

9-1-2009

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### Recommended Citation

Potholm, Christian P. (2009) "Margaret Chase Smith: The Persistence of a Political Archetype," *New England Journal of Political Science*: Vol. 4: No. 1, Article 4.

Available at: <https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/nejps/vol4/iss1/4>

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## **Margaret Chase Smith: The Persistence of a Political Archetype**

Christian P. Potholm  
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This article will explore iterative strategic, tactical and image replication of elements from that archetype in the political careers of William S. Cohen, Olympia Snowe and Susan Collins. It will also examine the overarching impacts Smith's career has had, and continues to have, on the statewide Maine electoral scene, especially its psychographic expectations.<sup>1</sup> Many observers of Maine's political history rightly highlight the important, even seminal, role played by Ed Muskie, his successful race for governor in 1954 and the resulting creation and expansion of the modern Democrat party.<sup>2</sup>

Both David Nevin's *Muskie of Maine* and Theo Lippman and Donald C. Hansen's *Muskie* are pleasant reads and suitably laudatory of Muskie, although both completely miss the important legitimizing role—as do most Democratic stalwarts in their oral traditions about Muskie's upset victory in 1954—of Neil

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<sup>1</sup> The author is most grateful for the numerous suggestions, observations, additions and corrections of earlier drafts provided by Merton Henry, Tony Buxton, Juliana L'Hereaux, Peter Burr, Greg Gallant, David Emery, Jed Lyons, Steve Robinson, Tina Curtin, Tom Daffron, Alex Ray, Tim Fuderich, Paul Mills, Bill Morin, Erik Potholm, John Baughman and Mike Franz. And a special thank you to Craig Hardt for his fine help with the footnotes. True scholarship will always be collaborative.

<sup>2</sup> Strangely enough, there is no recent scholarly biography of Muskie and according to the Muskie Archives, none currently in process. Lippman and Hansen (1971) Nevin (1972) appeared in the early 1970s. The interested reader should also consult Muskie (1972), which also seems to have been written with an eye toward the 1972 presidential election for it is very skimpy on Maine politics and even Muskie's own 1954 ground breaking election.

Bishop and his Republicans for Muskie. Bishop virtually delivered Waldo County (then along with Lincoln County, one of the most Republican of counties) after Bishop had a falling out with his 1952 primary opponent and subsequent sitting governor, Burton Cross. Bishop's fellow Republican, State Senator Malcolm Noyes, joined him in the Republicans for Muskie effort and nearly helped Muskie carry Hancock County. The Democrats also paid for Bishop to appear twice statewide on television urging support of Muskie.<sup>3</sup> This activity paid big electoral dividends.

But earlier, Margaret Chase Smith's upset victory in her 1948 US Senate race set in motion equally important and even more enduring patterns of influence by providing examples of how Republicans - and others - needed (and continue to need) to run to be successful on a statewide basis. Smith's subsequent loss to Congressman William "Bill" Hathaway in 1972 has tended to obscure the enduring political archetype she established which was to be imitated - often to a very considerable degree - by later successful Republican senatorial candidates, especially William "Bill" Cohen, Olympia "OJ" Snowe and Susan Collins. To this day, it remains baffling the extent to which political biographers and writers portray Smith in 1972 as doomed and too old to compete, as if it were a foregone conclusion she would lose simply because of her age and her seeming to be out of touch with political reality. This view is sheer nonsense. Bill Hathaway himself put it best when he told supporters after his election that he hadn't expected to win and if Smith had run but a single TV advertisement, he wouldn't have.

Although she handily (67% to 33%) defeated her Republican primary opponent, Robert A. G. Monks, that June, Monks spent almost \$150,000 (to her

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<sup>3</sup> For a further exploration of this understandable but still odd historical oversight, see Potholm (2003, 33-60). Of course, after 1954, Muskie was in control of his own destiny and no longer needed Bishop or Malcolm Noyes or any other Republican authority figures; and Bishop, in fact, would later run against Muskie in 1970 getting only 38% of the vote.

\$2600), to raise concerns about her age, status and positions on issues facing Mainers with the 1972 general election voters. To recoup this degraded image, Senator Smith simply needed to re-introduce herself to Maine voters that fall using television. It was a simple and known way to re-elect incumbents who had suffered erosion in support.

In this regard, many commentators have failed to note the marked contrast between her losing (“doomed”) campaign and the previous very successful re-election of the even older Republican senator from Vermont, 76 year old George Aiken. Aiken and the Republican Senatorial Committee used television masterfully to offset questions about his age and received 67% of the vote in the previous election cycle. Aiken’s success gives additional credence to Hathaway’s suggestion - as does Hathaway’s subsequent drubbing (receiving only 34% of the vote in 1978) by William Cohen in the next senatorial election. Regardless of his personal and professional *bone fides*, Hathaway won the senatorial election in 1972 largely by default.

In fact, very soon, Hathaway was to be only the second only Maine senator in 93 years to be forcibly limited to one term.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, Margaret Chase Smith only lost the 1972 contest with Hathaway by a margin of 53% to 47%, so that a mere 3.5% electoral swing in her favor would have re-elected her. This swing could quite easily have been accomplished with 1000 gross rating points (GRP’s) of television statewide - one week’s worth.

In comparison to Hathaway’s first-rate television effort,<sup>5</sup> not only did MCS do no television advertising of her own, she even refused to appear in the

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<sup>4</sup> Senator Fred Payne was the other, being beaten by Muskie in 1958. Those Maine senators serving less than two terms by their own volition or because they simply filled an unexpired term include Obadiah Gardner (1911-1913), A.R. Gould (1926-1931), Charles Johnson (1910-1916) and Edwin Burleigh (1913-1916).

<sup>5</sup> One of his very effective ads portrayed Hathaway as a man of the people while driving up Maine Turnpike as if that were the way he normally traveled from Washington to Maine. Another excellent one showed this Harvard and Harvard Law School graduate standing with some random old Maine codger, listening intently to him

television commercial crafted for her by the Maine Republican party.<sup>6</sup> Her campaign did feature a vigorous personal schedule - but only after Congress adjourned in mid-October - and also utilized techniques which had worked in the past, including telephone-chain volunteers and pre-printed post cards which were always up dated with each election. At the end of the day, it was her failure to take advantage of the newer form of TV advertising, the 30-second commercial which ensured that she would be defeated that election cycle (Ray 2008, 38).<sup>7</sup> It was thus Smith's failure in the conduct of her 1972 campaign *qua* campaign, not some *a priori* determinant, which cost her re-election.

Although there are numerous biographies of Smith, perhaps because of their excessive focus on her gender, her role as a feminist (or as some would argue, an "anti-feminist feminist") or her breaking of convention, most of these works seem to have overlooked her importance in terms of an enduring, gender-

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speak some odd platitudes as if the old fellow was imparting the true secrets of the universe. As the old geezer spoke his lines, Hathaway would nod sagely in agreement. This was, in terms of political image making, sheer genius. For her part, Smith (and other Republican candidates) had previously often relied on buying ½ hour of TV time the night before the election. By 1972, it was clear that this format and timing were no longer applicable, the timing because most voters in most elections were found to have made up their minds long before that time and with the novelty of TV have worn off, few voters would watch a half hour political piece. The late-stage, ½ hour format had now been superseded by the 30 second commercial. Bill Cohen in 1972 was the first Republican candidate to use this newer approach, one which had been adopted earlier by Democratic candidates in Maine.

<sup>6</sup> Part of this mistake in strategy may, or may not, have been due to the fact that on December 9, 1971, Bill Lewis suffered a major heart attack.

<sup>7</sup> Even if Senator Smith did not want to use TV herself, the Republican National Senatorial Committee and the Maine State Republican Party could have done the job for her but she refused to permit them to do so. In mid-October, I was astonished when sent by Bill Cohen to Republican Party Headquarters to meet with the then-chair, Charlie Moreshead. He reported that Margaret had refused to take \$30,000 (in 1972 dollars!) from the party. As I now remember, the Cohen campaign took \$10,000 from this total and was very grateful, using it for the campaign's last week's worth of TV. At the time, we cared not a fig for her re-election chances but only that we had some unexpected funds available for our final media blitz.

neutral role model for statewide political success in Maine (Schmidt 1996; Sherman\_2000; Wallace 1995; Gould 1995).

At base, there is, of course, a magical quality to her career as well as to the enduring legacy of the archetype she established. When you think of a young woman who came of age before women were even granted the right to vote; and one from a poor and somewhat dysfunctional family, one who struggled with her academic studies in high school and who started out as a night telephone operator and then as a teacher in a one room school house, her subsequent state and national political career is truly amazing.

To be sure, her natural leadership skills would emerge as a young adult even before her marriage to Clyde Smith, one of the most successful political figures of that or any other era in Maine politics.<sup>8</sup> Margaret Chase was, even four years before her marriage, the president of the state Business and Professional Women's (BPW) Clubs, then a very prestigious and influential organization, and spent several years in key roles at the local newspaper, and then as office manager of a large woolen mill. By the time of her marriage in 1930 to Clyde Smith (who was 21 years older than she), Margaret entered into a ten year partnership which would further showcase her talents.

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<sup>8</sup> Clyde H. Smith (known to Maine political campaign insiders as "Clyde the Glide") won 50 local and congressional elections and lost none, a truly amazing performance. A farmer, grocery store manager and owner, newspaper owner and small businessman before and after entering Maine elections, if not for a monogamous marriage. Indeed, when later in his career, Margaret claimed that people had voted for her as much as for him, he—quite rightly and tartly retorted—"Sis, you've done some good things for me, but you have to remember that I did some very good things before I ever knew you at all." (Mrs. Cornelius) Byrne (1947). Smith served as selectman, sheriff, state representative and senator, a member of the Governor's Executive Council, a Maine highway commissioner and Congressman. Margaret had a good role model for winning Maine elections, if not for a monogamous marriage. Indeed, when later in his career, Margaret claimed that people had voted for her as much as for him, he - quite rightly and tartly - retorted, "Sis, you've done some good things for me, but you have to remember that I did some very good things before I ever knew you at all." Byrne (1947).

When Clyde was elected to Congress in 1936, he tried to leave his wife behind to run his political office in Maine, but Margaret insisted on going with him to Washington, and used considerable political skill of her own to force him to take her with him (see below). Later, when he wanted to quit Congress because of poor health and a lack of desire to serve in an arena where he was not the center of attention, she insisted on his running for re-election.

Clyde's death in 1940 from heart failure cast in sharp relief Margaret's potential fall from her political and personal state of grace. But she jumped into the race to replace him with vigor and dispatch, and won four elections in six months (a special primary, a special election, then a regular primary and finally, a regular general election), eventually winning by a margin of 64.6 to 35.4% over Democrat Edward J. Beauchamp in September, 1940. From that time on, she played an important role in American as well as Maine politics.

