Florence Brooks Whitehouse and Maine’s Vote to Ratify Women’s Suffrage in 1919

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Florence Brooks Whitehouse was a prominent suffrage leader in Maine in the 1910s. Originally a member of the Maine Woman Suffrage Association, Whitehouse became the leader of the Maine branch of the National Woman's Party, which used more radical tactics and espoused immediate and full suffrage for women. Courtesy of the Sewall-Belmont House & Museum, Washington DC.
In 1919, as the question of extending voting rights to women was debated nationally, Maine suffragists had their own debate on this issue. While they agreed that action was necessary to gain the vote for women, they were divided over strategy. Some suffragists believed that women’s suffrage should only be enacted through a change to the U.S. Constitution, giving women the right to vote in all elections immediately. They also supported demanding the vote through more assertive means such as picketing. Other suffragists believed that states should have the right to decide whether women voted, and they accepted gradual advances such as giving women voting rights in presidential elections only. They also believed women should merely ask for, not demand, the right to vote. This divide over strategy led to an unusual circumstance in Maine politics in 1919: Maine’s governor Carl Milliken had to decide whether to schedule a vote to ratify the federal suffrage amendment passed by Congress (to give women full voting rights), or to
delay ratification until after a citizen’s referendum on partial suffrage for women was held. Maine’s anti-suffragists, men and women opposed to women’s suffrage, attempted to use this divide to prevent any form of woman suffrage from being enacted at all. Maine’s two different suffrage choices, through federal amendment or state action, reflected deep divisions in strategy at the national level. The two primary national suffrage organizations were the National Woman’s Party (NWP) led by Alice Paul, and the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) led by Carrie Chapman Catt. Formed in 1913, the NWP focused on the passage of an amendment to the U.S. Constitution through congressional action, in part by holding the political party in power responsible for its failure to advance the measure. NAWSA preferred to get women’s suffrage passed at the state level until there was sufficient support for a federal amendment. Its organizers had employed this approach for decades with some success, and they were bitterly opposed to Paul’s political activism.\textsuperscript{1} The inability of these two organizations to unite behind a single suffrage strategy divided loyalties at the state level and hampered the effectiveness of local organizing efforts, ultimately placing the outcome of Maine’s ratification vote in jeopardy. Yet in the final hours of the campaign, it took the more aggressive tactics employed by Florence Brooks Whitehouse and the NWP to persuade the Maine legislature to approve the federal amendment. Asking for the vote only got women so far; demanding the vote, even if it meant violating societal norms of proper female behavior, was necessary in order for suffragists to achieve their goals.

Florence Brooks Whitehouse was one of the most important leaders of Maine’s suffrage movement in the closing years of the struggle. Florence Brooks was born in 1869 in Augusta, where she also spent her formative years. She married Robert Treat Whitehouse in 1894, and the couple moved to Portland, where Florence pursued a writing career. She published two novels with Little, Brown & Company, as well as numerous short stories and plays.\textsuperscript{2} Robert was a promising young attorney who began his career in private practice and later became the United States Attorney for Cumberland County. Both Florence and Robert were part of Portland’s progressive movement in the early twentieth century, supporting improved public education and sanitation and combating prostitution. Their work convinced them that attaining voting rights for women was critical to enacting the economic, political, and social reforms central to the progressive movement.

Occupied with her writing career and with raising their three sons,
Whitehouse sometimes gave public speeches on the topic of women’s suffrage. This poster announced two speeches that she gave in an unspecified town on October 26, 1916. Maine Historical Society Collections.
Florence did not join the Maine Woman Suffrage Association (MWSA) until 1913, when it was sorely in need of new leadership. She quickly rose to prominence as a suffrage speaker and organizer. MWSA was affiliated with NAWSA, which held that women should ask politely for the vote rather than demand it, and decried tactics which strayed outside conventionally-held standards of womanly behavior. For decades NAWSA had utilized a state-level approach to winning suffrage. Yet by 1913, only nine states and one territory had granted women the right to vote, and these victories came at a high price. Between 1870 and 1910 suffragists across the country had mounted 480 campaigns in thirty-three states to get the question in front of voters. Only fifty-five of these, about 11 percent, were successful in getting referendums approved by state legislatures, and only two states actually approved suffrage in this way. Yet, four million women of voting age lived in equal suffrage states, all of them located in the western part of the country, and presidential candidates were beginning to take notice.

By contrast, Alice Paul and Lucy Burns established the National Woman’s Party (NWP) in order to focus exclusively on passing a woman suffrage amendment to the United States Constitution. Both Paul and Burns had worked with Emmeline Pankhurst and the suffragettes in Britain, and had used the types of militant tactics (such as breaking windows and public demonstrations) that NAWSA leaders abhorred. Founded in Washington, D.C., in 1913, by 1915 the NWP was reaching out to states across the country to obtain support from like-minded women. In the summer of 1915 labor activist Florence Kelley worked with Florence Brooks Whitehouse to found the Maine branch of the National Woman’s Party, which Whitehouse led from its inception. More than any other Maine suffragist, Whitehouse was associated with the NWP’s radical tactics, such as picketing President Woodrow Wilson outside the White House gates and elsewhere. As part of the NWP’s strategy, she campaigned against Democrats because their party refused to support the federal suffrage amendment. Her public support of the NWP earned her local notoriety and the opprobrium of her former colleagues at MWSA.

In 1919, MWSA was led by Anne Gannett, whose husband Guy was a prominent businessman and a state senator from Augusta. It was Guy Gannett who had introduced the presidential suffrage bill in the legislature in early 1919, where it met little opposition. The Gannets and the Whitehouses moved in the same social circles; Florence and Anne had been friends and had worked together in MWSA. They parted company,
however, in October 1917 when police crackdowns on the NWP pickets resulted in lengthy jail terms. “To me the things they are doing are perfectly awful,” Anne wrote Florence. “I can’t be a part of it even in the smallest way because to me it is all wrong.”

