Model Cities, Housing, and Renewal Policy in Portland, Maine: 1965-1974

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Downtown Portland, shown here in 1925, was poorly designed for the automobile age. Its streets were narrow and segmented, and its commercial establishments difficult to reach by auto. Modernization began in the 1960s with the Model Cities Program, a federal response to the 1960s ghetto riots and the failure of the urban renewal projects of the previous decade. Model Cities rejected the “bulldozer” form of renewal in favor of addressing social, as well as physical problems. Maine Historical Society photo.
MODEL CITIES, HOUSING, AND RENEWAL POLICY IN PORTLAND, MAINE: 1965-1974

BY JOHN F. BAUMAN

Shepherded through Congress by Maine Senator Edmund Muskie, the 1967 Model (or Demonstration) Cities Program was originally intended for the nation’s large, ghetto-ridden metropolises where it would target a host of social and economic programs including housing. Thanks to Senator Muskie, both Portland and Lewiston benefitted. Before the Nixon Administration scuttled the program in 1973, Portland had created a host of innovative housing, social welfare, law enforcement, and educational programs, shifting the city’s urban renewal program away from its strict emphasis on brick-and-mortar planning. Portland was unique in making Model Cities a part of its downtown renewal. Energizing the city’s young historic preservation movement and boosting housing rehabilitation efforts, Model Cities played a role in the rise of Portland’s celebrated Old Port. John F. Bauman of Southport, Maine, is a Visiting Research Professor at the University of Southern Maine and past-President of the Society for American City and Regional Planning History. He has authored or co-authored numerous books including PUBLIC HOUSING, RACE, AND RENEWAL: URBAN PLANNING IN PHILADELPHIA, 1920-1974 (1987) and BEFORE RENAISSANCE: PLANNING IN PITTSBURGH, 1889-1943 (2006). His history of Portland, Maine (from which this article derived), will be published by the University of Massachusetts Press in 2011.

In 2007, the Society for American City and Regional Planning History met in Portland, Maine. As part of that meeting, conferees toured Portland’s sparkling “Old Port,” its stunning historical districts, Congress and Monument Squares, and its gleaming banking center and plazas with open-air restaurants. The conference included a session on Model Cities, a federal program created in the mid-1960s in response to the failures of the urban renewal projects of the previous decade. The session featured many of the participants who drafted and executed Portland’s 1967 Model Cities Program, including Don Nicoll, a
legislative aide who oversaw Senator Edmund Muskie’s input into the creation of the Model Cities Program. All agreed that Model Cities had profoundly impacted the city, playing a key role in its downtown renaissance.

Viewed historically, this verdict on Portland’s Model Cities Program might seem incongruous. Many scholars have viewed Model Cities as a failure. The federal legislation, at first hailed as enlightened, was tragically diluted as the war in Vietnam took its fiscal toll on President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society initiatives. Praised for dictating maximum “citizen participation,” it was ultimately condemned for its “maximum citizen manipulation.” Moreover, Model Cities, which emerged in response to the 1960s summer riots in the black ghettos of large cities such as Philadelphia, Newark, and Detroit, made little Portland a seemingly inappropriate venue. Finally, and critical for this study, Model Cities reputedly rejected the bricks-and-mortar “bulldozer” renewal in favor of manpower training, education, and healthcare upgrading; it was, in short, a form of social, not physical renewal. Portland, however, wove Model Cities into the very fabric of its bricks and mortar revitalization program. It made Model Cities the handmaiden of urban renewal.1

Because of the racially explosive context of Model Cities, scholars have mainly, and understandably, focused on the shortcomings of the program’s citizen participation provisions and its underfunded initiatives.2 Little attention has been given to the program’s novel stress on integrating physical with social urban development goals. While Model Cities stressed human capital and social rebuilding, it hardly abjured urban physical renewal. Model Cities budgets brimmed with line items for housing development, medical and recreational facilities, new schools, and street improvements. The Demonstration Cities Program – later Model Cities – prescribed mobilizing all the tools of planning and urban development, public and private, state and federal, toward the goal of effective city-building. Presumably, neighborhoods enriched by better housing, sanitation, health, legal, educational, and job-training services (or “gilded” to use a pejorative term bandied about in the late 1960s and 1970s), and empowered by citizen involvement in decision-making, would stanch the outflow of population and tax dollars and restore health to the urban body politic.3

Like Providence, Rhode Island, and other small New England cities that in the nineteenth century developed industrial economies, in the mid-twentieth century Portland felt trapped in a long cycle of deindus-
trialization and plagued with aging housing and infrastructure. Once, prior to 1923, an important port linking America, Europe, and Canada, by the mid-1960s Portland struggled to redefine itself commercially. Portland had boomed during World War II as a center for shipbuilding and a staging site for trans-Atlantic convoys. Portland shipped over 100,000 tons annually during the war, but ocean-going tonnage dipped to 50,000 tons in 1955 and plunged to a mere 10,000 in 1960. In 1962 the Canadian Grand Trunk Railway, which since 1855 had dominated the railroad and wintertime grain-trans-shipment economy of Portland, sold its grain elevator and eight eastern wharves to the city. The sale opened the waterfront to potential redevelopment, but for what?4

