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THE SIXTIES: TURMOIL AND TRANSFORMATION IN THE NATION, IN HIGHER EDUCATION, AND AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MAINE

Peter Hoff

The University of Maine entered its second century of existence in February 1965, in the midst of a period known as “the sixties,” characterized by a cultural revolution, a robust civil rights movement, and a long war in Vietnam. These elements profoundly affected the nation, its people, and the University of Maine. So did the arrival of a large wave of students, the “baby boomers,” plus many for whom higher education had heretofore been out of reach. Three University of Maine presidents, Lloyd Elliott, H. Edwin Young, and Winthrop Libby, led the university through the sixties, addressing significant challenges and changes, which included student movements aimed at greater freedom in their campus life, participation in the civil rights movement, and controversy over the Vietnam War. Equally as important for the university as the changes wrought by these national movements was the effort in Maine to reorganize higher education through the creation of a university system. The university entered the decade as a stand-alone public land-grant university with its own governing board, plus statewide responsibilities in undergraduate and graduate education, basic and applied research, and extension and outreach to citizens, agriculturalists, and businesses. By the end of the decade, the University of Maine was still the state’s land-grant university with comprehensive statewide responsibilities. However, it had become “The University of Maine at Orono” (UMO), one of several units in a new statewide university system, named “The University of Maine,” and operated out of an office in Portland under the executive authority of a chancellor and a newly established board of trustees. Altogether, the impact of societal change, a new concept of the role and place of the student, and a new governance structure made the sixties not only a transitional decade for the university, but a genuinely transformational one, bringing new stature and advantages as well as difficult new circumstances to navigate. Peter S. Hoff, seventeenth president of the University of Maine (1997-2004) holds a BA from the University of Wis-
consmadison, a masters and a PhD in English and Humanities from Stanford University. In addition to his many articles on British literature, teaching excellence, and higher education administration, he and colleague Wendy Leeds-Hurwitz co-authored Learning Matters: The Transformation of U.S. Higher Education (2013). He lives in Carrollton, Georgia, his native state, where his wife Dianne is Dean of the College of Education at the University of West Georgia.

Three University of Maine Presidents at the Helm in a Pivotal Decade

THE UNIVERSITY of Maine entered its second century on February 25, 1965, precisely one hundred years after Governor Samuel Cony signed legislation establishing the university, one day after the bill had passed in the legislature in 1865. Before considering the University of Maine’s eventful third fifty years, readers would do well to return to David Smith’s First Century: A History of the University of Maine 1865-1965, which retells vividly the birth pangs of Maine’s land-grant college. Without the dogged efforts of Ezekiel Holmes and Phineas T. Barnes (according to Smith, members of the state’s “agricultural aristocracy”), the legislature might well have settled for a proposal to dispose of the funds from the land-grant sale by establishing an endowed chair in agriculture at Bowdoin College and calling it a day. Thanks to leaders like Holmes and Barnes, the legislature instead took a bolder step and established the University of Maine.¹

February 1965 was a remarkable month, witnessing events that did much to direct an historic transformation of the American political, social, cultural, moral, and educational landscape. The country was halfway through the tumultuous decade known now as “the sixties.” By the end of the decade, the nation and the university would be far different from the beginning.

During February of 1965 Alone:

In popular culture, Ringo Starr, fresh from a tonsillectomy, married Vivian Cox. John Lennon was making fast progress as a beginner on the Swiss ski slopes. The band started filming Help in Bermuda after a week-long recording session at EMI studios that included “Ticket to Ride,” “I Need You,” and several other hits. The United States’ space program, which would put a man on the moon in July, 1969, took a major step in
that direction by launching the lunar probe Ranger 8 from Cape Canaveral LC-12. The photographs it transmitted helped to select landing sites for future Apollo missions.

More ominously, events took place that would drive the course of the civil rights movement. On February 1, Martin Luther King, Jr. and seven hundred demonstrators were arrested in Selma, Alabama. Two weeks later, police clashed with four hundred black students outside the Brooklyn Board of Education, as a boycott of New York City schools continued to grow. On February 18, Reverend C. T. Vivian led a march to the courthouse in Marion, Alabama, where state troopers rushed the protesters and attacked them. One of the protestors, Jimmie Lee Jackson, was shot and killed by an Alabama state trooper. In New York, Malcolm X was shot and killed by three assailants February 21. On February 25, a Mississippi federal judge dismissed the “Mississippi Burning” case against seventeen of the eighteen men accused of murdering three civil rights workers, claiming insufficient evidence. (The Supreme Court would within a year reverse this decision). These events, and others, led to the historic March 7 march on Selma, Alabama.

Equally ominously, February 1965 was the month when the Vietnam War explosively escalated. On February 4, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy visited South Vietnam for the first time. In North Vietnam, Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin coincidentally arrived in Hanoi. Two days later, Viet Cong guerrillas attacked the United States military compound at Pleiku, killing eight Americans, wounding 126 and destroying ten aircraft. Lyndon Johnson reportedly told his staff, “I’ve had enough of this,” and on February 7, forty-nine United States Navy bombers struck Dong Hoi, North Vietnam. Four days later, ninety-nine navy planes attacked enemy barracks in southern North Vietnam. Kosygin reacted by promising North Vietnam unlimited military aid, including surface-to-air missiles. February 13 saw the Rubicon-crossing moment when President Lyndon B. Johnson authorized Operation Rolling Thunder, a campaign of air strikes against North Vietnam beginning in March, 1965 and extending through 1968. On February 16, United States forces sank a North Vietnamese trawler carrying one hundred tons of Soviet and Chinese-made war material. On February 19, two South Vietnamese generals launched a coup against General Nguyen Khanh, which only collapsed when the United States intervened and helped install a new military/civilian government. On February 22, General Westmoreland requested two battalions of United States Marines to protect the American air base at Da Nang from six thousand
Viet Cong massed in the vicinity. The president approved his request, despite the “grave reservations” of Ambassador Taylor in Vietnam, who warned that America may be about to repeat the same mistakes made by the French. All this occurred in February alone, the University of Maine’s centennial month.

While February, 1965 was a quiet month on college campuses, the events chronicled above lit the fuse that soon caused campuses to explode with intense and violent protest that made them the venue and focal point for civil rights and anti-war activity for years to come. In March, the first major teach-in occurred, organized by faculty and Students for a Democratic Society, at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. Years of often violent campus activism followed.

In brief, the hundredth anniversary of the University of Maine took place during a pivotal month in a pivotal decade. Events of the decade proved both dramatic and transformational. They touched every corner of American society, and made a profound impact on the nature of American universities—among them most certainly the University of Maine.

The sixties also saw transformation in higher education itself, revolutionizing things like who enrolled, what they studied, how they learned, what they did when they were not in class, how the universities themselves operated, how they were funded, and how—even as all the turmoil was going on—they grew. The University of Maine itself went from a fall 1960 enrollment of 4,062 to 7,484 in 1970, with another 559 at its new University College in Bangor—doubling its enrollment during those critical ten years.

In fact, enrollment growth drove events of the 1960s as much those events drove enrollment. The full force of the post-war baby boom hit American universities during the sixties, causing both the rapid expansion of enrollments and the creation of new institutions. Many other factors drove rapid enrollment growth, notably the war and student draft deferments. In every state, universities filled to the bursting point, while professors, classrooms, and other facilities were in very short supply. Public universities’ first reaction was to admit the students, but flunk out those who could not make the mark immediately. “Look to your left and look to your right,” deans would sternly warn entering freshmen. “Two of you won’t be here next semester.”

The National Defense Education Act (a response to the 1957 Russian Sputnik phenomenon, when Americans began to fear they were losing the space, science, and defense technology races) came to the rescue
by funding PhD study and turning out professors in droves by 1970. The national prosperity of the fifties and sixties made a wave of university building possible. By 1970, the United States had actually created a glut of professors and universities that has remained ever since, changing the college recruiting advantage from the admissions office to the prospective student. Today, all but the most elite universities have to scramble hard to make their enrollment targets. Competition for students is fierce. But during the sixties, enrollment growth was rampant almost everywhere, and most public universities were all but overrun by the numbers of entering students.

Yet, the economics of student numbers aside, and despite their precarious status on the class rolls, students themselves were the most significant drivers of university change during that decade. In 1960, the concept of *in loco parentis* was the norm: the institution served as a surrogate parent for the college student. Men and women lived in completely different residence halls. Female students were required to be inside their dorms by curfew—around 10:00 PM weekdays, a bit later on Fridays and Saturdays. Male students could visit women in their residence halls, but only in the first-floor main lounges.

Protest movements induced college-aged persons to become more aware of social issues. Because these issues proved divisive, even among students of similar backgrounds and ethnicities, they generated more discussion and often forced students to choose sides and to decide for themselves whether or not to act in various forms of outward expression and even protest. Students came to realize that they could actually influence major policy decisions, from war versus peace to race relations to fighting poverty to residence hall policies. Thus the petition, the protest, the sit-in, the boycott, and other tools of protest became common forms of student action. Students wanted to bring about various forms of change, from how they were allowed to comport themselves on campus to how the nation and the world should be run.

