The Battle of Hampden and Its Aftermath

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BY ROBERT FRASER

The successful British attack on the Penobscot Valley in fall 1814 was to annex eastern Maine to Canada, a move taken to protect the important line of communications between Halifax and Quebec. New England merchants had opposed the War of 1812, as it destroyed their international trade, and most New Englanders tried to remain neutral during the fray. At Hampden, enemy threats brought them out to defend their homes. Although Great Britain returned the area to the United States at war’s end, the occupation of the Penobscot Valley had lasting implications for the District of Maine. Between 1954 and 1984 Robert Fraser was assistant curator at the Cohasset Historical Society and a consultant to other historical societies. He writes historical articles for local newspapers and national magazines, and has published two books on lighthouses and another on local history. This article is the first in-depth study of the Battle of Hampden.

THE UNITED STATES’ declaration of war on Great Britain on June 12, 1812, was motivated by three contentious issues: British interference with the American transatlantic merchant trade; the impressment of American sailors on the high seas, and the continued British support for Indian resistance in the Northwest Territories. The first of these issues, the rights of Americans to liberty on the high seas, had contributed to the American Revolution a half-century earlier, and the issue once again dominated American diplomacy during the Anglo-French wars between 1799 and 1815. Both Britain and France imposed sanctions on American trade, hoping to direct American commerce to ports friendly to their cause. In spite of the profits to be made from the “neutral trade” between British and French West Indies ports and the home countries, Americans chafed under the new rules of seaborne commerce, and complained bitterly with each act of aggression. And when the British Parliament, driven by a desperate need for sailors, extended its impressment procedures to include naturalized American
citizens, the federal government launched a series of reprisals that eventually led to a declaration of war. While these international issues had little bearing on the coast of Maine, they precipitated a series of events that profoundly affected Maine people living in the towns along the Penobscot River – and those who directed Maine’s ongoing campaign for separation from Massachusetts.

By 1807 diplomatic tensions between the United States and Great Britain were at a flash point. Had President Thomas Jefferson declared war on England at the time, he would have enjoyed widespread popular support. Instead, he passed the Embargo Act, forbidding American merchant ships to trade in belligerent ports. This single act turned the powerful New England Federalist establishment against the U.S. government. Thus, when war was finally declared, Massachusetts ignored it and continued to trade with British merchants, who were desperate for American goods to sustain the British army in Spain. Once Napoleon was defeated in March 1814, this trade was no longer crucial, and Britain
Anti-British feelings were strong in America when President James Madison declared war in 1812, but New England Federalists were staunchly opposed to the president’s declaration. Ignoring “Mr. Madison’s War,” they continued trading with their British partners and enjoyed relative immunity from the hostilities. This changed in 1814. Maine Historical Society Collections.
turned its attention to America, adding New England to its blockade on April 25, 1814. American shipping, even the smallest fishing boat, became prey to British vessels, and villages up and down the East Coast fell victim to British harassment. The War of 1812 soon became known as the “Second War for Independence.”

The Indian problem in the Northwest Territories, like the problem of commerce on the high seas, had been simmering for some time. A confederation of tribes under Tecumseh brought America’s march westward to a halt. Due to callous treatment by the American government, most western Indians sided with Britain when war finally came in 1812. Thus America entered the war on several fronts: in the backwoods of Ohio; on the shores and waters of the lower Great Lakes, and along the Eastern Seaboard.