As Maine's statewide electorate appears to becoming more and more behavioral Democratic in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, especially in its choices for president and Congress, the lessons of Margaret Chase Smith have increasing validity for those Republican candidates who are interested in winning statewide elections in the Pine Tree State, as opposed to those simply content to make an ideological statement by or while running for office. Equally important, her approach is a model for those Democratic candidates who want to transcend their local success to win statewide elections for the US Senate.

We will now explore the tactics, strategies and especially the image projection techniques of Margaret Chase Smith (together with those of her subsequent chief political adviser and close confidant, General William Lewis), noting where possible how they were adopted by Cohen, Snowe, Collins and others. We are not suggesting, of course, that Cohen, Snowe and Collins necessarily or even consciously, decided to copy her model with *all* its major dimensions. But in fact, their congressional and later senatorial campaigns were to reproduce the key elements of that paradigm with great frequency and, of

course, consistent success. Her paradigm has, in fact, become a model of what Republicans must continue to do statewide in Maine in order to survive in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Certainly the political operatives who assisted Cohen, Snowe and Collins were well aware of the winning dimensions of her political model.

In this regard, the importance of that archetype would seem to grow out of the political science literature generated by those such as Richard Fenno who have looked at campaigns by “dropping into” them in order to see generalized pattern of success or failure in campaigns. The results of this participant/observer approach to the study of politics and Fenno’s resulting book (Fenno 1978) fall into this genre, as does Fenno’s important and ultimately overarching emphasis on the illuminating aspects of campaigns *qua* campaigns. (Fenno 1996).

### **Patterns of the Image Archetype**

There are at least five aspects to both Margaret Chase Smith’s election campaigns and her subsequent service which not only propelled her onto the national stage and into political immortality as the first woman of a major political party to have her name placed in presidential nomination, but, also created a political archetype which endures in Maine until the present day. That archetype helped to define (and motivate) the success of William S. Cohen, Olympia Snowe and Susan Collins, as well as others such as Dave Emery and Jock McKernan. Despite the myriad of differences among Cohen, Snowe and Collins, their basic adherence to the Margaret Chase Smith image archetype electorally overrides those differences.

Given the fact that three of the four were women, it might be tempting to see this as some atavistic, subconscious independent variable, with femaleness being the key influence vector. But gender was certainly *not* a key variable in this case. Three times during the period under review, the Democrats nominated a woman to run against Margaret Chase Smith, Olympia Snowe *and* Susan Collins. The average of the four attempts of Lucia Cormier, Libby Mitchell,



Chellie Pingree and Jean Hay-Bright was 36.6% in the general election. It was the adherence to the MCS archetype, not the variable of femininity, which carried the day.<sup>9</sup>

Cohen, Snowe and Collins all have paid deference to Smith as an inspiration to their political careers. Susan Collins perhaps summed it up most strongly (and perhaps most irritatingly to Maine's senior senator, Olympia Snowe) when she wrote, "In a sense, that torch was passed to me by our former senator from Maine, Margaret Chase Smith." (Whitney 2000)<sup>10</sup> Of the three senators under review, Collins would seem to have registered the greatest impact of Senator Smith when as a high school girl, she spent an hour with her and was very impressed. Collins herself had considerable family background in the field of politics with her father, uncle, grandfather and great, great grandfather all serving in the Maine Senate.

Bill Cohen clearly recognized Senator Smith's legacy when he spoke at her memorial service in Skowhegan in 1995, saying, "When thinking of Senator Smith, I am reminded of an ancient Chinese proverb that says, 'When drinking the water, don't forget who dug the well.' We are all carry on a great tradition which she help dig. Senator Smith's legacy transcends her specific accomplishments as a legislator. The whole is much greater than the sum of its parts" (Henry 2009).

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<sup>9</sup> Although it falls well beyond the prevue of this paper, it would be of considerable interest to explore systematically the thinking of Maine's Democratic leadership in their assumption that the way to beat a woman was to run a woman against her. Lucia M. Cormier was unopposed in her 1960 Democratic primary as was Chellie Pingree in 2002. Elizabeth "Libby" Mitchell was also unopposed in her 1984 primary when she ran against Bill Cohen, while Jean Hay Bright faced opposition by only Eric Mehnert in her 2006 primary bid to be the standard bearer against Olympia Snowe.

<sup>10</sup> Paul Mills adds another dimension to the comparison between the careers of Smith and Collins: both were to triumph in primaries over multi-millionaires, in Smith's case Governor Horace Hildreth and former Governor Sumner Sewall and in Collins' situation, Robert A. G. Months and John Hathaway.

For her part, Olympia Snowe credited Senator Smith with being “A fitting model for what being a good public servant should be” when she lobbied to have Smith’s portrait hung in the Capitol building. (Whitney 2000) Smith was someone upon whom another woman—or man—could take comfort and solace from when facing the inevitable slings and arrows of American politics. But this article will argue that besides serving as an inspiration and role model, Margaret Chase Smith provided William S. Cohen, Olympia J. Snowe and Susan Collins and other Republicans a masterful political archetype, the adherence to which makes statewide victory in Maine politics much more likely for Republicans and Democrats alike. That archetype remains as strong today as when she created it in the early 1940’s.

*The first primary feature of the Margaret Chase Smith archetype is a highly personalized style of political leadership and organization, one very different from that of Muskie and Maine’s party building Democrats.*

For Margaret Chase Smith, personal loyalty was held to be of importance, a feature above all else. She insisted that loyalty to herself trumped party, gender and other affiliations. Smith did not rely on the Republican party to provide her margin of victory. In fact, she consistently prided herself on her much more personal following which transcended Republican enrollment. (Smith 1950) She campaigned as if every voter mattered, irrespective of their party, and her many visits to every nook and cranny of the state were designed to bring her in close contact with people of all political persuasions.

This theme began even before her own electoral career. When Clyde won his congressional seat in 1936, and intended to head off to Washington without her, she insisted that the voters had elected a “team” and “they had voted for Margaret as much as for Clyde.” (Wallace 1995) After she had loyal followers circulate a petition to that effect, (which hundreds of people signed), Clyde

eventually grudgingly capitulated and took her to Washington with him where she became his office manager/administrative assistant.

From this initial foray into political action, Margaret Chase Smith evolved a fundamental dimension which declared in effect, you were a "Margaret Chase Smith Person" first and a Republican second. Westbrook Pegler, for example, called her only "a nominal Republican" (Wallace 1995, 108). She did not care about "party building" or later, "party rejuvenation." She had "Margaret Chase Smith people" in Clyde's district and later, in a majority of Maine towns and cities. These were people who believed in her and trusted her political judgment no matter what their own political affiliation.

Alex Ray, the national political operative who worked in Maine during the 1972-1974 period, put it best when he pointed out that there were three Republican parties in Maine during her tenure: elected Republican legislators, the Republican State Committee and "the Margaret Chase Smith Party those whose only interest was in keeping the legendary Senator in office." (Ray 2008)<sup>11</sup>

Patricia Ward Wallace also quotes former Republican John Reed incisively saying that in contrast to other Republican candidates of her era, "She had a chairperson in every hamlet, every city and town and plantation in the whole state.... She picked people very carefully," and "they believed in her." "They were for Margaret Smith, and they weren't going to worry about other candidates." (Wallace 1995) This was a time, of course, during and just after the Great Depression in which Democrats were competitive in many races despite huge Republican enrollment advantages.

There were at least several reasons for her antipathy to the Republican establishment. For one thing, she and Clyde harbored bitter feelings toward the Republican establishment - whose leaders thought she and he were not quite

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<sup>11</sup> Ray also notes that on arriving at party headquarters he was astonished to learn that "Senator Smith had never set foot in Maine's Republican headquarters."

deserving of the top prizes in the party. In Clyde's case, that leadership prevented him from running for governor in 1940 after he publically announced "I would like to complete a career of 43 years service to the State by being Governor in 1940" and began a de facto run for the Blaine House (Press Herald Bureau 1939) They pointedly refused to support him, and then pushed him into taking the consolation prize of a congressional seat after he had campaigned for a year seeking the governorship. Given their considerable power in that era, they effectively stopped his gubernatorial bid.

That same Republican state leadership also opposed Margaret's run for Congress in 1940, and especially when she tried for the US Senate in 1948, and continued to be troublesome to her thereafter. In fact, Merton Henry, President of the Margaret Chase Smith Foundation, has stated (as quoted by Barbara Cariddi) that if the Republican state committee had had the only votes in her elections, she would never have won any race (Cariddi 1999).

There was ongoing and often unparalleled hostility toward her by the Republican party establishment, hostility which fed her sense of paranoia and resentment to the point where, as Greg Gallant, Director of the Margaret Chase Smith Library, put it recently, "It is impossible to overemphasize Margaret Chase Smith's and Bill Lewis's disdain for the leadership of both the Maine Republican party and the Republican National Committee under Carroll Reese." (Gallant 2009).

Of course, as Paul Mills, the dean of Maine's political historians, has noted, Smith herself had some Republican role models of note when it came to bucking the party establishment. One such was Owen Brewster, who in 1924 upset the Republican establishment favorite, sitting Senate President and former House Speaker Frank G. Farrington by running on an anti- big power, anti-paper company populist theme. Also, there was the 1922 was example of Governor Percival Baxter, who not only championed conservation and was eventually responsible for the creation of Baxter State Park, but who also attacked the paper

companies and utilities who were such considerable sources of support for the Republican hierarchy.

Beyond her personal negative experience with the Republican establishment Margaret always envisioned herself as transcending purely “Republican values.” Viewing herself as an “outsider” from the Republican establishment in Maine (and nationally), she saw herself as representing all the people, not just Republicans, but Independents and Democrats alike. She always positioned herself as the candidate of the many, not the few. Smith’s core values were *her* core values, not the core values of her Republican base.

This astute positioning in a state where “the center holds” in all but a few exceptional elections, was to serve her and her imitators well. Oddly enough, one of her biographers, Patricia Schmidt, sees this independence as part of “her ongoing creation of herself (which) continued to isolate her” instead of the core value of her political success. (Schmidt 1996) Biography can be a strange business for those unused to the dynamics of political campaigns.

For his part, Bill Cohen made her personalized style of office-seeking the focus as one of his major core values, first in his 1972 Congressional race and later in his 1978 Senate bid. Indeed his written game plan for the 1972 election focuses again and again on the need to reach outside the Republican party to Independents and Democrats to make this personal connection (Bowdoin College 1972, XVIII, 249, 257, 263, especially the “Game Plan and General Strategy,” 319-339).<sup>12</sup> Indeed, the Cohen campaign’s dictum of “being for me is all that matters,” was stressfully implemented from the very beginning of his primary campaign when Cohen had to balance between supporters of Bob Monks who was challenging Margaret Chase Smith in the June, 1972 primary

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<sup>12</sup> The game plan predicted if he followed this outreach strategy, he would win 55% to 45% (Bowdoin College 1972, XVIII, 339). Cohen would actually attain 54.4% to Elmer Violette's 45.6%.