As in other cities, city planning officials and business leaders agonized over the lagging pace of postwar urban renewal and its legacy of ugly rubble-strewn lots marked off by white wooden fences. Portland’s “renewed” Bayside neighborhood in 1965 sat bulldozed and fallow, while residents of aging urban neighborhoods on the western end of the peninsula complained of poor schools, high crime rates, unemployment, poverty, and substandard housing.5 Economic decline, especially the waning waterfront activity, brought a 6.5 percent decline in the city’s population, from 78,000 in 1950 to 72,566 in 1960. Over the next decade it dropped another 10.4 percent to 65,000. A few signs of hope flickered. An oil pipeline from South Portland to Montreal renewed the economic link to Canada, and the Portland Chamber of Commerce took heart that the city in 1965 still reigned supreme as a center of finance, trade, and distribution for all of Maine. The state’s four largest banks called Portland home, as did its largest insurance company. Still, John Menario, the young, Portland-born, University of Pennsylvania Fels School graduate who became city manager in 1967, found the city dreary and forlorn upon his return home, its narrow, dark downtown streets unwelcoming and inhospitable. While the city resisted the term “depressed,” a sluggish post-industrial economy and the challenge of suburbia – especially the proposed Maine Mall on the city’s doorstep – fully mobilized city businessmen behind downtown renewal.6

Portland launched its urban renewal movement as early as 1947 and created a Slum Clearance and Renewal Authority in 1952. By 1965 the Portland Planning Department’s map displayed five renewal project areas on the peninsula. The Vine-Deering-Chatham project had been completed, and demolition and plans for public housing moved forward at Bayside Park and Munjoy South, the latter a large, aging neighborhood on the eastern periphery of downtown. But residents and small
Portland in the 1960s, like many once-industrialized cities, was slipping into decline, its urban renewal projects having failed to attract new business and many of its downtown buildings standing empty. Among the few signs of hope was an oil pipeline from South Portland to Montreal, which renewed the port city’s longstanding economic link to Canada. Maine Historical Society photo.

businesses there complained about the human cost of massive demolition plans and the inadequacy of relocation efforts. Like other cities, Portland failed to lure private investors into “de-slummed” tracts like Bayside, and these projects left deep scars on the urban landscape. Portland’s downtown, like main streets nationwide, still teetered financially. Fearing imminent competition from a large shopping mall rising in suburban South Portland, the city’s major department stores, Porteous, Mitchell, & Braun, and Benoits, with the Casco Bank and other businesses, threatened departure.

These threats only stiffened the Portland Redevelopment Authority’s resolve. In 1965 the chair of PRA, James H. Burke, proclaimed that the “day of the bulldozer is rapidly coming to a close.” He saw the “ugly wounds in the urban landscape . . . being healed” and “new and exciting forms of steel and stone . . . rearing their triumphant heads against the city skies.” Thrilled by urban modernism, Burke saw “glad tidings” in the new cityscapes unfolding in downtown Philadelphia, Baltimore, St. Louis, and New Haven. Burke never dissembled about the priority of downtown over neighborhood renewal. Clearing slums was important,
but relocating uprooted families proved costly and problematic, despite federal assistance. On the contrary, Portland officials viewed downtown renewal (for which the federal government covered two-thirds of the cost) as a crucial investment, adding vital ratables to a sagging tax base. Without renewal, Burke warned, “the downtown will fall, like an outgrown lobster shell to the bottom of the sea.” He cautioned that urban renewal could be divisive, pitting rich businessmen against less affluent neighborhood residents. “Whatever the local Chamber of Commerce wants is automatically denounced as merely another grasp for goodies for their ever enlarging gravy train,” he warned, but the city had to “take on a new personality.” He saw a revitalized downtown as the basis for a “shared ... good life.”

Gruen to the Rescue

It was in this light, then, that the city Chamber of Commerce in 1964 joined with city officials to hire the modernist architect-planner and mall designer Victor Gruen. They in turn consulted with the Portland Planning Department and Spencer M. Hurtt Associates to develop a General Neighborhood Renewal Plan for the downtown area. Gruen’s final report, however, bore the “Mall Makers” indelible imprint. Portland planners in 1965 defined the downtown as the area of the peninsula bounded by Cumberland Street on the north, Fore Street on the south, Pearl to the east, and State Street on the West. Gruen's September 1966 report, “Downtown Portland, Maine: General Neighborhood Renewal Plan,” fit the Vienna-born planner’s standard model for diagnosing urban ills. Portland, stated the report, suffered from three main problems: bad housing, bad streets, and bad parking. The 1960 census had found 28.8 percent of downtown housing stock to be substandard. The city endured horrid traffic circulation patterns, and its streets proved narrow and discontinuous. The city’s on-street parking rendered it inhospitable to modern automobility. By eliminating dingy rooming houses, single-room occupancy hotels, and other shabby downtown housing, designers could build a ring-road traffic circulation system bordered by strategically located parking garages. Moreover, by adding a million square feet of retail and office space, 280 new hotel units, and 316,000 square feet of state, local, and federal office space, Gruen would remake Portland’s shabby downtown into the scintillating, pulsating heart of the city. He would transform it into a desirable, mall-like place.