Maine was one of eight states in 1919 in which NAWSA and its local affiliates supported presidential suffrage campaigns, even though the U.S. House of Representatives had approved the federal amendment for full woman suffrage and the measure lacked only one vote for passage in the U.S. Senate. Unlike NWP, which continued to focus on passing the federal amendment, NAWSA was willing to accept half-measures that supported any progress towards woman suffrage.

The NWP was held responsible by the mainstream press and other opinion leaders for the disastrous outcome of Maine’s only statewide special referendum for full woman suffrage, which took place on September 10, 1917. The pro-suffrage forces lost the referendum by a two-to-one margin, a much worse showing than most observers had expected. The consensus was that the NWP pickets in Washington had generated so much negative publicity that the men of Maine were thoroughly disgusted and believed women undeserving of the franchise. Other possible explanations included voter apathy, Maine’s social conservatism, and the distraction of World War I, which the United States had entered in April. Still, the pickets were easy to blame, and at its very next meeting MWSA passed a resolution condemning them as “injurious to the suffrage cause.” Florence had campaigned vigorously for the statewide suffrage referendum in 1917, but following its defeat she resigned from MWSA and devoted herself exclusively to working for the federal suffrage amendment under the auspices of the NWP. She had seen firsthand that the state-by-state approach favored by NAWSA was agonizingly slow, and demeaning as well. In state campaigns women spent thousands of hours begging men for a civil right that should have been theirs as a matter of course. A federal amendment enfranchising women was a much more direct path and avoided the drudgery and expense of endless state campaigns.

Moreover, as events unfolded in Congress, Maine was in a position to play a decisive role in winning the vote. The U.S. House of Representatives passed the federal amendment in January 1918 with all four members of Maine’s delegation voting in favor. The Senate proved more intractable, however, and as the months dragged by into 1919 suffragists were still one vote shy of the total they needed to get the measure through. Alice Paul thought that Maine’s senator, Frederick Hale, might
supply the missing vote, since he was on record as supporting suffrage, but he refused to vote in favor of the federal amendment. In the summer of 1917 he had publicly promised Florence that he would be bound by the outcome of Maine’s statewide special suffrage referendum. Since the voters had defeated it so decisively Hale maintained he had no choice but to vote against the federal amendment, at least in that session of Congress. Florence worked closely with Alice Paul and the NWP in 1918 and 1919 to find ways to convert Senator Hale. Together they organized letter writing campaigns, brought well-known pro-suffrage speakers to Maine, and persuaded three-quarters of Maine’s state legislators to sign a petition calling on Hale to change his vote.

It was at this point that Guy Gannett quietly introduced a presidential suffrage bill into the Maine Senate on MWSA’s behalf. Florence found out about it only after the fact, and was quite irritated that MWSA chose this route when the federal amendment seemed just months away from passage, and the Maine legislature appeared likely to ratify it. For eighteen months MWSA chapters had done very little but raise money for the Red Cross, and they had long since given up trying to convert Senator Hale. However, Guy Gannett must have realized that his fellow lawmakers would support partial suffrage, so MWSA encouraged him to introduce the bill. It sailed through the legislature during the winter of 1919, easily attracting enough support to pass.

On June 4, 1919, the U.S. Senate finally approved the federal amendment with exactly the two-thirds vote required for passage. The missing vote did not come from Senator Hale but from Senator Edward Gay of Louisiana. Once the deciding vote had been obtained, Hale bravely called a press conference to announce his decision to change his vote in favor, wiring Florence the same day, “I shall vote for the Federal Amendment.” Florence was furious that the local press praised him for his vision and commitment to suffrage, ignoring the fact that his vote was superfluous.

Through its easy approval of presidential suffrage the Maine legislature had signaled that ratification would encounter little opposition, but there was a potential wrinkle. The anti-suffragists, or “antis,” those opposed to woman suffrage, were collecting signatures on a petition to send the presidential suffrage bill to the voters. They needed to get 10,000 signatures, which was a substantial hurdle, but since they had money to pay signature gatherers there was a strong likelihood they would succeed. The antis hoped to force the bill to referendum, piggy-backing on a special election tentatively scheduled for early September.
1919. If Mainers voted down presidential suffrage before the state legislature met to ratify the federal amendment, antis could claim with some justification that the state did not want to enfranchise its women. This might persuade lawmakers to oppose the federal amendment. The challenge, then, was to delay the timing of the presidential suffrage referendum vote and bring the legislature back into special session as quickly as possible so that it could act first on the federal amendment.¹⁹

Suffragists were fortunate that Maine’s governor, Carl E. Milliken, was a staunch ally and was watching the progress of signature gathering for the presidential suffrage referendum very closely. Maine had held only six special sessions since the state was organized in 1820 and Milliken was unwilling to schedule another one just for suffrage, especially as the state was still recovering financially from World War I.²⁰ If there was other legislative business, however, it would be easy to bring the lawmakers back to Augusta and urge them to ratify immediately. Happily, it looked as though there would be other business, and he was tentatively planning a special session for either September or October. Florence kept in close contact with Milliken and his staff as they waited to see whether the antis could gather enough signatures to force the presidential suffrage bill to referendum vote, as they would need to move quickly if that occurred.²¹

By early July, Maine’s antis had succeeded in collecting 12,000 signatures, many more than the 10,000 needed to force the presidential suffrage bill to referendum. A citizen’s referendum on presidential suffrage might not have stimulated much interest among the voters by itself, but the antis had been very clever. In January 1919, the Maine legislature ratified the eighteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution to help enact national prohibition. The antis joined with the “wet” forces in the petition drive, attempting to force a referendum not just on the suffrage question but on ratification of national prohibition as well. Joining the two issues together drew enough support for both to succeed.²²

Citizens in many other states also objected to their legislatures ratifying prohibition, and since the suffrage amendment followed immediately it fueled this debate as well. Some people unquestionably opposed prohibition, suffrage, or both, but the larger issue was the tension between states’ rights and federal rights that had been present from the country’s beginning. States’ rights proponents did not deny that the U.S. Constitution provided a vehicle for amending it. They simply believed that issues such as prohibition or suffrage were not the proper purview of the federal government; the states should decide on these issues individually.
Furthermore, the phrase “government of the people, by the people, for the people,” uttered by President Abraham Lincoln in his “Gettysburg Address,” had become a rallying cry for many who fought against the usurpation of individual rights by state and federal governments. These believers promoted the citizen referendum process as the ultimate expression of true democracy, maintaining that any controversial legislation ought to be referred to the people, giving legislatures little power to govern. State senator Alfred Ames articulated this position in February 1919 when he moved to amend Maine’s presidential suffrage bill to require a referendum vote:

