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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY AND THE IRANIAN
REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS IN CONNECTION TO THE EMERGENCE THEORY

by

Pardis Delijani

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for a Degree with Honors
(International Affairs)

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University of Maine

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Abstract:

The thesis covers an in-depth analysis of the internal operations of the Egyptian military and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp. In light of recent rebellions in Egypt and Iran, the paper will examine how the security, economic, and political role of these two institutions has led to Egypt's betrayal of President Mubarak, and the IRGC's loyalty to the Iranian leadership. The role of these two institutions will be investigated using Steven Johnson's Emergence Theory. In using Johnson's theory, this thesis will aim to uncover the function, performance, and system of two institutions that have become autonomous within their respective state.

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INTRODUCTION

Egypt and Iran have relied on elaborate security organizations for regime stability. The mission of these organizations ranges from subduing an array of external threats, internal threats, and in some cases, foreign espionage. However, the institutions within these two nations are not strictly limited to the purposes of national security and defense. Although both these nations have experienced major changes in their government within the previous century, the role of these coercive forces has continued to have a profound effect. Their power has expanded into various areas of society including affairs of the state and the economy, resulting into a dominant and influential force within their respective country.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Egyptian Military spark the fear of torture and death for many Iranian and Egyptian citizens, who are well aware that these security organizations are present in almost every facet of society. However, in the summer of 2009 following the disputed presidential elections, Iranian citizens challenged the capabilities of paramilitary forces including the IRGC and the Basij (basij means mobilization). The IRGC and the Basij obeyed their orders and put down the rebellion, and the regime held. Soon after, in the fall of 2010, the Arab revolts began. Tunisia was first, and then Egypt experienced a great transformation. Unlike the fate of the Iranian uprising, the Egyptian revolution illustrated a penetrable component in breaking the military's loyalty to Mubarak.

Although the shift of the military's loyalty was not the only variable responsible for the success of the revolutionaries, it can be said that the Egyptian military determined the major turning point of the rebellion. In cases, the structure and mold necessary to

preserve the loyalty of these powerful organizations is essential. Without the support of these powerful institutions, whose influence extends within all parts of society, the regime stability of Egypt and Iran becomes jeopardized.

Steven Johnson's version of the emergence theory will be applied to the organizational structure of the IRGC and the Egyptian military. The emergence theory is when components interact with one another to self-organize into a complex system. In doing so, a better basis for an in-depth analysis of the workings of the IRGC and the Egyptian military can be conceived. Furthermore, answer the question as to why the IRGC remained loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini's regime, whereas the Egyptian military broke faith and failed to protect President Hosni Mubarak's rule.

The reason for comparing the institutions of Iran and Egypt, in part, is due to the fact that the uprisings in Egypt and Iran resulted in different outcomes, in which the success of the Egyptians must be greatly attributed to the military. The IRGC and the Egyptian Army are also similar in the fact that they are major players within their respective countries who hold power within many facets of the nation. In a sense, the organizations act as their own state within the country.

METHODOLOGY

This thesis will analyze the behavior of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Egyptian Military as a result of the recent rebellions by answering the following questions:

1. What incentives have encouraged members of the IRGC, as well as the Egyptian military to remain loyal to the regime?
2. What role has the IRGC and the Egyptian military played within various areas of society?
3. How does Steven Johnson's emergence theory apply to the structural organization of the IRGC and the Egyptian military?
4. What led the Egyptian military to abandon Mubarak?
5. Under what circumstances could the IRGC follow in the Egyptian military's footsteps and take control over Iran?

The first chapter will be a brief history of the IRGC, beginning from the time it was established - following the 1979 Islamic revolution - through the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. A brief history of the Egyptian military will also be presented, beginning from Nasser's regime in 1952. The role of these institutions will be discussed before and during the uprising in Iran and the revolution in Egypt. Their popularity, or lack of it, will also be analyzed in order to better examine their position within their respective country. Also, this chapter will begin to discuss the organization of the IRGC and the Egyptian military relative to Steven Johnson's view of the emergence theory, in which later chapters will evaluate the structure and workings of these organizations in

order to reach a conclusion regarding the applicability and importance of implementing emergence theory.

The second chapter will focus on the military and security role of these institutions, discussing the original purpose for the creation of the IRGC, and how the Iran-Iraq war enhanced the position of Khomeini and the IRGC. This will be followed by an examination of the current role of the IRGC and the military, including other armed forces that participated in the rebellions, such as the Basij. The tension between the Artesh (Iranian professional military) and the IRGC will also be examined in order to define the two different roles that these Iranian armed forces play. Lastly, within this second chapter, the suppression of the green movement in Iran and the success of the Egyptian revolution will be discussed regarding the efforts made by the two armed forces to quash civil unrest.

Chapter three will examine the economic involvement of the IRGC and the Egyptian military, in which they have become a dominant force in most sectors of the economy. The network of current and former members of both the IRGC and the Egyptian military within the economic sector will be examined. This will include where these institutions receive funds, as well as where they have the ability to tap into other funds. The effects of the international sanctions on Iran will also highlight the economic benefits that the IRGC is reaping. This chapter will then analyze how economic influence of the IRGC and the Egyptian military impacted the outcome of the rebellions in Iran and Egypt. Lastly, the economic incentives given to these organizations will be applied to Johnson's model of the emergence theory.

The fourth chapter will concentrate on the political influence of these institutions. It will discuss the contention between Reformists and Conservatives, and how it impacts the operation of the IRGC. In Egypt, the 1952 overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy led to senior military officers serving as the Egyptian President, Prime Minister, and in cabinet and senior government positions. The origin of the political role of both these institutions will be examined in relation to other political leaders. The evolution of their current ideology will be examined, and applied to the rebellions in both countries, as well as Johnson's emergence theory.

In the conclusion and final chapter, the future of the IRGC and Egyptian military will be discussed in respect to Steven Johnson's emergence theory. It will also analyze the circumstances that could push the IRGC to turn away from the Iranian leadership, and the circumstances that could unite the Egyptian military with the future leader of Egypt.

CHAPTER ONE:**The history, the uprising, the revolution, and the emergence theory**

HISTORY OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS

Iran-Iraq War

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, or *Pasdaran* (Guardians), is a branch of the military that formed following the 1979 Islamic Revolution when Ayatollah Khomeini issued a decree on May 5th of that same year for its conception (Moin, 2003). It is currently Iran's most powerful security organization, and was created to protect and preserve the goal of the revolution. Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi solely relied on the imperial army to protect his regime, so when Khomeini took power, the Supreme Leader needed to be able to rely on his own coercive force. The military was looked upon with suspicion and distrust which led the religious leader to create a security organization, in which its purpose would be to safeguard the ideology of the new regime. Rather than using potentially tainted units, the IRGC was formed to counter loyalists in the military that may have still existed, and to establish legitimacy for the new found country. The IRGC symbolized a quickly developed new order that would eventually dominate the republic.

Under the Constitution of Iran, the IRGC is said to be responsible for guarding the independence and territorial integrity of the country, as well as the internal stability of the Islamic Republic. The Constitution also states that the IRGC must be an Islamic Army, committed to Islamic ideology and the people.¹ However, under Ayatollah Ali Khomeini, the position of the IRGC began to evolve into a force that would surpass its constitutional powers and ideological purpose.

¹ See Article 150 of the Constitution of The Islamic Republic of Iran.

Post Iran-Iraq War

The result of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war paved the way for the ascendancy of the IRGC. The war boosted the morale and confidence in the new regime. This united the people of Iran to support the IRGC for its successful efforts, and as a result, established the organization as the primary coercive force for internal and external ventures.

The “sacred defense” against Iraq necessitated the Iranian government to mold the IRGC into a conventional armed force (Wehrey, et al., 2009). However, this action may not have only been accomplished for the purpose of winning a war. Many IRGC commanders, as well as revolutionary leaders, like Khomeini, hoped to use the war not only to assert their territorial integrity, but as an opportunity to further establish the goals of the revolution. It is argued that the IRGC intentionally prolonged the war in order to marginalize the efforts of the *Artesh*, or Iranian Army (Abrahamian, 1992). Another reason for the argument of the drawn out war is that extra time could be given to the IRGC to remove any potential opponents of the revolution that may have still been present within the *Artesh*.

The concern of the IRGC and the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) was not just paranoia, for in the summer of 1980 before the Iraqi invasion, the army had attempted to organize several coup schemes. The IRGC and IRP made sure to spread the army thin throughout the western border of Iran in order to prevent a repeat of such an undertaking (Wehrey, et al., 2009). As long as the *Artesh* had minimal contact with other affiliates, Khomeini and his associates could reduce the threat of another potential uprising.

Today, the IRGC uses the success of the Iran-Iraq war to bolster its legitimacy. This theme becomes apparent in the economic and political arena that the organization

dominates. For instance, a reenactment or symbol representing the aftermath of the war is often depicted within construction and public works (Wehrey, et al., 2009). As an Iranian-born scholar and frequent visitor to the country, a man who chose to remain anonymous, stated regarding the IRGC's role in the war:

The bravery of the IRGC (during the Iran-Iraq War) is mostly an idea propagated by the government with no particular appeal or currency within Iran itself. In fact, many Iranians blame the IRGC for an excessively long and futile eight-year war against Iraq. Many believe that Iran, with a population two times larger than that of Iraq, could not defeat its forces because of the Guards' *nadanam kari* (inexperience), emotionally, and ideological zealotry.²

Nonetheless, the statement above may very well not match the attitude of the majority of Iranians. For many Iranians, the husbands, fathers, sons, and brothers died in the war, and became *shahids* (martyrs). Families of these men support the IRGC's endeavors, because the IRGC became victorious in a war in which their friends and family sacrificed their lives. For many Iranians, to support the IRGC, means to support the revolution's goals that loved ones fought to protect.

The importance of the Iran-Iraq war is crucial to the evolution of the IRGC, for it is the event that catapulted their popularity and established their place in society. The Iran-Iraq war expanded the organization of the *Basij-e Mostaz'afin* (Mobilization of the Oppressed), a paramilitary volunteer militia that was formed in November 1979. The Basij was used to conduct massive raids on Iraqi forces. The credited victory of the IRGC persuaded the IRP to provide more military equipment, and most of all, a permanent edge over the regular military.

² Interview with an Iranian-born scholar conducted by Frederic Wehrey on October 24th, 2007.

The end of the war also opened the door to a new regime. Following Khomeini's death in 1989, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei became the new Supreme Leader, while Akhbar Rafsanjani began his presidency in August of that same year. Rafsanjani's role as president was to centralize more power in the presidency. He also sought to pursue a free market economy, contradicting the preference of hardliners. Rafsanjani was popular with the upper and middle classes because of his economic reforms and support for human rights. Although he may have left a positive mark for the middle and upper class Iranians, he failed to gain popularity with the working class, the elderly, and the rural population where support was needed most. (Chua-Eoan, 2009) This was because his economic reforms failed to reach the groups that were the most deprived of financial means. The major disapproval from hardliners would lead to the increasing power of the IRGC during Khamenei's tenure as Supreme Leader.

When Khamenei assumed the role of Supreme Leader in 1989, he lacked much popularity, and looked to the IRGC to maintain his position as the Grand Ayatollah. He needed to not only protect his post, but the regime as well. As a result, Khamenei rejected the idea of merging the military and the IRGC, as Rafsanjani was hoping to accomplish. In an interview with the Fars news agency, former Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary Guard Rahim Safavi stated:

...the Supreme Leader from the early days of his leadership raised opposition to the plan, and the plan ceased to be implemented. The Supreme Leader believed that the Revolutionary Guard and the regular army have to remain two separate institutions with different duties (Fars News Agency, Iran Briefing – Human Rights Violation by Iran's Revolutionary Guards, 2012).

IRGC commanders believed Rafsanjani's reforms threatened the values of the revolution (Global Security, 2011). These same sentiments were exhibited by the IRGC

during Mohammad Khatami's presidency when the reform movement took off. The 1999 student protests prompted the IRGC to warn Khatami of the necessary actions they would take if the president were to endanger the pillars of the revolution (Global Security, 2011). In a 2003 letter written to the Majlis speaker by former IRGC Chief Commander Yahya Rahim Safavi:

The IRGC considers itself responsible for the defense of the Islamic Revolution, its achievements, and the ideology and values of Imam Khomeini. We insist upon avoiding political games and infighting among different parties and groups. [Parliamentarians] should also refrain from extremist actions and respect the dignity of the Majlis. Our main mission is to stop those who wish to destroy and overthrow the Islamic Revolution (Global Security, 2011).

In September of 2007, Ayatollah Khamenei appointed Mohammed Ali Jafari as the new IRGC commander. Jafari's experience had proven him to be a committed and loyal leader of the IRGC. He has commanded the IRGC land forces for 15 years, fought in the Iran-Iraq war as a Basij volunteer, and was supposedly one of the students who held 52 Americans hostage for over a year in Tehran from 1979 to 1981 (Iran Briefing – Human Rights Violation by Iran's Revolutionary Guards, 2012).

The extended power of the IRGC civilian society and politics required the executive, judicial, and legislative branch of the Islamic Republic to be subservient to the interests and demands of the IRGC. Disobeying the IRGC or the Supreme Leader would lead to severe punishment. When Ahmadinejad refused to reinstate intelligence minister Heyder Moslehi in 2011, as ordered by Khamenei, Ahmadinejad was punished by having the Oil Ministry fall under the control of the IRGC (Iran Briefing – Human Rights Violation by Iran's Revolutionary Guards, 2012).

Although the IRGC and Ahmadinejad have usually had a close relationship, this event caused a major rift. In a July 2011 interview, Jafari described Ahmadinejad as “deviant current” that needed to be tamed (Nader, 2011). Jafari also hinted at the Guards involvement in the conditions for future elections, stating that reformists - Ahmadinejad’s political enemies - who had not crossed the regime’s “red lines”, would be allowed to participate (Nader, 2011).