To make Portland again the heart of the region’s civic, cultural, and recreational life, Gruen proposed a civic center complex with concert hall, theaters, art galleries, and convention space. To facilitate access to
Edmund S. Muskie, elected to the U.S. Senate in 1958, took a keen interest in poverty, housing, and urban redevelopment. In 1966 President Lyndon Johnson asked Muskie to shepherd a Model Cities bill through the Senate, and when it passed, Johnson rewarded Muskie by promising that Portland would be one of the cities chosen to implement the program. Photo courtesy of the Edmund S. Muskie Archives and Special Collections Library.

the downtown Gruen proposed to widen Franklin Street, a narrow, densely populated, tree-lined residential street bisecting the Bayside neighborhood, into a wide, four-lane divided central artery looping off the proposed I-295 extension, and thus, as long envisioned, to connect Portland directly to the Maine Turnpike. For the future Gruen recommended converting the Forrest City’s spacious ocean front and pier-lined Commercial Street into a super highway, speeding turnpike traffic directly into the heart of the city.¹⁰

Gruen, in his defense, recognized Portland’s eighteenth- and nineteenth-century architecture as an asset, especially the historic architecture along Congress Street, the so-called spine of the peninsula. Congress Street boasted the revered birthplace of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow as well as Congress and Monument Squares, and other historic districts were located just off Congress Street on Park, High, Danforth, State, and Spring streets. As he did in his Fort Worth, Texas, Plan (which was never realized), Gruen proposed converting the city’s main shopping district, Congress between Pearl and High streets — the heart
of the downtown, and the site of Portland’s principal banks and the Benoit and Porteous and Mitchell department stores — into a pedestrian mall.\textsuperscript{11}

Gruen’s Portland plan, although never completed, left an enduring imprint on the city. At first using city and state, rather than federal funds, Portland acted immediately to widen Franklin Street and turn Spring Street into part of Gruen’s envisioned downtown expressway loop, complete with the Spring Street parking garage. In 1967 Portland applied for a multi-million dollar grant to undertake the “Downtown Two” project, which included Gruen’s Congress Street banking and retail center. This in 1969 became the Maine-Way project. Significantly, it neatly dovetailed with Portland’s 1967 Model Cities Program, meant to make Portland’s “Renaissance” as much about beautifying the city’s deteriorating social environment as about restoring the city’s material appearance.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{Muskie and Portland’s Model City}

Portland’s Model Cities Program owed an enormous debt to Maine’s distinguished senator, Edmund Muskie. Born in Rumford, educated at Bates College and Cornell Law School, and a World War II veteran, Muskie practiced law in Waterville and was elected a state legislator in 1946. He became Maine’s first Democratic governor in a generation in 1954 and moved on to the U.S. Senate in 1958. Lyndon B. Johnson initially relegated Muskie to seats on the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations and the Banking and Currency Committee. Muskie deftly used his effectiveness on these committees to chart a highly successful senatorial career. Known for his work on water and air quality issues, Muskie, like Republican Margaret Chase Smith, took an equally keen interest in poverty, housing, and urban redevelopment. In 1966 President Johnson tapped Muskie to manage his new Model Cities legislation. The “Demonstration Cities” legislation, as it was drafted and presented to Congress, initially called for a mere handful of cities to participate, but as his reward for shepherding the bill, Muskie negotiated Johnson’s promise that Portland would be one of those cities, its size notwithstanding.\textsuperscript{13}

Demonstration Cities faced hurdles. Many in Congress questioned the title itself, believing, as Alabama’s John Sparkman put it, that the word “demonstration” conjured up ugly, frightening images of young, long-haired radicals and fiery urban riots. Southerners objected to the law’s language barring segregation in low-cost housing built in Model Cities.
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City neighborhoods. Muskie used Post Office Department money to fly key architects, including Joseph Califano, Larry O’Brien, and Milton Semer, to Kennebunk Beach, Maine, where he owned a summer home. Muskie’s wife, Jane, served a steaming lobster stew, and in the wake of the feast the final legislation was drafted.¹⁴

Jane Muskie’s lobster stew altered the legislation little from the original form. To placate Senator Sparkman, Muskie and his colleagues substituted the words “afford maximum opportunity of choice of housing accommodations” for the more liberal language proscribing segregation. Although the official title remained intact, the group adopted Model Cities as the popular name for a program which, rather than spotlighting large cities, now encompassed sixty-six medium-sized towns. Muskie also insisted that the legislation emphasize novel and imaginative housing and renewal programs, and, crucial for Portland, a city poised for renewal amidst a rich architectural heritage, stipulated that surveys of historic resources and efforts at historic preservation accompany any proposal for slum clearance or housing rehabilitation. Outrage over the 1961 demolition of Portland’s chateauesque Union Station (1888) spawned an historic preservation movement that in 1964 sired Greater Portland Landmarks. With passage of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 and the creation of the National Register of Historic Places, the Maine senator ardently supported historic preservation. Muskie’s action assured that Model Cities funds would be used, typically with matching private funds, to rehabilitate run-down but historically important inner city buildings. Cities initially applied for planning funds, and those favored applied for supplemental monies for the all-important five-year action phase.¹⁵