This law should be submitted to the people of this State, and we should not assume the great responsibility of determining so great a question. It was for such determination that the referendum was created – that the people might rule. If we withhold the referendum from

Whitehouse was present on February 23, 1917, when Governor Carl E. Milliken called for a special election on the issue of women’s suffrage. The election occurred in September 1917 and proved disastrous for suffragists. Whitehouse is pictured standing over Milliken’s left shoulder. Anne Gannett is to her left. Maine Historical Society Collections.
this measure we deny to the people the right to determine for themselves how they may perform one of the highest duties of citizenship.23

In other words, the people of Maine (i.e., male voters), not their elected representatives, should have the right to decide whether women should be given the right to vote. According to Senator Ames, that was the whole point of the referendum process, to give voters the chance to weigh in on matters of such great importance. Ames’ motion was defeated, which is why the antis were forced to gather signatures to send it to referendum.

Opponents argued that overuse of the citizen’s referendum should be avoided. Senator LeRoy Folsom of Norridgewock, for example, complained that “when no argument prevails, legislators are becoming prone to invoke the referendum…. Legislators are liable to become addicted to the habit of a referendum, referendumitis, so to speak.” 24 When most voters were not concerned about an issue, or were actively in favor as Folsom believed was the case with presidential suffrage, the legislature should simply act on it and move on to other business. Still, the importance of “letting the people decide” was the Maine anti-suffragists’ most effective argument in opposing ratification of the federal suffrage amendment.

Governor Milliken made a last-ditch effort in July to head off the presidential suffrage referendum by referring the issue to the Maine Supreme Court, asking for a ruling on whether the legislature could act independently on both constitutional amendments or if they were covered by the initiative and referendum clauses contained in Article 4 of Maine’s constitution. Maine was one of twenty-two states that permitted sending federal amendments to voters for approval after their state legislatures had acted on them. These clauses had never been challenged in court. National prohibition and woman suffrage prompted the examination of this larger constitutional question of whether states could unilaterally change the process by which the federal constitution was amended. Many other states across the country were challenging the amendment process, and the issue would ultimately be brought to the U.S. Supreme Court for a final ruling.25

Suffragists nationwide watched anxiously to see how the Maine Supreme Court would rule on this issue. If Maine’s court ruled that both amendments were subject to the referendum process then the pro-suffrage forces could be in for an extended battle, as even states that had already ratified the federal amendment might be forced back into referendum campaigns. Considerable relief and rejoicing followed when
Maine’s highest court ruled unanimously that prohibition, as an amendment to the federal constitution, was not subject to Maine’s initiative and referendum process. The presidential suffrage measure, however, would have to go before the people of Maine since it was an action of the state legislature.26

MWSA leaders, Florence insisted, were “proving again how deadly lacking in political acumen they were”; they had mounted no counter-campaign to dissuade people from signing the presidential suffrage referendum petition.27 It was fortunate for the suffragists that Maine’s political leadership remained firmly in support of ratification. Governor Milliken, legislative leaders, and even Senator Hale publicly pledged that Maine would be among the states that ratified. Ironically, Hale now claimed to be a staunch supporter of women’s suffrage, although his single vote in the Senate could have secured its passage months earlier than actually occurred.28

Fortunately, Maine state law required at least a four-month period after the referendum signatures were submitted before the vote could take place, which bought time for ratification of the federal amendment by the state legislature. Governor Milliken still hoped ratification could occur at a special session that would take place in late fall, as long as a transportation bond issue passed at a special election in September. If the bond issue failed the Governor remained unwilling to call a session solely to ratify the federal amendment. He would do so only if other governors agreed to do the same in their states, or if Maine’s vote was critical to gaining the required number of states nationally. Still, he seemed to understand the danger of waiting to ratify until after the presidential suffrage referendum took place, and promised to watch the situation. Based on the relative ease with which the anti-suffragists had secured 12,000 signatures, Whitehouse was convinced the referendum would be defeated, so she was very anxious for the legislature to ratify the federal amendment first.29

Alice Paul shared Florence’s determination that the special session should be scheduled as quickly as possible. She hoped that it might be possible to secure the thirty-six states needed for ratification as early as September 1919; if this occurred, then women would have ample time to register for the upcoming November elections. This may have been simply a high-pressure tactic on Paul’s part to wring greater effort from her staff and state branches, since the resistance in many states to scheduling special sessions suggested that this hope was doomed from the start. Still, it did add a sense of urgency to the campaign and gave suffragists a
new excuse to hold public meetings and pressure their politicians. Paul thought she could arrange to have a prominent speaker travel to Maine to help draw crowds. Florence wanted NWP’s National Political Chairman, Abby Scott Baker, with whom she had become friendly on her previous visits to Maine. “I want you and not some one else,” she wrote Baker, “and hope you will use your influence to get here. It will be wonderful to see you again and we will get in a little fun besides. Write me when and I will meet you.” Florence hoped to tour the state for several days with Baker, going at least as far as Augusta and perhaps up to Bangor as well. While she still doubted it was possible to raise much money or even to draw much of a crowd to meetings, Florence believed that Baker’s experience would bring a fresh perspective to interviews with legislators and, most importantly, with Governor Milliken. “The Governor knows me too well,” Whitehouse told Baker. Baker might move him as no one else could.