The British Invasion of the Penobscot

The British blockade in the spring of 1814 dragged Massachusetts into the war, but due to the Federalists’ anti-war stance, units of the U.S. Army were deployed to the war zone in the West, leaving Massachusetts dependent on its own military resources. The state militia, dating from 1620 when the Pilgrims hired Myles Standish to teach them about firearms and defense, had grown to thirteen divisions by 1812, with seven in Massachusetts and six in the District of Maine. By law, the militia included all males between ages sixteen and forty. Soldiers wore no uniforms, but sported a badge bearing the state seal on their hats. Officers usually managed a blue coat and a sword of sorts. Members of the Elite Militia, little more than a men’s club, purchased their own gaudy uniforms and equipment. The militia calendar contained two holidays: Inspection Day on the first Tuesday in May, and the Muster, a week-long affair in mid-September. Both provided an opportunity for the men to socialize, drink, and show off in front of a crowd. Officers were elected, meaning that the most popular, rather than the most able, served as commanders. The size of the militia is difficult to estimate, with reports ranging from 59,700 to 140,538. In any case, they were no match against the professional soldier of the British Army.

British strategy in New England involved a thrust up the Penobscot River to capture and occupy eastern Maine. This was to ensure a line of communication between the British naval base at Halifax and the Canadian capital of Quebec when the St. Lawrence was frozen over in winter. Along alternate routes, messengers would often take three weeks on paths through the wilderness, and often the dispatches – and dispatchers
Since the days of the French and Indian wars, British strategists had used eastern Maine as a route of communication when the St. Lawrence River iced over in winter. In August 1814 Sir George Prevost, Governor of Canada, ordered the lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia to capture and occupy as much of Maine as was needed to “insure an uninterrupted communications between Halifax and Quebec.” Public Archives of Canada, courtesy of the author.

– were lost altogether. The War of 1812 provided an opportunity to reestablish British control over the essential communication routes in eastern Maine. On August 2, 1814, Sir George Prevost, Governor-General of Canada and the British military commander-in-chief of American War, ordered Sir John Coape Sherbrooke, Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia, to capture and occupy as much of Maine as was needed to “insure an uninterrupted communications between Halifax and Quebec.”

At about the same time, the twenty-six-gun American corvette Adams, under twenty-year-old Captain Charles Morris, entered Penob-
When the British arrived at Castine, they met only token resistance from U.S. soldiers occupying a small earthen battery. Illustration from Benson J. Lossing, *Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812* (1869).

scot Bay on August 17, 1814. The ship had stranded on a ledge off Isle au Haut, and, coming free on the next high tide, sailed up the Penobscot River to Hampden for safety and repairs. As the *Adams* crossed the bay, she sighted the eighteen-gun British brig-rigged sloop-of-war (generally called a “brig-sloop”) *Rifleman*. The *Adams* turned to give chase, but the enemy escaped.7

The British invasion force of ten ships set sail from Halifax on August 26, 1814, with Governor Sherbrooke in command. The land force consisted of about 3,000 men: two companies of the 7th Battalion of the 60th Infantry Regiment; the full 29th, 62nd, and 98th infantry regiments, a force of Royal Artillery under Brevet Major G. Crawford; and a force of sappers under Lieutenant G. Nicolls of the Royal Engineers. This force, divided into two brigades, arrived from the Mediterranean. Two units had been in the American Revolution, the 29th being infamous for the “Boston Massacre” and the 62nd a part of Burgoyne’s army, which had surrendered at the Battle of Saratoga. The 60th was a special unit raised in New York after Braddock’s defeat and trained to fight Indians. This commando force became a rifle regiment, changing their red coats for coats of green.8

Guarding the transports *Harmony*, *London*, *Thames*, and *Clifford*, and two stores ships were the seventy-four gun battleship *Dragon*, the flagship; the forty-four-gun frigate *Endymion*, the thirty-eight-gun frigate *Bacchante*, and the eighteen-gun brig-sloop *Sylph*. The naval force was under command of Rear Admiral Edward Griffith, commander of the New England blockade area, and the flagship was commanded by Captain Robert Barrie. The thirty-eight-gun frigate *Tenedos*, the eighteen-gun brig sloop *Rifleman*, and the tender *Eric* joined the task
force at sea, and the seventy-four-gun battleship *Bulwark* and the
twelve-gun schooner *Pictou* joined when the fleet reached Castine.9