Once a fiscally conservative Yankee Republican city that fiercely resisted federal programs such as public housing, Portland rallied behind the Model Cities Program. In 1967 it had a more progressive, more activist, and more ethnically diverse City Council, led by people such as the Irish bricklayer’s son, corporate counsel, and stalwart Democrat Harold Loring. Loring and Portland’s new city manager, John Menario, showered expressions of gratitude upon Senators Muskie and Smith for their efforts in assuring that Portland was on the approved list for the Model Cities Program.¹⁶ On November 11, 1967, Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Secretary Robert Weaver announced that Portland had been selected for a planning grant of $1,834,000 to develop its Model Cities Program. Ultimately, the city received $7,594,429 in Model Cities monies, but combined this with funds from other federal agencies to
draw into Portland more than $31 million. Unlike Portland’s Office of Economic Opportunity (Portland Regional Opportunity Program or PROP), where local citizens participated in policy decisions and the disposition of federal funds, Model Cities monies went directly to the City Council. The Council selected a Model Cities Director, Robert Hawkins, who reported to City Manager Menario. Closely supervised by Hawkins and the City Council and under the watchful eye of Muskie and his aide, Don Nicoll, Portland launched its Model Cities planning process.

Model Cities represented a revolutionary new form of federalism. In this instance the federal government stripped away burdensome layers of red tape that had frustrated urban renewal programs in the 1950s and shepherded recalcitrant, overly bureaucratic federal agencies such as the Office of Economic Opportunity, Health, Education, and Welfare, and Housing and Urban Development behind a unified solution to urban problems. The Forest City’s chosen Model Neighborhood was called “Portland West,” an area that, in the words of the application, included “virtually the entire western end of the [Falmouth] peninsula, plus an area of considerable blight adjacent to it immediately north of the central business district.” Portland West embraced as well a crucial segment of the city’s waterfront, rich in historical architecture, and the city’s Frederick Law Olmsted-designed Western Promenade.

The City Council designated the Portland West Advisory Committee (PWAC) as the local Model Cities neighborhood agency. However, most of the real “citizen participation” took place in seven, thirty-person task forces empowered to hold hearings, accumulate evidence, deliberate, and formulate first “Statements of Condition” and secondly “Recommended Solutions” for what were identified as Portland West’s key problems: housing, health, education, employment and economic development, recreation, crime and juvenile delinquency, and social services. While Model Cities literature insisted that it was “a people program,” the publications muted the role of “slum clearance”; in truth the city assigned a high priority to Portland West’s physical revitalization. Indeed, Portland’s successful 1967 request for a planning grant stated explicitly that “the City primarily sought to improve the quality of housing” in Portland West, in addition to providing relocation services, improved public facilities, and an attractive neighborhood.

All of these goals were considered vital to a renewed downtown – a downtown literally surrounded by Portland West. Muskie’s Senate Banking and Currency Committee exercised legislative responsibility for urban renewal, and Muskie in the early 1960s fretted that 1950s-style ur-
ban renewal had been growing day by day more unpopular, attacked from the right and the left. Without prompt action his state might fail to benefit from federal largess. Portland stood poised for both waterfront and downtown renewal, and as an advocate of comprehensive, coordinated urban renewal, Muskie saw Model Cities as the instrument for a more effective, integrated, and humane solution to urban blight.\(^\text{20}\)

Not coincidentally, then, when Howard Heller, Executive Director of the Portland Renewal Authority (PRA), submitted the city’s planning grant for “Downtown Two (to be funded by HUD’s General Neighborhood Renewal Plan [GNRP]),” he emphasized that Downtown Two and Model Cities were dovetailed. “The appropriateness of these [housing] programs,” he wrote, “has been predicated on “the assumption that downtown would be renewed and new employment opportunities would be created in this area.”\(^\text{21}\) Downtown Two mainly involved the “environmental upgrading” and retention of large, established city business houses, A.H. Benoit’s and the Porteous and Mitchell department stores, the Casco Bay and Canal banks, and the Union Mutual Insurance Company. Since HUD favored expansion of housing supply over business buildings, it initially rated Portland’s Downtown Two project low. Consequently, Portland endeavored to dovetail its Downtown and Model Cities programs. The Gruen plan had projected that by providing downtown access and modern parking facilities for Sears and Roebuck, Benoits, Porteous and Mitchell, Woolworths, Grants, and the city’s banking offices, renewal would add 300 new downtown jobs. Model Cities provided vocational training, new and rehabilitated housing, and enhanced quality of life for this workforce. Portland, in fact, had specifically tailored its renewal to meet the national goal of conservation and housing expansion, contending that downtown would become a district of job opportunity and Portland West a Mecca for good housing. Applications for Model Cities and GNRP grants, therefore, were developed jointly.\(^\text{22}\) In an explanatory letter to HUD’s Renewal Assistance Administrator Charles Horan, Heller minced few words in exhorting the human aspects of Downtown Two. Hundreds of jobs, he argued, hinged on Portland not losing employers like Union Mutual, Benoits, and Canal Bank. “I would like to point out that our Model Cities Program, which encompasses the area immediately adjacent to the Downtown, has been designed to supplement downtown renewal. Without Downtown renewal, it seems doubtful that the adjacent Model Cities neighborhood can be revitalized.”\(^\text{23}\)

In fall 1967 the presidents of almost every major downtown firm
A good part of the Model Cities effort went into physical reconstruction of Portland’s downtown, a project that mobilized a wide range of federal, state, and local resources. Model Cities dollars not only underwrote a key Greater Portland Landmarks historic resources study, but they funded a Housing Information Service, along with sewer, sidewalk, and street lighting repairs, traffic control studies, spot demolition, and a program titled simply “Urban Beautification.” Maine Historical Society photo.
beseeched HUD to fund Downtown Two in tandem with Model Cities. Arthur Benoit, whose store sat prominently on Monument Square, “couldn’t remember when there was quite as much team work within the community on any project as there is with regards to this. . . . There was never a more clear case of urgency for anything than that facing Portland for the next three years. We just cannot hope to survive in the classic sense of the city unless we receive the Renewal Funds.”