Jafari’s statements clearly displayed the political power of the IRGC. Since Khamenei has assigned IRGC members to key positions within the government, parliament, and judiciary, he is able to maintain stability within the regime. If members of the IRGC in senior positions oppose his actions or fail to meet Khamenei’s standards, he would easily be able to replace them with eager IRGC affiliates.

However, that is not to say that Khamenei has all the power in the relationship between him and the IRGC. In fact, it is reciprocal. Originally, many Iranians opposed Khamenei’s appointment as Supreme Leader. Khamenei’s position as Supreme Leader became respected when the IRGC stood behind the legitimacy of his appointment. The IRGC could just as quickly remove their support for the Supreme Leader, if conflict between the two were to arise.

THE GREEN MOVEMENT

Following the disputed elections in June of 2009, a series of protests occurred embodying a number of different interests. Within the green movement, a number of different groups created their own faction that incorporated the broad goals of the movement, which included a women’s movement and youth movement. The color green

was originally used as the symbol for presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi's campaign, but after the fraudulent election, the color transformed into the symbol of hope and unity for those seeking the annulment of the election (NowPublic, 2009). Throughout the summer and fall of 2009, the opposition would organize mass demonstrations. The participants mostly consisted of upper class and educated Iranians. Nonetheless, by the beginning of 2010, the IRGC had successfully quashed public displays of the protests.

As with any revolution or uprising, the green movement encompassed different types of ambitions from various factions. However, the one common goal of these groups was to remodel a despotic and dictatorial government, yet avoid a revolution leading that could lead to the overthrow of the Islamic Republic. The green movement cannot be easily defined. Various political analysts and scholars find it difficult to interpret an uprising that has made contradictory remarks regarding the nature of its purpose. The message of the green movement is unclear in relation to its main argument and democratic assertions (The Gulf Research Unit's Blog, 2010).

Dr. Yadullah Shahibzadeh, from the University of Oslo, bases the green movement's democratic argument on two presumptions; "first there was a popular revolution that produced a constitution which declares that all Iranian citizens have equal political rights, secondly, there are Iranian citizens who now demand these political rights" (The Gulf Research Unit's Blog, 2010). He claims that in order to fully grasp the meaning behind the movement, the time period from the 1979 Iranian Revolution up until the green movement must be greatly taken into account. He states that without this knowledge, the movement cannot be understood. The movement, according to Shahibzadeh, is a continuation of the mass demonstrations that occurred in 1979. The

promise of a democratic government affirming the basic principle for every citizen to have the right to govern or speak out against political or ideological content was, without a doubt, never achieved. This policy was justified up until the late 1980's, in order to prevent oppositional forces from jeopardizing the newfound Islamic Republic (The Gulf Research Unit's Blog, 2010).

Then, there is dissident cleric Mohsen Kadivar who explains the main features of the green movement in vague and broad terms. He identifies seven aspects of the movement, and states that the overall purpose of the Iranian protestors is to "peacefully remove a usurper president and replace him [President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad] with their own choice" (Rooz Online, 2009). He describes the green movement as a peaceful protest that is against violence and advocates the strengthening of democracy and human rights. He also explicitly states that the movement is independent from foreign influence, and is the result of humiliated Iranians whose votes were discounted. Overall, he describes the green movement as an ethical movement, in which the Iranian people are fighting against "lies, cheating, and treason" within the government.

However, the three other aspects of the green movement Kadivar mentions within his interview directly display the mixed messages of the uprising. Although the IRGC dominates almost all sectors of society, and is powerful enough to quell a protest, the blurred and sometimes contradictory statements made the movement easier for the IRGC to squash. The expression of the green movement coincided with the same rhetoric as that of the 1979 revolution. This has made it especially difficult for the leaders of the uprising to definitively differentiate their position from the demands of the Iranian revolution.

Kadivar summarizes Mousavi's words in saying "that the nature of this movement is Islamic and has asked that all slogans begin with 'Allah-u-akbar' and that Islamic institutions should be used as much as possible" (Rooz Online, 2009). And yet, immediately after this is mentioned, Kadivar states that the movement absolutely against using religion as a tool. Even within an interview from one man, the message of the green movement becomes abstract in its contradictory features.

Lastly, Kadivar states that the movement is not aiming to begin a revolution, for "it wants to attain its goals legally through the use of the existing constitution". However, clauses in the constitution regarding human rights— freedom of belief, freedom of protest, protection of torture – become irrelevant when the *Valiyat-e faqih* is applied. The term literally means the guardianship of the religious jurist. The theory was developed by Khomeini and applied to the newly constructed constitution following the overthrow of the shah. This clause bestows ultimate power to the one man, known as the *vali-e-faqih*, who has a thorough knowledge of Islamic law, is an *Imam*, and considered an heir to the Prophet Muhammad. No Muslim living in the jurisdiction of the *vali-e-faqih* can overrule the absolute authority of the leader (Mohaddessin, 1993).

Thus, for Kadivar to state that the green movement is choosing to attain its goals through the legality of the constitution means that the protestors must also recognize the *Valiyat-e faqih*. The IRGC may be a powerful and influential institution within Iran, but the contradictory messages and unrealistic approaches to attain their human rights may have very well contributed to the dominance that the IRGC had over the situation.

Nonetheless, the role of the IRGC in the 2009 presidential election cannot be ignored. Senior Guards officials did not want to risk their strong hold over the regime

with a reformist, such as former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi. Former Guard officer turned businessman, Interior Minister Sadegh Mahsouli, was in charge of supervising the election. He played a critical role in Ahmadinejad's re-election, resulting in mass protest for about six months that the Guards were responsible for suppressing (Wright, 2011). Later chapters will discuss the political role of the IRGC in regards to the green movement in more depth.

However, there are some ideological differences within the IRGC. Many respect Mousavi, who committed himself to the revolution and the Iran-Iraq War during his time as prime minister in the 1980s. Some Guards have also expressed disappointment with Ahmadinejad and Khamenei as a result of the conduct in quelling the demonstrations (Wright, 2011). Despite personal differences regarding the post-election protests, the beneficial relationship between Khamenei and top Guard officials will most likely guarantee the IRGC's role as protector of the principles of the revolution (Wright, 2011).

HISTORY OF EGYPTIAN MILITARY

NASSER

Similarly to the IRGC, the Egyptian military began to acquire considerable power within the country following the 1952 overthrow of the monarchy for the pursuit of Arab socialism. The overthrow of King Farouk on July 17th of 1952 opened the door for Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein to further integrate the military into civilian positions of society (Middle East Policy Council, 2012). However; this of course did not take place until the Free Officers disposed of top ranking military officers within King Farouk's regime. The

Free Officers were an organization composed of junior and middle ranking military officers following the Egyptian defeat in the 1948 Israeli-Arab War. The organization was founded by Nasser, whose experience in the Israeli-Arab war molded his dissatisfaction for top military ranking officers and the monarchy (Nasser, 1973). As an officer, Nasser described his superiors with disgust stating:

They were overfed, lazy and selfish, and they spent their time eating, drinking, carousing, smoking hashish and engaging in many different forms of tyranny and corruption. They were fawning and subservient to the British Military Mission and a disgrace to the uniform they wore. They spent money that belonged to the Egyptian army on food and drink for themselves (Baker, 1978).

The Free Officers' motivation for revolution did not stem entirely from their defeat in war, or their repulsion against high ranking officers. The people within the group came from many different ideological backgrounds, who all desired to remove the monarchy. Some had more liberal views while others belonged to either fascist groups or Islamic groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood. Nonetheless, all members of the Free Officers were "nationalistic in orientation" and loathed the Egyptian monarchy as well as its British masters (Middle East Policy Council, 2012).

By 1955, Nasser and the Free Officers had defeated their political opponents and were able to create a renewed Egypt built on unquestioned military power (Middle East Policy Council, 2012). The Egyptian military began to take over business and commercial sectors within Egypt, in which some divisions of the Free Officers were highly opposed. "The coup plotters were not modernizers and developers" of any sort, for when they seized power, the necessity for social transformation in creating a progressive state was hindered by military rule (Middle East Policy Council, 2012). According to Ahmed S. Hashim of the United States Naval War College, "the Egyptian officers who

seized power in 1952 may have had 'progressive' ideas, but the institution they emerged from was certainly not a modern or advanced institution" (Middle East Policy Council, 2012).

Nasser's charisma and nationalist goals may have contributed to the overlooked military run society. During his presidency the percentage of officers in cabinet positions ranged from 32 percent to 65 percent (Tusa, 1989). Except for one civilian, from 1952 to 1967, all top positions within the country were held by military members. This would include positions in the field of law, medicine, engineering, and politics. Between 1962 and 1967, 27 out of the 65 men who held the highest political positions were officers (Dekmejian, 1994). Placing members of the military within these top positions secured the power of the Free Officers within all sectors of society. However, this is not to say that the Egyptian military aligned themselves with one social class. Military men would involve themselves in almost every facet of a certain sector within society in order to ensure and advance their power.

Nonetheless, increased power of the military created tension. Nasser's military reign can be best described as the rule of the Free Officers and their military companions, so when the military's involvement in politics grew, Nasser and armed-forces commander Abdel Hakim Amer did not see eye to eye (Middle East Policy Council, 2012). Nonetheless, Nasser chose to keep him in his post.

Overall, the years between 1955 and 1966 proved to be one of the most brutal years for the Egyptian military in terms of effectiveness (Middle East Policy Council, 2012). This included the Suez War and their involvement in the North Yemen Civil War

from 1962 to 1970 (Global Security, 2011). This prompted Nasser to look to the Soviets for the purchase of more advanced equipment and weaponry.

The Soviet connection was pursued after the humiliation for Nasser and his nation at the hands of the Israeli assault in the Gaza Strip. Nasser would establish the 20-year arms relationship that would ensue with the Soviets (Middle East Policy Council, 2012). However, the influx of the new equipment proved to be of little use with Amer overseeing the implementation of the supplies to the armed forces. Amer did not properly train the army to use the highly modernized supplies in the most effective way possible. The army lacked detailed training with the new equipment they were given, especially when the materials were being provided at an excessive pace. Amer's character stepped in the way of his professionalism, for his main focus was the political power and advantages that his post could give him. Amer would also integrate his men into the political field in order to serve for his benefit. The politicization of his men steered from Nasser's goals of pan-Arabism when future military expeditions would prove to be fruitless, and the institution would become a center of competition.

The Egyptians involvement in the counterinsurgency of the Yemen Civil War cost the military a considerable amount in resources, including men and supplies (James, 2006). The military may have failed in its' endeavor, but the experience also displayed some profound benefits for officers and the enlistment process. According to Hashim:

...the war led to the emergence of a privileged and corrupt category of military personnel who enjoyed a doubling of basic pay, the ability to import consumer and luxury goods that were scarce in socialist Egypt and access to low-interest loans to buy Egyptian-made Nasr cars (Middle East Policy Council, 2012).

Many of the soldiers insisted on serving in Yemen in order to receive these benefits, for their service would provide access to “better medical care and preferential treatment for placement in universities” for themselves and their families (Middle East Policy Council, 2012). Top officers such as Amer made a fortune from the war.

The embarrassing loss of the Egyptians to the Israelis in the Six Day War reverberated in Moscow. The sales of their weapons and equipment to their Arab allies were going to waste. This prompted the Soviets to train the Egyptians, leading to the restructuring of the demoralized military. This included the removal of Amer and the expansion and extensive training of military ranks. However, this caused tension within the military. The officers were not fond of the Soviets, for they felt that the Soviets looked upon them with contempt and acted as if they controlled the ranks they were training (Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 1970). Egyptians found it particularly satisfying when “Israelis shot down four or five Soviet piloted MiG-21s — part of Egypt's rebuilt air defenses — over the Suez in 1971” (Middle East Policy Council, 2012).

SADAT

However, just as the Egyptian military began to go through a transformation, Nasser died of a heart attack. In 1971, Vice President Anwar El-Sadat became the new president of Egypt (Middle East Policy Council, 2012). His appointment was met with much criticism by his peers. He lacked the appeal of Nasser, and many thought that he would not last long as president. Sadat faced much opposition, in which he was able to

overcome when he gained the support of senior officers. Sadat was able to appeal to their sense of loyalty, legitimacy and professionalism (Gawrych, 2000).

He restructured the armed forces by demoting and promoting officers to various positions in order to guarantee the loyalty of the Egyptian military. Mohamad Ahmad Sadik became minister of war after Mohamad Fawzi's demotion for his Nasserist inclinations, while Lathi Nasif became commander of the presidential guard (Middle East Policy Council, 2012).

Sadat faced many challenges early in his presidency. Heavy defense spending contributed to the sinking economy, while Israel continued to occupy Sinai (Middle East Policy Council, 2012). The occupation of Sinai aroused much criticism and doubt in Sadat's ability to expel the Israelis. However, in preparing for the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the president focused his abilities on depoliticizing the armed forces rather than focusing on the military's readiness to enter conflict. Sadat reassigned positions fit for men who were apolitical. He chose Ahmad Ismail Ali for the position of General, and Abd al-Ghani Gamasy as Chief of Staff (Middle East Policy Council, 2012). Dr. Raymond Hinnebusch, professor of International Relations and Middle East Studies at the University of St. Andrews states, "Gamasi, the very model of the respected non-political professional prepared to defer to the authority of the president, became the key figure in further consolidating the principle of military non-intervention in political matters" (Middle East Policy Council, 2012). Sadat had also reduced the representation of military officers in ministries to 20 percent, changing the armed forces into an autonomous organization (Middle East Policy Council, 2012).

The military continued to loyally serve Sadat following the angry outburst of the *infitah* (opening) policy (Middle East Policy Council, 2012). After the 1973 war, the economy began to take a turn for the worse. This required Sadat to “promote reform and modernization”, in which the Egyptian people were faced with the reduction of basic commodities such as rice and cooking gas (Middle East Policy Council, 2012). In all major cities angry protestors littered the streets, including workers, the poor, and students. When the police and security forces could not quash the riots, Sadat was forced to turn to the military (Baker, 1990).