(and also providing significant funding for Cohen's campaign), and supporters of Senator Smith, whose votes were essential to his subsequent victory over Abbot Greene in that primary. Cohen was very successful in establishing the principle (much to Monks' chagrin) that loyalty to his campaign was the most paramount of concerns.

Later Cohen used the same strategy in all of his congressional races, his near-race against Senator Muskie in 1976 and that for the US Senate in 1978 against Bill Hathaway. Cohen's political career, like that of Margaret's, was based on this personalized approach to campaigning, as Cohen remained always on the lookout for Democrats and Independents who would support him even at the risk of alienating members of his own party.<sup>13</sup>

Indeed, Cohen's entire game plan for upsetting Senator Bill Hathaway in the election of 1978 was based not on getting out his Republican core following but on a concerted outreach to leaders and voters in the two Democratic strongholds of Portland and Lewiston, a strategy which eventually made it impossible for Hathaway to win no matter what he did. Key Democrats such as the Democratic mayor of Lewiston, Lillian Caron, and the highly respected

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<sup>13</sup> This was also the basis for his serious 1975 consideration of a run against Senator Edmund Muskie. Cohen's near run against Muskie in 1976 is fleshed out in some detail in Potholm (2003, 127-135). Cohen's initial 8% lead over Muskie in a potential matchup was based on over 25% of Democrats saying they would choose Cohen over Muskie. Parenthetically, alone among Cohen's advisors and closest supporters, I did not think that in this case, the Cohen outreach to Democrats would hold. At the end of the day were he to run against Muskie, I believed that enough of those disaffected Democrats would come back to "The Father of the Democrat Party" no matter how attractive Cohen's candidacy appeared early on.

At the very least, the odds for Cohen in such a race, I thought, were no better than 50-50; and by waiting two years and challenging Hathaway, there was a much better chance for him to become a US Senator. Operationally, there were (and are) some limits to the causal efficacy of the Margaret Chase Smith paradigm especially were it to be opposed by a serious candidate also imitating most of its dimensions.

Interestingly enough, until he ran for the presidency in 1972, Muskie himself fit a great deal of the Smith paradigm. When Muskie discovered how his radical veer to the left during that abortive effort had hurt his standing with Maine voters, he successfully tacked back to Maine's political center during "The Election Nobody Saw."

Democratic Representative (later State Senator), Georgette Berube, crossed party lines to endorse Cohen in that senatorial contest (Bowdoin College 1978, XX, 379-391, especially "The Senatorial Campaign of 1978," 483-885).<sup>14</sup> They did it on a personal basis as well as ideological grounds for, as Speaker John Martin so aptly put it when defending Berube's support of Cohen in the 1978 race (which she announced prior to her victory in the primary that year):

Although Rep. Berube had been the top vote-getter in Lewiston for some time, Bill Hathaway had never once contacted her until she announced for Cohen. Only after her endorsement of Cohen did he finally bother to call her. Perhaps this was because of the various factions in Lewiston. (Berube 2005)

It should be noted that none of the four Republican senators under review were ever terribly concerned about the ongoing drop in Republican party enrollments relative to Democratic ones. All were - and remain - consistently lukewarm to the notion of using their offices, personal followings and their prestige to rejuvenate the Republican state party apparatus as Republican enrollment fell from first in 1948 (and 1976) to third in 2008 behind "Independent" or Unenrolled and Democrat. None of the three ever spent much time or effort trying to increase party enrollment over the years in between. None ever worried overmuch about that decline.

All four of them were often at odds with the much more conservative Republican State Committee. In fact, like Smith, one of the few "electoral" defeats Cohen ever suffered occurred following his staff's ill-starred attempt to remove the executive director of the Republican party in 1973. Despite personally flying up from Washington and lobbying individual members of the

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<sup>14</sup> These personal commitments, of course, ran both ways as Cohen demonstrated through his support for many Democrats as when Lillian Caron ran to become Lewiston's mayor and Linda Abramson was elected mayor of Portland. Caron was the first woman mayor of any large city in Maine and Abramson the first female mayor of Portland.

State Committee, Cohen (and especially his political team) were ignominiously defeated. (Ray 2008) Cohen himself was very reluctant to engage in this effort, and was misled into this unwelcome arena and contest by over-reaching staff members, including the author.

Snowe herself was sporadically the subject of angry petitions by disenchanted Republicans, once just after she obtained 77% of the vote against Richard Charette in 1986.<sup>15</sup> As late as 2009, various Republican town committee members continue to complain about her moderate stances and putting what she perceives to be the good of the country above the good of Republican partisanship.

For her part, Collins was attacked in her 1994 gubernatorial race by members of the party apparatus, Republicans who were gleeful at her decline over that summer prior to her defeat in November. A Republican activist, Mark Finks, even went so far as to take her to court to challenge her residency requirement while the election was in process and eventually ran as a write-in candidate so as to cut Collin's vote. Republicans, far more than Democrats or Independents, were responsible for the undermining of her gubernatorial campaign. (Potholm 2003) She only later, in 1994, won election to the US Senate.

Over time, Cohen, Snowe and Collins learned - like Margaret Chase Smith before them - to avoid such turmoil with the Republican State Committee by having as little to do with it as possible. Instead, they concentrated on building and maintaining their own "personal" parties by reaching out to Democrats and Independents, not just at election time but year-round and election cycle-round.

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<sup>15</sup> That November, I had been asked to speak to the Brunswick Republican Town Committee on "Expanding the Republican Party," but when I began my talk, there was a lot of commotion over in one corner of the room. Orville "Tex" Ranger, a former Brunswick town councilor and long time harshly criticizing Senator Snowe. I tried, unsuccessfully, to point out that my talk and his action did not really go together. Republican activist, was indeed trying to get late comers to the lecture to sign his petition



They usually tried to ignore the machinations of the state party and often seemed to be imitating Senator Smith in avoiding state party headquarters altogether. Likewise, on the national level, all have always been careful not to get too tightly embraced by the Republican National Committee, or to care much about its views.

This separation from the Republican hard core and more conservative base (nationally, because in Maine, the Republican right wing is *not* the base of the party) paid big electoral dividends for all four.<sup>16</sup> More recently, in the election

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<sup>16</sup> In over 35 years of polling in Maine, I can assert categorically that the epicenter of the Republican party in Maine, as that of its Democratic counterpart, is on the moderate portion of the political spectrum. The Maine Republican party lies to the left of the national Republican party and the Maine Democrat party lies to the right of the national Democrat party, despite some long-held conventional wisdom to the contrary.

It is the very rare exception that the “most” conservative Republican wins its primary or the “most” liberal/progressive Democrat wins its primary let alone either winning the general election. There are exceptions, of course, but they are almost always proven by the variable of the campaign *qua* campaign, not ideology.

For example, the very liberal Tom Allen won the 1996 Democratic primary for Congress, but he beat the even more liberal Dale McCormick. In 1994, the most conservative of the Democrats running in the 2<sup>nd</sup> CD primary, John Baldacci won it, as did Mike Michaud in 2002. Likewise, Chandler Woodcock’s far right primary candidacy succeed in 2006 only because two moderates, Peter Mills and Dave Emery, split the 60% of the Republican voters who self-describe themselves as “moderate” or “liberal.”

More generally, the less liberal candidate in the Democratic primary wins as does the less conservative candidate in the Republican primary, especially in two person match-ups. See, for example, such as Bill Cohen over Abbot Green in 1972, Neil Bishop over Abbot Greene in 1970, Ted O’Meara over Linda Bean-Jones in 1988, Dave Emery over John McCormick in 1990, Susan Collins over John Hathaway and Robert A.G. Monks in 1996, Peter Cianchette over James “Jim” Libby in Republican primaries. Even in 1998, the conservative James B. Longley, Jr. beat the even more conservative Henry Joy in 1998.

For the Democrats, consider other Democratic primary examples including Peter Kyros over Brownie Carson in 1972 and Kyros against over Jadine O’Brien in 1974, Rick Barton over Bruce Reeves (and others) in 1976, Joe Brennan over Phil Merrill in 1978, John Kerry over John O’Leary and Phil Merrill in 1982, Dennis “Duke” Dutremble over Bonnie Titcomb and William “Bill” Troubh, John Baldacci over 6 more liberal Democrats in 1994, Joe Brennan over Sean Faircloth, Richard “Dick” Spencer, Jean Hay and Jerald Leonard in 1996. In general elections, the conservative/moderate John Baldacci beat the very conservative Jonathan Reisman in the general election of 1998 and the very conservative Paul Young in 1996, and so on. In Maine politics generally, in both

cycles of 2002, 2006 and 2008, for example, Democratic challengers of Senators Collins and Snowe found themselves encountering many prominent Democratic women (and men) who were already committed to Collins and Snowe despite their party affiliation. During his 2008 campaign, Congressman Allen, in particular, ran into significant defections of this type even in his home base of Portland.<sup>17</sup> Disgruntled Republicans continued (and continue) to attack the Margaret Chase Smith model, thereby making it all the more popular to the majority of Maine voters.

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Republican and Democratic primaries – as well in most general elections – over the last 40 years “the center holds.”

One caveat which needs to be stressed on this point, however, is that very liberal and very conservative politicians do not do well in Maine, but *only* if their very liberal or very conservative positions are widely known. If opposing campaigns are not able to make the electorate aware of these “off center” positions, however, politicians can be elected and re-elected. The free press may caricature very conservative candidates such as Linda Bean or Chandler Woodcock. They are far less likely to be diligent in the case of very liberal - and out of the Maine mainstream - candidates or office holders such as Tom Andrews, Tom Allen or Bill Hathaway.

In this regard, other important conventional wisdom about Maine politics is quite often wrong. For example, if one were to ask the average observer of the Maine scene, are there more Democratic self-styled environmentalists or Republicans, the vast majority of respondents would say “Democrats.” In fact, there are many more Republican “environmentalists” than Democrats who would self-identify themselves as “I donate to or belong to environmental groups or causes,” notwithstanding the overwhelmingly Democratic affiliation of the leaders of environmental groups in Maine. Think “Francos” and you will see why. Likewise, there are many Democratic voters who will declare “I hunt and/or fish.” Again, think Francos.