The town militias of the Penobscot River valley that would meet the
British made up the 3rd and 4th regiments, 1st Brigade, 10th Division.
The 3rd Regiment came from Frankfort (which then included Winter-
port), Hampden, Dixmont, Town No. 2 First Range (now Newburgh),
Town No. 2, Second Range (now Hermon), Orrington, and Lee Plant-
tion (now Monroe). The regimental commander was Lieutenant
Colonel Andrew Grant of Hampden, and his staff included Major
Joshua Chamberlain of Orrington, father of the Civil War hero Joshua L.
Chamberlain, and Major John Balch of Bangor. The regiment numbered
358 men according to the 1814 returns. The 4th Regiment consisted of
Bangor and several adjacent towns. Its regimental commander was Lieu-
tenant Colonel John Whiting of Brewer, and its staff included Major
Thomas George of Brewer and Major Benjamin Butterfield of Plant-
tion No. 4 (now Bradley). The regiment numbered 313 men. The only
federal force in the area was Lieutenant Andrew Lewis and forty men of
the U.S. 40th Regiment, garrisoned at Fort Madison, a crescent-shaped
earthen battery at Castine.10

The British force came to anchor off Castine on the morning of Sep-
tember 1 and demanded an immediate surrender of the fort and town.
Lewis gave token resistance, then spiked the guns and set the ammuni-
tion afire. He and his men fled upriver, dragging along two twelve-
pounders. When the American soldiers fled, Sherbrooke sent a 600-
man detachment to secure Castine, which surrendered without further
trouble. That afternoon, Sherbrooke ordered a 600-man force up the
Penobscot River to capture the *Adams*. This force consisted of flank
companies and fifty-three artillerymen. Three brigs took the soldiers
upriver: the *Peruvian*, the *Sylph*, and the transport *Harmony*. Guarding
these boats was the *Dragon's* tender with eighty marines armed with
Congreve Rockets. The British force totaled just over 1,100 men under
command of Colonel Henry John of the 60th Regiment. As the British
moved upriver, Sherbrooke sent another force across the head of the bay
to Belfast to “block the high road to Boston” and stop any American re-
inforcements moving in from the west. The 600-man detachment took
Belfast without a shot and occupied the town peacefully.11

The Penobscot Towns Prepare for Battle

When the British appeared off Castine, alarms sounded up and
down the river valley, and the militias prepared to fight. Taking com-
Command of the militia fell to Major General John Blake, whose stately home in Brewer suggests the relation between social status and military rank. Blake courtesy Bangor Public Library; drawing from Lossing, *Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812*. 
mand was sixty-one-year old Brigadier General John Blake of Brewer, commander of the 1st Brigade of the militia’s 10th Division. Blake was an early settler with interests in farming and lumbering. He was also state agent for the Penobscot Indians. He chose Bangor as the battle site and sent the militia forces out to harry the approaching enemy. Sherbrooke learned that an additional militia force with two cannons had mustered at Bucksport to fire on the passing British vessels, and at three A.M. on September 4, he led a force of 700 soldiers up the east bank of the river to Bucksport. The troops found two three-pounder brass field pieces and took them back to Castine the next day. The militia apparently fled when they saw the British.

The British movement up the river was slowed by mild winds and dense fog. Near noon on September 2, the fleet reached Frankfort. Sherbrooke sent a force ashore under a white flag to offer the residents a choice between letting the fleet pass unmolested or being burnt out of their homes. A short time later, the British spied a militia on the east bank marching north towards Brewer. In the ensuing battle, the militia suffered one death and a few wounded before they fled. The British, without casualties, were soon back aboard their ship. The British reached Bald Hill Cove, three miles below Hampden, at five P.M. on September 2. Here, Colonel John and his staff went ashore to discuss the American force now visible on the Hampden Highlands a mile and a half upriver. British scouts discovered another force at the north end of the cove guarding the road (now state route 1A) to Hampden. A grenadier company totaling 150 regulars drove away the American pickets. With the area secured, the British soldiers landed and bedded down, but a severe thunder and rain squall kept the luckier artillerymen aboard the Peru-vian. The full British force at Bald Head Cove numbered 675 men – far short of the 1,500 the Americans later claimed.