This new posture put students more directly and overtly at odds with adults in authority, especially university administrators. There developed much more of an “us versus them” relationship between students and administrators. Gone was Maine’s beloved old “Prexy Hauck,” who used to wire students money to get home from Europe or Florida. His successor, Lloyd Elliott, had made it clear by 1960 that he was “just not that kind of guy,” even though he placed the good of students at the top of his priority list and fought in other ways to improve their lot.² Across the country, protesting students made their feelings known by at-
tacking the college campus itself even when their true grievance was elsewhere, such as the “military-industrial complex,” state and federal governments, the war, and the draft. Students sat-in and took over (and sometimes even burned) university buildings and administrative offices. As we shall see, University of Maine presidents faced such challenges and protests during those years. President Winthrop (“Win”) Libby even had to deal one night with Stephen King and a few of his fellow protestors, determined to burn the University of Maine President’s house to the ground.

 Copies of the University of Maine yearbook, *Prism*, published during the sixties gives us a direct window into changing student moods during that decade. Published each year during the late fifties through the early seventies, *Prism* traditionally featured the University of Maine’s top administrators at or near the front of each volume and commented on what the administration signified. Nothing could better testify to the changing mood than these selected passages:

1959: Sageness . . . scholarship . . . ability to administrate . . . ability to teach. . . ability. The faculty reflect the ACADEMIC mood. We are blessed with a superior administration and faculty at Maine. Yearly, there are personnel changes. In February we lost a great president. We gained a very capable successor. This is the pattern. Old faces and new faces—all capable men. At Maine, Deans, Doctors, Professors, and Instructors alike look at us as not merely students, but men and women. They are practitioners of the Maine Hello; they are advisors. Better still, they are friends.

1962: High-flown harbingers, hewing hopes
Wax-winged through the obsidian maze of
Patter-purled confusion, guiding in
Leading, commanding respect in humility.

1964: Intelligence, imagination, and authority are vital qualities of an administration system which is serving a rapidly expanding university.
. . . Most of the responsibility for this is placed on the administrators whose vision and advance planning assures us of an education which will be a valid foundation for a productive life.

1966: The administration and faculty are the carpenters and tools of a growing university.

By 1968, the pages of *Prism* began to reveal cracks in that admiration. It
removed the administration from the beginning of the yearbook and relegated it to pages 252ff. Although freshman beanies were still evident in the photos, the rhetoric began to shift:

1968: The Buck sometimes stops here. After leading the University of Maine through a surge of growth and the birth pangs of the Super-U, President Young and Vice President Peck leave for greener pastures next year. Uniting the conflicting views of a varied faculty, and combining them with student aspirations and considering the preferences of the Board of Trustees is no easy chore. These key men, who though rarely seen, are strongly felt in this establishment called a university.

The following year, Prism refers to the administration as “The Control.”

1969: those who govern and teach and this year, even shared some of their power with (some of) us; they— learning all the time, how to handle. this big machine.

The 1969-1970 period was one of great turmoil on campus, with students protesting the war, civil rights, student rights, the elimination of in loco parentis, and the earth’s environment, as well as advocating to the university to retain popular professors denied tenure. The entire 1970 Prism reflected a bitter tone of student dissatisfaction and protest:

All those Botany 500 profs who had stemmed the tide with fancy rhetoric found their empire collapsing. All those generations of students who had talked about steak and potatoes but settled for baby food were a thing of the past.

“Who actually runs this damned place,” students began to ask, seeking the truth and getting some tired old vaudeville routines from people like Dean Nolde and his friends.

In 1967, when the student senate decided to get off its rump and do
University of Maine President Hugh Young confronting protestors outside of the door of the President’s Office. The rhetoric in the student yearbook *Prism* began to shift as students began referring to the administration as “The Control.”
something, social change was the word. Parietals were in. Curfew regulations were out. Drinking on campus was in. In loco parentis was quite definitely out. So the hierarchy admitted they would have to bend a little . . . just a little, but they would still have to bend.

. . . it was very obvious that the university was mired under by its own bureaucracy, by the inability of administrators and faculty members to relate to student needs. Very clear. And the understanding that something had to be done.

Academic freedom. It was never really the issue. Like a test of manhood, a tribal ceremony, it served to bring the chancellor and some trustees face to face with angry students who suddenly saw not men, but robots, reachable only with wrenches and screwdrivers and not with reason or emotion. The fight for academics, it was now obvious, was a losing battle, burying the need to strive for an end to the war.

The next *Prism* (1971) suggests that 1970, culminating in President Richard Nixon's invasion of Cambodia and the Kent State killings, followed by more student and civil violence than ever, had worn out the Maine student body. “The 1970-1971 academic year at the UMO left many with a feeling of helplessness.”

These student yearbooks give us a remarkable time-lapse glimpse of the sea change in student and university culture. Similarly, a look at the University of Maine’s presidents who spanned this pivotal decade reveals the challenges they faced, as well as the importance and the consequences of the steps they took to deal with those challenges. Many of those challenges—enrollment growth, budget pressures, funding, external relationships, responding to radically changing times, and student unrest—were common to the three presidents who immediately followed Arthur Hauck. Other items were unique to each presidency.

During the sixties, the university grew rapidly in enrollment and became more complex. It was said that President Hauck had known every student by name. Given his outgoing personality, and helped by the fact that his enrollment never topped about three thousand—the size of a typical high school anywhere but Maine—this claim may well have been true. The few remaining people who can give an eyewitness account of the Hauck years all describe his friendliness and benevolence to students. He presided over a long period of stability and mild growth, leading the university through the Great Depression and World War II, and emerging into a GI-Bill world that expanded higher education access as
never before. Hauck’s successor, and the university itself, was very different.

LLOYD HARTMAN ELLIOTT (UMaine President 1958-1965):

Well before Arthur Hauck’s last official day as University of Maine president, February 28, 1958, the process of selecting a successor had been underway. It was a process astonishingly different from today’s typical practice of naming a search committee, hiring a search consultant, advertising the opening widely, soliciting nominations and applications, conducting rounds of interviews, satisfying all of the affirmative-action requirements, and bringing the finalists to campus for meetings with all constituencies.

In the fall of 1957, Arthur Deering, having recently stepped down as the University of Maine’s Dean of Agriculture, was on sabbatical at Cornell University. Acting on instructions from Board of Trustees Chair Raymond Fogler, Deering dropped in uninvited and casually to visit with Cornell’s executive assistant to the president. They struck up a friendship, and Deering stopped by regularly to chat with the executive assistant. After some time passed, the Cornell administrator received a phone call from Fogler, asking if he would be willing to consider the possibility of becoming the University of Maine’s next president. The executive assistant was Lloyd Elliott, and Elliott said that he asked Fogler for a day to think about it and consult his family. The next day, Elliott returned the call and turned Fogler down flat. He was happy at Cornell, his children were in school, and he had no thoughts of changing jobs.

Fogler and Deering politely but firmly refused to take no for an answer. After months of additional friendly persuasion, they convinced Elliott to at least come to Orono and take a look over two cold and snowy days. Fogler offered the position to Elliott once again after his visit. This time he accepted. The New York Times noted the appointment occurred on February 6, 1958, and Elliott formally took the reins on July 1, 1958. Elliott reported that he did not officially meet with faculty, students, or other constituents during his visit and that Fogler handled the negotiations himself. Elliott said there was no significant board of trustees involvement, except that the appointment required their formal vote. In Elliott’s words, “[Fogler and the board] were willing to speak for all parties.”

The Elliott-Deering-Fogler triumvirate soon won many strong
friends among the faculty, which Elliott always called the “heart and soul of any university.” Elliott also devoted himself to making the university better and stronger for its students, though his style differed dramatically from Arthur Hauck’s. According to Elliott, Hauck helped students who came to his office needing money. Elliott claimed that students had gotten used to contacting the president’s office when they “ran out of money in Bermuda,” and Hauck generously wired them funds to get home. He declared that he was “not that smart” to be able to decipher which students needed what, either in the form of gifts or “loans.” Instead he referred such supplicants to the financial aid office. There is, however, no indication that he treated students with coldness or with the back of his hand. He met regularly with elected officers of student

University of Maine President Lloyd Elliott seated at the head of a conference table in May of 1965 shortly before his departure for George Washington University. Elliott, despite being hesitant to come to the University of Maine as President, quickly won over the faculty who he always called the “heart and soul” of the institute.
groups and kept his finger on the pulse of the student body, whom he defended staunchly to outside critics, always calling them “hard-working” and “well behaved.”

These outside critics were a serious barrier to Elliott’s chief agenda, to increase the state’s financial support of its land-grant university. In his words, his predecessor had been “too nice” to the legislature, having always tempered his requests, which resulted, over time, in the university being seriously underfunded—where it could not admit nearly as many applicants as were qualified to attend. Hauck, according to Elliott, had even allowed an adversarial state senator, Bob Haskell (famous as Maine’s “five-day governor” from January 2-7, 1959), to sit down with him and go over the books and identify budget reductions. Elliott denied Haskell that opportunity, and fought energetically to improve the state appropriation to the university. He reported that he and his fiscal vice president, Prescott Vose, toted up the results at the end of his seven years and found that the University of Maine had enjoyed a 525 percent increase in state appropriations over that period.7

President Elliott’s public style was at once aggressive, combatant, and diplomatic. At the outset, the legislature “challenged” (Elliott’s word) him to appear before a joint session, which he was only too happy to do. He said that he did not give a speech, but used the session as a “question and answer” exchange. A certain legislator kept asking things like, “Now Mr. President, these students of yours, why should we fund them at a higher rate?” Elliott leapt upon the phrase with a winning rejoinder: “Senator, I have only recently arrived in Maine. These are not MY students. They are YOUR students, the students of your constituents. Don’t you believe they deserve the finest education we can provide them?” Elliott reported that from that point in the session, the “questions turned in my direction,” were more and more friendly and supportive.