<sup>17</sup> As an illustration of how Snowe and Collins even today utilize Democrat strongholds to weather the changing electorate I am grateful to Peter Burr for data on Cape Elizabeth, Maine (currently a swing town, with many upper class professionals and currently 38% Democrats, 30% Republicans, 2% Green, and 30% Unenrolled as of 2009; and on Lewiston (still culturally French-Canadian blue collar, small business) and currently 46% Democrats 17% Republicans 4% Green and 33% Unenrolled. Snowe was opposed by two candidates who never gained traction. Collins was opposed by a sitting Democrat Congressman from Portland, thus some of Allen’s retained support on Cape Elizabeth. Yet in Cape Elizabeth Collins carried a quarter of the Democrats while losing only a tenth of the Republicans and splitting the Unenrolled, She did even better in Lewiston taking a third of the Democrats, almost 90% of the Republicans, and carrying the Unenrolled by 30%. (Burr 2009)

For example, disregarding Snowe's 2006 (74% to 26%) and Collins 2008 (61% to 39%) overwhelming victories, V. Paul Reynolds, a prominent Republican editorial writer recently claimed in the *Bangor Daily News* that "Maine's Grand Old Party sank to a new low this month when its two U.S. Senators, Olympia Snowe and Susan Collins" voted for President Obama's \$800 billion stimulus package. (Reynolds 2009) Heart-felt though Reynolds' opinion may be, it is not likely to cause any sleepless nights for two of the most popular senators in the United States, and shows an astonishing unfamiliarity with the true realities of Maine politics.

Not to be outdone, an unsigned *Portland Press Herald* editorial—but one which had to be written by M. D. Harmon when the publisher, Rich Connors, was absent—lambasted both Senators under the heading "Snowe, Collins should act like Republicans," quoting an unnamed "local" who lamented "They're not really Republicans." (Anonymous 2009). Again, this type of bizarre partisan criticism would only serve to enhance their popularity with a majority of Maine voters - surely not the intent of Mr. Harmon. Of course, many political figures put personal loyalty above party and ideological loyalty, but few have made of that strategy such an art form as Margaret Chase Smith, William S. Cohen, Olympia J. Snowe and Susan Collins.

*The second major element in the Margaret Chase Smith archetype is support for, and presence behind, a strong national defense.*

From the very first, Congresswoman, and then Senator Smith, made national defense and the military cornerstones in her political persona. In fact, one of her biographers, Patricia Wallace, claims it was her strong stand on defense that earned her an initial endorsement from the Guy Gannett newspapers in 1940 when she sought to replace her husband in Congress. (Wallace 1995) In fact, others, such as Merton Henry, put her accent on national

defense even farther back as when she gave a major speech in Maine during 1936 supporting a strong US Navy, a position he believes deviated from Clyde's more isolationist stance which Clyde shared with his First District Republican colleague, Jim Oliver (Henry 2009).

In 1943 she sought and received an appointment to the powerful House Naval Affairs Committee and she would go on to propose legislation to establish the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC), tour the Pacific theatre (dodging sniper fire on Saipan), and firmly establishing her defense credentials. (Wallace 1995) Wallace points out that she made national security a defining issue for her candidacy, "because without national security there is no hope," while another of her biographers, Janann Sherman, goes so far as to declare "World War II defined her career." (Sherman 2000)

Throughout her subsequent political life, Smith always projected a sense of concern about the nation's defense, later serving on the Senate Armed Forces committee and attacking both John F. Kennedy and Dwight Eisenhower for what she took to be their failures in this regard. She fought hard to keep open the Kittery Naval Shipyard and other facilities in Maine. But even more importantly, she argued nationally for a strong defense.<sup>18</sup>

In the case of the Kittery Naval Shipyard, Smith was secretly tipped off to its possible closure by President Lyndon Johnson and she went public with that information, much to the chagrin of Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell Gilpatric, Senator Muskie and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. Senator Smith then

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<sup>18</sup> Ironically enough, she was the ranking Republican on both the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees when Maine had two SAC bases closed, one at Bangor and one at Presque Isle. In keeping with her emphasis on national defense, she accepted the closing of the Bangor SAC base as a necessary step, but fought hard against the closing of the Kittery/Portsmouth Naval Base in 1963. Smith was also successful later in keeping that naval base open in 1971 despite the efforts of the Nixon administration to close it. The SAC base at Loring was also kept open, long after the Pentagon wanted it closed, by the efforts of Senator Cohen and Congresswoman, later Senator, Snowe who worked hard to prevent its closing after she succeeded Cohen as Congressperson for the Second District. The Loring base was not closed until 1994.

insisted that the Comptroller General and the General Accounting Office (GAO) compare Kittery in terms of comparative costs to all government shipyards. When the GAO results showed the Kittery was the 2<sup>nd</sup> most cost effective shipyard in the country, while its east coast competition, Boston, was the least cost effective, the Defense Department backed down. (Smith 1950) Thus she was able to put the keeping open of the Kittery facility in the greater context of what was best for the country's overall national defense.

She, and those who would successfully follow her, thus did not simply advocate for existing Maine bases and facilities, although they often did that. Margaret Chase Smith and those who followed her made sure that national defense was an important issue at the national level as well. This was a bi-partisan issue as far as she was concerned, saying, "It is high time that we stopped thinking politically as Republicans and Democrats about elections and started thinking patriotically as Americans about national security based on individual freedom." (Smith 1950)

In Maine today, despite the best and most consistent efforts of the left wing of the Maine Democrat party to the contrary, this remains a prevailing, even vital, theme in Maine among important psychographic groupings. Cohen, Snowe and Collins followed in her footsteps and always put up national defense as a wedge issue between themselves and their challengers. Maine, with its important shipyards at Kittery and Bath, and for much of the period under review, the Brunswick Naval Air Station and Loring Air Force Base, was a place where a strong national defense remained a compelling story. But for more reasons than smart politics, Margret Chase Smith was truly committed to a strong US defense. This commitment was mirrored in the stances and actions of Cohen, Snowe and Collins. Senator Collins, in particular, even remembers Senator Smith inculcating in her a strong sense of the importance of national defense when she first met the Senator on a high school trip to the Capitol. (Whitney 2000).

In 1978, for example, this defense dimension of Smith's archetype played a major role in the Cohen victory over Bill Hathaway. Despite Hathaway's status as a genuine, decorated war veteran from World War II (one who had been wounded and spent time in German captivity), Maine veterans endorsed Cohen over Hathaway because of Hathaway's previous pattern of "voting against every major new weapons system since serving in the Senate" and his contemporary support for returning the Panama Canal back to Panama. (Maine Sunday Telegram 1978) Overall, it was Hathaway's weakness as an advocate of a strong national defense which did him in as much as his being out of touch with Maine voters on specific issues such as the Panama Canal. By contrast, in his turn while in the Senate, Cohen would serve on both the Senate Armed Services Committee (1979-1997) and the Senate Intelligence Committee (1983-1991).

Interestingly enough, in the last 20 years, none of the major Democratic candidates challenging those Republicans already exhibiting the MCS paradigm—Tom Allen, Tom Andrews, Libby Mitchell, Chellie Pingree—ever seems to have recognized the importance of national defense to the collective psyche of the voters of Maine, although it will be interesting if Pingree, who seems to be lurking with intent, her eye on Senator Snowe's seat or its vacancy, may prove to be more interested than most in this element.

In the past, however, most Democratic candidates have either ignored this element or played it badly. In fact, when running against Cohen in 1984, Libby Mitchell, for example, proudly brought Helen Caldicott, the anti-nuclear activist (who opposed the entire US nuclear arsenal, including the weapons based at Loring) to campaign for her. This "endorsement" resulted in disastrous press and voter anger when Dr. Calicut, accompanied by candidate Mitchell, frightened school children in Falmouth with overly dramatic tales of nuclear devastation and nuclear winter. Statewide Maine voters were not attracted to Ms. Mitchell thereafter. She would lose rather ignominiously, 73.3% to 26.7%. Mitchell would, however, continue to be a political figure of some importance in

the Legislature, becoming the first woman Speaker of the House and later, the first female President of the Maine Senate who had been Speaker, and is currently a candidate for governor. But she wisely never again ran for the US Senate.

For his part, Tom Andrews blithely ignored this dimension of the paradigm and publically called for the closing of Loring Air Force Base when he ran against Snowe in 1994. He would eventually lose the Democratic bastion of Aroostook County by a margin of 71% to 29%, while statewide he would be defeated by a margin of 60.2% to 36.4%--with Plato Truman the Independent who also wanted to keep the base open getting 3.4%. In this race, it was almost as if Andrews eschewed any political model save the one which got him to his state senate seat in a very liberal Portland district.

Snowe and Collins continued to accent the importance of national defense. In 1996, for example, Senator Snowe left a senior position on the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee to take another on the Armed Services Committee saying "too much is at stake." (Portland Press Herald 1996) This was the clearest possible signal that she cared about, and recognized, the importance of the defense element of the archetype. She also served on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2003-2009).

Collins would later (2002) take over Snowe's position on the Armed Services Committee (when Snowe moved over to the Finance Committee) where she still serves. Collins also served as the Chair of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee which has jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security. By contrast, when he was getting ready to run against Collins in 2008, Tom Allen *left* the Armed Services Committee in 2003, a most rare Maine elected official to do so voluntarily.<sup>19</sup> Allen's claim that he was going

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<sup>19</sup> Polling during the election cycle before he ran against Senator Collins showed Allen very vulnerable on this issue, although his underfunded opponent, Charlie Summers, was unable to take advantage of this weakness. Allen's polling may not have

to the “more powerful” Commerce committee fell on electorate deaf ears. His leaving the Armed Services Committee was a clear sign that Allen also did not appreciate the importance of the defense dimension of the paradigm for himself, or for its vitality in the portfolio of his forthcoming opponent. Senator Collins would eventually crush him by 22% despite the Maine surge for Barack Obama in 2008 which brought over 70% of registered voters to the polls.

The failure of these major Democratic figures to even attempt to “fit” the psychographic image (which transcends partisan groupings in Maine) that was created by Senator Smith cost them all both actual votes and a great deal of electoral upside potential. For reasons unclear beyond a misplaced belief in the myth of the progressive voter dominance of their party, many Democratic candidates for the Senate consistently seem to ignore its long-term relevance to the voters of Maine.

*The third transcending element in the MCS archetype is demonstrated identification with working class people.*

Throughout her career, Margaret Chase Smith identified with working men and women and projected her concerns for them with words and deeds. Although opposed, like all Maine Republicans, by organized labor for much of her career, she reached out to, and identified with, working men and women. Obviously her background of poverty and privation contributed to her professed position, but image-wise, that position was at odds with those of many in the Republican Party who identified more with successful businessmen, utility, banking and paper company leaders, those who for 100 years had epitomized “success” in society and in the Republican Party. In contrast to these

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picked up this important wedge issue, or if it did, he and his campaign may have ignored its implications for both his last congressional campaign and his first senatorial one.