Baker was detained by some personal affairs until mid-August 1919, but in the interim, Paul proposed that NWP organizer Mary Winsor, who was vacationing at the Islesboro Inn in Dark Harbor, could be of some service. Winsor had graduated from Bryn Mawr College the year previously and was a veteran of the picket line, having been one of the women sentenced to sixty days in the Occuquan workhouse back in

Anti-suffragists in Maine formed the Maine Association Opposed to Suffrage for Women, which publicized its cause with stamps and other ephemera. In 1919, anti-suffragists hoped for a citizen’s referendum on the question of women’s suffrage. Maine Historical Society Collections.
1917. She was very agreeable to making hers a working vacation, offering to speak at meetings in Bar Harbor and the surrounding towns if they could be arranged. Paul sent Winsor some photos of the Occuquan workhouse and the suffragists who had been imprisoned there, so the audience could see as well as hear about that experience. In the end, though, Florence said she was too busy to set anything up for Winsor. The Maine NWP had no local branch in Bar Harbor, so organizing a meeting would have required a stay of several days; Florence had neither the time nor the inclination to do so. If she had a limited amount of time to spend touring the state on suffrage business that summer she wished to do it in the companionship of Abby Scott Baker. Reluctantly, Paul advised Winsor to focus her energies on persuading Governor Milliken and other key political leaders to schedule a special session as soon as possible to ratify the federal amendment.

By the end of July the exact situation with regard to Maine’s ratification campaign was confusing. There were two conflicting viewpoints. On the one hand, Florence was confident that the situation was well in hand; she resisted Winsor’s (and Paul’s) urging to try to ratify immediately. “It is absolutely impossible to get a special session of the legislature before October,” she insisted in a letter to Paul. “There cannot be a referendum on the Presidential Suffrage bill before November or December and the Gov has promised to call one for the ratification before the other if the other is inevitable so I do not think it is wise to push for any other session.” She and her husband were about to set sail for their summer house on Squirrel Island for their first real vacation in two years, evidence that Florence felt there was so little cause for alarm that she was prepared to take a few days off.

Winsor had some different intelligence and plainly thought Florence’s information was suspect. Her informant was state senator Willis A. Ricker of Castine, who was not a suffrage supporter. Ricker assured Winsor that the presidential suffrage referendum would be scheduled in September since a special election had already been called at that time. In fact, according to Ricker, there was no other option. “The Governor is legally obliged to call on the election to be held within 30 days after the requisite number of names have been obtained,” Winsor reported back to NWP Headquarters in early August. She wrote further that Ricker believed the legislature’s special session to ratify the federal amendment was now scheduled for October 8, which meant that the referendum on presidential suffrage would already have taken place by the time it occurred. If the voters rejected presidential suffrage in September, Ricker
thought the legislature would be unlikely to ratify the federal amendment, exactly as Florence had predicted. Winsor was a little miffed that Florence preferred to work with Baker. “Mrs. Whitehouse seemed to think that it would be impossible for her [sic] to get up any meetings for me in Maine at this time of year and that the best results would be obtained if she took Mrs. Baker to see the Governor etc,” Winsor wrote to Mabel Vernon, then the National Secretary for the NWP. Winsor thought Florence was not adequately focused and required some additional direction from headquarters. “I should advise you to urge on Mrs. Whitehouse,” Winsor wrote.35

Naturally, Winsor’s letter resulted in considerable alarm at NWP headquarters, and Paul promptly urged her to take command of the situation. “Possibly you can direct agitation from your part of the state, while you are taking your holiday,” Paul suggested.36 Although the task was difficult, her call to alarm appeared justified when a clerk in the governor’s office confirmed, in response to an inquiry from Paul, that the presidential suffrage bill would be voted on in September’s special election.37 Paul immediately wrote to Governor Milliken directly to verify the scheduling and then fired off letters to NWP organizers Margaret Whittemore and Dora Lewis asking for their help in what might be a very dicey campaign to get a special session called for ratification before the second Monday in September. Florence got a letter too, with a copy of the letter from the governor’s office to illustrate the peril in which Maine stood.38

In truth, their alarm was justified. While there had been an initial wave of ratifications, the campaigns in some states had bogged down and it was clear that suffragists would be unlikely to secure the requisite thirty-six states by the end of the year, let alone by September 1919, as Paul had briefly hoped would happen. By mid-August, fourteen states had ratified, but twenty-two more would have to do so before woman suffrage would be guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Nine states would not have a regular legislative session until sometime in 1920, and an additional seventeen would have their next regular session in 1921.39 This meant that in most states two campaigns would be required: one to persuade the governor to call a special session, and a second to secure the necessary votes for ratification in the legislature. A number of governors were opposed to suffrage, so merely scheduling a special session represented a formidable obstacle in some states. Therefore it was critical, in a state like Maine where there was substantial political support for ratification, to prevent anything from derailing it.40
Florence wrote to Governor Milliken from her vacation home on Squirrel Island, addressing her letter sweetly to “My Dear Governor.” She informed the governor that she thought there had been some mistake. “I shall greatly appreciate being set right upon this matter, and appeal to you to use your influence and power to get the F.A. [federal amendment] ratification firmly on the books before the Presidential suffrage bill goes to defeat, as it undoubtedly will if the people vote on it.” For once it appeared that Maine was in better shape than recent reports indicated; Florence had been right all along. While Governor Milliken was away at a conference one of his clerks had given out incorrect information regarding the timing of the presidential suffrage referendum.

On his return, the governor personally wrote to Alice Paul to set the record straight. “The date of the referendum election on the presidential suffrage bill has not been determined and probably will not be determined until after the special session of the Maine legislature which will be held sometime in the fall,” he assured her. Although this was a huge relief to the suffragists, Alice Paul left nothing to chance. When Margaret Whittemore, then serving as the NWP’s national secretary, was vacationing in Maine later in August, Paul encouraged her to connect with Florence and interview the governor about the prospects of a special session. The governor agreed to see her, and Whittemore reported that he was sure the roads bond would pass on September 8, 1919, making a special session inevitable. If, for some reason, it did not, he was committed to ensuring that Maine ratified in 1919 and would call a session for that purpose alone.