This joint session may have been the moment when Elliott’s approach began to get political traction. But political opportunism and antagonism remained to be reckoned with. In December, 1958, State Senator Seth Low (a Republican from Rockland) addressed the Rockland Rotary, claiming that the “low admissions standards of the university... resulted in the admission of a considerable number of students who gain little from college life other than a fairly convivial sojourn.”8 The speech gained Elliott’s attention—and concern.

His friend and adviser, Arthur Deering, counseled him to ignore
Low’s remarks and let them “blow away.” But the University of Maine’s publicity director, Howard Keyo, agreed with Elliott that the speech needed to be answered publicly, especially because they had so much evidence to the contrary. Keyo arranged for Elliott to speak at the same Rotary Club two weeks after Low’s speech, and he made sure, according to Elliott, that “every paper in Maine,” including the weeklies, would have a reporter present. Elliott also invited Senator Low to attend and sit at the dais, telling Low that he wanted the senator to be present rather than to later learn of his remarks second-hand. Low accepted.

Armed with the data assembled by Keyo and Vose, Elliott revealed that, because of Maine’s relatively low level of state appropriation, a college applicant in his or her home state of Massachusetts or Connecticut would have a “30 to 40 percent better chance of getting admitted than a Maine student applying to the University of Maine.” UMaine was, in fact, much more highly selective in admissions than the University of Massachusetts or the University of Connecticut—not because it wanted to be, but because its enrollment was held down by lack of state funding. “Tuition at the University of Maine is higher than the average for 87 other public universities. Expenditure per student for instruction is 26 percent lower than the national average for similar institutions,” reported the Lewiston Evening Journal on Elliott’s Rotary Speech. Elliott told the audience, “I’m going to fight like hell to get more students in and to get more money.”

More students did get in. UMaine’s enrollment was 3,933 the fall semester that he arrived (1958), and 5,678 in 1965 when Elliott moved on to George Washington University. State support had increased as well.

Elliott’s strategy included reaching out to citizens, parents, and leaders across the state. He not only frequently appeared before public groups, but when he did, he made a point of bringing a trustee or two, which had the twofold advantage of demonstrating that the board was with him and helping keep the board itself informed of his talking points. He also told me of his frequent visits to local reading clubs. He said he met them “as an old English teacher,” engaged them over their reading, and filled them in on goings on at the state’s land-grant university. Since the women who predominated in these groups were often also parents, the effect on enrollment was positive.

Elliott’s involvement in the student turmoil of the sixties appears to be minimal at the University of Maine, where students were not very active during his tenure. He said that, other than a few incidents along Fra-
ternity Row, there was little such activity. He also reported that he “and the faculty never got crosswise with each other.” Only after he moved on to George Washington University did Elliott face the fierier nature of student/faculty/administrative confrontations in the 1960s. There he faced opposition from faculty who were unhappy that an inside candidate was passed over in his favor. However, he weathered the initially strong student and faculty protest to his hiring and went on to serve for twenty-three years. When he finally retired, press accounts lauded his work to transform George Washington University from a “sleepy commuter college” into a prominent urban university.

On the academic side, Elliott reported that the University of Maine established few if any new academic programs during his otherwise expansionist administration. The increased state funding was used to strengthen existing programs across the board, “from Pulp and Paper to English,” as Elliott put it. Nor did funded research see much expansion. Chemical engineering (pulp and paper) and agriculture were essentially the only programs that enjoyed federal financial support for research. Elliott, here again, blamed lack of state funding. “We had no matching funds with which to attract research dollars,” he said, making it a “chicken and egg” issue. Not until 1998, with the establishment of the Maine Economic Improvement Fund (MEIF), would the state provide a financial chicken to produce the research eggs. Moreover, Maine seemed always to have had influential politicians vehemently opposed to accepting any kind of federal money. Elliott’s nemesis, Bangor Hydro Chief Executive Officer and State Senator Bob Haskell, was such a person. So, although Elliott came to Maine from Cornell, a research powerhouse and sister land-grant university, expanded research funding was not in the cards for the University of Maine at this time.

Also not part of Elliott’s significantly transitional presidency, but waiting in the wings, was the consolidation of public higher education in Maine into a “system.” This idea began to take political shape from 1965 to 1967, when a state commission, headed by Bowdoin President James “Spike” Coles, met and eventually drew up plans for creating what would become the “University of Maine,” appropriating the name of Maine’s land-grant university and making Orono but one campus of the new entity. Elliott was aware of those conversations before he left UMaine and discussed the concept with Coles. Elliott said he argued against the creation of the system, because of what he predicted would be deleterious effects on the land-grant flagship university. He was aware of similar consolidations that had taken place in New York and else-
University of Maine President Lloyd Elliot escorting President of the United States John F. Kennedy to an October 1963 ceremony where he received an honorary degree. This visit occurred five weeks before Kennedy’s assassination in Dallas, Texas.
where and felt that such reorganizations weakened the lead universities and inevitably brought them down toward the level of the smaller ones, rather than elevating those more modest institutions. He argued with Coles, who according to Elliott, “would have none of it.” Looking back from 2007, with the advantage of hindsight and history, Elliott’s views remained unchanged. “From grapevine reports,” he said, he feared that “the predicted leveling had taken place,” although he also remarked that “it had taken . . . years for Orono to come back.” Elliott said that he felt that a coordinating commission, rather than a governing board, should have been established. The newly-constituted UMaine System Board of Trustees, like its parallels in other states, took assets away from the leading institutions in order to assist the smaller ones. Elliott felt that pressure to do this essentially always led system boards and system chief executive officers inadvertently to promote mediocrity by giving in to that pressure. “Nothing has persuaded me,” he stated firmly in 2007, “that this is the way to go. The practice of system mongering is never as good as the theory.”

A bittersweet memory of Elliott’s time in Maine, for all concerned, was the October 1963 appearance of President John F. Kennedy, barely five weeks before his assassination in Dallas, Texas. Elliott remembers (and sixteen-millimeter color footage confirms) that this was a beautiful fall day, the kind that seemingly only Maine can conjure up. Kennedy came to Maine to visit Passamaquoddy at the invitation of Senator Edmund Muskie and was hosted at the University of Maine by Maine’s senior senator Margaret Chase Smith and Governor John Reed.10 According to Elliott, those three quarreled over who would introduce the president, and he—Elliott—settled the dispute by introducing Kennedy himself. The ceremony at the football field, during which President Kennedy received an honorary degree, was remembered as an extraordinarily warm and special moment, permanently fixed and glazed in time by the later November tragedy. According to Elliott, “everyone loved” the president’s “perfectly wonderful and non-political speech about the charm, attraction, and strength of the American Northeast.”


Upon the departure of Lloyd Elliot, the University of Maine turned to a native son who had made a name for himself in Wisconsin. H. Edwin Young (1917-2012), born in Newfoundland and raised in northern
Maine, earned bachelor’s (1940) and master’s (1942) degrees from the University of Maine in economics. He went on for his doctorate at the University of Wisconsin and became a member of UW’s economics faculty in 1947, rising to the rank of full professor by 1955. In 1962, he became UW’s dean of Arts and Sciences, and the University of Maine celebrated his achievement by awarding him an honorary doctorate in 1963.

Thus he was clearly on the University of Maine’s radar when they went looking for a president to succeed Elliott in 1965. Young gladly accepted Maine’s offer and became his alma mater’s new leader October 1 of that year. Young’s inauguration downplayed the pomp and ceremony of the occasion, and established an academic colloquium, which encapsulated the installation event itself. The colloquium’s theme was “The Tensions of our Times” and featured a number of nationally distinguished scholars, including superstar literary theorist Northrop Frye.

If this entry were about Edwin Young at the University of Wisconsin, it would be voluminous and dramatic. There he earned his PhD in economics and joined the faculty, quickly earning an international reputa-
tion as a scholar of New Deal economics. He was promoted to full professor a mere five years after earning his doctorate and named dean of one of the nation’s largest and most prestigious colleges of letters and sciences only a few years later. He then went back to Maine as president—essentially “on loan” or “in training” as it turned out—only to return to Wisconsin in 1968. Technically he returned as a “vice president,” but, within about two months, Young was named Chancellor of the University of Wisconsin-Madison.12

Extant documents tell us little of Edwin Young’s presidential years in Orono. He faced in Maine the same matters that would concern him in Wisconsin. Student confrontations and protests were just beginning in Maine then, but were a growing phenomenon. In the student prose about the administration in the University of Maine’s yearbook, *Prism*, the Elliot years continued to reflect student respect for administrators. During the Young administration, *Prism* referred to leaders as “rarely seen” individuals who struggled to balance conflicting concerns. That same 1968 *Prism* noted that Young was moving on to “greener pastures,” wryly suggesting that he was leaving the hardscrabble environment of Maine for a better opportunity.

War and mild student protest was only part of the apprenticeship Young served in Maine. His tenure in Maine placed him in the midst of the birth pangs of the new statewide system, allowing him to see a “movie” that would ironically come back for a rerun when he returned to Wisconsin. It was Young’s lot to serve as the head of the Orono campus, known until 1969 as “The University of Maine,” while the state was in the process of creating a different “University of Maine.”