Republicans, Smith always expressed sympathy for the working men and women of Maine and for the small businesses which employed them. As Schmidt points out “She also voted against her Party on labor legislation and in the early years, especially, stayed in close contact with the Maine Federation of Labor” (Schmidt 1996)

Smith’s back story, of course, played an important role in her concern but it is interesting to note that those who were to follow her, always underscored their own identification with working men and women by citing their affinities and life-stories as well.

After all, as a young girl, she formally went to work at age 13, after trying to at age 12, and knew, first-hand, the spirit-crushing drudgery of the turn of the century factory work; work she would later term “slave labor.” (Schmidt 1996) While in high school, in order to help pay for headstones for her two dead brothers, Roland and Franklin, she delivered milk to the stonemason’s house before going off to school. (Schmidt 1996)

This is not to say, of course, that Democratic candidates, including many of those who ran against Smith, Cohen, Snowe and Collins, did not, and do not, have compelling life stories, or do not identify with working men and women. It is just that they, as Democrats, tend to assume that the “labor” vote is “theirs” by virtue of their near universal and perpetual endorsements by the leaders of organized labor.

As a result therefore, Democratic candidates seldom feel a need or make a concerted effort to stress their “personal” identification with working men and women. This set of assumptions about their base almost always costs many Democratic candidates for statewide office considerable numbers of votes in general elections, although Congressman Mike Michaud is obviously a conspicuous exception to this pattern.

Cohen, for example, always spoke eloquently and poignantly about his father, the Bangor baker who went to work at 3 am every morning. Cohen’s walk

across Maine's Second District in 1972 epitomized not just his youth and vigor, but also his concern for working men and women all across the state. Men and women going to work in the morning and coming home in the afternoon saw him "at work" both times, and many marveled at his dedication. The fact that he ended up in the hospital three times to have his blisters treated didn't hurt his image either.

Olympia Snowe's story of being orphaned at nine and widowed at 26 likewise underscored her identification with those who were less fortunate, while Susan Collins, although coming from a prosperous business family, nevertheless accented her work ethic and background, including picking potatoes at a young age. Collins was also to make her identification with small business a cornerstone of all of her campaigns.

It was this identification with working class men and women, as well as ongoing concern with needs of small businesses which enabled all four to consistently break into the previously Democratic core group of blue collar Franco Americans.<sup>20</sup> Margaret Chase Smith's relationship to her Franco American heritage is complicated and to date somewhat clouded.

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<sup>20</sup> To view the importance of the 17%-18% of Maine voters who identify themselves as Franco Americans and the duality of their political affiliation which makes them the most discernable important swing group in Maine politics, Potholm 2002, 173-176), Potholm 1998, 115, 313-345), and, especially, Potholm 2004, 315-327).

On a personal note, as Bill Cohen's campaign manager and chief political strategist in 1972, I noticed that Margaret Chase Smith received approximately 25% of the vote in Lewiston virtually every time she ran. I believed that doing that well or better in Lewiston (and other Franco areas) would ensure Cohen's election to Congress even though he was running against a Franco American.

The split between the Acadian Franco Americans of the St. John's Valley and the Quebecois Franco Americans in Lewiston and Auburn provided another important fault line to be exploited in 1972 since Cohen's opponent, Elmer Violette was from Van Buren. Various Democrat party stalwarts such as Louis Jalbert, "Mr. Democrat," from Lewiston made it clear from the very beginning of the campaign that the first Franco American elected to Congress should not come from "The Valley" but from Lewiston. His reward? Senate President Joe Sewall took Representative Jalbert on an all expenses paid trip to the Upsulquich River to fish for salmon at the Sewall camp. At that time, such a visit was one of the most prized of perks for many political insiders.

While she was in office during an era when there was considerable prejudice against those of Franco American descent, according to Patricia Schmidt, one of her biographers, she never acknowledged the French ancestry of her mother (whose parents had anglicized Morin to Murray after coming to Maine from Canada in the 1860's), and probably did not know about it. According to Schmidt, it was not until Smith was 75 and out of office, according to Schmidt, that Smith travelled to Quebec "to discover that her grandfather's dark secret was that he had been christened Lambert Morin" (Schmidt 1996).

This analysis appears to be a significant mistake on Schmidt's part. According to both Paul Mills and Merton Henry, Margaret Chase Smith "...knew full well that her grandfather Murray had been Franco American and while she did not trumpet that heritage, neither did she deny it." (Mills 2009) To prove his point, Paul Mills rightly cites Frank Graham, Jr.'s earlier biography, *Margaret Chase Smith, Woman of Courage* which clearly states her Franco American lineage. (Graham Jr. 1964). Since Graham had excellent access to Senator Smith in this authorized biography, and he clearly puts her "French-Canadian blood" in her hereditary makeup, this seems a fair assertion, regardless of much that has been said to the contrary (Graham Jr. 1964).

Also, at that time, Maine's Second CD then contained Lewiston, Auburn, Waterville, Augusta and Skowhegan, all towns with substantial Franco American populations, so while she may not have loudly trumpeted about her Franco heritage, Smith would not have wanted to totally disown it either. (Mills 2009) This district (smaller than today's 2<sup>nd</sup> CD which is currently the largest congressional district east of the Mississippi) had been represented by Democrats before, and both Margaret and Clyde had been opposed by Franco Democratic opponents: F. Harold Dubord in 1938 (who lost to Clyde 48.9% to 41.1%), Edward Beauchamp in 1940 (who lost to Margaret in 1940 64.6% to 35.4%) and Bradford Redonnett in 1942 (who lost to Margaret in 1942 67.4% to 32.4%).

In researching this article, I also noted that whenever they touch on the question of her Franco American roots, Smith's biographers have tended to accent her Quebec ancestry and relations. But more recent scholarship and pedigree charts now track her lineage further back to the Pierre Morin dit Boucher family of Port Royal in Acadia, quite a different (or more multi-faceted) lineage than previously assumed (Morin 2008).<sup>21</sup> Today we now know that Smith

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<sup>21</sup> Morin convincingly traces her roots to Pierre Boucher Morin who was born in 1634 in Marrtaize, France and who died in Port Royal, Acadie in 1690. This discovery thus puts Margaret Chase Smith and her ancestors within the two major streams of Franco American background in Maine, the Acadian and the Québécois.

For an in depth examination of the terms "Arcadian" (which in the original Greek, and later translations, meant a utopian pastoral vision) and "Acadian," (the term which was applied to North America north of Virginia by Giovanni da Verrazano in the 16<sup>th</sup> century), as well as an important historical look at the Acadians in the St. John Valley, Hannay (1879), Clark (1968), NEAPQ Center (1972), and Reid (1981).

William Williamson states that "Acadia" (sometimes "Acadie," "Lacadie," "Accady," "Accadia," or "L'Acadie") is the name given to the Royal patent of Pierre de Gast Sieure de Monts which ran from 40 to 60 degrees north latitude. Williamson believes, "The name given it in the patent was "Acadia," or "Acadie," an abbreviation or corruption of Arcadia in Greece," Williamson (1832, 188). John S.C. Abbott wrote "This realm of truly imperial territorial grandeur was called Acadia, a corruption of Arcadia in Greece." (Abbott 1892, 31). Abbott himself references an earlier work by John George Bourinot and also notes in passing that "Some have argued that the name was derived from an Indian Tribe," Abbott (1892, 31.) For his part, Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain was subsequently quite adamant that the term "Arcadian" was not correct, saying, "The suggestion of Abbott, *History of Maine* that this name is from the Greek Arcadia is not good, historically or etymologically," Chamberlain (1877, 22).

On balance, I believe Naomi Griffiths is most persuasive when she writes in "Acadian Uniqueness" analyzing the Acadian creation of their own community, their own special society, in order to cope with alien administrators "...whether these were sent to them by the French or the English," Griffiths (1973, 84). Another useful perspective on all this is provided by Beatrice Craige and Maxime Dagenais. They present an in-depth examination of the Madawaska region, tracing the in-and-out migrations of many people in this borderland but especially the Acadians. The authors are insistent that "The Valley" was the result of mixture between Acadian French and those from Quebec, and also point out that the Deportation of 1755 was an essential psychological aspect of group solidarity, even for those Acadians who had not been deported but who had already simply migrated up the St. John Valley from Atlantic Canada. Both groups of willing emigrants were prompted, in large part, by overcrowding in their original areas, Craige and Dagenais (2009).

For three other useful analyses of the differences and commonalities between the Acadians and Quebecois communities in Maine, see Collins (1902), Allen (1974), and

sits within both important lines of Franco American heritage, that of Quebec and of Acadia. In any case, all of this was not widely known during her career and it may well have been that on balance, it was as much through her championship of working men and women, rather than a *sub rosa* acknowledgment of her ancestry which gained her the support of many Franco Americans in Maine.

For their part, certainly Cohen, Snowe and Collins all followed Smith in expressing concern for working men and women throughout the state, and even more conspicuously in her Franco strategy footsteps. They made the Francos an even more consistent strategic target of their attentions. As a result, all were to do considerably better than she in terms of attracting Franco American votes, their campaigns often turning this effort into an art form. This attention to Franco American interests, both on and off the campaign trail for Cohen, Snowe and Collins constitute what Fenno calls a “durable connection” and remained - and remains - central to their electoral success (Fenno 1996).<sup>22</sup>

Georgette Berube, the highly respected state representative from Lewiston and herself a supporter of, and worker for, Elmer Violette put her finger on this very point, saying,

Candidate Cohen had picked up on the “take them for granted Francos” and he paid special attention to the citizens of this ethnic group. At that first election of his many to come, he had not carried the city that was so predominately Democrat, but he had succeeded in making inroads eroding the Democratic support and establishing his credibility (Berube 2005).<sup>23</sup>

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Brault (1972). Brault is quite persuasive that ethnicity should be seen not as a unified phenomenon but as a diverse one, Brault 1972, 28).

<sup>22</sup> Fenno seems, however, less interested in the psychographic dimensions of those connections. He also seems, in both books, to focus much more on ad hoc factors in various campaigns than seem apparent in the more coherent overarching campaign strategies and themes of Cohen, Snowe and Collins. None of their campaigns have the feeling of day to day ad hoc decision making as portrayed by Fenno (1996).

<sup>23</sup> Representative Berube’s comments were echoed by many other Franco Americans privately and publicly during Cohen’s many campaigns.

Franco Americans, both blue collar workers and small business owners, became vital to Cohen's first election and then re-election campaigns. His efforts as "vote harvesting" were persistent and vital to his success. In 1972, for example, after investing a great deal of time and field work, he lost the Androscoggin Valley by only 8,000 votes instead of the normal minus 23,000 vote margin usually suffered by contemporary Republican candidates in that area.