Newly promoted Minister of Defense Gamasy was reluctant to have the army intervene. The 1973 War boosted the Egyptians confidence and support of the military (Middle East Policy Council, 2012). Gamasy did not want to use the army against civilians, and only agreed to control the riots if Sadat decreased the cuts on commodities (Middle East Policy Council, 2012). Sadat agreed fearing the armed forces would take over the country, when in fact; the senior officers had come to tell him that the demonstrations had dissipated (Middle East Policy Council, 2012).

Post-1973 not only transformed Egypt economically, but it also signified the strategic restructuring of foreign policy and national security (Middle East Policy Council, 2012). Due to strained relation with the Soviets, Sadat was forced to open to the west, and when he did, it paid off. Restructuring of the military began to occur between 1978 and 1981 (Middle East Policy Council, 2012). The armed forces were drastically altered so that the organizational structure would model NATO rather than that of the Soviet’s (Middle East Policy Council, 2012). The focus of the military also shifted from

purely targeting Israel, in order to leave room for examining all points of national security. According to Hashim,

Following the Yemen debacle in the early 1960s, the officer corps was not too keen on doing ‘dirty police work’ in far-off places. The officer corps did not favor the strategic drift that afflicted the country in the late 1970s (Middle East Policy Council, 2012).

The armed forces were relieved not to play “defender of the Arab nations”.

Sadat’s communication with the west also opened the door for arms exchange. Following the Camp David accords, the Egyptian military began to be supplied with massive amount of sophisticated weaponry (Middle East Policy Council, 2012).

MUBARAK

When Vice President Hosni Mubarak took power following the October 6th, 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat, much doubt surrounded Mubarak’s ability to successfully lead the country. Despite his thirty years in high military positions, he was originally seen as a man who lacked political tact and charisma compared to that of his predecessors. One major concern of the president immediately following the death of Sadat was whether the military would remain loyal to the state, or choose to follow Islamic radicals that had killed the former president (Hashim, 2011). The main concern primarily lay within the Egyptian armed forces, for it was Colonel Abboud Zumer, Lieutenant Khalid al-Islambouli, Sergeant Hussein Abbas Muhammad (the sniper), and

their cohorts who planned and carried out Sadat's assassination motivated by religious extremism.³

The writings of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, then a member of the Islamic Jihad organization that assassinated Sadat, have illustrated the goal of the radical Islamic organization to not only recruit men from impoverished communities, but men from the military as well. In the 1970's this recruitment became easier as a result of angry men from poor communities who were given false promises of "...provision of services and consumer goods, and job training for civilian life" upon joining the military.⁴ Recruiting men from the Egyptian military would enhance al-Qaeda's position in overthrowing the so-called apostate regime.⁵

The threat of Egyptian soldiers converting to Islamist militant Islam pushed Mubarak to issue an internal study for the reasons behind the growth of Islamic militancy, particularly within the armed forces (Hashim, 2011). However, this assessment was not applied to high ranking officers, who were assumed to be loyal to Mubarak's regime because of the promises of early retirement and lucrative positions in military owned companies following their services (Hashim, 2011). The result of the state's assessment of the armed forces showed that men who were more likely to be susceptible to the influence of Islamic extremism were those who lived in poverty or faced economic hardship (Wall Street Journal Online, 1986).

³ Among the few studies that deal with extremist infiltration of the EAF, see Joseph Kechichian and Jeanne Nazimek, "Challenges to the Military in Egypt," *Middle East Policy* 5, no. 3 (September 1, 1997); John Riddle, "The Egyptian Military and Fundamentalism," *Journal of Defense and Diplomacy* 4, no. 5 (May 1986): 15-20.

⁴ See Lawrence Wright. "The Rebellion Within," *New Yorker* 84, no. 16 (2008).

⁵ See Lawrence Wright. "The Rebellion Within," *New Yorker* 84, no. 16 (2008).

Due to this finding, the state created an institution to prevent any infiltration of Islamic extremists, and to weed out those who were already present within the armed forces. This organization proved to be of use when military intelligence had discovered a scheme planned by junior and middle ranking officers who had allegedly associated themselves with civilians belonging to Islamic Jihad (Wall Street Journal Online, 1986). Many high ranking officers found the oversight group to be of little value. They believed that serving in the military promised a rich future that would be enough of an incentive for low ranking officers to remain loyal to the Egyptian armed forces. However, only a handful of men would be in the position of top officers.

The naïve thoughts of senior officials contributed to some major internal issues. Despite the “vast financial and human resources directed its [Egyptian military] way”, which will be discussed in later chapters, the institution was very inefficient (Hashim, 2011). From the time Nasser restructured the military, the Egyptian armed forces have continued to struggle with low morale, insufficient training, and mediocre pay (Hashim, 2011).

By the 1980's Mubarak faced a new internal threat coming from the police and the paramilitary. In February of 1986, 20,000 men of the paramilitary organization, Central Security Forces (CSF), rebelled. The purpose of the CSF, somewhat similar to the Basij, is to quell any demonstrations posed by students and workers. When rumors spread of extended service, 20,000 members of the group began to riot, causing the state to send in the military to reluctantly put down the rebellion.⁶ The CSF, made up of illiterate, poor, rural peasants who were rejected to serve in the military, were of no real danger to

⁶ For details of the CSF riots see Nazih Ayubi, *The State and Public Policies in Egypt since Sadat* (Ithaca Press, 1991), 240-241.

the government. The CSF in northern Egypt continued to receive better benefits for their service while the CSF in southern Egypt (the group that rebelled) became more vulnerable to radical Islamic groups because of their deprived perks (Hashim, 2011).

Unfortunately, the government was not able to learn its lesson from this event. The government believed that because the CSF in the south was comprised of peasants, there would be no need to grant the same amount of privileges for their services as other military organizations.

By the 1990's Islamic extremism, and a struggling economy, became an issue of national security (Hashim, 2011). Nasser and Sadat both had to deal with Islamic opposition. However under Mubarak's regime, the problem became overwhelming. Fundamentalist groups, particularly in the south, were looking to replace the regime with a theocratic government. Oddly enough, the military did not take much action in suppressing the threat (Hashim, 2011). Although the armed forces were concerned about the stability of the country, their actions were limited to that of military tribunals to try terrorist suspects, and oversight and aid to the paramilitary organizations (Hashim, 2011). According to Hashim, the Egyptian armed forces traditionally show "a mark of distaste for dealing with domestic disturbances". This is evident in the riots following the installation of the *infatih*, the 1986 uprising, and has shown to be correct in the 2011 revolution (Hashim, 2011).

Over the years, the Egyptian military developed an indirect form of counterinsurgency in order to combat Islamic radicals. The beginning of the 1990's introduced new tactics used by the armed forces that would give them the reputation for being ruthless and brutish, particularly The General Directorate for State Security

Investigations (GDSSI), (Hashim, 2011). “Extra-judicial methods in the defense system” were used in to utilize various forms of torture and wire-tapping for intelligence gathering (Hashim, 2011). These methods were able to squash the high level of threat provoked by radical Islamists. Despite the success and increased budget that allowed the military to expand its power, the armed forces were once again in need of modernized equipment and organizational restructuring (Hashim, 2011).

By the mid-2000’s Egypt’s economy was inert, and had no signs of improving. This affected the military’s need for advanced technology and resources, as well as the top officers’ desires for future lucrative positions. In 2005, suspicion arose that Mubarak was promoting his son to succeed him rather than appointing a deputy president, as he had promised (Hanna, 2009). The military looked upon this with much disdain. The military did not want the country to be led by hereditary rule, nor did they like the fact that Gamal, Mubarak’s son, had never completed his military service (Le Monde Online, 2010). If Gamal were to become president, it would mean that senior officers would have competition for powerful economic positions with elite businessmen associated with Gamal over powerful positions of economic activity (Cambanis, 2010).

From the beginning of Mubarak’s reign, top ranking officers enjoyed the many perks that came with their post. Even low and middle ranking officers were rewarded for their military service with access to better health care and education. However, as the economy crumbled, competition for lucrative positions between senior officers and their elite rivals intensified. Mubarak’s decision in choosing his son as his successor created a political struggle that would not be in accordance with the traditionally military dominated regime. Mubarak’s actions dissatisfied the Egyptian military in a way that

would lead to his demise. Of course, this needs to be examined in much more detail through the security, economic, and political activities of this highly influential organization.

EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION

On January 25, 2011, the Egyptian people gathered for mass demonstrations. Grievances against the government included corruption, police brutality, high unemployment, inflation of food prices, and lack of political freedom (Agence France-Presse Online, 2011). Participants in the massive, nonviolent protests included Egyptians who came from various socio-economic and religious backgrounds. Their primary goal and demand was to remove Mubarak from power so that a non-military regime would be able to take over.

After much international pressure and domestic turmoil, Mubarak publicly announced his resignation on February 11th of 2011. This day would be known as the “Friday of Departure” (Schemm & Michael, 2011). Oddly enough, this day also coincided with the anniversary of the Iranian revolution of 1979. Upon Mubarak’s announcement, demonstrators gathered around Egyptian radio and television buildings while the army guarded the presidential palace, state television, and radio buildings (Al Jazeera Live Blogs, 2011). Following Mubarak’s resignation, Vice President Omar Suleiman stated:

In the name of God the merciful, the compassionate. Citizens, during these very difficult circumstances Egypt is going through, President Hosni Mubarak has decided to step down from the office of president of the republic and has charged the high council of the armed forces to administer the affairs of the country. May God help everybody (Kent, 2011).

The Egyptian people were so blinded by their happiness that they failed to realize the reincarnation of another military state. Egyptian law scholar and diplomat, Mohammed El Baradei told the *Associated Press*, “This is the greatest day of my life. The country has been liberated after decades of repression,” and anticipated a “beautiful” transition of power (My Way News, 2011). United States President, Barak Obama, even went as far as saying, “The people of Egypt have spoken, their voices have been heard, and Egypt will never be the same” (Kent, 2011).

Optimism and hope, following the overthrow of Mubarak, eclipsed the reality that the revolution was a mere coup. The conflict resulted in an internal takeover of the Egyptian military. Mubarak was the Commander of the Egyptian Air Force, and became president as a result of his service and high ranking position in the military. If the military is to overcome the political struggle with the Muslim Brotherhood, the military will be able to continue to wield its power over society. The tension between the Egyptian military and Islamic groups will be discussed in further chapters, but the question remains, why would the Egyptian military risk their power and control over the state by aiding in the oust of Mubarak?

As history has shown through the installation of the *infitah* and the 1986 uprising, the Egyptian military has traditionally chosen not to harm their own people. During the demonstration in Tahrir square, the army simply made sure that weapons were not being transported into the area. Meanwhile, the army accompanied a march in Alexandria that followed the funerals of casualties. The city had more bloodshed than any other throughout the revolution (ForEx Crunch, 2011).

Nonetheless, there are also political reasons behind the military's betrayal of Mubarak. Since the majority of the military's personnel are conscripts and reservists, there is much more of an inclination towards the demonstrators than the police. If senior officers were to pin their men against people they sympathize with, disobedience and desertion may occur within the ranks.

Also, the Egyptian military is highly dependent on foreign aid for equipment and training. The majority of their senior officers have received United States' training and education. These officers understand core American military values including separation of police and military duties, civilian control over the military, and loyalty to the state versus a person, party, or ideology. The Egyptian military was fully aware of the international pressure for Mubarak to step down. If the military were to take action against civilians, it would endanger their support.

Once considered heroes, the Egyptian military is now an obstacle standing in the way of the way of democracy (whatever that may mean to the Egyptian people). However, as an institution that was originally supposed to "administer the affairs of the country"; the military and the Muslim Brotherhood are now locked in a power struggle over the military's dominance and control over state interests.

JOHNSON'S EMERGENCE THEORY

The IRGC and the Egyptian military are complex organizations that act autonomously. These institutions do not rely on the political echelon, for it is the political echelon that needs the dominating armed forces to keep them in power. This means that

the relationship between these forces and the heads of government must be reciprocal, but not necessarily balanced. Often times the heads of state are from a military background. Nonetheless, the relationship between them and these highly influential institutions is vital to the stability of the country, as well as the distribution of political and economic power between the two groups.

The power given to these autonomous institutions is the primary factor contributing to the armed forces' loyalty to their respective regime. Of course, the armed forces may have a genuine respect for their nation's leader, but it is the incentives of political and financial gain given to these men that preserve the organization's allure, as well as the power of the present government leadership.

In order to better analyze the IRGC and the Egyptian military, Steven Johnson's emergence theory will be used to identify how the armed forces operate as a unit, recruit, maintain their recruits, interact with other ranks, and interact with the nation's leadership.

Emergence

The emergence theory has many names to it, including bottom-up behavior and collective phenomenon (Scribner, 2002). The theory describes the behavior of a system by breaking it down to its simple components. When the components come together, a complex and intelligent structure is created. Johnson approaches the theory by supporting it with many examples including the organization of cities and ant colonies. He describes the function of a city as a

...kind of pattern-amplifying machine: its neighborhoods are a way of measuring and expressing the repeated behavior of larger collectives – capturing information about group behavior, and sharing that information with the group. Because those patterns are fed back to the community,

small shifts in behavior can quickly escalate into larger movements: upscale shops dominate the main boulevards, while the working class remains clustered invisibly in the alleys and side streets; the artists live on the Left Bank, the investment bankers in the Eighth Arrondissement (Johnson, 2002).

Johnson claims that regulations and city planners are unnecessary to create a bustling city, such as Manchester. “All you need are thousands of individuals and a few simple rules of interaction” (Johnson, 2002). This statement is supported through the success story of ant colonies. Every ant operates based on a set of simple rules and feedback from their neighbor. This translates into a functioning system consisting of ants building tunnels and rooms for nurseries, mating, and food storage (Blüthgen, Gebauer & Fiedler, 2003). The example of ant colonies leads to Johnson’s discussion of five fundamental principles for the emergence theory.

The first principle is a critical amount of the component is vital for the creation and sustainability of any system, such as the ant colony. More ants would allow much more interaction, which in turn, would allow much more room for development and growth. One or two interactions between the ants simply cannot create a colony.

