.²¹

Coastal New England did not subscribe to the notion that “commerce corrupts.” Nor did Massachusetts Federalists entirely embrace the economic liberalism of Adam Smith. Ideas of deference remained strong in coastal Massachusetts until after the War of 1812, and those ideas were often regarded as reciprocal in nature. Paternalism remained a force that united society against external threats. New England society thus remained bound by traditional obligations within a community, even as it increasingly moved towards a market economy. While members of the community were encouraged to prosper, doing so at the expense of others was frowned upon, and persons who profited unjustly at the expense of the community could be the targets of the crowd’s wrath. Custom-house officers were often perceived as just such individuals because they received a fifty percent share of the proceeds of any contraband auctioned by the government. Federal laws also allowed informers lucrative incentives and, as a result, mobs often targeted informers. A crowd tarred and feathered one unfortunate informer in Portland in October 1808.²²

Maine communities protested the morality of the embargo on two principles. First, coastal residents believed they possessed a right to wrest a living from the sea. In petition after petition to President Jefferson, Maine towns pointed to their reliance on the sea for their livelihoods and the impossibility of pursuing agriculture. Opponents of the embargo interpreted the complete and seemingly perpetual denial of the right to navigate as an infringement of their constitutional right to enjoy the use of their property. There was also some feeling that the federal government had stepped beyond its powers to regulate interstate trade by denying vessels the right to proceed from one port to another within the same state. When these communities found themselves very suddenly impoverished in the midst of a spectacular shipping boom, they soon began to draw moral conclusions about the originators of the laws that denied them their economic rights. The Republicans of Massachusetts and Maine suffered a huge setback in the polls in the aftermath of the embargo and again when the federal government curtailed trade during the War of 1812.²³

The second moral issue raised by those opposed to the embargo was the enforcement of the various embargo acts. By the end of the embargo, customs officials were empowered to search stores and warehouses without a warrant, a privilege they had previously enjoyed only on ship-

board. Collectors were also empowered to call out state militia without the governor's approval and to call on the navy and army as well. Opponents objected to the enforcement of laws at bayonet point, and odious comparisons were made to the British occupation of Boston in the 1770s.²⁴

The most obvious manifestation of the embargo's oppression was the arming of customs officials. Before the embargo, customs officials were unarmed, as were revenue cutters. By the summer of 1808, however, customs officials had heavily armed themselves. In the Penobscot district Collector Hook mounted swivel guns on a sloop and supplied his men with muskets. Customhouse officers, on at least one occasion, irked Buckstown residents by firing a salute after a successful raid on a warehouse full of contraband rum. Not only were muskets and swivel guns fired, but the federal officers gave a hearty cheer for "Jefferson, rum, and embargo!" The presence of so much weaponry in the hands of those opposed to the community caused alarm all along the coast.²⁵

Resistance was at first legal and peaceful in nature. Town meetings protested the embargo in petitions to President Jefferson. When this tactic failed, towns turned to the Massachusetts General Court, describing their fears in vivid language. The petitions of the port towns surrounding Penobscot Bay were especially strident in tone. Camden warned that the embargo "cannot be carried into effect in this part of the country, except by military force, and we dread the consequences that may ensue from fire arms being put into the hands of unprincipled men, acting under the authority of the officers of government against the united and deliberate sentiments of the most respectable part of our citizens." Belfast resolved that every person who aided in the enforcement of the embargo was an enemy to liberty and the Constitution. Buckstown declared that President Jefferson possessed a "contemptible and wicked" policy toward the commercial states and further condemned customs officers as "enemies to their country."²⁶

Another method of resisting the embargo among Penobscot Bay towns was a poison pen campaign against Collector Hook. In June 1808, Hook received an official reprimand for his lack of vigilance in suppressing smuggling. Collector Hook was astonished; he claimed that no collector had been more vigilant in enforcing the embargo than himself and that he had risked his life in enforcing the laws. Collector Hook was right. While other customs collectors resigned their offices rather than enforce the unpopular law, turned a blind eye to violations, or even openly colluded with smugglers, Hook remained firm. On at least one

occasion Hook even sent an armed boat to help customs officials on Mount Desert Island, well outside of his own district. The complaints received by the Treasury Department about Hook's lack of vigilance should be taken with a grain of salt: no doubt they were written by individuals who wanted Hook removed for exactly the opposite reason.²⁷