As Portland’s Task Forces held hearings, carried out research, and compiled data to define Portland West’s employment, housing, education, health, crime, and recreation problems and sculpted a Model Cities Program, the City Council and the City Planning Department focused on identifying the crucial nexus between urban renewal and human renewal. Meeting with city business leaders, Muskie reiterated the new social emphasis of HUD: “the agency would look especially favorably,” he told them, “at Portland’s [downtown] urban renewal program as it related to the ‘people problem’ of the Model Cities.”

Muskie’s words resonated with Model Cities’ planners, and by 1969 Portland had moved from the planning stage of the Model Cities Program into the “First Year Action” phase, and clearly the city now saw Model Cities’ various segments — housing, job training, health services, policing, and historic preservation — tightly linked to the future of the downtown. Indeed, by 1972, when Downtown Two, now called the Maine Way project, was well underway, the Annual Report of the Portland Renewal Authority wove the two HUD programs together seamlessly. Clearing blight and re-housing Portland West benefitted the downtown area.

However, to label Portland West “blighted” surely stretched the definition of that word. The eight neighborhoods, an assemblage of old “streetcar suburbs” ringing most of the city’s downtown, had become “planning districts”: the West End, Bramhall, Mellen, Bayside West, Congress, Clark, Park, and Commercial. They included the magnificent Colonial Revival mansions overlooking the Fore River on the Western Promenade, the exquisite collection of John Calvin Stevens “Shingle Style” architecture on Bowdoin Street, and attractive Queen Anne-Style triple-deckers in the Park District. Other neighborhoods in the Model Cities district contained rich collections of early Federal and ornate Victorian treasures. However, parts of Bayside and the West End also harbored seedy rooming houses and ramshackle hovels. Portland’s director of Model Cities, Robert Hawkins, the PWAC, and Task Force members charged with drafting the city’s First Year Action Plan acknowledged this
diversity of conditions. They portrayed the area’s “threatened” historic landmarks, underscored the 2,700 dwelling units branded as “deteriorated” in the 1960 census, and stressed that Portland suffered from a severe shortage of decent affordable housing. But poor housing, along with the West End’s failing schools, its dearth of recreational facilities, and its poor mental health care, were all symptomatic of the real problem: low income. Poverty, argued Hawkins and the other authors of the action plan, was “the real specter which forever haunt[ed] the Portland West community. . . . Forty-one percent of its children suffered from hard-core poverty.” Hopelessness and defeatism accompanied poverty; here lived an older, more transient, undereducated, under-served population to be reintegrated into the social and economic orbit of Portland’s urban life by rebuilding the social and physical fabric of the Model City. Indeed, since Portland West comprised most of the peninsula minus the central business district, and since the downtown waited for funding under the General Neighborhood Renewal Program, rejuvenating the West End heralded an urban renaissance.28

That renaissance hopefully neared when on December 13, 1968, Robert Hawkins, on behalf of the City of Portland, applied to HUD for a $1,834,004 supplemental grant to execute “a Comprehensive City Development Plan Including the First Year Action Program for the year 1969.” It was a massive and impressive document, rich in statistics, laden with analysis, and programmatically innovative.29 In conformance with HUD guidelines, the plan detailed Portland West’s problems — alcoholism, crime, juvenile delinquency, joblessness, poor health, poor education, and shabby or non-existent social services — and described projects to remedy them. Social programs to “break the pattern of poverty,” give “access to opportunity,” “ensure dignity,” “increase purchasing power,” and afford “choice” loomed large. The plan mobilized the scattered resources of HUD, OEO, HEW, Department of Labor, and state, local and private agencies to flood Portland West with new programs, including a Model (experimental) Elementary School (Rosa True), area vocational education, adult education, Head Start, a model police unit, and a halfway house for alcoholics. Many of these programs fit the conventional Johnson-era “War on Poverty” mold, but some did not. Portland’s boldly innovative “income-maintenance” proposal, a $200,000 item to use as “child allotments,” resembled the Family Assistance Plan Daniel P. Moynihan proposed to the Richard Nixon administration several years later. That idea was rejected by the City Council, but other programs, such as Pharos House to combat criminal recidivism, a neighborhood
By the time the Nixon administration pulled the plug on the Model Cities Program, the Portland renaissance had been launched, with a new eleven-story Canal Bank Building facing a sparkling Monument Square, with other skyscrapers nearby on Congress Street. Maine Historical Society photo.
class in classical music appreciation, a drug store cooperative, and COMBAT (Consumers in Maine Bring Action Together), despite their radical tinge, won council approval.30

As much as Portland West sought to overcome the area’s poverty and kindle hope, the plan, confessed its authors, would fail if neighbors used their newfound power of choice to relocate to the newer, grassy suburbs. Thus, Portland West’s leadership viewed the redemption of the neighborhood’s physical space on a par with the revitalization of its social and economic life.