The second is that “ignorance is useful”. The simplicity of singular components is beneficial to systems, such as ant colonies. Johnson states that if each individual component had some level of complexity, the system would not be able to effectively function since it would have the potential to dominate all other components. A complex component may be detrimental to a system.

Thirdly, random encounters benefit the growth of a system through feedback. When ants interact with each other, they learn of each other’s capabilities, and as a result, use that knowledge to modify their behavior. For example, if there is an increase in the

population of ants, the ants that are in charge of storing food must adapt to the change in order to meet the needs of the demand.

Fourth, there must be some sort of pattern illustrated by all the components. For example, ants leave behind a trail of secreted or excreted chemical known as pheromones. These chemicals then trigger a social response for the ants, impacting the behavior of the receiving individual. There are many types of these pheromones including food trail pheromones and sex pheromones (Medicine Net, 2012). It is patterns like these that must be present between all the components in order for the system to function.

Lastly, Johnson states that “local information leads to global wisdom”. This means it is important for individuals to be aware of their surroundings in order to learn certain habits and behaviors. This also means that the individual component must be able to alter its behavior when another component is performing a certain action. For example, when an ant sees that a large group of other ants are gathering food, he will change his action in order to better serve the colony (Johnson, 2002).

Similar to ants, the IRGC and the Egyptian military use these same exact principles to operate their system. The utilization of these principles may be either intentional or unintentional, but in one form or another, these principles are the gears behind the institution’s dominance. Upon further examination, this paper will reveal how whether or not these two organizations meter Johnson’s criteria for the development of a successful system.

The structure of a military is hierarchal. In general, militaries represent an institution of professional and highly disciplined and motivated men. S.E. Finer describes

the military as a purposive instrument created to fulfill certain objectives; to fight and win wars for the defense of the state being its' main goal (Finer, 1988). However, the unique structure and characteristic of a military gives the institution potential to be much more than an instrument used in war. It is unique in the sense that a military operates as its' own society. Its' structure gives a military organization the ability to make rapid decisions and effectively execute these decisions using the vast and advanced resources that are exclusively available to them. Military organizations generally have the ability to operate affairs of state, manage national projects, and resolve political upheaval.

There is a vast amount of research that has been done on the IRGC. However, the research on the Egyptian military is limited. The reasons are not clear; it may be because the security threat of Iran prompted extensive analysis of their armed forces, or because its characteristics as a highly powerful and domineering force drew attention, whereas the Egyptian military has only recently piqued the interest of many political analysts. For this reason, this paper will provide a much more in depth examination of the IRGC than of the Egyptian military.

Application to the Egyptian Military

Information about the Egyptian military is limited; however, there is enough research to apply the emergence theory to the workings of the institution. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces is Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, and the Chief of Staff is Lt. Gen. Sami Hafez Anan (Global Security, 2012). The Egyptian Armed Forces is made up of less than one percent of Egypt's 62.4 million

populations (The CIA World Factbook, 2012). Each year, about 650,000 males reach military age. Approximately 80,000 are conscripted into the Armed Forces (Foreign Military Studies, 1997). From this group, the military will annually have an influence on 12.3 per cent of Egyptian males entering the work force (Foreign Military Studies, 1997). Although not a significant number, it means that these men will more likely steer away from the influence of Islamic radicalism.

The service length for conscripts begins after they have completed their education and varies depending on the level of education they have completed. This same form of required recruitment is used in Iran, in which some men attempt to pursue higher education in order to further delay their service. In Egypt, once men reach the age of thirty, they are seen as unfit to join the army (The CIA World Factbook, 2012). Egyptian men not only use education as a way to evade military service, but also traveling abroad. A man is also exempt from military service if he is a dual citizen. Whatever the path one may take to avoid this requirement, he must be able to pay a 580 dollar fine (as of 2004) to the government (The CIA World Factbook, 2012). This is considered as an honorable discharge, but is seen as offensive and cowardly.

However, many Egyptian men cannot afford a higher education, nor have the ability to pay the fee. Egyptians who have completed high school serve a two year term of service, whereas men without a high school diploma are required to serve for three years (The CIA World Factbook, 2012). These recruits live in military barracks and are trained according to the rank they are assigned. Conscripts are only paid about ten dollars a month. Their pay then becomes increased to forty dollars a month after promotion to the next higher grade (Foreign Military Studies, 1997). And because many of the

conscripts come from uneducated backgrounds, the military provides literacy and vocational training in order to prepare the soldier for civilian employment. The recruits are also exposed and trained to use advanced technology ranging from weaponry to communications that would otherwise be unavailable to them (Foreign Military Studies, 1997). This type of training is used to enhance economic development and nationalism, thereby not only enhancing the military, but the welfare of the state. When a country is dominated by the military, it only makes sense for the institution to train the youth according to their standards and values when implemented into civilian society.

Studies of United States Army Lieutenant Colonel Stephen H. Gotowicki conclude that military service is a vital socialization factor in Egyptian society. Upon joining the military, a conscript is given the opportunity to excel in a somewhat egalitarian environment that provides many material benefits (Foreign Military Studies, 1997). It is true that a soldier has the ability to be promoted through the ranks, but a soldier will probably gain a senior officer position only if he already has connections with the elite of the institution. Nonetheless, military service provides many benefits. This is especially important in a country that has a crumbling economy. The institution provides a monthly salary, medical care, sufficient food, and living accommodations. Gotowicki further describes the benefits of military service through a political lens stating that a soldier,

...learns of a world beyond his rural agrarian origins and of a larger political self in a national community. This tends to be a politicizing experience providing the soldier with a sense of "civic" identity and loyalty to the state -- a world view much expanded beyond his previous exclusive reference to family, village and religion. Military service provides a soldier with a sense of citizenship, responsibility, and nationalism -- all especially important in the Middle East where the credibility and legitimacy of a central government usually diminishes rapidly as distance increases from its capital (Foreign Military Studies, 1997).

The Egyptian military will remain a socializing influence within the country if the armed forces continue to operate at its strength level. The economic strain has done little to alter the military's spending habits (Foreign Military Studies, 1997). Since the institution is viewed as a deterrent for men to pursue Islamic activities or to decrease unemployment, the army is able to avoid the majority of the setbacks resulting from the struggling economy. Arguably, the military, unlike any other institution, is able to create a network of men who acquire the skills of work ethic, social mobility, civic responsibility, and nation building (Foreign Military Studies, 1997). This still applies to today. However, this does not persist without some sort of incentive. Men who are fortunate enough to achieve a senior position can convene for the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces – the body to which power was transferred following Mubarak's resignation in 2011.

Application of Iranian Revolutionary Guards

The IRGC has approximately 150,000 personnel serving functions ranging from internal security and external defense within their army, navy, and air force (Wright, 2010). In order to preserve the goals of the revolution, the IRGC presides over urban and rural areas in order to respond quickly in any location that may exhibit civil unrest. Their operations in rural areas also include border control, counternarcotics, and disaster relief (Wehrey, et al., 2009). The IRGC also maintains control of the development and deployment of weapons including ballistic missiles. If Iran gains nuclear weapons, the IRGC would probably be in charge of them.

However - on paper at least - the IRGC is subject to certain regulations, especially when it becomes important to distinguish the duties and capabilities of the *Artesh* and the IRGC. The necessity for these formal structures became apparent during the Iran-Iraq war to avoid confusion between the two institutions on the battlefield. In 1988, the Islamic Republic introduced the Joint Armed Forces General Staff to unite the senior officers of the *Artesh* and the IRGC. The 1989 creation of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics also decreased the IRGC's autonomy (Wehrey, et al., 2009).

As shown in the figure below, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) is the highest ranking group within the chain of command.⁷ It is reflective of the elites, consisting of powerful men such as the president, commander of Revolutionary Guards, defense and foreign ministers, and "representatives" of the Supreme Leader. However, the SNSC does not wield much independent power. Ayatollah Khamenei has complete command over this council, and is given this right through constitutional power (Wehrey, et al., 2009). As stated previously, the SNSC contains the Supreme Leader's representatives, who speak on behalf of his interests, always outweighing the opinions of other members within the group. Currently, Foreign Minister Ali Larijani and Hassan Rowhani serve as Khamenei's special envoys (Wehrey, et al., 2009). Representatives of Khamenei are not only present within the SNSC, but within most groups of the armed forces hierarchy. When it comes to national and foreign policy decision making, individuals are usually valued more than institutions (Wehrey, et al., 2009).

Two other security organizations rank directly below the SNSC, including the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the Ministry of Interior. Heyder

⁷ This figure is located on p. 9 in *The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps*.

Moslehi is the current commander of the MOIS, in which it is a secret police agency similar to the Shah's *Sāzemān-e Ettelā'āt va Amniyat-e Keshvar*, or SAVAK.⁸ The MOIS is a well funded agency that is notorious for carrying out assassinations of dissident Iranians who live abroad and within the country (Wehrey, et al., 2009). One of their most infamous murder sprees occurred in late 1998, when the agency assassinated three dissident writers, a political leader, and his wife in the span of two months (BBC News Online, 2003).

As a powerful institution, the IRGC views MOIS as a competitor. Under the umbrella of the IRGC exists the Qods Force, a group specialized in the export of the values of the revolution. In a 1998 document written by the Federation of American Scientists, the mission of the Qods Force is to organize, train, equip, and finance foreign Islamic revolutionary movements (Wehrey, et al., 2009). The research of this document has also found that the Qods Force maintains and builds communications with Islamic organizations all across the globe.

The Qods Force is extremely disciplined, and under the direct control of Khomeini. Similar to the MOIS, the Qods carry out murder for the preservation of Islam. However, unlike the MOIS, the Qods also carry out various types of attacks in order to expand Islam. Allegations against the Qods have been made regarding the 2007 Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center attack. A group of gunmen were captured by Americans after successfully passing an Iraqi checkpoint around 5:00pm disguised as American diplomats and militants speaking fluent English (CNN Online, 2007). Due to the elaborate and detailed manner of the attack, many analysts have suggested that only the Qods could be capable of executing such an action (Wehrey, et al., 2009). Unlike the

⁸ The translation of this title is National Intelligence and Security Organization.

MOIS, the Qods lack much independence. They are controlled tightly within the hierarchy of the IRGC, as well as that of Iran's Security Establishment.

Figure 1
Iran's National Security Establishment




Figure 1 – Iran's National Security Establishment. Source: Wehrey et al., *The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps*, 2009.

Another organization competing with the IRGC is the subordinate group of the Ministry of the Interior known as the Law Enforcement Forces (LEF). The LEF contains about 120,000 personnel (Wehrey, et al., 2009). This task force is responsible for a variety of duties including counternarcotics, border patrol, anticorruption, and riot control (Wehrey, et al., 2009). The functions of the LEF have the tendency to overlap with the Basij. The duties of the Basij also include responsibilities such as riot control and

anticorruption. Nonetheless, because the LEF is viewed as an inefficient and undisciplined group, the Basij is the force that is relied upon for such matters. However, when former IRGC Air Force commander Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf was appointed as the LEF's new chief, the force was able to improve its discipline, weapon inventory, and policing capabilities (Wehrey, et al., 2009).

It is important to note that the figure above is not an accurate portrayal of the balance of power among these forces (Wehrey, et al., 2009). Iran's government is based on an informal network of power, and political influence determines the power of organizations. Within the bureaucratic structures of Iran, a network must be established before a person can even think about advancing to any sort of position. And because the IRGC has always had a close knit relationship with the Supreme Leaders, Khomeini and Khamenei, men who are or have been well established in the institution have been able to saturate the Iranian military. According to the authors of, *The Rise of the Pasdaran*, the IRGC's domestic ascendancy is encouraged by the Iran's complex political structure.

Because this built-in redundancy has multiple centers of power, and because it relies on a ponderous process of checks and balances among different organizations, there is a default drift toward 'behind-the-scenes' bargaining and informal network (Wehrey, et al., 2009).

Thus, the figure shows the formal structure of the Iranian military and IRGC. However, behind that structure exists an informal network that completely dominates the bureaucratic system.

The hierarchy within the Egyptian military is like that of any other military. The structure may be similar, but their power over the state economically, politically, and socially is one that cannot be ignored. The military chooses to support the head of state if

he does not go against the interests of the military. As noted previously, rumors spread about Mubarak choosing his son to be his successor. This was a political move that went against the Egyptian military, and consequently, the institution found this to be one of the many reasons to abandon Mubarak.

However, the hierarchy of Iran's Armed Forces is very different compared to almost any existing military institution. Whereas Egypt's forces are comprised of one united body, Iran has two – the IRGC and the military. Although the Iranian military is controlled by veteran members of the IRGC, the complexity of its bureaucracy ensures corruption, back-handed dealing, and tension within the government. For the Iranian government, it is much easier to play into the prideful and esteemed character of Iranian men.

The majority of Iranian men hold themselves to high standards and is willing to be part of a corrupt system if it means reaping considerable benefits. Egyptian men also carry the same trait. For whatever reason, pride is an attribute that is held very highly within middle-eastern culture, which plays right into the recruitment process, and the maintaining of recruits. The financial incentives provided to Egyptians serving in the military and IRGC members, especially during a time of economic distress, is a strong asset in providing the respect and regard from peers. This mentality and the incentives provided encourage men to commit themselves to further service rather than just serving the mandatory amount.

The third chapter will discuss the economic role and advancements of both these institutions. Also, in further analyzing the Egyptian military and IRGC, Johnson's five principles of his emergence theory will be applied to the forces inner workings.

CHAPTER TWO:**Security Role**

POPULARIZATION OF IRGC

As previously mentioned, the IRGC was founded following the Iranian revolution. This armed force was created to counter any opposition to the new regime, especially military men who may have still been loyal to the shah. The shah's military had been supported by the United States, so was viewed with extreme suspicion by the regime. The original role and purpose of the IRGC was to protect the values of the revolution, which also included repelling Saddam Hussein's forces in the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. Iran's victory established the IRGC as a revered institution, as well as the primary internal and external security force. It is argued that the IRGC prolonged the war due to its inexperience and ideological commitment. However, the IRGC continues to use success against Iraq to boost its credibility as the country's "holy defender" (Wright, 2010).