Resistance soon turned to direct action. While some feared taking this course, the more desperate or bold mounted a campaign that soon showed how ineffective the embargo was. As early as April, two vessels loaded with fish allegedly parted their lines in a gale and sailed illegally from Buckstown. In June, the United States Navy was informed that smugglers were lightering illicit cargoes off Deer Isle and dispatched USS *Wasp* to investigate. In late August, a sloop loaded with flour owned by a Republican slipped out of Belfast. Clearly the community consensus had grown to the point that it absorbed those who politically should have supported the President's policy. Despite increasingly strict laws, vessels continued to escape from the Penobscot district in the fall and winter. Two schooners in September, two vessels in November, and at least ten in January evaded the local revenue cutter and customhouse agents. Nor were these events solitary, desperate measures: they might involve as many as sixty men. On at least two occasions, customs officers were assaulted while attempting to prevent vessels from sailing contrary to the law.²⁸

These crowd actions followed a pattern. They were not random acts of violence but the attainment of select extralegal goals by the crowd. Charles Tilly, in *From Mobilization to Revolution* recognized five stages that lead to collective violence: interests, organization, mobilization, opportunity, and collective action. The disturbances of the Penobscot district follow this pattern. Communities in the area clearly stated their reliance on a maritime economy in letters to the President. The port towns rallied around a unifying structure, the morality of their cause, and the apparent immorality of those deviating from it, resulting in greater organization. Once aware of their interests and organization, the communities mobilized into preparations for direct action. When an opportunity presented itself, be it a covering storm, or absence of custom officials, the crowd moved to collective action. The process was not necessarily quick—it was ten months before violence became a serious problem in the Penobscot district—but, as it progressed, the process strengthened, gaining support from more of the community as the effects of the embargo became unendurable.²⁹

The escalation of violence and desperation of the coastal communi-

ties called for more radical actions on the part of those who violated the embargo laws. The pinnacle of resistance to the embargo occurred late in 1808 and early in 1809. In November 1808, Buckstown merchants determined to repossess a cargo of flour and rice impounded on Isle au Haut, a remote island fishing community on the fringe of Penobscot Bay. They used the schooner *Peggy*, a vessel from Liverpool, Nova Scotia but with Eastport, Maine, painted on her stern as a ruse. Both local and foreign sailors manned the *Peggy*, with the intention of rescuing the contraband. The crew armed themselves with muskets, cutlasses, blunderbusses, and boarding pikes. On Sunday, November 6, a "dark and stormy night," at about seven o'clock the *Peggy* arrived in Kimball's Harbor on Isle au Haut (present-day Isle au Haut Thoroughfare) and came to anchor. A boat loaded with ten armed men put off from the schooner and approached the dock on which five customs officers guarded the contraband load of foodstuffs. A customhouse officer named Wilson hailed the boat; when the smugglers replied that they were from nearby Vinalhaven, he ordered them to row ashore. Immediately the boat approached the officer on the beach, and men sprang from it. With guns cocked, the smugglers took Wilson prisoner and put him in the bow of the boat.

The following sequence of events is not clear, but it seems that the smugglers rushed the remaining officers on the dock. Shots were fired on both sides; many believed that the customhouse officers fired first. The customs officers fired "cut shot," ordinary musket balls scored to break apart for a nonlethal, shotgun-like effect, while the smugglers fired regular musket balls. The cut shot wounded a smuggler, and the smugglers' musket balls killed the customhouse officer, Lazaro Bogdomovitch.

Who was Lazaro Bogdomovitch? The sources are less than satisfactory, but it is known that he was a foreigner. The local Federalist newspaper described him as a renegade arsonist and deserter from Napoleon's armies. Hook described him as Italian, others as Portuguese. The newspaper accounts further stated that Bogdomovitch had no relatives in the area. Probably he was a drifter attracted by the promise of working for Hook at the generous rate of two dollars per day. As a foreigner, he would not have hesitated to enforce the embargo. Furthermore, Bogdomovitch apparently had few qualms about using violence; he was overheard making threats to kill those who wanted to rescue the contraband flour in the days before his murder. Finally, painted in the press as a foreigner, a criminal, a deserter from the army of the hated Napoleon, and prone to violence, Bogdomovitch could not have been a less sympathetic victim.³⁰