Florence returned to Portland at the end of August, much restored by her “summer outing,” as she referred to it. On September 9, she wrote Mabel Vernon to report playfully that the special roads bill had gone through “with a flourish and now the Governor will call a session of the legislature to ratify ‘somethin.’” She was pondering what to do next about the ratification campaign for the federal amendment. “It seems best to let things go as they are going, for if we try to make a fight we will stir up the antis… Advise me if you think differently,” she wrote to Vernon. Governor Milliken called the Maine legislature into special session on November 4, 1919.

The NWP evidently agreed with Florence that the best strategy was one of watchful waiting, as there was little in the newspapers through September and October about the impending vote. Florence and Robert Whitehouse kept in touch with state legislative leaders, and in Washington the NWP staff did the same, but it seemed that the fight had gone
out of the antis. The ratification campaign got an extra boost when the California legislature approved it on November 1, 1919, with a unanimous Senate vote and just two opposed in the House.47

MWSA members, meanwhile, were quite confident of victory and behaved as if suffrage were already an accomplished fact. They spent much of 1919 preparing a booklet called “The Duty of Women Voters” and organizing county-level chapters throughout the state to train women how to handle the vote responsibly. At NAWSA’s request they had also been writing a history of Maine’s suffrage work, in which MWSA figured prominently and the contributions of NWP (and Florence) were pointedly ignored.48 At their annual meeting in October 1919 MWSA officers all spoke as if ratification of the amendment was assured, and they had to be chided by the new president, Mabel Connor, to stay in the fight until the end. She reminded them that “nothing worth having was achieved without effort; reforms do not come automatically…. It won’t come unless we work for it.”49

Thus the suffragists were shocked when, just days before the special session convened, the Maine Federation of Labor (MFL) issued a letter opposing ratification of the federal amendment on the grounds that “if the [Susan B.] Anthony Amendment is passed it Absolutely kills the Referendum.” MFL President C.P. Smith of Waterville and Secretary H.B. Brawn of Augusta co-signed the letter and sent it to every state lawmaker. It revealed the surprising fact that “the Referendum Act was fathered by the Labor Organizations; It is our own child. We cannot witness any attempt to nullify it. Directly or Indirectly, without offering a serious protest and opposing such action by every means in our power.” Smith and Brawn insisted that they were not trying to influence the outcome of the ratification vote; they believed that the legislature should not act until “the people” had the chance to express their views on the presidential suffrage referendum. Once again, the issue of states’ versus federal rights had entered the suffrage debate. Maine’s labor organizations had led the effort to establish the state’s Referendum Act, giving voters the power to rule on legislation through the referendum process. Smith and Brawn wanted to give the people the right to vote before the legislature acted on the federal amendment. “The Labor organizations of Maine believe in law and order,” they concluded. “They demand that in this case the spirit of the law be respected by the law-makers.”50

National labor organizations understood the connection between female voters and improved labor laws, and had actively supported suffrage
for several years. So what was going on in Maine? It is true that Maine suffrage organizations had never joined forces as solidly with labor organizations as occurred in other states; indeed, this failure contributed to the downfall of the 1917 suffrage referendum campaign. But there had been no prior hint from Maine’s leading labor group of its intention to oppose ratification. Quite the contrary, it had passed resolutions in recent years calling for Congress to pass the amendment. The pro-suffrage forces scrambled to find out what was behind this surprise announcement and counter its effects. They had to respond quickly, or ratification, which so recently had seemed assured in Maine, could be in jeopardy.

Florence sent a frantic telegram to Alice Paul early in the morning on October 29, 1919, explaining the situation and asking for help.

Paul took the threat seriously and marshaled a swift response. In a return telegram she urged Whitehouse to contact the Woman’s Trade Union League in Boston to ask for an organizer to reach out to women workers in Maine and put pressure on the MFL. The American section of the International Woman’s Labor Congress happened to be meeting in Washington at that time, and Paul persuaded them to pass a resolution calling on Maine to ratify. The National Woman’s Trade Union League paid to have a copy of this resolution sent to every member of the Maine legislature. The NWP also mailed each Maine legislator a copy of the resolution passed by the American Federation of Labor at its national convention urging suffrage ratification. Finally, NWP organizer Elizabeth Kalb was dispatched to Hagerstown, Maryland, where the Farmers’ National Congress was in session, to urge them to call on Maine and other states to ratify the federal amendment. They readily agreed to this and sent a copy of their resolution to every state legislator.

Nearly two years prior, in June 1917, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) had passed a resolution urging state legislatures to ratify the federal amendment, and declared it would “do all in its power to aid in the speedy consummation of this last step in woman’s enfranchisement, as it has ever aided throughout the long struggle.” On hearing from Paul that the MFL was opposed to ratification, AFL Secretary Frank Morrison wrote MFL Secretary Brawn to remind him of the national organization’s position on this issue. He pointedly instructed Brawn what he ought to do: “Pursuant to the foregoing, your organization is requested to give all possible assistance in having the members of the Maine legislature vote for the ratification of the measure, when it is brought up. Hoping to receive a favorable reply.”
It was abundantly clear that the suffragists could not depend on any state to ratify without a struggle, and the incident with the MFL demonstrated that the antis still had substantial strength in Maine. NWP organizer Dora Lewis was already in Maine helping Florence with last-minute arrangements, and Alice Paul arrived a few days before the special session opened to assist with the final lobbying effort. On the eve of the special session, the Maine branch of the NWP held a great “Ratification Dinner” at the Congress Square Hotel in Portland. The purple, white, and gold banners of the NWP were brought out to decorate the walls, and huge bouquets of yellow flowers were placed at intervals around the room. There was a celebratory tone to the affair, which honored the work of Alice Paul and the National Woman’s Party. Florence presided over the ceremonies and introduced all of the speakers. By the time Alice Paul got to the “money speech,” her plea for funds to support the ratification work that remained, the listeners were completely won over. Within minutes they had passed up to the front the staggering sum of $815, a remarkable achievement from a small group of people in conservative, tight-fisted Maine. It was a stirring tribute to the courage and tenacity of Alice Paul and her associates in the NWP.  

Governor Carl E. Milliken was a staunch supporter of extending voting rights to women. A longtime Maine politician, he served as Maine’s governor from 1917 to 1921, a critical period in the history of the suffrage movement. Maine Historical Society Collections.