As the IRGC became more relied upon, it received an increase in funds. Its' structure paralleled the Artesh, in that it operated as an efficient and independent land, sea, and air force. The IRGC eclipses the Artesh. It is unique in that it runs asymmetric warfare through the Qods force and radical Islamic organizations, such as Hezbollah. The IRGC is also in charge of expanding missile forces and commanding the nuclear arsenal, if Iran is to gain this capability (Wright, 2010).

The first mandated roles of the IRGC were domestic intelligence collection and suppression of dissent that opposed Khomeini's mission (Wehrey, et al., 2009). The suppression of one these groups in the early days of the regime included the Mujahedin-e Khalq-e Iran Organization (MEK). The MEK was originally a leftist group founded in

1965.⁹ The group supported the revolution, but ended up splitting with the theocrats (Wright, 2010). Recently investigative journalist Seymour Hersh published an article stating that the United States has been training the MEK in Nevada – contradicting the denials (Hersh, 2012). United States military and intelligence officials detest Hersh because of his deep sources, and usually never inaccurate in his findings. The MEK now claims to be the main opposition to the regime.

According to the 2010 Edition of the Iran Primer, the Guards forces is now up to 150,000 men divided between land, sea, and air forces. The IRGC land forces are estimated to be between 100,000 and 125,000, while the navy is as many as 20,000 and the Qods, around 5,000. The Basij also has the ability to mobilize hundreds of thousands of men in the event of a national security threat (Wright, 2010).

Although accusations of funding terrorist organizations has repeatedly been denied by the government, the IRGC has trained and equipped proxy groups such as Hamas, Hezboallah, Iraqi Shiite insurgents, and even parts of the Taliban in the event war is to break out with Israel or the United States (Wright, 2010). The IRGC specializes in is asymmetric warfare. This training is taught to the IRGC by the Qods force.

The IRGC's navy has also developed a naval strategy in the event asymmetric warfare is to break out. According to the Iran Primer;

The Guards have hundreds of fast attack boats, anti-ship cruise missiles,

⁹ Mujahedin-e Khalq-e Iran means the People's Mujahedin of Iran. The letter, e, following the two words is a sound in Farsi used to connect words together. It is not exclusively part of the word. The organization was founded by university students who intended to create a political movement of Islamists and Marxists. MEK was originally devoted to fighting capitalism and imperialism existing within the shah's regime. When Khomeini took power, the MEK attempted to fight with the IRGC against the authority of Islamic law. MEK was the largest opposition group since the post election protests of 2009. Today, the MEK has fizzled out, but continues to operate in locations such as Iraq. See *Our Men in Iran?* by Seymour M. Hersh from The New Yorker .

and naval mines. Together they impede U.S. operations in the Gulf, disrupt shipping, and impose a painful cost on U.S. forces in the event of an armed conflict. The Guards also operate hundreds of ballistic missiles that can target U.S. forces stationed in Gulf Cooperation Council countries, in addition to Israel and beyond (Wright, 2010).

The IRGC has not only eclipsed the *Artesh* in respect to coercive forces, but have also eclipsed them in intelligence security in scope and authority. This became even more apparent following the 2009 demonstrations (Wright, 2010).

As the IRGC gained more and more power, the competition with forces under the *Artesh* has grown. This type of rivalry has led to lack of communication of cooperation between the two organizations.

ARTESH AND IRGC RIVALRY

Although the distinction between the IRGC and *Artesh* is blurred due to the fact that the leadership positions within the *Artesh* are given to veteran members of the IRGC, power struggles between the two institutions continue. Following the success of dismantling and eliminating opposition organizations such as the Forghan¹⁰ and Communist Tudeh Party,¹¹ the IRGC stepped back from its' intelligence duties, and

¹⁰ Forghan is the Persian word for Koran. The Forghan was an Islamic terrorist group that formed in 1979, and committed a series of assassinations against the clergy of the Islamic Republic. Not much research can be found about the Forghan Party, but it has become a very weak organization resulting from crackdowns by the IRGC. much research can be found about the Forghan Party, but it has become a very weak organization resulting from crackdowns by the IRGC.

¹¹ The Communist Tudeh Party was founded in 1941 following the British-Soviet Allied invasion of Iran. It formed into a radical leftist party, in which members called for Iran to be part of the Soviet Union. They played a considerable role in Mohammad Mosaddeq's campaign to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The party still exists today, but it much weaker as a result of crackdowns by the IRGC. See *Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran* by Ervand Abrahamian, University of California Press, 1999.

gave the MOIS back its authority over its' intelligence services (Khaleigh, 2006). However, this did not last for long.

When reformist President Mohammed Khatami was elected in 1997, the IRGC began to once again include intelligence collection under its umbrella of authority (Khaleigh, 2006). Khatami appointed Hojatolislam Ali Younessi as Minister for Intelligence and Security. This appointment created a potential threat for the regime, for Younessi led the MOIS down a path that was tolerant of Khatami's reformist policies and ambitions (Iranian Students News Agency, 2004). The reform dominated department led Khomeini to revive the IRGC's former activity in intelligence collection and internal security (Wehrey, et al., 2009). The majority of men within the network were conservatives who modeled their intelligence department from the IRGC's ground forces (Khaligh, 2006).

The balance of internal security departments was once again altered when Ahmadinejad won the presidency seat in 2005. As a hardliner, Ahmadinejad sought to eradicate reformists within the government. Ahmadinejad appointed Hojatolislam Ghomlamhussein Mohseni-Ejehi as head of the MOIS, who proved to be of good use, through the MOIS's widespread suppression of civil liberties and intellectual freedoms (Farhi, 2007).

Currently, the security division of intelligence of the IRGC functions like a regular intelligence department; collecting information on opponents, arresting individuals, and imprisoning them in IRGC facilities (Wehrey, et al., 2009). The activity is, more likely than not, conducted under the direction of Hojattolislam Saedi, the Supreme Leader's representative. Khamenei is known for his scrupulous management

style, especially pertaining to the operations of the IRGC, and because he has the constitutional right to bypass the senior IRGC officers, the Supreme Leader is able to directly supervise the workings of the institution (Wehrey, et al., 2009).

The rivalry between the MOIS and the Qods Force, as well as the Basij and the LEF were discussed in chapter one in order to establish the structure of Iran's National Security Establishment. The competition between the two institutions is apparent, but in no way hinders the capabilities and efficiency of the IRGC. It is even difficult to separate the Artesh and the IRGC considering the leadership of the Artesh consists of IRGC veterans. However, when senior officials are assigned to leadership positions within the Artesh, a power struggle can ensue, with the IRGC to receiving the favorable outcome.

In the 33 years of the existence of the Islamic regime, the IRGC has become progressively more powerful within all sectors of society. It has complete control over the Iranian military, and begs the question for the existence of the institution if the IRGC has completely dominated it. Since the IRGC views the Artesh with little respect, cooperation and communication between the two institutions is limited, and, as a result, creates confusion and an overlap of operations that wastes time and money. However, if Khomeini were to abolish the Artesh, criticism of Iran's human rights violations would become heightened. The existence of a regular army, the Artesh can somewhat obscure the fact that Iran is run by an Islamic militant organization.

Another reason may be the fact that Khamenei does not want to bother reorganizing his armed forces. This is known as path dependency. It is the term used to describe how a specific circumstance is limited by the decisions one has made in the past, even though the past circumstance may be rendered as irrelevant (Praeger, 2011).

Although having two institutions is inefficient, restructuring and adapting to a reorganized body is an issue that is probably far from Khamenei's priorities.

The Egyptian military has a far less complex and confusing bureaucracy than Iran's National Security Establishment. Egypt's military does not have competing branches, nor does it have auxiliary forces, like the Basij. Nonetheless, what the Egyptian military lacks is the glue that binds them to the head of state. Although there may be great competition within the Iranian armed forces, one shared commonality between the forces is their reverence for Khamenei. He is known to be the careful thinker, and consensus builder that many Iranians respect (The Compendium, 2012). The rivalries do exist, but IRGC and *Artesh* members uphold Islamic values, and would be gracious to the leader who maintains them.

BASIJ FORCES

Jafari's appointment under Ahmadinejad proved to be an important development in the structural dynamics of the Guards. In a September 2007 speech, he identified the IRGC's current role, stating:

The Revolutionary Guards are not a one dimensional military organization. The mission of the Guards is guarding the revolution and its achievements against internal threats ... The current strategy, which has been clarified by the leadership of the revolution, differs from the strategies of the [war] years. The main mission of the Guards today is countering internal threats (Hamshahri, 2007).

Jafari's statement has proved to be correct. When the 2009 post-election uprising occurred, it was the IRGC that deployed the Basij to suppress the movement. The IRGC has the capability and the manpower to expand their responsibilities to further horizons.

Although it can be argued that the description and purpose of the IRGC would require them to undertake the suppression of an uprising, this responsibility usually falls under the task of the Iranian Police Force.

The Basij's official title is the Basij-e Mostaz'afin, meaning "mobilization of the oppressed". The force was created on November 25, 1979, when Khomeini called for a "twenty million man army" to defend the Islamic regime (Wright, 2010). Under Article 151 of the constitution the government is obligated to:

provide a program of military training, with all requisite facilities, for all its citizens, in accordance with the Islamic criteria, in such a way that all citizens will always be able to engage in the armed defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Wright, 2010).

Over the years, the Basij has expanded into a force intervening in politics. Initially, the Basij was used to assist the IRGC in maintaining law and order within various cities.¹² However, when the Iran-Iraq began, the auxiliary military transformed into a combat force fighting alongside the IRGC and Iranian military (Wright, 2010). According to the Iran Primer, the Basij were often used in "human wave" tactics.¹³ Although inexperienced, the Basij was large at the time of the war. In December of 1986, the participation of the Basij volunteers peaked at about 100,000 men (Wright, 2010).

When the war ended in 1988, the Basij's main commitment was to post-war reconstruction. However with the political reform movement in the 1990's, the duties of the Basij returned to overseeing and suppressing political dissident activities, particularly within the student and female population (Wright, 2010).

¹² This included fighting against separatist groups such as the Kurdish, Turkoman, and Baluchi minority.

¹³ This is an offensive tactic, in which the attacker(s) participate in an unprotected frontal assault in an attempt to overrun the enemy line.

The Basij played a pivotal role in suppressing the Green Movement. They were able to counteract demonstrations in universities, factories, and on the streets. However, there was much disinclination to participate in using force against the protestors (Wright, 2010). Basij members reportedly abandoned their post when commanded to beat and harass fellow students for participating in the demonstrations (Wright, 2010). As a result, the IRGC was forced to move basiji (individual members) far from their neighborhoods in order to prevent the basiji from deserting their responsibilities (Wright, 2010).

The IRGC has only recently obtained formal control over the Basij. In 2007 the IRGC was given complete authority over the Basij, under Khamenei's overall command (Wright, 2010). In 2008, the Basij were incorporated into the IRGC's ground forces unit (Wright, 2010). Before the formal incorporation of the Basij, a rivalry existed between the two groups during the Iran-Iraq War.¹⁴ In 1981, the Basij was part of the IRGC, but operated as a somewhat independent entity.

The Basij is complex. It has its own structure and operates as its own society. It is a very culturally diverse organization because the structure is designed for men of the same region to operate within their own communities. Thus, there is a culture and socialization behind being a member. For men in Iran, the Basij is a way of life. The auxiliary force divides each city in Iran depending on its size and population, into districts called resistance areas. Resistance areas are divided into resistance zones, which are further divided into resistance bases, and the bases into groups (Wright, 2010).

According to the Iran Primer, the Basij is also composed of three branches in which men of the same background, age, or experience are usually placed together. The three branches include:

¹⁴ See the *Memoirs of a Pragmatic Ayatollah: The Record and Memoirs of Hashemi Rafsanjani*.

- Ashoura and Al-Zahra Brigades – “security and military branch tasked with ‘defending the neighborhoods in case of emergencies’ ”.
- Imam Hossein Brigades – “composed of Basij war veterans who cooperate closely with the IRGC ground forces”.
- Imam Ali Brigades – “deal with security threats”.

The force also has multiple branches with specialized functions. They include:

- Basij of the Guilds [Basij-e Asnaf]
- Labor Basij [Basij-e Karegaran]
- Basij of the Nomads [Basij-e Ashayer]
- Public Servants' Basij [Basij-e Edarii]
- Pupil's Basij [Basij-e Danesh-Amouzi]
- Student Basij [Basij-e Daneshjouyi]¹⁵

Since basiji members share a commonality within their branch, it creates an atmosphere that is unmatched by the IRGC. The purpose of the subordination of the Basij to the IRGC was a calculated move in order to create a “brotherhood” environment in the IRGC similar to that of the Basij. Each branch of the Basij above is established as a counterweight to non-governmental organizations (Wright, 2010). For example the Labor Basij is the counterpart to labor unions.

Before one becomes a member of the IRGC, he usually has experience as a member of the Basij, for example Ahmadinejad. The age of Basij members ranges from high school age to mid-30s (Wright, 2010). Benefits of being a basiji include priority in entering a university, access to jobs, and health benefits. Members are selected by “clergy

¹⁵ The list of branches is directly taken from Wright, Robin, *The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy*. 2010.

of the neighborhoods and trusted citizens and legal associations of the neighborhoods” (Wright, 2010). According to the Iran Primer there are three different types of members:

- Regular members, “who are mobilized in wartime and engage in developmental activities in peacetime. Regular members are volunteers and are unpaid, unless they engage in war-time duty”.
- Active Members, “who have had extensive ideological and political indoctrination, and who also receive payment for peacetime work”.
- Special Members, “who are paid dual members of the Basij and the IRGC and serve as the IRGC ground forces”.¹⁶

The mosque is used as the recruiting center, where volunteers can apply for various positions within the Basij. Members are also not limited to men. Member may also include women, and Iranians of almost all ages who perform tasks other necessary tasks (Wright, 2010).