On the American side, Captain Morris and the crew of the Adams – about 150 men – removed nine eighteen-pounder cannon from the vessel and placed them on the bluff overlooking the river. The remaining fifteen eighteen-pounders and two twelve-pounders they positioned on Crosby’s Long Wharf, 900 feet upriver from the battery on the bluff. The crew made breastworks of the ship’s stores, and the Adams was anchored under the bluff’s cannon, with two privateers close by. Of General Blake’s brigade, officially 569 men mustered, although local histories say only 300 showed up. The force included Blake and his seven-man staff and militia from the following towns:
Dixmont: Captain Samuel Butman with 56 men
Carmel and Hampden: Captain James Patten with 38 men
Bucksport: Captain Abraham Hill with 23 men
Lee Plantation: Captain Joseph Neally with 72 men
Hampden: Captain Peter Newcomb with 56 men and Captain John Emery’s Light Infantry, with 36 men
Orrington: Captain Warren Ware with 56 men
Frankfort: Captain Elisha Thayer with 58 men; and Captain Amos Weston with 56 men
Brewer: Captain Solomon Blake with 31 men
Bangor: Captain Daniel Webster with 39 men
Eddington: Captain Thomas Sibley with 39 men; and Captain Lot Rider with 18 men

The militia mounted four six-pounder field guns, but since many militia men had no weapons, the crew of the *Adams* gave up their muskets and kept their pikes and cutlasses. Within a short time, Lieutenant Lewis and his regulars with their two cannon arrived, making a total of 761 men with thirty-two cannons. Blake’s militia were joined by others arriving on their own accord and not listed in the state records. Morris took one look at the ill equipped militia and voiced doubts to Blake, who retorted that they would fight.

The militia was in position by the afternoon of September 2, forming a single line from the main road beside the Academy to the river, just south of the *Adams* and about a quarter mile south of the village center. Major Chamberlain commanded the left flank; General Blake the center; and Colonel Grant the right flank. Lieutenant Lewis’s men with a single eighteen-pounder held the middle of the road, with the Bangor Artillery under Captain Charles Hammon and four cannon to their right. The entire force stood at arms all night in the rain without food.

Morris suggested an attack on the British as they landed, but Blake, with a senior rank, determined to make a more formal engagement on the field. At daybreak on September 3, the British were in rank and ready to move. The fog lifted briefly, giving the British a glimpse of the American position. Barrie estimated the American force at 1,400. At six A.M. the British advanced with a single company of the 60th in the van and a light infantry company of the 62nd as the rear guard. The Royal Marines guarded the flanks. On the river and keeping abreast of the soldiers was the squadron of armed rowboats, with the brigs in the rear as a reserve. Ahead of the rowboats was the rocket boat, with Barrie aboard.
In preparation for battle, Captain Charles Morris anchored the corvette Adams off Crosby’s Long Wharf in Hampden and moved the ship’s cannons to the bluff overlooking the river. The wharf scene looks down-river from the Hampden shore. Illustrations from Lossing, *Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812.*
The thick fog rolled in again, and neither side could see the other. However, the tramp of marching soldiers and splash of the oars on the river alerted the militia to the presence of the enemy. When Blake thought them in range, he ordered a volley of cannon fire; the British replied with rockets, giving Blake some estimate of their range. The militia waited as the British pressed on, and when they appeared on the bridge over Pitcher’s (now Reed’s) Brook, Lewis and his men opened fire. The British continued across the bridge, deployed, and charged. Ward’s company of the 60th, with the Light Infantry of the 29th under Captain Thomas L. Coker, engaged the Americans first. The British quickly took a hill on the American’s right flank.