Governor Milliken called Maine’s legislature into special session on November 4, 1919. While the roads bill was an important item on the agenda, it was clear that the most important business in front of the lawmakers was ratification of the suffrage amendment, which would be brought up for debate on the first day of the session. Florence, Paul, Lewis, and several other suffragists from Portland traveled up to Augusta
to monitor the proceedings. In his opening speech, Governor Milliken urged the legislators to ratify the federal amendment. It was simply the right thing to do, Milliken insisted: “it is not a question of how many women are seeking the right of suffrage and . . . if only one woman in Maine wants the vote it should be granted her.”

The Maine State Senate was the first to act on the measure. Senator LeRoy R. Folsom of Somerset County introduced the resolution and moved that it be voted on with “yeas and nays.” Opponents made a feeble attempt to derail this. Senator Alfred Ames of Washington County moved that the issue be referred to the regular session of the next legislature so that Maine men would have an opportunity to vote on the presidential suffrage bill first. Ames sided with those who believed it was underhanded for the legislature to ratify the federal amendment before “the people” had their say on the referendum. He saw no difference between the presidential suffrage bill and the federal amendment. “It matters not whether she is dressed in a hobble skirt or an evening gown, she is the same old girl,” he quipped. Senator Folsom had no patience with Ames’ position. Everyone was well acquainted with arguments for and against suffrage, he indicated, and there was no point in discussing the merits of the issue any longer. It was time to get on with the vote. This they soon did and it easily passed the Senate with a vote of 24-5. It was an even better showing than Florence had predicted the night before.

The House proved more difficult, however. The last-minute opposition from the MFL had the desired effect, and support for the federal amendment eroded quickly. The suffragists had discovered that MFL Secretary Brawn was employed by one of Maine’s most prominent anti-suffrage leaders. His boss had encouraged him to issue the letter, which reflected Brawn’s beliefs and not necessarily those of the general membership. On Tuesday afternoon, following the successful Senate vote, with the House scheduled to consider ratification the next morning, Florence, Alice Paul, and Dora Lewis met with the MFL officers in a last-ditch effort to persuade them to reverse their position and support the federal amendment.

The meeting dragged on for hours. Secretary Brawn could not be present for the first part and the women had to content themselves with exhorting MFL President Smith and Treasurer Fitzgerald to recant. The officers stubbornly resisted this, eventually leaving to find Brawn and explain to him what they were being pressured to do. Brawn later claimed that Fitzgerald absolutely refused to issue a letter supporting suffrage, so the women concentrated their efforts on Smith and Brawn. When
Brawn met with them it appears that Florence took the gloves off, threatening Brawn that he should give up any political ambitions unless he reversed his stance on ratification. “I was told that already plans were being made in their vicinities to GET ME, and that in the end I would be placed in OBLIVION,” he declared dramatically. He refused to yield and at last the exasperated women turned their attention back to Smith, who, for whatever reason, was more malleable. Brawn was unsure exactly what arguments against Smith eventually triumphed. “The only reason that I can see to explain it was that he got cold feet, or his brain had a storm and refused to stand for his previous act,” Brawn wrote. 62

What arm-twisting Whitehouse employed is unknown, but at some point it must have become clear to Smith that these angry women were simply not going to accept anything less than a full retraction. When the meeting finally adjourned, Florence had a statement signed by Smith (which she had written for him) placing all the blame for the previous letter squarely on Brawn’s shoulders, and calling on the legislature to ratify the federal amendment. 63 The following morning, as House members showed up for their session, each found a copy of the Kennebec Journal on his desk folded neatly to display a paid political announcement printed boldly in the lower left hand corner of the newspaper's front page, which noted that the MFL's president now supported the federal suffrage amendment.64

The NWP had scored an impressive victory by getting Smith to sign this statement, but would it be enough to save ratification in Maine? The antis were not ready to concede the fight. Their hopes were pinned on Representative Sherman L. Berry of Waterville, who had led the opposition to the suffrage referendum in 1917. When House Speaker Frank Farrington brought the session to order, Berry quickly rose to move that the ratification vote be delayed until the regular session of the next legislature, just as Ames had proposed in the Senate. He was a split second too late, however; Farrington first recognized Representative Percival Baxter of Portland, who moved that the House vote to ratify immediately. Berry persevered, pressing his motion and protesting that it was unfair to the people for the legislature to act first. “All through this great land of ours there is a spirit of unrest, and I think one reason for it is the forcing down throats of men what they do not want. Why this seeming haste to adopt the Susan B. Anthony amendment? Are the supporters of this afraid to trust the people at home?”65

Seeming haste? Susan B. Anthony had first introduced her amendment to Congress in 1878, more than forty years before, and the Maine
legislature had considered the issue on many occasions since. This was no rush to judgment; it was the culmination of decades of exhausting work by millions of suffrage supporters. The answer to Berry’s final question was clear: there was no faith that the voters would live up to America’s democratic ideals and support ratification. But, as in the Senate, the pro-suffrage forces had no intention of debating ratification endlessly. Baxter urged them to get on with the vote. Speaker Farrington ruled that Baxter’s motion had precedence over Berry’s and began calling the roll. Halfway through the roll call there had been so many negative votes that the antis began to smile, anticipating victory. The suffragists watched helplessly as many men who had assured them of their support voted against ratification. It hardly seemed possible that they could get this close and lose, especially when victory had seemed assured just a week before. Towards the end, though, the “yeas” came more frequently and the final tally was 72-68 in favor. Applause swept the room, lasting several minutes as the relieved suffragists celebrated the end of a very long journey. A watching reporter observed that the rejoicing prac-

On November 7, 1919, Governor Milliken held a ceremony to celebrate Maine’s ratification of the nineteenth amendment. He signed the letter informing U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing of Maine’s vote with a quill pen with feathers dyed purple, white, and gold, the colors of the National Woman’s Party. Courtesy of the Sewall-Belmont House & Museum, Washington DC.
tically “assumed the proportions of a demonstration” because it continued so long, perhaps a sly nudge at Alice Paul and the other NWP members who were among those celebrating.66