IRGC PARTICIPATION IN THE GREEN MOVEMENT

The security role of the IRGC dominated the efforts of the Green Movement. Although protestors were high in numbers, their strategic, non-violent demonstrations failed to deliver. With the exception of some Basij, IRGC members were not reluctant to carry out violence. This will become clearer in chapters three and four when the reasons behind the IRGC’s loyalty will be elaborated.

A series of uprisings occurred in Tehran immediately following the June 12th 2009 presidential election, in which police officials ended up arresting over 170 people (BBC News Online, 2009). Among the arrested were intellectuals and well-known reformist politicians. These included Behzad Nabavi, founder of the Mojahedin of the

¹⁶ The list of branches is directly taken from Wright, Robin, *The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy*. 2010.

Islamic Revolution Organization (MIRO),¹⁷ Iran Islamic Participation Front (IIPF)¹⁸ leader Mohsen Mirdamadi, and the brother of former president Khatami, Mohammad-Reza Khatami (Worth & Fathi, 2009).

In a confrontation with University of Tehran students, the police detained approximately 200 people, while Basij members shot their guns into the crowd (Tait, 2009). The majority would later be released after admitting their wrongdoing on national television.

On June 14th, acting Police Chief Ahmad-Reza Radan stated on national media that “in the interrogation of related rebels, we [Intelligence Ministry] intend to find the link between the plotters and foreign media” (Keller, 2009). This investigation later turned into a crackdown and removal of reform oriented individuals. According to relatives of detainees, prisoner interrogation was being headed by Saeed Mortazavi, a man notorious for cruel and ruthless interrogation and torture techniques (Booth & Hider, 2009).

Khamenei’s second eldest son, Mojtaba, has played a major role in purging reformists and dissidents within the government. He is well respected by both his father and Ahmadinejad, and is even said to be the Supreme Leader’s possible successor (Borger, 2009).

By August 11, 2008, the Iranian government claimed to have detained 4,000 Iranians relating to opposition activity (BBC News Online, 2009). In statements by various dissident leaders, including presidential candidate Mehdi Karroubi, claims were

¹⁷ MIRO is a small reformist group, known to be composed of radical intellectuals who are mild mannered in nature. See Abrahamian, Ervand, *History of Modern Iran*, Columbia University Press, 2008.

¹⁸ IIPF is a reformist organization that supports an Islamic regime, yet is opposed to its totalitarian rule, advocating for a democratic Iran. Mohammad-Reza Khatami was once the leader of the party.

made of prisoners forced to endure broken bones, torture of torn finger nails, and rape (Fletcher, 2009). The death toll resulting from confrontation between protestors and security forces is also unclear. The Iranian government is quite talented in preventing information to be leaked, and situations that would further tarnish the reputation of the country to be investigated. Nonetheless, the government has admitted to 27 casualties documented by hospital records, but refuses to investigate further (CNN News Online, 2009).

Throughout the protests members of the IRGC and Basij would break into homes and university dorms, destroying property in order to instill fear within the Iranian people. Tactics used by the Basij force against protestors have been described as choosing “targets at the edges of the crowds, going for the vulnerable and unwary stragglers,” attacking “surreptitiously ... jumping demonstrators as they return home on darkened streets at night,” (Anderson, 2009) and applying “tiny knives or razor blades to use against protestors from behind their backs” (Leyne, 2009).

However, as mentioned earlier, some Basij members did not have the heart to follow IRGC commands to carry out violence against their fellow Iranians. Due to lack of Basij willingness to participate, the IRGC had to expand its own role in quelling the demonstrations.

EGYPTIAN MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN REVOLUTION

Despite being known as a “non-violent” revolt, the Egyptian revolution saw violent and deadly clashes between police officers and protestors. One of the first protests occurred on the 25th of January 2011, known as the “Day of Anger”. The mass protests

that occurred in cities across Egypt, including Cairo and Suez, were purposefully organized to coincide with Egypt's National Police Day (BBC News Online, 2011).

Demonstrations occurred in front of the Ministry of Interior in order to protest against police abuse, as well as other gripes such as government corruption, unemployment, and the use of emergency law. Upon confrontation with the police, two protesters in Suez died (BBC News Online, 2011).

Meanwhile in the center of Cairo, thousands attended a demonstration located in front of the High Court. Due to the high number, protestors were able to break through the security cordon and advance into Tahrir Square (Al Dustour Online, 2011). Approximately 15,000 protestors were occupying Tahrir Square, leading police to use tear gas and water cannons to suppress the movement (Almasry Alyoum Online, 2011). However, this proved to be unsuccessful when protestors threw stones at police, causing the armed force to retreat (Leyne, 2011).

On January 27th the Muslim Brotherhood declared its allegiance to the protestors. In Suez, the continuation of protests led to an increase in violence, in which some of the protestors began to arm themselves with guns (Al Jazeera Online, 2011). According to the Australian tabloid, the Herald Sun, hundreds were arrested at various protests. About 600 were arrested in Cairo, and more than 120 protestors, the majority being Muslim Brotherhood members, were arrested in Asyut (Herald Sun Online, 2011).

However, on the following day, the police no longer had the man power or the equipment to suppress the mass riots. This particular day is known as the "Friday of Anger", in which hundreds of thousands of Egyptians emerged into the streets following Friday prayers (Sullivan, 2011). Police responded by using rubber bullets, water cannons,

and tear gas in an attempt to quell the mass demonstration (CNN World, 2011).

Nevertheless, the violence of the protestors escalated throughout Egypt.

In Suez, protestors seized a police station, freed arrested protestors, and set fire to a nearby, local police station. Similar chaos occurred in Port Said, where multiple government buildings were set on fire (Al Jazeera, 2011). Amid reports of looting, the disorder in Egypt raised concerns about the safety of the valuable antiquities in the Egyptian Museum. In order to protect the museum, army commandos were called upon (Blair, 2011).

This day of utter chaos forced the state to deploy the army. The army was deployed to Cairo, Suez, and Alexandria, in order to assist police (CBS News Online, 2011). However, specifically in Suez and Alexandria, the military expressed the desire to avoid confrontation with protestors (AsiaNews.it, 2011).

Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, Egypt's Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, was seen among the protestors in Tahrir Square, as was Egyptian law scholar and diplomat and recent head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed Mustafa El Baradei (Egypt Independent, 2011). El Baradei announced to demonstrators:

What we [Egyptian protestors] have begun cannot go back... You are the owners of this revolution. You are the future. Our key demand is the departure of the regime and the beginning of a new Egypt in which each Egyptian lives in virtue, freedom and dignity (Hendawi & Michael, 2011).

From the time the army was called out to suppress the regime it was clear that their only intent would be to protect the people. On January 30th Mubarak held a meeting

with military commanders in order to discuss solutions to ending the chaos that had erupted in Egypt (Salama, 2011).

When ordered, soldiers refused to use live ammunition on the people. The army chief announced to protesters the army's support, but despite their backing, violence all across Egypt became rampant (Al Jazeera, 2011). The police were losing an uphill battle, and as a result, many disappeared from their posts, either because they feared for their own lives, became frustrated with their efforts, and/or supported protestors. This became especially problematic in Cairo, for violence escalated there more than in other cities. Looters continued to take advantage of the disorder caused by the revolution, in one case, ransacking the Arkadia shopping mall (Al Jazeera Live Stream, 2011).

This made the military's security role that much more crucial. Nonetheless, senior Egyptian generals led by Tantawi released a statement saying:

The armed forces will not resort to use of force against our great people. Your armed forces, who are aware of the legitimacy of your demands and are keen to assume their responsibility in protecting the nation and the citizens, affirms that freedom of expression through peaceful means is guaranteed to everybody (Nakhoul, 2011).

From February 1st to the 3, 2011, the violence reached a new level in Cairo, known as the "Camel Battle" (Weaver et al., 2011). Pro-Mubarak supporters, who were more likely than not sent by Mubarak's National Democratic Party, attacked protestors with swords, whips, clubs, stones, rocks, and pocket knives, while on horse or camelback (Ackerman, 2011). Some security officials were witnessed bribing ordinary citizens into attacking protestors (Al Jazeera Live Blog, 2011). Clashes between the protestors and

Mubarak's supporters would viciously continue up until the president's departure. An Interior Ministry spokesman stated in reference to the encounters:

The army remains neutral and is not taking sides because if we protect one side we will be perceived as biased....our role is to prevent clashes and chaos as we separate the opposing groups (Ahmed et al.).

According to the Egyptian health ministry, the confrontation from the two opposing groups left 13 people dead and 1,200 injured. Civil disobedience and mass protests would continue to occur resulting in few deaths usually caused by gunshot wounds from both police and protestors. On February 11th, known as the "Friday of Departure", Suleiman announced Mubarak's resignation and the transitional leadership appointed to the Supreme Council of Egyptian Armed Forces (Schemm & Michael, 2011). Nationwide celebrations arose upon the release of the news.

However, once the military resumed power, protestors claimed that their demands were not being met. They claimed that the military was stalling the process of creating a new government, and as a result, feared a regime under military rule. Since the military took over the leadership position of Egypt, protestors resumed demonstration activity.

One particular demonstration caused the death of at least 25 people, and injured more than 200 (Fahmy, 2011). On October 9th, a peaceful protest, predominately staged by Egyptian Copts¹⁹ held in Maspero, called for the dissolution of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, and resignation of Tantawi (Knell, 2011). This turned violent when

¹⁹ Egyptian Copts are Egyptian Christians who are often subject to discrimination and attacks by radical Islamic groups.

military police began attacking the protestors. According to the Egyptian military, it was the Egyptian Copts who initiated the violent episode.

Despite protests against the military, the institution continues to have a stronghold over Egypt. The Egyptian military is unlikely to turn over their power to a government that will limit theirs. More likely than not, the Egyptian military will choose a leader or candidates for the presidency that will suit the interests of the institution, and the people within the institution. He may be a member of the military, or a man who is willing to be subject to the military. In any case, the same type of system, government, and inner workings of the government will most likely continue.

However, the military also must be able meet the demands of the people to some extent. This should include constitutional changes and economic reforms. Improvements that will directly and obviously affect the Egyptian people, will give the military a credible reputation as a security force.

While the military has the potential to come out as the “hero” of the revolution, the police have tarnished their prestige as an honorable and feared security force.

According to one source the Egyptian police:

Once feared by civilians, are now seen as leftover elements of Mubarak’s regime and treated with little respect. Pulled off the streets after violently cracking down on protests in January, they are now trying to reshape their role in the post-Mubarak Egypt (Lynch, 2011).

Following the ouster of Mubarak, protestors demanded that Interim Interior Minister Mansour al-Essawy purge up to 700 corrupt senior police officers in response to the killings during the Egyptian Revolution. However, protestors complained that only one officer has been convicted of foul play, and still has yet been incarcerated (Shenker,

2011). According to writer Ahdaf Soueif, since 2005 the police have notoriously been known for routinely grabbing female protesters to tear “their clothes off and beat them, groping them at the same time. The idea was to insinuate that females who took part in street protests wanted to be groped” (Soueif, 2011). As a result, the military has made it a priority to revive the demoralization and public perception of the police (Lynch, 2011).

JOHNSON’ PRINCIPLES APPLIED

This chapter does not speak much to the inner workings of the Egyptian military or IRGC. However, it does illustrate the security role the institutions played within the rebellions, and highlights the first principle of Johnson’s theory; an increased amount of a component leads to a better chance of sustainability. The Basij in particular were greatly responsible for suppressing the 2009 post-election uprisings. The expanding force is becoming increasingly more efficient since the accumulation of members allows room for growth and development.

The increase in numbers within the Egyptian military and IRGC has led to the creation of a much more complex institution that is deeply entrenched in all facets of society. This will be explored in more detail within the following two chapters.

CHAPTER THREE:

Economic Role

IRGC IN THE ECONOMIC SECTOR

The IRGC's involvement in the Iranian economy first began during Ayatollah Rafsanjani's presidency. After ten years of war with Iraq, one of Rafsanjani's major priorities was to reconstruct the badly damaged economy. The IRGC was the only institution that had the manpower and the resources to initiate such a challenging task (Wright, 2010). It can also be argued that by using the IRGC to participate in economic reforms, he would be able to win their approval, for Rafsanjani's government encouraged the IRGC to use economic activities to increase its budget (Sazegara, 2006).

Over the next 30 years, the IRGC grew into the largest economic institution (Wright, 2010). The organization is involved in almost every industry from banking and energy production to auto-making and construction. From the beginning of their economic dominance, the IRGC used abandoned warehouses to create the *moavenat bassazi* (headquarters of self-sufficiency) and *moavenat khodkafae* (headquarters of reconstruction). These two headquarters blossomed into various companies specializing in areas such as mining and agriculture (Khaligh, 2006).

In 1990, the headquarters became known as, *gharargah khatam alanbia*, the army base of Khatam al-Aniba (Wehrey et al., 2009).²⁰ It expanded to specialize in wide variety of fields including, "agriculture, industry, mining, road building, transportation, import, export, education, and culture" (Gharargah-e Sazandegiye Khatam al-Aniba, 2011).

Khatam al-Aniba has evolved into "one of Iran's largest contractors in industrial and development projects, and is considered the IRGC's major engineering arm..."

²⁰ Khatam al-Aniba literally means "Seal of the Prophets" in Arabic.

About 25,000 employees work at the headquarters, in which ten percent are IRGC members and the rest are contractors. However, this does not mean that the contractors are not IRGC members or veterans of the IRGC. Many IRGC veterans have become involved in the civilian sector.

The Ministry of Oil, Transportation, and Energy, and the mayor of Tehran have cooperated with the IRGC through Khatam al-Aniba, in order to accomplish such tasks as the construction of the Tehran-Tabriz railway (Tehran City Hall Information Management Organization, 2007) and the Karkheh dam (Refworld, 2012). Khatam al-Aniba assigns these projects to either its subsidiaries or private companies under its control (Wehrey et al., 2009).²¹

Other than construction projects, Khatam al-Aniba is also very active in the oil sector. It is also said that the agency is the only operator and contractor for Iran's gas industry (Open Source Center, 2007). According to government officials, contracts are awarded to the agency because of its lower costs, skilled engineers, experience with various projects, and access to advanced and necessary supplies and resources (Wehrey et al., 2009).