The smugglers' treatment of Bogdomovitch contrasted strongly with

their actions toward the other customs guards on Isle au Haut. After the skirmish they dragged Bagdomovitch's corpse into the water and set it adrift, perhaps as a further insult to the man, or as an attempt to hide the body, or both. They took another customs officer prisoner but released him after taking his weapon and the remaining two guards fled into the darkness. Meanwhile, the crew of the *Peggy* collected and secured all the small craft on the island so that no one could slip away for help, and Wilson remained a prisoner on board the *Peggy*. All in all, minimal force had been used, with the curious exception of Bogdomovitch.³¹


Unfortunately for the smugglers, the two escaped guards found a boat on the other side of the island. They went to Castine and informed Collector Hook of the skirmish. He immediately called for a posse. Thirteen men joined the collector on the schooner he used as a revenue cutter and four men followed in a small sail boat. Despite a "violent gale of wind," the two vessels immediately sailed for Isle au Haut. The small sailboat never made it. The boat, and the four men aboard it, simply vanished, presumably lost at sea.³² The collector's schooner arrived safely at Isle au Haut, but too late; the *Peggy* had already loaded the provisions and left. The collector pursued and found the *Peggy* at anchor in Fox Island Thoroughfare. Spying the cutter, the smugglers slipped the schooner's cable and crowded on sail in an attempt to escape. As the revenue cutter gained on the *Peggy* the smugglers hoisted a British flag to deter their pursuers but to no avail. The cutter overtook them, and the *Peggy* surrendered without further resistance.

Collector Hook took his prisoners to the Hancock County jail in Castine. Because the federal government had no homicide statute, the prisoners were interned at the county's expense on a charge of murder. The incident excited enough controversy that Hancock County officials posted two additional guards at the jail. Collector Hook then departed to attend federal court in Portland. During his absence, more shipping fled the Penobscot, and more gunfire was exchanged. On November 15, the collector's assistant, alarmed by the violence, wrote an urgent plea for help to the commanders of any naval vessel that happened to be near. The urgency of the letter is clear. Addressing "the commanders of the U.S. ship *Chesapeake*, ship *Wasp*, or brig *Argus*," the collector wrote: "I have to request that you will have the goodness to send some force to this district immediately, if it is in your power—every means is now used in this district to violate the Embargo laws by the opposers of government. The lives of those employed by the Collector are now in imminent danger." In response, the Navy dispatched USS *Argus* to Penobscot Bay.³³

Meanwhile the eight prisoners on murder charges languished in jail.

Some were sick, and one was wounded by cut shot. Their stay however was interrupted on Tuesday, December 13. At two o'clock in the morning, a heavily armed mob disguised as women descended upon the jail. They entered the jailhouse and demanded the keys from the assistant jailer who had little choice in the matter. The mob then unlocked the cell doors. Four of the prisoners escaped, but two guards arrived in time to prevent the remaining four from leaving. The escapees were never seen again, and the remaining prisoners were fitted with shackles to await trial in June.³⁴

In the aftermath of the jail break Collector Hook suffered severe blows to his authority. The master of the local revenue cutter became so alarmed at the proliferation of violence that he disarmed his vessel. Collector Hook's response is unrecorded, but it happened just after he sent his brother to Boston to buy more weapons. One newspaper raged that the collector's brother was "purchasing arms to butcher these unhappy sufferers if they do not tamely submit to this infernal usurpation [the embargo]." No doubt the collector was as determined as ever, and the captain's actions must have displeased him. The response of the community, however, was entirely different. In a town meeting Castine thanked the captain for his "manly and patriotic conduct in withdrawing his guns from the cutter." When the court tried the remaining four prisoners in



Hancock County Sheriff George Ulmer's House in Lincolnville.
Photograph circa 1900. *Courtesy Lincolnville Historical Society.*



John McMasters paid dearly for his role in the *Peggy* incident. He spent his remaining years in Wiscasset's Lincoln County jail because of his inability to pay the fine resulting from his smuggling conviction. Lincoln County jail and prisonkeeper's house, Wiscasset. Photograph circa 1900.

Courtesy Lincoln County Historical Association.