Instead of losing Lewiston 9 or 10 to 1, the way most Republicans normally performed, Cohen's emphasis on hard work and his blue color roots as well as his identification with the needs of small business resulted in his losing this Democratic bastion by only 2 ½ to 1, even though he was running against a respected and well-known Franco American, Elmer Violette.

When the Democratic Speaker of the House, John Martin, was first told of those 2½-1 returns from Lewiston, he recognized immediately what was happening. On election night, upon receiving numbers showing Violette's substantial but not overwhelming lead from Lewiston's top vote getter, Berube, Martin told her,

It isn't enough, Georgette, he should have done better there. We were done in by some members of our own party." Indeed candidate Cohen had eaten into the Democratic stronghold and he became the new Congressman for Maine (Berube 2005).

Moreover this showing in Lewiston spilled over into the nearby city of Auburn, and the towns of Lisbon and Lisbon Falls so that in Androscoggin County as a whole, he only lost 21,868 to 16,644.<sup>24</sup> This showing guaranteed his success district-wise.

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<sup>24</sup> For a fuller fleshing out of this phenomenon, see Lyons (1972, 503-548). See also Potholm (2002, 99-135) for a more extensive examination of the political career of William S. Cohen and the role of the Francos in it.

Cohen forthrightly acknowledged the importance of the Franco American vote in his victory statement, giving credit for his success to "...my decision to disregard the conventional wisdom that in the past has advised Republicans to write off certain predominantly Democratic areas such as Lewiston and the St. John Valley." (Bangor Daily News 1972)<sup>25</sup> In fact, the Cohen campaign blueprint, entitled "The Mini-Game Plan: An Ounce of Images is Worth a Pound of Performance," listed the 81 swing towns in the state which were targeted for personal and field operative attention. (Department of Government, Bowdoin College 1972) It is rare that a game plan so clearly indicated what had to be done and a candidate so clearly fulfilling its demands. Clearly, these results from Franco areas were not a case of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*.

From 1972 on, Cohen consistently kept a special focus on the Franco Americans and his subsequent success was later duplicated by first Snowe and then Collins. It is important to note the extent to which Franco Americans - both blue collar workers and small business owners - became and remained central to all of their winning coalitions. To this day, Democratic challengers to both Snowe and Collins seem to have missed entirely the importance of Franco Americans and their psychographic interests and needs.

As outlined above, the strong work ethic exhibited by Cohen, Snowe and Collins and their connections with working men and women in Maine, was paralleled even more noticeably by their appreciation for the plight of small business owners. Their heritages were central in this regard. Cohen's father was a baker in Bangor, Snowe's in laws ran a concrete business in Auburn and Collins' family owned a lumber yard in Caribou. They could therefore identify

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<sup>25</sup> In August, Cohen's chief campaign strategist noted the ongoing success of this effort to reach out to Democrats and Independents in the normal Democratic strongholds of Oxford and Androscoggin counties: "Bill has done exactly the job we all hoped it would on Democrat and Independents and he has carved out a very nice chunk of them."

with the problems of small businesses, especially as it relates to governmental interference with those businesses.

So many studies of Franco Americans in Maine have tended to accent their blue collar origins and competition with working class Irish Americans upon their arrival in Maine and their disdain for the English (and largely Republican) owners of the mills in which they initially toiled. But in fact, the heart of the various Franco American communities after their arrival in Maine very quickly became their small businesses—the bakers, printers, hairdressers, barbers, small shop keepers, newspaper owners, roofing and other skilled trades. Small businesses, not factory workers, became the key to understanding Franco wishes, needs and aspirations. Today, they remain central to the contemporary Franco political scene as well.

In short, along with the working class ethos came the French tradition of the *petite bourgeoisie* whose stock in trade, whether in France, or Canada or Maine, was suspicion of government and governmental intrusion (both in terms of taxation and work rules). These Franco Americans turned out to be receptive to the Republican message of smaller, less intrusive government.<sup>26</sup> That coupled with the fact that many Democratic candidates for major office in Maine were too liberal for many Franco Americans made Republican inroads possible. State Representative Georgette Berube explained this latter dimension lacking in many Democratic statewide candidates correctly when she said to Cohen,

Your views parallel my own philosophy and are reflective, I feel, of that of many of my fellow citizens of Lewiston...the very

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<sup>26</sup> When many members of the Maine business community were loudly complaining about worker's compensation laws in Maine during the administration of Republican Jock McKernan in the 1980's, I did a focus group of 15 small business people (roughly half men and half women) in the Lewiston area. Of the 15 small business owners, 14 admitted that because of these "unfair" rules, they had only "contract" workers from New Hampshire on their work rolls in order to avoid the worker's compensation rules the state had "imposed" on them.



same people who value integrity and honest in government, and individualism above partisan politics (Berube 2005).<sup>27</sup>

Or as Speaker John Martin put it later when explaining Cohen's endorsement by Representative Berube:

Cohen had also voiced strong support for the interests of Franco-Americans which Bill (Hathaway) had never done. Rep. Berube is a conservative Democrat who was never at ease with Bill's more liberal philosophy (Berube 2005).

Cohen, Snowe and Collins all understood the plight of not only Republican small business people, but their Franco American counterparts, and their concern was reciprocated by the support of those Franco American women and men who shared their views on small business and its importance. All three were to make the plight of small business key to their activities and interests. All would bring "small R" ideology with them onto the streets of Sanford, Westbrook, Brunswick, Waterville, Saco and other Franco American communities. In time, Cohen, Snowe and Collins would carry Lewiston and Auburn, for example, as well as many of the other Franco American strongholds such as Biddeford, Westbrook, Saco and Waterville, increasing their percentage of the Franco vote until they became impervious to Democratic challengers.

Franco communities became, and remain, the bulwarks behind which Snowe and Collins can weather any major challenge, thus denying their Democratic opponents desperately needed traction in their previous traditional strongholds. The Franco American psychographics and world views continue to reflect the patterns of support established by Margaret Chase Smith and remain

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<sup>27</sup> To his credit, Speaker Martin resisted calls to remove her from her chairmanship saying, "...while I do not approve of her decision, she is able and competent and she stays," Berube (2005). For her part, Berube rightly reminds, "John Martin, the Speaker of the House and one of the leading Democrats in the state had every right and opportunity to remove me from the chairmanship. That he did not seek retribution bespeaks volumes of the side of him that I got to know but that the public, especially the media, rarely saw," Berube (2005).

essential to Republican success on the statewide level.<sup>28</sup> While a majority of Franco Americans remain enrolled as Democrats or “Unenrolled” as Independents, their views on the size of government, the degree of its intrusiveness and the importance of small businesses continue to make them susceptible to Republican ideas and approaches. This profile provides a significant contrast with Irish American voters (another 17-18% of the voting population) in the Pine Tree State as Irish Americans *en masse* are much more likely to favor the expansion of government and its ability to provide employment - and who are likely to be less concerned about governmental interaction with small business.

*A fourth major element in the Margaret Chase Smith archetype consisted of always projecting an image of personal hard work and identification with working class Mainers.*

Margaret Chase Smith’s background and her entire political career were based on hard work. In the last 60 years, few candidates or office holders ever worked more hours on the campaign trail more consistently than Margaret Chase Smith, nor put in a more grueling schedule in Congress and the Senate. Hard work became a hallmark of her political and personal lives, dimensions which struck a resonant cord with blue collar voters all across Maine. She identified with working men and women by working very hard and very visibly herself so that hard work, in and of itself, became a hallmark of everything she stood for. Solidarity with working men and women was expressed not just by political positions and votes but by a hard personal work ethic as well.

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<sup>28</sup> Indeed, when looking at the vote totals for Smith among Francos in the 1972 election, one clearly sees the specter of her defeat writ large.

Replicating this important dimension of the winning paradigm, Cohen's famous 600 mile walk across Maine's Second District became the stuff of legends, but it should be noted also that Olympia Snowe also defeated the better known and initially preferred Democratic candidate, former Secretary of State Mark Gartley, by waging a sustained thirteen month effort, including a vigorous walk of her own across Penobscot and southern Aroostook counties,<sup>29</sup> a grueling effort that the *Bangor Daily News* credited with "evaporating" Gartley's large initial lead. (Bangor Daily News 1978b).

This projection of "hard working" values and actions and its ancillary syndrome also appears in Senator Smith's "never miss a vote" dimension. This is today echoed in Susan Collin's huge commitment to breaking Senator Smith's voting streak and being proud of it. By March 14, 2008, Susan Collins had cast 3,764 roll call votes without a miss, breaking her idol, Margaret Chase Smith's record (who cast 2,941 votes in a row from 1955 to 1968). Note how different this emphasis on a work benchmark *qua* benchmark is as opposed to making the case that not all votes are deserving of one's presence, the case made by her opponent, Tom Allen, in 2008.<sup>30</sup>

For Olympia Snowe, this hard work dimension also expressed itself in her many statements indicating how she eschewed the social scene in Washington. As she told the media, "It's an interesting life style but I try to minimize social activities." Other commentators noted, "Most of her time is devoted to work" (Agger 1982) Margaret Chase Smith could have given the press the exact same quote. As a result of living the "work-horse" rather than "show-horse" political typology, Snowe received huge national coverage *US News and World Report*, *Newsweek*, *USA Today* and was chosen as "one of the six likely prospects" to be

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<sup>29</sup> Snow trailed Gartley during the summer of 1978 until she concluded her walk. She never was behind after that point in the campaign.

<sup>30</sup> The truth of Congressman Allen's statement notwithstanding, it went against the 40 year old image of what a Maine national figure should say and do. You can be right, factually, but incorrect, politically.

the first woman President of the United States according to US magazine (Agger 1982). Whatever the actual odds on such an occurrence, it is precisely the kind of image Maine people have come to expect since Margaret Chase Smith was elected to the US Senate and indeed became the first woman to have her name put in nomination for President by a major party.

*A fifth and perhaps most defining element in her enduring archetype was an independent stance.*

As discussed, above, seeking and valuing a personal following, rather than relying on an existing party stalwarts and organization, became a key ingredient in the style and success of Margaret Chase Smith. But there is another dimension to her political profile which goes beyond this aspect and that is her willingness to challenge her party's leadership, not just in the state of Maine but nationally. Showing independence on issues and by attacking members of ones own party became one of the defining characteristics of her political career, as it would for Cohen, Snowe and Collins.