Since Khatam al-Aniba is under the IRGC umbrella, the agency has the perk of bypassing various bureaucratic obstacles in attaining a contract with a client. For example, the agency was given 1.3 billion dollars to build a 900-km natural gas pipeline that would transfer gas within the southern provinces of Iran. The National Iranian Gas Company waived bidding requirements for Khatam al-Aniba. Their reasoning behind this

²¹ The website lists the name of the companies under Khatam al-Aniba. The website can be found at khatam.com. The page is in Farsi, but the page can be translated into English.

was that the supply of natural gas for poorer regions was urgent enough to ignore standard procedures (Wehrey et al., 2009).

In a 2006 interview with the Iran Press,²² Abedzadeh was forced to answer questions regarding company funds and allegations earning contracts without participating in the bidding process. When responding to the allegations he simply stated “[the government has] seen our work. We must have done something for them to be willing to award us the contract without bidding” in order to justify the agency’s actions (Iran Press News, 2006).

Abedzadeh also stated that only ten percent of employees came from IRGC ranks, in which 70 percent of their business adhered to military projects (Wehrey et al., 2009). When employees were interviewed, they would decline to say anything about the projects they have been working on, or their experience as an employee under Khatam al-Aniba (Iran Press News, 2006).

Abedzadeh claims that funding for the agency comes from Iran’s foreign currency reserve. However, the interviewer asked a follow-up question as how this could be when “the foreign currency reserve account was established so 50 percent would be reserved and 50 percent would be loaned to the private sector, not to the government” (Iran Press News, 2006). Abedzadeh answered with “Others obtain those fund as well... The government does not do us any favors. We are paid to do our work. We are fined if we do not. Our difference with private companies is that we do not get to spend our profits” (Iran Press News, 2006). Instead, these profits are used to fund the armed forces of the IRGC (Wehrey et al., 2009).

²² Iran Press News is based in Paris, France. The organization is known to write articles critical of the Islamic Regime, and is thought to be headed by Iranian exiles.

Public Works

The IRGC views economic competition with the private sector as trivial. They believe that their growing connection and business profile has created enough networks to offset any sort of dissent, and with public works projects, the IRGC is expanding the opportunity to gain support in rural regions of Iran (Wehrey et al., 2009). After all, it is the support of rural people that has counter balanced opposition from the more urban population.

Essentially the IRGC has two motives in pursuing public works programs for rural areas. The first is to act as a security measure against potential uprisings, and increased security for villagers. The second is to create a positive image for the Basij and IRGC by aiding the rural population (Wehrey et al., 2009). The Basij began taking a role in rural construction in 2000, and has developed structures like the Kerman-Zahedan railway system and the Chabahar port in Sistan-Balchistan, under the supervision of Khatam al-Aniba (Wehrey et al., 2009).

The increased Basij operated projects in rural regions led to an estimated 3.2 million recruits in 2007 (Wehrey et al., 2009). According to Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi, 15 million dollars had been “allocated in the 2007 national budget for increased development activities” as directed by Khamenei in order to dramatically boost “infrastructure and human capital development” (Wehrey et al., 2009).

The number of recruits has continued to increase within these regions. This is most likely attributed to the socialization culture as well as the benefits awarded to rural men who become Basij members. Since most rural regions are impoverished, the presence of the Basij provides an opportunity for the youth to earn an income for their

family, and be part of an organization that has room for growth within the institution. Today, Basij members provide services including natural disaster relief, repairing of school buildings and supplies, such as tables and chairs. The Basij has also instituted a number of recreational facilities and has provided much assistance to the farming sector.

Nonetheless, the IRGC's growth in the economic sector has been criticized for hindering the benefits of participating in a global economy. Some believe that participating in the global market will only enhance Iran's economic development. However, this would go against the interests of the IRGC, due to the fact that the institution prefers to operate as a monopoly rather than have to face competition.

This is the main reason why international sanctions are not affecting the IRGC, but rather, strengthening their power within the economic sector. The sanctions have resulted in increased illicit economic activity that is controlled by the IRGC.

Impact of International Sanctions

Since Iran's pursuit for nuclear energy, western nations have taken a firm stance against this undertaking through the implementation of sanctions. On the 23rd of January 2012, European Union foreign ministers agreed to ban petroleum and petrochemical imports from Iran. This would begin July 1, 2012 (Sydow, 2012). The sanction permits new investments in Iranian oil companies and exports to Iran for the use of oil industries (Sydow, 2012). This is only one of the handfuls of sanctions western countries are imposing on Iran in an attempt to force it to abandon its nuclear program.

However, these sanctions are only feeding the powerhouse that dominates Iran – the IRGC. Economic sanctions are forcing Iranian companies to resort to illegal means of

doing international business, such as smuggling, or through companies that facilitate transactions between Iran and Western corporations (Sydow, 2012). The IRGC and the companies that they control are usually involved in these back-handed business deals. The IRGC ignores the legality of the process in exchange for payment, and as an institution that oversees the black market; they are making a major profit from western sanctions (Sydow, 2012).

The sanctions have also hurt their domestic and foreign business competitors. The IRGC has an advantage over its competitors in that it is able to use state funds. Ahmadinejad has given the IRGC “hundreds of no-bid government contracts in addition to billions of dollars in loans for construction, infrastructure and energy projects” (Wright, 2010). Sanctions will only further damage Iran’s economy, but will bolster the power and control of the IRGC.

Western countries, such as the United States, are well aware of the repercussions of their sanctions. However, because the IRGC is so engrossed in Iran’s economy, it is difficult to impose harsh sanctions without hurting the Iranian people. The Iranian government is also well aware of this. They know that the west is not willing to harm Iranian civilians, thereby, are continuing with their nuclear pursuits.

The sanctions prove how much of a dominant force the IRGC has become within the Iranian economy. International restriction cannot even slow the institution because it is so embedded within all sectors of the country.

EGYPTIAN MILITARY IN THE ECONOMIC SECTOR

Since the 1970s, the Egyptian military's role in economic activity has expanded. Currently, the Egyptian military controls as much as 40 percent of Egypt's economy (Hammer & Ismail, 2011).²³ Mubarak and former Egyptian Minister of Defense Field Marshal Abu Ghazala (1980-1989) believed that the participation of the military in the Egyptian economy would greatly contribute to its growth and development (Gotowicki, 1997).

The reason behind this logic for Mubarak and Ghazala was that they believed certain attributes and functions of the military would make it one of the few organizations that could lead to Egypt's economic prosperity. According to Gotowicki there are number of factors that lead to this perception, including:

the potential to exploit the comparative economic advantages of the military (low salaries, heavy equipment infrastructure, etc.) in fostering economic growth; the military's goal of self-sufficiency; and a need to effectively employ large numbers of soldiers in meaningful activities when defensive requirements are low, but there is an interest in maintaining a large force structure for deterrent purposes (Gotowicki, 1997).

The Egyptian military's involvement in the economy is said to benefit the civilian sector (Springborg, 1988). Private companies and entrepreneurs have received millions of dollars from "associated contracts the army has awarded as well as in cooperative efforts in technology sharing" (Gotowicki, 1997). The Egyptian military is also a great socialization tool into the civilian economic sector, in which military men are trained to be able to apply their learned skills into the work force. It can also be argued that without

²³ These estimates are difficult to predict due to information that is concealed by the Egyptian military and government. The numbers should be taken with a grain of salt.

the heavy involvement of the military in the economic sector, Islamic institutions would have the ability to take control of them (Satloff, 1988). This would be a worst case scenario for the Egyptian government, and has continued to be. This is also a main concern for the Egyptian military that currently holds power.

Military Industries

Military production began in Egypt in the 1820s under Mohammed Ali in an attempt to gain regional power.²⁴ As a result, military factories began to form all across the country, producing uniforms and small arms (Stier, 2011). Their role expanded with the state-led economy from the early 1950s, currently producing or assembling a wide variety of products including:

artillery, mortar and small arms ammunition, indigenously produced armored personnel carriers, the US M1A1 Abrams tank, British Lynx helicopters, Aerospatiale Gazelle helicopters, European AlphaJet aircraft, Chinese F-7 fighter aircraft, aircraft engines, and a wide variety of military electronics including radars and night vision devices (Gotowicki, 1997).

In contrast with Ali's vision, the recent goal within Mubarak's presidency was to create a strong military industry to attain self sufficiency. This has proven to be of special importance. There have been a number of instances when either the Soviet Union or the United States has abandoned Egypt – two countries that the military heavily depended on for supplies and resources (Gotowicki, 1997). For example, the Soviet Union refused to rearm or assist the Egyptian military after the 1973 war, and dropped all cooperation

²⁴ Mohammed Ali was an Albanian commander in the Ottoman army who became a self-declared Khedive, or viceroy, of Egypt and Sudan. He is known to be the founder of modern Egypt due to his military and economic reforms.

(Gotowicki, 1997). The Egyptian military has learned that a self-sufficient institution creates a greater independence and autonomy in security affairs.

It owns about 35 factories that produce anything from food to artillery, employing up to 100,000 people (Tadros, 2012). In the 1980's, production value in the military agency was estimated at 400 million dollars a year, and military exports at 191 million dollars per year (Sayigh, 1992). The arms sales of the Iran-Iraq war also greatly enriched the Egyptian military financially as exports increased from 30 million dollars in 1981 to 550 million dollars in 1988 (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1991). However, following the Iran-Iraq war, as represented in the Figure 2, exports from the military industry significantly decreased.




Figure 2 - Egyptian Arms Imports compared with Arms Exports. Source: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, Various issues 1965-1995. Arms Imports is in red, while Arms Exports is illustrated in green.

Since the Iran-Iraq war, Egypt's military production sector has declined. Egypt has been suffering with a crumbling economy since Sadat's presidency, which has affected funding. Inadequate funding, low productivity, and a shortage of external

markets, has prevented Egypt from resuming its once successful military industry. Their market, in which Arab states were its biggest customers, has flopped. Now Arab states are turning to countries like Russia and the United States which offer more advanced weaponry and technology for a cheaper price. Iraq was also removed from Egypt's market when they were sanctioned for invading Kuwait (Gotowicki, 1997).

Egypt may have factories devoted to assembling sophisticated weaponry, but the military receives these parts from the United States who keep the technology involved closely to them (Gotowicki, 1997). As a result, Egypt's military industries have done little to enhance their regional power. In fact, it is their involvement in the civilian sector that has truly been impressive in expanding their economic power.

Civilian Industries

The late 1970s ushered a number of economic difficulties for Egypt, including increased government deficits and a decreasing per capita income (The World Bank, 2012). In an attempt to stabilize the economy, the Egyptian government looked towards the military to provide the self-sufficiency the country needed. Thus, the economic power of the Egyptian military expanded to the civilian sector.

The Egyptian military has become involved in almost every type of business, running day care centers, beach resorts, and even manufacturing products such as television sets, stationary, clothing, and a brand of bottled water (named after a general's daughter, Safi) (Kirkpatrick, 2011).

The Egyptian military has also participated in major infrastructure projects including the construction of schools, power lines, and bridges. However, unlike the IRGC, reports have shown contracts conducted

with private, civilian businesses (Gotowicki, 1997). Once again, because of lack of research and the secrecy of the Egyptian military, not much data can be used to support the statement.

Overall, the increasing expansion into the economic sector has proved to be very successful for the Egyptian military. They have been able to attain the goal of self-sufficiency and earn much profit as a result. Since the Egyptian military has now assumed temporary leadership, it is more likely than not that their economic activity will grow.

ECONOMIC IMPACT ON REBELLIONS

Economic issues were one of the major catalysts of the Egyptian revolution, and the Iranian uprising. It was also a contributing factor to the betrayal of the Egyptian military. As mentioned in chapter one, senior officers became threatened upon hearing rumors of Mubarak appointing his own son as his successor. This would mean that senior officers who were promised top positions within the economic sector would face the danger of losing these positions to men whom Mubarak's son would favor. A transition of power resembling a monarchy was deeply opposed by the Egyptian military. However, unlike the Egyptian military, the IRGC has little to complain about the future of their economic standing.

The Egyptian military and IRGC clearly had the manpower and funds to quell any sort of uprising, and as detailed from previous chapters, both the Supreme Leader and former president Mubarak have only fed these institutions with more power and control over the economic sector.

Profits made by these institutions have gone to personal gain for senior officers, funding stipends and housing allowances for new recruits, financial support to veterans and their families, and of course, funding for armed force related costs.

Over the years, both institutions have had an increasingly large impact on the economic sector, operating in a wide variety of fields. Members from all ranks have been able to reap the benefits in one form or another. However, it is evident that one of reasons for the Egyptian military's break Mubarak resulted from senior officers who were faced with the threat of losing powerful positions within the economic sector.

Whereas high ranking officials of the IRGC faced minimal threat to their influential positions within the Iranian economy. By examining the political role of these two institutions in the next chapter, it may become evident that economic determinants have become the deciding factor of these institutions allegiance to their respective state's government in the wake of the recent rebellions. Nonetheless, the dominant role that both institutions play within their respective state's economy is vital to their stability and growth as a well-integrated and cohesive organization.

JOHNSON'S APPLIED PRINCIPLES

Two of Johnson's principles that can be applied to this chapter are the second ("ignorance is useful") and the fourth (a pattern illustrated by all components). Both institutions use economic incentives to maintain their recruits. However, the appeal of the Egyptian military and the IRGC is not simply financial, for it is also acts as a socialization tool. Men join these institutions to gain connections and skills for the

workforce, or in hopes of being admitted to a university. Some of these men continue to serve in order to advance within the ranks.