June, no witnesses came forward, and the smugglers were released on a plea of "ignoramus."³⁵

Federal court had more success. The court impounded the *Peggy* and, in March, auctioned the schooner and its cargo of flour and rice. The proceeds of the auction were split between the federal government and Collector Hook.³⁶ The federal courts also successfully prosecuted the organizers of the *Peggy* incident. Andrew Webster, a Castine physician and deputy sheriff, went to trial in March 1809, was found guilty and fined \$2500. Unable to pay the fine, the federal court placed Webster in the Castine jail as a debtor but not for long. Four days after internment, Webster "broke goal." As a former deputy sheriff, Webster must have been quite familiar with the building; he broke a hole in the plaster ceiling of the second floor debtor's chamber, crawled into the garret, and, using a bed cord, reached the ground through a scuttle in the jail's roof. Webster escaped to Nova Scotia, where he married and lived for the rest of his life.³⁷

The federal courts had more luck in prosecuting the principal organizer of the *Peggy* incident, John McMasters, a merchant heavily involved

in smuggling. McMasters was a slippery character. In various documents he claimed to have resided in Castine, Bucksport, and Eastport in Maine; Boston, Massachusetts; and Halifax, Nova Scotia. Even before the *Peggy* incident, federal officials discovered that McMasters was involved in smuggling at Eastport. McMasters went to trial in September 1809, when a jury found him guilty of breaking the embargo laws and fined him \$10,000. Unable to pay this staggering fine, McMasters went to the Lincoln County jail in Wiscasset for debt. There he stayed for years, unable to pay, and petitioning Congress several times for release. Congress ignored his pleas, and McMasters was still confined in Wiscasset when he was killed by a drunken sailor in August 1815.³⁸

The *Peggy* incident created political repercussions as well. Andrew Webster was a Republican, and his detection, trial, and escape did nothing to improve local Federalists' image of the Republican Party. It also proved extremely awkward to Sheriff George Ulmer, Hancock County's leading Republican. When Webster escaped, Ulmer faced the embarrassment of being sued by the Federal government, which held him personally responsible as sheriff for the prisoners in the Hancock County jail.³⁹

In addition to the federal suit, Ulmer's efforts to support the embargo also proved to be personally and politically embarrassing for him. When a handful of Hancock County Republicans under Ulmer's leadership attempted to inform the press that the entire county supported the embargo laws and President Jefferson, a Lincolnville countermeeting assembled under the leadership of the sheriff's own brother. The

Communications.

Another "Cat out of the Bag."



JOSEPH TYLER, Esq. of Deer Isle, the gentleman to whom the following letter was directed, has been a Republican and advocated the measures and policy of the *Jeffersonian Administration*, until it became evident that the government were guilty of duplicity in their negotiations with Foreign Nations; that they had been in constant practice of holding a language confidential and at the same time, a language totally different as official. Pretending to act with impartiality to all nations, and endeavouring by publishing the most barefaced falsehoods, to deceive the People, as to the true cause for which the Embargo was most wantonly and wickedly laid, and has continued to be enforced; that he became disgusted with their conduct, and hath long since abandoned the party, considering them the enemies of our Country and Liberty.

Lincolnville, Jan. 6th, 1809.

JOSEPH TYLER, Esq.

It is truly unfortunate that you Republicans on Deer Isle, did not vote for Judge Cook, instead of Major Gannett. It appears to me that you did

Anti-embargo letters such as this one, "Another 'Cat out of the Bag'" published in the *Gazette of Maine*, March 25, 1809, gloated over prominent Maine merchants' abandonment of the Jeffersonian Republicans.

countermeeting ridiculed Ulmer's attempt, pointing out that his meeting was attended by less than twenty men, among them several custom house officers. Notably, Samuel Whitney, the revenue cutter captain who had disarmed his vessel, attended the countermeeting. Clearly custom house authorities were now drifting away from the embargo and conforming to community standards. Ulmer grumbled to a fellow Republican: "There really is a want of patriotic firmness among the common people." Meanwhile Ulmer's carefully constructed Republican network began to unravel. Many formerly staunch Jeffersonians abandoned the party because they now associated Jeffersonian politics with the embargo.⁴⁰

In the aftermath of the *Peggy* incident, customs officers who did not act within the community norms continued to be the targets of violence. In April 1809, Deer Isle's first selectman assaulted a customs officer. In the words of the Lincolnville countermeeting, the officers of the federal government had "abused that confidence we have heretofore with pride and pleasure placed in them." Port towns now looked to the Massachusetts General Court to supply relief from the "oppressive" national government.⁴¹ The legitimacy of the Republican Party and its policies nearly self-destructed. Lucky for the party, Republican activists such as William King were able to seize on an issue that resonated with much of Maine's population: squatter's rights. With the murder of Paul Chadwick in Malta in September 1809, the issue of squatter's rights became all the more compelling. The murder of Bogdomovitch and Chadwick both reflected the tensions that were bitterly dividing Maine communities.