Senator Smith's "Declaration of Conscience" speech is considered the apogee of her political courage. What is often less well illuminated is the extent to which that speech projected her as being anti-Republican to many. It is important to remember that although six other senators signed her statement against Joe McCarthy, in the firestorm of criticism which followed, all the other Republican senators, save Wayne Morse, repudiated their own statement. And President Eisenhower, like President Truman, did not criticize McCarthy until much later, waiting a full four years. Instead, for pointing the finger at McCarthy, she was accused of being a "bad Republican" while Eisenhower remained silent.

Throughout her career, Margaret Chase Smith was known for criticizing Republican presidents, much to their irritation, and Senator Smith was, according to one of her closest and longest supporters, persona non-grata to the

Eisenhower White House for six of the eight years he was in power<sup>31</sup>, and fairly consistently on the outs with Eisenhower himself personally:

In the late spring of 1960, Senator Everett Dirksen went to Senator Smith on the Senate floor one day and told her that he had talked with President Eisenhower about arrangements for Republican Senators to have their pictures taken with the President. He said, 'Margaret, I hate to tell you this but Ike said that he would be happy to have his picture taken with every Republican Senator but the Smith woman (Smith 1950).

Indeed, "For the rest of the decade and for much of her time in the Senate, Margaret remained as solitary as a Maine winter" showing only "sporadic displays of Party regularity" (Schmidt 1996). This "ingratitude" toward their party and subsequent independence became a standard hallmark for her successor Republicans as well.

By contrast with her relations with Republican authority figures, Margaret Chase Smith was quite popular with both Truman and Johnson. This led to a bi-partisan image which made her attractive to leaders of the Democrats.<sup>32</sup> In fact, she was, according to Hal Pachios (a former aide of Lyndon Johnson and, currently, a very important Maine Democratic "rain maker"), "Lyndon Johnson's favorite senator" (quoted in Cariddi 1999). When she was asked by Merton Henry who was her favorite president, Margaret Chase Smith responded with no hesitation, "President Truman" (Henry 2009).

Opposition to national political leaders of their own party continued to be a part of the successful model for Cohen, Snowe and Collins. Cohen's vote on impeachment for Richard Nixon, for example, was a very courageous act at a time when the outcome was far from certain, but it nevertheless fit into the

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<sup>31</sup> In 1954, Smith tartly noted that she had never been invited to the White House as long as Eisenhower had been president, Smith (1950, 138-141).

<sup>32</sup> John F. Kennedy, however, was not one of them. He had campaigned against her in 1954 and she never forgave him. "Ted Sorenson, Kennedy's alter-ego, was later to describe Margaret as one of two enemies that Senator Kennedy had in the Senate," Schmidt 1996, 291).

historical precedent set by Smith that a representative from Maine *must* act for the good of the country, even if it means speaking out against the president of ones own party.

Later, one sees Bill Cohen chosen by President William Clinton for a cabinet post (while Democratic George Mitchell was not), much to the chagrin of both hard core Republicans *and* hard core Democrats. One can only imagine the anger and frustration of George Mitchell, for example, who after toiling in the extremely difficult environments of Bosnia and Northern Ireland for his president saw his promised appointment as Secretary of State torpedoed by an odd alliance of Democratic feminists, Al Gore, the Israeli lobby and Republicans who felt Mitchell was too partisan (Knowlton 1996; Sieff 1996).<sup>33</sup> That disappointment was bad enough, but then to have Cohen, a Republican and fellow Mainer, in the Clinton cabinet must have been even more galling. Senator Smith would, of course, have relished the irony of all this “non-partisanship” and “partisanship.”

For her part, when Olympia Snowe got to Washington, she became a member of the “Gypsy Moths,” a bi-partisan group of Congressmen and women who styled themselves as “moderate.”<sup>34</sup> In this, she was but continuing the tradition of Senator Smith. Later in 2000, Snowe became a leader of the Republican “centrists,” leading a fight to overturn the Republican party anti-abortion stance. *The Portland Press Herald* indicated this could “only confirm her

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<sup>33</sup> Cohen was quoted as saying he always believed that national security policy was not a partisan issue and took the appointment on that basis (Dahl 1996). Other analysts blamed feminists and Republicans who believed Mitchell had been too partisan when Majority Leader of the Senate but asserted that Mitchell had been promised the job: (Anonymous 1996). True to his inner Machiavelli, or more likely, his inner Kautilya, President William J. Clinton, when recounting the announcement of his new national security team of Madeline Albright, Bill Cohen, Tony Lake, Bill Richardson, and Sandy Berger in his memoirs, makes no mention of Senator Mitchell and his near miss (Clinton 2004).

<sup>34</sup> Although as Lee Agger points out in *Women of Maine*, this is a rather inappropriate name for the elegant Ms Snowe (Agger 1982).

reputation as a thoughtful and articulate spokeswoman for the party's moderate minority" (Portland Press Herald 2000).

In 2007, Snowe and Democratic Senator Mary Landrieu of Louisiana created the moderate "Common Ground Coalition" in order to bring members together on key issues. The Congressional Quarterly described her as being one of the "passionate moderates" (Whitney 2000; Jansen 2007). This positioning was not without personal cost. As Senator Snowe put it to the New York Times after the defection of Senator Arlen Specter who had fled the GOP after its national operatives encouraged a primary challenge against him,

It is true that being a Republican moderate sometimes feels like being a cast member of "Survivor" – you are presented with multiple challenges, and you often get the distinct feeling that you're no longer welcome in the tribe. (Snowe 2009)<sup>35</sup>

For Collins, the pattern was very similar. In 1999, for example, Collins (and Snowe), both voted *not* to impeach President Clinton, criticizing his actions but declaring they did not rise to the constitutional standards of high crimes and misdemeanors. That same year Collins joined the Democrats in voting against the \$792 billion tax cuts of the Bush administration.

Also this continuing theme of "independence" should be noted in the importance of Olympia Snowe and Susan Collins to the budget struggles in Washington – often in opposition to President Bush during his eight years in office and more recently, often in support of President Obama. Senate Democratic Leader Reid would say of her and Olympia Snowe after they voted for the Stimulus Package of 2009:

I'm at a lack of words how to express my admiration and respect for the love of our country, the patriotism and the courage

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<sup>35</sup> In a more rational, goal-oriented political universe, perhaps Republican national operatives would want to study and emulate the electoral and voting patterns which not only elect Senators Snowe and Collins by large margins but which make them consistently among the most popular of *all* US senators.

of three brave senators: Specter from Pennsylvania, Snowe and Collins from Maine (Phillips 2009).

In short, there are a myriad of examples of the two senators taking enough high profile “independent” stances to ensure that many Democrats in the Pine Tree State continue to hold them in high regard. Ironically, in today’s brave new world of the blogosphere, the attacks from the Republican right wing in Maine and nationally have only served to heighten support for Senators Snowe and Collins, getting more Democrats and Independents to be proud of their “moderate” stance. Since Democrats and Independents make up 70% of the electorate, this is a good thing for Republican office holders.

By calling them “RINOS,” or “Republicans in Name Only,” these commentators actually enhance and broaden the “RINOS” popularity in Maine, although surely this is not their true intent. This strange, reoccurring dimension of an ongoing, self-fulfilling prophecy continues to be hallmark of the Republican right wing in Maine.<sup>36</sup> In political heaven, Margaret Chase Smith can only smile with a strong sense of *déjà vu*.<sup>37</sup>

Summing up the Margaret Chase Smith image paradigm then and its efficacy in Maine, it is that of a political figure who is relatively moderate in terms of ideological positioning, who shows significant concern for working men and women, is independent in political thinking, who plays an important national as opposed to local or partisan role, and whose self-image and self-following are deemed more important than party following and one who is

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<sup>36</sup> Listen to the echo of these dimensions as Margaret Chase Smith recounts her situation in 1954: “Attacked in the Primary as a left-winger, I was attacked in the general election as a reactionary conservative” (Smith 1950, 147). It would appear that over the last 50 years, neither Right Wing Republicans, nor Left Wing Democrats have realized that, in Maine, “the center holds.” And after thirty five years of listening to party stalwarts in both parties frame strategy, it is not clear they will, anytime soon.

<sup>37</sup> David Emery rightly reminds that when Margaret Chase Smith ran for president in 1964, William Loeb, the very conservative publisher of the *Manchester Union Leader* constantly attacked her as “Moscow Maggie,” claiming she was soft on communism.



paradoxically and consistently, if not continually, attacked by the more radical elements within that party remains today as powerful an electoral attraction as it was when Margaret Chase Smith first developed it.

Those who would be elected to the US Senate in Maine continue to be forced to deal with its dimensions and demands, ignoring them at their peril. Margaret Chase Smith set the paradigm, while William S. Cohen, Olympia J. Snowe and Susan M. Collins all created or accented their own images to fit its major dimensions. That paradigm may well be their true selves as well as their projected images, but it was also a most useful political positioning.<sup>38</sup>

Since 1948, the Margaret Chase Smith paradigm has been brought to the voters 14 times in senate races. Without counting the 1972 anomaly of Smith versus Hathaway, that paradigm, as represented by the senatorial campaigns of Smith, Cohen, Snowe and Collins has averaged 62.1% of the popular vote, including a number of years when there were one or more third party candidates. Even counting the 1972 outrider vote and Smith's losing total of 46.8%, the paradigm received 61.5 % of the vote in fourteen elections spread over

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<sup>38</sup> While there is ample evidence that all three utilizers of the Smith paradigm willingly espoused that set of projected values and might have done so totally on their own, the contributions to its perpetuation by various political and staffers should not be totally overlooked. As Cohen's first campaign manager and senior strategist, for example, I certainly borrowed from the Smith playbook. Greg Stevens, a Cohen field person in his run for the US Senate in 1978 and who would become Olympia Snowe's administrative assistant, and Cohen's long time administrative assistant and senior councilor, Tom Daffron, would become Collins' chief political advisor and strategist were both involved in his successful 1978 senatorial race. Also, both Snowe (as a volunteer in Cohen's Lewiston congressional office) and Collins (a Cohen staffer herself for 12 years) were obviously exposed to his continuation of the Margaret Chase Smith strategies, and able to see (and later duplicate) his successful utilization of them. All, of course, added other dimensions to their electoral portfolio, such as Olympia Snowe and Jock McKernan's use of Maine's motorcyclists as an electoral asset.

sixty years. The average winning margin for Cohen, Snowe and Collins alone, including races with multiple opponents, is 62.7%.<sup>39</sup>

For over 60 years, a strong majority of Maine voters have preferred the Margaret Chase Smith image paradigm over others.<sup>40</sup>

They still do.

The archetype persists.