Model Cities and Neighborhood Renewal

Keyed as it was to the city’s broader strategy of downtown renewal, physical (bricks and mortar) development naturally ranked high among Portland’s Model Cities goals. The city aspired to restore Bramhall, Mellen, Park, and the other five neighborhoods of Portland West to their nineteenth-century respectability. In fact, one of those neighborhoods, the Western Promenade, crowned by an Olmsted-designed park featuring a distant vista of Mount Washington, had long housed the city’s economic elite. To adequately serve a newly-expanded downtown workforce, these neighborhoods would have to feature not only clean, safe streets, but also good schools and most of all plentiful affordable housing. Task Force studies conducted jointly by the city’s Housing Inspection Department, the Housing Task Force, and Portland Landmarks singled out structures “historically, aesthetically, or architecturally worthy of preservation.” Those less distinguished were deemed “eligible for federal renewal, rehabilitation, redevelopment and code enforcement” action, or even demolition.31

Age, disinvestment and decay had taken its toll on Portland West, despite the proximity of such valuable neighborhood assets as the mansion-studded Western Promenade. Raw waste from Portland West neighborhoods spilled into Portland Harbor. Broken street lamps and irregular garbage collection bequeathed dark, dangerous, and malodorous walkways. Too many area residents lived “below any minimum standard of existence which our society should tolerate.” The 1968 Action Plan summoned Portland West to become “a balanced [innovative] mixture of uses, [residential] structure types, and open space . . . that meet the highest standard of urban design that preserves the classic character and charm of our present city.” Planning, it added, “must be coordinated with . . . other aspects of the Model City Program, and other city programs within Portland West must be coordinated with the physical planning effort.”32
For this physical reconstruction phase, Portland West mobilized a bevy of federal, state and local public as well as private resources, including the Chamber of Commerce, the Maine State Savings Bank, the Urban Renewal Administration, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), city code enforcement, Portland Public Works, and the sanitation, and city planning departments. Using Model Cities’ funds, the city created a new Portland Department of Housing and Community Development. True to HUD’s mandate for comprehensiveness, Portland Model Cities dollars not only underwrote a key Greater Portland Landmarks historic resources study, but a Housing Information Service along with sewer, sidewalk, and street lighting repairs, traffic control studies, spot demolition, and a program titled simply “Urban Beautification.”

All of this physical development complemented Portland’s effort to make Model Cities a key part of the city’s larger downtown renewal. A $324,000 budget item identified as “Neighborhood Development Program,” targeted for Portland West housing and rehabilitation work, stood out as the city’s single largest Model Cities fiscal year 1969 expenditure, followed by the $94,000 budgeted for “Urban Beautification.” However, in order to bar Model Cities from intruding upon HUD’s ongoing housing development agenda, Congress prohibited Model Cities from directly using supplemental funds for new housing construction. Instead it limited all Model Cities new housing funds to “innovative” or “experimental” programs, a requirement that ultimately proved highly constraining.33

Experiments in Housing

Since 1937 federal housing administrators had always encouraged innovation in housing design hoping to employ technology to solve the problem of delivering affordable mass housing. In the 1940s, for example, Buckminster Fuller had proposed that FHA utilize geodesic domes as an affordable housing design. In 1968 Portland’s Housing Task Force enthusiastically seized upon the idea of an “Experimental Housing Program,” and, according to City Manager Menario, “indicated a deep desire that [the city] standards be high quality housing designed with relevance for inner-city housing and middle-income residents.”34 The City’s Chamber of Commerce perceived experimental housing as an ideal reuse for Portland’s aging and abandoned piers, molding from long disuse on the western waterfront. City officials creatively included this waterfront infrastructure as part of the Portland West neighborhood.

Obsessed as he was with both contemporary architecture and mod-
Thanks in no small part to the Model Cities Program, Portland learned to embrace historic preservation as a planning tool. This in turn smoothed the way for the reconstruction of the city’s threadbare waterfront district. The Old Port Exchange was designed to be an urban festival marketplace similar to Ghirardelli Square in San Francisco and Quincy Market in Boston. Maine Historical Society photo.

ern systems theory, Model Cities administrator Hawkins extolled the Westinghouse Corporation’s proposals for space age, modular housing designs, especially one for “Air Rights Housing” built on stilts, which seemed ideal for the unused city piers. Portland included the “Air Rights Housing” in its 1968 Model Cities application for supplemental funds, and although the idea never advanced beyond the fantasy stage, the city featured an architectural rendition of “Air Rights Housing” on the cover of its 1975 Model Cities final report.35

More realistic was the Chamber of Commerce’s sponsorship of Portland Housing Opportunities, Inc., a non-profit, limited-dividend corporation formed to build innovative affordable rental and private housing. Much of this would be located on space freed by Title I (of the 1949 Housing Act) slum clearance activity. Housing Opportunities (HO) functioned as a site developer working with local, state, and federal agencies to navigate the permitting process and expedite the construction of HUD-subsidized private housing and assisted rental housing. HO proposed construction of 105 high-rise housing units for low and moderate income families, whereas at Dermot Court the company em-
ployed an experimental modular design for sixteen low-rise, homeownership units. Edmund Muskie had long supported rent supplements, limited-dividend housing, and other private-market solutions to the low and moderate income housing supply problem, and he exuded considerable enthusiasm for Portland’s Housing Opportunities, Inc., as an experimental program. Nevertheless, Portland’s Final Report on Model Cities deemed the innovative program a failure. While it did build Dermot Court, Housing Opportunities’ plans for a much needed 105-unit, eleven-story high rise never left the architect’s drawing board, and the non-profit housing firm permanently folded in June 1973.