The embargo ended before the collective action in Penobscot Bay became the political action of Massachusetts as a whole. Many had predicted civil war if the laws continued to be enforced. Something had to give way, and it was the will of Thomas Jefferson that had to conform to economic realities. A few days before leaving office, President Jefferson signed a bill repealing the unpopular commercial restrictions. Although the laws that followed still limited trade, they were not as devastating as the embargo laws. Nevertheless, smuggling remained rampant under the new nonintercourse laws until at least 1815.

There are several conclusions to be drawn from extralegal resistance to the embargo laws. The first is that Maine's coastal populace felt they had a moral right to engage in maritime commerce. This conviction was based on the resources available, their interpretation of the Constitution, and established custom. The second conclusion is that embargo violators were not acting as individuals. Smuggling, by definition, is a crime that requires the acquiescence of a substantial portion of a community. Gov-

ernment attempted to prosecute smugglers as individuals, a tactic that met with little success when society did not view smugglers as criminals. The collective violence of embargo violators was an expression of community will; they viewed the customhouse officers, not themselves, as the transgressors. Third, the collective violence of the embargo resisters was an expression of moral economy. While moral economy most often espoused a negative view of commerce, it also represented a judgment about how a market economy should serve the community. In this case, a cessation of commerce was lethal to a community with an extractive economy. While the embargo had a negative impact on the merchants, the effect was far more devastating on the lower strata of society. As a result, the officials who enforced a cessation of commerce became viewed as oppressors, and targets of the community's wrath.

Finally, one should consider the scale of effort required by the federal government to enforce the embargo laws. Every available resource was strained to the utmost, yet the national government failed to impose its will on the tiny communities of coastal Maine. The Jeffersonians were slow to appreciate the strength of the commercial instinct. Once again, it was William King who realized that power. Just as he used the squatter issue to rescue the Republican cause, he used the issue of seaborne commerce to argue for the separation of Maine from Massachusetts. By manipulating a change in coasting laws, he persuaded coastal residents that statehood would not harm their commercial interests. In Alan Taylor's study of agrarian resistance, *Liberty Men and Great Proprietors*, King appears primarily as the benefactor of agrarian squatters, but it was his courtship of Maine's coastal populace that brought statehood to Maine.⁴² Seaborne commerce, the key to Maine's economy, wedded the region to a market economy very early in its history. That adherence to commerce, however, did not mean that coastal communities necessarily believed in the principles of economic rationalism or abandoned communal values.

NOTES

1. Lazaro Bogdomovitch was a foreigner, probably an Italian. Why he came to Penobscot Bay remains a mystery, but he was probably an unemployed sailor hired by the federal government to guard a cargo of contraband from being retaken by smugglers.

2. Neither George Augustus Wheeler's *History of Castine, Penobscot, and Brooksville, Maine* (Bangor: Burr & Robinson, 1875) nor the standard history for the early settlement of Isle au Haut, George L. Hosmer's *An Histori-*

cal Sketch of the Town of Deer Isle, Maine (Boston: Press of Stanley and Usher, 1886), mention the murder or any of the events surrounding it. When I presented my research to a group of Isle au Haut residents, some members of the audience insisted that no murder had ever taken place on the island.

3. The most reliable information about the incident comes from Federal District Court Records, Maine District, RG 21, National Archives Branch Depository, Waltham, Mass. This should be cross-referenced with the Hancock County Supreme Judicial Court records and the “Hancock County Goal Calendar, vol. 1,” all at the Maine State Archives, Augusta, Me.

4. Alan Taylor, *Liberty Men and Great Proprietors: The Revolutionary Settlement on the Maine Frontier, 1760–1820* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990).

5. A typically romanticized account of the embargo may be found in Maude Clark Gay, “The Garden of the East: Wiscasset on Sheepscot Bay,” in *The Trail of the Maine Pioneer* (Lewiston, Me.: Lewiston Journal Company, 1916), 29–49. The most recent work on the embargo’s political context is Burton Spivak, *Jefferson’s English Crisis: Commerce, Embargo, and the Republican Revolution* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1979). For a more controversial view, see Leonard W. Levy, *Jefferson and Civil Liberties: The Darker Side* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963). For maritime history, see Robert G. Albion, William A. Baker, and Benjamin W. Labaree, *New England and the Sea*, rev. ed. (Mystic, Ct.: Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc., 1994), 76–80.