Maine was the nineteenth state to ratify! The antis immediately called for reconsideration of the vote, and for several tense hours it appeared that this might actually occur. The antis claimed they had lined up ten House members who would change their vote. Suffragists countered that fourteen members said they would switch to “yes” if the vote were reconsidered, but they were understandably leery of putting this to the test, so they renewed their lobbying of House members to prevent this from happening. Fortunately, most legislators were weary of suffrage and accepted that its adoption was inevitable, so they agreed to let the results stand.67

Victory was sweet, and Florence was more than willing to savor the antis’ loss, particularly after they published an article in their weekly national newspaper, the Woman Patriot, attacking her methods of persuading President C.P. Smith of the MFL to sign a pro-ratification statement. “Aren’t they wretched losers?” she joked in a letter. “Their love of vituperative criticism of women in general and some women in particular is almost beyond belief, and makes one really wonder if its [sic] safe to let such women participate in full citizenship... I am not going to write anything more about it for it is not worth noticing but it does exasperate one to have to deal even so slightly with such people.”68

Florence could not resist one last broadside to the National Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage, however. She wrote them a scathing letter; surprisingly, since it was decidedly uncomplimentary, they elected to publish some of it. Since many suffrage leaders subscribed to the Woman Patriot to keep tabs on the opposition, they must have been delighted to read her strongly-worded denunciation. Florence wrote:

There is no money which I expend which I feel is so little worth while as the money which pays for your publication. There is no time which I feel is so nearly wasted as the time it takes to read that same sheet. After I have finished reading each edition of the paper I feel as if I had been reading the Police Gazette and need a mental and moral bath. How you women can be willing to be scavengers in a world which has so many beautiful things in it passes my comprehension, and incidentally your attitude toward women and toward life in general is the strongest argument I have ever seen for anti-suffrage... You ask for my opinion of THE WOMAN PATRIOT. I believe, with the New York Tribune, that it is an insult to the womanhood of America, that it is vulgar, vituperative, and unfair... Only cremation could improve the future of THE WOMAN PATRIOT. 69
It was a constant source of frustration and embarrassment to Florence and other suffragists that the antis were so willing to declare women unfit for voting, and that they used misleading and sensational language to dramatize the evils of woman suffrage. Across the bottom of the first page of this same issue of the Woman Patriot, for example, ran the statement, “The Anthony Amendment Means Race and Sex War.” Such inflammatory and exaggerated language had long caused trouble for suffragists, and Florence clearly relished being able to tell the antis what she thought of them.

On November 7, 1919, Governor Milliken held a ceremony at which he signed the letter notifying the U.S. Secretary of State that Maine had ratified the Susan B. Anthony amendment. In recognition of this historic occasion, six women were invited to witness the event. Whitehouse stood directly behind the governor while he signed the document. Governor Milliken used a quill pen with feathers dyed purple, white, and gold, the colors of the National Woman’s Party. This was a ceremonial pen the NWP national headquarters had commissioned specifically for ratification ceremonies, and it was sent from state to state as needed. Governor Milliken was surely aware of what the colors meant, and of MWSA’s longstanding animosity towards the NWP. He used the pen anyway, and then added a twist of his own. Following the signing he presented each woman with a souvenir. The four MWSA representatives and Grace Hill of the NWP each received a pen made out of steel. To Florence, in recognition of her leadership and perhaps with a nod to her outlaw sympathies, the governor gave a pearl handled gold pen. The press reported these minor distinctions between the two suffrage organizations matter-of-factly, without pursuing their meaning any further, and they were quickly forgotten.

Ratification did not end the suffrage battles in Maine completely. Immediately following the vote, the anti-suffragists signaled they would accept the outcome, but some weeks later they sued the state on the grounds that Maine’s constitution could only be amended by citizen referendum. Maine was one of six states where anti-suffragists launched a suit after the state legislature had ratified the amendment, and eventually Ohio’s case made its way to the United States Supreme Court. In June 1920, the Supreme Court justices ruled unanimously that the U.S. Constitution provided for state legislatures, not citizens’ referendum campaigns, to ratify amendments to the federal constitution, so all referenda organized for that purpose were invalid. Maine suffragists had to wait eight long months after their legislature had ratified for the Supreme Court to rule, during which they could not be confident that
the results would stand. Since the issue was in the courts there was little they could do to influence the outcome, but it also meant that they had to remain vigilant until the matter was decided.

Only after the Supreme Court had ruled and full woman suffrage had become the law of the land did Mainers vote on the presidential suffrage referendum. The state’s constitution had a provision for holding a referendum vote but not for canceling one; once it was on the ballot, the voters had to have their say. In September 1920, women helped pass the measure easily with 88,080 votes in favor and 30,462 opposed. MWSA leaders were quick to claim the results showed strong support for suffrage, which on the face of it certainly seems true. Yet the strength of the opposition vote was surprising. While less than the 38,000 votes polled against suffrage in 1917, this was three years later and full suffrage was already an established fact. There were no exit polls or any other way of knowing how men and women voted on this issue, but it seems clear that many Maine men – and women – still did not approve of woman suffrage. If men alone had voted on the presidential suffrage referendum before November 1919, they might well have rejected it. Had that occurred, the state legislature most likely would not have ratified the federal suffrage amendment. Florence and the NWP had been correct to insist that the legislature ratify before the partial suffrage measure went to the voters.

MWSA leaders never admitted publicly that their radical sister organization deserved any credit for helping to win suffrage in Maine. Indeed, it was at this early date that they took steps to expunge the NWP almost entirely from Maine’s written suffrage history. In the history MWSA forwarded to NAWSA, Florence’s name does not appear, while both her husband and her father-in-law are recognized for their far lesser efforts. Nevertheless the intense, last-minute lobbying from the NWP almost certainly saved the day for the pro-ratification forces. While earlier polls had shown solid support among legislators for the federal amendment, the anti-suffragists had persuaded many legislators to change their position. Public opposition from Maine’s labor leaders just days before the session began, when it was almost too late to counteract it, very nearly lost them the House vote. Interestingly, while members of MWSA were present in Augusta during the special session, the newspaper accounts make no mention of MWSA activities at all. NAWSA sent no national organizers to help with the lobbying effort. MWSA members were simply not willing to employ the sort of tough tactics that the NWP used to deliver the ratification vote in Maine.
NOTES


9. Ida H. Harper, ed., The History of Woman Suffrage, vol. 6 (New York: National American Woman Suffrage Association, 1922). See the state sections on Connecticut (pp.75-76), Florida (p. 120), Iowa (p. 192), Kentucky (p. 215), Minnesota (p. 325), North Dakota (p. 507), and Pennsylvania (p. 563) for other states pursuing presidential suffrage campaigns in 1919.