**President Young and the Creation of the University System:**

Although we know little about Edwin Young’s role in the creation of the system, an event that was to have a profound effect on the University of Maine’s future, it did occur during his presidency, and he *did* play a role. When Lloyd Elliott departed for George Washington University in 1965, the University of Maine System was but a dream of influential Mainers. We noted Elliott’s conversation with Bowdoin president, James Coles, who had, in the spring of 1965, just been named to head the Advisory Commission for the Higher Education Study, and their disagreement about what should be done. Some observers even claim that Young left the Maine presidency *because of* the consolidation. By the time Ed-
win Young departed for Madison in 1968, Maine’s University System was a done deal. The “consolidation” took place on his watch.

Young was in fact a member of that “Advisory Commission”—often referred to as the “Coles Commission.” What he did or said and how he acted as a member is not well documented. However, what the commission itself recommended was a far better arrangement for the Orono campus than the consolidation that emerged from the subsequent legislation. Thus the work Young himself participated in, had it not been altered, was something he himself might have favored. The initial legislation creating the commission, enacted March 30, 1965, directed it to study higher education “access” and mentioned nothing more, stating: “Whereas a study should be immediately instituted to the end that no qualified Maine youth should be denied the opportunity for higher education.” This limitation did not stop the commission from broadening its mission well beyond mere “access.”

The Coles Commission members, primarily state officials and the heads of educational units likely to be affected by consolidation, were “The President of the University of Maine, the Commissioner of Education, the Commissioner of Economic Development, . . . a president of a teachers college, a president of a private college, a principal of a vocational-technical institute, a member of the Governor’s Advisory Committee on Education, an executive of a junior college, a member of the House of Representatives, a member of the Senate, a representative from industry and a representative from labor.” The Commission began work in 1965 and finished in January, 1967 with a report to the governor and the legislature. It began by contracting with an outside consulting group, the Academy for Educational Development (AED). The AED had been formed in 1961 and still maintains a website today, although its mission has been completely redefined. By 1963, according to James Libby, AED was already “a well-known national nonprofit organization.”

The AED, in turn, formed a consultant panel, led by James A. McCain, president of Kansas State University, and including six other highly regarded educational leaders from across the nation. It also subcontracted with six other experts to provide data, analysis, and suggestions. Its formal report to the Coles Commission arrived in September, 1966, a 125-page report entitled, THE FIRST BUSINESS OF OUR TIMES: A Report to the Advisory Commission for the Higher Education Study, State of Maine (September 30, 1966).

This AED report itself was a remarkable document. It served as both a blueprint and a road map for creating a higher education system in the
state of Maine that, had it been followed fully and completely, could have made Maine the envy of the nation for the comprehensive excellence of its higher education institutions and programs. Exquisitely researched and compellingly written, it identified Maine’s higher education shortcomings and proposed a comprehensive solution. It does not mince words: “as good as Maine’s system of higher education has been for the needs of the past, the Consultant Panel does not believe that the present organization and structure of this system is adequate either for the present or the future.” It presents an extremely long list of the alleged failings of Maine’s status quo:

Enrollment on one- and two-year programs of a terminal or transfer nature is surprisingly low.

In public institutions nearly one-third of enrollment in four-year programs is for teacher education.

Graduate and professional enrollment is 3 per cent of total; nationally this figure is 10 per cent.

The full-time enrollment in Maine higher education institutions represents 15 per cent of the 18 to 24 year-olds in the state of Maine. The national average . . . is 20 per cent.

Today confusion in vocational and technical education pervades every aspect of this important program area.

A diversity of quality post-secondary two-year technical and vocational programs is a seriously underdeveloped aspect of higher education in Maine.

Enrollment projections by the vocational-technical institutes for 1970 and 1975 are unrealistically low. . . . On the other hand, the criteria used in the State Department of Education’s recent proposal . . . employs questionable criteria which could result in too many centers with enrollment much too small to support solid curriculum offerings.

. . . Many substantive programs are possible in career areas which are not related to just heavy and light industry or agriculture. In California, over 100 different associate-degree programs, (i.e.) in health, education, social work, business, . . . food services, and government service. . .

In 1928 (the former last time such a statewide study was carried out) a serious shortage of graduate education in the state was recognized. . . . Efforts to improve the situation were slow to materialize. From 1923, when the Division of Graduate Study was established at the University of Maine, to the present, a total of 29 PhDs have been awarded in the state of Maine, the first in 1960.
Graduate training for social work is not provided in Maine.

Maine ranks 48th among the states in the preparation of doctorates and last among the states in the proportion of its citizens who seek graduate education.

Among the New England states, Maine has the highest percentage of faculty members who have obtained only the bachelor’s degree and the next to lowest percentage of faculty who have obtained the doctorate of highest professional degree in their field.

More time should be spent on research. . . (The University of Maine) should be producing 90 to 100 PhDs per year.

There is a serious absence of graduate programs in science and engineering for the benefit of the employees of manufacturing plants in the state’s southern industrial center.

We could find little evidence in Maine which would suggest that institutions were familiar with the many approaches to better utilization of faculty and facilities, let alone examples of serious efforts to employ them.

The state of Maine today has a serious shortage of qualified teachers and administrators to staff the public schools.

(Of the state colleges) Only Farmington and Gorham State Colleges, which have regional and NCATE accreditation, have received approval for secondary teacher-education programs. Of the three other state colleges, each very small, only Aroostook State College seems likely to receive regional accreditation in the foreseeable future.

. . . because special attention will have to be given to strengthening many aspects of public higher education, costs of providing educational programs will be considerably higher than estimates by the institutions suggest they might be.

To be average for the nation today with respect to organized research, Maine’s institutions of higher education should in toto be spending $10 million or about four times what they are now spending for research.

In 1961-62, for the nation as a whole, state and local funds for the support of education programs in public institutions averaged 67.9 per cent of the total. In Maine, for the same year, only 44 per cent of education program expenses were covered by state and local funds. Only two states had poorer records.

In 1965 state expenditures for public institutions of higher education in Maine . . . amounted to $20 per capita of population. In the same year, 31 states spent over $40 per capita for public higher education, and only nine states spent less than Maine.
The Consultant Panel believes that Maine has the resources and can afford the expenditures which will be required. The Consultant Panel suspects, however, that few people in the state of Maine fully appreciate the time, money, stress, initiative, and imagination required to build a strong institution, let alone a cohesive and comprehensive system of public higher education.

The AED consultant panel thus identified, in vivid and clear-eyed terms, many serious deficiencies in Maine higher education. It also provided detailed advice on how to overcome those deficiencies. Central to all the advice was the creation of a single state system of higher education, which would incorporate all public institutions, the vocational-technical schools, the Maritime Academy, the state colleges, the University of Maine, and all the branches and outreach centers across the state. Also of importance to the panel was closer cooperation and coordination with private colleges and universities. Equally as central was the message that Maine would only get what it paid for. Excellence—or even mere adequacy—was going to cost the state money, but the expenditure would be, in the report’s view, well worth it.

Although the Coles Commission incorporated virtually all of the AED’s recommendations in its own October 31, 1966 draft report, which emerged as a trial balloon, one significant aspect of the AED’s proposed plan had already been axed: AED recommended that the new consolidated system be constructed on the foundation of the University of Maine itself. The University of Maine’s Board of Trustees, expanded from ten to fifteen members, would have become the governing board of the new system, with the Orono campus as the foundation. That one critical item became the first victim as the process of politicization began chipping away at the grand scheme envisioned by the AED consulting panel.

This October 31 trial balloon was entitled *HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE STATE OF MAINÉ, Tentative Report of the ADVISORY COMMISSION OF THE HIGHER EDUCATION STUDY*. Where the AED report was 125 pages long, the commission draft ran thirty-three double-spaced pages, typewritten; the final (January 14, 1967) version ran twenty-three single-spaced pages, printed. The draft explained its relative brevity by referring interested readers to the original AED report. Most notably omitted from the October commission draft were the many indictments of Maine’s educational shortcomings listed above, as well as its elaborate and detailed plea for a more robust state investment. In other words, the commission became the first entity to say in effect,
“yes, we like the idea of a higher education system, but we are not eager to pay for it.”

The October draft made recommendations almost identical to the AED report, with one exception that was highly significant to the University of Maine itself. Whereas the AED called for all higher education units to be consolidated under the University of Maine and its existing board, the Coles Commission in October called instead for a brand-new board of trustees to oversee all of higher education in Maine, calling the consolidation a brand-new university: “The University of the State of Maine.” The University of Maine was to be one unit belonging to the University of the State of Maine. To be sure, it would be the only “university” belonging to the new “university,” an awkward concept in itself. All the other units would be colleges and schools located in various parts of the state, and only three (Gorham, Farmington, and Presque Isle) would be four-year “colleges.” Machias and Fort Kent were to offer two-year programs only, as would the proposed “university community centers” at Portland, Auburn, Augusta, and Bangor (the “Dow” campus). However, the draft still called for the inclusion of the Maine Maritime Academy and Vocational-Technical education.

The discussion period (November-December, 1966) included meetings with a long list of stakeholders—mostly governing boards and leaders of Maine higher education institutions, as well as government committees. These are listed in the commission’s final report, which, significantly, does not mention any public forums or meetings with faculty or student groups. Subsequently, the final REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMISSION FOR THE HIGHER EDUCATION STUDY went to Governor Kenneth M. Curtis and the Maine State Legislature on January 14, 1967. While it was dressed up by a formal print job and a great deal of editing, its essence and most of its language came verbatim from the original AED report.