6. John Howe to George Prevost, May 5, 1808, in David W. Parker, “Some Reports of John Howe, 1808,” *American Historical Review* 17 (1911–1912): 77; Paul Dudley Sargent to Thomas Jefferson, July 6, 1808, in Carl E. Prince, ed., *Microfilm Edition of the Papers of Albert Gallatin Papers* (Philadelphia: Historic Publications, 1970) [hereafter cited as PAG]; William Hutchinson Rowe, *The Maritime History of Maine: Three Centuries of Seafaring* (1948; reprint, Gardiner, Me.: Harpswell Press, 1989), 78–86; Ronald F. Banks, *Maine Becomes a State: The Movement to Separate Maine from Massachusetts, 1785–1820* (1970; reprint, Somersworth: New Hampshire Publishing Company, 1973), 57–58. See also Congressman Orchard Cook’s letter to William King, William King Papers (hereafter cited as WKP) Maine Historical Society, Portland, Me. Cook wrote “the Dis’t. of Maine has interests different from the other parts of the U.S.— admit it—can you expect that all other parts can, or ought to yield to the Dis’t. of Main[e].”

7. The staples theory of economic development was originated by the Canadian historian Harold Innis. Carl Berger, *The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing Since 1900* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986). See also Gerald S. Graham, *Sea Power and British North America: A Study in British Colonial Policy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941). For references to starvation, see “Embargo Effects—In Maine,” and “Maine,” in *New York Evening Post*, May 9, 1808 and

February 11, 1809; George Herbert to Daniel Webster, March 13, 1809, in Charles M. Wiltse, ed., *The Papers of Daniel Webster: Correspondence* (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1974), 1:107. Herbert wrote of a "famine" in Hancock County and blamed the embargo.

8. "Official," *Eastern Argus* [Portland, Me.], November 23, 1808, and U.S. v. Pearl Spofford and Samuel G. Town, "Final Record Book," Federal District Court Records, Maine District, RG 21, National Archives Branch Depository, Waltham, Mass.

9. Kai T. Erikson, *Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), 4, 12, 21, 24; Edwin M. Schur, *The Politics of Deviance* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980), 24, 138. Erikson draws on Emile Durkheim's concept of deviancy.

10. "Important Seizures Under the Embargo Law," *Gazette of Maine* [Buckstown, Me.], June 16, 1808.

11. Seaboard merchants benefited greatly from the creation of a strong central government under the Constitution. The federal government supported aids to navigation such as lighthouses, protected shipping from pirates, provided courts to handle issues of interstate trade, and gave bounties to cod fishermen. See Joyce Butler, "Rising Like a Phoenix: Commerce in Southern Maine, 1775–1830," in *Agreeable Situations: Society, Commerce, and Art in Southern Maine, 1780–1830*, ed. Laura Fecych Sprague (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1987), 22.

12. For the problems courts had in prosecuting embargo violators, see Dwight F. Henderson, *Congress, Courts, and Criminals: The Development of Federal Criminal Law, 1801–1829* (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1985); Douglas Lamar Jones, "'The Caprice of Juries': The Enforcement of the Jeffersonian Embargo in Massachusetts," *American Journal of Legal History* 24 (1980): 319; Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, November 13, 1808, PAG. Jefferson wrote of Buckstown, "this is the first time the character of the place has been brought under consideration as an objection. Yet a general disobedience to the law in any place must have weight towards refusing to give them any facilities to evade. In such a case we may fairly require positive proof that the individuals of a town tainted with a general spirit of disobedience has never said or done anything himself to countenance that spirit."

13. *Gazette of Maine*, January 6, 1809.

14. For studies of New England merchants, see Peter Dobkin Hall, *The Organization of American Culture, 1700–1900: Private Institutions, Elites, and the Origins of American Nationality* (New York: New York University Press, 1982), 84, 68–75; Richard D. Brown, *Knowledge is Power: The Diffusion of Information in Early America, 1700–1865* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 110–131; Allen Silver, "Friendship in Commercial Society: Eighteenth-Century Social Theory and Modern Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology* 95 (May 1990): 1474–1504.