Stand and Retreat

The militia fell back, then panicked and fled the field. Lewis and Morris ordered the cannons spiked and the Adams set afire. The entire battle lasted only twenty minutes. Fire from the American cannon on the bluff and wharf kept the British boats at bay and mostly out of the fight, but as Barrie reported, the rockets were “generally well directed and threw the enemy into confusion.” In the brief battle the British suffered three wounded and one killed in the 29th, one wounded and one missing in the 62nd, four wounded in the 98th, and a sailor of the Dragon killed. Captain Thomas Gell of the 29th’s Grenadier Company was the only officer injured. Oddly, no one in the 60th, which led the charge, was injured. Of the Americans, one militia man was killed, eleven wounded, and eighty taken prisoner. While the name of the American killed has been lost to history, one of the wounded was Doan Battehell, a private in the Orrington Militia. Battehell asked the state to reimburse him for loss of time from his job, and was awarded thirty-six dollars – a generous sum for the time. The two British dead were Private Peter Bracewell of the 29th Regiment and Seaman Michael Cavernaugh. Both lie under a single stone behind the Hampden Police Station. Following the short battle, most of the militia fled north to Bangor or west to nearby farms. Morris and his men eventually reached Portland, while Samuel Ryder of Orrington rowed four officers of the Adams from Hampden to Boston. During the battle, the Sylph fired on the town of Orrington, across the river, hitting a number of buildings. Orrington resident William Reed was killed by a cannonball as he was standing in his house. The people of Hampden were likewise caught in the cross-fire, and while no one was hit, many fled or hid in their cellars.

When the British force entered Bangor on September 5, it was
greeted by numerous white flags. The British brigs anchored off the mouth of Kenduskeag Stream and sent several rockets over the cities of Bangor and Brewer. The British troops, quartered in the Bangor Court House, two schools, and two large dwellings, plundered stores and houses in the south section of the city, killing livestock and burning fourteen vessels harbored at Bangor and Brewer. The remaining six vessels they sent down river as prizes. Town leaders signed a bond for $30,000 to deliver four vessels still under construction to Castine by October. Captain Barrie forced 191 local men, including General Blake, to sign a pledge not to take up arms against Britain. Remaining in Bangor for thirty hours, the occupational force destroyed property worth $45,000.

Hampden was plundered as well. British soldiers entered houses and stores, took what they wanted, and destroyed the rest. Hogsheads of molasses were dumped everywhere. Soldiers shot livestock and forced residents to cook the carcasses for their meals. Official papers – town re-
ports, lawyers’ briefs, store account books – were burned, and Bible and Prayer Books were destroyed and pews smashed. The British cut down fruit trees, ripped up gardens, smashed windows and mirrors, and threw items into the grist mill hopper, where they were crushed between the stones. Rowboats were smashed, vessels fired, and the merchant ship Victory and the privateer Commodore Decatur taken as prizes. Hampden residents estimated the damage at $44,000. Barrie imprisoned seventy Hampden townsmen aboard the Decatur for a full day without food, and kept twelve of the men for another twenty-four hours. Others were briefly held in Crosby’s brick warehouse-store (now the Grist Mill Store). Like Bangor, Hampden was forced to sign a bond for $12,000 to deliver certain vessels to Castine by October. When a delegation of locals approached Barrie asking that their personal property be spared, the British captain’s reply was curt: “Humanity! I have none for you! My business is to burn, sink, and destroy. Your village is taken by storm, and by the rules of war, we ought to both lay your village in ashes and put its inhabitants to the sword! But I will spare your lives, though I mean to burn your houses!” A number of the townsmen slipped off to Castine and complained to Sherbrooke, who sent instructions to spare private property except in extreme necessity.