Appraising the successes and failures of Model Cities in 1975, both Portland West officials and Task Force members concluded that bureaucratic inertia and the rising cost of homebuilding in the early 1970s doomed any housing innovation and experimentation. Much of the enthusiasm for Air Rights housing and modular construction fizzled during the half-year delay between grant approval in late 1968 and the actual receipt of funds in June 1969, a delay mainly caused by the Nixon administration’s demand that all Model Cities grants be scrutinized to excise the fat. The City Council then continued the procrastination, first by stripping away the income-maintenance provision and then temporizing endlessly over funding experimental housing. Meanwhile, the Portland Building Inspection Department proved reluctant to grant variances to the city’s zoning and buildings codes, especially its minimum lot size. What housing innovation survived succumbed during the fourth and fifth years of Model Cities in 1972-1973, when, with rumors of scandals rife, the federal Office of Management and Budget (OMB) declared a moratorium on all subsidized housing programs.

Despite the travail, Housing Opportunities stimulated interest in subsidized housing, and during a national housing slowdown, caused in part by rising interest rates, 170 units of FHA-subsidized turnkey and leased public housing arose in Portland West, mainly as infill units. This, however, was barely half of what the PWAC demanded. The Nixon administration’s moratorium also affected housing rehabilitation, the most successful Model Cities housing program in Portland West. Thanks in large part to the city’s MICAH housing program, Model Cities blanketed Portland West with rehabilitation loans. Non-profit, non-denominational, MICAH (a play on the Biblical Micah and an acronym for Metropolitan Council on Affordable Housing) effectively made rehabilitation the chief vehicle for better housing in the district, and in effect, pre-
served Portland’s nineteenth-century housing stock, making the city’s West End again a more fashionable address.

MICAH, Inc., in fact, operated to make housing rehabilitation a viable alternative to new construction and neighborhood conservation. Over the five-year life of Model Cities funding, from 1969 to 1973, MICAH received $672,000 in grants, $550,000 of which went directly to low and moderate income homeowners, and generated over $1.25 million in rehabilitation activity. MICAH coordinated with city housing inspectors and intensified code enforcement in the Portland West neighborhood. Grants funded by both Model Cities and FHA allowed owners of substandard, nineteenth-century housing to correct major interior and exterior code violations. A vital part of MICAH’s work involved purchasing, rehabilitating, and selling or renting deteriorated residential structures, often originally held by absentee owners. This profitable venture made MICAH a self-sufficient, non-profit corporation that also became a housing advocacy body, assisting many families to become homeowners. In 1973 MICAH in addition controlled 106 units of rehabilitated for-rent homes in the Danforth Street neighborhood. However, OMB’s impoundment of HUD rehabilitation loan monies in 1973 — later ruled illegal — crippled MICAH and other housing conservation work in Portland.40

Portland West’s checkered experience with citizen participation and its disappointing experimental housing record aside, the program’s accomplishments in housing rehabilitation, historic preservation, neighborhood beautification, and neighborhood education were significant. In addition, its highly-praised Model Police Station, half way houses, Youth Opportunity, and day care centers more than warranted the encomiums accorded the program. Understandably, then, Portland decried the Nixon cutbacks in Model Cities funding. Washington’s evisceration of Model Cities brought the program to a halt in 1974 when the city received its last Model Cities supplemental payment, barely half of what was due.41

But Portland West’s success must be measured in the broader context of downtown renewal. Maine Way, the signature downtown renaissance project that began as Downtown Two, surged at the very moment Nixon pulled the plug on Model Cities. The $13 million project, approved by HUD in 1972, remade the face of Portland’s downtown. By the 1980s, Maine Way featured a new eleven-story Canal Bank Building facing a sparkling Monument Square, a shimmering Maine Savings Bank skyscraper nearby on Congress Street, and the bench-and tree-
lined pedestrian mall linking the Old Port with Portland’s business and banking center on Congress Street. On widened Spring Street stood the Cumberland County Civic Center, first proposed by Victor Gruen in the 1960s, along with his ring-road position parking garages. The whole assemblage was accessed by the Franklin Arterial and one-way traffic on High and State Street.42

Thanks in no small part to the Model Cities Program, Portland soon came to embrace historic preservation as a premier planning tool. Greater Portland Landmarks used its Model Cities grant to alert Portland to its underappreciated historic resources and to make history a vehicle for resurrecting the city’s sagging, but once critically important tourist economy. Thanks to Model Cities, Portland came to appreciate rehabilitation more than demolition as a planning tool.43