15. E. P. Thompson, *Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular*

Culture (New York: New Press, 1993) contains both a reprint of Thompson's 1971 article in *Past and Present*, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," and a more recent defense of his reasoning in "The Moral Economy Reviewed." John Bohstedt, "The Moral Economy and the Discipline of Historical Context," *Journal of Social History* 26 (Winter 1992): 265–284.

16. Gary B. Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution*, abridged ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 80–87; Barbara Clark Smith, "Food Rioters and the American Revolution," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 51 (January 1994): 3–38.

17. Ruth Bogin, "Petitioning and the New Moral Economy of Post-Revolutionary America," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 45 (July 1988): 391–425.

18. Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1978), 3–4.

19. Thompson, *Customs in Common*, 340–341, 103; Markus Rediker, *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700–1750* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), chap. 6 and 248–251.

20. Paul A. Gilje, "The Meaning of Freedom for Waterfront Workers," in *Devising Liberty: Preserving and Creating Freedom in the New American Republic*, ed. David Thomas Konig (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 110–111; for Jefferson's troubles in the last months of the embargo, see Levy, *Jefferson and Civil Liberties*, 141.

21. For sailors, see "American Seamen," *Boston Gazette*, May 19, 1808; Rediker, *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea*, 249; for lumbermen see Graeme Wynn, "'Deplorably Dark and Demoralized Lumberers'? Rhetoric and Reality in Early Nineteenth-Century New Brunswick," *Journal of Forest History* 24 (October 1980): 168–187; for fishermen, see Daniel Vickers, *Farmers and Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in Essex County, Massachusetts 1630–1850* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 275 and Rowe, *Maritime History of Maine*, 268.

22. Congressman Fisher Ames of Dedham, Massachusetts wrote of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, "The principles of the book are excellent, but the application of them to America requires caution." See Fisher Ames to George Richards Minot, May 29, 1789, in *Works of Fisher Ames*, ed. Seth Ames, 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1854), 1:638; Ronald P. Formisano, *The Transformation of Political Culture: Massachusetts Parties, 1790s–1840s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 130–135, 160–164; Christine Leigh Heyrman, *Commerce and Culture: The Maritime Communities of Colonial Massachusetts, 1690–1750* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1984), 75; "The Spirit of the Argus," *Portland Gazette*, December 12, 1808.

23. The *Portland Gazette*, a Federalist newspaper, published many anti-

embargo letters and petitions in 1808 and 1809; for the constitutionality of the embargo, see Jones, "The Caprice of Juries," 310, 323; Henderson, *Congress, Courts, and Criminals*, 81–84.

24. "Standing Army, and 100,000 Men!" *Portland Gazette*, December 12, 1808; Jones, "Caprice of Juries," 312–315.

25. "Important Seizures, Under the Embargo Laws," *Gazette of Maine*, June 16, 1808.

26. "Camden Town Meeting," *Portland Gazette*, February 27, 1809; "Belfast Town Meeting," *Portland Gazette*, March 6, 1809; "Records of the Town of Buckstown," January 30, 1809, Town Clerk's Office, Bucksport, Me.

27. Albert Gallatin to Josiah Hook, June 4, 1808; Josiah Hook to Henry Dearborn, July 21, 1808, both in PAG; Melatiah Jordan to Albert Gallatin, June 30, 1808, "Correspondence of the Secretary of the Treasury with Collectors of Customs, 1789–1833," RG 56, M178, National Archives.

28. "Shipping Intelligence," *Portland Gazette*, May 16, 1808; Albert Gallatin to Robert Smith, June 4, 1808, PAG; "Extract of a letter from Belfast," *Portland Gazette*, September 5, 1808; *Connecticut Courant*, February 8, 1809; Josiah Hook to Albert Gallatin, December 19, 1808, PAG.

29. Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, 54–55.

30. *Gazette of Maine*, December 31, 1808; Luther Phillips to unknown woman, April 5, 1884, *Bangor Daily Whig and Courier*, January 1, 1886.