11. Following her efforts to defeat Wilson in Wyoming during the 1916 presidential campaign, MWSA barred Whitehouse from any public role in the 1917 referendum. As a result, friends and supporters formed the Equal Suffrage Referendum League and elected her president. The League was disbanded after the campaign ended in defeat in September 1917. See Florence Brooks Whitehouse to Alice Paul, December 12, 1916, Series 1, reel 36, NWP Papers.
12. Florence Brooks Whitehouse, “Notes from meeting with Senator Hale,” February 12, 1918, Box 3, Folder 1, FBW Papers.
15. Julia Emory to Vivian Pierce, April 6, 1918, Series 1, reel 59, NWP Papers; Florence Brooks Whitehouse to Mabel Vernon, June 10, 1919, Series 1, reel 71, NWP Papers.
16. Betty Gram to Maude Younger, February 3, 1919, Series 1, reel 68, NWP Papers; Florence Brooks Whitehouse to Alice Paul, April 16, 1919, Series 1, reel 70, NWP Papers.
22. Florence Brooks Whitehouse to Abby Scott Baker, undated (c. June 1919), Series 1, reel 75, NWP Papers.
27. Florence Brooks Whitehouse to Abby Scott Baker, July 11, 1919, Series 1, reel 72, NWP Papers.
29. Florence Brooks Whitehouse to Abby Scott Baker, July 11, 1919, Series 1, reel 72, NWP Papers.
30. Alice Paul to Florence Brooks Whitehouse, July 15, 1919, Series 1, reel 72, NWP Papers.
32. Mary Winsor to Alice Paul, July 13, 1919, Series 1, reel 72, NWP Papers; Alice Paul to Mary Winsor, July 17, 1919, Series 1, reel 72, NWP Papers.
33. Alice Paul to Mary Winsor, August 12, 1919, Series 1, reel 73, NWP Papers.
34. Florence Brooks Whitehouse to Mary Winsor, August 2, 1919, Series 1, reel 73, NWP Papers.
35. Mary Winsor to Mabel Vernon, August 8, 1919, Series 1, reel 73, NWP Papers.
36. Alice Paul to Mary Winsor, August 12, 1919, Series 1, reel 73, NWP Papers.
37. Lelia E. Teaton to Mary Winsor, August 11, 1919, Box 3, Folder 1, FBW Papers.
38. Alice Paul to Florence Brooks Whitehouse, August 18, 1919, Series 1, reel 73, NWP Papers.
39. Ratification Schedule, August 16, 1919, Series 1, reel 73, NWP Papers.
40. Alice Paul to Florence Brooks Whitehouse, June 23, 1919, Series 1, reel 72, NWP Papers.
41. Florence Brooks Whitehouse to Carl Milliken, August 17, 1919, Box 3, Folder 1, FBW Papers.
42. Lelia E. Yeaton to Alice Paul, August 15, 1919, Series 1, reel 73, NWP Papers.
43. Carl Milliken to Alice Paul, August 18, 1919, Series 1, reel 73, NWP Papers.
44. Margaret Whittemore to Alice Paul, August 28, 1919, Series 1, reel 73, NWP Papers; Margaret Whittemore to Florence Brooks Whitehouse, September 2, 1919, Series 1, reel 73, NWP Papers.
45. Florence Brooks Whitehouse to Mabel Vernon, September 9, 1919, Series 1, reel 73, NWP Papers.
46. Mabel Vernon to Mrs. Robert Treat (Florence Brooks) Whitehouse, October 2, 1919, Series 1, reel 73, NWP Papers.
47. Mabel Vernon to Alice Paul, November 2, 1919, Series 1, reel 74, NWP Papers.
50. C.P. Smith & H.B. Brawn to “Dear Sir,” October 27, 1919, Series 1, reel 74, NWP Papers.
51. H.B. Brawn to Florence Brooks Whitehouse, June 29, 1917, Box 3, Folder 1, FBW Papers.
52. Florence Brooks Whitehouse to Alice Paul, October 29, 1919, Series 1, reel 74, NWP Papers.
54. Elizabeth Kalb to Mabel Vernon, October 30, 1919, Series 1, reel 74, NWP Papers.
55. Copy of Resolution Passed by the American Federation of Labor, June 1917, Box 3, Folder 1, FBW Papers.
56. Frank Morrison to H.B. Brawn, October 30, 1919, Box 3, Folder 1, FBW Papers.
58. “If But One Maine Woman Wants to Vote She Should Have Chance Says Governor,” Portland Evening Express, November 4, 1919.
60. Mabel Vernon to Caroline Katzenstein, November 11, 1919, Series 1, reel 74, NWP Papers.
63. Mabel Vernon to Caroline Katzenstein, November 11, 1919, Series 1, reel 74, NWP Papers.
68. Florence Brooks Whitehouse to Lewis Burleigh, November 3, 1919, Box 3, Folder 1, FBW Papers.
70. “Notification of Suffrage Vote is Sent to Lansing,” Portland Evening Express, November 7, 1919.
72. “Says Suffragists are Afraid to Await Vote of People,” Portland Evening Express, November 5, 1919.
73. Flexner and Fitzpatrick, *A Century of Struggle*, p. 314. The other states were Massachusetts, Missouri, Texas, Oklahoma, and Ohio.


77. Mabel Vernon to Caroline Katzenstein, November 11, 1919, Series 1, reel 74, NWP Papers.