The January report cited the legislature’s “dissatisfaction with the situation as it presently exists” and listed major shortcomings in Maine higher education, including low rates of postsecondary attendance, the state’s failure to invest in higher education, its failure to seek federal research funding, the always-popular indictment of “duplication of services,” and predictions of an oncoming tidal wave of students. The report, like the October draft, proposed the establishment of “The University of the State of Maine,” which would include “all existing public higher education institutions in the State of Maine, including the University, the five State Colleges, the four Vocational-Technical Institutes, the Mar-
itime Academy, and any branches, campuses, or schools maintained by any of these institutions and any future public higher education institutions which might be established.” Among the most salient recommendations were as follows:

These units and their assets should be transferred to the trustees of the University of the State of Maine on July 1, 1968.

The new University was to have a board of 15 members, who would appoint the university’s “President,” to whom campus CEOs—chancellors, provosts, and deans (depending on size and scope of unit) would report.

All Maine citizens shall be considered eligible for the benefits of higher education.

The Board of trustees would be responsible for creating a “Master Plan” for Maine higher education.

The Board would develop a “division of responsibility” for all units.

All campus/unit heads would report to the President, who would be the one responsible for all communication with the governor and legislature on matters of budget.

All faculty members at these units would be considered faculty of the University of the State of Maine.

At least 90% of Mainers should be within 40 miles of at least a two-year college education.

There would be “full transferability of credits.”

(In spite of greater centralization and consolidation) there should also be “greater autonomy for individual campuses.”

Greatly increase research for economic development, especially in the southern part of state.

Encourage industry by creating high tech work force
Oversee all teacher preparation (including cooperative arrangements with private institutions.)

In keeping with the thrust of the AED report, the Coles Commission’s January report called upon the state itself to step up and provide much more adequate funding, stating: “The legislature should anticipate making a substantially higher commitment of state revenues in the future to the support of public higher education programs.”

Higher faculty salaries
Improvement of libraries
Strengthening graduate and professional programs, and research
Increased support of economic development
Strengthening vocational-technical education
Planning
Accommodate increased enrollment
“Make maximum use of Federal funds available.” The State should provide matching funds (“initially and on a continuing basis”).

“Immediate and adequate public support by the state of Maine for scholarships, fellowships, and student loans.”

While Elliott and other University of Maine presidents were on record expressing a preference for a “coordinating” board rather than a “governing” board, Young, a member of the Coles Commission, voiced no public dissent. He may have wanted the positive items among the recommendations: dramatic increases in funding to boost faculty salaries, improved libraries, and building the facilities that could accommodate the expected tidal wave of new students, and to be more aggressive in pursuing federal funding and engaging in research. The effects of a fully implemented plan and fully-funded university system could have been extremely good for the state and also beneficial to its flagship (and at the time, its only) university. On the other hand, it was also possible that Young saw the handwriting on the wall, and was by January already planning his escape back to Wisconsin.

More to the point, the differences between what the commission proposed and what the state created were stark, although it took several years for the full array of consequences to emerge. Whereas the AED report was a comprehensive blueprint and road map to educational excel-
lence, the state legislature treated it instead as an *a la carte* menu, picking and choosing the appetizers they would order and even determining how little they wished to spend. These menu choices emerged in the form of State Statutes, Chapter 229, “An ACT Relating to Coordination of Public Higher Education” (passed in the house on 1/22/68, the senate on 1/25/68 and signed into law on 1/29/68).

The vocational-technical schools and the Maritime Academy wanted no part of membership in this consolidated system, and they had the political clout to opt out. They managed to work the legislature to do so before the bill was passed. Hence, they are not even mentioned in the act. The higher education system that was created, therefore, included only six entities: “University of Maine, Gorham State College, Farmington State College, Aroostook State College, Washington State College, and Fort Kent State College.” While the act never actually gave a name to the new system, it consistently refers to the newly created system as “the university,” and declared, for example, that the state colleges would be given new names such as, “Aroostook State College of the University of Maine.” It does not, however, make them branch campuses of what was until this point known as the “University of Maine.” The implication was clear. The University of Maine was having its name commandeered by the state and given over to the newly-created system. The resolve did not state what the statewide land-grant university headquartered in Orono would henceforth be called. The Coles Commission had deftly avoided this slight to the flagship by calling its proposed new system “The University of the State of Maine.” A name such as “The University System of Maine,” would also have avoided this slight.15

More substantively, discussion around the consolidation issue boasted that the smaller campuses would be raised in quality to that of the University of Maine, but said nothing of increasing the excellence and stature of the land-grant university itself. The very leveling and mediocrization that Elliott predicted was already underway. The act itself appropriated $103,700 “to carry out the purposes of this act.” Even in 1968, $103,700 would not even have been sufficient to establish and staff a system office (which the resolve said was to be located in Augusta). To be fair, however, appropriations to the new system did grow significantly during its first years. A report issued by the University of Maine System in 2011 lists Fiscal Year 1968 state appropriation to the system as $17,058,403. By Fiscal Year 1976 it had increased to $36,468,544.

Even though enrollment growth estimates verged on mind-bog-
gling, the entire process failed to take into account (or even imagine) the large numbers of older, place-bound “non-traditional” students who would in fact become the primary constituency of the regional campuses. From the legislation creating the commission, to the commission itself, to the consolidation act, the language repeatedly refers to the “youth of Maine,” who would be served. From the beginning, and certainly today, many of the campuses not located in Orono had great difficulty maintaining a critical mass of students without the degree-seeking working adults who depend on them for educational opportunities.

The most significant changes between the initial report and the new university system as actually created were the exemption of the Maritime Academy and vocational-technical schools from the consolidation, the change from consolidating all units under the existing University of Maine and instead creating a new entity, which appropriated the University of Maine’s name.

The creation of a new governing board and the appointment of a new system chief executive officer (“chancellor”) established a new dynamic that altered the course of events in Maine higher education. James Libby’s book, Super U, states that, “It was the final compromise state legislation that led to a unified University of Maine System that drew the interest of [Donald] McNeil, a rising administrator in the Wisconsin public higher education system,” and who became Maine’s first university-system chancellor. While the legislation had called for the system office to be located in Augusta, the new Board of Trustees compromised again in order to land McNeil, allowing him to establish the new system office in Portland, so that he could live in nearby Cape Elizabeth. Within months of the passage of Chapter 229, Young accepted the offer to return to Wisconsin as vice president. A few months later, he became chancellor of the University of Wisconsin’s Madison campus.

Winthrop Libby (UMaine President July 1, 1968-August 1, 1973):

When H. Edwin Young returned to Madison for a future that proved even more turbulent than he could have imagined, the University of Maine turned inward rather than outward for its next president, and yet picked someone who had much in common with him. Like Young, Winthrop Libby hailed from what Mainers call “The County” (Aroostook County). He too was an economist (an agricultural one) who earned his bachelor’s and master’s degrees at Orono. Like Deering and
Elliott, he also spent time at Cornell. Libby was head of the University of Maine’s Agricultural Experiment Station when he was tapped in July to serve as acting president. The interim appointment became permanent when the new board of trustees convened in April, 1969. The years that followed also proved similar for Young and Libby. Both weathered the height of the student protest era, enduring savage verbal attacks from their young adversaries. Both were in the flagship leadership seat when their campuses were engulfed by a larger entity. And, in the end, both received glowing encomiums when the tumult was over. Both retired much loved and respected by those who knew them.

A nation bitterly divided by issues of war and race and, in the minds of some, close to outright revolution, fought many of its battles on college campuses. Orono was hardly immune, though, in general, the protests were far less violent than at places like Berkeley, Madison, Columbia, and ultimately Kent State. Academic year 1969-1970 proved the most difficult for campus administrators, featuring controversies over student rights (e.g., residence hall rules, alcohol on campus, and partici-
pation in campus governance). It was a year when students rose up to defend popular professors threatened with dismissal by the administration. Collective emotions hit the boiling point often during that year. Libby consistently worked to remind everyone what the university was about—an academic institution dedicated to the rational quest for truth. He did his very best to be the peacemaker, and he generally prevailed, but not without moments of institutional collapse. At least twice (September and March), he called for, and got, two-day moratoriums in the hubbub. Still the crises kept returning.

A memorable moment occurred when antiwar protesters, with undergraduate student Stephen King among those leading the way, went to the President’s House with the avowed goal of burning it down. King himself has narrated the story of what happened. President Libby met the crowd at the door and invited its leaders to come in and talk. It was friendly and productive. Libby showed his humane genuineness and participated in a frank and sympathetic discussion of the crowd’s concerns. While the leaders remained adamantly antiwar, in spite of their original determination to burn the house to show the world how strongly they felt, they backed away from this act, and the demonstration ended peacefully. One eyewitness account stated:

In 1970 students stormed his house screaming about strikes. He came to his porch and it was obvious that he was hurt. He wanted to listen to us, to talk about Kent State. And all we did was scream at him. (The Movement vs. the Establishment). Finally a small group sat down with him and while the masses yelled away all the good jargon they had ever learned, Win listened, he argued, and finally an agreement was made and UMO held a two-day moratorium to try to put the pieces together.18

This one anecdote, repeated variously by a number of former students who witnessed it, encapsulates Libby’s leadership qualities. He understood and sympathized with the passions that drove so many in those difficult days. He dealt with anger and outrage over many concerns: the war, racial and ethnic inequality, damage to the environment, university politics and infighting, the birth pangs of the new university system. None of these issues was the subject of mere academic and rational discussion. All were flashpoints for conflict and even violence. The university was often the battleground, even though it was seldom responsible for the problem. Libby proved to be the right person to play this most difficult of roles.
When Libby retired in 1973, he was universally celebrated for his exceptional work. Even those who had shaken their fists at him recognized his efforts and acknowledged his achievements. Graduating senior, Patricia “Trish” Riley, then president of student government, wrote these words in her *Prism* tribute to Libby:

In 1969, the first year of the Libby administration, we entered UMO with dreams and aspirations that have since been twisted, deadened, forgotten, revitalized, and sometimes achieved. . .. Throughout it all, Win Libby is leaving, and once more we rally to the group, to the slogan (“This Win is our loss”), to the cause (“do it for Win”). President Libby has retained his compassion and his sensitivity to people despite his role as administrator. His five years were riddled with an intense student upheaval and a national mood that something was very wrong with the higher education. Win Libby believed in us, he listened to our dreams and horrors—he shared it all. He moved with us without losing touch with the community or the faculty. He broke down the myth of the untouchable administrator by refusing to accept the role. By his strength, he made the title secondary to the person.19

A Brave New Academic World: Membership in the “Super-University”:

Winthrop Libby was the first University of Maine president to report to a chief executive officer rather than to his own governing board. This change was anything but inconsequential. While Libby handled the usual administrative matters of the university and dealt with several years of campus turmoil, the newly formed university system (The “University of Maine”) was busy getting its act together. Governor Curtis appointed a new board of trustees. A Wisconsin press release on December 13, 1968 first announced University of Wisconsin Extension Chancellor David McNeil’s appointment as the first chancellor of the University of Maine System. McNeil did not arrive until sometime early in 1969, but the act said the consolidation was to take place thirty days after its effective date. People must have been scurrying to get the basics done. At least one source says that Winthrop Libby served as the executive head of the new entity before McNeil arrived. Although this makes sense, it remains unconfirmed.

McNeil’s appointment was not only announced December 13, 1968, it was *effective* that same day. First, there was the debate and negotiation about the location of the office. McNeil wanted Portland and got it. Space needed to be located, staff hired, and equipment purchased. Even
though the consolidation legislation had been in place through much of 1968, the last-minute decision as to office location must have created a mad scramble.

Don McNeil’s paper credentials made him appear to be the ideal candidate. He was a war hero with liberal arts degrees from University of Washington (BA) and University of Wisconsin (MA and PhD), served as Wisconsin President Fred Harvey Harrington’s right-hand man, and was named by Harrington as the chancellor of the statewide University of Wisconsin Extension. The first extension leader not to be an agricultur-alist, he made university extension far more than agricultural extension. It was a full realization of the famous “Wisconsin Idea,” that “the Boundaries of the Campus are the Boundaries of the State.” Thus, McNeil already handled a major statewide consolidation and, by all accounts, had done it well. However, Edmund Cronon and John Jenkins’ history of the University of Wisconsin suggests that McNeil had seemed detached from the extension work, leaving the tasks to others, and traveled to Africa during the fall semester before signing on with Maine.20

The hasty organizational work to create a system administration from the typewriters and file cabinets up must have been dizzying (bringing to mind the image of building an airplane while it is in flight); and, all the while, McNeil recognized the need to focus on broad strategic thinking. The interesting thing, writ large, about Maine’s higher education strategy and action in the late 1960s was that, again and again, extensive and soundly researched reports had told Maine officials essentially the same thing. From our twenty-first century viewpoint, they sound like Greek oracles or the chorus of a Greek tragedy. To paraphrase the consistent message:

Maine is a geographically large state with a small population and a modest economy. Its people are distributed (albeit unevenly) across all that geography, but concentrate mainly in two areas. There is a critical need for improved access to higher education and its benefits. Fiscal reality, though, dictates careful planning and frugal (though vastly expanded) investment. Therefore, vocational, liberal, and cultural education need to be consolidated in comprehensive community colleges that must be located within reach of all Mainers. Four year universities (one or two offering graduate degrees) should be few in number and geographically distributed.

The AED Report brought this message, and, for the most part, the Coles Commission echoed it. But politics had dismembered key elements of these clear recommendations. The legislature had exempted vocational-
technical education as well as the Maritime Academy from the consolidation, leaving only six named entities in what was supposed to be a statewide consolidation, and essentially ruling out the possibility of true comprehensive community colleges.

In the spring of 1969, Chancellor McNeil commissioned yet another group to report on the same subject. This time, it was a group of respected citizens that became known as the Higher Education Planning Commission (HEPC). It soon reported:

While we have some educators in our group, we are basically a cross-section of the citizenry, our twenty-eight members coming from many walks of life. Our role is to build upon the Coles Report, to face concrete problems in the light of that report’s statement of goals. Accordingly, we have not hired outside consultants but have relied on University staff, the experience of our members, and our discussions with education officials, groups, and administrators.

This commission focused mainly on two thorny issues: two-year post-secondary education and the missions of the various units of the newly-formed system. Their conclusions were remarkably similar to those of the AED and the Coles Commission. Again they called for unification of two-year university centers and the vocational-technical schools into one statewide set of comprehensive community colleges. As for the larger units, the HEPC said there should be four, four-year university “centers”: a comprehensive one without graduate education in the north (Presque Isle), two that would develop graduate and research agendas (the land-grant university in Orono, and a four-year university center emerging from the confluence of several campuses and the law school in the South), plus an undergraduate college in Farmington that would develop liberal-arts programs to support its primary function of teacher preparation. Machias, Fort Kent, and Augusta would remain two-year institutions of a community college nature, emphasizing associate degrees for transfer, vocational training, and community enrichment. A telling statistic revealed by the HEPC reveals that the state’s leaders needed to know: “Maine exceeds California by two percentage points in four-year college enrollments per 100,000 population. By contrast, California’s enrollment per 100,000 in institutions offering less than four years of college work exceeds Maine’s comparable record by more than 1100%.”

There it was in stark numbers. Maine had not stepped up to serve its
widely distributed population by creating community colleges that were within geographical and monetary reach of everyone, but had attempted to create more expensive and generally tiny four-year colleges (soon to be “universities”) that neither the students nor the state could afford. California had found the answer and demonstrated proof of concept. The commission had shown Maine this better way. Did the state listen? Did Chancellor McNeil’s new board of trustees listen? Sadly, no. A month after the advisory commission report, the board of trustees issued its own report to the governor, the legislature, and the state. It did not echo the commission’s call for integrating the vocational-technical schools and the two-year centers into comprehensive community colleges. Instead, in language that has become hackneyed in the world of such reports, it stated, “We resolve that steps be taken to bring the University and the VTI’s (Vocational-Technical Institutes) into a closer relationship and that there be further study by the Board of Education and the Board of Trustees.” As for differentiated missions, the following were listed:

We resolve that Fort Kent State College be a four-year campus of the university. . . .
We resolve that Washington State College be a four-year campus of the university. . . .
We resolve that Aroostook State College be a four-year campus of the university. . . .
We resolve that Farmington State College be a four-year college of the university. . . .

To be sure, there were codicils that specified the ways in which their missions would differ a bit. But the opportunity to structure the system more along the lines of California’s master plan was gone forever. No comprehensive community colleges were established; instead, four four-year colleges (soon to be five and soon all to be named “universities” in spite of their three-figure enrollments) became the norm.

The commission’s text acknowledges that, “We would have wished more time even for this first part of our work. We would have liked to be able to say that we had talked with everyone who had something to say on these problems. But further delay in setting new directions would have meant a year irrevocably lost for many young people.” As it turns out, that extra time might have worked wonders for future generations, even if it was (and “if” is the operative word) costly to that year’s
prospects. On the other hand, given the state’s record, more time might well not have achieved a better result. Witness the next shoe dropped near the end of the forty-seven-page document: “The Commission recognizes that its recommendations will be controversial. It suggests, therefore, that the Chancellor of the University of Maine should seek out comments and reactions from individuals and groups who are most directly concerned.” In light of what followed, one has to wonder whether there was a hint of schadenfreud in the recommendation.

To be fair to the commission, the chancellor, and the board of trustees, the proverbial toothpaste had little chance of returning to the tube. Subsequent events at the Machias campus demonstrated this.

In September 1952 Washington State Normal School became Washington State Teachers College, a four-year granting institution. . . . The first Bachelor of Science degree was conferred in June of 1953. . . . In the late 1950’s enrollment began to grow rapidly. . . . From a low of eighty-five students in 1956-57, the enrollment grew to one hundred forty-three in 1959-60. The campus realized not only new construction but also program expansion. In 1959 the State Board of Education authorized the college to develop a Business Education curriculum for the preparation of teachers for secondary schools. The first Business Education students entered Washington State Teachers’ College in September, 1960. . . . More changes for the campus came through legislative action. In 1965 the Maine State Legislature authorized the five state teachers’ colleges to remove the word “Teachers” from their names, and Washington State Teachers College became Washington State College. . . . During this period enrollment continued to spiral (sic). In fall of 1963 two hundred eighty-nine students were enrolled, but by the fall of 1969, the enrollment was four hundred.21

Given these facts, no one familiar with educational politics was surprised by what occurred on December 2, 1969, when Chancellor McNeil, presumably following up on his commission’s advice, arrived in Machias to “seek out comments and reactions” on the recommendation to return Machias to two-year status. Maine Sunday Telegram writer William Williamson recorded the events in an article entitled “‘Twas Hot Night in Machias for UM Chancellor” (December 7, 1969).