Amidst Model Cities and the early Downtown Two, Frank Akers, president of a central city brass castings firm forced to relocate due to the widening of Spring Street, purchased an old brick building at Fore and Exchange streets, at the heart of the grimy “Old Port” district. Aware of the successful urban festival marketplaces at Ghirardelli Square in San Francisco and Faneuil Hall in Boston, Akers saw potential in Old Port’s quaint, narrow, serpentine streets and its four- and five-story nineteenth-century commercial buildings, many of them endowed with striking Italianate bracketed cornices, Queen-Ann bays, and other Victorian architrave. In the face of city plans to demolish parts of the Old Port area, Akers joined with other intrigued neighborhood businessmen to form the Old Port Exchange Association. Akers and his associates purchased several whole blocks of the gritty district adjoining the Commercial Street wharves and proceeded to promote the idea of the Old Port as Portland’s own festival marketplace.44

Portland’s Maine Way and the subsequent Old Port development in some ways restored the city’s nineteenth-century legacy as the “Gateway to Vacationland.” Although Congress Street still battles to recapture the glamour and vibrancy of its youth, and while the Bayside Neighborhood still awaits a developer to crown its half-century of renewal promises, most modern urban critics regard the Portland urban peninsula as renewed and – on the whole – economically healthy. Model Cities played a key role in that process.45

From the outset Portland renewal officials linked Model Cities, “a mayor’s program,” with the city’s larger plans for downtown renewal. Under the auspices of Senator Edmund Muskie, Portland carved out a model neighborhood. Portland West, comprising the lion’s share of the
peninsula, encompasses stately Victorian-era homes and neighborhoods of renter occupied housing strained by suburbanization, disinvestment, and poor services. Reborn, this once seedy residential area became the social and economic foundation for revitalization of a new downtown economy based on banking, insurance, government, and business services, as well as traditional commerce. Upgrading housing, health, education, recreation, and police services in Portland West, argued the city’s Model Cities’ officials, would restore “neighborhood quality,” boosting the viability of Portland as a whole. This historically Progressive-Era interpretation of comprehensive civic well-being infused the Model Cities Program in Portland, with its emphasis on the connection between better housing, improved social services, downtown renewal, and revitalization of the “city as a whole.”46 While the much touted experimental housing failed, the Model Cities emphasis on housing rehabilitation and historic preservation left a deep impression on the city. Model Cities was all too easily forgotten, but it remains the cornerstone of the Portland renaissance.

NOTES


Muskie “for all you have done to assist City of Portland in its relationship with the Federal Government,” Box 763, folder 6, MSP, MA; Barnett I. Shur to Muskie, May 15, 1967, Box 763, folder 6, MSP, MA.

14. Muskie’s aid Don Nicoll witnessed the event. See Don Nicoll, interview with Andrea L’Hommedieu, MA [hereinafter Nicoll interview], May 3, 2003, MOH #435, MA.

15. Nevin, Muskie of Maine; Nicoll interview, May 3, 2003, MA. See also Frieden and Kaplan, Politics of Neglect, p. 58. On Portland’s application for a Model Cities planning grant, see Robert Weaver to Muskie, May 11, 1967, and Weaver to Muskie, June 1, 1967, both in Box 763, folder 7, MSP, MA.

16. See Robert C. Weaver to Margaret Chase Smith, November 16, 1967; Edward Allen to Margaret Chase Smith, August 2, 1967; and John E. Menario to Margaret Chase Smith, August 3, 1967, all in Margaret Chase Smith Library, Skowhegan, Maine [hereinafter MCSL].


20. Muskie to Casper Cowan (Portland Renewal Authority), March 31, 1967, Box 191, Folder 9, MSP, MA.


22. Portland Program for Meeting the National Goal of Urban Renewal Priorities,” September 21, 1967, and Heller to Muskie, September 22, 1967, both in Box 1107, folder 8, MSP, MA.

24. For example, Carleton Lane to Paul Folan, Chair of PRA, September 13, 1967; Arthur Benoit to Paul Folan, September 15, 1967, and Arthur H. Benoit to Muskie, November 22, 1967, all in Box 1107, Folder 8, MSP, MA.


33. Final Evaluation Report, 1975, p. 107, Box 2481, folder 4, MSP, MA.

34. John E. Menario to H. Ralph Taylor, Assistant Secretary of HUD, June 7, 1968, and “Housing Experiment May be Tried Here,” *Portland Evening Express*, April 26, 1968, both in Box 1733, folder 2, MSP, MA.


36. On Housing Opportunities, Inc., see Menario to Muskie, March 29, 1971, Box 1733, folder 5; Portland Renewal Authority, Annual Report, 1972, MSP, MA.


38. Final Report, 1975, Box 2481, folder 4, p. 117, MA.


40. On conservation work in Longfellow square and MICAH, see Final Report, 1975, Box 2481, folder 4, page 107, 117-118.

42. The Gruen Plan included a set of design drawings for the downtown arterial system. See also personal interview with Joseph Gray, City Manager of Portland, in his City Hall Office, January 31, 2007.


45. In 2007 a Whole Foods grocery moved into Bayside together with office complexes and a large student housing complex, but the presence of junk yards and empty lots still belie evidence of real renaissance. On “Main Street” and its triumphs and travails, see Isenberg, Downtown America. On Maine Way, see “Meeting [sponsored by Greater Portland Chamber of Commerce] on “Maine Way: Plan Analysis, Wednesday, May 16, 1973,” in Box 2171, folder 4, MSP, MA; also Portland Renewal Authority, Annual Report, 1972, found in Maine Historical Society Library, MP837.125, Maine Historical Society.