According to sometimes inconsistent reports, twenty-one vessels were destroyed and fourteen sent to Castine, along with thirty cannon, and another five seized. British troops also claimed “goods found in the woods” valued at £20,000 – about $100,000 U.S. today. Also taken down river were sixty-five prisoners of war, four of them later taken to Melville Island Prison in Halifax. The Sylph’s Muster Book mentions that “Indians from Hamden – Chief Francis Rowlin, Captain John Epton, Capt. John Collie, Capt. Paul Dosap, Capt. John Elton, John Marie ‘Esquire’, [and] 14 soldiers” were taken to Castine. The Indians were not prisoners; rather it might have occurred to the British that they would prove to be allies or at least neutrals during the occupation. The Penobscots were a powerful tribe, and many white inhabitants still feared them.

Occupation

With the Penobscot secured, Sherbrooke sent a force to Machias while he returned to Halifax. A detachment of 1,750 soldiers remained to occupy Castine under General Gosselin’s command. The British military were delighted with the operation, but it was a long time before Maine people forgot Captain Barrie: for years, his effigy was hung, burned, or shot in the river towns. Massachusetts called General Blake to
When Massachusetts failed to come to the aid of its occupied eastern district, the Secretary of War ordered General Henry Dearborn to drive the British out. Federalist Governor Caleb Strong refused to help fund the expedition. The war ended shortly thereafter, but resentment against Massachusetts lingered in Maine. Dearborn portrait from Lossing, *Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812*; Strong from Maine Historical Society Collections.
account for the defeat, but the officer defended himself and was exonerated. Blake then called his own court of inquiry and had regimental commander Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Grant held accountable. Grant was suspended from command for two years.22

The Battle of Hampden alerted Massachusetts to the danger on the eastern border. Within a few days, the state militia was out in force and deployed along the coast from Belfast west to Massachusetts. The militia on the west side of Penobscot Bay and the British on the east side took little notice of each other. The British were satisfied with their acquisitions, and the Americans were reluctant to attempt anything that would bring another defeat. Despite this demonstration of Maine’s vulnerability, the Massachusetts legislature, at a special meeting in October, appropriated funds to defend Boston, but not to free Maine. Maine State Senator Mark Langdon Hill of Phippsburg, representing Lincoln County, twice asked for a force to drive out the enemy, but his pleas were ignored. Governor Caleb Strong explained that without a large force, the expedition would end in failure; the responsibility for liberating Maine lay with the United States, not with Massachusetts, he added.23

When Massachusetts refused to help Maine, Secretary of War James Monroe ordered U.S. Army General Henry Dearborn to take 5,000 Massachusetts militiamen, “without the intervention of the state authority,” and place them under command of William King of Bath. King was a leading Democratic-Republican and a major general in the District militia’s 11th Division. Monroe discovered, however, that the U.S. could not pay for the expedition, and in December he asked Massachusetts for supplemental funds; incredibly, the governor refused Monroe’s plea. While these negotiations were proceeding, Sherbrooke ordered the 99th Regiment and a detachment of the 27th to reinforce Castine.24

By this time, however British peace proposals were appearing in the New England newspapers, among them a plan calling for the annexation of eastern Maine by Canada. Massachusetts’s radical anti-war Federalists, viscerally at odds with the Republican-Democrats and with President James Madison and “his” war, considered eastern Maine’s annexation to Canada an honorable settlement. Loudest in his approval was Federalist Thomas Adams of Castine, a state politician known to make frequent friendly visits to British Commander-in-Chief Sherbrooke at Halifax.25

The war ended before Monroe’s orders to General Dearborn could be carried out. British military leaders determined that occupying Maine was not worth the costs of its defense, and the territory was re-
turned to the United States. The bonds signed by town leaders in Hampden and Bangor came due in October, and neither town could pay them, but the war’s end brought the issue to rest. The British left Castine on April 28, 1815 – to the great sorrow of certain residents who, under the occupation, had profited from a trans-Atlantic trade with ports that the war had previously closed to them. The customs officer at Castine collected $150,000 in just five weeks. Many more had profited from Canadian goods smuggled across the Penobscot River into the adjacent U.S. towns.