Nearly 2,000 of those residents (Washington County) jammed and squeezed into the college auditorium and several classrooms . . . Dr. McNeil had come to get the response of area residents to the Higher Education Planning Commission (HEP) report, and he got it. Wash-
ington County treated the whole business as a gigantic insult, and responded as a united block. For the first time in recorded county history, white men cheered as Indians spoke, and vice versa. As WSC Professor George Thurston . . . suggested, the HEP proposal had such a unifying effect as to cause ‘the lion to lie down with the lamb, and the Rotary now agree with the Lions, the Baptists with the Congregationalists, Machias with Calais, students with faculty, politicians with voters, and even the Democrats with the Republicans.

The meeting opened with several minutes of standing ovation for (campus) President Lincoln Sennett. This ovation; the series of ten minute speeches from the community members, faculty, administration, and students; and the one-minute testimonies of legislators illustrated such support that Dr. McNeil on December 18 recommended to the board of trustees that Machias remain a four year campus.22

Doubtless Dr. McNeil heard similar comments and reactions throughout the state in the month that intervened between the commission report and the board’s report to the state. The politics of higher education seemed to include a ratchet phenomenon that allows institutions to move in only one direction, regardless of actual circumstances. Universities never became colleges. Four-year institutions never reverted to two-year status. And woe betide the politician who sought to eliminate any institution once established. Enrollm ents may decline, budgets may be cut, reputations may collapse, but the name and official status of an educational institution only moved upward.

Structure was one matter—and we see how far short of the planning vision the actual structure came to be. Funding was another. Again the committees, commissions, and leading administrators had all come to the same conclusion: doing higher education in Maine was going to cost money—a lot more money than Mainers were used to committing to the cause. No one tried to hide this reality in messages to the governor and legislature. One governor at least—Kenneth Curtis—truly seemed to understand the size of the investment in capital and operating expenses it took to realize the ambition of keeping Maine competitive with the rest of the country when it came to higher education. The stakes were high. He knew that only with sufficient investment and wise financial decisions could Maine hope to elevate its higher education system. With the politicization of key structural decisions such as whether a college was two-year or four-year, the state was already spending money unwisely before it even raised an allocation or a bond issue. Keeping the vocational-technical system out of the mix was expensive and counterproductive.
It appears the vocational-technical leaders never had the least interest in such amalgamation. Their fears of being swallowed up and becoming deprived stepchildren of a more “elite” university system perhaps had some basis. But that merger was critical to the vision of enhanced higher education in Maine; and failure to push through even a shotgun wedding was bleeding the state’s money even without enhanced allocations. The Maritime Academy involved, perhaps, some different issues. It is worth pointing out, though, that California had a fine Maritime Academy that became part of the California State University System with no apparent ill effects.

Kenneth Curtis (in office 1967-1975) proved to be a most supportive governor. Under his administration, a fair amount of the needed increase in operating money began to flow. In 1972, Bangor Daily News Reporter Richard Hertz summed up the good and bad news regarding UMS funding in the early years of the “Super-U:”

State support for the University of Maine the year of the merger, 1967-68, was $15 million; in the next four years it went up to $22.3 million, $24.8 million, and 26.2 million. For 1972-73 state support is projected at $27.1 million. . . . state subsidy per student went from $1,283 in 67-68 to $1,346 for 72-73.

In the first year of the merger, the legislature increased support 21% to $1,424 per student in what many regard as the heyday of education. Then campus disorder and tax revolt swept the country and the state and the lawmakers felt the pinch. . . .

Another indication of legislative reluctance toward the university may be seen in the decreasing percentage of money granted, compared with money requested.

The biennium before the merger, the lawmakers gave the university $500,000 more than asked for; but in the three subsequent legislatures, the university got $700,000 and $1.5 million, and $24 million cut from budget requests. 23

On the equally important capital-funding side for a university system whose enrollments were rapidly growing, Chancellor McNeil and Governor Curtis fared poorly. They needed buildings in which to instruct and house the growing numbers. “The university has increased more than 65% in the past five years to 19,434,” reported Hertz in the same 1972 article. 24 However, in 1969 and 1970, Maine voters turned
down the new system’s first two capital bond proposals. Finally, in November, 1972, a significant but insufficient bond referendum passed, authorizing $8,360,000 for classrooms across the University of Maine System.\textsuperscript{25} In terms of both operating money and capital, Mainers fell far short of meeting their side of the bargain proposed by those who created the University of Maine System. Consolidation was achieved; the money necessary to make the consolidated system effective never arrived.

Most accounts suggested that Chancellor McNeil never successfully connected with his constituencies, and, as a result, his administration fell far short of its ambitions. Immediately, an uproar about the home in Cape Elizabeth the system was purchasing for him caused the board to back off and limit him to a $5,000-per-year housing allowance. McNeil’s siting the system office in Portland never sat well with those north of the Kennebec River. Nor did his insistence on employing a chauffeur. System faculty members, long used to having policy matters decided on their respective campuses, protested that they felt “powerless and far removed from the power center.”\textsuperscript{26} The Orono Student Senate called for McNeil’s resignation after members learned that the annual budget for operating the chancellor’s office was $280,000.\textsuperscript{27}

In 1974, a gubernatorial candidate far less friendly to public higher education appeared. Campaigning, James Longley “stated, that if elected, he would find a replacement for McNeil and appoint a citizens’ committee to restructure the board.”\textsuperscript{28} The budget-slashing Longley indeed won election, and by December, McNeil announced that he was leaving for California to take over its higher education coordinating board, CPEC.

What, then, did the University of Maine’s first chancellor accomplish during his five years in office? He inherited the extensive planning documents and the legislation creating the system, but it was up to him and his new board of trustees to make real those plans. Universities and university systems are difficult to change, even if in theory you are starting afresh and creating a new one. Another state’s regent once said that changing the course of a university system was as difficult as “turning a battleship under full steam.” The University of Maine had existed for 104 years before its absorption into the new “University of Maine” (the system), and the other small colleges that found themselves also incorporated had likewise been around for a while and had become used to relative independence, if also underfunded. Yet the new “super-university” was supposed to create a master plan, co-ordinate and synchronize their efforts by “assigning a division of responsibility to all units,” “elimi-
nat[ing] costly duplication,” accommodating expanding enrollment demand and make a college education available within forty miles of every Mainer, strengthening graduate studies, promoting economic development, and accomplishing a number of other things the planning commissions had placed on its do list. McNeil had arrived to find a very full plate of assignments as well as a horde of barbarians surrounding his controversial new office.

Among the first items of business had been to figure out what a “super-university” was. It is a term that seldom appears in the higher education vocabulary outside of Maine. McNeil had not coined it. It was already in parlance when he arrived, more so in the news media than in official documents. Because of the word “super,” one is tempted to believe it implied that this new “university” would be somehow more wonderful than your common garden-variety university. However, if one reviews the contexts in which the term appeared, it seems to imply not “super-wonderful” but something more like “überuniversity” or “meta-university”—in other words a superstructure above the actual university, or the entity that is a consolidation of a number of universities. The last two meanings were what actually existed, but the connotation of “super” raised expectations, perhaps to unrealistic levels, especially given the chronic and continuing lack of sufficient funding.

Thus, Chancellor McNeil found himself in charge of an entity much like many others that emerged at the time, as more and more states consolidated their colleges and universities into systems, and added more campuses. Yet he was expected to operate with less adequate funding than most of those other states, and with the expectation that his creation would somehow be “super.” The McNeil board and administration cranked out more paper in response to the state’s expectation that it would produce a master plan. California had already done so in 1960, creating a plan that was both masterful and remarkably enduring. Although Maine is not California, we have already noted one feature of the California master plan that Maine would have done well to adopt. California had established two-year comprehensive community colleges that placed affordable higher education within reach of every citizen, and that met a three-pronged mission at every site: vocational and career training, liberal-arts preparation for degree completion at four-year colleges, and embracing each individual community to meet its needs.

McNeil and his board established some unfortunate precedents that the state has never been able to overcome. Some of it was not his fault: the vocational-technical schools eluded incorporation into his system,
and some of his own two-year schools had already been accorded four-year status—a status from which it appears no school ever regresses. However, the McNeil board of trustees immediately burned more bridges on the road to a statewide system of community colleges. In 1970, the super-university’s board declared that all of its colleges were now “universities.” They did this even though several of them only had a few hundred enrolled students and a handful of academic programs. Just like “super-university,” “university” is a term of indeterminate meaning. But just like “super-university,” “university” created unrealistic expectations that could neither be realized nor undone.

Avoiding “costly duplication of services” was another area where the McNeil administration (like so many others) made little headway. The terms “costly” or “wasteful duplication” constituted a chimera endlessly and universally decried by university boards and state legislatures alike. They certainly sounded like a dragon that needs to be slain, and it is hard to imagine that unnecessary duplication did not exist among competing but supposedly allied universities. However, while these imagined costly and duplicative services must have certainly existed, which services are they, how does one identify them, and how can they be successfully eliminated? These questions indeed lead us to the details where you-know-who dwells.

The issue that never seemed to get sufficient emphasis or consideration in this debate arose from the almost universal fact that a major portion of students enrolled on regional campuses were and are truly place-bound. They were often working adults who support families with spouses also tied to their communities. This “new majority” (as Indiana University President Thomas Ehrlich called them when he championed the phrase) made up an unexpectedly significant portion of enrollments in Fort Kent, Presque Isle, Machias, Augusta, Farmington (to a lesser degree) and Portland. The new majority’s existence, and academic needs, threw a monkey wrench into the planners’ mistaken notion that specific majors (French and political science, for example) might by exclusively placed on various campuses, and that students who wished to pursue those majors could just pack up and move to the campus that met their need. While there were indeed some major programs that could only be sustained at a campus as comprehensive as Orono, a need remained for a basic array of degree programs to exist almost everywhere. This actuality ultimately trumped theoretical planning concepts.