31. "Official," *Eastern Argus*, January 25, 1809, is the best account of the Peggy Affair, and reprinted as far away as Halifax, Nova Scotia, and Baltimore, Maryland. The Republican *Eastern Argus* and the Federalist *Portland Gazette* engaged in a lively debate as to what actually happened on Isle au Haut for some weeks; see "Argus Falsehoods Exposed," *Portland Gazette*, December 5, 1808 for the accusation that the customs officials fired first. Another source for some details is "Confirmation of the British Outrage," *Old Colony Gazette* [New Bedford], December 9, 1808. Cut shot (also known as swan shot) was commonly used by customs officers in England; see F. F. Nichols, *Honest Thieves: The Violent Heyday of English Smuggling* (London: Heinemann, 1973), 52.

32. See letter of Luther Philips to unknown woman, April 5, 1884, *Bangor Daily Whig and Courier*, January 1, 1886. Luther's father was one of the four who died in the smaller boat. The three others were Eben Mann, James Douglass, and an unidentified man who was also one of the customs guards who came from Isle au Haut with news of the murder.

33. "Hancock County Jail Calendar," vol. 1; "Hancock County Court of Sessions," 2:10 for authorization of additional guards, Maine State Archives; Josiah Hook to Albert Gallatin, December 19, 1808, PAG; William Pillsbury to Commanders of the U.S. ship *Chesapeake*, ship *Wasp*, or brig *Argus*, November 15, 1808, "Letters Sent by the Secretary of the Navy to Officers, 1798–1868," RG 45, M 149, National Archives. For an account of the United States Navy's role in enforcing the embargo, see Joshua M. Smith, "'So Far

Distant from the Eye of Authority: The Embargo of 1807 and the U.S. Navy, 1807–1809,” in *New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Twelfth Naval History Symposium*, ed. William B. Cogar (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 123–140.

34. Jail accounts, May 1809 term, Hancock County Court of Sessions, in “Hancock County Court of Sessions Records,” Maine State Archives; “Murderers Rescued!” *Eastern Argus*, December 29, 1808; *Philadelphia Daily Advertiser*, December 30, 1808.

35. Wheeler, *History of Castine*, 78–79; this is the only matter connected with the murder of Bogdomovitch mentioned in this book. See also “Maine,” *New York Evening Post*, February 11, 1809; Commonwealth v. Edward Lewis and Others, Hancock County Supreme Judicial Court records June 1809 term, Maine State Archives. See also accounts of John Minot, Castine’s goal keeper, May 8, 1809, in Hancock County Court of Sessions records, Maine State Archives.

36. *Eastern Argus*, January 26, 1809.

37. Webster served as a deputy sheriff and court crier for Hancock County; see George Ulmer’s account, May 1808 term, Hancock County Court of Common Pleas, Maine State Archives; for his escape, see deposition of Ephraim Mullet, May 21, 1810, in U.S. v. George Ulmer file papers, and U.S. v. Andrew Webster, “Final Record Book,” March 1809 term, Federal District Court Records, Maine District, RG 21, National Archives Branch Depository, Waltham, Mass. For Webster’s life in Nova Scotia see Charles Bruce Fergusson, *The Diary of Simeon Perkins, 1797–1803* (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1967), 4:403n.

38. For smuggling during the embargo, see U.S. v. John McMasters, “Final Record Book,” September 1809 term, Federal District Court Records, Maine District, RG 21, National Archives Branch Depository, Waltham, Mass.; for McMaster’s pleas from jail, see *Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States* (Washington: Gales & Seaton, 1826), 8:32, 686, and 691; for McMaster’s death see Rufus K. Sewall, *Wiscasset Point: The Old Meeting House and Interesting Incidents Connected with its History* (Wiscasset, Me.: Charles E. Emerson, 1883), 11–14.

39. Ulmer to Caleb Strong, September 26, 1812, “Secretary of the Commonwealth/Commissions,” Massachusetts State Archives, Boston.

40. “Hancock County Meeting,” *Eastern Argus*, January 19, 1809; “At a legal meeting of the inhabitants of Lincolnville,” *Montreal Gazette*, March 20, 1809; Ulmer to William King, March 17, 1809, WKP; “Another ‘Cat out of the Bag,’” *Gazette of Maine*, March 25, 1809.

41. U.S. v. Pearl Spofford and Samuel G. Town, “Final Record Book,” March 1810 term, Federal District Court Records, Maine District, RG 21, National Archives Branch Depository, Waltham, Mass.; “At a legal meeting of the inhabitants of Lincolnville,” *Montreal Gazette*, March 20, 1809.

42. Banks, *Maine Becomes a State*, 126–129.