As a result of his disregard for the defense of Maine, Governor Strong became the focus of Maine’s hatred. He was ridiculed as the “Hero of Castine,” and Mainers proposed to give him a sword made of white pine with an appropriate symbol that would “mark ... our estimation of his patriotic and gallant defense of Castine, and the prompt and efficient protection he afforded the District when invaded by the enemy.” The Federalists’ willingness to sacrifice Maine to the interests of Boston became a major rallying cry as Maine moved to separate from Massachusetts in the years between 1816 and 1819. As the years passed, however, the stigma of military defeat at Hampden disappeared.
The battle’s centennial was quietly marked in 1914, and in August 1980 the Hampden Historical Society celebrated its tenth anniversary by re-enacting the battle and inviting neighboring historical societies to join in the festivities.30

Overlooked today, the Anglo-American War of 1812 brought profound changes to the United States. The various embargoes and blockades before and during the war forced the nation to look to its own resources. Americans shifted their gaze westward away from the Atlantic trade to the vast resources of the trans-Appalachian frontier, and merchants who previously invested in the shipping industry plied their capital in western land speculation and in new industrial experiments in the East. Great textile mills appeared on the rivers of Rhode Island and Massachusetts after the war, as the Northeast launched the industrial revolution in America. Because Massachusetts opposed the war, its Federalist leaders became the subject of ridicule after the American victory. Once powerful in national politics, the state was at least temporarily reduced to a political backwater, and the Federalists vanished so abruptly that for a decade the nation operated under a single major political party. Indian resistance in the Northwest Territories declined under a continuing policy of extermination and relocation.31

The War of 1812 confirmed the principle of freedom of the seas, and in this sense, it was a successful conclusion to a long battle between the young nation and its former mother country. A far less appreciated consequence of the war was the fact that Maine, after two decades of indecision, began moving resolutely toward separation from Massachusetts. The Battle of Hampden, vortex of a little-known campaign in a little-known place in Maine, was a military disaster, but also an important milestone in a long train of events that brought Maine to statehood in 1820.

NOTES

4. Militia Records, Massachusetts State House; William James, *Full and Correct


9. Ships' logbooks in PRO: Dragon (Adm 51/2288); *Endymion* (Adm 51/2324); Bacchante (Adm 51/2047); Tenedos (Adm 51/2909); Bulwark (Adm 51/2107); Pictou (Adm 51/2051). Sylph’s log was lost at sea.

10. Massachusetts Militia Magazine Returns, September 1814; Officers’ names from Roster Book No. 4, dated 1809 to 1813 but covering from 1796 to 1816, General and Staff Officers Roster Book, National Archives Record Group 45. See Wheeler, *History of Castine, Brooksville, and Penobscot*; Militia Records, State House.

11. The British reports are: Adm 1/507 (Barrie and Crawford), CO 217/93 (Sherbrooke and John), and CO 216/96 (author unknown), Admiralty Records, 37 and 51, PRO. Also, the Dragon’s Muster book, Adm 37/5054 and the Sylph’s Muster Book, Adm 37/4819.

12. The American reports are primarily from the *Columbian Centinel* (Boston), September 14, 1814. Files of the Hampden Historical Society contain an unattributed Bangor newspaper account.


16. Reed’s name is from an undated Bangor newspaper at the Hampden Historical Society. Oakman’s is from William F. Fernald, *In Defense of the “Adams”: Some Men and Women of Frankfort (Winterport) and the Battle of Hampden* (Farmingdale, Maine: W. Fernald, 1992).


20. This quote is found in every book that contains details of the Battle of Hampden.


30. The society also published a booklet, *Call to Arms*, which detailed the battle and included the many anecdotes.