A thorough anatomy of the pursuit of “costly duplication” is the subject for another article. As it applies to the McNeil years, his office
and board certainly struggled with it, but (as is usually the case) with less success than most would have wished. Certain academic programs on certain campuses might have been eliminated. Centralized admissions processing (as practiced by the University of California System) might have been established. Other back-office services might have been centralized in Portland or on a single large campus. But for whatever reasons, none of these things happened. And whether it was a good or bad thing that they did not happen depended upon who you were and how you were looking at the possibilities.

“Ease of transfer” was another such chimæra. Many states have pursued it; few have fully succeeded in establishing it. Ease of transfer was a good thing if you are a student seeking to transfer, the parent who was paying the freight for such a student, a campus looking to make hay by racking up general education credit hours and then sending students off for an unavailable major, or a politician thinking simplistically and opportunistically. It was a bad thing if you are a professor on the receiving end of a transfer population that seems ill-prepared, or if you were such a professor who believed that making transfer of credits difficult resulted in “higher academic standards.”

Universities operate on the principle that the faculty owns the credit. Credit and grades awarded by non-faculty entities (read “administrators and other bureaucrats”) violated that sacred principle in academia. It was akin to the notion that only physicians should make medical decisions—another politically controversial idea in our society today. Whatever the ideal solution might be, the public official or university system administrator who wanted to create a more rational transfer system must run the gauntlet of academic culture. McNeil’s administration did not make it through that corridor of challenges, and neither has any succeeding University of Maine System administration.

The new University of Maine System was not the only such statewide unit attempting to manage the differentiation of campuses. This was another common planning item that seems attractive to those who defined the system in a top-down way. Wisconsin, when it merged its twenty-six campuses into one university system in 1973, assigned each unit a “select mission” that was supposed to make it uniquely identifiable, and to reduce costs by downplaying that special theme on other campuses. Other states did likewise. Maine never went that far, but the board did pursue the notion as best they could, at least in planning documents. Curiously, though, there never appeared to be emphasis or enthusiasm at the chancellor or board level for underscoring Orono’s truly
unique role in the state as the “flagship,” the land-grant, or the Research-I university. The word “flagship” always seemed to get stuck in the craw of system officials, who were consciously or unconsciously more comfortable with a leveling approach. They tended to give in to the temptation to say, “If we do something for one campus, we must do it for all the others.” Witness their 1970 action to declare that all their units were “universities.” The extension of graduate programs across the system, and even a few doctoral programs, took place over time with a board that had difficulty saying “no” to regional and legislative pressures, but also had a hard time saying “yes” to the notion that true excellence and economies could be achieved by acknowledging that Orono had unique, real, and potential strengths in doctoral and research areas that would have been prohibitively difficult and expensive to duplicate elsewhere. The result of this leveling instinct was, as Lloyd Elliott predicted, harmful to the growth of the University of Maine at Orono, and expensive for Maine higher education as a whole.

Another early proposal, centralized admissions, also never happened. It is a rare phenomenon in higher education. The University of California has practiced it for a long time. There, a prospective student lists two or three preferred campuses to the centralized admissions office, and if admitted at all, the office tells the student where he or she will be enrolled. This enrollment system has thrived in a university system that was, and remains, oversubscribed. The nationwide overbuilding of new campuses in the sixties and seventies created a buyer’s market that negated the efficacy of centralized admissions for campuses (most state university campuses and many private colleges and universities fall into this category) that were competing fiercely with each other and scrambling for sufficiently large entering classes.

Finally, how centralized was Chancellor McNeil’s super-university? The answer may lie in the eye of the beholder. As noted previously, a common faculty criticism of the newly-formed university system was that it made them feel “powerless and far removed from the power center.” A number of news articles and official reports maintained that, on the campuses, there was little positive sentiment for the chancellor’s office and its governance. Structurally, the changes were not as substantial as one might think. Most significantly, state appropriation now came in one lump sum to the board, and the chancellor and his staff (with board approval) decided how it would be allocated to individual campuses. This process, not surprisingly, has been the battlefield where most intramural blood has been shed, and no allocation system has ever emerged
that satisfied the campuses as a group. The McNeil administration had little time to enact a swath of odious policies that would apply to all campuses. Succeeding administrations and boards have swarmed in various directions in their attempts to find a working balance between uniform top-down policy and campus autonomy. Campuses have maintained their own administrations, with presidents, chief academic officers, chief student affairs officers, chief financial officers, and faculty senates, etc.

One area where the statistics dramatically suggest a new pattern brought on by the creation of the system was the average length of presidencies. Between 1865 and 1969, the University of Maine had ten presidents, serving an average term of 10.4 years. Since consolidation, the university has now been served by another ten presidents. Their average period of service lasted 4.6 years. Although such correlation does not necessarily prove causation, it would be foolish to believe that the newly created dynamic between chancellor and president, where the former had the power to determine the longevity of the latter, has not made a difference.

* * *

For the University of Maine and its presidents, the “sixties” effectively began when Lloyd Elliot replaced Arthur Hauck in 1958, and ended when Win Libby retired in 1973. Elliot replaced a much-loved legend, and brought many changes, most of them associated with growth, expansion, better funding, and higher aspirations for Maine’s leading public university. He also began to face challenges virtually unknown to Hauck and his predecessors: the awakening of student activism; public eruption over the civil rights struggle; an unpopular and divisive foreign war; a cultural revolution that changed the way the younger generation viewed its nature, role, tastes, and liberties; increased public skepticism about funding higher education; and thoughts of a consolidated “super-university” for Maine. H. Edwin Young would find himself even more engaged in most of those challenges and would be the president on whose watch consolidation occurred. Yet his Maine presidency turned out to be a mild dress rehearsal for the full-fledged drama that awaited him in Madison. Winthrop Libby was the president who had to figure out how to navigate Orono’s brave new world of membership in a consolidated system that had not only usurped his campus’s historic name, but threatened to undercut its traditional roles. He too faced the flood
tide of student revolt brought on by nationwide changes not of his or the university’s making. He would emerge with the historic President’s House still standing and with a shining reputation among students for bravely and lovingly holding the university together in spite of forces tearing it apart. Win Libby continued contributing guest columns to the *Ellsworth American* while his successors defined the contemporary university and its presidency in the context of even more changes and challenges. He learned, as did his predecessors and successors, that a university presidency was like participating in a long-distance relay race. You grasp the baton, run as fast and as well across an unpredictable landscape for as long as you can, and then hand the baton to the next runner.

**NOTES**


2. Lloyd Elliott, Interviewed by Peter Hoff, 2007. Fogler Library Special Collections.

3. For those unfamiliar with campus speak, “parietals” are rules governing residence hall visits from members of the opposite sex, and by extension, the visits themselves.

4. This 1970 edition of *Prism* was the first to refer to what heretofore had been known as The University of Maine (or UM) was now “UMO” (University of Maine at Orono) under the recently formed “Super-U.”

5. During my years at the University of Maine, I had the pleasure and privilege of meeting with still-living former presidents of the University of Maine for the purpose of oral history interviews. Lloyd Elliott (1918-2013) was among those living presidents. I interviewed him at his Washington, D.C. home on February 1, 2007. Much of what appears in this section I learned from that meeting. [PSH]

6. The findings from examining annual State budgets, is that the University of Maine received $2,466,443 from the state for FY1958 (the year before Elliott arrived, and $7,459,716 for FY1966, the year he departed. In other words, by my calculations, Elliott had achieved a remarkable tripling of the appropriation during his tenure. However, we cannot confirm his claim of a 525 percent increase. By the time his successor, Edwin Young, had moved on to Wisconsin, the state appropriation had reached $11,550,294.


9. John F. Kennedy visited the campus of the University of Maine for a special convocation program on October 19, 1963, where he was awarded an honorary
Doctor of Laws degree. According to a press release included in the collection, “arrangements for President Kennedy’s visit to the university were made by Senator Edmund S. Muskie, who felt that the State University was the logical site for a presidential address during the chief executive’s visit to Maine for an inspection flight over the proposed Passamaquoddy Power project site.”


10. “We have foregone beautiful pageantry and ask you to share with us a day of thought.” Trustee Lawrence M. Cutler at President Young’s inaugural colloquium.

11. Wisconsin’s executive titles are the reverse of Maine’s. In Wisconsin, the system head is the president, and campus heads are chancellors. In 1968, when Edwin Young returned to Wisconsin, he was initially a vice president for the then four-campus University of Wisconsin (Madison, Milwaukee, Parkside, and Green Bay). Quickly, though, he was put at the helm of the flagship Madison campus.


14. This solution was applied in the establishment of the University System of Georgia. “UGA,” as the University of Georgia is known, does not mean “University of Georgia at Athens,” but University of Georgia. There are no such entities as “UG-Augusta,” “UG-Kennesaw,” etc. And the system itself is called the University System of Georgia, not the University of Georgia System. Although the difference may seem trivial to the casual observer, an amazing amount of rancor is avoided.

15. Libby, 52.


17. Patricia Riley, Prism (1973), 3.

18. Ibid, 3.


21. Ibid.


23. Hertz, op cit, 2.

24. Accounts differ regarding what should be straightforward fact when it comes to university bond issues. Hertz (1972) writes that Voters rejected a $7.5 million bond referendum in November, 1969, and a $14.9 million bond in June,


27. Ibid, 54.