These enticing rewards are usually offered to rural men, who are poor and lack education. Since these men lack the resources to make a better life for themselves, many of them choose to join these institutions in hopes of greater opportunities. The poor and uneducated allow the IRGC and Egyptian military to exploit these men in order to establish the next generation of loyal and committed members. Without the recruitment of men within this class, the IRGC and Egyptian military would not be as strong. Rural men live a simple life, and generally have a simple outlook. This simplicity prevents conflict within the institution, for if components were complex, a power struggle would ensue. If these institutions were made up of educated men the system would not be able to efficiently function since lower ranks would attempt to dominate higher ranks.

This shows some sort of a pattern within all ranks and divisions under the Egyptian military and the IRGC. Incentives and rewards are vital to the operation of these two institutions. The pride and prestige of being part of such a powerful organization may contribute to commitment of its members, but without the potential of gaining power and glory, a recruit may not choose to remain with the institution. Recruits feed off small incentives, such as weekly wages, while senior officers feed off larger incentives, such as control over one of the institution's companies following his service.

However, unlike the Egyptian military, the IRGC reveres the Supreme Leader. Many IRGC members come from religious backgrounds, and as a result, live to serve Khamenei and to preserve the values of the 1979 Revolution, whereas the Egyptian military lacks the attitude of protecting moral values of the divine.

CHAPTER FOUR:

Political Role

POLITICAL ROLE OF IRGC

As previously mentioned, the role of the IRGC in politics has been strongly debated. Arguments have been made that Khomeini did not intend the IRGC to participate in domestic politics because the origins of the IRGC called for the force to only defend against enemies of the values of the revolution. However, under Article 150 of the Islamic Republic's Constitution, the IRGC is defined as the "guardian of the revolution and of its achievements", Section 5 further describes it as the defender of "politico-military" and "ideological" matters (Wehrey, et al., 2009).

Since Khomeini's death, the political role of the IRGC has increased. However, it is also important to note that Rafsanjani's presidency from 1989 to 1997 was a lull period for the political involvement of IRGC members (Wehrey, et al., 2009). During this time the IRGC was focusing on its image, and as a result, substituted radical officials for more pragmatic one (Wehrey, et al., 2009). Nonetheless, when Khamenei became the Supreme Leader, he bolstered the political role of the IRGC in order to gain the legitimacy he originally lacked from his peers.

Khamenei also expanded the political role of the IRGC to prevent reformist presidents from achieving more liberal agendas. Iran has produced one of the most "intellectually vibrant democratic movements in the contemporary Middle East" (Takeyh, 2009, p. 181), and as discussed before, contention between former reformist presidents and conservative clerics has given the IRGC leverage to expand their domestic, political role.

When Khatami won a landslide victory in 1997 and the presidency, many IRGC members feared that he would be the next Mikhail Gorbachev: loyal to the ideology of

the regime, but leading the government down a path that would destroy the system (Alfoneh, 2008). Khatami's presidency ushered in a reformist movement that attempted to alter the republic towards freedom and democracy. The movement expanded to youth, universities, and even various newspapers and magazines which published articles denouncing the IRGC.

Angered by reformist actions, the IRGC and Khamenei took it upon themselves to dismantle the voices behind the movement. In Mashhad, Safavi spoke of "suspicious acts and behavior of some people siding with the U.S. policies and interests in the country," and added that some of these people may be working within the government (Islamic Republic News Agency, 2003). This referred to reformists within the government who were fighting for a more liberal regime.

Khamenei ordered crackdowns within the government. Two prominent men who were caught in the fire were, Gholamhossein Karbaschi and Abdollah Noori, who were imprisoned and impeached in 1999 (Takeyh, 2009). Karbaschi was the former mayor of Tehran, political activist, and close ally of Khatami, while Noori was a reformist politician and cleric. These men were used as examples to scare reformists from pursuing further action (Takeyh, 2009).

The IRGC used the courts not only to silence dissident political activists and clerics, but also to punish the media. Once such example took place "on July 12, 2000, [when] the IRGC filed a complaint against the weekly Omid-e Zanjan at Branch 1408 of Tehran's Public Court for insulting the IRGC and its commander in an article criticizing their interference in politics" (Alfoneh, 2008).

Under Ahmadinejad, the political role of the IRGC dramatically expanded. According to Alfoneh, by 2008, nine of the twenty-one ministry portfolios were occupied by either former IRGC or Basij officers (Alfoneh, 2008). Ahmadinejad used - and continues to use the power of the IRGC to his advantage. He is able to gain their support through lucrative handouts given to senior officers and veterans. And because Ahmadinejad was a conservative serving the interests of Khomeini, the IRGC is even more loyal to the president.

The 2008 parliamentary elections illustrated the growing political role of the IRGC, supported by Khomeini and Ahmadinejad. Khomeini appointed former IRGC commander Ali-Reza Afshar to oversee the elections (Alfoneh, 2008). The IRGC had complete control over which candidates could run for parliament positions. According to the minister of interior, 7,168 candidates registered for the elections, in which the Council of Guardians approved of 5,000 of them (Islamic Republic of Iran Ministry of Interior, 2008). Candidates were disqualified for various reasons, from filing the paperwork late, to having connections with the shah's regime (Alfoneh, 2008).

Khomeini also appointed IRGC veteran Ezzatollah Zarghami as head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) (Alfoneh, 2008). Zarghami refused to air speech from reformist candidates. In light of the 2009 uprisings, the IRGC also shut-down internet access to Iranians during the 2012 parliamentary elections.

The IRGC also became much more integrated in domestic politics when Ahmadinejad utilized the force to guarantee him second term in office. Soon after his 2005 victory, Ahmadinejad replaced provincial governors who supported reformists with "officials recruited from the ranks of the IRGC, the Basij, and the Islamic Republic

prison administration” (Alfoneh, 2008). It became evident that Khamenei wanted to prevent another reformist from assuming the presidency. Ahmadinejad systematically appointed conservative allies in the following positions in order to ensure another four years in power:

The governors of Kerman, West Azerbaijan, Khuzestan, Hamadan, and Ilam are all IRGC veterans while the governors of Zanzan, Lorestan, Isfahan, and South Khorasan are veterans of the prison administration (Alfoneh, 2008).

The importance of these appointments is worth mentioning because of the impact they have on elections. Governors have the ability to manipulate elections by transferring funds to candidates, and skewing the polls to alter the outcome in the respective province. This operation became evident in the aftermath of the 2009 elections. The 2009 presidential elections established the IRGC as the dominant political force in Iran. Members of the institution may be motivated by material gain, but their devotion and loyalty remains for Khamenei and the pillars of the revolution, which is why the IRGC does not hesitate to get involved in domestic politics.

However, most recently, there has been a political struggle between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad. In the 2012 parliamentary elections, Khamenei had the allegiance of the IRGC resulting in the victory of Khamenei’s candidates. Ahmadinejad has now been marginalized, a lame duck, further showing how the IRGC support is essential to power, and strengthening the bond between the IRGC and the Supreme Leader.

POLITICAL ROLE OF EGYPTIAN MILITARY

After the 1952 Egyptian revolution, Nasser appointed many high-ranking officers to cabinet positions, and other senior positions. However, since 1967, military involvement in domestic politics has decreased (Gotowicki, 1997). The primary reason for this occurrence was Sadat's efforts in demilitarizing the military in political affairs. He removed senior officers who posed a threat to his regime, and appointed fewer senior or retired officers to top government positions (Gotowicki, 1997).

In order to prevent military dominance over domestic politics, Sadat "manipulated" senior military positions by preventing any one commander to stay in power for too long. For example, from 1971 to 1980, Sadat appointed seven Ministers of Defense (Gotowicki, 1997). The graph below illustrates the decrease of senior officer serving in the cabinet during Sadat's presidency.




Figure 3 - Number of Egyptian Military Officers serving on the Cabinet, 1951-1981. Source: Mark N. Cooper. "The Demilitarization of the Egyptian Cabinet." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. 14 (1982). pp. 203-225.

When Mubarak assumed power, he followed in the footsteps of Sadat and continued to exercise a tight leash on senior officers to prevent them from dominating domestic politics. Although Mubarak, like all his predecessors since the 1952 revolution came from the military ranks, the Egyptian military has exercised minimal influence in political affairs prior to the 2011 uprisings. Throughout the 30 years prior to Mubarak's overthrow, there was no indication that military loyalty to the regime and the president depended on senior officers receiving powerful positions within the political sector.

Before the 2011 rebellion, the military was not a dominant player in domestic politics. Interest groups of unionized workers, urban commercial businesses, and even clerical, religious, and secular intellectuals have become politically active. Another important factor behind the declining military role in domestic politics "is the emergence of a group of trained, experienced, and professional civilians such as Osama al-Baz and Amre Moussa"²⁵ (Gotowicki, 1997). These two men have served in cabinet positions, and have been close aides of Mubarak (Gotowicki, 1997).

Up until the revolution, the Egyptian military seemed to be unconcerned about its role in domestic politics. Economic power is more important to the Egyptian military, which is most likely what has offset its minimal political influence. As stated previously, one main factor behind the military's betrayal of Mubarak may have been the fact he was rumored to choose his son as a successor, and as a result, threaten top business positions for senior officers. Egyptian military leaders do not feel the need to go beyond their boundaries in exercising professional military activities. Some may feel that they should only subject themselves to military business. Demonstrated in the food riots, the military

²⁵ Moussa is an Egyptian politician and diplomat who served in the government of Egypt as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1991 to 2001. He ran for president in 2005, and will be candidate once again in the 2012 presidential election.

is also reluctant to interfere in restraining the government's domestic opponents. If there is one entity the Egyptian military prides themselves upon it is their reputation. Thus, by interfering in conflict between the government and people, the military feels their image is being tarnished in one form or another. This is another factor that may have led to the overthrow of Mubarak.

JOHNSON'S APPLIED PRINCIPLES

In applying Johnson's third principle (random encounters benefit the growth of a system through feedback) to the IRGC, it is evident that both the institution and leaders of the government benefit from the exchange. However, the exchanges between IRGC members and Khamenei and Ahmadinejad are not random. They are calculated, and are done so in order to preserve the traditional values of the revolution. However, it can be said that reformists within the Islamic government have created the "random encounters" necessary to encourage Khamenei to give the IRGC more political power.

Khatami's liberal agenda and reformist rhetoric from various media outlets has made Khamenei and the IRGC aware of their surroundings, learning to crush their opposition through the political interference. This applies to Johnson's fifth principle, "local information leads to global wisdom". If reformist actions did not shake up conservatives in the way that it did, Khamenei may have never increased the political power of the IRGC. The IRGC altered their behavior and functions in order to serve Khamenei, and preserve the values of the revolution.

However, unlike the IRGC, the Egyptian military has been reluctant to participate in domestic politics until recently. This recent change is mostly due to the fact that the

military is afraid to see Egypt potentially under the control of the Muslim Brotherhood. If the Muslim Brotherhood were to take power, the economic interests of the military would be in danger. The “random encounters” the Egyptian military has experienced in defining their political role is that of protestors. As previously mentioned, the military prefers not to harm its own people. Their reluctance in choosing sides between the people and the government has actually benefitted the military to some degree. Overall, since the military received a satisfactory perception from Egyptians until the aftermath of the 2011 revolution, the military has been able to take advantage of the situation in an attempt to feed their interests.

The Egyptian military is very conscious of its reputation, and adapts to opposition primarily based on the effects it would have on their image, which stands above and apart from politics. The 2011 revolution was surrounded with international pressure for Mubarak to step down, and because the military did not want to be seen as supporting a dictator, they changed their action to maintain their image and economic power.

CONCLUSION

One of the main differences between the Egyptian military and the IRGC is the role of ideology. Members of the IRGC revere their Supreme Leader primarily because of the sanctity of his position. Ideology plays a major role in the stability of the IRGC, and the loyalty to the regime. Islam is the pattern between all components of the IRGC. The level of faith may vary from member to member, but it is a connection that keeps IRGC members and their affiliates united.

However, the Egyptian military lacks a spiritual pattern. The pattern within its system can be attributed to economic rewards. This is especially gratifying for men who live in country that has been increasingly struggling in the economy. Nonetheless, that is not to say that the IRGC is not committed to the same kinds of incentives. In fact, a unification pattern shared by the IRGC and Egyptian military is a sufficient amount of members who are prideful and value reputation almost more than anything else. This mindset of Egyptian and Iranian armed force members can either led to the detriment or growth of the organization. In most cases, it is the growth.

The appeal of the Egyptian military and the IRGC is not simply financial, for it is also acts as a socialization tool that can advance the lives and well-being of its members. Men join these institutions to gain connections and skills for the workforce, or in hopes of being admitted to a university. This adds to the esteem many Egyptian and Iranian men seek.

However, according to Johnson, patterns of components are only one part of maintaining a stable and functioning complex system. Men from poor, uneducated backgrounds play one of the important roles within the IRGC and Egyptian military. As

“components”, men from poor and uneducated backgrounds are the backbone of these two institutions because they provide numbers and moldable minds. Rewards are usually offered to rural men, who lack the resources to create a better life. Simple men, much like one-dimensional components, prevent conflict within the institution, for if components were complex, a power struggle would ensue. If these institutions were made up of educated men, the system would not be able to efficiently function since lower ranks would attempt to dominate higher ranks.

Thus, it can be stated that the Egyptian military and IRGC are bottom-up organizations. Both heavily rely upon the recruitment of rural men. Components of the system are encouraged by various incentives and lucrative positions to remain loyal to the force. However, because the Egyptian military and IRGC have so much power and are so well integrated into society, senior officers have the opportunity to stage a coup. This has played out for the Egyptian military, but mainly because senior officers are worried about their economic interests. As previously stated, political gain means little to the institution. The Egyptian military will most likely choose the next president. He may or may not be a military officer, but he must have the military’s economic interests in mind.

On the other hand, it is difficult to know under what conditions the IRGC could stage a coup. It has so much autonomy and power that there is no need to abandon the regime. However, as stated before, the majority of IRGC members are religious men who almost never do anything to harm Khamenei, or the establishment of the Islamic Republic.

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