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<sup>39</sup> The electoral percentages for all senatorial campaigns of these four Republicans are:

Margaret Chase Smith

1948	71.3%
1954	58.6
1960	53.8
1972	46.8

William S. Cohen

1978	57.3
1984	73.3
1990	61.3

Olympia J. Snowe

1994	60.2
2000	68.9
2006	74.4

Susan Collins

1996	49.2
2002	58.4
2008	61

<sup>40</sup> Anthony Buxton is quite right in pointing out that the four successful Republicans under review (plus Muskie) all shared an additional ingredient: all were from Maine's 2<sup>nd</sup> CD—Smith from Skowhegan, Cohen from Bangor, Snowe from Auburn, Collins from Caribou and Muskie from Rumford respectively. But that dimension of Maine politics: "There are two Maines and the northern one most often wins statewide elections" is but an additional counter-intuitive subject, albeit for another day.

**Appendix A**  
**Electoral Returns\***

Cape Elizabeth

Governor	Party	DEM.	GOP	GREEN			
2006	Cnddte.	Baldacci	Woodcock	LaMarche	Other	Blank	TOTAL
DEM.		59%	1%	9%	31%	0%	100%
Green		4%	0%	91%	4%	0%	100%
GOP		13%	62%	0%	24%	0%	100%
Unrld.		42%	14%	11%	33%	0%	100%
Male	Over 50	40%	32%	3%	24%	0%	100%
Male	31-50	35%	22%	8%	34%	1%	100%
Male	18-30	37%	14%	15%	33%	1%	100%
Female	Over 50	38%	24%	7%	30%	0%	100%
Female	31-50	45%	17%	10%	27%	0%	100%
Female	18-30	43%	10%	17%	29%	1%	100%
Male		38%	27%	6%	28%	0%	100%
Female		41%	21%	9%	29%	0%	100%
Over 50		39%	28%	5%	27%	0%	100%
31-50		40%	20%	10%	30%	0%	100%
18-30		40%	12%	16%	31%	1%	100%
TOTAL		40%	24%	8%	29%	0%	100%

Cape Elizabeth

USS	Party	DEM	GOP	IND			
2006	Cnddte.	Hay	Snowe	Slavik	Other	Blank	TOTAL
DEM.		49%	35%	4%	0%	11%	100%
Green		13%	2%	77%	0%	11%	100%
GOP		1%	94%	0%	0%	4%	100%
Unrld.		13%	76%	2%	0%	8%	100%
Male	Ovr 50	21%	70%	3%	0%	5%	100%
Male	31-50	19%	70%	4%	0%	7%	100%
Male	18-30	28%	52%	5%	0%	15%	100%
Female	Ovr 50	24%	63%	3%	0%	10%	100%
Female	31-50	30%	59%	3%	0%	8%	100%
Female	18-30	36%	51%	6%	0%	8%	100%
Male		22%	68%	4%	0%	7%	100%
Female		27%	61%	3%	0%	9%	100%
Ovr 50		23%	66%	3%	0%	8%	100%
31-50		25%	64%	4%	0%	8%	100%
18-30		31%	52%	5%	0%	12%	100%
TOTAL		24%	64%	3%	0%	8%	100%

PRES.	Party	DEM	GOP				
2008	Cnddte.	Obama	McCain		Other	Blank	TOTAL
DEM.		92%	8%		0%	0%	100%
Green		45%	2%		42%	12%	100%
GOP		30%	69%		0%	1%	100%
Unrllld.		67%	32%		1%	1%	100%
Male	Ovr 50	61%	38%		0%	1%	100%
Male	31-50	61%	36%		1%	1%	100%
Male	18-30	68%	29%		2%	2%	100%
Female	Ovr 50	66%	34%		0%	0%	100%
Female	31-50	68%	28%		1%	2%	100%
Female	18-30	81%	15%		3%	2%	100%
Male		62%	36%		1%	1%	100%
Female		68%	30%		1%	1%	100%
Ovr 50		63%	36%		0%	0%	100%
31-50		65%	32%		1%	2%	100%
18-30		74%	23%		2%	2%	100%
TOTAL		65%	33%		1%	1%	100%

Cape Elizabeth

USS	Party	DEM	GOP				
2008	Cnddte.	Allen	Collins		Other	Blank	TOTAL
DEM.		73%	26%		0%	1%	100%
Green		75%	5%		1%	19%	100%
GOP		9%	90%		0%	1%	100%
Unrllld.		48%	48%		0%	4%	100%
Male	Ovr 50	43%	55%		0%	1%	100%
Male	31-50	41%	56%		0%	3%	100%
Male	18-30	48%	47%		0%	5%	100%
Female	Ovr 50	48%	51%		0%	1%	100%
Female	31-50	49%	49%		0%	2%	100%
Female	18-30	54%	39%		0%	7%	100%
Male		43%	54%		0%	2%	100%
Female		49%	49%		0%	2%	100%
Ovr 50		46%	53%		0%	1%	100%
31-50		45%	52%		0%	2%	100%
18-30		51%	44%		0%	5%	100%
TOTAL		46%	52%		0%	2%	100%

## Lewiston

Governor	Party	DEM.	GOP	GREEN			
2006	Cnddte.	Baldacci	Woodcock	LaMarche	Other	Blank	TOTAL
DEM.		63%	8%	7%	21%	1%	100%
Green		10%	0%	87%	4%	0%	100%
GOP		6%	74%	3%	15%	2%	100%
Unrld.		35%	31%	6%	28%	0%	100%
Male	Ovr 50	41%	28%	7%	22%	1%	100%
Male	31-50	35%	34%	10%	20%	1%	100%
Male	18-30	40%	22%	12%	25%	1%	100%
Female	Ovr 50	45%	25%	8%	22%	1%	100%
Female	31-50	40%	29%	10%	20%	1%	100%
Female	18-30	50%	14%	14%	21%	1%	100%
Male		39%	29%	9%	22%	1%	100%
Female		44%	25%	9%	21%	1%	100%
Ovr 50		43%	27%	7%	22%	1%	100%
31-50		38%	31%	10%	20%	1%	100%
18-30		45%	18%	13%	23%	1%	100%
TOTAL		42%	27%	9%	21%	1%	100%

## Lewiston

USS	Party	DEM	GOP	IND			
2006	Cnddte.	Hay-B	Snowe	Slavik	Other	Blank	TOTAL
DEM.		35%	58%	3%	0%	4%	100%
Green		19%	1%	80%	0%	0%	100%
GOP		1%	97%	0%	0%	1%	100%
Unrld.		6%	90%	2%	0%	2%	100%
Male	Ovr 50	21%	75%	2%	0%	2%	100%
Male	31-50	15%	77%	5%	0%	3%	100%
Male	18-30	18%	70%	8%	0%	3%	100%
Female	Ovr 50	20%	73%	3%	0%	3%	100%
Female	31-50	17%	74%	7%	0%	3%	100%
Female	18-30	19%	68%	10%	0%	3%	100%
Male		18%	75%	5%	0%	3%	100%
Female		19%	73%	6%	0%	3%	100%
Ovr 50		21%	74%	3%	0%	2%	100%
31-50		16%	75%	6%	0%	3%	100%
18-30		19%	69%	9%	0%	3%	100%
TOTAL		19%	73%	5%	0%	3%	

PRES	Party>	DEM	GOP				
2008	Cnddte.	Obama	McCain		Other	Blank	TOTAL
DEM.		92%	8%		0%	0%	100%
Green		45%	2%		42%	12%	100%
GOP		30%	69%		0%	1%	100%
Unrld.		67%	32%		1%	1%	100%
Male	Ovr 50	61%	38%		0%	1%	100%
Male	31-50	61%	36%		1%	1%	100%
Male	18-30	68%	29%		2%	2%	100%
Female	Ovr 50	66%	34%		0%	0%	100%
Female	31-50	68%	28%		1%	2%	100%
Female	18-30	81%	15%		3%	2%	100%
Male		62%	36%		1%	1%	100%
Female		68%	30%		1%	1%	100%
Ovr 50		63%	36%		0%	0%	100%
31-50		65%	32%		1%	2%	100%
18-30		74%	23%		2%	2%	100%
TOTAL		65%	33%		1%	1%	100%

Lewiston

USS	Party	DEM	GOP				
2008	Cnddte.	Allen	Collins		Other	Blank	TOTAL
DEM.		64%	35%		0%	1%	100%
Green		95%	2%		0%	3%	100%
GOP		7%	89%		0%	4%	100%
Unrld.		30%	65%		0%	5%	100%
Male	Ovr 50	45%	53%		0%	3%	100%
Male	31-50	41%	56%		0%	3%	100%
Male	18-30	50%	48%		0%	3%	100%
Female	Ovr 50	44%	54%		0%	2%	100%
Female	31-50	42%	55%		0%	3%	100%
Female	18-30	44%	51%		0%	5%	100%
Male		44%	53%		0%	3%	100%
Female		43%	54%		0%	3%	100%
Ovr 50		45%	53%		0%	2%	100%
31-50		42%	56%		0%	3%	100%
18-30		47%	49%		0%	4%	100%
TOTAL		44%	53%		0%	3%	100%

\* All data copyright Peter H. Burr, Concord Research, 2009.

## Appendix B

## Franco American Strongholds and St. John River Valley Indicators

M. Smith	1954	1960	1966	1972
Lewiston	31.5	24.2	25	23.2
Auburn	65.8	57.5	54.8	49.5
Sanford	37.3	44	42.6	40.6
Waterville	40.5	42.8	46.4	41.4
Westbrook	48.7	50	47.8	43.8
Saco	44.5	52.7	52.1	51.7
Fort Kent	50.6	24.8	40	35.6
Van Buren	38	22.4	5.2	17
Biddeford	22.5	37.4	29.7	26.6

W.S. Cohen	1978	1984	1990
Auburn	53.8	75.2	60.6
Lewiston	39.6	64.6	48.8
Saco	47.2	69.1	55
Sanford	45.5	66.3	52.5
Waterville	51.9	61.7	53.8
Westbrook	49.3	71.8	55.7
Fort Kent	36	63	46.2
Van Buren	26.2	58.2	38.5
Biddeford	30.4	43	42.2

S. Collins	1996	2002	2008
Saco	42.7	66	56.3
Biddeford	35	53.7	52.9
Westbrook	41.1	58.2	55.6
Auburn	46.8	63.8	61.4
Waterville	36	40	47.6
Sanford	42.7	57.8	60
Fort Kent	40.5	60.6	65.5
Van Buren	34.2	54.7	64.7
Lewiston	37	48.8	55

O. J. Snowe	1994	2000	2006
Saco	53	68.1	75.9
Biddeford	42.7	62	75.6
Westbrook	55.3	69.7	75
Auburn	58	68.3	78
Waterville	48.1	56.3	68.3
Sanford	56.1	68.8	77.1
Fort Kent	53.5	61.5	66.8
Van Buren	58.3	59	72.5
Lewiston	47.6	39.3	75.5



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